204 U.S.

415
27 S.Ct. 363
51 L.Ed. 547

HUGH WALLACE, Will Wallace, Verge Goodwin, et al., Plffs.

in Err.,
v.
MRS. ELLA ADAMS, for Herself and as Natural Guardian
and Next Friend of Henry McSwain and Roma McSwain, Her
Minor Children.
No. 260.
Argued December 21, 1906.
Decided February 25, 1907.

Messrs. A. C. Cruce, Jackson H. Ralston, Frederick L. Siddons, William

E. Richardson, W. I. Cruce, and W. R. Bleakmore for plaintiffs in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 415-417 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. George A. Mansfield, J. F. McMurray, and Melven Cornish (by
special leave) for Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action commenced in September, 1904, by Mrs. Ella Adams, for
herself and her minor children, defendants in error, in the United States court
for the southern district of the Indian territory, to recover possession of a tract
of land in that territory. Defendants answered, and, upon trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of plaintiffs. This judgment was sustained by the United
States court of appeals of the Indian territory, and, on further appeal, reaffirmed
by the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. 143 Fed.
716.

The case arises out of the legislation of Congress designed to secure the
disintegration of the tribal organization of the Five Civilized Tribes in the
Indian territory, and the distribution of the property of those tribes among the

individual Indians. A full r esum e of this legislation and the general litigation
following it is to be found in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 43 L.
ed. 1041, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722, and a full statement of the facts in this case is to
be found in the opinion of the United States circuit court of appeals. An entire
restatement of these matters is, therefore, unnecessary.
3

There is but a single matter to be determined. As counsel for plaintiffs in error

say:

'The assignment of errors presents but one question. If the decree of the
Choctaw-Chickasaw citizenship court, in the test case known as the Riddle
Case, vacated the decree that defendant, Hill, had, theretofore, procured in the
United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, wherein he
was adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw tribe of Indians, this case should
be affirmed. If it did not, it should be reversed.'

To properly appreciate and rightly answer this single question some things in
the history of the legislation and litigation and also some of the facts in this
case must be noticed.

In order to divide the lands of these Indian nations an enumeration of the

individuals entitled thereto became necessary. By the act of March 3, 1893 (27
Stat. at L. 645, chap. 209, 16), the commission to the Five Civilized Tribes,
generally known as the Dawes Commission, was empowered to negotiate and
extinguish the tribal title to the lands and to make an allotment thereof to the
members of the tribe in severalty. By that of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 339,
340, chap. 398), the commission was authorized to hear the application and
determine the right of each applicant for citizenship in either of these tribes.
The act also granted an appeal to the proper United States district court in the
Indian territory to any party aggrieved by the ruling of the commission, and
declared that the judgment of that court should be final. It required the
commission to make a complete roll of the citizens of each of the tribes, to be
'hereafter held and considered to be the true and correct rolls of persons entitled
to the rights of citizenship in said several tribes.' Hill, who is the principal
defendant, applied to be enrolled as a citizen of the Choctaw Nation, and his
application was finally sustained by the court, and he was, on March 8, 1898,
adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw tribe by blood and entitled to be
enrolled as such. The land in controversy was selected and taken possession of
by him in reliance upon this adjudication of citizenship. On July 1, 1898,
Congress passed an act (30 Stat. at L. 591, chap. 545) granting to the tribes an
appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgments of the United States courts of
the Indian territory in citizenship cases. Under the authority of this act many of

these cases were appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgments.
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, supra. On March 21, 1902, an agreement was
made between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations,
which was confirmed by act of Congress July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 641, chap.
1362). This agreement and act were substantially that a court known as the
Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court should be created, and that that court
should have power, in a suit in equity brought by either or both of these tribes
against any ten persons who had been admitted to citizenship or enrolment by
the terms of the judgments of the several United States courts in the Indian
territory, as representatives of all persons similarly situated, to determine
whether the judgments of those courts should be annulled on account of certain
alleged irregularities. The agreement and act also provided that, in case the
citizenship courts should decide that those judgments should be annulled the
papers in any action in those courts, wherein such a judgment had been
rendered, should, upon seasonable application of either party, be transferred to
the citizenship court, which should proceed to a hearing and determination of
the question of citizenship. Under this agreement and act the court was
established and test suit brought, in which a decree was entered to the effect
that the judgments of the United States courts in the Indian territory, whereby
persons were admitted to citizenship in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations
under the act of June 10, 1896, were annulled and vacated. Hill was not named
a party in that test suit, nor did he thereafter apply for a transfer of his case to
the citizenship court. The above statement of facts is sufficiently full for an
understanding of the single question presented for determination.
7

That single question may be divided into two. First, was the decree in the
Indian territory court declaring Hill a citizen a finality, beyond the power of
Congress to in any manner disturb? This was answered in the Stephens Case,
supra. In that case we held that Congress could authorize a review of the
judgments of the United States courts of the Indian territory in citizenship
cases, and this although, by the terms of prior legislation, those judgments had
become final. While sustaining the act authorizing such review and providing
for appeals to this court, we construed it as limiting the appeals to the question
of the constitutionality or validity of the legislation, and not as bringing before
us the facts in the instances of all applications for citizenship. In the opinion
(page 477, L. ed. page 1052, Sup. Ct. Rep. page 734) we said:

'The contention is that the act of July 1, 1898, in extending the remedy by
appeal to this court, was invalid because retrospective, an invasion of the
judicial domain, and destructive of vested rights. By its terms the act was to
operate retrospectively, and as to that it may be observed that while the general
rule is that statutes should be so construed as to give them only prospective

operation, yet, where the language expresses a contrary intention in

unequivocal terms, the mere fact that the legislation is retroactive does not
necessarily render it void.
9

'And while it is undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set aside the
judgments of courts, compel them to grant new trials, order the discharge of
offenders, or direct what steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry, the grant of a new remedy by way of review has been often sustained
under particular circumstances. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648;
Sampeyreac v. United States, 7 Pet. 222, 8 L. ed. 665; Freeborn v. Smith, 2
Wall. 160, 17 L. ed. 922; Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196, 22 L. ed. 612;
Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. ed. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 763; Essex
Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. ed. 446, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep.
790.

10

'The United States court in Indian territory is a legislative court and was
authorized to exercise jurisdiction in these citizenship cases as a part of the
machinery devised by Congress in the discharge of its duties in respect of these
Indian tribes; and, assuming that Congress possesses plenary power of
legislation in regard to them, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States, it follows that the validity of remedial legislation of this sort cannot be
questioned unless in violation of some prohibition of that instrument.

11

'In its enactment Congress has not attempted to interfere in any way with the
judicial department of the government, nor can the act be properly regarded as
destroying any vested right, since the right asserted to be vested is only the
exemption of these judgments from review; and the mere expectation of a share
in the public lands and moneys of these tribes, if hereafter distributed, if the
applicants are admitted to citizenship, cannot be held to amount to such an
absolute right of property that the original cause of action, which is citizenship
or not, is placed by the judgment of a lower court beyond the power of reexamination by a higher court, though subsequently authorized by general law
to exercise jurisdiction.'

12

This decision established that no such vested right was created by the
proceedings of the Dawes Commission or the judgments of the courts of the
Indian territory on appeal from the findings of the commission as prevented
subsequent investigation. The power of Congress over the matter of citizenship
in these Indian tribes was plenary, and it could adopt any reasonable means to
ascertain who were entitled to its privileges. If the result of one measure was
not satisfactory it could try another. The fact that the first provision was by an
inquiry in a territorial court did not exhaust the power of Congress or preclude

further investigation. The functions of the territorial courts in this respect were
but little more than those of a commission. While the act of July 1, 1898,
provided for an appeal to this court, and appeals were taken in many cases, yet
our inquiry stopped with the question of the constitutionality of the legislation.
In other words, we entertained and decided the purely judicial question of the
validity of the means Congress had adopted for determining the matter of
citizenship. We did not attempt to pass upon the question of citizenship in any
particular case, nor determine whether the applicant was or was not entitled to
be enrolled as a citizen. It is unnecessary to consider what would have been the
effect of a judgment of this court, a court provided for in the Constitution, on
the question of the right of a litigant to citizenship. The distinction between this
court and the courts established by act of Congress in virtue of its power to
ordain and establish inferior courts is shown in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.
S. 697, Appx. in which we held that while Congress could give to the court of
claims jurisdiction to inquire and report upon claims against the government, it
could not authorize an appeal from such report to this court unless our decision
was made a final judgment, not subject to congressional review. In the opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Taney said (pp. 699, 702): 'Congress may undoubtedly
establish tribunals with special powers to examine testimony and decide, in the
first instance, upon the validity and justice of any claim for money against the
United States, subject to the supervision and control of Congress, or a head of
any of the executive departments. In this respect the authority of the court of
claims is like to that of an auditor or comptroller, with this difference only: that
in the latter case the appropriation is made in advance, upon estimates furnished
by the different executive departments, of their probable expenses during the
ensuing year; and the validity of the claim is decided by the officer appointed
by law for that purpose, and the money paid out of the appropriation afterwards
made. In the case before us the validity of the claim is to be first decided, and
the appropriation made afterwards. But in principle there is no difference
between these two special jurisdictions created by acts of Congress for special
purposes, and neither of them possesses judicial power in the sense in which
those words are used in the Constitution. The circumstance that one is called a
court and its decisions called judgments cannot alter its character nor enlarge its
power. . . . Congress cannot extend the appellate power of this court beyond the
limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither confer nor impose on it
the authority or duty of hearing and determining an appeal from a
commissioner or auditor, or any other tribunal exercising only special powers
under an act of Congress; nor can Congress authorize or require this court to
express an opinion on a case where its judicial power could not be exercised,
and where its judgment would not be final and conclusive upon the rights of the
parties, and process of execution awarded to carry it into effect.'
13

This decree was followed by legislation which, in a general way, provided that

13

This decree was followed by legislation which, in a general way, provided that
the rulings of this court on appeals from the judgments of the court of claims
should be in effect judgments. While that case is not entirely parallel to this, yet
the line of thought pursued in the opinion is suggestive. We do not feel called
upon to enlarge upon it. It is enough now to hold that Congress, in giving to the
Indian territory courts jurisdiction of appeals from the action of the Dawes
Commission, did not place the decisions of these courts beyond the reach of
further investigation. Hence the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, creating the
Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court, and giving to it power to examine
the judgments of the Indian territory courts, and determine whether they should
not be annulled on account of irregularities, was a valid exercise of power.

14

The other question is one of procedure, and not of power. It is objected that the
defendant Hill was not made a party to the proceeding instituted in the
citizenship court, but there were a multitude, according to the report of the
Dawes Commission, probably one thousand, in whose favor judgments of
citizenship have been entered in the Indian territory courts, and the act provided
that ten should be selected as representatives of the class. It further authorized
any individual, in case of an adverse judgment by the citizenship court, to
transfer his case from the territorial to that court. Now, it is undoubtedly within
the power of a court of equity to name as defendants a few individuals who are
in fact the representatives of a large class having a common interest or a
common right,a class too large to be all conveniently brought into court,
and make the decree effective not merely upon those individuals, but also upon
the class represented by them. Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet. 482, 7 L. ed. 493;
Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 14 L. ed. 942; Bacon v. Robertson, 18
How. 480, 489, 15 L. ed. 499, 504; United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427,
480, 37 L. ed. 509, 529, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650. It was by way of extra
precaution, and in order to more effectually secure the rights of the individuals
other than those named as parties defendant in that suit, that Congress provided
that anyone might transfer his individual case from the territorial court to the
citizenship court, and there have the merits of his claim decided. Hill, as every
other citizen, was bound to take notice of the legislation of Congress, and it is
not to be doubted that he, as well as others similarly situated, was cognizant of
the proceedings that were being had in pursuance of such legislation. He made
no application to transfer his case, but chose to abide by the outcome of the
case against the ten representatives of his class. The answers to these
subordinate questions fully dispose of the main question. Without further
discussion, we refer to the exhaustive opinion of Circuit Judge Sanborn, in
delivering the judgment of the court of appeals, with which, in the main, we
fully concur.

15

We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

affirmed.