McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 385 U.S. 533 (1967)

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385 U.S.

533
87 S.Ct. 637
17 L.Ed.2d 588

Ivan C. McLEOD, Regional Director of the Second Region,


NLRB
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. et al. INTERNATIONAL
UNION, ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE
WORKERS, AFL-CIO v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. et al.
Nos. 645, 774.
Jan. 16, 1967.

Solicitor General Marshall, Richard A. Posner, Arnold Ordman,


Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come, for Ivan C. McLeod.
Irving Abramson and Ruth Weyand, for International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.
David L. Benetar, for General Electric Co.
PER CURIAM.

The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit is set aside with direction to that court to enter a new
judgment consistent with this opinion.

The Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations
Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing upon a charge filed by the
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE).
The charge alleged that General Electric Company violated 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C.
158(a)(1) and (5), in refusing to bargain upon the renewal of an expiring
collective bargaining agreement because of 'the inclusion among the persons
designated by the Union to represent it * * * of persons who also represented
other labor organizations which engaged in collective bargaining with' the

company. Pursuant to 10(j) of the Act the Regional Director also obtained a
temporary injunction in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York restraining the company from '(f)ailing or refusing to meet, confer and
bargain collectively in good faith with * * * (IUE) by declining to meet with the
selected representatives of * * * (IUE) because of the presence of any
representatives of other unions whom IUE and its constituent locals have
invited to attend for the purpose of participating in the discussion and advising
or consulting with IUE and its constituent locals.' The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed. 366 F.2d 847. Mr. Justice Harlan, 87 S.Ct. 5, 17
L.Ed.2d 45, stayed the Court of Appeals' judgment pending action on the
petition for writ of certiorari filed in No. 645.
3

The District Court and the Court of Appeals differed regarding the proper
standard which should be determinative of the right to injunctive relief under
10(j). The District Court applied a dual test: (1) whether 'the impact upon the
public interest is grave enough to justify swifter corrective action than the
normal process of Board adjudication and court enforcement,' 257 F.Supp. 690,
708, and (2) 'whether the Board has 'reasonable cause to believe' that the
accused party has been guilty of unfair labor practices.' 257 F.Supp., at 709.
The Court of Appeals on the other hand considered the proper standard to be
whether the Board had 'demonstrated that an injunction is necessary to preserve
the status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm.' 366 F.2d, at 850.

We do not think it appropriate however to decide at this time the proper


construction of 10(j). For on October 14, 1966, after the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the company and IUE agreed upon a three-year collective
bargaining agreement to replace the expired contract. We think that the District
Court should determine in the first instance the effect of this supervening event
upon the appropriateness of injunctive relief. The controversy over the proper
standard for injunctive relief is immaterial if such relief is now improper
whichever standard is applied. We therefore dissolve the stay granted by Mr.
Justice Harlan and set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals with
direction to enter a new judgment setting aside the order of the District Court
and remanding to that court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate
in light of the supervening event. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263, 84
S.Ct. 1235, 12 L.Ed.2d 288; Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40, 85 S.Ct. 207, 13
L.Ed.2d 107.

It is so ordered.

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