SOCORRO D.

RAMIREZ
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event, which was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, Anti-Wire Tapping Act.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200, and was granted by the Trial
Court, agreeing that: 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that
2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person
other than a participant to the communication.
Petition for Certiorari was filed by private respondent, where the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
Ruling:
No. Provision under RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr.
Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered
judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.
Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
Lourdes T. Marquez vs. Hon. AnianoDisierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her
breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.

ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10,
2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and
the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not
by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD:
Petitioner was denied of due process.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners
should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau
of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of
a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the
duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has
re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support
such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to
her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.