Torts Released Questions
Torts Released Questions
Torts Released Questions
RELEASED QUESTIONS
NOTE: These Released Questions may be useful for review but keep in mind
that they are older questions that are not as representative of the current
format of the exam as the questions developed by BARBRI.
Original versions of all questions copyright 1983, 1987, 1990 by National Conference of Bar Examiners.
All answers copyright 2013 by BARBRI, Inc. Original questions modified by BARBRI.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America.
TORTS 1.
1.
2.
2. RELEASED QUESTIONS
4.
Question 5
A licensed physician resided in her own home.
The street in front of the home had a gradual
slope. The doctors garage was on the street
level, with a driveway entrance from the street.
At two in the morning, the doctor received
an emergency call. She dressed and went to the
garage to get her car and found a car parked in
front of her driveway. That car was occupied
by a driver who, while intoxicated, had driven
to that place and now was in a drunken stupor
in the front seat. Unable to rouse the driver, the
doctor pushed him into the passengers side of
the front seat and got in on the drivers side. The
doctor released the brake and coasted the car
down the street, planning to pull into a parking
space that was open. When the doctor attempted
to stop the car, the brakes failed to work, and the
car crashed into the wall of a home, damaging
the home and the drivers car and injuring the
doctor and the driver. Subsequent examination
of the car disclosed that the brake linings were
badly worn. A state statute prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle unless the brakes are
capable of stopping the vehicle within specified
distances at specified speeds. The brakes on
the drivers car were incapable of stopping the
vehicle within the limits required by the statute.
Another state statute makes it a criminal offense
to be intoxicated while driving a motor vehicle.
The state follows traditional contributory negligence rules.
If the driver asserts a claim against the doctor
for his injuries, the driver will probably:
(A) Recover, because the doctor was negligent
as a matter of law.
(B) Recover, because the doctor had no right to
move the car.
(C) Not recover, because his brakes were defective.
(D) Not recover, because he was in a drunken
stupor when injured.
TORTS 3.
Question 6
Question 7
4. RELEASED QUESTIONS
Question 8
A homeowner hired a contractor to remodel
the homeowners kitchen. She had learned of
him through a classified advertisement he placed
in the local newspaper. During the telephone
conversation in which she hired him, he stated
he was experienced and qualified to do all necessary work. Because of his low charge for his
work, they agreed in writing that on acceptance
of his job by the homeowner, he would have no
further liability to her or to anyone else for any
defects in materials or workmanship, and that
she would bear all such costs.
The homeowner purchased a dishwasher
manufactured by an appliance company from a
dealer in the retail electrical appliance business.
The washer was sold by the dealer with only the
manufacturers warranty and with no warranty
by the dealer; the appliance company restricted
its warranty to 90 days on parts and labor. The
contractor installed the dishwasher.
Two months after the homeowner accepted the
entire job, she was conversing in her home with
an accountant, an acquaintance who had agreed
to prepare her income tax return gratuitously.
As they talked, they noticed that the dishwasher
was operating strangely, repeatedly stopping
and starting. At the homeowners request, the
accountant gave it a cursory examination and,
while inspecting it, received a violent electrical
shock which did him extensive harm. The
dishwasher had an internal wiring defect that
allowed electrical current to be carried into the
framework and caused the machine to malfunction. The machine had not been adequately
grounded by the contractor during installation;
if it had been, the current would have been led
harmlessly away. The machine carried instructions for correct grounding, which the contractor
had not followed.
If the accountant asserts a claim based on
strict liability against the appliance company for
damages, the probable result is that the accountant will:
(A) Recover, because the dishwasher was defectively made.
(B) Recover, because the appliance company is
vicariously liable for the improper installation.
(C) Not recover, because he assumed the risk
by inspecting the machine.
(D) Not recover, because he was not the
purchaser.
Question 9
A drive-in hamburger and ice cream stand
recently opened for business in a suburban town.
The drive-ins business hours are from 9 a.m. to
midnight. It is in an area that for 15 years has
been zoned for small retail businesses, apartment
buildings, and one and twofamily residences.
The zoning code specifies that small retail
businesses include businesses where food and
drink are dispensed for consumption on the
premises. The drive-in was the first drive-in in
the town. For seven years a retired couple have
owned and lived in their single-family residence,
which is across the street from the drive-in.
On opening day a brass band played in the
parking lot of the drive-in until midnight, and
the noise of cars and the usual activity as a result
of the new business prevented the retired couple
from getting to sleep until well after midnight,
long after their usual time. The drive-in is
heavily patronized during the day and night
by high school students. The noise of cars, the
lights of the cars, the lights illuminating the
parking lot at the drive-in, and the noise from
the loudspeaker of the ordering system prevented
the retired couple from sleeping before midnight.
Paper cups, napkins, and other items from the
drive-in are regularly blown into the retired
couples front yard by the prevailing wind. The
traffic to and from the drive-in is so heavy on
the street in front of their house that the retired
couple are afraid to allow their grandchildren to
play in the front yard.
TORTS 5.
6. RELEASED QUESTIONS
Question 12
A month after a woman and a man got
married, the womans ex-husband secretly
entered their rented apartment during their
absence by using a master key. The ex-husband
placed a microphone behind the bookstand in
the bedroom of the apartment and drilled a hole
in the nearby wall, with the result that the microphone appeared to be connected with wires
going into the adjoining apartment. Actually, the
microphone was not connected to anything. The
ex-husband anticipated that the woman would
discover the microphone in a few days and
would be upset by the thought that someone had
been listening to her conversations with the man
in their bedroom.
Shortly thereafter, as he was putting a book
on the stand, the man noticed the wires behind
the bookstand and discovered the hidden microphone. He then called the woman and showed
her the microphone and wires. The woman
fainted and, in falling, struck her head on the
bookstand and suffered a mild concussion. The
next day the man telephoned the ex-husband and
accused him of planting the microphone. The
ex-husband laughingly admitted it.
If the woman asserts a claim against the
ex-husband based on infliction of mental distress,
the fact that the man was the person who showed
her the microphone will:
(A) Relieve the ex-husband of liability, because
the man was careless in so doing.
(B) Relieve the ex-husband of liability, because
the mans conduct was the immediate cause
of the womans harm.
(C) Not relieve the ex-husband of liability,
because the ex-husbands goal was
achieved.
(D) Not relieve the ex-husband of liability,
because the conduct of a third person is
irrelevant in emotional distress cases.
TORTS 7.
8. RELEASED QUESTIONS
A six-year-old boy has a well-deserved reputation for bullying younger and smaller children.
His parents have encouraged him to be aggressive and tough. The boy, for no reason, knocked
down, kicked, and severely injured a four-yearold child. A claim has been asserted by the
childs parents for their medical and hospital
costs and for the childs injuries.
TORTS 9.
Question 19
A patron was eating in a restaurant when
he began to choke on a piece of food that had
lodged in his throat. A physician who was
sitting at a nearby table did not wish to become
involved and did not render any assistance,
although prompt medical attention would have
been effective in removing the obstruction from
the patrons throat. Because of the failure to
obtain prompt medical attention, the patron
suffered severe brain injury from lack of oxygen.
If the patron asserts a claim against the physician for his injuries, will the patron prevail?
(A) Yes, if the jurisdiction relieves physicians
of malpractice liability for emergency first
aid.
(B) Yes, if a reasonably prudent person with the
physicians experience, training, and knowledge would have assisted the patron.
(C) No, because the physician was not responsible for the patrons condition.
(D) No, unless the physician knew that the
patron was substantially certain to sustain
serious injury.
21. If the childs claims against the manufacturer, the heating company, and the cooling
company are based on strict liability in tort,
the child will probably recover against:
(A) The manufacturer only, because the
ventilating system was defectively
designed by the manufacturer.
(B) The heating company only, because
it was the excessive heat from the
furnace that caused the childs injuries.
(C) The manufacturer and the heating
company only, because the combination of the manufacturers design and
the heating companys furnace caused
the childs injuries.
(D) The manufacturer, the heating
company, and the cooling company,
because the combination of the
manufacturers design, the heating
companys furnace, and the cooling
companys air conditioning unit caused
the childs injuries.
Question 22
The owner of a second hand goods store often
placed merchandise on the sidewalk, sometimes
for short intervals, sometimes from 7 a.m. until 6
p.m. Pedestrians from time to time stopped and
gathered to look at the merchandise. A tenant
had moved into an apartment that was situated
immediately above the owners store; a streetlevel stairway entrance was located about 20
feet to the east. On several occasions, the tenant
had complained to the owner about the situation
because not only were his view and peace of
mind affected, but also his travel on the sidewalk
was made more difficult. The tenant owned and
managed a restaurant two blocks to the west of
his apartment and made frequent trips back and
TORTS 11.
forth. There was a back entrance to his apartment through a parking lot; this entrance was
about 200 feet farther in walking distance from
his restaurant. Once the tenant complained to the
police, whereupon the owner was arrested under
a local ordinance which prohibited the placing of
goods or merchandise on public sidewalks and
imposed, as its sole sanction, a fine for its violation.
One day, the sidewalk in front of the owners
store was unusually cluttered because he was
cleaning and mopping the floor of his shop. The
tenant saw a bus he wished to take and raced
down the stairs and onto the cluttered sidewalk
in front of the owners store. While dodging
merchandise and people, the tenant fell. The
tenant suffered broken bones and was unable to
attend to his duties for six weeks.
If, prior to the day of his personal injuries,
the tenant had asserted a claim based on public
nuisance for injunctive relief against the owner
for his obstruction of the sidewalk in violation of
the ordinance, the defense on which the owner
would have most likely prevailed is that:
(A) The tenant consented to the obstruction by
continuing to rent his apartment.
(B) The violation of the ordinance was not
unreasonable.
(C) Remedy of abatement by self-help was
adequate.
(D) There was no claim for special damage.
Question 23
A city has an ordinance that makes it an
offense, punishable by fine, for the owner of
a dog to permit the dog to run unleashed on a
public way. A police officer observed a small
dog running loose in the street. As the officer
picked the dog up, the dogs owner, who was
seated in her car lawfully parked at the curb,
called out, Oh, thank you, Officer, for returning
Fido. The officer asked the owner whether
the dog was hers, and when she acknowledged
ownership, he asked to see her drivers license.
The owner gave her name and address, but she
refused to produce a drivers license. The officer
then told her to produce her drivers license
if she did not want to go to jail. The owner
responded by saying, Isnt this ridiculous? The
officer took her by the arm and said, Lets go.
You are under arrest.
The owner cried out that the officer was
hurting her but he refused to release her arm,
and she struck him with her free hand. The
officer then dragged the owner from her car,
forced her into his squad car, and took her to the
police station.
The incident took place on the street in front
of the apartment where the owner and her aged
father lived. The officer did not know that the
father had observed what took place from a
window in the apartment.
If the owners father asserts a claim against
the officer for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, will the father prevail?
(A) Yes, if the officers acts caused the father
severe emotional distress.
(B) Yes, if it is found that the officers behavior
was extreme and outrageous with respect to
the owner.
(C) No, because the officer did not know that
the father was watching.
(D) No, because the father was not within the
zone of physical danger.
TORTS 13.
Question 26
A private duty nurse had on occasion worked
in a local hospital. The hospital called the private
duty referral agency through which the nurse
usually obtained employment, and asked that in
the future she not be assigned to patients in the
hospital. The agency asked the hospital why it
had made the request. The hospital sent a letter
to the agency giving as the reason for its request
that significant amounts of narcotics had disappeared during the nurses shifts from the nursing
stations at which she had worked.
If the nurse asserts a claim based on defamation against the hospital, the nurse will:
(A) Recover, because the hospital accused the
nurse of improper professional conduct.
(B) Recover if the nurse did not take the
narcotics.
(C) Not recover if narcotics disappeared during
the nurses shifts.
(D) Not recover if the hospital reasonably
believed that the nurse took the narcotics.
Question 27
Question 28
TORTS 15.
Question 29
Question 30
Question 31
An auto company was a small dealer in big
new cars and operated a service department.
A customer wanted to ask the service manager
whether the auto company would check the
muffler on his small foreign car. The customer
parked on the street near the service department
with the intention of entering that part of the
building by walking through one of the three
large entrances designed for use by automobiles. There was no street entrance to the service
department for individuals, and customers as
well as company employees often used one of
the automobile entrances.
As the customer reached the building, he
glanced behind him to be sure no vehicle was
approaching that entrance. Seeing none, he
walked through the entrance, but immediately he
was struck on the back of the head and neck by
the large overhead door which was descending.
The blow knocked the customer unconscious and
caused permanent damage.
The customer did not know how the door was
raised and lowered; however, the overhead door
was operated by the use of either of two switches
in the building. One switch was located in the
office of the service manager and the other was
located near the door in the service work area
for the convenience of the mechanics. On this
occasion, no one was in the service work area
except three auto company mechanics. The
service manager, who had been in his office, and
the three mechanics denied having touched a
switch that would have lowered the door. Subsequent investigation showed, however, that the
switches were working properly and that all of
the mechanisms for moving the door were in
good working order.
If the customer asserts a claim based on negligence against the auto company, the customer
probably will:
(A) Recover, because the auto company is
strictly liable under the circumstances.
(B) Recover, because an employee of the auto
company was negligent.
TORTS 17.
Question 34
Question 35
Question 36
Question 37
A 13-year-old who did not live in the apartment complex fell over a sprinkler head while
running for a pass and broke his leg. Although
the boy had played football on the common area
before, he had never noticed the sprinkler heads,
which protruded one inch above the ground
and were part of a permanently installed underground sprinkler system.
If a claim is asserted on the boys behalf, the
boy will:
(A) Prevail, if the sprinkler head was a hazard
that the boy probably would not discover.
(B) Prevail, because the owner had not objected
to children playing on the common area.
(C) Not prevail, because the boy did not live in
the apartment complex.
(D) Not prevail, unless the sprinkler heads
were abnormally dangerous to users of the
common area.
Question 38
Many years ago, a cement company
constructed a plant for manufacturing readymix concrete. At that time the company was
using bagged cement, which caused little or no
dust. Several years later, the plaintiff bought a
home approximately 1,800 feet from the plant.
Recently, the company stopped using bagged
cement and began to receive cement in bulk
shipments. Since then at least five truckloads
of cement have passed the plaintiffs house
daily. Cement blows off the trucks and into
the plaintiffs house. When the cement arrives
at the plant, it is blown by forced air from the
trucks into the storage bin. As a consequence,
cement dust fills the air surrounding the plant to
a distance of 2,000 feet. The plaintiffs house is
the only residence within 2,000 feet of the plant.
If the plaintiff asserts a claim against the
company based on nuisance, will the plaintiff
prevail?
TORTS 19.
TORTS 21.
TORTS ANSWERS
Answer to Question 1
(A) Because the manufacturer had no notice that the product would cause eye injuries, an action
against the manufacturer must be predicated on strict liability, not negligence. The strict duty
in such cases extends to any supplier in the distributive chain. Thus, if the manufacturer of the
glue is liable, then the paint company, the retailer, may also be subject to liability. Conversely, if
there is a determination that the manufacturer did not manufacture an unreasonably dangerous
product, then there will be no basis for holding the retailer liable. (B) is incorrect. It addresses the
secretarys status as a foreseeable victim of the fumes. However, it fails to address the basic issue
of liability. The secretary could be a foreseeable victim, yet she still must establish the unreasonably dangerous character of the product. (C) is incorrect because negligence is irrelevant to a
strict liability action, which the secretary can pursue against the paint company as a commercial
supplier. (D) is incorrect because the dangerous character of the glue emanates from its properties
during use, not its packaging. The fact that the paint company had no opportunity to inspect the
product is irrelevant to its liability.
Answer to Question 2
(D) The secretary probably cannot recover against the retail store. An action against the retail store
would have to be based on the actions of its employees. Because it was not functioning as a
commercial supplier in this case, it cannot be held liable on a strict liability theory. A successful
action against it must be based on negligence. The employees had no notice of the dangerous
character of the glue, nor were they even aware of the common ductwork. Therefore, a cause of
action for negligence will not lie against the employees, and obviously will not lie against the
retail store. (A) is an incorrect statement of the law. (B) is incorrect. The employees did cause
the fumes to enter the secretarys area of the building. However, as has been shown, they were
unaware of the damage the fumes could cause, or that they were sending fumes into the other
area. (C) is incorrect because use of a product for its intended purpose does not negate the possibility of liability. If the retail stores employees acted negligently while using the product for its
intended purpose, the retail store could be held vicariously liable for their actions.
Answer to Question 3
(C) The neighbor will not recover if the homeowners conduct did not threaten immediate physical
harm. A prima facie case for tortious assault requires that the defendant create a reasonable
apprehension in the plaintiff of immediate harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiffs person.
Threats of future harm do not give rise to an action for assault. (A) is incorrect because mere
intent to place in fear of physical harm is not enough. There must be a creation of reasonable
apprehension of immediate harm. (B) is incorrect; extreme and outrageous conduct is an element
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, but not of assault. (D) is incorrect because it is irrelevant, and later actions would not vitiate any threat of immediate harm.
Answer to Question 4
(A) The neighbor will recover if he suffered severe emotional distress. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires: (i) an act by defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to cause severe emotional distress or recklessness as to the effect of
the conduct; (iii) causation; and (iv) damages. If the neighbor suffered severe emotional distress
resulting from the homeowners conduct (which was extreme and outrageous and, at the very
least, reckless), he can recover from the homeowner. (B) is incorrect because intent, without
more, does not establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. (C) is incorrect because
immediate threat of physical harm is an element of assault rather than intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (D) is incorrect because, even though actual damages are required to win a
case grounded on intentional infliction of emotional distress, physical injuries are not required.
Answer to Question 5
(C) The driver will not prevail because at common law the drivers contributory negligence will
completely bar his right to recover. The driver was contributorily negligent because he had been
operating a car with defective brakes in violation of the statute. (A) is wrong because the driver
was not in the class intended to be protected by the statute. It was the drivers obligation to ensure
that the brakes complied with the statute. (B) is incorrect because the existence of an emergency,
presenting little time for reflection, may be considered as among the circumstances under which
the defendant acted (i.e., he must act as the reasonable person would act in the same emergency).
Applying this criterion, the doctor was justified in moving the car. (D) is incorrect because a
person who is injured while intoxicated does not automatically lose a cause of action against the
person causing the injury. In addition, the harm in this case was not the type of harm which the
drunk driving statute was designed to prevent.
Answer to Question 6
(A) The plaintiff will recover because leaving the trench uncovered was the proximate cause of the
boys death. Generally, rescuers are viewed as foreseeable intervening forces, and the original
tortfeasor will be liable for their negligence. (B) is wrong as a matter of law. Construction companies are subject to strict liability based on the same criteria applied to other companies and
individuals. The activity must be deemed abnormally dangerous to subject the party performing
the activity to strict liability. Leaving the trench uncovered was negligent, but it is not abnormally
dangerous. (C) is wrong because under the attractive nuisance doctrine, the defendant had a duty
to exercise ordinary care to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm to children caused by artificial
conditions on the property. The fact that children played on the vacant lot made it possible for the
defendant to anticipate infant trespassers. The defendant also knew of the dangerous condition,
and the expense of covering the trench would be slight in comparison with the magnitude of the
risk. (D) is incorrect, because even if the collapse of the trench was unforeseeable, the construction companys conduct still threatened to cause injury, and most courts find liability where there
is a foreseeable result of an unforeseeable cause.
Answer to Question 7
(D) The most significant factor pertains to the burden on the company to eliminate the danger. Under
the attractive nuisance doctrine, most courts impose on a landowner the duty to exercise ordinary
care to avoid reasonably foreseeable risks of harm to children caused by artificial conditions on
the property. To assess this special duty on the landowner, the plaintiff must show, among other
things, that the expense of remedying the situation is slight compared with the magnitude of the
risk. Choice (D) most closely reflects that requirement. (A) is incorrect because most jurisdictions
no longer require that the child plaintiff be lured onto the property by the dangerous condition.
Thus, whether the press was visible from a public way would only be relevant to show that the
trespass was foreseeable, and here the facts indicate that the landowner was already aware that
children played on the machinery. (B) and (C) are incorrect because the doctrine of attractive
nuisance is distinct from nuisance law. The landowner may be liable even if the danger is neither a
public nor a private nuisance as to adjoining landowners.
TORTS 23.
Answer to Question 8
(A) The accountant will recover because the dishwasher was defective. A prima facie products liability
action based on strict liability in tort requires proof that: (i) the defendant is a commercial supplier;
(ii) the defendant produced or sold a defective product; (iii) the defective product was the actual and
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (iv) the plaintiff suffered damage to person or property.
The accountant can make such a case because he need not prove that the defendant was at fault
in selling or producing a defective productonly that the product in fact is so defective as to be
unreasonably dangerous. The product also must have reached the user without substantial change
in the condition in which it is supplied. The fact that the dishwasher had an internal wiring defect
causing the machine to malfunction is a sufficient basis to impose strict liability. Any negligence by
the contractor as an intermediary does not void the manufacturers liability. Suppliers must anticipate
reasonably foreseeable uses even if they are misuses. (B) is wrong because the contractor was an
independent contractor with no relationship to the appliance company that vicarious liability would
support. (C) is wrong even though assumption of risk may sometimes be successfully raised in
strict liability cases. Here, the accountant did not know of the risk and did not voluntarily assume it.
(D) is incorrect because privity is not required to bring a strict liability action. A majority of courts
extend protection not only to buyers, but also to members of the buyers family, guests, friends, and
employees of the buyer, as well as foreseeable bystanders.
Answer to Question 9
(D) The couples prior presence is some, but not controlling, evidence. Absent a valid defense, a defendant may not cause a substantial, unreasonable interference with a neighbors use or enjoyment of
his property. Whether the retired couple were there before or after the drive-in opened does not
control the result; plaintiffs right to the reasonable use or enjoyment of their land is the test. (A)
is wrong because the fact that one type of land use was entered into before another is relevant but
not conclusive evidence as to reasonableness of use. (B) is wrong because a use permitted under a
zoning ordinance may be shown to be unreasonable. (C) is a misstatement of law.
Answer to Question 10
(C) The truckers negligence is both an actual and a legal cause of the drivers injuries. The drivers
injuries were actually caused by the trucker since they would not have occurred but for the truckers negligent parking. The trucker was also the legal (proximate) cause of the drivers injuries. It
was foreseeable that an eastbound car might proceed into the intersection when the traffic signal was
obstructed and possibly collide with another car possessing the right of waya foreseeable result
caused by a foreseeable intervening force. Therefore, (A), (B), and (D) are incorrect.
Answer to Question 11
(B) The best theory for the driver is that the city was negligent in not replacing the broken pole within
72 hours. Nothing in the facts indicates that the city was under an absolute duty to maintain its
traffic poles. Hence, (A) and (C) are incorrect. (D) states no legal theory for the drivers claim and
so is not as good an answer as (B).
Answer to Question 12
(C) The ex-husband will not be relieved of liability. The ex-husband intended to cause the woman the
severe emotional distress that did, in fact, result from his outrageous conduct. Hence, his conduct
satisfies the prima facie case and (C) is the correct response. The mans conduct was a foreseeable
response to the ex-husbands act and hence did not break the chain of causation leading to the
result intended by the ex-husband. Thus, (B) is wrong. (A) is unsupported by the facts, and (D)
is a misstatement of law; if the third persons conduct was unforeseeable, it may affect the defendants liability.
Answer to Question 13
(D) A necessary element is whether the man had reasonable grounds to believe his boat might sink.
Although the man intended to go onto the owners property, his entry was privileged if the man
believed it was necessary to protect himself and/or his boat. Note that this privilege is qualified
in that the man must pay for any damage he caused to the owners property. (A), (B), and (C)
are incorrect because knowledge that the land is privately owned is irrelevant to the privilege of
necessity.
Answer to Question 14
(A) The owner will have no defense. The privilege to invade land as a private necessity supersedes
the occupants right to protect the property from invasion; hence, the landowner is liable to the
invader for any harm suffered if entry is denied. (C) is wrong because the owner could have
recovered for injury to his dock, but had no right to resist the mans entry. (B) and (D) are incorrect because the mans entry was privileged.
Answer to Question 15
(B) The parents most likely will be liable. Parents may be liable for negligence for failing to prevent
the tortious conduct of their children. Further, if parents know of their childs propensity to
harm, they have a duty to exercise due care to control the childs behavior. Here, they did just the
opposite. Hence, (D) is wrong. (C) is wrong because children are considered capable of committing torts. (A) is wrong because parents liability is based on negligence.
Answer to Question 16
(A) The boy likely will be liable. A child is liable for his intentional torts whether or not he knows
of their wrongfulness. Hence, (B) is incorrect. (C) is wrong because there is no minimum age
for capacity to commit torts. Children generally are deemed to have the capacity to form the
intent to commit intentional torts. (D) is wrong because parents are not vicariously liable for their
childrens torts.
Answer to Question 17
(B) The child must establish that the stove was in substantially the same condition. To hold the
commercial supplier strictly liable for a product defect, the product must be expected to, and
must in fact, reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it
is supplied. (A) is wrong because warnings are only one consideration in determining whether
a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous as required for strict liability
purposes. Strict liability can apply even if the customer is informed of the warnings. (C) is wrong
because it goes to an issue of negligence on the retailers part. It is unnecessary for a retailer to
affirmatively contribute to the defectiveness of the product for strict liability to apply. (See the
analysis of option (B), above.) (D) is incorrect because in a strict liability case it is unnecessary to
prove that the defendant was at fault in selling or producing a dangerous productonly that the
product is in fact so defective as to be unreasonably dangerous. Thus, plaintiff need not show that
TORTS 25.
the local retailer was aware or should have been aware of the danger. Options (A), (C), and (D) all
deal with fault on the local retailers part, and are, therefore, wrong in a strict liability analysis.
Answer to Question 18
(D) The child must show that the stove had an unreasonably dangerous defect to establish a breach of
duty by the manufacturer. To establish a prima facie case based on strict liability in tort, the plaintiff must prove: (i) strict duty owed by a commercial supplier; (ii) breach of that duty; (iii) actual
and proximate cause; and (iv) damages. To establish breach of duty for a strict liability action,
the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant was at fault in selling or producing a dangerous
productonly that the product in fact is so defective as to be unreasonably dangerous. (A) is
wrong because negligence need not be proven in a strict liability case. (B) is wrong because the
availability of safer product alternatives is only one factor to be considered by the courts in determining whether a product is defective. (C) is incorrect because even though the warnings may
well have been inadequate because they were placed on the crate rather than on the stove itself,
the role of instructions and warnings is but one of many factors the courts will consider in determining the defective nature of a given product.
Answer to Question 19
(C) The patron will not prevail. At issue is the physicians duty to the patron. Generally, the law
imposes no duty to affirmatively act for the benefit of others. There are exceptions to this
rulee.g., one who places another in a position of peril must use reasonable care to aid that
person; one who gratuitously acts for the benefit of another thereby assumes a duty to act like an
ordinary reasonable person. None of the exceptions is applicable to the case at bar. Therefore, (B)
and (D) are clearly incorrect. The Good Samaritan statute, described in (A), generally exempts
from liability medical personnel who voluntarily and gratuitously render emergency treatment.
However, it does not require them to provide such treatment. Thus, (A) is incorrect.
Answer to Question 20
(D) The child must show that the system was defective and the defect should have been discovered. Under a negligence analysis, the defendants conduct must fall below the standard of care
expected of a reasonable person under like circumstances. In the instant case, the seller had
a duty, at the time of transfer of possession of the home to the parents, to disclose concealed,
unreasonably dangerous conditions, of which he knew or had reason to know, and of which he
knew the parents were ignorant and not likely to discover on reasonable inspection. Thus, if the
seller did not know of a defect in the ventilating system, and could not have discovered the defect
through reasonable care, a cause of action for negligence would not lie. (B) and (C) imply that
the seller would be liable in negligence merely for failure to inspect or for failure to discover the
defect upon inspection. However, there must also be a showing that a reasonable inspection would
have disclosed the defect. Consequently, (B) and (C) are incorrect. (A) is more appropriate to a
strict liability case, since it does not even mention the necessity for knowledge or discovery of the
defect. Therefore, it is an incorrect alternative.
Answer to Question 21
(A) The child will probably recover against the manufacturer only. The issue is causation. But for the
manufacturers defective design of the ventilating system, the injury to the child would not have
occurred. Since the child can trace the injury to a defect in the ventilating system that existed
when it left the manufacturers control, cause in fact is established. The same concepts of proximate cause which govern negligence actions are applicable to strict liability actions for defective
products. The childs injury is the direct result of the manufacturers defective design, which is the
cause in fact of the injury. Thus, proximate cause is established. The heating companys furnace
and the cooling companys air conditioning unit contained no defects and did not cause injury to
the child. As the facts make clear, both units were controlled by a thermostat independent of the
units themselves. Thus, (B), (C), and (D) are incorrect.
Answer to Question 22
(D) The owner would prevail in the absence of a claim for special damage. Public nuisance is an
act that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, or property rights of the community.
Recovery is available for public nuisance only if a private party has suffered some unique damage
not suffered by the public at large. Thus, without a claim of special damage by the tenant, the
owner would be able to defend against the tenants public nuisance suit. (A) is wrong because it
is a form of the largely discredited coming to the nuisance defense. The tenant is entitled to
the reasonable use and enjoyment of his leasehold. Remaining in the apartment does not constitute consent. (B) is incorrect because the ordinance is enforceable against the owner even
if his violation is reasonable. This option is a distractor, designed to lure you into wrongfully applying the unreasonable interference test from private nuisance cases. (C) is incorrect
because only one who has suffered some unique damage has a privilege to abate a public nuisance
by self-help. In the absence of such unique damage, a public nuisance may be abated or enjoined
only by public authority.
Answer to Question 23
(C) The father will not prevail. Where the defendant intentionally causes severe physical harm to one
person, and another person suffers severe emotional distress because of that persons relationship to the injured party, problems of intent and causation arise. To sustain a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under such circumstances, the plaintiff generally must show: (i) he
was present when the injury occurred to the other person; (ii) he is a close relation of the injured
person; and (iii) the defendant knew that the plaintiff was present and a close relation to the
injured person. In the case at bar, we do not know that the owner suffered severe physical harm.
However, we do know that the officer was unaware that the father observed the incident. (A) and
(B) are incorrect, because they ignore the issue of whether the officer knew that the father was
watching. (D) is incorrect, because the term zone of physical danger is more appropriate to an
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Answer to Question 24
(A) The farmer will prevail. An activity may be characterized as abnormally dangerous if it (i) creates
a foreseeable risk of serious harm even when reasonable care is taken by the actors; and (ii) is
not a matter of common usage in the particular community. In such cases, the duty owed is an
absolute duty to make safe the condition. Liability will be imposed for any injuries to persons
or property resulting from the condition. Pursuant to the foregoing criteria, the gas companys
operation of the storage facility constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity, subjecting the gas
company to liability for damage caused by the explosion, regardless of any negligence on the
part of the gas company. Thus, (C) is incorrect. (D) is incorrect because any negligence on the
part of the contractor will not absolve the gas company of liability for maintenance of an abnormally dangerous condition. (B) is incorrect because where, as here, no physical object enters the
TORTS 27.
plaintiffs land, a court will generally treat the matter as a nuisance case or one involving strict
liability if an abnormally dangerous activity is involved, rather than as a trespass case.
Answer to Question 25
(D) The farmer will prevail if the contractor was aware of a defect that caused the explosion. The
contractor, as the manufacturer of the facility, owed a duty of due care to any foreseeable plaintiff. The farmer, whose farm is located near the facility, is a foreseeable plaintiff. Therefore, if the
explosion resulted from a defect of which the contractor was aware, the contractor would be liable
to the farmer for the resultant loss of his lettuce crop. (B) is incorrect because the contractors
status as an independent contractor relative to the gas company has no bearing on the duty owed
by the contractor to the farmer. (A) is incorrect because the contractor will be liable for manufacturing the facility with knowledge of a defect, regardless of the identity of the facilitys designer.
(C) is incorrect because the contractor was the manufacturer, rather than the operator, of the
facility.
Answer to Question 26
(D) The nurse will not recover if the hospital reasonably believed that she took the narcotics. In a
defamation action, a defendant may assert a claim of qualified privilege for statements made in
the interest of the publisher of the statement, the recipient of the statement, or both. The privilege
will be lost only if the statement is not within the scope of the privilege or if it was made with
malice (i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity). In this case, the hospitals response to the agency on a matter of common interest was within the scope of the privilege.
Thus, (D) is correct because the hospitals reasonable belief would negate any malice on its part.
(A) is incorrect, because the accusation alone does not establish defamation when a claim of
qualified privilege is raised. (B) is incorrect, because the falsity of the statement does not dispose
of the question of qualified privilege. (C) is incorrect, because the disappearance of the narcotics
does not, by itself, establish a reasonable belief on the part of the hospital that the nurse was
responsible for the disappearance.
Answer to Question 27
(C) The child will not prevail absent a showing of negligence. (A) is incorrect because the owner
owed the child the duty to act as an ordinary, prudent, reasonable personnot the highest
degree of care. (B) is incorrect because, even if a two-year-old were incapable of contributory
negligence, the plaintiff could prevail only if the defendant or his employees were negligent
i.e., failed to exercise reasonable care to ensure the plaintiffs safety. Because (C) reflects this
principle, it is the correct answer. (D) is incorrect because, even if the woman assumed the risk,
her assumption of risk will not be imputed to the plaintiff-child.
Answer to Question 28
(A) The homeowner has a viable claim against the motorist. In negligently causing the collision with
the fire engine, it was foreseeable that the motorists actions could cause injury to someone else
(e.g., a local resident who the fire engine would be unable to reach because of the accident). The
homeowner, whose house was located only 10 blocks from the scene of the accident, falls within
the foreseeable zone of danger. It follows that (D) is incorrect. (C) is incorrect because, even if
the motorist was not involved in causing the fire, his negligence caused the delay in the arrival
of the fire engine. In turn, this delay may well have caused all or part of the damage suffered by
the homeowner. (B) is incorrect because it assumes, without a factual basis, that the motorists
negligence caused the entire loss. (A) is correct because it recognizes that the motorist breached
a duty of due care owed to the homeowner, and that the motorist will be liable for that part of the
homeowners damages that was actually and proximately caused by the motorists breach of duty.
Answer to Question 29
(C) The first and second statements will support the buyers claim. A cause of action for deceit
requires: (i) a false representation of a material past or present fact; (ii) scienter; (iii) intent to
induce reliance; (iv) causation; (v) justifiable reliance; and (vi) damages. Generally, reliance upon
false statements of opinion, value, or quality is unjustified. Here, the dealers statements regarding
the cars not having been involved in an accident and the gasoline mileage constitute knowingly
false representations of material fact that will form the basis of a cause of action for deceit. Thus,
those statements will support the buyers claim. The third statement, regarding the smooth ride of
the car, is an opinion, upon which the buyer would not be justified in relying. Consequently, that
statement would not support the buyers claim for deceit. Therefore, (C) is correct, and (A), (B),
and (D) are wrong.
Answer to Question 30
(B) The customer must establish that the spray mist was an offensive or harmful contact. In order to
establish a prima facie case for battery, the customer must show (i) an act by the defendant store
that brings about harmful or offensive contact to the customers person, (ii) intent by the store to
bring about such contact, and (iii) causation. (B) is correct since this is one of the elements necessary to establish a battery. (A) is wrong because there need not be severe bodily harm for a battery
to occur. The contact may be merely offensive without causing any bodily injury. (C) is wrong
because there need not be any emotional distress for a battery to occur. (D) is wrong because
the customers conduct of vigorously shaking the door was indeed the factual cause of the spray.
However, there was causation on the stores part in the sense of the store having set in motion a
force that would bring about a harmful or offensive contact to the customers person where there
was any attempt to open the door.
Answer to Question 31
(B) The customer probably will recover because res ipsa loquitur applies. When the facts are such as
to strongly indicate that the plaintiffs injuries resulted from the defendants negligence, the trier
of fact may be permitted to infer the defendants liability. The circumstantial evidence doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur requires the plaintiff to show: (i) the accident causing his injury is of the type
that would not normally occur unless someone was negligent; (ii) the negligence was attributable to the defendant; and (iii) the plaintiff was free from negligence. All of these elements are
satisfied from the facts of this case. Because the switches and the doors were found to be in good
working order, the injury can reasonably be inferred to be attributable to one of the auto companys employees, because they had access to the switches. (A) is wrong because strict liability
applies to abnormally dangerous activities that cannot be performed without risk of serious harm
no matter how much care is taken. The operation of the door cannot be characterized as abnormally dangerous. (C) is incorrect because the owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in
the conduct of active operations (such as opening and closing the door) for the protection of
licensees known to be on the property. (D) is incorrect because to have assumed the risk, the
plaintiff must have known of the risk and voluntarily assumed it. The customer had no reason to
know of any risk involving the overhead door and consequently could not assume it.
TORTS 29.
Answer to Question 32
(B) The rescuer will prevail. It is foreseeable that where a defendants wrongful conduct places him
in a position of peril, a rescuer may suffer injuries while reasonably attempting to aid him, i.e.,
danger invites rescue. Hence, (B) is correct and (D) is incorrect. (C) is wrong because a rescue
is not a voluntary assumption of the risk. (A) is not a reason for imposing liability.
Answer to Question 33
(C) The rescuer will not prevail. Because the neighbors conduct did not endanger the man, the
neighbor owed no duty to the man or his rescuer. Generally, there is no duty owed to an undiscovered trespasser such as the man here, whose conduct was unforeseeable. (A) and (B) are wrong
because the facts that the rescuer acted reasonably or saved the neighbors property are irrelevant
to the issue of the neighbors duty. (D) is wrong because an act of rescue is not an assumption of
the risk.
Answer to Question 34
(D) The telephone company and the motorist are liable for the full amount as joint tortfeasors. In
cases where there are joint tortfeasors and the injury suffered is not divisible, each tortfeasor
will be jointly and severally liable for that injury. The rule of joint and several liability applies
even where (as in the case described by the facts) each defendant acted entirely independently.
Both defendants were negligent and contributed to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff when
the pole fell. (A) is incorrect because the telephone companys prior negligence has no effect on
the motorists liability. Her conduct was the direct cause of the foreseeable harmful result of the
pole falling; the fact that it did not happen immediately is irrelevant. (B) is incorrect because
the motorists reckless driving was not a superseding intervening force that would cut off the
telephone companys liability for its original negligence. Because of the telephone companys
negligence, it was foreseeable that the pole would fall. The fact that it was caused by anothers
reckless conduct, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable, does not cut off the telephone companys
liability. (C) is incorrect because there is no basis to divide the plaintiffs injuries as 50% caused
by the telephone company and 50% caused by the motorist.
Answer to Question 35
(C) The hiker will not recover because she was an unforeseeable plaintiff to whom the owner owed no
duty. A duty of care is owed only to foreseeable plaintiffs. A trespasser is not a foreseeable plaintiff unless the landowner has discovered her presence or should reasonably know of trespassers
who constantly cross over a section of his land. Neither of these situations is indicated by the
facts. Thus, the hiker was an undiscovered trespasser to whom no duty is owed. The owner was
under no obligation to inspect his premises to determine if trespassers were entering his cabin.
(A) is incorrect. Because the owner owed no duty to the hiker, it is irrelevant whether the owner
knew that the stove was defective. (B) is incorrect for the same reason. The owner had no duty to
inspect the appliances in his cabin to make it safe for undiscovered trespassers. (D) is incorrect
because it mitigates the hikers liability for trespass but has no effect on the owners duty to the
hiker.
Answer to Question 36
(A) The boy will prevail if the sprinkler head was a latent hazard. Most courts impose upon a
landowner the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
children caused by artificial conditions on his property. Under the general rule, the plaintiff must
show: (i) that there is a dangerous condition present on the land that the owner is (or should be)
aware of; (ii) that the owner knows or should know that young persons frequent the vicinity of this
dangerous condition; (iii) that the condition is likely to cause injury because of the childs inability
to appreciate the risk; and (iv) that the expense of remedying the situation is slight compared to
the magnitude of the risk. If the sprinkler head was a hazard that the boy would probably not
discover, it would meet the requirements for a showing of attractive nuisance, and the owner
would be liable. (B) is incorrect because the owner would continue to be responsible even if he
had objected to the children playing on the common area. (C) is incorrect because it is of no
consequence where the boy lived. (D) is incorrect because there is a higher standard of care where
attractive nuisances to children are concerned.
Answer to Question 37
(A) The comedians knowledge that the politician was about to sit on the chair makes him liable for
battery. A prima facie case for battery requires an act by defendant that brings about harmful or
offensive contact to plaintiff, intent on the part of defendant to do the act, and causation. Here, the
comedians act in pulling out the politicians chair brought about offensive contact to the politician. The causation element is satisfied not only by direct contact but also by indirect contact.
Here, since the comedian set in motion the events that brought about the offensive contact, causation exists. The intent element is satisfied if defendant knew with substantial certainty the consequences of his act. Here, if the comedian knew that the politician was about to sit on the chair, he
also knew with substantial certainty that the politician would fall if the chair were moved. Thus,
the politician will prevail on a battery cause of action. (B) is incorrect because the comedians
negligence would not suffice for battery, and the only alternative cause of action based on negligence is negligent infliction of emotional distress, which requires that defendants negligent
conduct cause some physical injury to plaintiff. Here, the politician suffered no physical harm.
(C) is incorrect because the prima facie case for battery does not require physical harm to be
shown. Even if the politician cannot prove any actual damages, he will be entitled to a judgment
for nominal damages. (D) is incorrect because it merely states the comedians motive for moving
the chair. Regardless of the fact that the comedian did not have an evil motive or intend to cause
injury, he knew with substantial certainty that his conduct would cause an offensive contact to the
politician; this satisfies the intent requirement for battery.
Answer to Question 38
(B) The plaintiff will prevail if the cement dust constituted an unreasonable interference. For a
private nuisance to be actionable, defendants conduct must amount to a substantial, unreasonable interference with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of property. The operative language in the
choice is interfered unreasonably, and in most MBE nuisance questions such language usually
can be found in the correct choice. (A) is incorrect because, even though a balancing test is
sometimes used in nuisance cases, mere increased costs is not a sufficient justification to allow
continued unreasonable interference with plaintiffs rights. (C) is incorrect because the number of
individuals affected is not determinative of whether a nuisance exists. (D) is similarly incorrect;
conformity to general methods in the industry will not preclude the company from being liable for
nuisance.