Strategies Against Human Trafficking

Study Group Information
Cornelius Friesendorf (Ed.)
Strategies Against Human

Trafficking:
The Role of the Security Sector
Vienna and Geneva, September 2009
Impressum:
Study Group Information
Publishers:
National Defence Academy and
Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports
Rossauer Lnde 1, 1090 Wien
in co-operation with
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
Editor:
Cornelius Friesendorf
Managing Editors:
Benjamin S. Buckland
Ernst M. Felberbauer
Christian M. Huber
Printing and Finishing:
Reprocenter Vienna
1070 Vienna, Stiftgasse 2a
ISBN: 978-3-902670-19-9
ReproZ Vienna
Table of Contents
Foreword ............................................................................................................ 5
Antonio Maria Costa
Foreword ............................................................................................................ 7
Theodor H. Winkler
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ 9
List of Acronyms .............................................................................................. 11
Introduction: The Security Sector and Counter-Trafficking ............................ 17
PART 1: Issues ............................................................................................... 33

Human Trafficking Patterns ............................................................................. 35
Francesca Bosco, Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Anvar Serojitdinov
Human Trafficking & Corruption: Triple Victimisation? ................................ 83
Leslie Holmes
Human Trafficking & Organised Crime in the US & Western Europe.......... 115
John Picarelli
Human Trafficking & Smuggling: Crossover & Overlap .............................. 137
PART 2: Actors ............................................................................................. 167

Human Trafficking & Policing: Good & Bad Practices ................................. 169
Jana Arsovska, Stef Janssens
Human Trafficking, Organised Crime & Intelligence .................................... 213

Fred Schreier
Human Trafficking & Migration Management .............................................. 261
Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens, Mariela Guajardo
Human Trafficking & Peacekeepers .............................................................. 299
Keith J. Allred
Human Trafficking, Prosecutors & Judges .................................................... 329
Allison Jernow
PART 3: Cooperation ................................................................................... 379

Combating Human Trafficking: Improving Governance Institutions,
Mechanisms & Strategies ............................................................................... 381
Phil Williams
Problems of Anti-trafficking Cooperation...................................................... 427
Barbara Limanowska, Helga Konrad
Improving International Counter-Trafficking Cooperation:
Transnational Referral Mechanisms ............................................................... 459
Mariyana Radeva, Elisa Trossero, Martijn Pluim
Conclusions: Improving Counter-Trafficking Efforts Through Better
Implementation, Networking & Evaluation ................................................... 477
Notes on the Authors ...................................................................................... 511
Foreword
In 2000, the international community adopted the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. Since then,
124 countries have ratified the Protocol, and many of these have adopted legal
instruments to help them in the fight against trafficking.
Yet the scourge persists. Millions of people worldwidemen, women and
childrencontinue to be exploited for their labour, for sexual purposes, for
their organs.
Security sector personnel are well-placed to assist in the fight against human
trafficking: by identifying victims; investigating networks; disrupting
operations; and prosecuting traffickers. Moreover, trafficking, like many
crimes, flourishes where the rule of law is weak, such as in post-conflict
situations. Restoring security based on the rule of law can reduce vulnerability
to human trafficking and other types of organised crime.
Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector provides
practical guidance on how practitioners in the security sector can take measures
against modern-day slavery.
Two points stand out. First, policy and intervention depend on evidence. Thus
far, the fight against human trafficking has been handicapped by a lack of data.
UNODC is working with governments and social scientists to fill this void. In
2009 we published the first Global Report on Trafficking in Persons. But the
picture remains impressionistic. Security sector professionals can provide the
information needed to profile victims and identify traffickers.
The second major point highlighted in this study is the need for cooperation.
This fight is a shared responsibility. It requires inter-agency cooperation among
law enforcement personnel as well as trans-national cooperation. It also
depends on effective joint work among a wide range of stakeholders, including
criminal justice experts, the private sector, civil society, and concerned citizens.
Disjointed effortshowever well-meaningwill have little impact on
sophisticated criminal networks. This publication offers strong
recommendations on how to make cooperation work.
Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the Security Sector is the
result of good cooperation between UNODC and the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, as well as the input of experts on the
security sector and organised crime. It should contribute to a more strategic
fight against a crime that shames us all.
Antonio Maria Costa

Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Foreword
Human trafficking is one of the most heinous crimes of our time. Across the
globe, millions of people live in slave-like conditions, generating billions of
dollars in profit for their traffickers. Human trafficking undermines the security
of states because it is related to organised crime and corruption, and because
some traffickers deal not only in people but also in drugs, weapons, and other
goods. But most obviously, trafficking violates the human rights of trafficked
persons who are exploited, raped, and sometimes killed.
The topic has been on the contemporary international security agenda since the
late 1990s. Much progress has been made since: new laws have been created,
awareness has been raised, government officials have been trained, and
cooperation agreements have been struck between the various state and nonstate counter-trafficking actors. However, there are few signs that trafficking is
diminishing. Instead, there are many signs that it is increasing.
This book focuses on the role of security actors. Their first obligation is to fight
human trafficking. Police, border guards, the armed forces, prosecutors and
judges (among others) must prosecute traffickers, protect victims, and prevent
trafficking. Their second obligation is to do no harm. Many trafficked persons
have been subject to double victimisation, by traffickers as well as security
actors. This is the case when the police raid brothels and then treat people
forced into prostitution as criminals; when state migration officials decide to
deport victims of trafficking, who are then picked up at the airport in their
country of origin by those who trafficked them in the first place; or when
peacekeepers, who are supposed to protect people, exploit them.
DCAF has decided to produce this book since counter-trafficking epitomises
the need for an effective and democratically accountable security sectorthe
creation of which is DCAFs aim. The book acknowledges that many of the
factors which allow trafficking to thrive are beyond the remit of the security
sector alone. However, while not sufficient, the authors of this book argue that
proper security sector responses to human trafficking are necessary.
Much has been written about human trafficking over recent years. While this
book rehearses the main points, it also fills gaps. The chapters, written by
prominent experts in their fields, contribute to counter-trafficking by providing
concrete recommendations for how to improve policy implementation,
networking among the various counter-trafficking stakeholders, and research
and evaluation. Crucially, the authors argue against oversimplified solutions,
revealing that counter-trafficking is rife with trade-offs and unintended

consequences. By problematising common assumptions, the book thus
underlines the complexity of trafficking and the trickiness of countertrafficking, while still highlighting how progress can be made.
A major argument running through all of the chapters is that prosecution,
protection, and prevention complement one another. We need more law
enforcement, as well as law enforcers that better cooperate with their
counterparts in other countries to fight this partly transnational problem. This
book also stresses the requirement of close cooperation between actors
focusing on prosecution and those, including international organisations and
NGOs, who specialise in protection and prevention. Yet no matter who
cooperates with whom and how, concerns for the human rights of trafficked
persons and other vulnerable groups should be at the centre of all countertrafficking efforts.
This book, presenting a sober analysis of a dramatic reality, addresses primarily
policymakers and security practitioners. But its conclusions are relevant for a
broader audience as well. Everybody can contribute to counter-trafficking, by
not buying services provided by trafficked persons, by supporting institutions
fighting trafficking, or by informing others about the problem. We hope that
this book promotes practices and discourses that are both passionate and
rational. Millions of enslaved people are waiting.
Theodor H. Winkler
Director
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Acknowledgements
The publication of this book would not have been possible without the support
of numerous individuals. Theodor H. Winkler, Ernst M. Felberbauer, and
especially Anja H. Ebnther provided continuous support, motivation, and
feedback. Benjamin S. Buckland played an essential role in this project, as
researcher, chapter author, coordinator, and copy-editor. It has been a privilege
to work with you.
Mike Dottridge and Louise Shelley sent detailed comments on each chapter,
which much enhanced the quality of the book. Many others shared their views
with us on trafficking and counter-trafficking. These contributions are
acknowledged in the respective chapters. Most importantly, thanks is due to all
of the authors, for agreeing to contribute their insights to this book and for
showing so much tenacity in producing several drafts of their chapters.
Fellow, Special Programmes
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
List of Acronyms
ACP
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ASEAN
Association of South-East Asian Nations
AWF
Analysis Work Files
CATW
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
CCTV
Closed Circuit Television
CEDAW
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination

against Women
CEOOR
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE
Council of Europe
CompStat
Comparative Statistics
COSPOL
Comprehensive Operational Strategic Planning for the Police
CRC
Convention on the Rights of the Child
CTM
Counter-Trafficking Module
DCAF
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DoD
Department of Defence
DODIG
Department of Defence Inspector General
DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS
Economic Community of Central African States
ECIM
European Criminal Intelligence Model
ECOSOC
UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EIS
Europol Information System
EMN
European Migration Network
ESDP
European Security and Defence Policy
EU
European Union
EURODAC European Dactyloscopie
11
Eurojust
European Investigation and Prosecutorial Cooperation

Mechanism
Europol
European Police Office
EUROSUR
European Border Surveillance System
FADO
False and Authentic Documents Online
FATF
Financial Action Task Force
FIND
Fixed INTERPOL Network Database
Frontex
European External Borders Agency
FYROM
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAATW
Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women
GAO
Government Accountability Office
GCC
Gulf Cooperation Council
GNIB
Garda National Immigration Bureau
GO
Governmental Organisation
GPAT
Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings
GRETA
Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking in Human

Beings
HIV/AIDS
Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency

Syndrome
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICCPR
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICMPD
International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRMW
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all

Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
ICT
Information and Communication Technology
ICTY
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ILO
International Labour Organization
ILP
Intelligence-led policing
IND
Immigration and Naturalisation Service
12
Interpol
International Criminal Police Organization
IO
International Organisation
IOM
International Organization for Migration
IRCP
International Research on Criminal Policy
IT
Information Technology
JHA
Justice and Home Affairs
LEA
Law Enforcement Agency
MASINT
Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MIND
Mobile INTERPOL Network Database
MOA
Memorandum of Agreement
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
NCB
National Central Bureau
NCIS
National Criminal Intelligence Service
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
NRM
National Referral Mechanism
OCHA
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
OCR
Organized Crime Report
OCTA
Organized Crime Threat Assessment
ODIHR
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLAF
European Anti-Fraud Office
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACO
Programme against Corruption and Organised Crime
PJC
Police and Judicial Cooperation Matters
PKO
Peacekeeping Operation
PSO
Peace Support Operation
R&D
Research and Development
13
RABIT
Rapid Border Intervention Teams
RCM
Regional Conference on Migration
RCP
Regional Clearing Point
RCPs
Regional Consultative Processes
RCM
Regional Conference on Migration
RFID
Radio Frequency Identification Device
RNCOM
Regional Network for Civil Organizations on Migration
SAP
(EU) Stabilisation and Association Process for South Eastern

Europe
SAP-FL
Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour
SBGS
State Border Guards Service
SC
Security Council
SCCOPOL
Section Centrale de Coopration Oprationnelle de Police
SECI
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SEE
South Eastern Europe
SISCESCO
Information system to follow up on crimes relating to sexual

exploitation of children and trafficking in children for sexual
purposes
SOCA
Serious and Organised Crime Agency
SOP
Standard Operating Procedure
SPTF
Stability Pact Task Force on Combating Trafficking in Human

Beings
SRSG
Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSG
Security Sector Governance
SSR
Security Sector Reform
STD
Sexually Transmitted Disease
TCC
Troop Contributing Country
THB
Trafficking in Human Beings
TIP Report
Trafficking in Persons Report
TOC
Transnational Organised Crime
14
TRM
Transnational Referral Mechanism
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK
United Kingdom
UN TOCC
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised

Crime
UN
United Nations
UNAMA
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO
United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIAP
United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking
UNICEF
United Nations Childrens Fund
UNICRI
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research

Institute
UNMIK
United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMISET
United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor
UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human

Rights
US
United States of America
USAID
US Agency for International Development
VIS
Visa Information System
VoT
Victim of Trafficking
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
15
INTRODUCTION
The Security Sector and Counter-Trafficking
Introduction
Over recent years, many states have stepped up efforts against human
trafficking.1 However, counter-trafficking continues to suffer from
shortcomings. There is still a lack of political will, operational capacity, and
knowledge on trafficking and on what counter-strategies work best. As a
consequence, human trafficking continues to thrive. By focusing on the role of
the security sector, this book offers ways of making progress against a pressing
contemporary problem that undermines the security of states, societies, and
individuals. This introduction first highlights the contribution of the security
sector to counter-trafficking. It then examines the scope and nature of
trafficking and discusses different perspectives on the problem. Finally, this
introduction summarises the chapters of the book.
1. Conceptualising the Role of the Security Sector
The fight against human trafficking has three components: the prosecution of
traffickers, the protection of trafficked persons, and the prevention of
trafficking. In addition, and cutting through these three Ps, national and
international cooperation among the various actors constituting the countertrafficking security sector is needed.
Who are these actors? There is no common definition of the security sector. A
narrow definition includes core security actors such as the police and military,
but does not include, for example, NGOs and the media.2 The narrowest
1
For discussions on trafficking and counter-trafficking I thank the chapter authors, Beate Andrees, Mike
Dottridge, Louise Shelley, and many other researchers and practitioners. Special thanks go to Benjamin
S. Buckland. The views expressed in this introduction may be different from those of institutions and
individuals contributing to this book.
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security
System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007), 22.
17
definition would not even include the judiciary, but focus instead on power
ministries such as the Ministry of Interior and Defence, and their respective
agencies.
When looking at counter-trafficking, the security sector should be defined
broadly.3 For the purpose of this book, it encompasses: core security actors
(such as the armed forces, regular police, border police and immigration
services), judicial personnel (especially prosecutors and judges), security
management and oversight bodies that hold security agencies accountable, and
non-statutory security forces (such as private military companies).
Moreover, a definition of the counter-trafficking security sector must take into
account the essential role of state-run social service and protection agencies, as
well as NGOs. Including these non-coercive actors in the definition of the
security sector is not intended to securitise counter-trafficking efforts.4
Securitisation tends to give rise to inappropriate coercive practices that lack
democratic oversight and a proper balance of prosecution with protection and
prevention.
Most of the actors in this list operate primarily on the national level. However,
human trafficking is very much a transnational problem. International
Organisations (IOs) have become crucial in promoting and implementing
counter-trafficking policies, and are therefore included in the definition of the
counter-trafficking security sector.
This book pays special attention to the role of coercive actors, such as the
police, judiciary, and armed forces.5 These actors not only put pressure on
traffickers, but also have a stake in protecting trafficked persons and in
preventing trafficking. However, to reduce trafficking, more is needed than
improving law enforcement or preventing the involvement of peacekeepers in
trafficking. Good security sector responses must combine the activities of
coercive actors with those of other government agencies, IOs, NGOs,
parliaments, private businesses, and the media.6
3
See also Heiner Hnggi, Making Sense of Security Sector Governance, in Challenges of Security
Sector Governance, ed. Heiner Hnggi and Theodor H. Winkler (Geneva: DCAF, 2003): 3-23, here p.
10.
On securitisation see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
This book does not discuss in depth the role of parliamentary oversight committees, private businesses,
the media, or prison guards. This is not meant to deny these actors potential or actual contribution to
counter-trafficking.
On private actors in international affairs, see Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini, ed., Private Actors and
Security Governance (Mnster: LIT and DCAF, 2006).
18
By analyzing counter-trafficking responses both on a national and international

level, this book draws on three, overlapping, concepts that inform all activities
of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
First, proper counter-trafficking responses require Security Sector Reform
(SSR). A poorly governed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to
sustainable development, democracy, and security. SSR is aimed at developing
a security apparatus that provides security to the state and its people within a
framework of democratic accountability. SSR-oriented counter-trafficking
efforts are needed, not only in countries that emerge from violent conflict, but
also in more stable settings. For example, police forces, border guards, or
prosecutors need training to identify and properly treat victims of trafficking,
no matter where.7
Secondly, to ensure cooperation among the various counter-trafficking
stakeholders on a national level, as well as democratically accountable state
responses to trafficking, Security Sector Governance (SSG) needs to be
enhanced.
Yet SSR and SSG are insufficient, both as conceptual tools and as practical
guidance for counter-trafficking. SSR and SSG must be complemented, thirdly,
with Security Governance. This concept takes into account the transnational
nature of contemporary security problems. Effective, efficient, and legitimate
responses against human traffickers demand cooperation among national actors
and their foreign counterparts. In counter-trafficking and other realms, states
can no longer act (if they ever did) as monolithic entitiesthey need to create
horizontal policy networks that quickly and flexibly reach across borders.
These networks should comprise state agencies such as the police and border
guards, but also IOs and NGOs.8
Because counter-trafficking efforts integrate the know-how and material
resources of many actors, they are a prime example of the shift from
government to governance.9 They also underline the need to broaden traditional
security concepts and practices hitherto focused on state security and the
military. A move towards the concept of human security, whereby the security
7
The term victim is here used in a legal sense (a victim of a crime); it does not deny that people make
choices, even under difficult circumstances.
On networked security governance, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Elke Krahmann, Security Governance and Networks: New
Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no.1
(2005): 15-30.
See Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, ed., Governance Without Government: Order and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
19
of individuals is the main reference point of security activities, is warranted in

the field of counter-trafficking, as in other fields. Since the 1990s, when many
programmes were initiated, efforts against human trafficking have often been
skewed toward inappropriate law enforcement strategies that have undermined
both the human rights of victims and the ability of states to prosecute
traffickers.10 Trafficking is too complex to lend itself to simplified assumptions
and counter-strategies.11
By focusing on coercive actors, this book does not intend to contribute to the
prolongation of practices such as the deportation of trafficked persons that are
problematic both normatively and functionally. Instead, we argue that a human
security approach, which emphasizes the rights and needs of trafficked persons,
also defends state interests, such as the arrest of traffickers.
Our focus on the security sector disregards crucial aspects of countertrafficking. Even if all actors discussed in this book (ranging from the police to
NGOs and IOs) properly engaged in counter-trafficking (which is not the case
yet), trafficking would continue. Progress against trafficking hinges on the
presence and amenability of conditions as diverse as poverty, gender-based
discrimination, a lack of legal migration and employment opportunities, the
Internet as a facilitator of migration and commercial sexual services, the
demand for cheap, unregulated labour, advances in transport technology,
violence against women as a tactic of war, and many other phenomena.
Security actors can mitigate some of the causes and consequences of
trafficking, but not all of them. For example, institutions looking after victims
of trafficking have little leverage over discrimination, poverty, and other
conditions that push people to migrate under risky circumstances. Security
sector responses are therefore only one element in a larger puzzle. But they are
an important one.
The authors of this book also acknowledge that there are no technical solutions
to trafficking (even though there is much room in the ways technical programs
10
Cornelius Friesendorf, Pathologies of Security Governance: Efforts Against Human Trafficking in

Europe, Security Dialogue 38, no.3 (2007): 379402.
11
It is widely acknowledged, for instance, that trafficking affects particularly women. But appreciating
the gendered impact of trafficking must go beyond simplified assumptions. In Central Asia, some of the
men who migrated and then got trafficked were unable to send money home (although not all men who
failed to send money home were trafficked). This process increased trafficking risks for their wives,
leading some of them to be exploited in the agricultural sector (although not all women exploited in
agriculture in this particular country were victims of trafficking, and not all wives of men who did not
send money home were trafficked). Thus, there is a link between gender and trafficking, yet it is a
complex one. Source: Interview with an official from a Geneva-based international organisation,
Geneva, March 2008.
20
are implemented). Counter-trafficking efforts are political in natureand often

mired in ideological disputes. Counter-trafficking responses reflect a mix of
power, as well as constantly changing norms and perceptions.12 They also
involve trade-offs and are prone to causing negative unintended consequences,
even if intentions are good. Yet pointing out diverse views on trafficking and
the problems related to security sector responses is a precondition for
improvement.
By discussing the opportunities and problems of counter-trafficking, and
offering recommendations to policy-makers and practitioners, this volume
contributes to more effective, efficient, and legitimate counter-trafficking
efforts.
2. What Is Human Trafficking?
In May 2008, a daffodil harvester in the United Kingdom (UK) was stripped of
his licence.13 Accused of imposing debts on his workers, as well as threatening
them and their families, the Gangmaster Licensing Authority (GLA) cited
abhorrent living and working conditions as evidence that they had
uncovered a disgraceful story of forced labour in 21st-century Britain.14 The
story of the around 500 Polish workers employed by the gangmaster may be
less horrific than the accounts of forced prostitution that have made the
headlines since the late 1990s. It is, however, an important story because it
hints at three of the major themes that will run through this book.
Firstly, it illustrates the diversity of traffickinga diversity that is sometimes
hidden by the overwhelming focus on sex trafficking. Daffodil pickers in
Suffolk are just some of the estimated 2.4 million people trafficked every year
into numerous sectors and industries, including prostitution, construction,
12
See Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter 1.
13
I thank Benjamin S. Buckland for his significant contribution in researching and writing this section
and the following one.
14
Paul Lewis, Daffodil Harvester Stripped of Gangmaster Licence and Accused of Using Forced
Labour, The Guardian, May 8, 2008, available at:
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/may/08/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices (accessed December
5, 2008).
21
agriculture, fisheries, sport, begging, service, domestic labour, entertainment,

and war.15
Secondly, the story underlines the heterogeneity of traffickers. The billions of
dollars in profits generated by trafficking every year are shared, not only by
sophisticated organised crime groups, but by all those who transfer, harbour,
receive, or exploit trafficked peoplemany of whom are disorganised, smalltime, or one-off operators.
Lastly, the comments of other flower growers and those in the industry, cited in
the newspaper article, reveal some of the multiple driving forces of human
trafficking in countries of origin, transit, and destination. They talk of an
industry already short of workers, of supermarket chains holding down prices,
and of labour markets creating demand for cheap foreign workers.
So what is human trafficking? A trafficked person is someone who is
transferred across borders or within a state for the purposes of slavery or
servitude. Trafficking is characterised by the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or reception of persons when this is accompanied by the
threat or use of force, fraud, deception, or other means and when the purpose is
to exploit a person. These definitional elements are drawn from Article 3 of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature in Palermo, Italy, in
2000. The exact definition is as follows:
(a) Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of the victim of trafficking in persons to the intended
exploitation set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article shall be
15
International Labour Organization, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the
Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva: ILO,
2005), 10.
22
irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have
been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered trafficking
in persons even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) Child shall mean any person under 18 years of age.16
Since the mid-1990s, trafficking had been steadily climbing the international
security agenda. Yet even before discussions on the Protocol began in Vienna
in 1998, counter-trafficking efforts suffered from competing definitions.17 With
no agreed definition, some actors stuck with that contained in the 1949
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which contains no specific definition
of the term traffic in persons but which covers women in prostitution. Others
worked with an expanded concept that covered trafficking into all forms of
forced labour. Conceptual competition was harmful to early data-gathering
efforts and, by extension, to the counter-trafficking programmes, laws, and
strategies that this data was designed to inform.
The Protocol definition represented improvement. However, it soon became
clear that its convoluted structure is not easy to translate into national laws or
training guidelines. Where it has been directly transcribed, uncertainty
remained, undermining proper data gathering. Yet efforts by states to create
their own definitions have been problematic as well. Brazil, for instance, has
incorporated the Protocol definition into national law. Yet it sits on the statute
books alongside definitions drawn from the earlier 1949 instrument. This
situation has led to confusion on the part of lawmakers, enforcers, and
trafficked people themselves,18 and has made it difficult either to estimate the
number of people being trafficked in Brazil itself or to compare trafficking in
Brazil with the scope of the problem in other countries.
Thus, estimating the global scope of human trafficking is difficult.19 The US
Government has suggested that between 600,000 and 800,000 persons are
16
The Protocol is available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/18-12-a.E.doc.
17
See Melissa Ditmore and Marjan Wijers, The Negotiations on the UN Protocol on Trafficking in
Persons, Nemesis 4 (2003): 7988.
18
Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women, Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking
Measures on Human Rights Around the World (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007), 8889.
19
For an overview of data on human trafficking and data problems, see the first chapter in this book. See
also Frank Laczko and Elzbieta Gozdziak, Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global
Survey, Special Issue, International Migration 43, no.12 (2005).
23
trafficked worldwide each year, 80 per cent of whom are women.20 Yet this
figure does not include trafficking that occurs within the borders of a country,
generally known as internal or domestic trafficking, which may well
account for more people than those trafficked across borders. The best global
figure available comes from the International Labour Organization (ILO),
which in 2005 estimated the total number of people trafficked at around 2.4
million people (and the annual turnover of the industry at around $32 billion).21
However, the real figure could be much lower or higher.
A lack of primary data on the scope, loci, and most prevalent types of
trafficking is obviously a major challenge: the less visible a phenomenon is, the
harder it is to formulate and implement effective counter-policies. This holds
true with regard to drug trafficking, terrorism, or insurgency, and also human
trafficking.
Existing data on human trafficking is weak because researchers have had to
project total values from relatively small numbers of known cases. The fog
surrounding human trafficking is a result of various factors. While trafficking is
an almost universal phenomenon,22 countries may understate the extent of
trafficking because of embarrassment, or because they lack legislation,
enforcement, or capacity to collect data and information. Moreover, collected
data is often not properly collated or shared, but remains quarantined on the
files of state agencies, IOs, and NGOs.
The very nature of human trafficking compounds these problems of collecting
good and comprehensive data. Trafficking is a clandestine activity hidden by
traffickers. Moreover, while it is not a victimless crime, as is the case with
the illicit drug industry where both buyers and sellers usually lack incentives to
contact the police, even victims of trafficking are often reluctant to speak out.
They may hide their predicament for fear of reprisals by traffickers, or because
they fear returning home and facing communities who often shun those whose
migration projects have failed, especially those who have worked in
prostitution. Also, trafficked persons may not realise they have been trafficked,
viewing their situation perhaps as terrible and exploitative, yet better than it
20
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington D.C.: US Department of State,

June 2007), 8.
21
International Labour Organization, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, 10.
22
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (Vienna: UNODC,
April 2006), 17.
24
was at home. The notion of exploitation is thus more ambiguous than

commonly suggested.23
Moreover, even though the Protocol underlines that trafficked people should
not be made liable for immigration offences committed as part of the
trafficking process, many trafficked people do not know this and are afraid of
contacting the authorities. This fear is not unjustified, given that countries of
destination often simply deport victims, a practice that both violates human
rights and hampers the successful prosecution of traffickers.24 This book
underlines that flawed law enforcement, i.e., practices that are not based on a
human rights approach, aggravates the problem of trafficking.
3. Disputing the Nature of the Problem
Trafficking has been approached from a number of angles, each representing
the perceptions and interests of various parties. The Abolitionist view takes
some of its cues from the 1949 Convention. Informed by elements of radical
feminism and developed more recently by NGOs such as the Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women (CATW), it disputes that there can be truly consensual
prostitution. Abolitionists argue that the abolition of prostitution and
criminalisation of demand are the most promising solutions to the problem.25
States such as Sweden have subscribed to this view, claiming to have made
great strides against trafficking by criminalising demand for commercial sex.
The administration of George W. Bush also leant in this direction, arguing that
legal prostitution fuels trafficking by increasing demand.
This book includes few comments on the highly-charged debate about the pros
and cons of different prostitution regimes. However, it is obvious that many
men, women, and children are trafficked into sectors other than the sex
industry.26 Moreover, various factors drive both migration and trafficking. Last,
23
See Vanessa E. Munro, Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of Degradation and Exploitation in the
Context of Sex Trafficking, Journal of Law and Society 35, no.2 (June 2008): 240264.
24
Dina F. Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the
Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of Traffickers, Human Rights Quarterly 26, no.2
(May 2004): 221272.
25
See, for example, Donna M. Hughes, The Natasha Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of
Trafficking in Women, Journal of International Affairs 53, no.2 (Spring 2000): 625651.
26
Due to space constraints and to the quite different policy recommendations they entail, this book does
not examine in depth child trafficking, forced marriage and the organ trade, except where they directly
overlap with sex and labour trafficking.
25
it is not clear yet whether criminalizing (the demand for) commercial sexual
services has produced positive results.27
Governments view trafficking primarily as a problem of transnational
organised crime. This standpoint has informed the drafters of the UN Protocol.
It fits human trafficking within the same conceptual framework as trafficking
in arms and drugs, and consequently assumes that measures against organised
crime can work against human trafficking as well. Human trafficking has
become a profitable activity of organised crime groups. Moreover, trafficking
meshes with other organised crime operations in various ways. For example,
trafficking can occur along the same routes as trafficking in drugs or weapons;
in combined retailing schemes,28 traffickers may sell both drugs and sexual
services provided by trafficked persons; or, a person may be used as a drug
mule en route, before ending up in forced labour in a destination country.
It must be noted, however, that the focus on transnational organised crime
networks engaged in human trafficking has been problematic. Much trafficking
is run by small-time, disorganised, unsophisticated, and only loosely networked
groups, as well as by individuals acting alone. Moreover, this framework has
given rise to coercive law enforcement strategies that, while not always
contributing to successful prosecution, have been detrimental to the interests of
migrants in general and trafficked persons in particular.
A related framework views trafficking primarily as a migration problem. This
analysis stresses that it is not the very poorest who leave their homes. Instead,
slight increases in economic development, combined with a growing
knowledge of relative poverty, drive people to migrate. Rejecting the
assumption that the majority of trafficked people are bundled up and
transported to their destinations, this conceptual framework asserts rather that
trafficking is driven by increasing mobility and a desire to migrate. Trafficking
results from the interplay of ever-tighter migration controls attempting to
27
The Swedish government says the policy works. The Swedish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in
Human Beings, as well as a former special advisor to the Swedish government on prostitution and
human trafficking, claim that the policy, among other effects, has decreased the percentage of men
purchasing sexual services and prevented the trafficking of foreign women to Sweden by organised
crime networks (Gunilla Ekberg, e-mail communication with the author, December 2008). Other
sources are more sceptical, however. See, for example, US Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Anti-trafficking
Efforts Abroad, report no. GAO-06-825 to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary and the
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. Washington DC, July
2006, 25.
28
Phil Williams Drugs, Human Trafficking, and Fraud as a Security Threat (presentation, Geneva
Centre for Security Policy, June 25, 2007).
26
frustrate migration of people without valid travel or work documents, the desire
of people to migrate (for reason ranging from the need to escape persecution to
a desire for adventure), and the presence of criminals willing to exploit the
paradox of migration controls in the era of globalisation.
More recently, a fourth approach for conceptualising trafficking has focused on
human rights. This framework developed in parallel and in response to the
security trope that has dominated much trafficking discourse and practice.
Human rights violations, according to this analysis, are perpetrated in two
directions. In one direction, they are the acts of violence, coercion and
exploitation exacted by traffickers. In the other, they are the acts of states who,
seeking to secure their borders, may violate the human rights of trafficked
people and other vulnerable groups, especially asylum seekers.
While the human rights approach has gained traction among an increasing
number of counter-trafficking actors, commitments, especially by governments
of net destination countries, are often not translated into practice. This
publication takes a close look at trade-offs and unintended consequences of
counter-trafficking efforts. The human rights consequences of security sector
responses against trafficking run all the way through the chapters.
The final framework to inform counter-trafficking has been the labour market
approach. Viewing trafficking as only one element of forced labour, this
approach examines the factors that drive demand for labour, as well as the
regulatory frameworks that allow the dark side of a globalized labour market to
flourish. Championed especially by the ILO, this approach seeks to engage
governments, trade unions, workplace inspectors, and other actors. The forced
labour approach looks at both legal and political methods of improving
conditions for foreign and migrant workers generally and trafficked people in
particular.
The focus of this book on security sector actors precludes an in-depth
discussion of labour market forces. But some of the authors have a great deal of
sympathy for the hypothesis that trafficking is a labour market phenomenon,
the solutions to which must involve the main market actors.
27
4. The Structure of the Book

This book is intended to contribute to better security sector responses to human
trafficking. Geographically, the chapters refer to many examples of trafficking
and counter-trafficking from Europe and North America. But we also discuss
human trafficking patterns and counter-efforts elsewhere, especially in the
countries of origin for many of those trafficked to Europe and North America
(noting, of course, that states may be countries of origin, transit, and destination
simultaneously).
This book is both a scholarly work and a practical tool containing concrete
recommendations for security policymakers and practitioners. Our
recommendations take into account both regional and issue-specific
idiosyncrasies, but are, to a large extent, also universally applicable. Moreover,
they are concrete and focused on implementation (without, as noted above,
pretending to offer technical solutions).29 This book does not duplicate
existing works on trafficking (of which there has been a veritable explosion
over recent years), but rather complements them. It does so by crossreferencing existing toolkits,30 manuals, and scholarly writings as much as
possible. The book adds value to existing works on trafficking for several
reasons, as an overview of the respective chapters shows.
Part I: Issues
First, we discuss issues related to trafficking that are often mentioned, yet
rarely discussed systematically. Francesca Bosco, Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia,
and Anvar Serojitdinov begin Part 1 with an overview of global trafficking
patterns. The authors discuss the scope of trafficking, data problems, and which
forms of trafficking occur where. They also examine causes and consequences
of human trafficking.
In chapter two, Leslie Holmes explores the links between trafficking and
corruption. This link is often assumed to exist, yet this study is among the first
to explore, in detail, how corruption facilitates trafficking, and what policy
responses might help to mitigate the problem. Looking at what forms of
29
On the need for recommendations that take into account implementation challenges, see Gordon Peake
and Otwin Marenin, Their Reports Are Not Read and Their Recommendations Are Resisted: The
Challenge for the Global Police Policy Community, Police Practice and Research 9, no.1 (March
2008): 5969.
30
One of the best toolkits available is the: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Toolkit to Combat
Trafficking in Persons (UNODC: Vienna, 2006),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Trafficking_toolkit_Oct06.pdf (accessed January 18, 2009).
28
corruption facilitate trafficking, this chapter draws on both empirical examples

and theoretical debates. Without neglecting the limits, trade-offs, and
unintended consequences of counter-corruption policies, Holmes provides
recommendations for reducing trafficking-related corruption.
Links between trafficking and organised crime are not as clear and simple as
they seem. Chapter three, written by John T. Picarelli, critically examines the
extent to which organised crime groups have been involved in human
trafficking. Comparing current and historical trends, he shows that there is
much diversity with regard to the individuals and groups involved in human
trafficking. One of his main conclusions is that counter-traffickers need to
better understand their adversaries.
Trafficking and smuggling in people each have their own protocol to the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Smuggling is defined as
the illegal transfer of migrants across international boundaries. While trafficked
people are posited as victims, this is not the case for smuggled persons. In
contrast to this legal divide, Benjamin S. Buckland argues that there is much
cross-over and overlap between the two groups. Buckland suggests that, while
the categories of smuggled and trafficked may be clear-cut at the extremes,
there is a trafficking-smuggling continuum at the middle of which definitions
blur to the point that they often become unworkable.
Part II: Actors
The second part of the book also seeks to fill a gap in the literature. It does so
by looking at the role of specific security sector actors, providing concrete
recommendations for appropriate responses. The chapters also analyse the
trade-offs and unintended consequences of security actors participation in
counter-trafficking efforts. Jana Arsovska and Stef Janssens open this section
by discussing a central contributor to counter-trafficking: the police. Issues
examined include the practical and political difficulties of apprehending
traffickers and the challenges of transnational police cooperation.
Fred Schreier, in his chapter, argues that counter-trafficking activities should be
intelligence-led. The author highlights challenges of forging intelligence-led
coalitions and bridging institutional and national boundaries, as well as issues
of accountability and oversight in applying intelligence-led strategies against
organised crime in general and human trafficking in particular.
In chapter seven, Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens and Mariela Guajardo
discuss the contribution of migration management to counter-trafficking. As
29
well as examining the roles of a variety of actors, the authors explain that
migration management strategies can have a detrimental impact on the rights of
trafficked persons and migrants more generally, and propose strategies for
avoiding negative consequences of counter-trafficking efforts, particularly
those focusing on source countries.
International staff participating in peace operations have exacerbated problems
of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking. Soldiers, private military
contractors, police, and NGO staff have all been involved in exploitation and
abuse. This has not only led to human rights violations, but also undermined
stabilisation and peacebuilding objectives. In his chapter, Keith J. Allred
explores ways of improving strategies against abusive practices by personnel
participating in peace missions, discussing the loopholes and implementation
challenges that remain to be confronted.
In the final chapter of part two, Allison Jernow looks at the criminal justice
sector, as represented primarily by prosecutors and judges. Traffickers must be
prosecuted and victims of forced labour, including trafficking, protected, both
in courtrooms and before and after trial. The author examines the opportunities
and problems of criminal justice responses to trafficking, emphasising that
protecting the rights of trafficked persons should be at the core of prosecution
efforts.
Part III: Cooperation
The books third and final section focuses on the under-researched area of
counter-trafficking cooperation. Many argue that it takes networks to fight
(transnational) networks.31 However, netwars, striving at stealthy attacks on
criminal networks, tend to foster informal and often unaccountable governance.
Governments and their partners cannot emulate the practices of their criminal
opponents without running the risk of undermining their own legitimacylicit
actors have to abide by rules that illicit actors can afford to ignore.32
Constructing viable counter-trafficking networks is difficult from a practical
perspective as well, with numerous obstacles hampering cooperation. These
include a lack of capacity; legal loopholes; competition and turf battles
between institutions; divergent worldviews, standard operating procedures, and
31
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 2001).
32
For a critique of the netwar concept, see Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and
Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park,
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 261, note 15.
30
priorities of counter-trafficking actors; and a lack of trust due to fears over

corruption.
The literature on counter-crime governance and networks is still in its infancy.
With notable exceptions,33 existing works tend to focus on how specific actors,
especially states, fight specific crimes. What are needed are more systematic
assessments of how hybrid alliances, comprising both state and non-state
actors, can address more effectively illicit activities in which non-state actors
figure prominently. This third section addresses this deficit by offering
concrete recommendations for more effective, efficient, and legitimate countertrafficking cooperation between separate organisations within countries and
across borders.
In chapter 10, Phil Williams points out the obstacles to networked security
governance against human trafficking, and provides recommendations for how
to exploit vulnerabilities of criminal networks. Williams distinguishes between
different types of networks involved in human trafficking, showing that
networks have distinct advantages over hierarchically organised governments.
He thus takes issue with the claim that the power of illicit networks is
overestimated.34 At the same time, however, Williams argues that attacking
networks is not sufficient for reducing traffickingapproaches that attack
criminal markets are warranted.
Helga Konrad and Barbara Limanowska look closely at the conditions that
have stymied counter-trafficking cooperation, focusing on Southeast Europe.
Avoiding the rehearsal of commonplaces such as: transnational police
cooperation must be stepped up; intelligence must be exchanged; and the
judicial sector must cooperate with civil society organisations, Konrad and
Limanowska show that cooperation in the region has suffered from a law
enforcement bias. This bias is indicated by the dominance of coercive actors
such as Ministries of Interior in cooperation arrangements that has had a
detrimental impact on the protection of trafficked persons and the prevention of
trafficking. The authors posit that improving cooperation hinges on the
systematic protection of the human rights of vulnerable people.
Chapter 12 covers Transnational Referral Mechanisms (TRMs). Recognising
the progress made in coordinating national counter-trafficking responses,
Mariyana Radeva, Elisa Trossero, and Martijn Pluim offer a way forward for
33
See, for example, Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe.
34
See Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why
Al-Qaida May be Less Threatening Than Many Think, International Security 33, no.2 (Fall 2008): 7
44.
31
improving transnational cooperation. They discuss the objectives of TRMs;

their practical operation; links to National Referral Mechanisms; the challenges
faced by the TRM; and the conditions that must be present for TRMs to work
effectively.
The conclusion summarises the empirical findings and recommendations of the
book. It shows that further progress against human trafficking hinges on
progress in three (interrelated and overlapping) areas. First, international
agreements, national laws, and working practices must be better implemented.
Second, it is important to overcome the obstacles to better counter-trafficking
networking. Third, there is a need for more research on the scope and nature of
trafficking, and for evaluating the impact of counter-trafficking measures, in a
way that is free of political pressure, institutional competition, and prejudice.
In reducing trafficking, security sector activities are not sufficient, even if these
are effective, efficient, and legitimate. Whether progress can be made depends
on numerous conditions, many of which are beyond the remit of security
actors. Nevertheless, a properly functioning counter-trafficking security sector
is necessary for reducing human trafficking. By focusing on issues (Part 1),
security sector actors (Part 2), and counter-trafficking cooperation (Part 3), this
book offers a hybrid approach for improving efforts against human trafficking.
32
PART 1: Issues
33
CHAPTER 1
Human Trafficking Patterns
Francesca Bosco, Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Anvar Serojitdinov (UNICRI)
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of global trafficking patterns. It begins with
an analysis of the extent of the phenomenon before going on to examine some
of its main features and causes. Part 1 of this chapter covers data collection
constraints, existing figures on human trafficking, including different datasets
and data collection efforts on the national, regional and global level, as well as
some common assumptions. Parts 2 and 3 focus on the forms and prevalence of
human trafficking in different regions, while part 4 provides general
information on the types of criminals and criminal structures involved. It
contains also a brief description of the profiles of victims of trafficking and the
risks and hardships that they incur. Parts 5 and 6 analyse the factors that drive
the crime and its consequences. Part 7 deals with prevention, prosecution and
protection. It also covers various measures and types of national and
international cooperation in the fight against human trafficking. The chapter
concludes with recommendations. Specific and detailed aspects of the complex
issue presented in this chapter will have dedicated chapters further on in this
volume.
1. Data and Data Problems: Figures and Caveats
Although various international and national entities are today tackling human
trafficking, reliable information is still lacking on the scale of the phenomenon,
on the way it works, and on the most effective means to prevent it. One of the
major gaps in knowledge lies in the area of data collection. In spite of some
recent progress, there are relatively few reliable sources of information
available on the actual numbers of people trafficked. Better data will lead to an
improved understanding of the problem. Moreover, a deeper understanding will
produce better protection, detection, enforcement, and prevention strategies.
35
Since trafficking is typically a hidden behaviour, estimates are needed to

assess the severity of the phenomenon. Accurate estimates have to be based on
known data, rather than on secondary information or speculation.1 Below, we
provide a non-exhaustive set of factors that stand in the way of collecting
reliable data and producing reliable estimates on human trafficking.
1.1 Lack of Legislation and Harmonised National Definitions of Human
Trafficking
o
Some countries have not yet incorporated the provisions of the United
Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
Persons into their national legislation.2 Thus, they have neither
legislation against human trafficking, nor a clear distinction between
smuggling of migrants and human trafficking. Consequently,
information related to irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and
trafficking is mixed.
Countries lacking specific legislation on human trafficking face two

problems:
The focus of police investigations shifts to associated criminal

elements, and human trafficking crimes are reported under
different criminal provisions, leading to a lack of good
statistical data.3
There are no official criminal justice statistics on human

trafficking cases or on the numbers of police-recorded crimes
and of prosecuted and convicted persons.
The narrow application of counter-trafficking legislation to sexual

exploitation (to the exclusion of labour trafficking, for example) results
J. Albanese, A Criminal Network Approach to Understanding & Measuring Trafficking in Human

Beings, in Measuring Human Trafficking: Complexities and Pitfalls, ed. E. Savona and S. Stefanizzi
(New York: Springer, 2007), 58.
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN Trafficking
Protocol), attached to the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN TOCC), was opened
for signature in December 2000 in Palermo, Italy. Among other things, it provided the international
community with a definition of human trafficking. For the texts of the Protocol and Convention, see:
http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/legal_framework/un.php (accessed March 24, 2009).
F. Laczko, Human Trafficking: The Need for Better Data, Migration Information Source, (November
2002), 16. Available at: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=66 (accessed
on August 25, 2008).
36
in few investigations and in almost nonexistent statistics on these

cases.4
1.2 Lack of Systematic Data Collection
Among those countries that have signed and ratified the UN

Trafficking Protocol, only few systematically collect and/or publish
data on human trafficking. This makes it difficult to accurately
establish the extent to which human trafficking may be increasing or
decreasing.5
Data collection differs from agency to agency. Frequently, data on

human trafficking collected by international agencies and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) is programme-specific. In view of
the fact that each agency collects information according to its own
needs, it is possible that the same case appears in data produced by
more than one organisation. In addition, data often covers only those
who have received certain types of assistance (for example, persons
enrolled in assisted return programmes or those accommodated in
shelters). Data collection also varies according to the resources of any
given organisation. Some are better financed and accord greater
priority to data collection than others. Finally, some agencies compile
data over a one-year period (for example), while others produce
statistics only for the duration of a specific project.6
Data is not collected for comparative purposes. Types of data collected

by various countries and agencies may differ. To take just one
example, data may be either investigative or judicial. Investigative data
may refer to the initial phase of investigation or to the phase in which
K. Kangaspunta, Collecting Data on Human Trafficking: Availability, Reliability and Comparability

of Trafficking Data, in Measuring Human Trafficking: Complexities and Pitfalls, ed. E. Savona and S.
Stefanizzi (New York: Springer, 2007), 2737.
F. Laczko, Enhancing Data Collection and Research on Trafficking in Persons, in Measuring Human
Trafficking: Complexities and Pitfalls, ed. E. Savona and S. Stefanizzi (New York: Springer, 2007), 40.
For further reading, see: US Government Accountability Office, Human Trafficking: Better Data,
Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance US Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad (Washington D.C.: US
Government Accountability Office, 2006). Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06825.pdf
(accessed March 24, 2009).
Among others, see F. Laczko and M. Gramegna., Developing Better Indicators of Human
Trafficking. The Brown Journal of World Affairs X, no.1 (summer/fall 2003): 184. Available at:
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/10.1/SexTrafficking/Laczko.pdf (accessed August 25,
2008); E. Savona and S. Stefanizzi, Introduction in Measuring Human Trafficking: Complexities and
Pitfalls, ed. E. Savona and S. Stefanizzi (New York: Springer, 2007), 23.
37
investigations are concluded. In some countries, data is only

investigative and is collected at the beginning of an investigation. In
others, data refers to concluded investigations, or to convictions.7
Differing data collection methodologies hinder comparability across
countries and international agencies.
o
Often, NGOs gather extremely useful first-hand information. However,

their data storage (or sharing) systems are sometimes inadequate,
resulting in the loss of information.8
1.3 Lack of Criminal Justice Response9

o
Human trafficking as only a low priority for law enforcement results

in:
Lack of investigation, lack of prosecution, no convictions and

no records of cases, in addition to large discrepancies in law
enforcement preparedness to address human trafficking.10
Inadequate protection for witnesses/victims prevents them

from testifying. Many trafficked people are usually unaware of
their non-liability for the infringement of immigration laws.
Thus, many are reluctant to report or testify, fearing
deportation as undocumented migrants. In many cases,
trafficking victims are not promptly identified as such, and end
up being repatriated. Also, many victims do not approach law
enforcement authorities for fear of threats by criminal
organisations exploiting them or possible stigmatisation at
home. As a result, most trafficking crimes go unreported.
Criminal justice services pay little attention to gathering information

on trafficking victims. The number and characteristics of victims that
are known to investigative and judicial authorities is of crucial
importance. This data would not only lead to a better understanding of
A. Di Nicola and A. Cauduro, Review of Official Statistics on Trafficking in Human Beings for
Sexual Exploitation and their Validity in the 25 EU Member States from Official Statistics to Estimates
of the Phenomenon in Measuring Human Trafficking: Complexities and Pitfalls, ed. E. Savona and S.
Di Nicola and Cauduro, Review of Official Statistics on Trafficking, 8586.
For more information see Chapter 9 of this volume, Human Trafficking, Prosecutors, and Judges by
Allison Jernow.
10
Albanese, A Criminal Network Approach, 58.
38
trafficking trends but it would also help put in place effective

prevention strategies.
1.4 Existing Figures on Human Trafficking
Without good estimates it is difficult for countries to determine the level of
resources that should be allocated to counter-trafficking initiatives. This also
hinders efforts to map the phenomenon that might help orient law enforcement
actions.11 Without information on trafficking trends over time, countries and
agencies are ill equipped to adequately assess the impact of prevention and
intervention efforts and hence built better knowledge-based policies. For this
reason, several estimates on the scope of the problem have been released in
recent years.
According to the estimates of the International Labour Organization (ILO), at
least 2.45 million people worldwide find themselves in forced labour as a result
of human trafficking at any given time.12 This figure includes both
transnational and internal trafficking. The ILO study suggests that most people
are trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation (43 per cent) or for economic
exploitation (32 per cent).
The destination region ranked first in the ILO study is Asia and the Pacific,
with an estimated 1.36 million victims trafficked there for forced labour. About
270,000 people are trafficked to industrialised countries, 250,000 to Latin
America and the Caribbean, and around 230,000 people to forced labour in the
Middle East and North Africa. The authors of the study explain the lower
estimates for Africa (130,000) and for transition economies (200,000) by
reference to the fact that many people from these regions are trafficked towards
other regions, including industrialised countries.
According to a 2006 United States (US) Department of State report, about
800,000 people are trafficked every year across international borders
worldwide.13 This figure does not include people trafficked internally.
11
Di Nicola and Cauduro, Review of Official Statistics on Trafficking, 93.
12
P. Belser and M. de Cock, ILO Minimum Estimate of Forced Labour in the World (Geneva:
International Labour Organization, 2005), 45. Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081913.pdf (accessed August 25, 2008).
13
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington D.C.: United States Department of
State, June 2008), 7. Available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/ (accessed February 2,
2009).
39
These two estimates differ less than one might think. In fact, taking into
account the average duration of exploitation (about two years), the ILO study
compared its results (2,450,000 people at any given time) with the US estimate
(800,000 annually), thus converting its stock estimate into annual flows. This
results in 1,225,000 people trafficked annually for forced labour transnationally
as well as internally.14
1.5 Different Datasets and Data Collection Efforts
Global Level
Four bodies have databases on global trafficking levels and flows: the
International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and
the US Government. Among these, only the ILO and the US Government have
sought to estimate the total number of victims worldwide, while the UNODC
traces the major international trafficking routes and the IOM collects data on
assisted victims.15
In the absence of solid and widely accepted national estimates from which to
derive regional and global figures, the ILO Special Action Programme to
Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) has developed its own methodology, relying
on reported cases of trafficking for forced labour. The result of ILO research
has been a minimum estimate on the total number of victims of human
trafficking worldwide.16
The UNODC Global Database on Trafficking Trends was established to collect
open source information on trafficking in persons that can be compared
between different countries and regions. The database includes 5,000 episodes
from 400 documents with information on 161 countries and special
administrative territories provided by 113 source institutions. By June 2004,
information from 500 sources had been entered, mostly from industrialised
countries.17
14
Belser and de Cock, ILO Minimum Estimate of Forced Labour, 35.
15
UNODC, Human Trafficking: An Overview (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
2008), 6. Available at: http://www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/knowledge/ebook.pdf (accessed October
15, 2008).
16
Belser and de Cock, ILO Minimum Estimate of Forced Labour, 1314.
17
Albanese, A Criminal Network Approach, 58.
40
A significant data collection effort has also been undertaken by the IOM.
Information from all IOM counter-trafficking programmes worldwide is
collected in a standardised data-management tool, the Counter-Trafficking
Module, which contains information on more than 12,750 documented victims
(between November 1999 and June 2008). This tool aims to facilitate the
management of IOMs direct assistance, movement and reintegration process,
as well as map individual trafficking experiences. It strengthens research
capacity, provides a better understanding of the causes, processes, trends and
consequences of trafficking and it serves as a knowledge bank, from which
statistics and detailed reports can be drawn, informing research, programme
development and policy making on counter-trafficking.18
Lastly, the US State Department issues an annual Trafficking in Persons
Report, collecting data from US embassies, foreign government officials,
NGOs and international organisations, as well as from published reports,
research trips, and information submitted to the State Department by e-mail. In
its report, the US State Department also assesses counter-trafficking efforts
undertaken by every country in the world.
Regional Level
Despite some improvement in recent years, regional statistics and research on
irregular migration and human trafficking remain highly unsatisfactory. The
European Union (EU) has agreed upon a uniform definition along the lines of
that found in the UN Protocol and the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Nonetheless, data collection
efforts in the EU have been difficult. There is almost no data on the number of
irregular migrants or labour migrants in search of jobs who may have resorted
to the services of traffickers and ended up being exploited. In addition, very
little is known about the numbers and profiles of individuals working in or for
criminal groups involved in human trafficking. Statistics on the numbers and
characteristics of the various categories of trafficked persons are almost
impossible to obtain.
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was established on March 1, 2007,
with a mandate to collect and analyse data on human trafficking.19 Since then,
18
IOM, Countertrafficking http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/748 (accessed October 25, 2008).
19
European Commission, The Creation of a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights is a
Fundamental Element of the EU Policy to Respect and Promote Fundamental Rights, 2007, EU Justice
and Home Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/rights/fsj_rights_agency_en.htm (accessed
October 21, 2008).
41
the agency has started collecting, recording, analysing and disseminating

objective, reliable and comparable information.
In the Balkans, a regional database on human trafficking was created by a
Regional Clearing Point of the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in
Human Beings. The first annual report on victims of human trafficking in
South-Eastern Europe provides figures on the number of victims of trafficking
identified and assisted in the seven Balkan countries along with Kosovo and
Montenegro, as well as describing the mechanisms of assistance and
protection.20
In Asia, the IOM has implemented a pilot project aimed at improving data
collection on human trafficking in several ASEAN member countries
(Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand). The purpose of this
project is to assist selected beneficiary countries in developing an improved
statistical collection system on trafficking. The first phase of the project
involved an analysis of data collection systems and ended with a situation
report published in 2007.21
National Level
A few examples of national efforts are provided below. One report from 2004
suggests that information on trafficking in EU member countries is still mainly
obtained from statistics pertaining to general crime or to migration and is
usually scattered throughout several different, often disparate, national
databases.22 Furthermore, in many countries, the existing databases are
confidential, and their information can be used just for other investigative
purposes. In addition, collected data is frequently very general. This does not
20
IOM, First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe (Vienna: International
Organization for Migration, Counter-Trafficking Regional Clearing Point, 2003). Available at:
http://www.iom.hu/PDFs/First per cent20Annual per cent20Report per cent20on per cent20VoT per
cent20in per cent20SEE.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008). For more information on the regional
trends of human trafficking in South-East Europe, see the reports of B. Limanowska, Trafficking in
Human Beings in Southeastern Europe (UNICEF/UNHCHR/OSCE/ODIHR, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).
Available at: http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/04/13771_211_en.pdf (accessed March 2,
2009).
21
IOM, ASEAN and Trafficking in Persons: Using Data as a Tool to Combat Trafficking in Persons
(Jakarta: International Organization for Migration, 2007). Available at
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/lowres
per cent20asean per cent20report-complete.pdf (accessed February 1, 2009).
22
A. Cauduro, A. Di Nicola, A Study for Monitoring the Trafficking of Human Beings for the Purpose of
Sexual Exploitation in the EU Member States, Mon-Eu-Traf II (STOP II), Final Report (Brussels:
European Commission, 2004).
42
help in understanding trends, producing reliable estimates and in preventing the

phenomenon.
The German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation and the Dutch National
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings are two of the few systematic
providers of national statistics on human trafficking in Europe. Each year,
Germany produces a report on known cases of trafficking and on existing
trends. The Netherlands, in turn, have established a National Rapporteur, who
has been able to map data collected by different agencies in the country. The
Dutch methodology could be used, for example, as a basis for a European
model for data collection with the inclusion of data referring to trafficking for
labour exploitation.
The activities of NGOs are also very important for to the collection of human
trafficking information. Nonetheless, the data collection and storage systems of
many European NGOs working in the field are not entirely adequate. The
number of EU NGOs with regularly updated databases on human trafficking is
still fairly small. On the other hand, some Eastern European source and transit
countries have been supported in the development of special anti-trafficking
programmes, including data collection. In many states in the region, NGOs
possess significant information. Nonetheless, problems arise because of
differing recording systems and procedures. Outside Europe, the problems
seem to be similar: lack of common definitions, non-comparable, poor and
scattered data sources, and a very large number of estimates with obscure
origins.23
1.6 Common Assumptions Related to Human Trafficking
There are a great deal of (often inaccurate) assumptions related to trafficking.
One of these is that trafficking for sexual exploitation is more widespread than
trafficking for labour exploitation. Trafficking for labour exploitation has been
(and is currently) underreported. For several years, discussions on human
trafficking focused solely on trafficking for sexual exploitation. In addition,
considering that many countries for several years did not even recognise
trafficking for labour exploitation as a problem, the identification of victims of
this form of trafficking has been less successful than in the case of sexual
exploitation.
23
K. Aromaa, Trafficking in Human Beings: Uniform Definitions for Better Measuring and for Effective
Counter-Measures, in Measuring Human Trafficking: Complexities and Pitfalls, ed. E. Savona and S.
43
Trafficking for labour exploitation has only recently been included in the
legislation of many countries. However, even when adequate legislation is in
place, cases involving labour exploitation are often not recognised as
trafficking cases. In many countries, there is limited awareness of labour
situations corresponding to human trafficking. Moreover, trafficking for labour
exploitation in some countries is not seen as a crime but, rather, as an issue to
be dealt with through labour regulations and trade unions. In addition, the
media often finds sexual exploitation to be a more appealing topic than labour
exploitation. Unlike trafficking for sexual exploitation, labour exploitation is
often not as visible and is less stigmatised by society. Frequently, sexual
exploitation and labour exploitation are both present in the same case.
Types of exploitation can vary in different regions. In Central and South
Eastern Europe, sexual exploitation is the predominant form of exploitation
reported. The situation is reportedly similar in Latin America, the Caribbean
and in Western Europe. The situation differs in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). While some states (such as Belarus, Moldova, the
Russian Federation and Ukraine) are frequently reported as origin countries for
sexual trafficking to Europe, other CIS countries in the Caucasus and Central
Asia have observed trafficking for labour exploitation into Kazakhstan and the
Russian Federation. Labour exploitation cases are reported by the majority of
sources in Africa24 and are also frequently reported in Asia, Oceania and North
America.
Another common assumption that has to be clarified is that trafficking always
involves organised crime and sophisticated transnational networks.25 As we
will see later in this chapter, human trafficking may instead involve a number
of people, each playing his or her own role in loose networks. Some of these
individuals (such as pilots and train or bus drivers), may unknowingly
participate in the process, while others (for example, document forgers, owners
of clubs and brothels, or recruitment agents who lure victims by using false
promises of employment) are fully aware of the crime they are involved in.
Travel agents, for instance, are found on both sides: they can unknowingly
participate or they can be fully aware of the human trafficking operations.
24
UNODC, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
2006), 65. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/traffickinginpersons_report_2006-04.pdf (accessed
September 27, 2008).
25
For more information see Chapter 3 of this volume on Human Trafficking and Organised Crime by
John Picarelli.
44
The human trafficking chain also involves many other people: investors who
provide the money; organisers who plan the operation; corrupt public officials
who accept bribes to enable people to enter and exit illegally;26 informers who
gather information on border surveillance and transit procedures; drivers
responsible for moving people from one point to another; enforcers responsible
for policing staff and migrants; local people in transit points who provide
accommodation and other assistance; debt collectors and money-movers who
launder the criminal proceeds.27
Small or large-scale organised crime is often the engine of the human
trafficking process. There are episodes of human trafficking undertaken by
occasional operators but it seems that significant trafficking flows have to be
supported by organised criminals to be sustained in the medium to long term.
Organised crime entails a stable organisation that is involved in various
criminal activities,28 as reflected in the definition of organised crime groups
found in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (article 5).29
In Europe, groups that operate in human trafficking represent mainly loose
networks, rather than hierarchically structured organisations. These
organisations include different nationals operating in their area of competence
and, while they specialise in human trafficking, they also operate in related
26
For more information see Chapter 2 of this volume on Human Trafficking and Corruption by Les
Holmes.
27
F. David and P. Monzini, Human Smuggling and Trafficking: a Desk Review on the Trafficking in
Women from the Philippines (paper presented at the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Vienna, Austria, April 1017, 2000; Doc A/Conf. 187/CRP.
April 15, 2000) in Human Trafficking in Europe: An Economic Perspective, ed. G. Van Liemt (Geneva:
International Labour Organization, 2004), 14.
28
J. Finckenauer, Russian Transnational Organised Crime and Human Trafficking, in Global Human
Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, ed. D. Kyle and R. Koslowki (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2001), 166186.
29
Article 5(1) states: Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or
completion of the criminal activity: (i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious
crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit
and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in
furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group; (ii) Conduct by a person who,
with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its
intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in: a. Criminal activities of the
organized criminal group; b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his
or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim;
(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of serious crime
involving an organized criminal group.
45
areas such as pimping, forgery of documents, smuggling of migrants and

money-laundering.30 There can also be particular specialisation, depending on
the origin of the trafficked persons and on the type of exploitation.
A particular feature, for instance, of trafficking in Nigerian girls and women to
Europe for sexual exploitation lies in the role of women in the management of
the whole process.31 A 2004 study by the United Nations Interregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) revealed that men play a marginal role
since it is the madam who is in charge of the direct management of the
victims, from recruitment to exploitation. An upside to this practice is the fact
that sexual violence by pimps is less of an issue. In all probability it is not a
structured organisation according to a strongly hierarchical model (as the
Italian mafia organisations) [which deals with trafficking of Nigerian women
for sexual exploitation], but numerous criminal groups, horizontally linked and
characterised by flexibility, a high level of specialization, and a system of
network links which is not easily visible from the outside.32 This type of
organisation has advantages. Firstly, such loose networks are usually much less
visible and attract less attention from law enforcement authorities. Secondly,
high levels of organisational flexibility allow criminals to take rapid decisions
and to adapt their tactics and strategies.
Traffickers calculate risk (of being caught, of having to pay fines, of seeing
their assets confiscated), reward and effort involved, both in absolute terms and
in comparison with other activities.33 The profits generated by human
trafficking are colossal. The ILO estimates that the gains from human
trafficking for both commercial sexual and economic exploitation may
approach 31.6 billion US dollars a year.34 People are both plentiful and cheap.
Also, the risks involved are quite low compared to the gravity of the crime.
Sexual exploitation seems to be the activity generating the highest revenues.
The total profits from sexual exploitation are estimated at 27.8 billion US
30
UNODC, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, 23.
31
UNICRI, Trafficking of Nigerian Girls to Italy (Turin: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice
Research Institute, 2003), 7980. Available at:
http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/nigeria/docs/rr_prina_eng.pdf (accessed September 22, 2008).
32
UNICRI, Trafficking of Nigerian Girls to Italy, 92.
33
V. L. Gijbert, Human Trafficking in Europe: An Economic Perspective (Geneva: International Labour

Organization, 2004), 17. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081992.pdf (accessed September 17, 2008).
34
P. Belser, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits (Geneva: International Labour
Organization, 2005), 17. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081971.pdf (accessed September 11, 2008).
46
dollars.35 Apart from the price of the services, sexually exploited women are
often being sold, rented and even resold. All actors involved in the trafficking
chain profit from this criminal activity. In 2008, an NGO stated, with the
average price of full sex in a London brothel at a current estimate of 61.93, a
woman working five days a week, serving three customers per day for 48
weeks in a year would generate 44,589.60 annually. The report goes on,
based on an absolute minimum of 1,198 women working solely in brothels
which advertise through local London newspapers, an estimated 53.5 million
is generated for brothels through this medium alone.36 In order to disguise the
crime, human traffickers create fake model agencies, film production studios,
and marriage agencies to recruit women. These agencies are also used to
launder money and enable reinvestment into other criminal and grey-market
activities.37
Another assumption is that better prosecution would solve the problem of
human trafficking.38 Better prosecution can enhance the fight against human
trafficking but prosecution alone cannot be a panacea to the problem. Despite
the criminalisation of human trafficking in many countries, very few traffickers
are being prosecuted and convicted. Of course, the small number of cases can
be viewed as a positive sign, suggesting that human trafficking is not so
widespread. However, the real figures are not as low as the number of court
cases appears to show. The fact that only a few traffickers have been
successfully prosecuted is linked with the difficulty of identifying cases of
trafficking and an absence of intelligence collection. The identification of
trafficking cases and the prosecution of perpetrators often requires testimony
by the victims, which they are often reluctant to do. In many cases, this is due
to (often justified) fears that they identity of witnesses will not be protected, or
that victims or relevant state officials will be subject to intimidation.
35
Belser, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking, 17.
36
J. Bindel and H. Atkins, Big Brothel: A Survey Of The Off-Street Sex Industry In London (London:
Eaves Housing for Women, 2008), 25. Available at: http://www.eaves4women.co.uk/Publications.php.
37
Georgina Vaz Cabral, La traite des tres humains : Ralits de lesclavage contemporain (Paris: La
Dcouverte, 2006), 4751.
38
For more information see Chapter 9 of this volume, Human Trafficking, Prosecutors, and Judges by
Allison Jernow.
47
2. Types of Human Trafficking

2.1 Forced Labour
According to the ILO, forced labour is a work or service exacted from a
person under threat or penalty, which includes penal sanctions and the loss of
rights and privileges, where the person has not offered him/herself
voluntarily.39 Forced labour takes place because unscrupulous employers
exploit gaps in national legislation. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable,
although even individuals can suffer from forced labour exploitation within
their own countries. Many women and girls in situations of domestic servitude
are also sexually exploited. Criminal groups and networks may also subjugate
large numbers of workers to involuntary servitude in household work or in
factories, construction, sports, agriculture and mining.
In some regions, a sizeable number of labour migrants end up working under
conditions of debt bondage and servitude. Several factors contribute to these
practices: abuse of contracts, inadequate local laws on recruitment and
employment of migrant labourers, and the imposition of exploitative costs and
debts on labour migrants in their country of origin, often with the complicity of
labour agencies and employers in the country of destination.40
Domestic servitude usually involves the use of force or coercion (physical and
emotional abuse). Children are particularly vulnerable. Sometimes parents are
approached by family friends who promise to take the child abroad and provide
him/her with better living conditions and educational opportunities. In the end,
children end up becoming domestic servants, working under slave-like
conditions for families abroad. Domestic servitude is rather difficult to detect
since it takes place in private homes. Countries of the EU as well as some
wealthier countries of Asia and the Middle East have witnessed a growing
demand for domestic servants, some of whom end up in forced labour. This
type of forced labour has also been detected among people trafficked to
Thailand from other countries, and among those assisted by the IOM in
Indonesia.41
39
K. N. Ruwanpura and P. Rai, Forced Labour: Definition, Indicators and Measurement (Geneva:
International Labour Organization, 2005), 3. Available at:
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=forcedlabor (accessed
August 23, 2008).
40

2008), 20. Available at: www.state.gov/g/tip (accessed September 30, 2008).
41
UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, 2009), 55. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-ontrafficking-in-persons.html (accessed February 2, 2009).
48
The trafficking and selling of children and their exploitation in bonded and
forced labour are considered to be the worst forms of child labour. A child is
considered victim of human trafficking for the purpose of forced labour if
he/she is being exploited in conditions similar to involuntary servitude, debt
bondage, or slavery through the use of force, fraud or coercion. Children are
often exploited as a cheap labour force in construction, mining and agriculture.
2.2 Sexual Exploitation
Human trafficking for sexual exploitation comprises a significant portion of
overall human trafficking activities. It would be not possible for this type of
human trafficking to exist without demand for commercial sex around the
world. Even though commercial sexual exploitation has been criminalised,42
sexual trafficking continues to take place in almost every country of the world,
be it a place of origin, transit or destination.
For recruitment, traffickers resort to deception, in particular through false
promises of well-paid jobs or opportunities to study abroad. As was suggested
above, they often create fake model agencies, film production studios, and
marriage agencies for the purposes of recruitment and to cover the crime. In
many cases, victims find themselves abroad, locked in apartments, with their
passports confiscated by traffickers who coerce them to work in prostitution
through threats, use of force, abuse and rape. Very often, the victims are
promised their freedom only after earning their purchase price, as well as their
travel and visa costs, through prostitution. In addition to the many trafficked
adults, UNICEF estimates that about two million children are exploited every
year in the global commercial sex industry.43
42
Some key instruments applicable and relevant to trafficking in persons include: Council of Europe
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005); Brussels Declaration on Preventing
and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (2002); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2000); Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995);
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993); Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979); Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949). For the full texts see:
http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/legal_framework/un.php (accessed June 14, 2009).
43
UNICEF, All Children Deserve Protection from Exploitation and Abuse, UNICEF Child Protection,
http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_csec.html (accessed November 25, 2008).
49
2.3 Begging and Involvement in Criminal Activities

After prostitution, the most visible forms of exploitation in the streets are
begging and peddling (selling small equipment, flowers and cigarettes).
Research conducted in Greece showed that during the 1990s thousands of
children worked in the streets of all major cities in the country (Athens and
Thessaloniki but also Patras, Larissa, Ioannina, Kavala and Heraklion). From
1993 to 1999 an average of 300 children per year, mostly Albanians, were
arrested in Athens for involvement in begging. Recently, this number seems to
have diminished. However, experts agree that trafficking continues. With little
information about what happens to the children exploited during this period,
children (and girls especially) apparently shift from economic exploitation to
sexual exploitation when they reach the age of twelve. In Greece,
approximately 10 per cent of female prostitutes are minors, and 75 per cent of
these are Albanians.44 In France, begging especially concerns Romanian
children of the Roma community. In one prominent case, a Ukrainian network
sent young deaf-mute people to sell trinkets in public places in France, Spain,
Portugal and Germany, as well as throughout the rest of Europe.45
Another purpose of human trafficking involves the use of trafficked people in
criminal activities. Human traffickers and criminal groups prefer minors to
adults: children are easier to control; and their relatively small stature gives
them an advantage in committing crimes such as burglary or shoplifting. In one
case, a trafficking organisation exploited minors, some as young as thirteen
years old, forcing them to shoplift in Northern Italy. Joint investigations started
in February 2005 and were carried out in both Italy and Romania.
Collaborative work between Romanian and Italian police revealed a total of
100 people trafficked to the Piedmont region (Italy) from the Bistrita-Nasaud
District (Romania) for the purposes of shoplifting. All of the minors belonged
to extremely poor families and were usually recruited in schools or discos.
Only in very few cases did the families report their disappearance to the police.
Following the investigation, three persons were arrested in Turin and three in
Bistrita.46
44
Vaz Cabral, La traite des tres humains : Ralits de lesclavage contemporain, 149150.
45
Idem.
46
C. Bianconi, Trafficking of Minors for Robbery: a Successful Case Prosecuted by Turin Public
Prosecution Office (PowerPoint Presentation). Available at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Turin_Statements/BIANCONI.pdf (accessed
November 27, 2008).
50
2.4 Organ Removal

The UN Trafficking Protocol lists among the purposes of human trafficking the
removal of organs or other human tissues. This would appear to mostly concern
the trafficking of kidneys, since removing other organs would require the donor
to be killed, which occurs very rarely. Although the link between human
trafficking and organ trafficking has not been clearly established, some
similarities are evident. Root causes are the same, namely poverty and lack of
employment opportunities. Sometimes organ removal happens by means of
total deception or coercion. There have been cases reported in Argentina,
Brazil and India of people hospitalized to treat an unrelated illness or accident
who underwent surgery for kidney removal without their knowledge or
consent.
Moreover, there have been rumours of street children in Latin America and
children from impoverished families in Eastern Europe being kidnapped or sold
and sometimes even murdered for their organs. Although not verified, media
reports have also connected the illegal adoption trade to trafficking in organs.
Furthermore, there have been reported cases of children trafficked, within and
from Africa, in order to use their organs during rituals.47 According to a study
by UNODC, victims of human trafficking for organ removal, ritual killings and
mystic practices were recorded in Chad, Egypt, Israel, Liberia, Malawi,
Moldova and in a few states in India.48
2.5 Exploitation in Armed Forces and Conflict49
Human trafficking for the purpose of military exploitation occurs when human
brokers import labourers (from impoverished regions within the same country
or from a third country) to work in military bases. A series of abusive practices
happen during the trafficking and exploitation process, including debt bondage,
confiscation of passports, and forced or coerced labour. Some contracting and
47
E. Pearson, Coercion in the Kidney Trade? A Background Study on Trafficking in Human Organs
Worldwide (Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ], 2004), 11.
Available at: http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-svbf-organ-trafficking-e.pdf (accessed November 15,
2008).
48
UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 5255.
49
For more information see Chapter 8 of this volume, Human Trafficking and Peacekeepers by Keith J.
Allred.
51
subcontracting firms in military bases in Afghanistan and Iraq have been

reportedly involved in such abusive practices.50
One of the worst forms of human trafficking is the use of child soldiers in
conflict areas. According to a UNODC report, the recruitment of child soldiers
is not uncommon in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.51 According to
UNICEF, more than 300,000 child soldiers have been and still are exploited in
more than thirty armed conflicts in almost every region of the world.52 While
the majority of child soldiers are between the ages of fifteen and eighteen,
some are as young as seven or eight.
A variety of armed forces use child soldiers, including government forces, progovernment paramilitary factions, militias and self-defence units, as well as
insurgent groups. Relatively few former child soldiers go through disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Despite negotiated peace
agreements or ongoing peace processes, trafficked children used as child
soldiers and deprived of their childhood can keep on finding themselves in
situations of exploitation. Even when this is not the case, some returning child
soldiers are rejected by their home communities. The problem of child soldiers
is a global one; however, it is particularly critical in Western and Central Africa
(for example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad), as well as
in Asia (for example, in Sri Lanka, Burma and the Philippines), in the
Americas (for example, in Colombia)53 and in the Middle East where armed
groups are also unlawfully using children in conflict areas.54
2.6 Forced Marriage
Forced marriage is a practice with deep historical roots in which at least one of
the parties is married against his/her will and consent. Today, forced marriage
50
C. Simpson, Iraq War Contractors Ordered to End Abuses, Chicago Tribune, April 23, 2006.
Available at: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-060423pipeline-story,0,1853590.story
(accessed November 4, 2008).
51
52
UNICEF, Factsheet: Child Soldiers. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf

(accessed October 15, 2008).
53
54
Among others, see J. C. Andvig and G. Gates, Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict (Pittsburgh:
Ford Institute for Human Security, 2007). Available at:
http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/andvig_07_recruiting_0109.pdf (accessed February 15, 2009); J.
Becker, Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka and Nepal (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007).
Available at: http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/becker_07_child_recruitment_0109.pdf (accessed
February 15, 2009).
52
can also be linked to human trafficking. Despite being recognised as a human

rights violation and being condemned by the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA), the practice of forced marriage occurs on a significant scale today.
In some Asian countries with asymmetrical sex ratios (due to preferences for
male children and as a result of one-child policies), men outnumber women by
117 to 100. Once they become adults, the social pressure to marry often leads
these men to resort to human trafficking services in order to purchase a bride
from another country.55 According to the US State Department, it is not
uncommon that, in some villages, most of the marriages result from human
trafficking. Victims of trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage are often
also exploited by recipient families as domestic workers and sex slaves. The
UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons mentions specifically Indian
victims of trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage.56
Forced marriage is also reported in the US and in other Western countries,
where mail-order-bride agencies, or international introduction services, are
commonly advertised.57 Pictures, body measurements and descriptions of
advertised women are provided by the agencies on-line. The descriptions
follow sexist stereotypes of Russian women to market them to potential
Western consumers. Although there are many successful cases of women
getting happily married to foreigners through marriage agencies, recruiters
occasionally use this method to contact vulnerable young women eager to
migrate in search of a brighter future.58 In the United Kingdom (UK), the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office has established the Forced Marriage Unit, a
joint initiative with the Home Office, which handles about 400 cases per year,
some of which seem to be related to human trafficking.59
55
Action to End Exploitation, Forced Marriage, http://endexploitation.org/forced-marriages.html

56
57
D. M. Hughes, The Role of Marriage Agencies in Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Women from
the Former Soviet Union, International Review of Victimology 11, no.1 (2004): 4971.
58
UNICRI, Desk Review on Trafficking in Minors for Commercial Sexual Exploitation: Ukraine (Turin:
UNICRI, 2005): 1921. Available at: http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/minors/docs/dr_ukraine.pdf
59
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Forced Marriage Unit, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-inaction/nationals/forced-marriage-unit (accessed March 3, 2009).
53
2.7 Illicit Adoption

Illegal adoption of children as a form of human trafficking has become a highly
profitable activity for organised criminal groups, private child adoption firms
and state officials around the world, driven partly by demand for international
adoption, particularly in Europe and the US. However, trafficking for illicit
adoption can occur not only transnationally, but internally as well. Through
various means, such as abduction and falsification of adoption permits,
criminals take advantage of shortcomings in legislation, law enforcement, birth
registration and social welfare systems. In some African countries, due to an
inexistent system of birth registration, it is almost impossible for local
authorities to track the numbers and the locations of children that have been
illegally adopted.
In both East and South-East Asia, trafficking in children occurs largely for
domestic illegal adoption. Deeply rooted traditional beliefs that favour male
children serve as a driving forces for illegal adoption in China. The one-childfamily policy (enforced in China since the 1980s) has only exacerbated the
problem. According to a national survey conducted in 2000 by Chinese police,
a total of 10,768 children were abducted and trafficked between 1980 and
1999, primarily for the purpose of illegal adoption.60
In Central America, and particularly in Guatemala, trafficking of minors for
illicit international adoption has become a lucrative trade. Guatemala is known
for having the highest number (per capita) of international adoptions
worldwide.61 Under the guise of adoptions, more than half of the children are
trafficked from Guatemala to the USA. Many individuals are involved in illegal
adoption, from midwives to registry officials, lawyers, notaries, doctors and
even judges. Midwives often persuade poor mothers to sell their children, or
deceive them by telling them that their babies have an illness or have died.
Sometimes they even drug mothers and steal their babies in order to sell them
to human traffickers. With regard to lawyers, notaries and others, they have
60
X. Ren, Trafficking in Children: China and Asian Perspective (Montreal: Conference on Making
Childrens Rights Work: National & International Perspectives International Bureau for Childrens
Rights, 2004): 2. Available at: http://www.notrafficking.org/content/web/05reading_rooms/China/trafficking_in_china_china_and_asian_perspective
.pdf (accessed November 11, 2008).
61
BBC World Service, The Children of Guatemala, BBC, People and Beliefs (October 28, 2000)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/001027_adoption.shtml (accessed February 25,
2008).
54
better access to forged documents, as well as the relative freedom found in

private adoption procedures and from virtually inexistent state control.62
3. Human Trafficking in Different Regions63
A 2006 UNODC report showed that trafficking roles vary across regions.64
Some regions, such as Western Europe, North America, Western Asia, Turkey
and Oceania, are reported to be predominantly destinations for trafficked
victims, while other regions are largely areas of origin and/or transit. For
example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of
Independent States became a region of origin for human trafficking. Africa,
Asia, Central and South Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean are
significant regions of both origin and destination. Central and South-Eastern
Europe, Asia, Africa and Western Europe have also been identified as transit
areas. This may be an indicator of either intra-regional trafficking (in the case
of Central and South-Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa), or of the use of certain
countries and sub-regions as predominantly transit areas to reach the final
destination (most often Western Europe). Even within the same region, there
can be great differences. Also, trafficking routes do not always seem to follow
the logic from poor to rich, as is the case, for example, with flows from
Benin to Nigeria and from Nigeria to Togo.
3.1 Africa
Trafficking in Africa is characterised by sub-regional differences. West Africa
is the major area of reported human trafficking and the sub-region from which
most human trafficking originates (particularly so in Nigeria, Benin and
Ghana). Eastern and Central Africa are also frequently reported as areas of
origin. Southern Africa is reported mostly as a sub-regional destination,
whereas Northern Africa is viewed mostly as a region of origin and transit. The
number of minors trafficked from Africa outnumbers the number of adult
women, and is more frequently reported in Central African countries than in
the other sub-regions of the continent. Human trafficking for the purpose of
labour exploitation is higher in Africa than in other parts of the world (with the
62
CATW, Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation, Guatemala, CATW Factbook,

http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/guatemal.htm (accessed February 2, 2008).
63
For further references, see UNICRIs Bibliography on Human Trafficking, available at:
http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/bibliography/index.php (accessed March 24, 2009).
64
55
possible exception of South Asia), with Central African countries at the top of
the list.
African victims are mostly trafficked within the African continent or to
Western European countries. As for trafficking within Africa, Cote dIvoire,
Nigeria and South Africa appear to be the main countries of destination for
victims from other African states, such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali,
Burkina Faso, Cte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Lesotho,
Cameroon, Ethiopia and Sudan. According to the IOM, there has been a rapid
rise in Ethiopia in the number of men who are promised lucrative contracts in
the construction industry in South Africa related to the 2010 Football World
Cup. Cases have been identified in Tanzania of men trafficked from East
African countries to South Africa, who were also forced to commit crime.65
The United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are the main
destination countries for trafficking flows from Africa, along with Saudi
Arabia. Reportedly, there are now fewer cases of human trafficking from
Africa to North America. The southern part of Africa is also a destination
region for trafficked persons from Asia (mostly from Thailand), from the
Commonwealth of Independent States (particularly from the Russian
Federation) and from Central and South-East Europe.
3.2 Asia
Asia is a region of origin and of destination. The prevalent trend is that of intraregional human trafficking, generally towards Thailand, Japan, India, Taiwan
and Pakistan. South-East Asia is identified as a major sub-regional area of
origin, followed by South-Central Asia and East Asia.
When considering Asia as a destination region for human trafficking, a
different pattern emerges. As sub-regions, the Middle East and Turkey are
frequently reported as destinations for trafficked persons, followed by East
Asia and South-East Asia. Dynamism and intricate flows characterise
migration in South-East Asia, particularly in the Greater Mekong Sub-region,
in terms of sending and receiving of migrants, as well as transit countries. Due
to recent political and economic changes, the region witnessed a dramatic rise
in the number of migrants on the move in South-East Asia. Trafficking in
human beings, particularly in women and children, is a major social issue in the
65
Humantrafficking.org, Research on Trafficking of Men for Labour Exploitation in Africa, News &
Updates (December 18, 2007), http://www.humantrafficking.org/updates/786 (accessed January 24,
2009).
56
Greater Mekong Sub-region. According to the IOMs field missions in SouthEast Asia, the number of people trafficked annually from and within the region
is between 200,000 and 450,000.66
In Asia, the bulk of trafficked persons end up being sexually exploited, whereas
only 20 per cent of those trafficked are trafficked for the purpose of labour
exploitation.67 The main countries of origin for human trafficking in Asia are
China and Thailand, followed by Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Myanmar,
Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam. Intra-regional trafficking takes
place between these origin countries (which can also be destinations) and
countries such as Japan, Thailand, India, Taiwan, China and Pakistan. Other
destinations are Israel, Turkey, Japan, Thailand, Australia, Western European
countries and North America (Canada and the US). All of the following
countries are also destinations for human trafficking (some being both
countries of origin and transit as well): China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India,
Pakistan, Cambodia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Recently, the
Commonwealth of Independent States became an origin region for human
trafficking into Asia. Cases of human trafficking from Ukraine, the Russian
Federation and from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia have also been
reported as a growing and dominant trend.
3.3 The Commonwealth of Independent States
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is rarely reported as a
destination region for human trafficking, yet the rate of internal trafficking
tends to be quite high. Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are among the major origin countries in the region.
Victims are mostly trafficked into Europe (in particular to Germany, Italy and
Greece), into North America, to West Asia, Israel and to Turkey.
Human trafficking from the CIS appears to be in women, minors and men for
labour exploitation.68 Sexual exploitation is of particular concern in countries
such as Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. As far as
internal trafficking is concerned, countries such as Tajikistan, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus appear to be the
66
IOM, Migration in South East Asia, International Organization for Migration in South East Asia,
http://www.iom-seasia.org/ (accessed January 24, 2009).
67
ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005), 13.
68
E. Tyuryukanova, Forced Labour in the Russian Federation Today: Irregular Migration and
Trafficking in Human Beings (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005).
57
countries of origin for human trafficking in the CIS. For example, people
trafficked for labour exploitation mainly come from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan and are trafficked into the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and
most recently Ukraine. The available information indicates that trafficking
within the CIS region is much greater than trafficking from the CIS to other
regions (such as Western Europe and Middle East). The flow of trafficking in
human beings very much follows the flow of labour migration within the CIS
region, characterized by a movement of workers away from countries with low
levels of pay and labour surplus towards those with higher levels of pay and
labour shortages.69
3.4 Europe
Central and South-East Europe are reported as origin, transit and destination
sub-regions, while Western Europe mostly plays a destination role. Human
trafficking for sexual exploitation purposes seems to prevail in European
countries over trafficking for labour exploitation. However, the latter is
frequently under-reported.
As in other regions of the world, intra-regional patterns of trafficking exist in
Europe as well. People trafficked from Central and South-East Europe (mostly
from Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia) end up being exploited in Western
European countries. To a lesser extent, victims from Central and South-East
Europe are exploited in their sub-region, namely in Poland, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Czech Republic and Kosovo. A relatively small number of
trafficking cases from Asia and Africa into Central and South-East Europe
have also been reported.
According to the IOMs 2005 Second Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking
in South Eastern Europe, trafficking at the time had reached alarming
proportions in the region and affected an increasing number of men. This is
particularly true in the case of Albania, where 70 per cent of victims trafficked
for labour exploitation, delinquency and begging are male.70
69
UNDP, Human Trafficking and Human Development in the Commonwealth of Independent States
(Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, unpublished draft).
70
R. Surtees, P. Biro and R. Bruun, The Second Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South-Eastern
Europe 2005 (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2005). Available at:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/studies_and_r
eports/second_annual05.pdf (accessed on January 22, 2009).
58
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands take the lead among
Western European destination countries in terms of trafficking from Central
and South-East Europe and the CIS. Africa (in particular Nigeria) and Latin
America (particularly Colombia and the Dominican Republic) are also among
the most frequently reported origin regions for human trafficking to Western
Europe.
3.5 Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean are reported to be mainly a region of origin
and, to a lesser extent, of destination. Political instability and social unrest in
some areas have created an environment conducive to traffickers. Since parts of
Asia began taking measures to reduce sex tourism, traffickers have started
targeting Latin America which has resulted in increased human trafficking
activity in that region.
Sexual exploitation appears to be the main purpose of human trafficking
activities in this area, whereas trafficking for labour exploitation accounts for
about one third of the total of reported cases. More than 50,000 women from
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and the Dominican Republic are
working abroad in the sex industry, with many being trafficked to North
America, Western Europe and East Asia (Japan). According to UNODC,
increasing numbers of men and boys are being recorded as victims of human
trafficking for forced labour in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and,
episodically, in Bolivia.71 Intra-regional patterns of human trafficking have
been characterised by trafficking from countries in the region to Costa Rica,
Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador.72 In 2002, more than 50,000 children may
have been involved or were at risk of involvement in sexual exploitation in the
region. Most children are trafficked from Honduras and El Salvador to
Guatemala, from Nicaragua to Costa Rica, and from Guatemala to El
Salvador.73
71
72
IAC, Trafficking of Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the Americas, Fact Sheet, July
2001, Inter-American Commission of Women (Organization of American States), Women, Health and
Development Programme (Pan American Health Organization),
http://www.oas.org/CIM/english/Traffickingfactsheetfinaling.pdf (accessed March 24, 2009).
73
See the speech Efforts in Central America to End Trafficking of Children of Villareal Maria Eugenia
at the conference Building Sustainable Futures: Enacting Peace and Development, University of
Leuven, Belgium, July 1519, 2008,
http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/ipra2008/papers/index.php?action=paperall (accessed April 22, 2009).
59
3.6 North America

North America is almost exclusively reported as a destination region. Human
trafficking in this region is for both labour and sexual exploitation. However,
according to UNODC, cases of trafficking for forced labour accounted for at
least 63 per cent of the victims detected in 2007.74 The main regions of origin
are reported to be Eastern Europe (Romania),75 the CIS (the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova), Asia (China, Malaysia, Thailand,
the Philippines), Latin America and the Caribbean (Mexico, Colombia).76
There are fewer cases of human trafficking from countries in Central and South
Eastern Europe and a limited number of human trafficking cases reported from
Africa into North America.
3.7 Oceania
Oceania (including Australia, New Zealand and many Pacific islands) is mainly
a destination for human trafficking. According to UNODC, there are no
reported references to men or boys as victims of trafficking in this region.
Trafficking to this region is reported to be predominantly for the purpose of
sexual exploitation. Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines are the
most frequently reported origin countries. Other countries such as China, South
Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam are also reported to be origin countries for the
trafficking of sex workers into Australia and New Zealand, based on statistics
gathered by immigration authorities and on submissions to a parliamentary
inquiry into trafficking of women for sexual servitude.77
4. Traffickers and the Trafficked
4.1 Who are the Traffickers?
There is far less information available on offenders than on trafficked people.
As was mentioned above, traffickers can be involved in various functions (as
74
75
Maria E. Molina, Human Trafficking Cases Result in No Convictions in Canadian Courts, Impunity
Watch Reporter, October 31, 2008,
http://www.impunitywatch.com/impunity_watch_north_amer/2008/10/by-maria-emoli.html#comments (accessed January 15, 2009).
76
US Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report.
77
J. Putt, Human Trafficking to Australia: A Research Challenge, Trends & Issues in Crime and
Criminal Justice, no.338 (June 2007).
60
recruiters, transporters or exploiters) and in various activities during the

different stages of the process (including forging documents, corruption and the
withholding of documents). Organised criminal groups are involved in human
trafficking, at different operational levels.
Traffickers can be men or women of any age. Increasingly, women play a role
during the recruitment and exploitation phases.78 Similarly, there is an
increasing use of older teenage males as low-level operatives in activities such
as look-outs, as security for brothels or as general helpers. Male traffickers
with varying degrees of seniority within the trafficking network act as
recruiters, transporters and managers during the exploitation phase.
Increasingly, females may also perform these roles. For example, traffickers in
Greece are using their female victims to find new recruits in the Balkans and in
the former Soviet countries.79 According to the UNODC, males represent the
great majority of offenders for many crimes, but females appear to play a
prominent role in human trafficking cases. The results of a global comparison
of the percentage of women involved in human trafficking and of women
involved in (or convicted for) other crimes show that the percentage of women
convicted for all crimes did not exceed 15 per cent, whilst the percentage of
women convicted for trafficking offences is often above 50 per cent in the
same regions. In Eastern Europe and in Central Asia, the role of female human
traffickers appears to be predominant. This trend is being reported in other
parts of the world as well.80
There are situations where the female traffickers role is to help the males,
leaving her at the margins of criminal activity.81 Indeed, the coercive
enforcement of the exploitation phase and disciplining of the victims is
predominately conducted by male traffickers. Nevertheless, female traffickers
do play key roles both in the recruitment phaseparticularly as the current
modus operandi moves away from recruitment by advertisement towards a
greater focus on contact and recruitment through networks of personal
78
UNICRI, Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace-Support Operations. Pre-deployment /in-service

Training Programme for International Law Enforcement Personnel Training Manual (Turin: United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2006), 34.
79
N. Kitsantonis, In Greece, Female Sex Victims Become Recruiters, International Herald Tribune,
January 29, 2008. Available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/29/europe/traffic.php (accessed
February 1, 2009).
80
81
N. Levenkron, Another Delivery from Tashkent: Profile of the Israeli Trafficker (Tel Aviv: Hotline for
Migrant Workers, 2007), 4041. Available at:
http://www.hotline.org.il/english/pdf/Another_Delivery_From_Tashkent-English.pdf (accessed October
15, 2008).
61
contactsand in the management of the exploitation phase, acting as

managers, receptionists and money launderers.
Trafficking operations consisting of only male traffickers, or of both male and
female traffickers, have been reported in cases of trafficking in women, men
and children. In other cases, there are operations in which traffickers are
exclusively female; the information available indicates that their victims tend to
be women or girls.82 Studies have suggested that traffickers who sexually abuse
their women and child victims are almost always male.83 Some traffickers are
former victims themselves. For instance, in some countries, a madam in a
destination country supervises controls and organises girls and women
trafficked for sexual exploitation, coordinates their activities and collects their
income. Many such madams started as trafficked persons themselves, turning
to the same methods once their own debts were paid off.84
Reasons why a trafficked person might become a trafficker include fear of
violence, and/or a promotion within a trafficking enterprise. Many victims
are promoted to the next step of a trafficking hierarchy, turning them into
traffickers, but at the same time they are kept under control by those above
them. Therefore, many are not free from exploitation, even though they may
control another victim. They are also often given the most visible and
dangerous roles, making them targets for law enforcement.
In many cases, recruiters are older than those they recruit. This has been
attributed to the heightened ease with which an older person can manipulate
and ultimately recruit a younger person. On the other hand, many children are
forcibly recruited into armed conflict as child soldiers by other children.
Given that almost every country is a country of origin, transit and/or
destination, traffickers can be of any nationality. Knowledge of the countries in
which traffickers operate and of their origin offers insights on their modus
operandi and on their role in the process. For instance, recruitment of victims
may be significantly facilitated where the recruiter speaks the same language
and comes from the same cultural background. Many organised crime groups
established in diaspora communities maintain strong links with their states of
82
83
P. M. Nair, A Report on Trafficking in Women and Children in India (New Delhi: Institute of Social
SciencesNational Human Rights CommissionUNIFEM, 20022003), 148. Available at:
http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/ReportonTrafficking.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008).
84
UNODC, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, 74. For further reading, see J. Kane, Child (or
Human) Trafficking in South Eastern Europe (Geneva: ILO/IPEC, 2005). Available at:
http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/ipec_balkana_05_trafficking1097_10.pdf (accessed March 3,
2009).
62
origin. In several countries, the majority of offenders are nationals of the

country in which the trafficking case is investigated.85
Not enough research has yet been undertaken into who these people were
before they became traffickers, how they came to be traffickers, and who they
are outside of being traffickers. What is known reveals that the only unifying
factor between traffickers of differing economic, social, cultural and
educational backgrounds is almost always financial; some traffickers hope to
grow rich while others are merely struggling to make a living and to provide
for their families.86
Throughout the process of trafficking, individual traffickers are required to
perform particular roles.87 According to simplified phases of trafficking,
traffickers operate as:
o
recruiters
transporters, operating both within a country and/or across borders
exploiters
Understanding traffickers requires that the larger structures in which they

operate also be investigated. Human trafficking can be conducted by
spontaneous informal low-level contacts, up to highly organised international
networks. Small groups of individuals may comprise family networks or be
connected through shared ethnicity, while large-scale criminal networks may
operate internationally and oversee the entire operation from the recruitment to
the exploitation of the victim.
Different criminal groups operate in different criminal structures; the way in
which groups are structured can give an indication of how the activities are
pursued. For instance, it has been established that the more hierarchical the
85
For instance, the Dutch National Rapporteur reported that, between 1998 and 2002, the most common
nationality of suspects of trafficking in that country was Dutch. However, in other countries, available
information suggests greater complexitiesa study in Germany showed that 52 per cent of Germannational traffickers had a different nationality at birth. Similarly, the majority of detected traffickers in
Italy between 1996 and 2003 were born in Albania. UNODC, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns,
72.
86
Levenkron, Another Delivery from Tashkent: Profile of the Israeli Trafficker, 76.
87
See OHCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking
(Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002), 67. Available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.2002.68.Add.1.En?Opendocument (accessed
March 4, 2009).
63
group, the more likely it is to engage in violence.88 Furthermore, higher

structural rigidity has been shown to correlate with a higher propensity for
corruption and trans-border activities.89 Rigid hierarchies often have a single
boss, and are organised into several cells reporting to a centre, with strong
internal discipline systems.90
Given that human trafficking is a high-profit, comparatively low-risk form of
criminal activity (although the risks are increasing in many jurisdictions),
organised crime groups are increasingly involved.91 The phenomenon is not,
however, exclusively under the control of major criminal networks. Groups
involved in human trafficking can be fairly small and operate in loose
connection with each other. These groups may specialise in different links of
the human trafficking chain, such as personal recruitment, transportation, or
brothel management.92
The larger criminal networks do not necessarily operate in isolation from one
another. There are established linkages to other forms of organised crime, such
as weapons and narcotics trafficking and other forms of criminality. The
structural links may be constant or consist of loose affiliations whereby the
different components come together to commit crime. Trafficking networks
may consist of ethnically or nationally homogeneous groups, trafficking in
people from the same background. They are equally likely to develop into
mixed groups where the perpetrators and those trafficked are from different
national and ethnic backgrounds.
Small-Scale Informal Networks
Low-level informal networks usually take the form of small groups of
individuals within limited family networks and/or ethnic communities that
extend across borders. Small numbers of victims are trafficked as the need
arises. Traffickers will often use contacts with family and community members
back home to recruit women for sexual exploitation, and younger males and
females for labour exploitation. Such networks are frequently active in the
88
UNODC, Results of a Pilot Study of Forty Selected Organised Crime Groups in Sixteen Countries
(Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002), 30. Available at:
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf (accessed October 16, 2008).
89
UNODC, Results of a Pilot Study of Forty Selected Organised Crime Groups in Sixteen Countries, 30.
90
Idem.
91
UNODC, Human Trafficking: An Overview, 1.
92
UNICRI, Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace-Support Operations, 3235.
64
border regions between countries of origin and destination, and within ethnic
communities.
Large-Scale Organised Criminal Networks
Large-scale criminal groups are different from small organisations in that they
specifically supply markets in foreign countries. Where they operate, they
control most aspects of trafficking, from recruitment and transportation to the
management of illegal activities.93 Sophisticated middle-sized groups move or
rotate trafficking victims from one place to another, both within a country and
across international borders. Furthermore, criminal organisations trade or
exchange their victims with other organisations, which give them new
identities when the risk of law enforcement grows too high. Flexible
organisational structures include recruiters, bodyguards, transporters and
decision-makers who negotiate financial conditions with final exploiters.94
Criminal Distribution Networks
More complex transnational criminal organisations are those that control and
coordinate every phase of the trafficking procedure, from recruitment to
exploitation. These networks are highly specialised. Several professional
figures take part in the business.95 All levels of trafficking groups exist side-byside. As was mentioned above, these networks are usually involved in
smuggling people as well as drugs and stolen goods.96
93
Some of these groups focus their activities uniquely on the recruitment and transport of victims. Human
trafficking functions like a business with a recruitment agency office, document procurement office,
transport office and management office. UNICRI, Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace-Support
Operations, 33.
94
Traffickers need to be supported at least by a reliable network of exploiters and by middle-men in the
transit countries who can facilitate their crossing of national borders by corrupting border officials or
providing forged papers.
95
Initial investors are often sheltered and not otherwise directly involved. Within this network,
specialised recruiters are in charge of finding victims. Travel or employment agencies often carry out
deals directly in bars, or through newspaper adverts, telephone solicitation or contacts with friends or
family members. Transport professionals organise all the travel arrangements, while protectors take
care of the necessary bribes. Debt collectors make sure the victims pay the agreed fees once they are in
the destination country. Eventually money specialists launder the profits. As operations become more
sophisticated, other specialists such as forgers and lawyers are brought in.
96
Groups from Afghanistan, China, Iran, Kosovo, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey are very active in both
drug-trafficking and trafficking/smuggling of persons in Europe, making the horizontal
interdependency between other forms of organised criminality and THB obvious. Also, Nigerian
organised criminal groups have been caught in various activities in connection with trafficking and
65
4.2 Who are the Victims?

Inadequate knowledge of this crime often results from a failure to identify the
victims as such. Among those who are identified, adult women are most
frequently reported to be trafficked, followed by children. According to the
IOM database, the biggest age group receiving assistance is that from 18 to 24.
Many victims have at least mid-level education.97
In order for a trafficked person to be meaningfully recognised as a victim of
crime, it is important that victims be immune from liability for their
involvement in unlawful activities, where such involvement is a direct
consequence of their situation as a trafficked person.98 This idea is reflected in
Article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking
in Human Beings, which states that: each party shall, in accordance with the
basic principles of its legal system, provide for the possibility of not imposing
penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent
that they have been compelled to do so.99 As shown below, trafficked persons
have to contend with serious consequences. Therefore, they should be
identified as soon as possible in order to provide them with assistance and with
protection from both former traffickers and from law enforcement officers who
regard them as offenders.
5. Causes of Trafficking
The root causes of trafficking are various and often differ from country to
country. Trafficking is a complex phenomenon, driven or influenced by social,
economic, cultural and other factors. Many of these factors are specific to
individual trafficking patterns and to the countries in which they occur. Many
smuggling: fraud, counterfeiting of cheques and other documents, prostitution, drug trafficking and
money-laundering. Groups of other nationalities, such as Albanian, Romanian and Turkish, are also
involved in counterfeiting or stealing of documents and then using them for other criminal purposes,
such as trafficking in persons. Here, the vertical chains of criminal offences are obvious. UNICRI,
Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace Support Operations, 34.
97
IOM, Counter-Trafficking Database, 78 Countries, 19992006. Available at:

http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/8/EN/Data_and_Research_on_Human_Trafficking.pdf (accessed
October 25, 2008).
98
OHCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking,
Guideline 7.
99
Article 26, Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CETS, No.
197. This is further borne out in Recommendation 1.8 of the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking
in Persons which recommends ensuring that victims of trafficking are not subjected to criminal
proceedings solely as a direct result of them having been trafficked. (Decision 557, Revision 1, July 7,
2005).
66
common patterns, however, can be found in different regions and situations.

One such factor is the desire of victims to migrate, which is exploited by
offenders during the recruitment phase and to gain initial control or
cooperation, only to be then replaced by more coercive measures once the
victims have been moved to another country or region.100
The factors that make people vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation are
partly determined by the specific stage of the trafficking process. There are
vulnerabilities related to the conditions in the country of origin. Transportation
also makes people vulnerable, as they may not have proper documents or
financial means and, therefore, depend on traffickers. The exploitation phase
produces some additional vulnerabilities, for example when victims have
illegal status in the country or are physically isolated.
We can identify factors that push victims into migration and therefore into
the control of traffickers, and other factors that tend to pull potential victims.
o
Push factors: Countries or regions of origin are often characterised by

poverty and little prospect of sustained economic opportunity.
Consequently, there is a constant supply of victims available for
exploitation. Push factors can be identified as, inter alia,
unemployment, poverty, lack of education, gender discrimination, high
level of general and/or domestic violence, and conflict or post conflict
situations. The search for work or improved living conditions are, in
general, strong push factors for all trafficked persons.
Pull factors: Destination countries or regions are characterised by

demand for sexual services or an increasing demand for cheap migrant
labour or other forms of exploitative service.
Organised criminal networks: Organised crime has taken advantage

of this economic supply and demand situation in order to generate
vast profits through trafficking and exploitation.
Factors affecting vulnerability in the countries of origin include age and

gender: women and children represent the main endangered categories. For
women confronting unemployment, sexual harassment or domestic violence,
the offer of a good salary for working abroad often seems like a magical escape
to a better world.101 The discriminatory and negative factors outlined below
100
UNICRI, Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace Support Operations, Section 2.
101
In a study on physical and mental health consequences of human trafficking in Europe it was found that
60 per cent of victims had experienced physical or sexual violence before they were trafficked. Cathy
Zimmermann, et al., Stolen Smiles: A Summary Report on the Physical and Psychological Health
67
must be set against the benefits offered by traffickers: employment and

financial reward; improved social position and treatment; and access to
material benefits.
5.1 Factors Contributing to Trafficking in Women
Political and economic transition. Political, social and economic instability
have a disproportionately negative impact upon women, reinforcing inequality
through increased poverty and unemployment. In some cases, this is due to
patriarchal social structures, as well as to discrimination more generally.
Trafficking in women can be seen as one consequence of this inequity.
Gender discrimination. In some countries, gender discrimination laws either
do not exist or are not enforced. Women are often unaware of their rights to
equal treatment. In other countries, where national legislation prohibits gender
discrimination, there is no formal legal definition of the term nor has a working
definition been built through legal cases. Thus, there is a failure to hold
accountable those who discriminate against women, and there is almost no
access to judicial or other types of remedy.
Violence against women. Violence against women, in particular domestic
violence, is an important factor in why so many girls and young women want
to leave their families and their countries, particularly when the state does not
protect them.
Discrimination in the labour market. Women are often hired last and fired
first. In many cases, women have restricted access to the formal, regulated
labour market. Income differentials between men and women are also frequent,
as is harassment. Discrimination against certain ethnic groups plays a role, too.
Social factors. In times of economic hardship, societies often consolidate
existing power structures. Such structures tend to reinforce the position of men,
and cause further deterioration in the already-subordinated position of women.
Children are vulnerable to the demands and expectations of those in positions
of authority. This vulnerability makes their consent to being trafficked
irrelevant, even if there was no fraud, force or deception to begin with.
Consequences of Women and Adolescents Trafficked in Europe (London: London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine, 2006). Available at http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/hpu/docs/StolenSmiles.pdf
(accessed October 15, 2008).
68
5.2 Factors Contributing to Trafficking in Children

Poverty. A lack of education or employment can sometimes tempt parents to
allow their children to go with traffickers who claim to be offering them a
brighter future abroad.
Domestic abuse of children and neglect. Persons involved in the commercial
sexual exploitation of children may also include family members.102 Some
parents knowingly sell their children to brothel owners or to traffickers.
Addiction to drugs, the need to conceal incest, discrimination against baby girls
and greed are other common push factors in child trafficking.
Orphans. Unaccompanied children are especially vulnerable to the risk of
sexual abuse or exploitation. Orphans or children burdened with the
responsibility of caring for younger siblings are particularly vulnerable.
Discrimination. Widespread racism, fragmentation of indigenous cultures and
families, as well as limited access to education are the main factors that make
minors easy prey for traffickers.
Misconceptions regarding sexual behaviour. In many countries it is believed
that sex with young girlswho are presumably virginsprevents the
contraction of HIV/AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases. Some even
believe that it can cure HIV/AIDS or renew youthfulness.
Harmful traditions or customs. The practice of early, forced or temporary
child marriages also makes children vulnerable to trafficking. Moreover, some
daughters of trafficked women become trafficking commodities. This may
occur through formal structures such as the caste system or, more informally,
through social stigmatization. Both result in girls being forced to work in the
commercial sex trade, following their mothers means of survival. For
whatever reason, children of trafficked victims rarely have viable alternatives.
In some countries, the sexual exploitation of children is thinly disguised as a
religious practice.
Corruption. Corruption among police and other law enforcement officials is
often cited as a cause of trafficking and as a major obstacle to combating it.103
102
It is believed that approximately 80 per cent of trafficked children have been psychologically or
physically abused by a family member or friend.
103
Sheldon X. Zhang and Samuel L. Pineda, Corruption as a Causal Factor in Human Trafficking, in
Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies, ed. D. Siegel and H. Nelen (New York: Springer,
2008), Chapter 4.
69
5.3 Conflict and Post-conflict Situations104

Although there is no precise data, there is strong anecdotal evidence that
human trafficking escalates during armed conflict. Impunity, lawlessness,
collapse of state institutions and lack of border controls are all factors that
allow human trafficking to flourish. Furthermore, the destruction of the
economy, family income and family units places women and children at higher
risk of being trafficked. Conflict areas may become areas of origin, transit or
destination.
Organised criminal groups operate and move more freely than they would in
peacetime, exploiting chaotic conditions that make it less likely that their
activities will be detected. There is also evidence that the deployment of
internationals can exacerbate the situation by creating additional demand for
sexual services. As demonstrated in recent peace support operations, the arrival
of large groups of adult men unaccompanied by wives or girlfriends frequently
creates a market for commercial sex and trafficking. During times of armed
conflict, very specific forms of human trafficking that are directly linked to
conflict may emerge.105
The same factors that allow human trafficking to flourish during conflict are
often also prevalent in post-conflict situations. High levels of political
instability, criminal activity and violence can remain years after fighting has
ended. Furthermore, the (re)establishment of the rule of law, including the
reconstruction of effective law and order institutions, is never immediate.
Criminal networks are therefore able to exploit the situation, often
consolidating power gained during conflict.
6. Consequences of Trafficking
The consequences of trafficking are varied and wide-ranging for countries of
origin, transit, and destination. As noted above, human trafficking is related to
organised crime. Corruption is a closely related problem, too. A ready supply
of cash can undermine the counter-trafficking efforts within the criminal justice
104
For more information see Chapter 8 of this volume on Human Trafficking and Peacekeepers by Keith
J. Allred.
105
In a number of conflicts, such as those in Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina, fighting factions and
governmental forces have used human trafficking and sexual exploitation as a strategy of war.
Moreover, many minors have been trafficked to or within several conflict areas, eventually becoming
child soldiers. There have also been reports of girls as young as twelve forced to engage in sexual
activity with paramilitary forces. UNICRI, Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace Support
Operations, Section 2.
70
system.106 Furthermore, the link between peacekeeping and human trafficking

is detrimental to the credibility of peace operations.107 It should also be noted
that human trafficking on a significant scale can destabilise populations at the
micro and macro level.108
Yet most obviously, human trafficking threatens the well-being of trafficked
persons. The most immediate danger faced by trafficked persons is physical
violence from those who exploit them. Many victims are physically and
sexually abused and are held in conditions of actual and/or psychological
captivity. Murders are sometimes used as warnings to other victims to not seek
help or assistance. Threats of reprisal against them or their families, and the
lack (or invalidity) of identity documents, prevent many victims from escaping.
Victims also often suffer from stigmatisation by their communities. Moreover,
many are treated as criminals by officials in countries of transit and destination
due to their irregular status in the country, and their status as illegal workers or
sex workers. In Italy, victims are granted a six-month permit to stay to consider
their options and prepare themselves to go back to their homeland. But they
often risk being detained and deported shortly after being discovered or coming
forward. Even after being identified and having been offered a reprieve from
detainment and deportation, many trafficked persons find little access to basic
services, from housing to medical care and temporary welfare.
Further health risks should be noted. Trafficked women are often not in a
position to negotiate safe sex, or lack access to education about HIV/AIDS.
They therefore run the risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Also,
in some cultures, it is a commonly held belief that sex with a virgin is a
potential cure for AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, which
increases the demand for children (and virgins) for sexual exploitation. The
victims become infected and can transmit the diseases to the next customer.
Other impacts on the physical and psychological health of the victim include:
o
Infections and infectious diseases due to unhygienic conditions,

overcrowding, and lack of access to clean water
106
UNODC, Assistance for the Implementation of the ECOWAS Plan of Action against Trafficking in
Persons, Training Manual (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006). Available at:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/ecowas_training_manual_2006.pdf (accessed
September 7, 2008).
107
See UNICRI, Trafficking in Human Beings and Peace Support Operations.
108
In some countries, such as Moldova, human trafficking for sexual exploitation has reached proportions
that threaten to destabilize the demographic situation. M. Vlachov and L. Biason, eds., Women in an
Insecure World: Violence Against WomenFacts, Figures and Analysis (Geneva: DCAF, 2005),
Executive summary; 1, 2.
71
Unwanted pregnancies
Forced abortions
Occupational health risks; injuries, skin infections, respiratory illnesses
Hazardous working conditions that may affect the growth of a child
Physical reaction to trauma in the form of psychosomatic pain, change

in sleep patterns, weakened immune system and increased use of
alcohol and drugs
Psychological reaction to trauma in the form of shock and fear,

disorientation, nightmares and flashbacks, difficulty in trusting,
feelings of betrayal, a tendency to isolate oneself, and suicidal
tendencies
Stigmatisation in their communities or countries of origin.
7. Counter-Trafficking Measures
Successful counter-trafficking requires political will and cooperation at all
levels, at points of origin, transit and destination. In many ways, the differences
in legal frameworks across jurisdictions constitute the most fundamental
impediment to an effective response to trafficking.
A large number of international instruments have been produced. The
Trafficking Protocol advances international law by providing, for the first time,
a working definition of human trafficking and requiring ratifying states to
criminalise such practices. Several United Nations conventions and regional
instruments form the international legal framework within which states must
define their own counter-trafficking laws. These instruments also provide a
framework for states wishing to collaborate with each other against human
trafficking.109
Article 2 of the UN Trafficking Protocol indicates that the scope of the
Protocol (at a minimum) pertains to the: prevention of trafficking in persons;
prosecution (and investigation) of suspected traffickers; and protection of
individuals who have fallen victim to trafficking. These are the three main
pillars that should be addressed in any domestic legislation. In addition to
109
UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, 2008), 1. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/humantrafficking/HT_Toolkit08_English.pdf (accessed September 28, 2008).
72
drafting appropriate legal provisions, governments should implement these

provisions.
7.1 Prevention
Article 9 of the Protocol requires states to prevent and combat human
trafficking and protect victims from re-victimisation. Measures should be taken
to alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and children,
vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal
opportunities. To this end bilateral or multilateral cooperation, including with
non-governmental organisations, is encouraged.
The Protocol recognises that human trafficking should be dealt with from both
the demand and the supply side, requiring measures intended to discourage the
demand for services, which fosters the exploitive element of trafficking and
hence its major source of illicit revenue. Certifying products or services as
forced labour free, for example, is one way to do this.
The Protocol also takes into consideration that former victims are vulnerable
later on, especially if they are repatriated to places where trafficking is
common. Hence, in addition to the basic requirements to protect victims from
intimidation or retaliation by offenders, Article 9(1) of the Protocol calls for
measures to protect victims from being trafficked again and from other forms
of re-victimisation.
Finally, the Protocol seeks to prevent trafficking by requiring measures
intended to make it more difficult for traffickers to use conventional means of
transport by requiring states party to ensure that border controls are effective
and by taking measures to prevent the misuse of passports and other travel or
identification documents. Preventive anti-trafficking measures include:
110
awareness raising and information campaigns targeted at potential

victims and their families110
the development of long-term strategies aimed at improving the

economic and social condition of vulnerable groups
increased opportunities for individuals to migrate legally for work and

vocational training.
See USAID, Final Report: Best Practices in Trafficking Prevention in Europe & Eurasia (Washington
D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, January 2009). Available at: http://tdhchildprotection.org/component/option,com_doclib/task,dl/docid,733/l,1/ (accessed March 3, 2009).
73
Box 1: Example of a Successful NGO Anti-trafficking Effort111

Coalition of NGOs in Nigeria
As a result of international and domestic support, the number of NGOs working on trafficking
throughout Nigeria has been increasing considerably. Six NGOs (ENCATIP, Edo State Coalition
against Trafficking in Persons) cooperate to develop and implement anti-trafficking projects.
These projects also involve collaboration with anti-trafficking NGOs in Italy, a major destination
country for women trafficked from Nigeria. The first project falls under the area of prevention
and addresses issues set forth in Article 9 of the UN Trafficking Protocol. The project focuses on
awareness-raising to reach specific target groups such as parents, traditional chiefs and priests,
villagers, and children. All campaigns are conducted in the local language and with support from
community leaders and associations in order to ensure commitment and participation from the
existing communal networks.112
The second major project of the coalition addresses both Article 6 and Article 9 of the UN
Trafficking Protocol by implementing means of victim assistance and protection as well as
means of preventing trafficking. The project targets young women who have been trafficked,
young girls and women who have been deported back to Edo State, and girls and women who are
vulnerable to trafficking. The programme supports victims of trafficking at the local level. The
major component consists of micro-finance schemes that facilitate the rehabilitation and
reintegration of trafficking victims into society. Project participants receive specialised technical
assistance, business counselling and training, and the resources required to start and run a small
business.
7.2 Prosecution
Relatively few traffickers are successfully prosecuted. In recent years, many
countries have revised their legislation in order to comply with the
requirements of the Trafficking Protocol. However, the implementation of this
legislation is still pending in many countries. In order to effectively prosecute
traffickers, a state must:
o
clearly define trafficking in its legislation as a distinct crime
establish criminal sanctions comparable to the gravity of the offence
provide for the criminal liability of legal persons that are used by
traffickers as a front for their illicit activities
criminalise all activities related to trafficking
establish other criminal offences related (but in addition) to trafficking
111
ABA/CEELI, An Introduction to The Human Trafficking Assessment Tool (Washington D.C.: ABA,
2005), 158.
112
For more information see: UNICRI, Trafficking from Nigeria, UNICRI Main Page,
http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/nigeria/index.php (accessed March 24, 2009).
74
create specialised investigation units
cooperate across borders
implement extradition agreements and proceedings.
Article 5 of the Protocol obligates states party to adopt legislation and

implement other necessary measures in order to criminalise trafficking in
persons.113
Box 2: Promising Practice
SISCESCO-Costa Rica114
With the aim of strengthening the capacities of Costa Rican public prosecutors in responding to
trafficking in persons, the 2006 UNICRI Action Programme Against Trafficking In Minors For
Sexual Purposes set up a sophisticated information system for the investigation and prosecution
of human trafficking cases, specifically targeting the offices of public prosecutors in charge of
investigating cases of domestic violence and sexual exploitation of children. All prosecution
offices in Costa Rica are connected through the system. This important data collection tool
assists in building stronger cases and improve investigating skills and strategies. It also supports
the Attorney Generals Office in drawing up counter-crime policy.
7.3 Protection
Both physical and psychological consequences for victims of trafficking are
devastating. Thus, psychological, social and legal support provided by
government agencies, in cooperation with specialised NGOs, is indispensable.
Moreover, building appropriate national structures and capacities for
reintegration, including opportunities for reinsertion into the labour market, is
necessary in order to prevent victims from being re-trafficked.
Basic principles include measures to:
o
properly identify victims of trafficking
define trafficked persons as victims according to international

standards
113
Prosecution under the UN Trafficking Protocol is for offences established in accordance with article 5
of the Protocol, where those offences are transnational in nature and involve an organised criminal
group.
114
For more information see: UNICRI, Trafficking in Minors: Activities in Costa Rica, UNICRI Main
Page, http://www.unicri.it/wwd/trafficking/minors/activities_costarica.php (accessed March 24, 2009).
75
ensure that the acts of trafficked persons, as victims of the offence, are
not criminalised.
Another purpose of the UN Trafficking Protocol is to protect and assist victims

of trafficking with full respect for their human rights.115 Firstly, the UN
Organised Crime Convention recognises the importance of alleviating the
impact of transnational organised crime on vulnerable individuals and groups
and requires countries to take measures to protect victims against retaliation or
intimidation and to ensure that they introduce procedures for compensation and
restitution. In addition, States will have to consider the perspective of victims,
in accordance with domestic legal principles and consistent with the local
defendants rights.
It should be remembered that the UN Trafficking Protocol applies to the
protection of victims irrespective of the element of trans-nationality or the
involvement of organised crime. The Protocol recognises that victims of
trafficking are especially vulnerable, and thus need specific protection.
Therefore the UN Trafficking Protocol requires each state party to:
o
Protect, to the extent that is possible under domestic law, the privacy
and identity of victims, including by making legal proceedings relating
to trafficking confidential (Article 6(1))
Ensure that victims receive information on relevant court proceedings

in appropriate cases and have an opportunity to have their views
presented and considered (Article 6(2))
Consider providing, in co-operation with civil society, for the physical,

psychological and social recovery of the victim (Article 6(3)).
Protection measures for victims of trafficking include:116

o
medical care
safe accommodation117
115
UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 2(b) and Article 25.
116
Relevant international human rights instruments include the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);
the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; and UN
Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking. Legal provisions
safeguarding the rights of victims of crime have also been incorporated in international law, for
example, in the Statute and Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
117
Although there is a significant amount of information on shelters, there is a lack of evaluation on

existing shelters and assistance programmes. The information is mostly provided in the form of
76
psychological and legal counselling
legal residency status for a certain period of time
protection from criminal charges that would otherwise stem from

irregular residence and employment status
access to employment and education
information campaigns regarding the rights of victims.
These types of assistance should be made available to victims of trafficking in

countries of origin, transit, and destination. The aforementioned protective
measures are meant to complement prevention and prosecution efforts by
creating a comprehensive method for combating trafficking.
The essence of the rights-centred approach is captured in paragraph 1 of the
UN Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human
Trafficking, which states that: the human rights of trafficked persons shall be
at the centre of all efforts to prevent and combat trafficking and to protect,
assist and provide redress to victims. This is also reflected in paragraph 2,
which notes that: states have a responsibility under international law to act
with due diligence to prevent trafficking, to investigate and prosecute
traffickers and to assist and protect trafficked persons. The rehabilitation of
victims and the demonstration that justice is done are important elements of an
overall anti-trafficking strategy.118 The UN Organised Crime Convention and
the Trafficking Protocol are not human rights but criminal justice instruments.
A human rights-based approach not only better protects trafficked persons but
can help effective law enforcement.119
descriptive case studies and recommended best practices. Shelter facilities vary widely and can include
private homes, institutional facilities, hotels and churches. IOM, Handbook on Direct Assistance to
Victims of Trafficking (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2007), 112. See also R.
Rosenberg, Best Practices for Programming to Protect and Assist Victims of Trafficking in Europe and
Eurasia (Bethesda, Maryland: Development Alternatives, 2004). Available at:
http://www.vitalvoices.org/files/docs/Prevention per cent20assessment per cent20Report-formatted per
cent20CAS1.pdf (accessed March 3, 2009).
118
OHCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council,
(New York: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 20, 2002).
Available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/caf3deb2b05d4f35c1256bf30051a003/$FILE/N02401
68.pdf (accessed March 24, 2009).
119
See: ASEAN, Responses to Trafficking in Persons: Ending Impunity for Traffickers and Securing
Justice for Victims (Jakarta: ASEAN, April 2006), 6667; 81. The Coordinated Mekong Ministerial
Initiative against Trafficking process (COMMIT) MOU (2004) draws heavily on the UNs
Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking (E/2002/68/Add.1).
77
7.4 National and Transnational Cooperation

The UN Trafficking Protocol sets out specific obligations to co-operate with
other countries, be they party or not to the Protocol. Article 2(c) states the need
to promote international cooperation in combating trafficking. States should
cooperate on bilateral and multilateral levels in order to coordinate law
enforcement efforts among the various national authorities as well as
international organisations such as Europol and Interpol. Cooperation among
states also entails exchange of information; training of law enforcement
authorities; mutual legal assistance (i.e., taking evidence or statements from
persons or providing copies of relevant documents); and joint investigations.
Various steps have been taken to ensure sustainable cooperation between state
and non-state actors:
o
Task Forces: to develop methods for organising, monitoring and

evaluating the implementation of action plans against trafficking; to
recommend improvements for existing action plans, legal frameworks,
and organisational measures; to co-operate with NGOs.
National Rapporteurs: to collect and analyse trafficking data; to

monitor the effects of national action plans; to report to government
and to make proposals on the development of national policies and
action plans.
National Referral Mechanisms: a national referral mechanism (NRM)

is a co-operative framework through which state actors fulfil their
obligations to protect and promote the human rights of trafficked
persons and co-ordinate their efforts in a strategic partnership with civil
society.
The Role of NGOs: a victim-oriented approach requires cooperation

between police, prosecutors and NGOs who counsel and support
trafficking victims. Comprehensive concepts include provision for the
support and protection of victim-witnesses before, during and after
trafficking trials.
Memorandum of Understanding: agreements between law enforcement

agencies and IOs/NGOs to formalise a continuing cooperative
relationship.
The MOU adopts a victim-centred and rights-based approach. COMMIT Member Countries have
agreed to undertake thirty-four actions, most of which are at the national level, but several of which
involve bilateral and regional cooperation.
78
Recommendations
Protect the Rights of Victims
The essence of the rights-centred approach to human trafficking is captured in
paragraph 1 of the UN Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human
Rights and Human Trafficking, which states that: the human rights of
trafficked persons shall be at the centre of all efforts to prevent and combat
trafficking and to protect, assist and provide redress to victims.120 The needs
and rights of victims should be considered at every stage in proceedings. Law
enforcement officers have an obligation to ensure that measures adopted for the
purpose of preventing and combating human trafficking do not have an adverse
impact on the rights and dignity of trafficking victims, even in cases where they
do not become witnesses in a criminal proceeding.
Reduce Demand
Demand reduction must be linked closely to prevention and protection. A new
sensitivity toward the creation of a positive demand should be fostered, for
example, calling on consumers to buy products that are forced labour free.
Establish Comprehensive Policies
The complexities of the trafficking problem and its global reach requires
concerted efforts by relevant entities at the local, national, regional, and
international levels. It is vitally important to form partnerships with
intergovernmental organisations, governments, NGOs, international
organisations, academic communities, legislators, community leaders, and
families confronted with trafficking. The expertise, extensive networks, access,
and in-depth understanding of local communities should be an integral part of
any national response to human trafficking.
Assist Countries of Origin and Destination
Specialised structures have to be established to coordinate the treatment of
identified victims in destination and origin countries by assuring the persons
right to remain on the territory of the destination country if applicable
according to its legislation; and by providing origin countries upon their
120
This is also reflected in the Recommended Principles paragraph (2), which states that: states have a
responsibility under international law to act with due diligence to prevent trafficking, to investigate and
prosecute traffickers and to assist and protect trafficked persons. The rehabilitation of victims and the
demonstration that justice is done are important elements of an overall anti-trafficking strategy".
79
request with any relevant information for the purposes of family tracing and
risk assessment.
Implement Effective Monitoring and Evaluation Tools
All the relevant actors should design appropriate planning, monitoring and
evaluation tools, which track progress and identify unintended consequences. A
logical framework should be developed to identify outcome indicators and
reporting requirements. Inputs and outputs shall be closely monitored at
different levels to make sure that policy approaches, built on research and
evaluation, become more evidence-based.
More Information About Traffickers
Data and information about how people come to commit trafficking crimes,
their respective roles in networks of traffickers, and their relationships to other
criminals and to victims would help identify and prosecute human traffickers
and deter potential traffickers.
Collect Reliable Data at the National and International Level
Research and data collection capacities especially in developing countries have
to be built. Moreover, technical guidelines on data collection and storage
standards as well as on research methods have to be developed. To facilitate
data collection, various agencies need to more actively share data. Different
agencies tackling human trafficking have to agree on and use a common
typology of data to be collected. A network with a central interchange, acting
as a collecting and informative entity on all the research initiatives in this field
needs to be established, as well as a data-bank assembling, rationalising and
integrating all collected data and materials. Short-term snapshot approaches
to data collection and research on human trafficking that focus only on one
type of exploitation have to be replaced by a longer-term systematic collection
of information and research on various types of trafficking.
Fight Human Trafficking Through a Gender Perspective
Addressing trafficking from a gender perspective, policy makers should
acknowledge trafficking in both men and women. They should also address the
similarities and differences in the trafficking experiences of women and men,
as well as the differential impacts of policies on men and women. A gender
perspective distinguishes between the terms sex and gender; refers to the
80
relative status and position of men and women, and women's greater
disadvantage in most societies; recognises that women's less valued roles can
marginalise them, denying them ownership and control over material and nonmaterial resources and forcing them to rely on men; and considers the
interaction between gender and the other social categories such as class, race
and ethnicity.121
Measures to Prevent Re-Victimisation
Protection of trafficked persons includes a number of measures to avoid revictimisation: providing residency status or a permit to stay in the country;
asylum; granting assistance to victims in the country of destination; providing
accommodation, medical support and counselling; ensuring free translation and
legal assistance.
Follow Interview Guidelines with Trafficked Persons122
While conducting interviews with potential trafficking victim, it should be kept
in mind that they must be treated sensitively and in accordance with their
human rights.
Raise Awareness
Respect for local cultures means finding appropriate ways to raise awareness
and seeking innovative approaches to communication, especially so as to reach
the widest public possible and to effectively convey the appropriate
information.
Reintegration Victims
The UN Trafficking Protocol calls for further social and reintegration
assistance to victims, as well as in other areas such as legal and psychological
counselling, housing, education and healthcare needs.
121
UNIFEM/UNIAP, Trafficking in Persons: A Gender and Rights Perspective (Bangkok: United Nations
Development Fund for Women/United Nations Inter-agency Project on Human Trafficking in the
Mekong Sub-region, 2002). Available at: http://unifem-eseasia.org/resources/others/traffkit.pdf
(accessed December 12, 2008).
122
For more information on this topic, see, among others: ICMPD, Listening to Victims: Experiences of
Identification, Return and Assistance in South-Eastern Europe (Vienna: International Centre for
Migration Policy Development, 2007); B. Mitchels, Lets Talk: Developing Effective Communication
with Child Victims of Abuse and Human Trafficking (Pristina: UNICEF, 2004).
81
Strengthen Efforts Against Human Trafficking in Peace Support Operations

Measures to strengthen and combat human trafficking in PSOs are rooted in
recent initiatives that aim to ensure that a gender perspective is fully integrated
into all aspects of PSOs. The basis for these initiatives is found in UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, binding on all UN
member states. Initiatives that result from this resolution include the
establishment of a UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations Gender Unit
with the responsibility for integrating gender issues into all aspects of PSOs,
and the deployment of gender advisors or gender focal points into PSOs (for
example, to UNAMA, Afghanistan, UNMISET and East Timor). In addition, a
number of mission-specific codes of conduct prohibiting sexual abuse and/or
exploitation have been adopted. All of these initiatives offer important entry
points for anti-trafficking measures.123
Involve the Private Sector
The private sector can make an invaluable preventive contribution by creating
opportunities for livelihoods and supporting organisations that prosecute
traffickers and protect victims. Through effective collaboration with
government agencies, international organisations, non-governmental
organisations and the media, information can be disseminated and awareness
created among the workforce. Business coalitions can be formed to encourage
the adoption of codes of conduct that keep supply chains and human resources
free of trafficking. Civil society can be supported through corporate social
responsibility initiatives.
123
A report on sexual exploitation occurring in peacekeeping missions (A/59/710) was prepared by the
Secretary-Generals Adviser on this issue, H.R.H. Prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, recommending
the establishment of Personnel Conduct Units (PCUs) in the UNDPKO, at UN Headquarters and in
existing missions. This recommendation was approved on May 10, 2005. These PCUs address issues
such as preventing misconduct, handling complaints and data management and ensuring compliance
with United Nations standards of conduct. On the basis of these standards, the Units ensure training on
sexual exploitation and abuse. The Units do not conduct investigations, which are handled by the
United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) and other offices. In addition, other
measures are in the process of implementation, including a policy on victim assistance, intensified
mandatory training of peacekeepers, measures to strengthen leadership accountability, improvements in
living conditions and welfare for peacekeeping personnel, as well as amendments to legal agreements
with troop-contributing countries and contracts with all peacekeeping personnel to include prohibitions
on sexual exploitation and abuse.
82
CHAPTER 2
Human Trafficking & Corruption: Triple
Victimisation?
Leslie Holmes
Introduction
According to one OSCE report, there is a very strong correlation between
trafficking and corruption and the trafficking of persons flourishes in part
through the corruption of public officials.1 Yet, in marked contrast to the
situation vis--vis organised crime and trafficking, little has been published on
corruption and human trafficking; most references in the literature are general
criticisms of this collusion, without any detail.2 This is primarily because it is
so difficult to obtain concrete information on the issue, for a number of
reasons.3
One is that corrupt officials themselves are not generally willing to talk about
their activities. A second is that undercover operations are even more difficult
to mount than in the case of narcotics or illicit arms control. All too often,
female police officers would actually have to engage in sex work to be
convincing as prostitutes (and might be subjected to violence), while male
officers would in most countries actually have to have sex with prostitutes if
trying to investigate and charge those suspected of trafficking for sexual
1
L. Mann and I. Dolea, OSCE Trial Observation Manual for the Republic of Moldova (Chisinau:
OSCE/ODIHR, 2006), 79; 182.
Surprisingly, the latest UNODC report on trafficking makes no significant reference to the role of
corruption in traffickingsee S. Chawla, A. Me and T. le Pichon, eds., Global Report on Trafficking in
Persons (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009). I am indebted to the Australian
Research Council for funding (ARC Discovery Grant No. DP0558453) that made the research into this
topic possible. I also wish to thank Shaorong Baggio, Adam Berryman, Ben Buckland, Kasia Lach,
Katya Malinova, Janine Pentzold and Wu Dong Dong for their invaluable research assistance, and the
two reviewers of an earlier version of this chapter (Louise Shelley and Mike Dottridge) for their
perceptive comments and useful suggestions. All mistakes and interpretations remain my own
responsibility, however.
Scattered evidence is available, however. Some is provided in this chapter. For limited and sometimes
circumstantial evidence on China, see for example, B. Lintner, Blood Brothers (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003), esp. 37387.
83
exploitation purposes. In contrast, drug or even weapons stings often involve

merely setting up a purchase, not actually taking the drugs or using the
weapons. A third factor is that those trafficked are often too traumatised and/or
scared to discuss their situation with state authorities. Since police officers
sometimes either collude with traffickers or even run trafficking operations
themselves (see below for evidence), this is not surprising.4 Fourth, whereas
law enforcement officers and statisticians in most countries are usually willing
to provide details on cases involving organised crime gangs, the former
typically become coy when asked to provide hard information on corrupt
behaviour among their own ranks. This problem is exacerbated when such
behaviour relates to human trafficking and collusion with organised crime.
Finally, even researchers have been either slow or reluctant to consider
including questions about possible collusion between corrupt officials and
traffickers when surveying trafficked persons. For instance, in an otherwise
impressively thorough analysis of trafficking in three West European states
published in the early-2000s under the aegis of the European Union, the long
questionnaires did not include any question directly related to possible
corruption.5 Similarly, a detailed and highly sensitive analysis of children
trafficked in South Eastern Europe included no questions directly relating to
corruption, and only a few passing references to the possible involvement of
corrupt officials.6
Yet there is no question that human trafficking could not occur on the scale it
does were it not for the complicity and collusion of corrupt officials with
criminal gangs. Although the data-deficiencies mean it is impossible to draw a
comprehensive picture of the involvement of corrupt officials, the seriousness
of this problem renders it vital to sketch at least an incomplete image of the
ways in which corruption interacts with trafficking. After all, one important
aspect of this issue usually overlooked is that trafficking-related corruption can
subject those trafficked to a double or even triple victimisation and abuse of
4
There are many other reasons for this reluctance to report, of course, including fear of imprisonment for
breaking immigration, labour and prostitution lawsand violent retribution from the traffickers.
W. Vandekerckhove, Z. Pari, B. Moens, I. Orfano, R. Hopkins, and J. Nijboer, Research Based on

Case Studies of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings in 3 EU Member States, i.e. Belgium, Italy and
The Netherlands (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities DG Justice and Home Affairs,
2003): esp. Annexes 13 (unpaginated, but beginning on what is page 347).
M. Dottridge, Action to Prevent Child Trafficking in South Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Assessment
(Geneva and Le Mont sur Lausanne: UNICEF and Terre des Hommes Foundation, 2006), esp. 12; 22;
23; 43; 46 and 7389 (questionnaire). Apparently, some of the children interviewed for this project did
provide evidence of the involvement of corrupt officials in their responses; but this was not included in
the report.
84
human rights.7 All too often, they are victims not only of criminal gangs, but
also of officials who cannot be trusted to help them counter the first form of
victimisation. And if states turn a blind eye to their own officers corrupt
involvement in trafficking and/or treat trafficked persons as criminals rather
than victims, there is a third form of victimisation.
This chapter provides evidence of both alleged and confirmed involvement of
corrupt officials in trafficking from various parts of the world. It identifies the
types of officials involved and how they operate. This includes consideration of
the ways in which corrupt officials can impact upon trafficking indirectly as
well as directly, so that the scale of trafficking-related corruption is larger than
is commonly assumed. Importantly, it then makes concrete policy proposals for
combating corruption as this relates to human trafficking; merely
understanding the problem is not enough.
Before considering the limited evidence, however, some important definitional
points need to be made. The most common definition of corruption is one used
by the World Bankthe abuse of public office for private gainor else
something very similar (for example, the use of public office for private
advantage). In recent times, there has been a debate about the meaning of
public office, with some observers arguing that it can include positions in the
private sector. In line with more traditional approaches, it is maintained here
that corruption must involve officers of the state, which is how the term public
officials is understood in this chapter.8 Thus improper business-to-business
activity that does not involve officers of the state is excluded from this
approach.9
7
I am indebted to Dr. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers for having encouraged me to develop this concept.
The spread of neo-liberalism since the end of the 1970s has blurred the distinction between the private
and public sectors. One of the main areas in which this blurring is obvious is in out-sourcingi.e.
where states now pay private agencies to perform tasks that had previously been performed by officers
of the state. The approach adopted here is to include under the term public officials those private
contractors who are performing responsible tasksinvolving authority, typically legal or military
on behalf of the state. Thus soldiers or prison wardens employed by private companies but contracted to
work for states could in this approach be corrupt, whereas state-employed canteen workers in a prison
could not. This example highlights well the problems in demarcating public office, as well as the fact
that some decisions on which posts to include must ultimately be subjective and somewhat arbitrary.
Until the end of the 1990s, the interpretation of corruption adopted here was also that of the worlds
leading international anti-corruption NGO, Transparency International (TI). But TI opted with effect
from 2000 to include under the term corruption examples of improper behaviour that occur exclusively
within the private sector (which we prefer to call corporate crime). Its current definition of corruption is
thus the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. Unfortunately, however, TI is inconsistent in its
definition, since some of its indicesnotably the annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)are still
based on the original definition (i.e. state officials must be involvedthe definition used for the CPI is
precisely that presented above as the most common definition). Another expert who now prefers to
85
In this sense, our definition is at the narrower end of the spectrum. But from
another perspective, the interpretation of corruption employed here is broader
than usual. This is because it includes behaviour by public officials that is not
necessarily illegal in any formal sense, nor even very consciousbut which is
condemned and seen as highly improper by large sections of the population. In
the vernacular, it relates to activity that is perceived by many as seriously
inappropriate behaviour by officers of the state. For example, officials who
have in some way been involved in trafficking, but who cannot be prosecuted
for this because of political immunity, will still be treated in this analysis as
corrupt. Similarly, if state officials employ foreign domestic help at very low
rates, without bothering to check their papers and background when they know
they should, this is treated here as corrupt behaviour. This is in line with the socalled sunlight test in corruption analysis, whereby officials who are
uncertain as to whether a particular action in which they are engaging is corrupt
or not choose not to check, for fear that the result might be against their own
interests. This avoidance means that they fail the sunlight test, since they are
not willing to expose their questionable behaviour to public scrutiny.
Conversely, cases in which a criminal gang provides information to law
enforcement agencies about other trafficking gangs in return for warnings
about an imminent raid or investigation are not treated here as corruption
unless any of the law enforcement agents personally benefit from thissince
the states officers questionable behaviour is intended to maximise public
benefit, not improperly reward individual officers.10
Box 1: Ways in Which Officials Can Be Corruptly Involved in Trafficking

A.
Direct ways
i.
Running a trafficking operation
ii.
Consciously participating in a trafficking operation run by a criminal

gang. Collusion may involve alerting the gang to forthcoming raids,
turning a blind eye during border crossings, illegally providing relevant
state paperwork such as visas, or helping traffickers regain control of
include corporate crime under corruption is Daniel Kaufmann, who was until the end of 2008 the
leading light in the World Bank Institute (Governance and Anti-Corruption)see D. Kaufmann and P.
Vicenze, Legal Corruption2nd Draft The World Bank,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/Legal_Corruption.pdf (accessed
January 5, 2009). While disagreeing with Kaufmann on this issue, it will be obvious from the following
text that I strongly agree with him that not all corruption is illegal.
10
See A. Schloenhardt, Organized Crime and the Business of Migrant Trafficking, Crime, Law and
Social Change. 32, no. 3 (1999) esp. 210.
86
victims who have escaped.
B.
iii.
Running activities that involve trafficking (for example, prostitution,

forced labour, begging)
iv.
Consciously participating in activities run by a criminal gang that

involve trafficking (for example, prostitution, forced labour, begging).
This may involve alerting the gang to forthcoming raids, or illegally
providing relevant state paperwork such as work permits.
Indirect ways
i.
Using persons known to be or suspected of having been trafficked (for

example, in prostitution, in domestic help)
ii.
Refusing to investigate allegations of trafficking
iii.
Supportive involvement in passing legislation that is conducive to

trafficking
iv.
Supportive involvement in refusing to pass legislation designed to curb

trafficking.
In all of the above cases, there must be proof or a realistic assumption that the state official
intends to benefit from his/her action or inaction for that action or inaction to constitute
corruption. Whereas this is obvious in the activities listed in Section A, it is less so in activities
listed in Section B, requiring further elaboration. If, for example, a parliamentarian votes against
a bill designed to criminalise the use of trafficked women for sexual purposes or trafficked
persons working in agriculture primarily because he or she has been given or promised a bribe
(an example of state capture activity), this constitutes corruption relating to trafficking. If, on
the other hand, parliamentarians vote against the bill primarily because of their own values, not
any received or promised reward, their action can be described as conducive to trafficking, but
not actually corrupt.
1. Scattered Evidence
While details on actual cases are scarce, a patchwork quilt can be created
using the scattered evidence available from various parts of the world. This
said, my own research focus on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) means there will be more evidence
from there than from elsewhere. But since the OSCE identified CEE and the
CIS in the late-1990s as the worlds fastest-growing source region for
trafficked people, this focus is justifiable.11 Citing actual cases provides
information on the kinds of officials involved; how they interact with criminal
gangs involved in trafficking; whether or not they ever operate independently
of organised crime gangs; and how they are dealt with by the authorities.
11
OSCE/ODIHR, Trafficking in Human Beings: Implications for the OSCE (Warsaw: ODIHR, 1999), 5.
87
Sally Stoecker and Louise Shelley argue that the trafficking of women for the
purposes of prostitution was primarily an Asian phenomenon until the end of
the 1980s.12 Thus, while there was unquestionably plenty of trafficking
elsewhere, including much internal trafficking (i.e. within a given country),
Asia is an appropriate continent in which to start our analysis. Between June
2004 and June 2006, Bangladesh prosecuted eight officials for complicity in
trafficking.13 In 2006, the former Deputy Director of the Police Anti-Human
Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department in Cambodia was convicted for
involvement in trafficking and received a five-year prison sentence; two of his
subordinates were also convicted, and were sentenced to seven years
imprisonment. In the same year, two military officers and a member of the
military police were arrested for running brothels and trafficking; one received
a five-year suspended sentence and was fined the equivalent of approximately
US$1,250.14
According to the then head of Khabarovsks Border Patrol Unit, Chinese police
officers are directly involved in the trafficking of Russian women. The Russian
official alleged in 2000 that there were cases of Russian women trying to
escape from Chinese brothels by approaching the Chinese police, only to find
that the latter either returned them to their brothels or else sold them to other
brothels.15 However, despite on one level fulfilling public promises to deal
firmly with corruption generally, by both prosecuting and convicting large
numbers of officials,16 the Chinese authorities appear seldom if ever to
prosecute officials for corruption relating directly to trafficking, as distinct
from people smuggling.17 A rare exception to this, though it occurred in Hong
12
S. Stoecker and L. Shelley, Introduction in Human Traffic and Transnational Crime: Eurasian and
American Perspectives , ed. S. Stoecker and L. Shelley, (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005),
1.
13
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (hereafter TiPR) June 2006 (Washington DC:
US Department of State, 2006), 68.
14
Department of State, TiPR 2007, 74.
15
L. Erokhina, Trafficking in Women in the Russian Far East: A Real or Imaginary Phenomenon? in
Human Traffic and Transnational Crime: Eurasian and American Perspectives , ed. S. Stoecker and L.
Shelley, (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 91-2.
16
For instance, 136,161 officials were punished in China in 2001 for graft, bribery or misconduct
(Peoples Daily Online, January 2, 2002accessed September 18, 2003)while the number of
Communist party cadres disciplined in 2004 for corruption was 164,831 (Peoples Daily Online,
February 16, 2005accessed October 3, 2005).
17
The Deputy Chairman of Changle (in Fujian Province) Municipal Committee of the Chinese Peoples
Political Consultative Committee was in 2001 sentenced to three years imprisonment and a substantial
fine for his direct involvement in people smugglingChina News Network, March 19, 2001; Huang
Rui, A Probe into Transnational People Smuggling on the Coast of Fujian Province, [in Chinese]
Journal of Shandong Public Security College 67, no.1 (2003), 87.
88
Kong rather than Communist China itself, was the 2005 sentencing of a police
sergeant for tipping off Mongkok-based brothels about impending police
raids.18 Similarly, Russia does prosecute a number of officials for corruption
but, relative to the perceived problems and reports from NGOs, not nearly
enough in the area of trafficking.19 However, corruption unquestionably plays a
role in Russian trafficking. In June 2005, for instance, a Russian narcotics
enforcement officer was investigated for allegedly selling Uzbek migrants to
traffickers for some US$15 each. Life is very cheap in some parts of the
world.20
Since the collapse of most of the communist bloc in the late-1980s/early-1990s,
there has been a huge increase in the number of peoplemostly women, but
also some men and an increasing number of childrentrafficked from CEE
and the CIS to Western Europe, East Asia and elsewhere. As in other parts of
the world, there is still relatively little hard evidence on the involvement of
corrupt officials in this. But there are plenty of general references to corruption
and sex-related trafficking, including from officials in post-communist states.
For example, the head of the ten-person police unit formed in Moscow in the
late-1990s to counter prostitution, Viktor Yegorin, noted that the units efforts
to reduce prostitution were undermined by police corruption. The police accept
bribes to assist the women in getting residence permits and to ignore the
prostitution.21 But detailed concrete information is still difficult to obtain.
This said, evidence from Poland, Lithuania, successor states to the former
Yugoslavia and (East) Germany is cited here. Thus, in April 2001, the trial
began in the Polish town of Gorzw of an organised crime gang accused of
trafficking some 600 undocumented migrants to Germany; among the accused
were six Polish border guards.22 Then in May 2006, Polish media reported the
case of two Polish police officers from Wrocaw who had engaged in the
selling of women to escort agencies in Vienna (Austria) for between 1000 and
1500 Euros each. They collaborated in this activity with a female prostitute
from Wrocaw and a Polish male living in Vienna. By the time of their arrests,
18
Peoples Daily Online, 12 May 2005 (accessed October 3, 2005); the sentence was three years
imprisonment.
19
20
Ibid.
21
Donna Hughes, Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation (Geneva:
International Organization for Migration, 2002), 22.
22
Gazeta Wyborcza, April 29, 2001. In September 2002, two border guards working on the Polish border
with Lithuania were acquitted of involvement in the trafficking of 113 Asians into Poland; the court
considered the evidence against them suggestive but not conclusive (Gazeta Wyborcza, September 9,
2002).
89
the police officers had been involved in the trafficking of 440 women, of whom
150 were from Poland (many of the others were apparently Romanian).23 A
final example reported in the Polish press in March 2004 reveals that not all
trafficking involving corrupt officials is transnational. Thus a police sergeant
from Katowice recruited teenage girls from a child shelter, and supplied them
to a local gang in return for free use of the girls for sexual purposes.24
However, as of the end of 2006, no Polish police officers or other officers of
the state had been convicted for involvement in trafficking.25
Other CEE and CIS countries that are to be commended for having recently
clamped down much harder on civilian traffickers still appear not to be taking
the issue of complicit corrupt officials seriously enough; examples include
Armenia and Belarus.26 As in the cases of China and Russia cited above, even
countries that do prosecute reasonably large numbers of officials for corruption
do not always focus on trafficking; Czechia is an example.27 One exception to
this is Lithuania, which has in the past convicted corrupt officials involved in
trafficking. In 2002, Lithuanian authorities sentenced six former police officers
to between three and seven years imprisonment for their involvement in
trafficking, extortion and pimping. This was a marked increase on the previous
year, when only one former police officer was convicted.28 However, one of the
police officers had his sentence reduced in 2003 from seven years
imprisonment to two years probation, which might send an unfortunate
message to other corrupt or potentially corrupt officers.29 Moreover, there do
not appear to have been any convictions since Lithuania joined the EU (May
2004). It would be reassuring to have it confirmed explicitly that this is because
there were no allegations and no evidence, rather than a reflection of lower
levels of concern once EU membership had been achieved.
The successor states of former Yugoslavia provide some of the most detailed
evidence on the involvement of corrupt officials in trafficking. However, while
there is plenty of evidence of corrupt police officers being involved in
23
K. agowska, Policjanci sprzedawali kobiety do agencji towarzyskich, Gazeta Wyborcza, May 12,
2006.
24
Policjant nakanial nastolatki do prostytucji, Gazeta Wyborcza, March 24, 2004.
25
26
Department of State, TiPR 2006, 62; 69.
27
Ibid., 104.
28
Department of State, TiPR 2002, 71; Department of State, TiPR 2003, 98.
29
Department of State, TiPR 2004, 155. Admittedly, the sentence was reduced because of insufficient
evidence; but in this case, it is unclear why the heavier sentence was imposed in the first place.
90
trafficking in various ways, there are very few prosecutions.30 A relatively

straightforward case is of a police officer from Banja Luka (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) who was sentenced in 2001 to fifteen months imprisonment for
being directly involved in the smuggling of people across international borders
for the purposes of trafficking.31 In 2006, two police officers in the Republic of
Macedonia were convicted of crimes relating to trafficking.32 This figure was
down on the number of corrupt officials convicted in 2003, when several
government officials and police officers were convicted for corruption relating
to trafficking, and a police inspector was convicted for selling information
regarding a forthcoming trafficking raid.33 The Republic of Macedonia has
been convicting corrupt officials for involvement in trafficking since at least
2002.34
But it is not only domestic state officials who are involved in trafficking. There
is considerable evidence that some international peacekeepers in Bosnia have
both used prostitutes they knew had been trafficked and been directly involved
in their trafficking.35 Moreover, interviews and surveys reveal that many
officials of state organisations and IOs have not appreciated until recently the
potential significance of the involvement of peacekeepers in trafficking, failing
to understand the security implications of both human rights abuses and the
unwitting support of organised crime.36
Next door to former Yugoslavia, Albania has also witnessed cases of corrupt
officials involved in trafficking. In 2006, for example, five state officers (a
policeman and four border police officers) were arrested for various crimes
30
For detailed evidence of police involvement see M. Vandenberg, Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of
Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution, Human Rights
Watch 14, no.9.D (2002), 26-34. See too M. Vandenberg, Peacekeeping and Rule Breaking: United
Nations Anti-Trafficking Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Human Trafficking, Human Security,
and the Balkans ed. H. R. Friman and S. Reich (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 81
95.
31
Ibid., 37; n.180.
32
33
34
35
For evidence of UN peacekeepers and other officials using prostitutes in former Yugoslavia see C.
Corrin, Transitional Road for Traffic: Analysing Trafficking in Women From and Through Central
and Eastern Europe, Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 4 (2005), 54360.
36
S. Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans
(Washington DC: CSIS Press, 2005), 4. See also esp. pages 1968 for concrete evidence both of corrupt
involvement in trafficking and of the disturbing attitudes of many officials in the US military, NATO
and the UN. The situation appears to have improved by the mid-2000s, at least in some parts of the
worldsee Keith J. Allreds analysis of peacekeepers in chapter 8 of this collection.
91
relating to corrupt involvement in trafficking.37 In the following year, twelve

police officers in Albania were charged with involvement in trafficking.38
Another post-communist state that has acknowledged the involvement of
corrupt officials in trafficking is Moldova where, in August 2006, several
senior government officialsincluding the Deputy Director of the Centre for
Combating Trafficking in Personswere dismissed from their posts for
assisting a well-known trafficking syndicate; but none was prosecuted.39
Turning to Western Europealthough Germany may still enjoy a relatively
clean image in the minds of many, its record in terms of human trafficking is
far from pristine. That corruption occurs at the highest levels in Germany has
been evident for many years, with the Flick scandal of the 1980s and the
Kohlgate scandal of the late-1990s/early-2000s being the best-known
examples. But a significant trafficking-related scandal broke in Leipzig in
2007, when it was alleged that senior local politicians had knowingly been
using trafficked female and child prostitutes. The press in Leipzig had for some
years been reporting on prostitution in the city.40 By early-1993, it was
reporting on under-age prostitutes in local brothels, of which the best known
was the Jasmin brothel. For instance, reports in the Leipziger Volkszeitung in
January and February provided details on four girls aged between thirteen and
sixteen years who had been forcibly prostituted.41 By early-February, a police
officer had been arrested for allegedly forcing a fifteen-year old Turkish girl to
work as a prostitute in one of the local brothelsthe same one (Jasmin) in
which the other girls had been discovered days before.42 He went on trial on
charges of furthering sexual activities with an under-age person and human
trafficking in January 1994.43
Disturbing though this already was, the whole case became far more significant
in the late-Spring of 2007, when first local, then national newspapers and other
media began to provide details on a case that allegedly involved senior Saxon
politicians, justice officials, intelligence officers and police officers colluding
37
38
39
Ibid., 150.
40
See, for example, Ein Bordell in Leipzig, Leipziger Volkszeitung, April 17, 1991.
41
Minderjhrige in Leipziger Bordell and Bordell der kleinen Mdchen aufgeflogen, Leipziger
Volkszeitung, January, 3031, 1993; Mdchen ins Bordell, Leipziger Volkszeitung, February 11,
1993.
42
Polizist brachte Mdchen ins Bordell, Leipziger Volkszeitung, February 11, 1993.
43
S. Kreuz, Der Zuhalter vom Mdchen-Bordell Jasmin vor Gericht, Leipziger Volkszeitung, January
26, 1994.
92
with organised crime gangs in child prostitution, bribery, cover-ups and

interference in investigations and trials. By June 2007, even Chancellor
Merkels Chief-of-Staff and coordinator of German intelligence services,
Thomas de Maiziere, had been implicated. He had been Saxon Interior Minister
in 2004-5, and was accused of having failed to initiate investigations when the
evidence of corruption was strong.44 By August 2007, Saxonys Minister of the
Interior was claiming that a considerable amount of misinformation had been
disseminated about the Leipzig case, and that he had been deceived by several
senior officials about the nature and extent of the corruption/trafficking
scandal.45 However, while some aspects of the case may have been exaggerated
by the media, there is ample evidence that some public officials in Saxony were
both directly and indirectly involved in trafficking.
The focus so far has mainly been on active involvement of corrupt officials in
trafficking, either in collusion with organised crime gangs, or in their own
right. But some corrupt officials are involved in trafficking in a more inactive
waynotably turning a blind eye in return for pay-offs.46 Such involvement
still represents direct and conscious involvement, however. Yet there are also
ways in which state officials can contribute less directly to the crime of
trafficking. One is through the use or abuse of immunity. Thus diplomats
sometimes use trafficked persons as domestic helps, without checking their
employees backgrounds. Even if such diplomats are not fully aware of the
trafficking background of the person they employ, they do know about the
suspicious circumstances under which their domestics entered their service, and
are fully aware that they need not concern themselves about trafficking
implications because of diplomatic immunityin most countries, at least.47
However, some Western states are now beginning to tighten up in this area.
Belgium is a good example. In the two-year period 2004 and 2005, Belgiums
44
German State Corruption Scandal Takes First Victim, Deutsche Welle online, June 13, 2007,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2607523,00.html (accessed March 12, 2009); Merkels
Chief of Staff under Pressure, Spiegel Online International, June 12, 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,488054,00.html (accessed March 12, 2009);
Mafise Strukturen im Leipziger Sumpf? tagesschau.de, June 14, 2007,
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/meldung22150.html (all accessed July 25, 2008); CDU-Politiker
nehmen Kanzleramtschef de Maizire ins Visier, Spiegel-Online, June 7, 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,487312,00.html (accessed January 9, 2009).
45
Sachsens Innenminister will von Mafia-Rede nichts mehr wissen, Spiegel-Online, August 7, 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,498636,00.html (accessed January 9, 2009).
46
L. Douglas, Sex Trafficking in Cambodia (working paper 122, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton,
2003), 4.
47
OSCE/ODIHR, Trafficking in Human Beings, 21.
93
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued ten sanctions and twenty letters of intent to
sanction against diplomats for alleged use of forced or bonded labour.48
The type of case just referred to makes it clear that not all trafficking is
primarily for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Indeed, while a majority of
commentators assume that most trafficking relates to the sex industry, there is
evidence to suggest that such a perception might be misguided, in some
countries at least. Empirical research suggests that there is more trafficking into
Russia of seasonal migrant workers (primarily for agriculture) than of women
for sexual exploitation, for instance.49 While one recent major research project
into child trafficking in twenty-five countries indicates that the most common
reason for it is sexual exploitation, many children are trafficked instead for the
purposes of street begging, working in sweat-shops, and engaging in crime (for
example, pick-pocketing).50
Having provided evidence of the existence of a problem that has been almost
neglected by researchers and governments, we can begin to identify certain
patterns and high-risk situations. Wherever there are relatively closed national
borders, there is the potential for corruption among customs officers and border
guards. This is particularly so between very unequal countries with different
standards of living and opportunities; the more affluent and attractive country
will act as a powerful magnet to citizens from poorer countries. All this plays
into the hands of transnational traffickers, who will often seek to minimise their
risks by paying corrupt border officials to ensure smooth passage of their
goods, whatever these may be. While the borders within Europes Schengen
zone have become much more open in recent years, those at the edges of the
zone have become more difficult to cross, leading many observers to refer to
Fortress Europe. Misha Glenny has argued that it is precisely West European
restrictions on labour movement by citizens of non-EU states that encourage
48
49
E. Tyuryukanova, Forced Labour in the Russian Federation Today: Irregular Migration and
Trafficking in Human Beings (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2005); the original version is E.
Tyuryukanova, Prinuditelnyi Trud v Sovremennoi Rossii: Nereguliruemaya Migratsiya i Torgovlya
Lyudmi (Geneva: International Labour Office 2004), a 2nd edition of which was published (in
Russian) in 2006.
50
AGIS 2005, Bundesministerium fr Inneres Republik sterreich, and International Organization for
Migration, Comprehensive Training for Law Enforcement Authorities Responsible for Child
Trafficking/Minors (Vienna: AGIS, BM.I, IOM, 2005), 3.
94
illegal migration;51 this obviously overlaps with both people smuggling and
human trafficking.52
But Western Europe is by no means the only part of the world in which
powerful pull factors operate. Another is the US. Peter Andreas is among
those who argue that the liberalisation of trade across the US-Mexico border
(with the creation of NAFTA) has been accompanied by at least the rhetoric of
much tougher border controls.53 Ironically, this has in turn increased the
propensity of traffickers to seek to corrupt officials on both sides of the border,
so that they can continue conducting their activities under more difficult
conditions.
Another group of state officials at risk of being corrupted in the context of
people smuggling and human trafficking is that responsible for issuing
passports or visas. In June 2008, a senior officer from Australias immigration
department was sentenced in Sydney to nine months imprisonment for
corruptly approving 110 applications for illegal migration by Chinese nationals
in the period 1996-2000. While it is not clear whether or not this involved
trafficking, this kind of post is certainly conducive to that (see Box 2).54 A
more clearcut example of this type of involvement by a corrupt official is of a
Czech national working in the US Embassy in Prague who was discovered in
the 1990s to have been improperly issuing B1 (business) and B2 (tourist) visas
to the US in return for bribes from a Czech organised crime gang.55
51
M. Glenny, Migration Policies of Western European Governments and the Fight against Organized
Crime in SEE, in Fighting Organized Crime in Southeast Europe ed. E. Athanassopoulou, (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2005), 3440.
52
For the distinctions between people smuggling and human trafficking, see chapter 4 (by Benjamin S.
Buckland).
53
P. Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press,
2000). See too R. Maril, Patrolling Chaos: The U.S. Border Patrol in Deep South Texas (Lubbock:
Texas Tech University Press, 2004).
54
Sydney Morning Herald, June 4, 2008. For allegations of German officials in the Embassy in Chisinau
(Moldova) being dismissed for corruptly selling visas see E. Wood, EU Visas for Sale in Moldova,
Tiraspol Times, May 17, 2007, 1. Similar allegations of the corrupt sale of visas made against
Romanian Embassy officials in the same city can be found in The DiplomatBucharest, September
2007, http://www.thediplomat.ro/news_review_0907.php (accessed August 20, 2008).
55
A. ONeill Richard, International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary

Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence
[CIA], 2000), 8.
95
Box 2: Corruption in Migration Services

Two trafficking-related aspects of corruption to have been particularly under-researched are the
role of corrupt officials in embassies and consulates in source-countries, and in immigration
departments in destination-countries. Unfortunately, this gap is not because the problems do not
exist, or because they arise only rarely, but rather because of the paucity of concrete
information. Nevertheless, a few examples of both types of trafficking-related corruption soon
demonstrate that the problems exist and may be all too common.
Corruption in embassies and consulates
In August 2001, the French Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs confirmed that
investigations were underway in eight French embassies after it was acknowledged that
thousandssome claim up to 25,000, though this figure sounds unrealistically highof visas
had been issued in Sofia to Bulgarian prostitutes. In itself, this constitutes corruption relating to
illegal immigration and prostitution, if not directly to trafficking. However, a police investigator
acknowledged that it was quite possible that organised crime was involved in the scam; since
organised crimes involvement in prostitution is so frequently in the form of trafficking, the
circumstantial evidence that corrupt officials were involved in corruption is strong (Guardian,
August 28, 2001). And the French Embassy was apparently not the only West European
embassy in Sofia in which corrupt officials were involved at least in people smuggling, and
possibly in human trafficking. Thus a senior official at the Belgian Embassy was accused of
developing a number of front companies in Belgium that would issue fake work invitations
for a fee of up to 4230to Bulgarians that could then be used to obtain Belgian work visas.56
A more clear-cut case of corruption relating to human trafficking came to light in April and
May 2006 at the Swiss embassy in Islamabad (Pakistan). According to officials of the Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Pakistani organised crime gangs involved in human
trafficking had almost certainly infiltrated the visa section of the Islamabad embassy and
corrupted officials. In the words of Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, We have
little doubt that we have been targeted by criminal networks engaged in human trafficking.
Apparently, one of the channels used by the gangs was Pakistani travel agencies. As a result of
an investigation conducted by Swiss specialists on people smuggling, at least 100 cases of visa
fraud were uncovered, and the visa section in Islamabad was completely closed for some time.
It was not re-opened until the entire staff of the embassy had been replaced; the staff of the
Swiss consulate in Karachi was also replaced. The Swiss authorities quickly learnt lessons from
this case. They engaged in risk assessments of all their embassies and consulates, and by the end
of 2006 had identified thirty-three in which the dangers of corruption among visa-officials were
particularly acute. Fourteen of these were in Asia (including Beijing and Mumbai), ten in
Africa, and five in Eastern Europe (including Moscow, Belgrade and Pristina). The Swiss
authorities also responded to suggestions that part of the reason for the problem was staff
overload because of staff cutbacks. Staff numbers at various embassies were increased in
response.57
56
Crimes Against Persons Unit, Trafficking of Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the EU:
The Involvement of Western Balkans Organised Crime 2006Public Version (The Hague: Europol,
2007), 22.
57
All from BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 1, 6, 7 and 19, 2006, December 10, 2006; swissinfo.ch May
3, 2006; Daily Times [Pakistan], April 28, 2006.
96
Corruption in immigration departments

It has been suggested that officials in immigration departments in some Western states have
sought bribes and/or sex in return for visas. Again, such corruption is not explicitly related to
human trafficking. However, its existence does indicate the willingness of some officials to
provide visas corruptly, which unquestionably plays into the hands of traffickers. One of the
best-known cases in recent years relates to the Immigration and Nationality Directorates Lunar
House in Croydon (South London), which was widely publicised in the UK in 2006. An
investigation revealed that several immigration officers at the centre, displaying a laddish
culture, had improperly bypassed normal appointment procedures and expedited the
applications of attractive females, while The Times claimed that the Home Office had revealed
that three immigration officials had had sex with visa applicants and had been arrested.58
According to some British media, immigration minister Tony McNulty lost his ministerial post
in part because of poor handling of the case.59
The police are also all too often involved in assisting traffickers. One Thai
trafficker claimed that another trafficker had paid Thai police some US$12,000
in bribes in return for their turning a blind eye to the fact that he had been
caught with some 300 passports. Other cases from Thailand indicate that police
there have also extorted bribes from applicants for US visas whose passports
are counterfeited or else have been illegally modified (usually through
changing the photograph).60 Yet another way in which the police can be
involved in trafficking is in alerting owners of brothels, karaoke bars and other
locations in which there are trafficked women to impending raids; there have
been allegations against police officers in New Orleans (US) for this form of
involvement.61 Some police officers are only grass-eaters (i.e. they will
accept bribes if offered). But others are more predatorymeat-eatersand
will seek revenge on traffickers who do not pay the bribes the officers demand.
Thus, some members of the Mexican Grupo Beta police team were allegedly
demanding between $200 and $500 per time during the 1990s to allow human
traffickers and people-smugglers to take people across the border with the US,
and would not only imprison (for two to three days) traffickers who refused to
pay, but would also sell their human cargoes to other traffickers for $50 per
person.62
58
The Times, March 15 and 16, 2006; The Independent, May, 21 2006; The Observer, May 28, 2006.
59
For example, The Scotsman, May 23, 2006; The Sun, May 25, 2006; The Independent, June 10, 2006.
60
ONeill Richard, International Trafficking in Women, 8. For a detailed analysis of how some police
officers in Thailand corruptly collude in human trafficking and prostitution more generally see Pasuk
Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsan and Nualnoi Treerat, Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja (Chiang
Mai: Silkworm, 1998), esp. 155214.
61
ONeill Richard, International Trafficking in Women, 15.
62
Ibid., 17.
97
While concrete evidence on this is hard to come by, there have certainly been
allegations that state officials have been involved in trafficking through selling
children from orphanages to procurers.63 And it seems that prosecutors can
sometimes be bought off by crime gangs of traffickers; there are allegations of
this in Russia, for instance.64
What conclusions can be drawn from the cases cited?
o
There is no question that officials in all types of system, including

affluent ones, are sometimes tempted to become involved in
trafficking. This said, the incomplete evidence available suggests that
the problem is usually worse in poorer countries.
We have concrete evidence only of relatively small numbers of

officials being directly involved in trafficking. But this is just the tip of
an iceberg, and is explained largely by the difficulties involved in
investigating such activities. As the global economic crisis that began
in 2008 demonstrates, much improper and even illegal behaviourin
this case by corporate executivescan occur for many years before it
eventually comes to light. However, prolonged near-invisibility does
not mean that a phenomenon is not occurring. Rather, it often indicates
that those engaged in some forms of crime are much better at hiding
their activities than those involved in more overt crimes with more
visible victims.
While many corrupt officers collude with criminal gangs in the

trafficking process, some operate in their own right.
Although it seems that it is primarily law enforcement officers of

various kinds who are most prone to become directly involved in the
actual trafficking process, other officers of the state contribute to
trafficking by using the services of prostitutes they know or should
suspect have been trafficked; some peacekeeping forces are an obvious
example. This constitutes corruption as defined at the beginning of this
analysis.
Finally, evidence from around the world and all types of system
indicate that far too many state authorities are typically either unwilling
or feel unable to prosecute corrupt officials involved in trafficking.
Indeed, many countries have only recently made human trafficking a
63
OSCE/ODIHR Trafficking in Human Beings, 12.
64
98
punishable crime. This was the case in Russia, for example, until
President Putin pushed through an amendment to the Russian Criminal
Code in December 2003although even this was not finally ratified by
the Duma (legislature) until March 2004. In fact, of the 155 countries
and territories covered in the 2009 UNODC Global Report on
Trafficking, only just over one third had formally criminalised human
trafficking as of 2003. Fortunately, this figure had soared to almost 80
per cent by the end of 2008, though several statesparticularly in
Africastill had no anti-trafficking legislation.65
2. Public Perceptions
While there is no shortage of survey material on public and business attitudes
towards, and experience of, corruption generally, and somethough much
lesson organised crime, there is very little survey data on public perceptions
of and attitudes towards trafficking, particularly towards corruption and
trafficking.66 But surveys conducted on behalf of the author in three states
(Germany, Italy and Poland) in 2006 provide limited insights into attitudes
toward these phenomena in parts of Europe. It must be emphasised that the
survey was intended to discover attitudes and beliefs towards people smuggling
generally, as distinct from human trafficking more specifically. However, and
despite the fact that the questionnaire drew a distinction between these two
phenomena, feedback from some of the interviewers indicated that many
respondents did not accept that there was a difference. Since a number of
specialists on these crimes also argue that, in practice, one often mutates into
the other, it is maintained here that the survey results are of value to the present
exercise, especially in the absence of many more!
65
Chawla, Me and le Pichon, Global Report, 8-9.
66
For readily available survey data on corruption, see the Corruption Perceptions Indices (CPIs) on the
Transparency International website; this index has been published annually since 1995. For survey
evidence on organised crime see the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and the International
Crime Business Surveys (ICBS). And for an innovative approach to the measurement of organised
crime and its impact in individual countries see J. Van Dijk, Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized
Crime and its Impact on Societies, Trends in Organized Crime 10, no.4 (2007), 3956.
99
Table 1: Public Beliefs (2006) about the Suggestion that Most People Entering their Country Illegally
do so with the Assistance of Organised Crime Gangs (Percentages)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Dont Know, or Neither Agree nor

Disagree
Germany
39
40
16
Italy
27
44
14
Poland
37
12
38
Notes:
1.
All percentages have been rounded to whole figures, so that some rows do not sum to exactly 100.
2.
Surveys conducted by TNS-Emnid in Germany (N = 1030), TNS-infratest in Italy (N = 1027), and

CBOS in Poland (N = 937).
It is clear from Table 1 that a majority of citizens in all three countries believed
that people smuggling was a crime that more often than not involved organised
crime gangs; while only just under 50 per cent of Poles believed this, 71 per
cent of Italians and 79 per cent of Germans did. But even the Polish figure was
high. The main difference between the Polish findings and those in Italy and
Germany was not that many more Poles believed that organised crime was not
involved (Poles were actually the middle-rankers on this), but rather that many
more Poles than Germans or Italians were not sure what to believe. We can
now consider the responses vis--vis the involvement of corrupt officials.
Table 2: Public Beliefs (2006) about the Suggestion that Organised Crime Gangs that Smuggle People
into their Country do so with the Corrupt Assistance of State Officials (Percentages)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Dont Know, or Neither Agree nor

Disagree
Germany
13
28
12
44
Italy
11
28
26
25
Poland
35
15
40
Note: Caveat and sources as for Table 1
A striking feature of Table 2 is that far higher percentages of Germans and

Italians were unsure of whether or not corrupt officials were involved with
organised crime gangs in people smuggling than were unsure about the
involvement of just crime gangs; the Polish figure was almost the same as in
the previous table. The high German percentage could be interpreted as
indicating that many Germans are now less certain than they have traditionally
100
been that their Beamten (civil servants and other state officials) are uncorrupt,
but are still unwilling to believe that many of them have indeed become
corrupt. It would be interesting to compare these figures with any taken before
the Kohlgate affair; that corruption scandal, which broke in late-1999, shook
many Germans faith in the trustworthiness of their officialdom. Conversely,
the Italianswhile still less sure than they are about the involvement of
organised crimehave long been used to high rates of corruption among their
officials.
Yet for all these caveats and uncertainties, the percentages of respondents who
did believe that corrupt officials were colluding with crime gangs ranged
between 40 per cent (Germany) and 54 per cent (Italy); by any assessment, this
means that large numbers of citizens in the three countriesexactly half in
Poland, and an absolute majority in Italyperceive there to be widespread
involvement of state officers in people smuggling. It is reasonable to assume
from this that large numbers of citizens believe some of their officials are
colluding in trafficking.
3. Causes
In a book published some sixteen years ago, the author identified more than
sixty causes of corruption.67 Most of these still pertain, so that space limitations
require a high degree of selectivity in this section.68 In his major study of
revolutions since the Middle Ages, Charles Tilly argues persuasively that we
should distinguish between revolutionary situations and revolutionary
outcomes; not all revolutionary situations crystallise into actual revolutions.69
Similarly, a distinction can be drawn between corruption-friendly situations
and corruption triggers. The assumption here is that certain contexts are
particularly conducive to corruption, but that there need to be additional factors
for potentially corrupt officials actually to engage in corruption.
67
L. Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 157201.
68
Those interested in more detailed analyses of the causes of corruption should begin their search with
some of the classics in corruption studies, such as M. Clarke (ed.), Corruption: Causes,
Consequences and Control (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), A. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970the [3rd] edition of this collection was co-edited with
M. Johnston and was published in 2001 by Transaction Publishers), or R. Williams, ed., Explaining
Corruption (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000).
69
C. Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), esp. 10-16.
101
Many factors contribute to a corruption-friendly situation. Perhaps the most

obvious is perceived relative poverty. If state officials find they are unable to
afford what they consider to be a minimally acceptable standard of living, they
are more likely to be tempted into engaging in corruption. The term relative
here is important, and is to be interpreted in three ways. The first is relative to
perceived basic needs. What these would be to even an impoverished US
citizen will be very different from what they would be to someone living in
Darfur or the Amazon jungle. The second meaning is relative to the officials
previous income. If there is massive inflation, for example, and state salaries
do not keep pace with this, then many officials will feel relatively
impoverished and deprived. Another situation in which this second meaning
pertains could be found in many post-communist states in the 1990s. Fiscal
problems meant that many officials were paid late, or not in full, or not at all.
Third, state officials can compare themselves with others, and feel that they
have been left behind. In a weak or failed state in which the authorities cannot
afford adequate protection of their citizens against criminals, organised crime is
likely to flourish. If state officers believe that criminals are faring much better
financially than they are and getting away with it, they might decide to join
those criminals, or to collude with them, or to emulate themall for personal
benefit.
In terms of corruption-friendly factors specific to trafficking, at least two that
have changed in recent years need to be highlighted. The first is the
contradictory impact of the simultaneous loosening and tightening of borders.
As Archibold and Becker argue in the case of the tightening of the border
between the US and Mexico, Increased corruption is linked, in part, to tougher
enforcement, driving smugglers to recruit federal employees as accomplices.70
The same argument applies to the outer limits of the Schengen Zone in Europe.
Yet the ease of travel once in the Schengen area makes it very tempting for
traffickers and illegal migrants to try to cross the outer barriers, thus increasing
the proclivity to offer bribes to border guards.
The second driver is the growth of the sex industry in the affluent world, and
the reduction of social stigma for prostitutes clients as many forms of paid sex
have been legalised. Yet there is an ambiguityeven a contradictionhere.
Normally in a situation of labour imbalance between supply and demand in a
given economy, governments encourage workers in the area of shortage to
immigrate. But this does not happen in the case of sex work. This very fact
70
R. Archibold and A. Becker, Border Agents, Lured by the Other Side, New York Times, May 27,
2008.
102
indicates that Western authorities are still ambiguous about the status of such
work. But since they do not offer work visas in an area of growing demand, it
is rationaleven if ethically questionablefor traffickers to increase supply to
the market. If this requires the payment of bribes to various officials involved
in the illegal migration process, so be it.
What of corruption triggers, the factors that encourage dissatisfied state
officialsthose in a corruption-friendly situationto actually jump the
fence and engage in corruption? There are many reasons why officers of the
state become involved in the business of trafficking. In some cases, these are
personal (individual), such as the build-up of a high level of debt because of
gambling, drug abuse, a mistress, etc. Here, only systemic factors will be
considered.
A number of analysts of crime generally, as well as of organised crime and
corruption more specifically, have argued that it is neither poverty nor
economic problems that constitute the primary drivers of most types of crime
(crimes of passion usually involve other motivations), but rather opportunity.71
In addition to the fact that certain branches of the statethose in which
officials are most likely to be offered bribes of various kindsare much higher
risk than others, there are also a number of specific factors that increase the
exposure of state officials to what is sometimes called active corruption (i.e.
where citizens offer rewards in return for improper favours from officials).
Several of these relate very much to the changed conditions of the 1990s that
resulted in new opportunities, some of which can still arise in both transition
and developing countries.
One of these changes was that many state apparatuses, including police forces,
were downsized in the 1990s. As a result, there were often large numbers of
retrenched officers who felt demoralised and alienated from their former
employer, the state. Many of them turned to organised crime gangs, for whom
they had a number of advantages over others wanting to join such groups. For
instance, they had insider knowledge of how the authorities investigated and
addressed criminality. But another advantageof direct relevance to the
current analysiswas that many still had links to their former colleagues, and
were thus able to identify those who might most easily be tempted into
corruption. They would also know who might be most prone to blackmail or
even threats, which are two concrete reasons why some officials engage in
corruption and collude with crime gangs; there are times when the distinction
71
See for example, V. Ruggiero, Crime and Markets: Essays in Anti-Criminology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
103
between criminal and victim becomes blurred. All this meant that officers
might be approachedand thus subject to opportunities (temptation!)in a
way they would probably not have been in a more stable situation.
4. Consequences
It is obvious that the principal losers in trafficking are those trafficked. It is
perhaps less obvious that corruption can exacerbate their situation. This is
because the need for their traffickers to pay bribes as part of the trafficking
operation can substantially increase the overall costs of that operation. In
Russia, it was claimed by the Deputy Chair of the Committee on Security and
Safety in the 1990s that up to 50 per cent of criminal income is spent on bribes
to government and police officials. While this was not only to human
traffickers, the point certainly applied to them too.72 These costs have to be
recuperated by the traffickers. Although they can in theory pass some of them
on to customers, empirically we know that they also pass some on to trafficked
persons. In short, the debt bondage situation for trafficked persons is
exacerbated. Reducing the corruption variable in trafficking should render it
more difficult for traffickers to engage in their unsavoury business. But even if
it did not, trafficked persons should benefit, assuming their debts to the
traffickers were reducedand that the traffickers pass on their savings.
Unfortunately, given the type of people engaged in trafficking, such a
reasonable assumption cannot be made.
It is probably even less intuitively obvious that corruption among officials can
be so rife in a country that ordinary citizens seek to flee their homeland country
just to live in a less corrupt society. But research conducted by Donna Hughes
suggests that this does occur.73 Given the overall context of this point, their
desperation is likely to make such citizens more prone to being duped into what
eventually becomes a trafficking situation.
72
S. Boskholov, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia, Demokratizatsiya 3, no.3 (2005), 2704,
here p. 271.
73
D. Hughes, Supplying Women for the Sex Industry: Trafficking from the Russian Federation, in
Sexualities in Post-Communism, ed. A. tulhofer, T. Sandfort, V. Diehl Elias and J. Elias, online at
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/supplying_women.pdf, pp.45 in online version (accessed
September 3, 2008).
104
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

It has been demonstrated that law enforcement officers, immigration officers,
military personnel, politicians and other state officials have all engaged in
corrupt behaviour relating to trafficking. The ways in which this could
constitute a security issue can now be explored.
In cases in which corrupt involvement in trafficking clearly breaks the law,
those officers of the state engaged in it are at risk of being blackmailed. The
Leipzig case outlined above allegedly involved blackmail of senior officials
who were using child prostitutes.74 This risk also arises if the corrupt officer is
married, or merely wishes to present himself (or, more rarely, herself) as a
respected pillar of the community. This not only means that the official is more
prone to continue his or her involvement in human trafficking (i.e. it is unlikely
to be a one-off event), but also that s/he is at greater risk of being either
persuaded or coerced into involvement in other kinds of collusion with
organised crime. If a gang is involved in other types of smuggling and
traffickingsuch as narcotics or armsthen officers of the state could become
involved in that. It is obvious why this constitutes a serious security threat.
Another implication is that corrupt officers can assist in the continuation and
even expansion of trafficking operations through tipping off brothel-owners
and others of imminent raids. Even where a brothel is operating legally, some
of the sex-workers may be working under slave-like conditions, and can be
hidden away until the raid is over. Moreover, given that some raids,
particularly those on unambiguously illegal operations, result in armed
resistance from the traffickers, corrupt officials tipping off crime gangs can
assist in the killing or wounding of their colleagues.75
It is only in the past ten years or so that governments and IOs have begun to
address the issue of trafficking seriously. Their awareness of, and interest in,
the role of corruption in trafficking is still at a low level, despite recent
improvements. It follows from this that current counter-corruption strategies
are, in most cases, still very underdeveloped. However, the recommendations
below are based in part on methods that have been either trialled or proposed in
one or more states or by one or more IOs.
74
C. Kohl, Ein Sumpf und mindestens drei Tote, Sddeutsche Zeitung, May 25, 2007, 2.
75
For evidence of such armed resistance, albeit without hard evidence of the collusion of corrupt officials,
see P. Chemnitz, Streit der Zuhlter wird mit der Waffe ausgetragen, Leipziger Volkszeitung, March
24, 1994.
105
Although organised crime and corruption are interactive, the latter drives the
former more than the converse. If trafficking is to be reduced, states and IOs
will have to acknowledge far more than most currently do that it could not
occur on the scale and with the ease it does without the collusion of their own
officers. The sooner this unpleasant truth is recognised, the sooner the recent
substantial growth in trafficking, especially transnational, will be contained and
then reversed. This is desirable from the human rights perspective, in that it
would reduce the triple victimisation to a single or double one, as well as the
scale of the first and second types of victimisation. But it is also important and
urgent in terms of the security interests of states.
Recommendations
There are numerous measures that governments and IOs can and should take to
reduce both corruption and trafficking, which then necessarily affect the
corruption-trafficking nexus. Here, the focus is on fourteen of the potentially
most effective.
Risk Assessments
While a priori assumptions and intuition must always play a role in identifying
potential dangers, the analysis of actual case-studies adds considerably to our
ability to assess the risks in particular types of situation, and to determine
which types of official are most likely to be involved. This certainly applies in
the case of corruption and trafficking.
Trafficking can occur both within a country and transnationally, and this fact
should be seen as the starting point for assessing potential risks. An appropriate
area for consideration is with policies that can be almost immediately
implemented. In the case of transnational trafficking, the state agencies to
which most attention should be directed are those involved in international
travel. The most obvious groups of potentially corruptible officers are those
involved in border-crossingcustoms officials and border guards. But there
are other agencies that might well be involved and that are perhaps less
immediately obvious. They include any agencies that provide passports and
visas, as well as any that register newly-arrived migrants or visitors.
All of the factors that apply primarily to risk assessment in the case of purely
domestic trafficking apply also in the case of transnational trafficking, so that
they can be added to the list provided in the previous paragraph. Thus, where
various types of prostitution are illegal, it is the police in most states who are
106
responsible for controlling this, so that they should be primary targets in any
corruption risk-assessment.
Education
Ideally, public attitudes towards prostitution, trafficking and corruption would
be changed over timeso that the corrupt officials are condemned more
strongly, and trafficked persons are treated with more sympathy, as victims.
Unfortunately, such re-education of the public could be a long and difficult
process. But other forms of educationarguably even more importantcan be
introduced quickly, are inexpensive, and, from the limited empirical results
available, can be very effective. This is the education of officials potentially
involved in the investigation and prosecution of cases of alleged corruption and
trafficking. According to Prof. Zbigniew Lasocik, one of Polands leading
experts on trafficking,76 even short seminars of a few hoursif presented
wellcan change the attitudes of police officers, judges and others towards
corruption and trafficking. Such sessions can make officers of the state more
willing than previously to treat the trafficked persons as victims, and corrupt
officials as real criminals and a potential danger to society.77
The view that the personal values of investigators and prosecutors constitute a
major factor in explaining different rates of corruption and trafficking in
different locations appears to be borne out by comparative research on
Khabarovsk and Primorskii Krai in the Russian Far East. According to
Liudmila Erokhina, who reaches her conclusions on the basis of a number of
interviews primarily with law enforcement officers in the two regions, the
authorities in the former are far more concerned than their counterparts in the
latter about addressing the issue of trafficking, which results in higher rates of
anti-trafficking activity and more impressive results. Admittedly, the reasons
for the higher level of attention in Khabarovsk relate more to concerns about
the effects of trafficking on STD (sexually transmitted disease) rates in the
broader population, the fact that trafficked persons are often involved in
smuggling of goods, and other factors that are pragmatic rather than based on
76
See Z. Lasocik, ed., Handel Ludmi: Zapobeganie i ciganie (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu
Warszawskiego, 2006).
77
For some disturbing survey results of police attitudes towards corruption and/or trafficking see N.
Arteaga Botello and A. Lpez Rivera, Everything in This Job is Money: Inside the Mexican Police,
World Policy Journal 17, no.3 (2000), 6170; A. Beck and R. Lee, Attitudes to Corruption amongst
Russian Police Officers and Trainees, Crime, Law and Social Change 38, no.4 (2002), 35772; A.
Maljevi, D. Datzer, E. Muratbegovi and M. Budimli, Overtly About Police and Corruption
(Sarajevo: Udruenje Diplomiranih Kriminalista u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2006), esp. 121216.
107
sympathy or a concern for human rights.78 Nevertheless, it is ultimately a

fundamental difference of attitudes among law enforcement officers in the two
Russian locations that accounts for significantly different levels of antitrafficking activity in them.
Harsher Punishments
As a number of analysts have noted, the punishments meted out for
traffickingwhen administered at allare in most countries very mild, and
typically even milder for officials than for gang members. Often, the
punishments for human trafficking are far more lenient than for drug
trafficking, even though the profit margins can be higher. This is seen by some
observers as likely to result in the former soon becoming an even bigger
business than the latter.79 This is not the only reason, however. Many drugs
require ingredients available only in certain parts of the world, so that supply
may be severely reduced if authorities commit to destroying the crops (as has
happened in both Afghanistan and Colombia on occasions), which then creates
major problems for those whose livelihoods depend on supplying and
trafficking such products. In contrast, the potential supply of persons for
trafficking is almost limitlessagain increasing its attractiveness to criminals.
Moreover, whereas the revenue from any particular batch of illicit drugs is a
one-off, that from a trafficked person can last years. Increasing the number of
convictions and making the sentences more severe for traffickers, and for
corrupt officials who collude with them, would deter some, and at least put
some traffickers and corrupt officials somewhere where they can do less harm.
Immunity
The reference to the need for harsher punishments leads to another factor that
needs to be addressed as a matter of urgencyimmunity. The United States
has demonstrated in various ways that it is now taking the issue of transnational
human (or alien, as the US authorities usually call it) trafficking far more
seriously than it used to. But as long as it continues to insist that its military
78
Erokhina, Trafficking in Women in the Russian Far East, 8893.
79
Whereas several Asian states administer the death penalty for certain types of drug trafficking, only
Bangladesh does for human trafficking; three people were sentenced to death in Bangladesh between
June 2008 and January 2009 for trafficking of females. The death penalty is not being advocated here;
rather, the contrast between the treatments needs to be highlighted. Thus the maximum fine in India for
drug trafficking is approximately 100 times more than the maximum for human trafficking. Cited in
Janis Foo, Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery, Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 6, 2009, Reviews.
108
and diplomatic personnel must enjoy immunity from local law enforcement, a
potentially powerful weapon for reducing either direct or indirect involvement
of officers of the state in trafficking is blunted.
One reason so many states are unwilling to lift the immunity of their officers
overseas is the concern that their increasing dependence on civilian contractors
and privately-employed soldiers will be jeopardised (i.e. that they will be
unable to attract sufficient numbers relative to the tasks at hand). But another
significant reason, which applies both to regular officers of the state and
contracted persons, is that the judicial systems in many countries in which
these officers operate are known to be flawed, often seriously. Basically, the
rule of law operates poorly or not at all in such countries. Manifestations of this
range from inadequate laws and sub-standard evidence-collecting mechanisms
to what many Westerners would consider excessively draconian punishments
for those found guilty (for example, the death penalty for corruption), an
insufficiently independent judiciaryand corruption in the law-enforcement
agencies. But in addition to assisting developing and transition states to
improve their law-enforcement agencies and the rule of law more generally,
developed states could and should address the immunity issue by being far
more willing than most currently are to investigate claims of corruption and
trafficking-related activities among their own officers and contractors, and
trying their own people themselves. One of the most effective ways of
encouraging others to respect and develop the rule of law is to set a good
example oneself!
Naming and Shaming
A method that has been used in some parts of the world and could usefully be
extended to others is naming and shaming. South Korean authorities have
threatened to publish the names not only of brothel owners found guilty of
using trafficked persons, but also patrons, many of them high profile public
figures; this is the shining the light policy that some claim has been very
effective at reducing the patronage of such brothels by public servants.80
Removal of Limits on the Number of Testimony-Related Visas That Can Be
Issued
It is strange that various governments actually impose limits on the number of
special visas that can be issued each year to persons who are prepared to testify
80
109
against criminals. But the US, for instance, has had such a limit200 per year,
with up to fifty extra ones possible if the testimony relates to terrorism.81 There
are potential drawbacks involved in a limitless visa situationmost obviously,
that an increasing number of people will make false allegations simply in order
to be granted a visa. Nevertheless, states should examine this issue from a
likely cost-benefit perspective. If the potential benefits of either having a
limitless numberor, preferably, a limited number plus a workable method for
rapidly expanding this number if there is good reason to do sooutweigh the
potential costs, which they usually would do, then that should steer policy.
Bureaucratic regulations should not play into the hands of either corrupt
officials or crime gangs involved in trafficking. Indeed, having a strict limit
gives discretionary power to officials, which in turn increases their
susceptibility to corruption.
Reducing Demand through New Approaches to Prostitution
In most countries, it is the women (mostly) who sell sexual services, not the
men (mostly) who purchase them, who are treated as law-breakers and/or social
outcasts. Perhaps ironically, the legalisation orworsede facto
decriminalisation of prostitution, brothels, etc. in many countries in recent
years appears to have increased the scale of trafficking.82 Research indicates
that only a few women become prostitutes out of genuine preference (because
of the high incomes, a feeling of power over men, etc.). Most are either forced
or tricked into it, or else engage in it reluctantly because of a desperate
economic situation. Legalisation of prostitution makes the use of prostitutes
more socially acceptable. In theory, and logically, this should also render the
activities of sex workers more socially acceptableless stigmatisedtoo. But
logic does not always drive social attitudes, and all too often the prostitutes
suffer in various ways, while their clients do not. But Sweden (in 1999),
Norway (effective January 2009) and a small number of other countries have
now made or appear set to make the use of prostitutes illegal (though the
selling of sexual services remains legal in Sweden);83 while some men will risk
81
82
While this point is fairly obvious in the case of decriminalisation (i.e. because the potential costs of
trafficking, such as a prison sentence, are reduced, thus rendering trafficking more attractive), it is less
so in the case of legalisation. But Australian experience suggests that legalisation of brothels makes it
much more difficult for the police to raid them at will than is the case with illegal brothels; this in turn
makes it harder for the police to discover trafficked prostitutes. Laws could be amended to address this
anomaly, however.
83
Other countries to have recently adopted or that are considering this approachi.e. making the
purchase of sex illegal, rather than its saleinclude Bulgaria (International Herald Tribune, October 9,
2007), Estonia, and South Africa. Some countries have made the purchase of sex only with trafficked
110
breaking the law for sex, manyperhaps mostjohns will think twice about
paying for sex if this could land them in prison. The Russian media have
certainly claimed that the change in Swedish legislation has had an impact on
Russian traffickers.84 Given that the demand for sexual services has apparently
declined markedly in Sweden since the introduction of the new law, Russian
suppliers of trafficked women have redirected their attention to countries such
as Germany, where prostitution was de facto legalised from the beginning of
2002. Reducing the demand for sexual services should reduce the number of
opportunities for corruption in trafficking.
Changing Media Laws
In an excellent summary of the different roles the media can play in exposing
and publicising corruption, Rodney Tiffen identified five canine modelsthe
wolf, the yapping pack, the lapdog, the muzzled watchdog, and the watchdog.85
Space limitations preclude a full exposition of these five types here. But the
concept of the muzzled watchdog is highly relevant to the current analysis. If
the media are muzzled, not by strict government censorship as such, but by
overly harsh defamation laws that render it too dangerous (potentially
expensive!) for the media to make claims about officers of the state that they
cannot support almost 100 per cent, then they will normally refrain from
making such claims. The apparently high levels of corruption in Cambodia,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine have been explained partly in terms of those
countries draconian defamation laws,86 while the USs laws are often cited as
exemplary if the media are to play a watchdog role on corruption.87
persons, rather than with all prostitutes, illegal (for example, Finland since 2006; the UK published
details of a similar plan in November 2008). While the rationale behind such a policy might be
defensible (i.e. that women or men who freely choose to sell their own bodies for sex should have the
right to do so), the practicalities of implementing such a two-pronged (differentiated) approach render it
highly problematical.
84
M. Buckley, Press Images of Human Trafficking from Russia: Myths and Interpretations, (paper
presented at the ICCEES World Congress, Berlin, July 2005).
85
R. Tiffen, Scandals, Media and Corruption in Contemporary Australia (Sydney: University of New
South Wales Press, 1999), 20639.
86
See for example, A. Karatnycky, A. Motyl and C. Graybow, C., eds., Nations in Transit 1998: Civil
Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New
York: Freedom House, 1998), 6145; D. Nussbaum, Dead Silence: When Journalists are Muzzled,
Corruption Goes Unchecked, May 3, 2006,
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/5988/35174/file/WPFDay_statement_DN_03_05_06.pdf (accessed January 10, 2009).
87
Russia had looked set to introduce much stricter media libel laws in April 2008; but, in an encouraging
sign, President Medvedev made critical comments on the bill, which were interpreted as having sunk it
111
Increasing the Involvement of NGOs

One of the most problematic aspects of controlling corruption, including in
trafficking, is that the people responsible for exercising such control are
precisely those who might be engaged in the anti-social, and usually illegal,
activity themselves, especially in highly corrupt societies. Even establishing
government watchdogs is not invariably a failsafe method, particularly in
countries in which corruption is rife across the system. For this reason, it is
important that NGOs be permitted to play a greater role in monitoring
trafficking and the role of corruption in this. Unfortunately, agencies that can
play such a role, including Human Rights Watch and Transparency
International, are all too often treated by government authorities as
troublemakers and outside agents provocateurs.88 This needs to change. If
the only way to do this is for external agencies to fund relevant NGOs, so be it;
governments genuinely committed to fighting corruption and trafficking should
welcome and appreciate such funding.
Further Improvement of States Treatment of Trafficked Persons
Several analysts make the point that trafficked persons are all too often still
treated as illegal immigrants and/or criminals rather than as victims. While the
situation is beginning to improve, more governments will have to follow the
Italian lead and provide supportive conditions to victims, whether or not they
are prepared to testify against their traffickers and collusive corrupt officials.
The Italian experience indicates that many victims will gradually become more
relaxed after their traumatic experiences if treated in this sympathetic way by
authorities, and be prepared to testify.89 But even when they do testify, most
courts seek information only about the traffickers, not the collusion of corrupt
officials. This is an area in need of significant change.
(Reuters, June 2, 2008in Johnsons Russia List, No. 108, June 3, 2008, Item #1; Glasnost Defence
Foundation Digest, #384, June 9, 2008).
88
An example is the authorities in Republika Srpska (Bosnia), who in 2008 accused the local branch of
Transparency International of corruptionsee A. Alic, Bosnia: Corruption Watchdog under Fire
(Zurich: International Relations and Security Network ISN, July 16, 2008).
89
The path-breaking legislation by the Italian authorities is usually referred to as Article 18; it was passed
in 1998 and became effective in 2000for details on the legislation and its impact, plus suggestions for
further improvement, see I. Orfano, ed., Article 18: Protection of Victims of Trafficking and Fight
against Crime (Italy and the European Scenarios)Research Report (Martinsicuro: On the Road,
2002). Whereas Article 18 was originally designed to protect only persons trafficked for work in the
sex industry, its effectiveness has led to its recent amendment, to cover also persons trafficked for other
kinds of work.
112
Changing the Gender Balance

It might appear a priori that state agencies in the high risk category for being
corrupted by traffickers would be less prone to such corruption were they to be
staffed primarily by women. Unfortunately, empirical research suggests that
such an assumption must be questioned.90 One reason is that women are often
heavily involved in running trafficking and prostitution operations, so that the
notion of a law-abiding sisterhood displaying solidarity needs to be
challenged.91 Second, authorities such as the Mexico City traffic police have in
the past sought to eradicate or reduce corruption by changing the dominant
gender of a particular agency. But research indicates that, while switching from
a predominantly or all-male force to a predominantly or exclusively female one
typically does reduce them substantially in the short-term, corruption levels
often begin to creep up again in the longer term. The current view on this,
based on a limited amount of research, is that the most effective long-term
gender arrangement for reducing corruption levels is to have roughly equal
numbers of men and women in a given agency.92
Greater Use of Technology and Data Sharing
While some civil rights activists might oppose the advocacy of greater state
control through technology, the scale and nature of traffickingand the rights
of trafficked persons!should override concerns about the rights of
individuals, especially officers of the state assessed to be in high risk
(opportunity) situations for engaging in trafficking and/or corruption. The
technology could include more cameras in border crossing posts, more
telephone and e-mail monitoring in police stations and judges chambers, better
data banks, etc. Such technology should not be secretive (which addresses one
concern of many civil rights activists). Rather, simply knowing that ones email might be read or ones phone conversations listened in to should act as a
deterrent to many potentially corruptible officials. There would have to be legal
safeguards in place, of course, to ensure that monitoring related only to
criminal activity, not to any improper behaviour detected (for example,
90
For evidence that attitudes towards some aspects of corruption can be markedly different between male
and female police officers, while views on other aspects can be remarkably similar or else display no
clear gender-related pattern, see Maljevi et al., Overtly About Police and Corruption, esp. 15761.
91
For empirical evidence see D. Hughes and T. Denisova, Trafficking in Women from Ukraine
(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 2002), 19. More generally on the role of women in
trafficking and organised crime see G. Fiandaca, ed., Women and the Mafia: Female Roles in
Organized Crime Structures (New York: Springer, 2007).
92
R. Mukherjee and O. Golcekus, Gender and Corruption in the Public Sector, in Global Corruption
Report 2004 ed. R. Hodess, T. Inowlocki, D. Rodriguez, and T. Wolfe, (London: Pluto, 2004), 337-9.
113
cheating on ones partner, smoking in a non-smoking building); but this is not

an insurmountable obstacle.
Given the transnational nature of much human trafficking, government
agencies in different countries will have to share more of their data.
Unfortunately, while this might seem obvious in theory, experience renders it
less so in practice. Thus some Western governments find it difficult to
collaborate with foreign authorities precisely because of the high levels of
corruption in those countries,93 though this is not the only reason. Others
include arrogance on the part of some Western officials who are loath to
collaborate with counterparts in less developed states, and their unwillingness
to acknowledge the seriousness of the trafficking problem within their own
countries.
Standardisation of Definitions
There remain too many definitional differences and inconsistencies across
jurisdictions. Despite signing up to various international treaties that define
terms such as organised crime, corruption, and trafficking, many states
continue to use their own definitions for domestic purposes. Differences can
render extradition and other forms of transnational policing collaboration much
more difficult and slower, which plays into the hands of both traffickers and
corrupt officials.
The Role of Political Will
Finally, several analysts maintain that the single most important factor in
combating corruptiongenerally, not specifically relating to traffickingis
political will. This is usually taken to refer to the political will of the
leadership. But leadership commitment is in fact only a necessary, not a
sufficient, condition. Just as important as political will is political capacity.
Unless leaders have state administrative apparatuses able and willing to
implement their policies, their commitment to reducing corruption will mean
little. Expressed another way, those responsible for the actual realisation of
policies must also have political commitment and resources if those policies
are to succeed.
93
114
CHAPTER 3
Human Trafficking & Organised Crime in the US
& Western Europe
John Picarelli
Introduction
It is easy to assume that human trafficking and organised crime are
interchangeable terms.1 Perusing the media, words like mafia or crime group
are frequently found in articles about human trafficking. Yet human trafficking
is nothing more than a form of organised crime. The perpetrators of human
trafficking can and do vary greatly from case to case. Major international
organised crime groups are perpetrators of trafficking in human beings. But
they are not the sole perpetrators. Crime groups often cooperate with other
crime groups, with smaller ad hoc collections of criminal and even with
talented criminal entrepreneurs to perpetrate human trafficking. The
relationship between organised crime and trafficking in human beings is,
therefore, more complicated than one might assume. Traffickers, in other
words, are a diverse set of actors.2
This chapter explores the diversity of traffickers historically and in western
Europe and the United States (US).3 Historically, those who traded in human
beings under the flags of western European states and later the US ranged from
small groups of entrepreneurs to large state-sanctioned or state-owned
corporations. While the trade remained legal, many of these actors operated
1
The opinions expressed in this chapter are the authors personal views and do not represent the official
views of the National Institute of Justice.
A number of studies have examined the heterogeneity of traffickers in specific countries and regions.
Examples include Stephen Lize and Kevin Bales, Trafficking in Persons in the United States, Final
Report (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 2005) for the US; J. Kaizen, W. Nonneman,
Irregular Migration in Belgium and Organized Crime: an Overview, International Migration 45, no.2
(2007): 127-32 for Belgium; and Liz Kelly, You Can Find Anything You Want: A Critical
Reflection on Research on Trafficking in Persons within and into Europe, International Migration 43,
no.1/2 (2005), 235-65, here 249-54, on Europe.
While the findings of this chapter are applicable to other regions of the globe, the chapter limits its
analysis to western Europe and the US for the sake of brevity.
115
under the regulation and protection of the state. As states took measures to
abolish the trade, however, traders responded not by disbanding but often by
turning to the illicit trade in human beings. Contemporary trafficking in human
beings has therefore retained this diversity, and has done so in no small part
due to the evolution of the trade. Today, small groups of perpetrators operate
among and with large transnational criminal organisations. Criminal
entrepreneurs provide specialised services, such as money laundering and
document fraud to traffickers. And in keeping with the past, the contemporary
trade in human beings spans the upperworld and underworld. Corruption
links traffickers to government officials and corporate firms.4
Understanding the links between organised crime and human trafficking
therefore requires an analytical model that can accommodate this diversity.
This chapter develops just such a model by drawing on the tradition of
international political economy, which examines how actors organise and
operate complex cross-border markets for goods and services. The transactional
social network model identifies three main types of trafficking organisations.
The first are small trafficking groups comprised mainly of a handful of
entrepreneurial individuals. Second are cooperatives comprised of individuals,
small groups and even criminal organisations that combine specialised skills to
form larger trafficking syndicates. Last are situations where one large criminal
organisation controls all aspects of a trafficking network.
Improving our understanding of this diversity should serve as a priority for
those policymakers and practitioners that form the anti-trafficking community.
Since each of these organisational types has different attributes and levels of
sophistication, each also has a different set of ramifications for authorities.
Thus, while studies have demonstrated that authorities require more training to
recognise trafficking cases in general, this chapter suggests that they also
require more specialised training to recognise different types of trafficking
organisations. The chapter also concludes that the fusion of law enforcement,
immigration and other information sources is vital to making this determination
more rapidly and more accurately. Finally, while the research community is
growing more robust and continues to produce more well-grounded studies of
trafficking, we must continue to encourage researchers to develop more
empirically-grounded studies of trafficking organisations, both to improve our
understanding and to identify how organisations continue to evolve in the face
of state intervention.
4
For more information on the links between trafficking and corruption, see Leslie Holmes chapter on
the subject in this volume.
116
1. Perpetrators of Human Trafficking in History

Traffickers today are the direct descendants of slave traders from millennia
past. Contemporary traffickers in Europe and the US have evolved from those
who traded African slaves in the Americas as early as the 1500s.5 From the
outset, a diversity of actors have participated in different stages of the trade.
Over time, states outlawed different forms of the trade. In response, those
trading in human beings evolved into first grey market and later black market
operators. The evolution of traffickers is an important but often overlooked
element for understanding the diversity of actors engaged in contemporary
human trafficking.
Two elements of the early trade in slaves between the Americas and Africa are
important to note. The first is the early diversity in actors involved in the trade.
In the 1600s and 1700s, it appeared that state-owned and other quasi-public
companies monopolised the trade in human beings from Africa to colonies in
the Americas. However, smaller private traders conducted the bulk of the trade.
Akinjogbin provides a detailed examination of one of these entrepreneurs, the
British slave trader Archibald Dalzel.6 During the middle of the 18th century,
Dalzel made the decision to enter the trade in African chattel slaves due to the
lack gainful employment coupled with a need to save his family from debt and
ruin. Operating from the British fort at Whydah (modern day Ouidah in Benin),
Dalzel earned some 1000 pounds annually trading slaves with the French and
Portuguese. Dalzel would parlay these gains into the sole ownership of three
vessels, each of which earned him profits from the slave trade between Africa
and the Americas. In the space of a decade, Dalzel had created a small slaving
and trading company from the trade in chattel slaves.
The other important observation about the early trade in human beings is that
there has always been an illicit element to the trade. The illicit slave trade
became more prominent as countries first regulated and later criminalised the
trade. In the 1640s, the Dutch exploited the Spanish revocation of Portuguese
rights to sell slaves on Spanish territory by smuggling slaves into Spanish
colonies. The colonial powers were generally tolerant of the illicit trade in
slaves if it met the exploding demand for slaves in the colonies, a growing
5
Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem (Walnut Creek:
AltaMira, 2003); John Picarelli, Historical Approaches to the Trade in Human Beings, in Human
Trafficking, ed. Maggy Lee, 2648 (London: Willian, 2007).
I. A. Akinjogbin, Archibald Dalzel: Slave Trader and Historian of Dahomey, Journal of African
History 7, no.1 (1966): 67-78. The terms slave trade and slaves in this section refer to the practice
of chattel slavery from the 1500s to the 1800s in the Western hemisphere, and is not synonymous with
indentured servants or trafficked persons.
117
problem with the rise of the plantation economy. Since black market traders
were more efficient and cost-effective than the monopoly-controlled trading
systems, colonial authorities viewed it as a welcome safety valve. The Spanish
tolerated the illicit trade in slaves to its colonies in the 1640s and 1650s for this
reason.7 So large was this trade that Bermuda served as a black market transshipment station by the 1670s. Private individuals thereby short-circuited the
top-down approach of the large companies, using smuggling and off-the-record
trades of slaves to accomplish these ends.
During the 1800s, also known as the age of abolition, the balance of the trade
in human beings steadily tilted towards the illicit side. The British were the first
to ban the trade in chattel slaves, and were quick to bring their diplomatic and
military power to bear to convince other states to do likewise. Yet demand for
slaves did not slacken, and this resulted in traders shifting away from legal
trading in slaves to a burgeoning illicit trade. One estimate, based on detailed
archival research, identified some 3,033 French traders in slaves operating in
the black market that controlled some 25 per cent of the trade in slaves.8 Eltis
notes that 338 black market French slave traders brought 105,000 African
slaves into the French West Indies between 1821 and 1833.9
The shift to the illicit trade brought with it a concomitant shift in the
organisation of the trade. Brazil offers an excellent illustration of how abolition
fuelled both an illicit trade in human beings and the reformulation of those who
traded in human beings. In 1826, Brazil signed a treaty to end the importation
of chattel slaves in 1829. Yet the treaty did nothing to end the demand for
slaves. Thus, the tempo of the trade at first doubled and then later tripled on an
annual basis. In the 1840s alone, illicit traders smuggled 370,000 chattel slaves
from Africa into Brazil.10 In order to avoid British naval patrols and Brazilian
state authorities, traders in human beings first oversaw small, tight-knit and
entrepreneurial enterprises.
James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1981).
Serge Daget, British Repression of the Illegal French Slave Trade: Some Considerations, in The
Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. Henry Gemery and
Jan Hogendorn, 41942 (New York: Academic Press, 1979).
David Eltis, The Direction and Fluctuation of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1821-1843: A Revision of
the 1845 Parliamentary Paper, in The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the
Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. Henry Gemery and Jan Hogendorn, 273-302 (New York: Academic Press,
1979).
10
Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade (London: Frank Cass, 1968).
118
On the whole, the later slave trade drew its participants from the
Portuguese commercial class in Rio de Janeiro. In 1849, the Portuguese
immigrants formed approximately 10% of the population of Rio de
Janeiro and its suburbs. Although of all economic levels, most of them
shared two common characteristics: They had once been impoverished
immigrants from Portugal or the islands off Africa; and most were
engaged in trade or small business Most slave-traders had originally
immigrated as young boys from Portugal, the Azores, or Madeira.
Usually, they came as indentured servants to work in gin shops, petty
dry-goods stores, and on slave ships as common seamen. When they
became free of their masters, many joined he jobless poor whites of
the cities. Others participated in the slave trade because no other way
of earning a living was open to them.11
Yet as time progressed, the risks associated with the illegal slave trade drove
out the occasional traders and consolidated the trade in slaves into the hands of
a small minority of merchants of Portuguese extraction, who had always
controlled the nominally independent government.12 The trade in slaves
became bolder and larger syndicates emerged, who purchased protection from
the government of Brazil through bribes paid to port inspectors, customs
officials, judges and other political agents.13 Manoel Pinto da Fonseca, one of
the wealthiest men in Rio, worked fastidiously in the late 1830s and 1840s to
construct a trading house that operated on four continents and had the power to
squeeze out many smaller slave traders from the market. His profits from the
slave trade, estimated at one point to be roughly 150,000 pounds per annum,
allowed him to make substantial loans to the Brazilian government. Another
trader, Jos Bernardino de S, was rumoured to have even more economic clout
than Fonseca. S owned slave stations in southern Africa, used Portugueseflagged ships to transport slaves and held a trading house in Rio. He, like many
other traders, shifted to charter American ships to transport his slaves on their
return legs from Africa.14
From this combination of black marketeering, organisational consolidation,
intercontinental operations and distribution of corruption arose the first traders
in human beings worthy of the label transnational criminal organisations.
11
Mary Karasch, The Brazilian Slavers and the Illegal Slave Trade, 1836-1851 (M.A. diss., University
of Wisconsin, 1967).
12
Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade.
13
Jose Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
14
Mary Karasch, The Brazilian Slavers.
119
Consider, for example, that Florida provided an ideal location for trafficking in
human beings, and was so well organised that a slave ferry operated between
Havana and Florida starting in 1818. Richard Drake, in his memoir of slave
trading, notes that Florida was a sort of nursery for slave-breeders, and many
American citizens grew rich by trafficking in Guinea negroes, and smuggling
them continually, in small parties, through the southern United States.15 In
1840, Drake was also responsible for the creation of a slave trading station off
the coast of Honduras, backed by capital obtained from American and Spanish
mercantile houses, that traded slaves to cities throughout the US. Corruption
followed the trade, either through the active involvement of public officials in
the slave trade or through bribery of port officials and the like.
After the abolition of the trade in chattel slaves from Africa, the trade in human
beings did not end. Rather, the trade continued to operate as an interconnected
series of grey and black markets. Indentured servants and indebted bondsmen
replaced many of the chattels on plantations throughout the Americas. The
trade in indentured servants operated largely as a grey marketlegal in theory
but illegally as a surrogate for the African slave system it replaced.16
Like the trade in African slaves, the trade in indentured servants and debt
bondsmen relied on international chains of entrepreneurs and small firms
connecting supply to demand. Such chains began with recruiters who would
bring their recruits to the firms located in the major port cities of India and
China. Recruiters were paid by the head and fees steadily increased during the
late 1800s as demand for indentured servants rose. In response, recruiters
employed steadily more illegal tactics to fill their quotas. For example, it
became common practice to use black market Indian recruiters called arkatia,
who would search marketplaces, railway stations, temples and urban squares
for eligible men and use whatever ruse they could to deliver these recruits to
official legal recruiters for a fee. For example, a story titled An Indian Slave
Trade in the London Standard of April 5, 1871 described an Indian recruiter
named Buldeo Jemadar who used deceptive recruiting and force to coerce
young women into indentured servitude in Jamaica.17 Jemadar employed at
least eight men to locate men and women, especially those coming to the city
on pilgrimage, and delivered recruits to a sub-agent, John Manasseh, who
served as a go-between for Bird & Co., a firm that provided funds and other
15
Philip Drake, Revelations of a Slave Smuggler (Northbrook: Metro Books, 1972).
16
Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 18301920 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1974).
17
Ibid.
120
logistical support in order to aid recruiters in establishing relations with agents

in Calcutta.
The tactics recruiters employed to meet the demand for indentured servants
were strikingly similar to those contemporary traffickers use. Recruiters either
obfuscated or ignored mandatory disclosures during the recruiting process,
used whatever leverage they had at hand and often treated recruits no
differently that the slaves they purchased earlier in the 1800s.
Often the recruiting was done in such a manner that there was hardly
any question of a free choice on the part of the laborers. This became
particularly known of China. The poverty-stricken Chinese were
tempted with loans, after receipt of which they were immediately in the
power of the recruiting agents because of the Chinese laws pertaining
to debt slavery. Naturally they were also tempted with false promises
of a glorious future in the foreign countries.18
The trade [in indentured labour from China] was largely in the hands of
two British firms, Tait and Company and Syme, Muir and Company.
The latter built a special barracoon or pig pen (chu-tsai kuan), as the
Chinese called it, in front of their firm, where the potential emigrants
were stripped naked, examined for defects, and, if approved, made to
put their mark on labor contracts then stamped or painted with the
letter of their destination.19
Examples of recruiters engaging in illegal and clandestine behaviour were so
common that the paragraphs on recruiters licenses in the annual reports to the
Protector of Emigrants provide ample evidence of this, including theft of
money and valuables, illegal detention and rape.20 Furthermore, it was not out
of the ordinary for the use of force to come into the recruiting process. In 1930,
a League of Nations investigative committee led by Cuthbert Christy of Great
Britain published its first report on human trafficking that accused Liberian
officials of establishing a front company that used military units to forcibly
18
W. Kloosterboer, Involuntary Labour Since the Abolition of Slavery: A Survey of Compulsory Labour
Throughout the World (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1960).
19
David Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 18341922 (New York: Cambridge
20
P. C. Emmer, The Great Escape: The Migration of Female Indentured Servants From British India to
Surinam, 18731916, in Abolition and Its Aftermath: The Historical Context, 1790 - 1916, ed. David
Richardson, 245266 (London: Frank Cass, 1985).
121
recruit workers for Spanish cocoa plantations and the American Firestone
rubber company.21
Overlap between the black market for indentured servants, legitimate business
and government was as widespread as during the slave era. A number of
corporations, such as the aforementioned Firestone rubber company, benefited
from the employment of indentures. Some local government officials fostered
an environment conducive to indentured servitude and debt bondage. Miers
captures their mindset perfectly when she states that the colonial rulers need
to extract labour led to ad hoc experiments, some of which resulted in atrocities
causing scandals on an unprecedented scale.22 Such experiments most often
involved the trade in humans from other colonies and held under contract or
debt bondagesuch as the transfer of Indian indentured labour to South Africa.
Indeed, some colonial officials experimented in multiple forms of unfree
labour. In 1926, a French enquiry into high mortality rates amongst workers
building a railroad from Brazzaville to the Atlantic Coast found the workers
were in fact trafficked from West Africa. Furthermore, the report noted that the
company trafficked in women in order to maintain brothels for the labourers.
The evolution of a more diverse set of traders in human beings was not limited
to the trade for labour exploitation. By the 1800s, sex trafficking served as a
separate but parallel form of the trade. New York City provides one example of
how sex trafficking largely paralleled the evolution of the trade in human
beings for labour exploitation. In the mid to late 1800s, criminal groups from
the burgeoning migrant communities of the day teamed up with the corrupt
Tammany Hall political machine to gain protection for prostitution rings that
centred on crime group-controlled brothels. The groups procured women for
brothels from recruiters operating in Europe. The New York-based crime
groups would have the recruiters deliver the women to New York and then
would force the women to work in the corruption-protected brothels in the city.
For example, the Vice Trust of 1912 was reported to have hundreds of
women ensconced in forty-three brothels between West 16th and 40th streets in
Manhattan. The women were forced into debt bondage, paying madams five
dollars per day in rent, three dollars for board and only receiving a snack during
21
Cuthbert Christy, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Existence of Slavery and
Forced Labor in the Republic of Liberia (Geneva: League of Nations, 1930).
22
Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem (Walnut Creek:
AltaMira, 2003).
122
each eight hour shift. The trust used payouts to police and local government
officials of 400,000 dollars a year to protect their interests.23
Like their brethren trading in indentured servants and debt bondsmen, sex
traffickers formed an international confraternity of entrepreneurs, formal
criminal groups and links to government and law enforcement officials. An
investigation in New York City in 1909 detailed how a diverse pimps,
procurers and crime group often met in New Yorks saloons to coordinate
actions and share market information.
[T]he club on 6th Ave. is called the Faverdale Club and is located
at 425 Sixth Ave., and is next to Mouquins restaurant. August Frings
above referred to is one of its moving spirits [slang for trader in human
beings], and others are Armand, Jean lItalian, etc. It is a headquarters
for the old procurers and new ones from France go there on arrival
The men who compose this Club used, a year and a half ago, to
frequent various public saloons and Cafes Chantants, but since the
efforts of the Government to secure their arrest and conviction have
been successful in so many cases. They have confined themselves
principally to the Club and to private meeting places where they are
safe from observation.24
Records from this time detail similar meeting houses in other major American
cities, and go so far as to detail circuits along which prostitutes and sexual
slaves were sent from brothel to brothel (another parallel to the operation of
contemporary trafficking in women). Women were recruited and trafficked
from countries like Japan, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Poland and Russia
into the US. A 1909 US Immigration Service (USIS) memo detailed a number
of brothels located in Fort Worth, Texas, including a case where two Japanese
women were trafficked via New Orleans and a French trafficker used fake
citizenship papers from Los Angeles.25 In another case, a Japanese woman was
brought to Portland, Oregon in October 1906 and held in sexual slavery
through a debt bondage scheme. Other US immigration investigations from the
time took place in Chicago, Atlanta, San Francisco and Philadelphia.
Yet the example that most resembled transnational criminal organisations was
the Zwi Migdal organisation. A Jewish group that originated in Eastern Europe,
23
Edward Bristow, Prostitution and Prejudice: The Jewish Fight Against White Slavery 1870-1939 (New
York: Schocken Books, 1982).
24
Alan Kraut, Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Part 4, European Investigations,
18981936 (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), micro-fiche, 19, 52484/3.
25
Kraut, Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 11, 52484/8.
123
the Zwi Migdal group would traffic women from Eastern Europe into South
America for six decades. The group controlled the entire trade in women, from
recruiting in Eastern Europe to transport via France and other countries to the
brothels in Argentina and Brazil. Vincent chronicles the Zwi Migdal
organisations expansive trade in women through the personal stories of Jewish
women that entered into religious marriages they later found were rooted in the
false pretences of recruiting them for South American brothels.26
In sum, four observations arise from this briefest of glimpses into the history of
the trade in human beings. The first is that traders in human beings were and
remain a diverse set of actors. From the earliest forms of the trade, individual
entrepreneurs and small firms operated alongside larger, more organised actors.
Second, the trade in human beings has always consisted of licit and illicit
dimensions. This leads to a third and related observation, which is that as legal
restrictions on the trade advanced, the need to purchase protection from
government agencies through bribes and other forms of corruption also
increased. Last, and most importantly, the trade in human beings always
required a level of international organisation that today we most often
summarise through the use of one word: transnational.
2. Contemporary Traffickers: Three Brief Case Examples
Contemporary trafficking continues as a diverse criminal enterprise that
involves both licit and illicit actors operating both domestically and
transnationally. Diversity continues to define the perpetration of trafficking in
human beings. Recent trafficking cases have shown that actors range from
small groups of entrepreneurial individuals to large, well-organised criminal
groups. Government officials, commercial actors and specialised actors remain
important to some but not all trafficking organisations. Such general statements
hold true regardless of the location of the trafficking organisations. In 2006, the
author conducted over forty interviews with law enforcement, prosecutors,
academic experts and nongovernmental officials in the US, Sweden and Italy
on how trafficking in persons operated. The interviews supported the
conclusion that traffickers are diverse.
Sweden drew praise for having an effective anti-trafficking policy that has
resulted in low rates of trafficking into a western European state. Trafficking,
however, still occurs. When it does, it is often entrepreneurial and small-scale,
26
Isabel Vincent, Bodies and Souls, The Tragic Plight of Three Jewish Women Forced into Prostitution
in the Americas (New York: William Morrow, 2005).
124
reflecting a lack of strong markets for commercial sex. Of the dozen or more
trafficking cases that Swedish authorities investigated between 2000 and 2006,
none had more than six perpetrators. Repeated questioning of law enforcement,
prosecutors and other experts failed to locate large criminal syndicates
controlling trafficking networks operating in Sweden. For example, Swedish
authorities established a task force that for three years sought to locate major
transnational criminal groups engaging in trafficking. The task force resulted in
only six cases, and in each of these cases the criminal groups remained offshore
and collected profits from smaller, more entrepreneurial trafficking groups
operating in Sweden on their behalf. Three of these cases involved the
Kemetova crime group, an ethnic Russian criminal organisation based in
Estonia that collected 10 per cent of profits from project leaders that in turn
organised and ran trafficking rings from Estonia into Sweden. None of the
experts in Sweden were able to identify a single case of labour trafficking.
Italy, on the other hand, has very active markets and has often been successful
in identifying and prosecuting trafficking cases. A sign of just how significant
the trafficking problem is in Italy is that between 1998 and 2006 the
government accepted 8000 applications from sex trafficking victims for state
protection. The actual prosecutions of trafficking in Italy reveal the diversity of
actors as well. Transcrime, an Italian research centre, stated that Italian
prosecutors opened 2930 separate cases of trafficking between 1996 and 2000
that targeted 7582 traffickers and involved 2741 victims.27
Thus it is not surprising that, unlike Sweden, a number of large criminal groups
conducted sex trafficking in Italy. Criminal organisations from Nigeria,
Albania and other former Warsaw Pact countries are the largest trafficking
organisations operating in Italy. Starting in the 1980s, Nigerian procurers and
madams established brothels in northern Italian cities and expanded into
roadside prostitution as well. The women forced to work in these schemes were
recruited in Nigeria and neighbouring countries and then held through debt
bondage and other mechanisms. One expert estimated that in 2006, 50 per cent
of the prostitutes in Italy (12,500) were Nigerian or a product of the Nigerian
sex trade. In the early 1990s, Albanian crime groups began to traffic women
into Italy. After the 1997 collapse of the Albanian economy, the Albanians
quickly ascended to become the most prolific traffickers into Italy. Albanian
traffickers were most well-known for a ferocious use of violence to maintain
control of their trafficking routes and their victims. More recently, Italy
27
Ernesto Savona, Roberta Belli, Frederica Curtol, Silva Decarli, and Andrea Di Nicola, Trafficking in
Persons and Smuggling of Migrants into Italy (Trento: Transcrime, 2003).
125
witnessed a steep increase in trafficking from countries in the former Warsaw

Pact. Traffickers form Ukraine, Romania and Moldova have all increased in the
past few years. According to one expert, Romanian women, in 2006, became
the most frequent victims seen in Italian rescue shelters.
Labour trafficking schemes also exist throughout the country. Labour
trafficking occurs within the larger context of illegal Chinese immigration that
began in the 1970s and continued to provide cheap labour to textile firms
outside Florence and elsewhere in Italy. Ukrainian women were forced into
slavery in service of agricultural concerns in the Calabria region, and North
Africans were identified as slaves working on farms in Sicily. Another NGO
reported on separate cases of labour trafficking involving men from China,
Romania, Morocco and Pakistan. Forced begging and the enslavement of
children were also found in Italy. In May 2006, police in Trieste uncovered a
major Bulgarian trafficking ring that was trafficking eight to twelve year old
boys and girls for petty theft, shoplifting and even prostitution.
The significant size of trafficking markets in Italy has allowed a diversity of
actors, ranging from entrepreneurs to organised crime groups, to focus on
specific segments of trafficking networks and garner profits from this
specialisation. For example, Italian and Bulgarian authorities in June 2005
completed Operation Balkangate and ordered the arrest of fifty-seven people
for operating a wide-scale trafficking network. Using an elaborate series of
front companies and portraying themselves as alien smugglers, the trafficking
group forced their victims into various forms of slavery upon their arrival in
Italy. Women were trafficked into prostitution and men for work as shepherds.
Expanding their operations, the network began to traffic babies into Italy and
sold them for 10,000 Euros each. Italian authorities revealed similar cases
occurring in 2003, including one in which traffickers kidnapped a pregnant
Albanian woman and, along with eighteen other women, brought her to Lecce
in southern Italy to give birth and sell her baby.28
This diversity of actors is also found in US trafficking markets. A recent review
of over a dozen of the most recent cases of trafficking into the US revealed that
over half of them involved a single individual trafficker, while another quarter
were a small group of individuals.29 Some of these traffickers were
entrepreneurial individuals that formed small groups to bring in relatively small
numbers of victims for large profits. In 1996-7, Alex Mishulovich and a
28
Arie Sophie Bari, I was pregnant, and then my lover sold me and my baby, The Observer, July 20,
2003.
29
Lize and Bales, Trafficking in Persons.
126
handful of other traffickers employed a debt bondage scheme, backed by

threats and the use of force, to traffic five Latvian women into the US and force
them to work as adult dancers in the Chicago area. In California, a US Federal
Court convicted an Indian national named Lakireddy Bali Reddy in 2001 for
exploiting the H1-B visa programme, intended to grant high tech workers
working rights, to traffic twenty Indian men for labour exploitation and two
girls for sexual exploitation. In 1997, members of the Cadena-Sosa family, a
mother and her four sons, led a sex trafficking ring that brought women and
girls from Mexico to Florida and forced them to work off a two thousand three
hundred dollar smuggling fee through prostitution in trailers that served as
brothels. In 2003, the US government convicted Kil Soo Lee for trafficking
some 200 victims, mainly women, from Vietnam and China to American
Samoa for labour exploitation in a garment-producing sweatshop.
Yet other cases involve more significant involvement of criminal organisations.
For example, the author spoke numerous times with law enforcement
investigators in Montgomery County, a suburban Maryland county located just
northwest of Washington DC. In 2006, the investigators arrested members of a
Latin American trafficking network that supplied women for sexual slavery in
the Washington, DC suburbs, and catered only to Latin American customers.
The network started with international traffickers responsible for bringing
victims into the US. The international traffickers were based in Queens, New
York and Union City, New Jersey. From these sites, the traffickers supplied the
women to brothels in cities that ranged from Boston, Massachusetts to
Richmond, Virginia. The brothel owners would hire the women from the
traffickers for a week. In Maryland, a representative of the brothel
organisations would drive to Queens and Union City every Sunday to exchange
the women of the previous week with a new group acquired from the
traffickers. Brothel owners and the traffickers split the proceeds evenly, while
the trafficked women kept none of the money.
One last facet of contemporary trafficking bears a striking resemblance to the
trade in human beings of earlier erasthe presence of corruption. Corruption
acts both as an environmental condition that favours trafficking and as a tactic
that traffickers use to ply their trade. Some studies have shown that the level of
corruption in society is a causal factor for contemporary trafficking in human
beings.30 But traffickers using corruption to perpetrate the trade is also welldocumented. Studies have shown how law enforcement officials, border
30
Kevin Bales, Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2005).
127
guards, customs officials, consular staff members and numerous other types of
government officials have taken bribes or even conspired with traffickers.31 In
sum, corruption remains an integral part of the trafficking in human beings.32
3. Trafficking Organisations or Trafficking That Is Organised?
A growing number of experts and practitioners are choosing to focus on
organised crime as a market for illicit goods and services rather than as
exclusively a form of criminal organisation.33 Such an approach, which
political scientists refer to as illicit international political economy and
criminologists call crime that is organised, allows the analyst to capture the
diversity of actors who contribute to the criminal act directly or indirectly.34
Both the historical trace and the case evidence presented here fits this approach
to trafficking in human beings. In sum, trafficking in human beings is an
example of a complex crime that is organised and has a diverse set of
perpetrators.
Rather than focus on specific criminal organisations and how they form to
perpetrate trafficking in human beings, an alternative approach deconstructs the
roles that individuals or groups fulfil to conduct trafficking. One of the best
ways to capture the complexity of trafficking is therefore to think of it as a
transactional network. The nodes of the networks are the roles that need filling
in order for trafficking to occur. The model contains three parts:
1. Required roles: Elements of trafficking that must be present.
Specifically, these are (a) recruitment, (b) movement and (c)
exploitation of victims.
2. Ancillary roles: Elements of trafficking that may or may not be present.
Some trafficking groups require experts in document fraud or money
laundering. Escorts, debt collectors and security agents are also
31
Osita Agbu, Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case, West Africa Review 4, no. 1
(2003); Andrew Cockburn, 21st Century Slaves, National Geographic 204, no.3 (2003): 2.
32
For more information on the links between trafficking and corruption, see Leslie Holmes chapter on
the subject in this volume.
33
Peter Andreas, Illicit International Political Economy: The Clandestine Side of Globalization, Review
of International Political Economy 11, no. 3 (2004): 641-652; Richard H. Friman and Peter Andreas,
eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); John
Picarelli and Phil Williams, Combating Organized Crime in Armed Conflicts, in Profiting from
Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War, ed. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke,
123-152 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
34
Andreas, Illicit International Political Economy.
128
sometimes found in trafficking groups. Finally, some traffickers pay

bribes to government officials or business leaders in order to prevent
legal complications.
3. Transactions: Flows that connect the nodes of the network. For
example, one can represent the recruitment of victims in one country
and their movement into enslavement in a second country as three roles
(i.e. recruitment, movement and enslavement) connected by the flow of
one or more victims. The movement of other commodities such as
information or money can serve as links between the roles in the
network as well.
The power of this approach is found when the model network is transformed
from a transactional to a social network model. One or more agents can fulfil
each of the roles in the model. Individuals can serve as recruiters, transporters,
protectors or any number of other roles. Small groups of two or three
individuals can also specialise in one role without meeting any formal
definition of organised crime. But formal organised crime groups are also
active agents in trafficking. They can focus on fulfilling one role, a couple of
roles or even all of the roles in the transactional network. Moreover, the social
network model captures the important linkages between upperworld and
underworld. For example, some examples might have businesses serving as
exploiters or government officials providing the traffickers with protection.
The model transactional network captures the complexity of trafficking in
human beings. The logical start of a trafficking ring is the recruitment of
victims. Through promises of work, marriage, a better life in a new country or
any number of other schemes, recruiters locate persons willing to relocate to
improve their lives somehow and arrange for their travel. After relocation,
victims are enslaved and held in place through debt bondage, physical threats,
psychological abuse, drug dependency and other mechanisms. The larger the
trafficking scheme, the more likely one is to find associated criminal activities
like document fraud, money laundering, cyber-crime and corruption involved.35
The network model establishes a range of ways that trafficking is organised.
Just using examples from the above historical and contemporary evidence,
three types of trafficking networks emerge.
35
Louise Shelley, Human Trafficking as a Form of Transnational Crime, in Human Trafficking, ed.
Maggy Lee, 11637 (Portland: Willan, 2007).
129
3.1 Entrepreneurial Trafficking Organisations

Entrepreneurial trafficking organisations occupy the smaller end of the
spectrum. Often, these groups are small in size with only a handful of
perpetrators fulfilling one or more roles. It is not uncommon to find two or
three perpetrators acting simultaneously as recruiters, transporters, and
exploitersessentially travelling overseas to recruit persons for exploitation
schemes they are operating and escorting the persons in the process. It also
follows that, due to their small size, these trafficking organisations often limit
the number of persons they are trafficking or exploiting at any one given time.
Finally, these groups are not likely to engage in ancillary activities like money
laundering or document fraud themselves, but will engage specialists when
these services are required.
The methods that entrepreneurial groups use to conduct trafficking are often
simple and unsophisticated. First, they are much more likely to engage in
specific country-to-country trafficking. For example, these traffickers prefer to
operate in source countries they are familiar with through prior citizenship or
ethnic heritage. Moreover, they most often traffic people to a destination state
that they reside in or within which they maintain some form of business
dealings. In order to move the persons, they almost always use commercial
carriers and seemingly legitimate methods to circumvent immigration controls.
Regarding the latter, entrepreneurial traffickers often engage in visa shopping
to obtain a visa, and then have the trafficked persons overstay their visa once in
the destination state.36 Finally, due primarily to the reasons mentioned above,
such groups are likely to engage in trafficking only sporadically, replacing
victims in sweatshops or brothels as needed. While entrepreneurial trafficking
groups are small in size and engage in trafficking only sporadically, one should
not discount the harm that these groups inflict or assume that these groups earn
paltry sums from their criminal endeavours. In fact, entrepreneurial groups
have been known to earn significant sums of money in a short period of time.
Since entrepreneurial groups draw their profits from the exploitation phase of
trafficking, they often maintain close control over their victims.
The Mishulovich case in the US is an example of how an entrepreneurial group
operates. The case centred on two Latvian men who left Chicago in the US to
recruit women in Latvia for clerical positions but later forced them to work as
36
Visa shopping is the act of filing visa petitions with more than one of a states Embassy or Consulate in
a region. The theory behind visa shopping is twofold. One is that some consular officials may not as
strictly adjudicate visa applications as others. Second, that by only applying for one or two visas at a
time, the trafficker is less likely to draw attention to him or herself.
130
exotic dancers and in other related businesses in the Chicago area. The two
men recruited five women in Riga in 1996 with promises that they would only
have to pay half their travel fees and would earn 60,000 dollars per year. They
helped the women obtain tourist visas by stating the women were their
relatives, escorted them into the US on commercial air flights, and then
enslaved them when they reached the UStaking their papers, locking them
into a one-bedroom apartment and threatening them with harm and violence if
the women did not cooperate. For six months, the women worked almost every
night and earned roughly 600 dollars per night but only kept 20 dollars. Not
including travel and boarding expenses, Mishulovich and his associates earned
roughly 100,000 dollars per woman for the six months. In sum, two men and a
limited number of accomplices recruited, transported and exploited women in
sex trafficking network that lasted months and resulted in both significant
profits and sizeable trauma for the victims.
3.2 Transnational Networks
A second form of trafficking networks is a large organised crime group that
controls all aspects of trafficking. Major transnational networks often have
large numbers of perpetrators and operate across wide geographical range. The
transnational networks involve larger aggregate volumes of trafficked persons
and, as such, tend to maintain their trafficking schemes continuously. For this
reason (and others), these groups tend to be more innovative, constantly
searching for new routes or ports of entry to exploit. Finally, the transnational
groups employ numerous routes to multiple destinations, and are often found to
engage in other smuggling activities, such as narcotics trafficking and arms
smuggling, alongside (or even using) trafficking methods. Such groups are
more likely to contain linkages to ancillary services like protectors in
government, debt collectors, document fraud experts, money launderers and
even some form of intelligence-gathering function. Moreover, these criminal
organisations are likely to have connections to the upperworld, either through
the use or complicity of businesses or from bribes paid to government officials.
While the Zwi Migdal group serves as a historical example of a crime group
that controlled all aspects of trafficking, plenty of contemporary examples exist
as well. In Operation Lost Thai, US investigators in California collected
numerous wiretap conversations between brothel operators, a crime group in
the Los Angeles area and recruiters overseas. The criminal group in Los
Angeles served as the coordinator for the network, essentially soliciting
demands from the brothel owners and then working with their recruiters
131
overseas to secure new victims. At one point in the investigation, law

enforcement wiretaps captured discussions between traffickers and recruiters
that asked for Malaysian women since the brothel-keepers found them easier to
market. In sum, the crime group controlled the trafficking network from
recruitment to exploitation.
From a review of recent cases and the inputs of expert investigators, indicators
of organised crime involvement in human trafficking cases into the US and
Europe include the following:
o
High-quality altered and/or forged documents
Numerous front companies or other commercial interests
Advanced technology (e.g. satellite phones, GPS, laptop computers,

digital surveillance equipment)
Extensive corruption
Rapid modification or adaptation of trafficking operations to reflect

changing risks
Trafficked persons travelling extremely long distances in larger

numbers
The same lawyers for different criminal cases
Sophisticated methods of laundering funds from the trafficking

network.
All of these indicators are relative to other forms of human trafficking, and thus
by themselves are not all that useful. But, when combined with the
investigators experience of human trafficking cases, they serve as a way to
better understand what law enforcement officers may be encountering as they
develop information about a human trafficking network.37
3.3 Hybrid Groups
A third type of trafficking organisation is a hybrid of entrepreneurs and
criminal groups that collaborate to complete trafficking. From the historical
37
It is important to note that this list of indicators is drawn from a sample of trafficking cases into only
two, industrialized regions of the globe. The diversity of cultural, socioeconomic and other factors
suggests that trafficking groups in other regions of the globe will have different sets of indicators. See
Louise Shelley, The Trade in People in and from the Former Soviet Union, Crime, Law and Social
Change 40 (2003): 231-249.
132
and contemporary evidence, it is clear that this middle option is the most
frequent and most diverse. Small groups of individuals and formal crime
groups collaborate. From the earlier historical example, it was individual
arkatia recruiters that located victims for firms that indentured men to work the
plantations of the Caribbean and South America. A good contemporary
example concerns three trafficking cases in Sweden that involved Estonian
crime groups. While the crime groups found women from Eastern Europe and
transported them to Estonia and eventually Sweden, it was small groups of
Estonian and Russian traffickers that controlled the women and established the
apartment brothels where they were exploited. This combination of small
groups and large criminal establishments played to each organisations
strengths and allowed each to reap profits from sex trafficking. The Estonian
crime group provided false documents, hired members of a long-haul trucking
company to transport the women and paid protection money to another crime
group in Estonia. In return, the small group ran the brothels in Sweden,
collected the money from the brothels and paid a percentage of the weekly
profits to the crime group in Estonia. The crime groups satisfied different roles
in the trafficking network based on the most efficient use of their resources.
In sum, it is important to note that this categorisation scheme is nothing more
than a means to an end. Other systems of categorisation are certainly possible.
Yet the important conclusion is that trafficking organisations are diverse and
defy parsimonious explanations. Trafficking in human beings requires an
organisation that fulfils a number of roles. While some criminal organisations
have the resources to manage large trafficking networks, a good number of
other trafficking organisations prefer to use a more cooperative or
entrepreneurial model. Establishing investigative techniques geared only to
criminal groups or small entrepreneurial models of trafficking are bound to
miss significant amounts of trafficking perpetrated by hybrid organisations.
Situational awareness of the types of trafficking organisations operating within
a specific region is therefore a ground-level requirement for anti-trafficking
policies and programmes.
Recommendations
This chapter made the case that the link between organised crime and human
trafficking is best captured as one embedded within the greater diversity of
actors that perpetrate the trade in human beings. Organised crime is a major
player in the trade. Discerning those trafficking organisations controlled
133
entirely by organised crime as opposed to those affiliated with organised crime

is thus an important goal for security services. Contending with the diversity of
actors leads to other important recommendations regarding investigative
resources, training, intelligence and further research.
Investigators Need to Devote Resources to be Able to Recognise and
Investigate the Full Diversity of Trafficking in Persons
While some might think this a supercilious recommendation, recent surveys of
the US effectiveness at fighting human trafficking suggest otherwise. The
National Institute of Justice convened two independent surveys of law
enforcement agencies, one for those involved in Anti-Trafficking Task Forces
and a second for those that are not. Both surveys indicated that a sizeable
minority of law enforcement agencies remain unable to provide even a simple
definition of trafficking.38 The studies concluded that those agencies that
dedicated resources and training for countering trafficking were the same
agencies that most often found cases of trafficking.
Investigators Need Basic and Advanced Training on Human Trafficking
Some training for investigators needs to introduce basic concepts like
definitions and resources available to investigators. Yet training should also go
beyond the basics and provide up-to-date information on the organisation of
trafficking, including how to recognise when organised crime is more likely to
be involved in trafficking.
Investigators Require Devoted Resources to Implement Training Against the
Diversity of Trafficking Groups
Training is not a magic bullet against human trafficking. Investigators also
need to access additional resources when they identify a trafficking case.39 The
diversity of actors and their networked forms of organisation will require
significant human and capital resources to investigate. The establishment and
funding of task forces provides early and steady support for investigators and
prosecutors as they take the case through the judicial system. Investigators also
require specialized support. For example, this chapter identified the links
38
Amy Farrell, Jack McDevitt, and Stephanie Fahy, Understanding and Improving Law Enforcement
Responses to Human Trafficking (Boston: Institute on Race and Justice, 2008); Phyllis Newton,
Timothy Mulcahy, and Susan Martin, Finding Victims of Human Trafficking (Rockville: National
Opinion Research Center, 2008).
39
For more on the prosecution of trafficking, see Allison Jernows chapter on the subject in this volume.
134
between corruption and trafficking organizations.40 Policymakers must provide

investigators with experts in financial forensics in order to identify bribes and
with regulators that can identify corrupt links to officials and firms.
Investigators Would Benefit from the Formation of Domestic Intelligence
Services Dedicated to the Identification of Human Traffickers
Law enforcement intelligence has proven itself a valuable asset by making the
connections between trafficking actors quickly through the sharing and fusion
of information from multiple (and international) law enforcement agencies.41
The US Human Trafficking and Smuggling Center and the UK Human
Trafficking Centre are two examples of how information sharing can lead to
quicker identification and wiser investment of resources to bring investigations
of trafficking cases to a successful end.
Researchers Can Help Improve our Understanding of the Diversity of
Trafficking Groups and Their Impact on Security Services
While quality research on trafficking in human beings is growing at a rapid
pace, more information is needed on types of trafficking organisations.42
Studies that examine and compare how trafficking groups organised in specific
cases in one or more countries would contribute a richer understanding of how
trafficking groups operate as well as how best to identify them. Moreover,
studies that analyze cases over time will allow for the important observation of
how trafficking groups are evolving to meet the threat from new laws, new
investigative capacities and so on. Finally, researchers can provide evaluations
of different investigative techniques in order to identify best practices that are
transferable from one country to another. Only through the construction of an
effective and truly international response will investigators gain an advantage
against human trafficking organisations.
40
For more on the links between trafficking and corruption, see Leslie Holmes chapter on the subject in
this volume.
41
For more information on intelligence and trafficking, see Fred Schreiers chapter on the subject in this
volume.
42
Elzbieta Gozdziak and Micah Bump, Data and Research on Human Trafficking: Bibliography of
Research-Based Literature (Washington DC: Georgetown University 2008).
135
CHAPTER 4
Human Trafficking & Smuggling: Crossover &
Overlap
Introduction
The Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols have been a spur to efforts aimed at
improving protection for trafficked people.1 It is now increasingly clear what
the protection needs of trafficked people are, even if those needs often remain
unfulfilled. Great strides have also been made towards establishing standards
for better prevention and better prosecution.
The definition of trafficking contained in the Protocol was important for a
number of reasons. Perhaps foremost among these is the fact that an agreed
definition has done much to aid the collection of data on trafficking scope,
patterns, and trends. While the nature of the phenomenon (particularly the fact
that many of those involved are keen to keep it in the shadows) means that an
accurate picture is still out of reach, many elements are visible and well
defined. This data has enabled better responses by police, border guards,
prosecutors, NGOs and others.
What this chapter argues, however, is that the trafficked person described by
the Trafficking Protocol represents something of an ideal type, one that only
captures a small percentage of those in need of protection. I argue that human
trafficking and the smuggling of migrants often sit together on a long
continuum of exploitation and that, while they may be very different at the
extremes, there is a great deal of crossover (a migrant starts in one category and
ends in another) and overlap (various factors make it hard to place a migrant in
either category) in the middle.2
1
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children
(Trafficking Protocol), 25 December 2003; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air (Smuggling Protocol), 28 January 2004.
It should be noted at the outset that the following discussion only really applies to the trafficking and
smuggling of adults.
137
This fact is well illustrated by a simple example. The 2008 United States (US)
Governments Trafficking in Persons Report opens with the story of Lila,
a 19-year-old Romanian girl who was introduced by an
acquaintance to a man who offered her a job as a
housekeeper/salesperson in the UK When she arrived in the UK, the
man sold her to a pimp and Lila was forced into prostitution. She was
threatened that she would be sent home in pieces if she did not follow
every order. After an attempted escape, her papers were confiscated
and the beatings became more frequent and brutal.3
Lila was clearly trafficked but what if we change her story a little and imagine
that she had come to Britain willingly, but illegally, arrived owing debts to the
people who had arranged her passage and worked willingly, but in difficult
conditions, in order to repay that debt? This second scenario is far from
implausible and, with a little variation in industry and working conditions,
describes the situation of many thousands in the UK alone. In the second
example Lila has merely been smuggled.
The trafficking/smuggling binary set up by the two Palermo Protocols offers
dramatically less protection to the second category of person. In fact, while
trafficked people are posited as innocent victims, smuggled people are regarded
as criminals. This is something that I will explore in more detail below, but
suffice to say that this victim/criminal divide is an assumption that this chapter
seeks to challenge.
Of course, while I intend to undermine the sharp distinction made in most
jurisdictions between trafficked victims and smuggled criminals, it is not my
intention to tar everyone with the criminal brusha race to the bottom in
terms of protection should not be in anyones interest. Rather, it is argued here
that the extension of current protection regimes needs to continue so that many
more people are covered than the current narrow band of migrants classed
officially as trafficked.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I look initially at the
trafficking of people and smuggling of migrants as they are currently
conceptualised, as well as at the way both state and non-state actors have
sought to approach them. I then examine how the two phenomena may both
crossover and overlap. In the second part I look at the possible factors that have
led to crossover and overlap not being widely reflected by current policy. In
3
United States of America, Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington DC:
Department of State, 2008).
138
particular, I argue that factors such as path dependency, narrow state interests
and false assumptions are key.
The final part is divided into two. In the first of these sub-parts, I look at the
consequences of current policy. In particular, I criticise the negative side
effects of current policy for refugees and asylum seekers that have been
highlighted by many scholars. Finally, I look at constructive ways in which
policy can be improved so as to better protect all categories of people crossing
international borders.
1. Definitions
As John Salt notes, trafficking is a subject that divides those who come into
contact with it. Much of the concern expressed about its causes and
consequences have been emotional, for example, dwelling on the plight of
women and children trafficked into prostitution and sex work.4 Despite this
focus, reflected in the title of the Trafficking Protocol, which refers to
trafficking in persons, especially women and children, international law does
define a trafficked person more broadly as someone who is transferred across
borders or within a state for the purposes of slavery or servitude. Drawing on
the Protocols Article 3, we can characterise the crime of trafficking as
consisting of three key elements:
o
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of

persons
The threat or use of force or various forms of non-violent coercion,

such as fraud or deception
Exploitation, predominantly for forced labour in one of the many

sectors mentioned above.5
John Salt, Trafficking and Human Smuggling: A European Perspective, International Migration
(Special Issue) 1, (2000): note 3.
The full definition is as follows:

(a) Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs;
139
Smuggling on the other hand is defined as the illegal transfer of migrants

across international boundaries for financial or material benefit. The
Smuggling Protocols own Article 3 refers specifically to states of which the
person is not a national or permanent resident.6
Mike Dottridge has argued that the definitions in the Protocols are hard to
understand, leading to problems of implementation and operationalisation, as
they are misinterpreted and misapplied by relevant actors.7 Taking this into
account, I have simply drawn out the key elements of the Protocols most
relevant articles below. Thus, in the simplest sense, the Trafficking Protocol
requires states party to:
o
Criminalise trafficking and impose penalties
Accept and facilitate the return of trafficked nationals
Ensure this return occurs with due regard for the health and safety of
trafficked persons and for ongoing legal proceedings
Exchange information aimed at apprehending traffickers
Provide/strengthen training for security sector actors
Strengthen border controls
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a)
have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall be considered trafficking in persons even if this does not involve any of the means
set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) Child shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
6
(a) Smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person
is not a national or a permanent resident;
(b) Illegal entry shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for
legal entry into the receiving State;
(c) Fraudulent travel or identity document shall mean any travel or identity document:
(i) That has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other than a person or agency
lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity document on behalf of a State; or
(ii) That has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption or duress or in
any other unlawful manner; or
(iii) That is being used by a person other than the rightful holder;
(d) Vessel shall mean any type of water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used
or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water, except a warship, naval auxiliary or
other vessel owned or operated by a Government and used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial service.
Mike Dottridge, Introduction, in Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on

Human Rights Around the World, ed. Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (Bangkok:
GAATW, 2007), 4.
140
Implement carrier sanctions and other interdiction measures
Improve document security.
In addition, the Protocol has a non-binding section relating to rights and

protectionsevidence of the lower priority these are given. Here the Protocol
asks states party, in appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its
domestic law, to:
o
Protect the privacy of victims and provide them with appropriate

information about legal proceedings
Consider implementing measures to aid in physical and psychological

recovery of victims
Endeavour to provide for the physical safety of trafficking victims
Make available under domestic law the possibility of accessing

compensation
Consider granting permission to remain in the destination state in

appropriate cases with consideration being given to humanitarian and
compassionate factors
Endeavour to establish policies preventing revictimisation
Endeavour to undertake additional measures to prevent trafficking,

such as economic development, awareness raising etc.
Smuggling is, by contrast, assumed to be voluntary. Smuggled people are thus

assumed to be in substantially less need of protection. Even more so than in the
Trafficking Protocol, the focus is on strengthening border controls, especially
sea bordersthe Protocol being the first instance in international law of states
being permitted to intercept vessels suspected of transporting smuggled
migrants on the high seas.8 In particular, the new smuggling laws attempt to
funnel what were multiple crimes into a single crime, with a concurrent
reduction in the amount of evidence required and a simultaneous increase in
gravity.9 The Smuggling Protocol requires states party to:
Anne Gallagher, Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights: Tricks and Treaties, Forced Migration
Review 12, (2002): 26.
Andi Pacurar, Smuggling, Detention and Expulsion of Irregular Migrants: A Study on International
Legal Norms, Standards and Practices, European Journal of Migration and Law 5, no.2 (2003): 25960.
141
Criminalise the smuggling of migrants and related offences, including

the production, provision and possession of counterfeit documents
[emphasis added]
Ensure document security, including by cooperating to stop fraudulent

use
Provide training to security sector actors to prevent, combat, and

eradicate smuggling of migrants
Implement legal and administrative measures (such as sanctions) to

stop the use by smugglers of commercial carriers.
The Protocol also contains a number of articles aimed at protecting smuggled

people from the worst forms of exploitation. But these are nowhere near as
comprehensive as the protections contained in the Trafficking Protocol, and
like their counterparts in that instrument, they are mostly recommendatory.10
The Protocol asks states party to:
o
Ensure that, when criminalising smuggling, situations that endanger

life, involve exploitation or inhumane and degrading treatment should
be considered as aggravating circumstances
Not make smuggled people liable for criminal prosecution
Take all appropriate measures to preserve the internationally

recognised rights of smuggled persons, particularly the right to life and
the right not be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment
Provide protection from violence
Assist those who have been put in danger by being smuggled.
While these definitions posit trafficking and smuggling at opposite ends of a

long continuumwith trafficked victims at one end and smuggled
criminals at the otherthe reality is not nearly so simple.11 Smuggled and
trafficked people overlap at many points. I now turn to this overlap.
10
Gallagher, Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights, 26.
11
Salt, Trafficking and Human Smuggling, 33-4.
142
2. Crossover and Overlap

2.1 Overlap Between Smuggled and Trafficked Persons
First, it is important to note that both trafficked and smuggled people most
often choose to leave their homes,12 whether as economic migrants, asylum
seekers, or to be reunited with their families (among many other reasons).13
While the image of the trafficked person, kidnapped in the dead of night, is a
powerful one, it only describes a small minority of cases.
Thus, we can perhaps best describe what happens next as, in the words of
Alexis Aronowitz, a continuum of victimisation along which migrants fall as
their use of illicit migration channels exposes them to greater or lesser forms of
vulnerability.14 Smuggled people may, to take just a single example from the
many available, become trapped in exploitative working conditions due to
forms of debt bondage incurred vis--vis those who have arranged their
passage.15 As Beate Andrees and Mariska van der Linden suggest, the forced
labour process is perhaps best seen as an ever-narrowing labyrinth where ones
perceived alternatives become less and less viable.16
John Salt supports this view, arguing that clear categories are almost
impossible to define. Instead, Salt argues for a continuum of undocumented
migration with considerable variation (and considerable exploitation) between
the extremes.17 Ronald Skeldon, in an article based on his extensive work on
trafficking in Asia, agrees, noting that:
while the general intent of the term trafficking may be clear, in
practice it is difficult to apply. Networks of human smugglers have
proved to be highly successful in moving large numbers of people
illegally and in amassing substantial profits. Violence, coercion and
exploitation are an integral part of smuggling, and it is virtually
impossible to discuss smuggling without trafficking. A critical
12
Of course, questions of agency are difficult to properly assess, particularly when extreme poverty,
repression, or discrimination is involved.
13
Alexis A. Aronowitz, Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets
that Drive It and the Organisations that Promote It, European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research 9, no.2 (2001): 164.
14
Ibid, 166-7.
Claire Brolan, An Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) from a Refugee Protection Perspective, International Journal of
Refugee Law 14, no.4 (2003): 579.
15
16
Beate Andrees and N. J. Mariska, Designing Trafficking Research from a Labour Market Perspective:
The ILO Experience, International Migration 43, no.1-2 (2005): 65.
17
Salt, Trafficking and Human Smuggling, 33-4.
143
examination of the whole process will reveal that a clear distinction

between coercion and freedom of choice becomes blurred. In fact, a
clear distinction between trafficking, smuggling and other forms of
population movement also becomes blurred.18
Skeldon elaborates on this theme, labelling the processes involved as a
continuum of facilitation, spanning the divide from completely transparent,
fully invoiced and accountable recruitment on the one hand, through to the
movement of people through networks entirely controlled by criminal gangs on
the other.19 One of the reasons for this continuum is the opacity of
bureaucratic migration proceduresprocedures that are often so long and
complex that would-be migrants have no choice but to use facilitators or
intermediaries. These intermediaries, many offering diverse services such as
interview coaching, bribe-paying, and document procurement, blur boundaries
by exposing even otherwise legal migrants to illegal or semi-legal activities.
The danger, of course, is that the use of intermediaries can in many cases
expose migrants to exploitation or abuse.
The fact that intermediaries blur the boundaries between legal and illegal
migration, as well as opening up possibilities for exploitation, further underpins
my argument that between the extremes there is a broad grey area within which
smuggled and trafficked people overlap. This is particularly the case if we
accept, as Salt argues, that there are open questions regarding the true links
between large-scale organised crime and traffickinga question dealt with by
John Picarelli elsewhere in this book.20
By treating trafficking as a purely criminal and illegal activity, one involving
greater or lesser degrees of involvement by organised crime, we may fail to
apprehend those elements of migration that are associated with trafficking but
which have quasi-legal status and those cases where the status of the migrant
drifts in and out of legality during the process as a whole,21 as in the case of
intermediary use. As Skeldon again posits:
it would be incorrect to assume that all trafficking or illegal migration
is controlled by international criminal syndicates. There are many
amateurs, either individuals or small groups of villagers, and small
groups of criminals as well as transnational syndicates, involved in the
18
Ronald Skeldon, Trafficking: A Perspective from Asia, special issue, International Migration 38,
no.1 (2000): 9.
19
Ibid, 10.
20
See also Salt, Trafficking and Human Smuggling, 36.
21
Ibid, 36-7.
144
process. In fact, trafficking seems to lend itself to a fissiparous

operation requiring little start-up capital and little in the way of
organizational capital. Individual entrepreneurs and petty criminal
groups are both capable of attempting to bring in or export small
numbers of workers. The operative word appears to be flexibility,
with groups responding to particular situations, constantly changing
routes and tactics, involving whoever can assist at specific locations
and specific times. Rather than any large organization, trafficking is the
product of diverse groups constantly shifting in composition and
alliance as the need arises.22
Because much of the counter-trafficking focus has been on its worst forms,
what has often been ignored has been lower level exploitation on the margins
of legality. Much of this low-level exploitation involves people often regarded
as smuggled, or those at the trafficking/smuggling boundary (see Box 1).
Box 1
Alfred (case 1)
Alfred, a Nigerian in Britain illegally, took work involving cleaning up after undergraduates
at a well-known London college. Although Alfred and his fellow workers - many of whom were
also in Britain illegally - were paid the minimum wage, they worked in appalling conditions and
suffered routine verbal abuse. His patience finally ran out and he started protesting about their
treatment. A friend of Alfred's said: Everyone was being exploited, whether they were legal or
not. When he started to make a fuss, he was told that if he didn't keep quiet he would be reported
to immigration. Alfred left the job soon afterwards and has since disappeared.23
Children in West Africa
Children moved and moving within West Africa well illustrate the confusion and difficulty of
accurately tracing the trafficking/smuggling boundary. Children in the region either contact
recruiters, or they or their parents are approached with lucrative-sounding offers of work
elsewhere. As Anti-Slavery International argued in a 2001 report,
The prospect of good wages in a wealthier country, such as Gabon or Cte d'Ivoire,
seems an acceptable option [to the children or their parents]. But the realities of what
most of these children have to face along the route and once they reach their
destination are not widely known. Although many of those who are trafficked
ultimately do not earn the money promised and the conditions in which they are forced
22
Skeldon, Trafficking: A Perspective from Asia, 12.
23
Nigel Morris, Amnesty on Illegal Immigrants is 'Worth 6bn to UK, The Independent, 31 March
2006.
145
to live and work range from basic to brutal, the reality of one less mouth to feed for a
poor household makes a significant difference.24
Looking more closely at this trafficking/smuggling boundary helps further

elucidate the grey area between the two phenomena. As the case of Alfred
neatly demonstrates, just as the levels of illicit activity involved may vary, so
too do levels of control. At the overlap between smuggling and trafficking we
find a control continuum that spans document confiscation and psychological
control (through reference to honour, threats of violence against family
members, and so forth), all the way to forced confinement and violence at the
other.25
As I suggested above, in many cases of illegal or semi-legal migration,
networks of facilitators are involved. Even in cases that would, according to the
relevant sections of international law, be classified as smuggling, such
facilitators can profit for many years from high interest on debt incurred by
migrants seeking help to cross borders. The difficulty comes in attempting to
distinguish between a trafficked person and an irregular migrant suffering
exploitative working conditions and/or debt bondage.26
Debt bondage has been defined as a status or condition arising from a pledge
by a debtor of his personal services or those of a person under his control as
security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not
applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those
services are not respectively limited and defined.27 Given that loans to
migrants are often made in the informal and/or criminal sectors, the question of
how the value of services may reasonably be assessed, as well as how the
length and nature of those services might be properly limited and defined, is
one of particular relevance to my examination of the trafficking/smuggling
boundary. As a report on debt bondage by Anti-Slavery International notes,
there are very few cases where chains are actually used but the constraints
on the people concerned are every bit as real and as restricting.28
24
Anti-Slavery International, Trafficking of children in West Africa - focus on Mali and Cte d'Ivoire,
June 2001, http://www.antislavery.org/archive/other/trafficking-children-wafrica.htm (accessed January
20, 2009).
25
Aronowitz, Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings, 177.
26
Beate Andrees and N. J. Mariska, Designing Trafficking Research, 66; Claire Brolan, Analysis of
the Human Smuggling Trade, 579-580.
27
Supplementary Slavery Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, 266 UNTS 3, 1956.
28
Anti-Slavery International, Debt Bondage (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1998).
146
2.2 Crossover Between Smuggled And Trafficked Persons

The above discussion of facilitators and debt bondage hints at the fact that
many people may start their journey in one category and end it in another,
creating an operational link between trafficking and smuggling that the
Protocols completely fail to recognise.29 I call this link crossover and, while
it is similar to the overlap described above, there are important differences.
I have argued elsewhere that the victim label is often inappropriate to describe
trafficked people, the majority of whom have made some decision to migrate
(at least at the outset).30 If this is the case, then the single largest factor
distinguishing those in the middle of the trafficking-smuggling continuum from
each other is the level of coercion they have suffered.31
Both trafficked and smuggled people use or are coerced by opportunistic
entrepreneurs/amateur traffickers, small scale criminal networks and/or
international criminal networks.32 Within this context, some migrants pay for
transit-related services, believing they are acting illegally; some pay believing
they are acting legally; some cannot afford to pay and accept they will have to
work to clear the debt; and some are totally unaware of what is happening (see
Box 2).33
Box 2
Compare the story of Ana (case 2), who left her home willingly and travelled legally to her
destination, with that of Reza (case 3), who fled persecution in Iran but ended up using illegal
networks during his journey.
Ana (case 2)
In 1999 Ana left her home in the coastal state of Bahia [Brazil] to travel to Switzerland at her
aunts invitation. Her aunt promised that she would be able to study, have a good job and also be
able to send money to sustain her family living in the countryside. As soon as Ana arrived in
Switzerland, she married a Swiss man, probably to arrange a permit to stay. However, her
29
Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A
Preliminary Analysis, Human Rights Quarterly 23, no.4 (2001): 1001.
30
Benjamin S. Buckland, More Than Just Victims: The Truth About Human Trafficking, Public Policy
Research 15, no.1 (2008).
31
Buckland, More Than Just Victims; Adam Graycar, Trafficking in Human Beings, in Migration,
Culture Conflict and Crime, ed. Joshua D. Freilich, Graham Newman, S. Giora Shoham and Moshe
Addad (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 24.
32
Ibid, 25-31.
33
Ibid, 25-6.
147
newlywed husband started almost immediately exploiting her with the help of her aunt. They
kept all of Anas earnings.34
Reza (case 3)
First I went to Istanbul. The agent smuggled me over the border in the hills, at night. Just in
case, he gave me a false Turkish passport. But the police stopped us in Istanbul and confiscated
the passport. We hid in a house belonging to the agents friend for two weeks, while he got me
another passport. This time it was Spanish, and my name was Martin Sanchez. Then I came
overland to Bulgaria. In Bulgaria the agent took away my passport. To come to the Netherlands I
was hidden in the back of a van. We drove all the way from Bulgaria and entered the Netherlands
without anyone knowing.35
Many of those involved are asylum seekers and refugees looking for help in
traversing tightly controlled borders. Unable to make an asylum claim, many
turn to smugglers and thus become more vulnerable to exploitation, or
ultimately trafficking (see Box 2, the case of Reza).36 Increased criminalisation
of illegal entry only increases the difficulties faced by potential refugees and
other migrants. As Jacqueline Oxman-Martinez, Andrea Martinez and Jill
Hanley argue in their study of Canadian government policy and practice:
it is difficult to distinguish irregular movements (labour force
immigration, brain drain, refugees and asylum seekers on various
grounds including religion, colour, and ethnic origin) from other,
illegal activities, such as trafficking in human beings, arms dealing,
drug smuggling, or even terrorism; and the difficulty casts doubt on the
efficacy of controls on migratory flows. If controls are ineffective and
human rights are not safeguarded, do we not lose more by closing
borders than we do by opening them?37
The authors contend that border controls result in the interception of illegal
migrants without offering a genuine solution to the problem of human
trafficking, noting that far from punishing traffickers, the situation instead
strips immigrants and refugees of basic rights.38
34
Frans Nederstigt and Luciana Campello R. Almeida, Brazil, in Collateral Damage: The Impact of
Anti-Trafficking Measures on Human Rights Around the World, ed. the Global Alliance Against
Trafficking in Women (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007), 99.
35
Khalid Koser, Asylum Policies, Trafficking and Vulnerability, special issue, International Migration
38, no.3 (2000): 100-101.
36
Jacqueline Oxman-Martinez, Andrea Martinez and Jill Hanley. Human Trafficking: Canadian
Government Policy and Practice, Refuge 19, no.4 (2001): 15.
37
Ibid, 19-20.
38
Ibid, 20.
148
2.3 Consent: A Problem The Protocols Failed To Resolve

The Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols largely ignore the overlap and
crossover I have just described, preferring instead to paint a picture of
smuggled criminals and trafficked victims. A careful examination of the way
the two instruments deal with the issue of consent, however, further buttresses
my argument. In seeking to establish clear criteria by which the two groups
could be distinguished, consent is an issue that the Protocols never adequately
resolve. I argue that, despite their best efforts, the Protocols are, ultimately,
incapable of describing trafficking and smuggling more precisely than as mere
points on a poorly defined continuum. In other words, reality has kept rearing
its head.
The fundamental division between the current trafficking and smuggling
definitions revolves around the question of consent. Basically, one consents to
being smuggled but one is coerced into being trafficked. Sadly, however, the
wording of the Trafficking Protocol blurs the issue of consent to a degree that
the distinction is far from clear. 39
Paragraphs a. and b. of the Trafficking Protocols article 3 talks about consent
being immaterial in cases where an abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability has occurred, but does nothing to define what vulnerability
might mean. If, for example, a migrant arrives in London, having escaped a
situation of extreme poverty, in which he earned one dollar a day, and accepts a
new job paying five dollars a day, has his position of vulnerability been
exploited? Should he be counted as having been trafficked, or merely as having
been smuggled? The ambiguity of the concept of exploitation (at least as far
as it is enunciated by paragraph a.), serves to break down the legal divide
between trafficking and smuggling and both are left as mere points on a poorly
defined continuum.40 This is something that Vanessa E. Munro argues when
she states that:
A person may be exploited while nonetheless gaining as a net result of
the transaction [D]isagreements over the role of harm relate directly
to debates over the relevance of consent in defining and responding to
exploitation. Indeed, while some have argued that a party cannot be
regarded as having been exploited unless the transaction or treatment in
question was forced upon her, or her apparent consent to it laboured
39
Gregor Noll, The Insecurity of Trafficking in International Law, in Mondialisation, migration et

droits de l'homme : le droit international en question, ed. V. Chetail (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), 346.
40
Ibid, 349.
149
under some kind of crucial (personal or structural) qualitative defect,

others have insisted that there can be exploitation despite the
exploitees full and voluntary consent.41
The concepts of abuse of power and abuse of vulnerability, also contained
in paragraph a. of the Trafficking Protocol, raise issues too. The travaux
prparatoires (the official record of negotiations) do not cover the concept of
abuse of power but they do state that the reference to the abuse of a position
of vulnerability is understood to refer to any situation in which the person
involved has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse
involved.42 The Explanatory Report of the 2005 Council of Europe (CoE)
Trafficking Convention43 reflects the difficulty involved in giving vulnerability
a precise meaning, stating that:
the vulnerability may be of any kind, whether physical, psychological,
emotional, family-related, social or economic. The situation might, for
example, involve insecurity or illegality of the victims immigration
status, economic dependence or fragile health. In short, the situation
can be any state of hardship in which a human being is impelled to
accept being exploited. Persons abusing such a situation flagrantly
infringe human rights and violate human dignity and integrity, which
no one can validly renounce.44
Because the archetypal trafficked person is an innocent and powerless victim,
they are thus assumed to be incapable of renouncing their rights (by agreeing to
work under harsh conditions, for example), and consent is thus rendered void,
then linked backwards to abuse and exploitation by the trafficker.45
Due to the difficulty of ascribing intentions and motives, it cannot be said here
whether the confusion of the Protocol on the meaning of concepts such as
exploitation and abuse of power is strategic, designed to play down the
41
Vanessa E. Munro, Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of Degradation and Exploitation in the Context
of Sex Trafficking, Journal of Law and Society 35, no.2 (June 2008): 260.
42
UN General Assembly, Fifty-Fifth Session, Agenda item 105, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime on the Work of its First to Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretative Notes for the Official
Records (Travaux Prparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, UN doc A/55/383/Add.1, para. 63.
43
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Warsaw, 16 May
2005), Council of Europe Treaty Series, No.197.
44
Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings:
Explanatory Report, Para 83 of CM(83)32 Addendum 2 Final of 3 May 2005.
45
Ibid, 351; Benjamin S. Buckland, More Than Just Victims, 42-47.
150
inequalities that drive migration while emphasising single actors in their place.
What is clear, however, is that the definitions are constructed in such as way
that consent is almost immaterial and that the agency of the migrant is reduced
to nil, even when it comes to choosing between different forms of misery.46
Further hampering efforts to distinguish those who have been trafficked from
those who have been smuggled is the fact that neither instrument contains any
guidance on how to distinguish between the two groups. Cross-over and
overlap, despite the fact that they appear to be extremely common, are not even
mentioned (see Box 3).47
Box 3
JZ (case 4)
[A] printer, JZ from China was brought to Melbourne and owed A$ 10,000 (US$ 7,823) to his
Australian employer, even after paying upfront A$10,000 to a recruiter in Shanghai. After the
employer made deductions for the debt owed, rent, tax and health benefits, JZ only earned A$280
per week (US$220), even though he worked 60 hours every week. He lived with other workers in
a rundown house owned by the employer. JZ slept on a mattress on the floor of the scantilyfurnished house which had no heating. After a year, JZ paid back the A$10,000 but was told his
work was not up to standard and so his contract was terminated and he was going to be deported.
JZs case indicates debt bondage under Australian criminal law. Despite being widely reported in
the media, the case was not investigated by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) as a debt
bondage offence. The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), although
aware of it, did not seem to refer the case to the AFP. Government officials seem largely resistant
to seeing the nexus between trafficking and migrant exploitation in industries such as
manufacturing, construction and agriculture. As one AFP officer stated, JZs case was not a case
for the Transnational Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking Strike Team: We dont deal with
labour cases, we just dont have the resources, if we did wed get all sorts of cases like from fruit
pickers, there would be so many.48
This case illustrates both the difficulties involved in distinguishing trafficked and smuggled
people, as well as the fact that, in many states, exploitation is tolerated, undermining human
rights and the rule of law more generally.
46
Noll, Insecurity of Trafficking in International Law, 352-3.
47
48
Elaine Pearson, Australia, in Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on

Human Rights Around the World, ed. the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (Bangkok:
GAATW, 2007), 45.
151
3. Factors Contributing to Low Recognition of Overlap and Crossover

Despite the obvious links between trafficking and smuggling that I described
above, the Protocols prefer to see the two phenomena as completely distinct. In
fact, the links just described are not discussed at all, nor do the Protocols
provide guidance on proper identification of migrants. Whether this is a
deliberate weakness is open to debate.
One of the reasons for this division is that, while it is possible to look at
smuggling and trafficking through a number of possible framesas a labour
market phenomenon, as a security issue, or as a human rights issue, the security
frame has been clearly dominant.49 This was the case even at a very early stage,
evidenced by the fact that the negotiations took place under the auspices of the
UN Crime Commission (the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice) and by the fact that both smuggling and trafficking instruments were
elaborated as additional Protocols to the UN Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime. As Melissa Ditmore and Marjan Wijers note in their critique
of the Protocol negotiations:
many government delegates came from a law enforcement background
and were not trained in human rights issues, which meant that especially
in the beginning of the negotiations, a great number of them did not even
see the connection between combating the crime of trafficking and the
need to provide assistance to trafficked persons and protect their rights.
Insofar as the need for assistance of trafficked persons was recognised in
the course of the negotiations, this was viewed as a prosecution tool
rather than a state obligation. Numerous delegates expressed the view
that trafficked persons were valuable as witnesses and, therefore,
deserving of protections during trials but that they should be deported
immediately after the trial. One delegate even wanted assurances that the
Protocol would not prevent his government from prosecuting the
victims.50
It is difficult to say why security concerns so dominated early trafficking
discourse, although several theories have been floated. Didier Bigo suggests
that political expediency is to blame.51 This is an explanation that has been
built on by Franois Crpeau and Delphine Nakache who posit that, as States
49
Dottridge, Introduction, 3.
50
Melissa Ditmore and Marjan Wijers, The Negotiations on the UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons,
Nemesis 19, no.4 (2003): 85.
51
Didier Bigo, Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27, no.11 (2002): 63.
152
lose ground in other areas (due in part to globalisation) they seek to claw it
back through the securitisation of immigration and border controls, trafficking
being only one recent manifestation of this process.52
Despite uncertainty over the origins of the linkage, it is evident that the
Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols reflect an immigration/security overlap.
Central to this overlap is a presumption that through border controls the
desirable can be sifted from the undesirable. This presumption has increasingly
led to negative side effects in the realm of human rights and refugee law.53
Ryszard Cholewinski, for example, argues that:
Illegal migrants are often portrayed as carriers of many ills and as the
vanguard of a much larger migrant army waiting in the wings to invade
and plunder the social welfare systems of affluent European nations.
This negative picture, exaggerated frequently in the media and fuelled
by political and electoral agendas, inexplicably turns a blind eye to the
simple fact that illegal immigrants are human beings possessing
fundamental and inalienable rights.54
The migrant, representing in the public mind a confluence of threats
encompassing unemployment, terrorism and international crime, has come to
be seen as a problem resolvable only through tighter border controls.55 Even if
we accept (and it is certainly contested) that tighter border controls are an
effective counter-trafficking instrument, it is nevertheless clear that, as has
been widely reported, trafficking of people occurs extensively within the
boundaries of states. Such trafficking has been largely ignored because, viewed
through a security frame, trafficking and smuggling have become tightly
connected to issues of sovereignty and border security, excluding the question
of internal trafficking.56
By choosing a security frame for counter-trafficking and smuggling efforts,
both state and non-state actors have since been locked into a kind of path
dependency, one that has subsequently played an enormous role in dictating
52
Franois Crpeau and Delphine Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada: Reconciling
Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection, Immigration and Refugee Policy 12, no.1 (February
2006): 4.
53
Howard Adelman, Refugees and Border Security Post-September 11, Refuge 20, no.4 (2001): 5; 11.
54
Ryszard Cholewinski, The EU Acquis on Irregular Migration: Reinforcing Security at the Expense of
Rights, European Journal of Migration and Law 2, no.1 (2001): 361.
55
Tom J. Farer, How the International System Copes with Involuntary Migration: Norms, Institutions
and State Practice, Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995); Franois Crpeau and Delphine Nakache,
Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada, 4.
56
Skeldon, Trafficking: A Perspective from Asia, 8.
153
key decisions and priorities. This path dependency has in many ways restricted
human rights and other protections to the narrowest possible group of people.
In consequence, protection is often denied to those at the less extreme end of
the exploitation continuum I described earlier. Though he is talking about
security in a broader sense, Jef Huysmans makes a relevant point when he
suggests that:
Security professionals derive their authority from being experts in the
definition of insecurities. Security knowledge is always knowledge
about dangers, about what and how we should fear. Security experts do
not usually reflect back extensively on how sustaining unease, fear and
insecurity feeds back into politics; how it may challenge other values
such as wealth and justice; how it may contribute to new procedures
and institutions that undermine corner stones of liberal democracy,
etc.57
In addition to the problem of path dependency, we can also attribute the failure
of policies to address the full spectrum of those in need of protection to a series
of misleading preconceptions among policymakers, opinion formers, and the
general public. Perhaps foremost among these is the idea that women and
children trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation constitute the vast
majority of trafficked persons worldwide.
This group do represent the majority of people identified as victims of
traffickers, due mostly to biases in the process of data gathering, yet available
figures suggest that many thousands are also trafficked into agriculture,
construction, industry and domestic labour worldwide.58 The International
Labour Organization, in a 2005 study, suggests that, of the 9.5 million people
in forced labour in Asia, less than 10 per cent were in the sex trade.59 While
most media coverage of human trafficking in the UK has focused on the sex
trade, research indicates that the use of forced migrant labour is probably
equally prevalent in agriculture, food processing, seafood gathering and
domestic service.60 Yet the lives of agricultural workers in forced labour or
debt bondage seldom feature in the fundraising literature of charities that claim
57
Jef Huysmans, Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy,
Contemporary Political Theory 3, no.3 (December 2004): 323.
58
UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: UNODC, 2009), 6.
59
David A. Feingold, Think Again: Human Trafficking, Foreign Policy 142 (September/October
2005): 26-7.
60
Bridget Anderson and B. Rogaly, Forced Labour And Migration To The UK (Oxford: Centre for
Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), 2005).
154
to work with victims of trafficking.61

In fact, it is possible to view the trafficking/smuggling divide itself as largely
constructed around the inaccurate, yet widely held, preconception that
smuggled criminals are men, while trafficked victims are women.62
Wendy Chapkis argues that current US trafficking legislation is, in fact, little
more than a politically strategic exception to a punishing rule, an exception
that divides violated innocents from illegal immigrants along gender
lines.63 In her view, protections afforded to the trafficked innocent serve
merely to justify the severity of those punishments meted out to the complicit:
smuggled people, economic migrants, illegal immigrants, and so forth.64
Underlining the problems inherent in what we might term the innocent
victim approach, Chapkis notes that such victims are commodities
depicted as objects of exchange rather than as exploited workers.65 She
contends that:
[the distinction between] the innocent victim and the wilful illegal
immigrant used to determine punishment and protection is not only a
dangerous one, but it is also a distinction that does not hold. Most
trafficking victims are also economic migrants. Their victimization
most often involves high debts and abusive working conditions, not
outright kidnapping and imprisonment.66
Trafficked and smuggled people lie along a continuum of exploitation, one that
is largely ignored by the relevant legal instruments. In the next part I turn to the
manifestation of this situation in public policy, something that has important
consequences for trafficked and smuggled people, for refugees and asylum
seekers, for law enforcement and for trafficking and smuggling networks
themselves.
61
Buckland, More Than Just Victims, 43.
62
Ditmore and Wijers, Negotiations on the UN Protocol, 82.
63
Wendy Chapkis, Trafficking, Migration, and the Law: Protecting Innocents, Punishing Immigrants,
Gender and Society 17, no.6 (December 2003): 924.
64
Ibid, 925.
65
Ibid, 930.
66
Ibid, 931.
155
4. Negative Side Effects

This part seeks to examine the policy disadvantages of ignoring the
trafficking/smuggling crossover and overlap described above. Border and
migration issues have been increasingly securitised over the past two decades.
Counter-traffickings chosen security frame and the blindness of policy
towards the crossover and overlap of trafficked and smuggled persons has led
to an overwhelming focus on interdiction measures.
We saw above that trafficked and smuggled people often lie along a continuum
of exploitation. But by assuming that trafficked and smuggled people can be
cleanly distinguished into groups of victims and criminals, current interdiction
policy assumes that the border can act as an efficient filterdistinguishing
those in need of protection (trafficked people, refugees, and so forth) from
those who are not (smuggled people, illegal immigrants, and so forth).
The downsides to this assumption are no more apparent than for trafficked
people themselves. Firstly, by raising operational costs for traffickers, many
scholars have argued that interdiction policies may actually increase overall
levels of exploitation as traffickers seek to make the maximum return on each
trafficked person.67 Because dependency is increased as a function of
increased migration restrictions, such restrictions increase costs for traffickers
and thus the amount of forced labour they seek in order to make a profit.68
There is not a lot of good empirical evidence to support this assertion but
scholars like Yuri Tamura have recently sought to fill the gap with
sophisticated statistical analysis. Tamuras model suggests that by reducing the
volume of smuggling or trafficking, the average level of exploitation
experienced by each migrant will actually increase.69
In addition to the issue of increased exploitation, it is clear that interdiction
policies push more people into illegal channels. As Ditmore and Wijers argue,
policies that restrict travel, and especially womens travel, actually encourage
the practice of human trafficking. By closing legal avenues of migration, they
leave would-be migrants no other option than to use the services of traffickers
and smugglers.70 This is also an assertion supported by Tamura, who cites a
67
Chapkis, Trafficking, Migration, and the Law, 927.
68
Siriporn Skrobanek, Nattaya Boonpakdi and Chutima Janthakeero, The Traffic in Women: Human
Realities of the International Sex Trade (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997), 16.
69
Yuri Tamura, On the Coexistence of Smuggling and Trafficking in Migrants, Warwick Economic
Research Papers No.730, Department of Economics, The University of Warwick, 2005, 30.
70
Ditmore and Wijers, Negotiations on the UN Protocol, 87.
156
large number of studies that show that restrictive immigration policies increase
the number of migrants who choose to use clandestine methods.71
Peter Andreas, in his pioneering study of the US-Mexico border, argues that the
expansion in border policing has been less about achieving the stated goal of
deterring illegal crossings and more about politically recrafting the image of
the border and symbolically reaffirming the states territorial authority.72 He
suggests that the escalation of policing has largely failed and has generated
perverse and counterproductive consequences that reinforce calls for further
escalation.73 First among the consequences he describes is the
professionalisation and consolidation of smuggling and trafficking
organisations. This is a point eloquently made by Anne Gallagher when she
notes that,
Severely restrictive immigration policies are more likely to fuel
organised, irregular migration than stop it. Tighter law enforcement
controls on smuggling and trafficking push individuals and smaller,
informal operators out of the markethelping to create a monopoly for
the best and most sophisticated criminal networks.74
At borders where it was once possible to travel alone or with limited help,
illegal entry now requires refined methods, provided by professional smugglers
at ever increasing prices.75 On the US-Mexico border, the increasingly complex
requirements of their trade have also led to an increasing centralisation of the
smuggling tradereportedly concentrated among ten or twelve familiesas
well as an arms race as both sides seek the technological upper-hand.76 As
the European Union (EU) has strengthened its southern border, similar trends
have occurred with the entrance of criminal gangs into the trans-border
movement of people.77 In the case of twenty-nine trafficked Iranians,
interviewed in the Netherlands, Koser reports that all ceded control over their
migration to traffickers due to the restrictive immigration policies in force
71
Yuri Tamura, On the Coexistence of Smuggling and Trafficking in Migrants, 7.
72
Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2000), 85.
73
Idem.
74
75
Andreas, Border Games, 95.
76
Ibid, 97.
77
Ibid, 131-133.
157
around Europe.78 As well as being linked to the expansion of smuggling

networks,
tightening of migration laws and policies in many of the destination
countries has led to a decrease in the legal opportunities for
international migration, creating an environment that is very conducive
to migrant smuggling. If stricter border controls are imposed, more
people will turn to irregular means of migrating, including resorting to
smuggling organizations, because they will feel they have little
choice.79
Box 4
In two case studies of Iranian asylum seekers in the Netherlands, Khalid Koser illustrates the way
in which desperate people turn to smugglers (called travel agents by the interviewees) when
legal migration channels are closed.
Ahmad (case 5)
When I paid him, the travel agent promised to bring me straight to the Netherlands. He said he
would give me a passport and an air ticket, and everything would be fine. But in the end it took
me two months to get here. First he took me to Istanbul by car. Then he hid me in the back of a
van and took me to Bulgaria. We flew from there to the Netherlands.80
Koerosh (case 6)
I contacted the travel agent through a friend who knew him personally. It took 15 days to
organize everything. This was a terrible time as I expected to be arrested any minute.81
This is a view supported by Andrew Brouwer and Judith Kumin who note that
most enforcement mechanisms designed to prevent illegal or unauthorised
migration, such as carrier sanctions and immigration control activities
have the side effect of encouraging the expansion of smuggling and trafficking
networks.82 Andreas reports that this is also the case in the EU where the
migrant-smuggling industry has boomed as border controls have increased.83
And while it is hard to draw direct lines of causality, it is clear that of the
78
Koser, Asylum Policies, Trafficking and Vulnerability, 97.
79
Crpeau and Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration, 4-5.
80
81
Ibid, 98.
82
Andrew Brouwer and Judith Kumin Interception and Asylum: Where Migration Control and Human
Rights Collide, Interception and Asylum (December 2003): 9.
83
158
thousands entering the EU illegally each year, the percentage of those using
some form of assistance has increased as a result of interdiction policies. Willy
Bruggeman suggests a figure of 50 per cent.84
Closing borders completely may halt trafficking and smuggling altogether but
this is, of course, increasingly difficult in todays interconnected world. In
practice, tighter border controls have led to the expansion of smuggling and
trafficking networks. For example, the case of Albania prior to 1989 showed
that one can seal borders. But Kosovo during the late 80s and 90s (as well as
other parts of the former Yugoslavia) provides evidence that informal sector
travel agents flourish and create a culture of popular support for people who are
regarded as smugglers and criminals under the terms of the Smuggling
Protocol.
I argue that ignoring the smuggling/trafficking overlap means also ignoring the
fact that the very vulnerable, particularly refugees and asylum seekers,
increasingly turn to smugglers and traffickers in order to reach their
destinations. Based on extensive interviews with Iranian asylum seekers in the
Netherlands, Khalid Koser posits that trafficking and smuggling have become
an integral part of applying for asylum in Europe, and this as a direct result of
increased migration restrictions.85 Koser goes on to suggest that this situation
has led to increased vulnerability among both asylum seekers and migrants
more generally.86 This position is shared by Claire Brolan who equates the
formal channels through which refugees and asylum seekers are encouraged to
pass with a lottery, noting that for many being smuggled is a reasonable
alternative to bureaucratic, time consuming, and therefore life endangering
legal migration.87 Where the costs (broadly defined) of legal migration are
high, individuals turn to illicit activity.
This has led in many cases to asylum seekers suffering the imputation of
double criminality, having entered in an irregular manner, often with the
assistance of people smugglers, and being aligned with crime by officials and
the media, leading to assumptions about the (il)legitimacy of their claims.88
This, of course, represents a distinct change in attitudes among European
84
W. Bruggeman, Illegal Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings seen as a Security Problem for
Europe, Paper presented at the European Conference on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in
Human Beings, Brussels, 18-20 September, 2002, 1.
85
Koser, Asylum Policies, Trafficking and Vulnerability, 105-6.
86
Ibid, 106.
87
Brolan, Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade, 577.
88
Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 384-385.
159
governments among whom (prior to the mid 1980s) there existed a general
consensus that it was acceptable for refugees to arrive illegally.
Box 5
The popular fusion of asylum seekers and criminals is well illustrated by an article in Britains
Daily Mail newspaper, entitled Jailed: Gang Who Offered Club Class People-Smuggling. In
this piece, Lucy Ballinger writes that:
Turkish nationals were flown from France on a glamorous six-seater plane with a plush leather
interior to small airstrips around the M25 [the London ringroad] where there were no passport
controls. The wealthy criminals and asylum seekers simply walked off the plane and were ferried
to London in chauffeur-driven luxury to start a new life.89 (emphasis added).
Of particular relevance here are border protection instruments such as visa

regimes, carrier sanctions and interdiction and interception mechanisms,
mechanisms that I suggest are contrary to the carrying out of obligations
regarding refugees and asylum seekers in good faith.90 As Gallagher points
out,
The border-control provisions in both instruments (the trafficking and
smuggling Protocols) are especially worrying. Border enforcement
measures such as readmission treaties, carrier sanctions or the posting
of Airline Liaison Officers abroad are now routinely used by
governments of the major destination countries. This is despite the fact
that such measures risk denying bona fide refugees the chance of
escaping persecution. Rather than addressing this conflict, the two
Protocols contribute to confusion by endorsing strengthened border
controls while at the same time nominally upholding the right to
asylum.91
As I argued above, imagining that migrants can be delineated into clear
categoriessmuggled, trafficked, refugee, asylum seeker, economic migrant,
and so forthleads to a policy outcome whereby border management tools
attempt to classify, separate, and process migrants according to relevant
criteria. While this may work well in theory, it is clear that in practice
89
Lucy Ballinger, Jailed, Gang Who Offered Club-Class People Smuggling, The Daily Mail, 19
December 2006.
90
Crpeau and Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration, 12-14.
91
160
categories of migrants are much more fine-grainedthe crossover between

smuggled and trafficked people being only one example among many.
Carrier sanctions and stricter document requirementsboth mandated by the
trafficking and smuggling Protocolsare particularly problematic in this
regard. Carrier Sanctionsthe sanctioning of airlines and shipping companies
for permitting insufficiently documented migrants to travelmandate private
actors with the task of differentiating between different categories of migrants,
allowing some to travel and refusing passage to others. In practice, the private
actors thus engaged often lack the training, experience and time required to
adequately process migrants.
As Brouwer and Kumin argue, airline officers are seldom well equipped to
examine the credibility of asylum claims.92 Similarly, immigration control
officersoften sent by states to aid carriers in their taskdo not appear to
have any mandate to examine the intercepted persons motivation for migration
or to address any need for international protection.93 In fact, carrier sanctions
may have the least effect on the so-called economic migrants that they
purport to target. Such migrants may often have the means, time and
connections to obtain tourist or other visas legitimately, something that is often
impossible for refugees.94
Stricter document requirements also have a disproportionate impact on
refugees and asylum seekers. This is because many people in need of
protection have no possibility of gaining the necessary paperwork required to
reach their destinations and make a claim. As an NGO report states, desperate
people will resort to desperate measures. With all other options closed,
migrants and asylum seekers have been forced to make use of illegal and
dangerous means of entry via sophisticated trafficking and smuggling rings.95
Guy Goodwin-Gill supports this view, arguing that for many refugees,
obtaining necessary passports from persecutory state authorities is too
dangerous while, in countries where national institutions have broken down,
consular authorities may be non-existent. Because flight is commonly very
sudden there may be no time to obtain the requisite travel documents.
Furthermore, visas are not generally issued for protection reasons, and even a
92
Brouwer and Kumin Interception and Asylum, 10.
93
Idem.
94
Farer, How the International System Copes with Involuntary Migration, 89.
95
Human Rights Watch, the International Catholic Migration Committee, and the World Council of
Churches, NGO Background Paper on the Refugee and Migration Interface, UNHCR Global
Consultations on International Protection, Geneva, 2829 June 2001.
161
standard tourist visa may not be granted if it is suspected that the individual
will seek asylum on arrival in the destination state. In practice, individuals are
either forced into trying to obtain a visa on false premises simply to gain entry
into a State in which a protection claim may be lodged, or into moving
illegally. Though States may lawfully control their borders, Goodwin-Gill
maintains that such control policiesif pursued in isolationcan be
counterproductive. 96
The fact that many asylum-seekers rely on illegal methods becomes
explainable when we recognise that states have introduced visa requirements in
direct response to increased refugee claims from nationals of particular
countries. The imposition of visa requirements on nationals of refugeeproducing countries has been described as the most explicit blocking
mechanism for asylum flows, since it hinders the individuals ability to seek
asylum and may force asylum seekers into illegal migration channels, such as
trafficking and smuggling networks.97
5. Conclusions
I have argued here that the simple categories of smuggled and trafficked person
do not adequately represent the fine-grained nature of international migration
today. It would be easy to take away from this argument the assumption that
the substantial advances made over the last decade in the protection,
identification and care of trafficked people are for nothing. On the contrary, I
suggest that what is required is recognition that a greater tranche of those
crossing international borders each year are vulnerable and in need of
protection of some kind. What is needed is not less protection for trafficked
people but more protection for all.
In his introduction to Collateral Damage, a report on the human rights impact
of counter-trafficking policies worldwide, Mike Dottridge argues that a rightsbased approach means identifying those most vulnerable to human rights
abuses and then designing policy to address their needs.98 In practice, countertrafficking and counter-smuggling policy has worked in the opposite direction.
Assumptions have been made about who is most vulnerable, a framework for
action has been chosen and policy has, ultimately, failed to adequately protect
the rights of many migrants in all categories.
96
Goodwin-Gill, Refugee in International Law, 375-376.
97
Ibid, 374-375.
98
Dottridge, Introduction, 6-8.
162
As I argued in the first part, the strict categories of trafficked and smuggled
person do not adequately reflect the fine-grained nature of international
migrationa fact no better reflected than in the failure of the Protocol drafters
to adequately define questions of consent and of exploitation. Rather, smuggled
and trafficked people fall along a continuum of abusequite clearly
distinguishable at the extremes but increasingly hard to tell apart at the centre.
Possible responses to trafficking can be divided into a series of frames
economic, security, human rights, migration, and labour market, are just some
of the possible alternatives. What I argued in the second major part of this
chapter is that because the security frame has been dominant, attempts to
extend wide human rights protections to both trafficked and smuggled people,
or to use labour market approaches to the problem, have been heavily curtailed.
Furthermore, I suggested that misleading preconceptions about the problem
have led to a failure among policy-makers to address the full spectrum of those
in need of protection.
Ignoring the overlap between smuggled and trafficked people has led to
negative consequences for a number of groups. To give just three examples,
trafficked people may be subject to increased exploitation as traffickers seek to
recoup higher operating costs incurred by tighter border controls and law
enforcement pressure. Trafficking and smuggling networks may expand as
more people are forced into using illegal migration channels. And, lastly,
refugees and asylum seekers may be unable to access protection.
In the end, it is difficult not to conclude that the true beneficiaries of current
policies have been migrant smugglers and trafficking networks, lawmakers and
law enforcers.99 This will continue to be the case until we face up to the
difficult, complex and uneasy challenges of 21st century migration.
Recommendations
Human Rights Protection Must Be Given As Much Emphasis As Law
Enforcement
Regardless of the category into which they fall, many irregular migrants need
protection against human rights violations and should not be considered simply
criminals.100 The assumption that counter-crime tactics are sufficient to counter
trafficking and smuggling needs reconsideration, particularly given the fact that
99
100
Crpeau and Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration, 17.
163
aggressive law enforcement may only seek to drive industries further

underground.
Protection Should Be Decoupled From Cooperation
Linking protection with the willingness of trafficked people to cooperate with
law enforcement can lead to further exploitation as the interests of victims is
made secondary to the crime-fighting aspects of anti-trafficking action.101 This
is particularly the case given the fact that the deportation of non-cooperative
persons can result in re-trafficking.
Policy Integration Needs To Be Improved
Asylum, smuggling and trafficking policy needs to be more tightly integrated,
rather than subordinating policy related to these three to a priority to stop
migrants entering a country. Khalid Koser argues that in the current situation,
asylum policies encourage trafficking and trafficking overcomes asylum
policies.102 Immigration policy (broadly conceived) needs to reduce its
emphasis on border security in order to minimise the number of refugees
prevented from reaching their destination.
Policy-Makers Must Use Careful Language
Policy-makers must use careful language when speaking about migration.
Criminals, economic migrants, refugees and trafficked people become all too
easily confused in the public mind, leading to greater securitization of the
debate as well as to greater public fear and racism.103
The Labour Market Must Not Be Ignored
Current security-focused strategies have drawn attention away from the more
awkward task of recognising and regulating the cross-border labour market.104
This needs more attention from policy-makers and more honest attention
attention that goes beyond allowing the entry of well-qualified migrants, when
there is high demand for cheap, manual labour.
101
Nicole Lindstrom, Transnational Responses to Human Trafficking in the Balkans, International

Affairs Working Paper 2006-09, International Affairs at The New School, New York, 2006, 17.
102
103
Brolan, Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade, 594.
104
164
The Privatisation of Border Control Can Have Negative Consequences

States have increasingly used private actors (through measures such as carrier
sanctions) to control who crosses international borders. Such actors are often
poorly trained and free from strict oversight. Their use can have negative
consequences for many categories of migrants, particularly refugees and
asylum seekers. If private actors are mandated with border management
activities (via carrier sanctions, and so forth), their actions must be closely
monitored by states and they must undergo rigorous training before
deployment.
Visa Systems Must Not Discriminate
Visa systems must not discriminate on racial grounds or obstruct access to
protection for asylum seekers and refugees.105 Training of consular and
immigration officials needs to recognise this fact.
More Training for Migration Management Officials
Emphasis has been placed on training border guards and immigration officials
to recognise trafficked people. While this is important, training should
reinforce the fact that many classes of migrant, whether they be smuggled or
trafficked, are entitled to human rights protection.
105
Goodwin-Gill, Refugee in International Law, 374.
165
PART 2: Actors
167
CHAPTER 5
Human Trafficking & Policing: Good & Bad
Practices
Jana Arsovska, Stef Janssens
Introduction
This chapter looks at criminal justice responses to human trafficking, assessing
the role of the police.1 It argues that police forces play a vital role in the fight
against human trafficking. Court cases against human traffickers are often
initiated by the police who have frequent contact with victims, clients of
prostitution, informants and offenders. Police must ensure that criminal
networks are dismantled and that traffickers are arrested and have their assets
seized. They need to identify victims, protect them from criminal retribution
and ensure that they are not re-victimised. Victims need to be referred to social
service providers, and given incentives to testify in court. These and other
issues require effective, multi-faceted and well-coordinated police work. Police
officials, however, are continuously facing numerous challenges, including
both corruption and a lack of political will to deal with trafficking issues. Other
challenges include a lack of national and international police cooperation, lack
of intelligence to help support police activities, a shortage of trained staff, as
well as ineffective cooperation between state and civil society agencies.
1. Policing and Counter-Trafficking
Human trafficking cases are complex in nature and difficult to detect and
prosecute. According to interviews with EU law enforcement officials, the
problem is exacerbated by the growing involvement of organised crime groups
worldwide.2 Despite numerous efforts in recent years, there are still many
1
The authors would like to thank Benjamin S. Buckland, Mike Dottridge, Cornelius Friesendorf, and
Louise Shelley and for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
See Austrian Ministry of Interior, Development of Guidelines for the Collection of Data on Trafficking
in Human Beings, Including Comparable Indicators (Vienna: International Organization for Migration,
2008). Also, according to INTERPOL officials, nowadays, human trafficking is a multi-billion-dollar
169
challenges remaining with regards to the effective measurement, monitoring,

prevention and combating of trafficking in persons worldwide. An Austrian-led
Expert Group on Human Trafficking notes: The result is that after more than a
decade of tireless efforts by governments, international organizations, NGOs
and academia, trafficking remains an issue. Valuable information is often
scattered or unrecorded, hampering cooperation between competent authorities
and playing into the hands of traffickers.3
Law enforcement officials deal with a wide range of issues; from the rescue of
victims and the protection of witnesses to the prosecution of traffickers. Initial
actions taken by police in investigations are crucial to the ultimate success of
prosecutions. Police have to identify trafficking victims. Trafficking
investigations require careful treatment of such victims, upon whose testimony
the prosecution often depends. Offering protection to witnesses is also an
essential condition for effective intervention. After initial interviews with
suspected victims and witnesses, often done in cooperation with NGOs,
investigators begin collecting information and compiling evidence to build
their case. Where possible, they also need to obtain the collaboration of
offenders.
In recent years, however, changes in the operational methods of trafficking
networks have taken place. Investigated files from Belgium and the
Netherlands show that trafficking networks have become professional,
entrepreneurial and less visible.4 This makes the detection of victims more
difficult than ever before. In many cases, law enforcement officials are not
approached directly by victims who are willing to testify. Thus, police need to
collect other types of evidence to build their case, or they need to obtain the
victims cooperation. Overall, police forces have to be flexible, employing
different investigative techniques to combat complex trafficking networks (see
Box 1).
form of international organised crime. They claim that tightening of border controls has made more
potential migrants turn to organised crime groups for help.
3
Ibid, 20.
Professionalisation is discussed in 2009 reports of INTERPOL and Europol on ethnic Albanian

organised crime groups.
170
Box 1: Investigative Police Approaches

Reactive Investigation
A reactive investigation is a victim-led investigation which does not always lead to the successful
prosecution of offenders. The need to intervene quickly to protect the victims affords little time
for a proactive investigation aimed at obtaining additional evidence. The result is that
investigators might be left with no evidence upon which to prosecute. Also, victims may initially
promise to testify in judicial proceedings and then withdraw their cooperation.
Proactive Investigation
A proactive investigation is an intelligence-generated, police-led5 investigation which often leads
to successful prosecution of traffickers, even without having to rely upon the testimony of
victims. By using a combination of intelligence, surveillance, undercover operations and
investigative techniques, investigators can identify traffickers and ensure that they are
prosecuted. The widespread use of this option confirms the difficulties law enforcement officials
face when confronting trafficking victims who do not wish to testify.6
Disruptive Investigation
A disruptive investigation is a police-led investigation7 used when neither the reactive nor the
proactive approach is possible. It may be necessary for law enforcement officials to resort to
tactics which disrupt human trafficking operations and force traffickers to reveal themselves.
Disruption, however, does not provide long-term solutions and may only displace the crimes to
another location.8
When proactive investigative techniques are applied, police have to ensure that
the use of informants, surveillance, and other investigative techniques is in
accordance with existing laws. The criminal use of cash and underground
banking and the lack of police collaboration make financial investigations, the
seizure of assets, the confiscations of proceeds of crime and the investigation of
crime scenes challenging for police. Given that trafficking in persons often
takes place across borders, law enforcement officials need to investigate broad
criminal networks. This requires international police cooperation. Moreover,
police officials need to cooperate with immigration officers, social workers,
labour inspectors, prosecutors, judges, victim shelters and others concerned
with ensuring successful prosecution. Through practical examples, the
subsequent sections illustrate how police have been dealing with human
5
See UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, 2006), Tool 5.2.
The proactive option does not intend to disenfranchise the victims from the prosecution process. Their
testimonies remain the prime evidence although testimonies are rarely forthcoming.
See UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Tool 5.5.
According to the UN Tool 5.5, the use of the disruptive option is appropriate: (1) Where the level of
risk to the victims demands an immediate response; (2) Where the proactive option is not viable; (3)
Where legislative or resource implications preclude the use of proactive tactics.
171
trafficking cases both domestically and internationally.9 The chapter presents

good and bad police practices at various levels: prevention, protection and
prosecution.
2. Synchronising Police Work: Instruments, Laws and Regulations
2.1. Defining Human Trafficking
Clear criminal provisions are crucial during criminal investigations. Over the
years, international authorities have been struggling to formulate common
provisions designed to fight human trafficking and to protect victims. A
common definition was included in the protocols to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime: The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. Generally speaking, the UN
Trafficking Protocol laid down the foundations for international action against
human trafficking.10
The definition in the UN Protocol also underpinned the EU Council's
Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (Article 4).11
Since 2005, police work is also regulated on a European level by the Council of
Europe (CoE) Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.12
The CoE Convention elaborates extensively on measures designed to protect
victims. It also covers not only trafficking for sexual or economic exploitation,
but also trafficking for the purpose of organ removal.13
The chapter draws primarily but not exclusively on European examples (European police practices).
Many of the court cases examined here are from Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands, although we
include examples from the Balkan countries and other regions, too.
10
Not all UN member states have ratified and implemented the UN definition. Also, in not a single
Western European state does anti-trafficking legislation directly incorporate the provisions of the UN
Trafficking protocol as far as minors are concerned.
11
European Council, Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002, 2002/629/JHA, OJ L203 of

1/8/2002. The EU definition does not feature all of the UN Protocol components, while some parts of it
are more specific.
12
Council of Europe Convention of May 16, 2005 on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings,
adopted in Warsaw.
13
Council of Europe, Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings: Prevention, Protection and
Prosecution, (conference proceedings, Oslo, November 12, 2006).
172
2.2. Protection of Victims and Witnesses

Article 5 (Criminalisation) and Articles 68 (Measures for the protection
and support of trafficked victims) of the UN Protocol relate to the
identification of victims. If trafficked persons are not identified as such, they
may be treated as illegal immigrants, or they may be left without protection or
support. Article 12 of the CoE Convention provides assistance for victims of
trafficking. If victims are unaware of their right to protective procedural
measures as well as compensation and legal redress, they might be reluctant to
cooperate with the police. According to the CoE Article 28 (Protection of
victims, witnesses and collaborators with the judicial authorities) victims must
be provided with appropriate protection from potential retaliation. Protection
measures must be applied with the consent of the victim. Special protection
measures should be provided for child victims. Protection can also be relevant
to victims families, persons cooperating in a different capacity with the
judicial authorities, and members of NGOs that support victims of trafficking.
The aim of the recovery and reflection period discussed in Article 13 of the
Convention is to allow victims to escape the influence of traffickers, and to
come to an informed decision on cooperating with the authorities.
2.3. Confiscations
Article 12 (Confiscations and Seizure) of the UN Convention attempts to
bring member states into conformity with one another.14 If this article is not
implemented properly, states cannot respond to international requests to
confiscate. Article 12 requires states to have the necessary legal framework to
permit: (1) The confiscation of proceeds of crime derived from offences
covered by the Convention; (2) The confiscation of property, equipment or
other instruments used in those offences; (3) The identification, tracing and
freezing and/or seizure of the proceeds of crime; (4) The application of
confiscation powers against transforming property and proceeds, intermingled
with legitimately obtained property, benefits or income derived from the
proceeds of crime covered by the Convention.15
14
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Tool 4.2.
15
Ibid. See also UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Chapter 4.
173
2.4. Special Investigative Techniques

Article 20 of the UN Organised Crime Convention endorses the following
investigative techniques: (1) Controlled delivery;16 (2) Electronic and other
forms of surveillance; and (3) Undercover operations. Article 20 encourages
member states to employ appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements
regarding the use of special investigative techniques in the context of
international cooperation. Various states often have different regulations on the
use of informants, electronic surveillance and undercover operations. But in
international joint operations, common agreements are necessary for effective
police cooperation.
2.5. Travel and Identity Cards
Article 8 of the CoE Convention requires states party to adopt the necessary
measures to ensure the quality of travel and identity documents. These
measures may include introducing minimum standards to improve the security
of passports, as well as including more sophisticated preventive features that
make counterfeiting, falsification and fraud more difficult.17 Article 9 of the
Convention, modelled on Article 13 of the Palermo Protocol, requires states
party to check the legality of travel or identity documents issued by their
authorities when they are requested to do so by another party and when it is
suspected that the documents are being used for human trafficking. Documents
used for trafficking may be outright forgeries. They may also have been issued
by the requested party but later altered to produce a counterfeit. Documents
which neither are counterfeits nor have been altered may likewise be used for
human trafficking. Article 9 requires parties to cooperate in detecting such
situations and to respond within a reasonable time.
3. Prevention
3.1. Targeting Those at Risk
Although this chapter focuses on operational questions relating to prosecution
rather than to prevention, the role of the police in prevention should also be
acknowledged. Prevention measures vary, depending on conditions such as
whether a country is one of origin or of destination, its level of corruption and
16
Out of concern for the safety of victims, controlled delivery is not appropriate in cases of human
trafficking.
17
Council of Europe, Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings.
174
political will, and its economic and political situation. The sensitive nature of
the issue reflects the unwillingness of some governments to acknowledge
trafficking problems in the first place.18 As Patsy Sorensen, Director of the
Victim Shelter Payoke argues: In all this, probably the most decisive
ingredient is political will. If that is present, make it stronger, if it is lacking,
we need to find ways to regenerate it.19
Developing successful anti-trafficking prevention policies is difficult without
up-to-date research, proper evaluation of existing policies, cooperation by
victims, political will and intelligence-led policing. One does not work without
the other. Police and victim shelters need to share knowledge with scholars,
NGOs and policy-makers in order to construct a more realistic picture of risk
populations, vulnerable communities, human traffickers, trafficking methods,
and trafficking networks. The mapping of the situation should be based on
multiple sources, such as: police records, victims statements, the experiences
of social workers, migration officers and representatives from NGOs and
shelters.
Police, immigration officers, border control officers and others who have
contact with trafficking victims should be provided with relevant and regular
training, particularly on high-risk populations. One promising police practice is
to find, in cooperation with other concerned organisations, hot spots of
trafficking as well as to help in the identification of risk populations, and then
to implement proactive policing (Box 2).
Box 2: Targeting at Risk Populations and Trafficking Hot Spots
Operation Paladin Child was conducted in 2004. This initiative involved the recording of the
personal details of every child arriving at border posts throughout the UK that was assessed as
possibly being at risk of trafficking or exploitation. Each child was issued with an identification
number, had his or her photograph taken and was asked to say where he or she would be living in
the UK. If the child could not be located at the address given during subsequent visits by social
services staff, an investigation would be opened. Details of the adults welcoming unaccompanied
children at airports or ports were also recorded.20
18
Jana Arsovska, Decline, Change or Denial: Human Trafficking Activities and EU Responses in the
Balkan Triangle, Policing 2, no.1 (2008): 5063.
19
Personal interview, Brussels, June 2007.
20
The case is taken from a UNDP study. See also Reflex, Paladin Child, A Partnership Study of Child
Migration to the UK via London Heathrow, January 2004,
www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/committees/ppr/ppr-040712-14-appendix01.pdf (accessed June 30, 2009)
175
The police should be also able to recognise the gendered impact of

traffickingwomen into forced prostitution and/or domestic labour; men into
construction or agricultural work; children into sport, begging, etc.21 However,
they should not generalise too quickly about gender-specific domains of
exploitation because this can be misleading (see Chapter 1 in this volume).
Thus, although profiling and identifying those at risk appears to be a useful
preventive tool, unsubstantiated generalisations and discriminatory policing
tactics should be avoided. Mapping of risk populations should not mean
stereotyping women from specific countries and restricting their freedom of
movement or treating them with disrespect. Police should also avoid
stereotyping men from countries with high levels of trafficking, by
immediately concluding that they are traffickers.
The concerned parties should be alert to the fact that traffickers adjust quickly
to their environment. When they realise that people from their own nationality
or gender are investigated by police, they often use people from other
nationalities as a front for their illegal activities. Traffickers tend to deceive the
police, keep a low profile and attract little attention, which makes the work of
law enforcement officials more difficult. Profiling should remain a task of
specialised police officers. One Belgian law enforcement official explains:
In the past, the Albanians were the main pimps and traffickers of women for
sexual exploitation in Belgium. They used violence frequently and their
crimes had high social impact [Therefore,] they quickly attracted
international attention. The police focused extensively on the suspicious
Albanians. Now, the offenders have learned from their mistakes. For various
types of activities they make use of Belgian or Dutch women who look more
innocent than the tough Albanians. The Albanian pimps and traffickers live in
one city while the Dutch or Belgian madamsappointed by the traffickers
to control the prostituteslive in another. The Albanians come occasionally
to check their business and to collect the money while the madams act as the
main pimps. Since Albanians are involved in multi-crime, they also use the
same madams, or other women with EU passports as drug couriers. The
women drive the cars and transport cocaine from Belgium and Netherlands to
Italy. The police are less suspicious of blond Belgian girls than of Albanian
men driving frequently to Italy. 22
21
Increasing gender diversity within law enforcement agencies can facilitate trust-building between
different parties and supply greater information to the police. This usually improves career prospects for
female staff.
22
Personal interview, Belgian Federal Police August 2006.
176
3.2. Multi-Agency Collaboration

Practice shows that NGO representatives, labour inspectors, social workers,
customs officials, police officers, prosecutors and others need to operate in a
coordinated manner in order to develop effective preventive policies (Box 3).
For instance, in 2001, a collaboration protocol was created between two
inspection services in Belgium. The protocol provided the necessary
framework for the execution of joint actions in high-risk sectors for human
trafficking and illegal work. It served as a good operational platform and
involved judicial authorities, social inspection departments, police and the tax
office.23
Box 3: Multidimensional Training Process
The Italian Ministry of Interior participated in the project Fight against Trafficking in Human
Beings into the EU from EU Accession and Neighbouring Countries: Operational Network and
Multidisciplinary Training Process. The Project was implemented over a three-year period
starting from 2004. It involved different sectors and people engaged in the fight against human
trafficking, including governmental (Ministries of Justice, Interior and Social Affairs) and nongovernmental organisations, law enforcement and judicial authorities, legal practitioners, social
workers and training professionals. The project covered a wide geographical area with a total
number of twelve participating countries. It resulted in the delivery of training courses structured
around two manuals developed during the programme through a multilateral consultation process
(the AGIS Guides on Best Practices for Students and Trainers). Following the drafting of these
manuals, national training teams were identified (training the trainers). National groups made
up of professionals from different operational areas acted as trainers.
Cooperation among border control services is also key to preventing human

trafficking. Modernising border control systems, rationalising operational
activities and establishing a system of direct exchange of information have a
definite place in transnational and national cooperation in the field of
preventive police measures.24 Although cooperation often yields positive
results, the strengthening of border control services alone might have the
opposite effect. INTERPOL reported that operations conducted by Frontex, the
main EU External Borders Agency, often result in positive but short-term
solutions. Frontex provides one of the most advanced border protection and
23
See Social Intelligence and Investigation Service (SIOD), Bi-Annual Report 20052006 on the Illegal
Employment of Foreign Workers and the Exploitation of Labour (Brussels: SIOD, 2007), 100101;
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR), Annual Report on Human
Trafficking (Brussels: CEOOR, 2005), 8889.
24
Council of Europe, Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 4445.
177
management services, but it does not reduce peoples demand to emigrate

abroad or human trafficking in general. Strict border control often forces illegal
immigrants into trafficking/smuggling networks. Trafficking networks can
produce forged documents and adapt their operational methods to avoid police
control.25
3.3. Police and Awareness Campaigns
Police officers often have the first contact with trafficking victims so they are
able to distribute prevention materials and inform victims about their rights.
The Belgian Federal Polices Human Trafficking Unit initiated the Flyer
information project in 2001. Through a leaflet, this unit provided information
to truck drivers about illegal immigrants and trafficked victims who, with the
assistance of trafficking networks, often hide in trucks without the drivers
knowledge.26
Internationally, INTERPOLs Expert Working Group on Trafficking in Human
Beings has been meeting annually to raise awareness of emerging issues and
promote prevention programmes. UNODC has also been active in raising
awareness of the risks associated with trafficking by releasing video and radio
broadcasts around the world. Via media channels, police officers can also share
some experiences with the general population, including potential and actual
victims. Although most evaluations have suggested that information targeting
high risk groups is more effective than general information or scare
campaigns (for example, recommendations against travelling abroad), some of
these campaigns do provide people with good advice on how to minimise the
likelihood of running into problems. Police, in cooperation with NGOs and
International Organisations (IOs), can develop awareness campaigns that
counter, for example, deceptive promises by traffickers.
3.4. Community Policing
Community policing is an important prevention tool against human
trafficking.27 It is a transparent policing model, which involves the public in
25
Personal conversation, April 2009.
26
The results of such campaigns are difficult to assess, considering the rapid adaptation of criminal
organisations.
27
See Skogan Wesley and Hartnett Susan, Community Policing, Chicago Style (New York: Oxford
178
achieving the mission of the police. This is important when it comes to human
trafficking cases since victims (particularly those coming from post-communist
or authoritarian states) often distrust the police (Box 6).
More thought should also be given to the idea of community vigilance
committees. Some of these surveillance networks have been set up to monitor
local sex trade activity for evidence of trafficking while others have been set up
to protest against the presence of sex workers in particular areas. Overall, the
idea mirrors efforts taking place in the US, where the federal government has
set up rescue and restore coalitions aimed at all forms of trafficking.28
Community policing has also been applied in many other countries faced with
human trafficking problems. For example, the porous border between India and
Nepal is an area of heavy cross-border human trafficking. In 200607,
UNODC supported NGO initiatives such as the Community Vigilance project,
led by local leaders and womens groups, which mobilised thousands of
villagers to detect and prevent trafficking. Similarly, a local study conducted in
250 villages in Bangladesh revealed that approximately 7,000 women and
children are trafficked each year both internally and across borders.29 Vigilance
and Law and Order Committees have been established by the police in each
village. Every police officer in the village has been working with people from
the community who know each household of their community. The committees
have remained vigilant about suspicious movements, new arrivals, and
recruitment of people with the promise of jobs. They have also overseen locallevel marriages with foreigners, marriages without registration, as well as child
marriages. Although such community activities are problematic (due to the risk
of locals providing information to traffickers; distrust and xenophobia; limiting
peoples freedom of choice and movement), overall, involving vulnerable
communities in prevention is a promising practice. It can yield positive results
especially if the selected segments of the communities are guided by NGO and
police experts.
3.5. Reducing Opportunities for Corruption
Traffickers often use corruption as a strategy to achieve their goals. There are
many cases where police, customs and immigration officers have enabled
traffickers to proceed with their illegal activities in return for benefits.30
28
Child Trafficking Network News, e-mail message to author, February 2009.
29
See Kamal Khairuzzaman, Human Trafficking: Preventive Approach (Bangladesh: BMSF, 2007).
30
This assessment is based on court and police files as well as interviews with law enforcement officials
from several European countries.
179
Particularly, SEE countries have been labelled as countries with serious

corruption problems. The CoEs Programme against Corruption and Organized
Crime in South-Eastern Europe (PACO) group stated that corruption linked to
human trafficking is clearly an issue in SEE countries.31 It backed up its claims
with reports on specific cases of corruption that have not led to judicial
proceedings or convictions. According to the report, networks involved in
human trafficking cannot operate without the help of corrupt government
officials. According to the 2007 CEOOR Annual Report, it is significant that
NGO representatives in these countries, who wanted to remain anonymous,
were willing, during the PACO conference, to reveal that their government had
put pressure on them to influence the way they refer to human trafficking and
corruption issues.32 While investigated cases indicate that police corruption is
more common in less developed and poorer countries, internal reports
demonstrate that this is also problem in Western countries.33
Box 4: Corrupt Police Officials
Case G-V (20012002) concerns an international, inter-ethnic criminal network composed of
Italian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Greek traffickers corrupting police officials, and a disciplinary
inquiry regarding seven agents of the Belgian police. A Belgian ex-prostitute accused two of
those agents of corruption. During their working and private hours the policemen regularly
visited prostitution bars to control prostitutes. The exploiter told the police that she received
protection from Bulgarian and Albanian criminals but also from police officials.
According to PACO,34 corrupt staff members at Western embassies are

sometimes involved in human trafficking (Box 6). Corruption linked to human
trafficking goes hand in hand with the forgery of documents and visa fraud. In
the Belgian Federal Prosecution Service's Albanian case, one of the defendants
used to be an officer in President Berisha's republican guard in Albania. In
informal conversations, sources confirmed that the defendant was an exSigurimi agent (the Albanian former security services). He was trailed in two
human trafficking cases and played a role in an important prostitution and
money laundering case. In late 1997, when the Berisha regime collapsed, the
31
PACO, Corruption and Organised Crime, Report on the Regional Seminar (Portoroz: PACO, June 19
22, 2002).
32
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR), 2007 Annual Report on Human
Trafficking (Brussels: CEOOR, 2008).
33
Ibid. See also the chapter of Leslie Holmes in this book. In most investigated cases from Western
Europe it appears that police corruption occurs in a more subtle way and on an individual level; it is
less systematic and organised when compared to the Balkans, for example.
34
PACO, Corruption and Organised Crime.
180
defendant lost his job. During his cross-examination, he explained how he had
bought a visa in the Greek embassy in Albania: I acquired the Greek visa in
the following way. A man I knew, who shall remain nameless because I am
frightened of him, has ties with the Greek embassy. I handed in my passport
and he took steps to secure the visa. I paid him Euro 2,500 for the Greek
visa.35 Then, in March 2009, a former employee of the German Diplomatic
Office in Kosovo was arrested and charged with espionage, for allegedly
passing classified government information to people linked to organised crime
and to foreign intelligence services in Kosovo and Macedonia. The diplomat
worked together with a Macedonian Albanian man who was a translator in the
German diplomatic mission in Kosovo between 2007 and 2008.36
Box 5: Corruption and Visa Fraud in Western Europe
Case L
Case L was a Belgian case of visa fraud and corruption from the 1990s, linked to money
laundering and human smuggling and trafficking. A Belgian civil servant employed in the
protocol service of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged the distribution of
diplomatic passports. He admitted to having sold at least 300 residence permits to people
associated with the Russian mafia and people known for espionage. Four Philippino girls
received illegal diplomatic passports. Three of them had jobs as domestic servants. One of the
accomplices in this case was an important figure in a large Russian company. The case file
contained information from INTERPOL that the company was laundering dirty money. Five
diplomatic passports were given to this company illegally. The Belgian civil servant was trailed
and convicted of forgery. 37
Case T
This case concerns a mala fide Bulgarian travel agency. From 1993, the agency was owned by
the family of a former senior Bulgarian intelligence official. In the mid-90s, the agency and a
Western embassy in Sofia established close relations. Until July 1996, official tourist visas were
delivered en masse to the travel agency. Then, one of the persons who applied for a tourist visa
via the agency had the application denied and, shortly after, was convicted for sexually
exploiting women. Another person, who also acquired a visa via the agency, was mentioned in a
case on Kurdish PKK child soldiers and the smuggling of weapons. A third person appearing on
the visa listings participated in the international trafficking of stolen cars. In an informal talk with
an official of the security services of the concerned Western country, the official stated that the
Bulgarian travel agency in addition to smuggling/trafficking and issuing of visas illegally
was laundering money. In 1997, when the police started investigating, the agency changed its
name. In 2000 it was declared bankrupt. 38
35
CEOOR, 2005 Annual Report on Human Trafficking, 8889.
36
Internal Police News, German Diplomat Arrested for Espionage in Kosovo, March 19, 2009,
personal communication.
37
Based on a Belgian court file. See Johan Leman, Human Trafficking: Case Studies, (NATO
Workshop, Sofia, November 1618, 2007).
38
Leman, Human Trafficking: Case Studies. The author argues that this was not an isolated case.
181
One problem of police corruption is that it creates distrust in the state. As a

result, people are unwilling to report trafficking incidents to the authorities.
Box 6: Gaining Trust in Authorities
In the case V, the Belgian police in collaboration with a victim shelter managed to gain the trust
of several sexually exploited trafficking victims from Romania. When the police asked the
victims why they did not file a complaint against their exploiters earlier, the victims said they
were afraid of the consequences. They did not know if they could trust the Belgian police
because the Romanian police are very corrupt. The victims noted that if they knew that their
problems could be solved without too much suffering (by the Belgian victim protection system
and the correct attitude of the police) they would have contacted the Belgian police earlier. The
victims claimed that the Romanian traffickers had strong links with Romanian political figures
and policemen and often prepared sex parties for them. 39
Anti-corruption policies cannot be reduced to a scapegoat approach where

corruption issues are solved by removing only peripheral criminal actors;40
all parties should be equally deterred. Some authors have argued that
conviction rates could be increased along with penalties by setting up an
international inspectorate, rather like the UN weapons inspectors, with the
power to assist local police forces and to monitor judicial prosecutions. Such
inspectorates could also monitor corruption cases. Besim Klemendi, the Head
of the Anti-Corruption Agency in Kosovo and Deputy Prosecutor, however,
argues:
It is not so simple. It is not only the Kosovo police involved in trafficking and
corruptionmany UN officials are also part of the game. Particularly people
coming from Africa they have more problems with corruption than we do
here they make profitable business. When we submit criminal files on
trafficking, corruption or other incidents to UNMIK [United Nations Interim
Administration in Kosovo]which also involve some of their employees
they never deal with them. Such cases are never prosecuted.41
All people must be treated equally before the law. Governments should not
prosecute only members of opposing parties. Western countries and IOs should
not hide incidents of corruption linked to their own nationals and/or employees
39
Ibid.
40
European Commission, Directorate-General Justice Freedom and Security, Report of the Experts Group
on Trafficking in Human Beings (Brussels: EC, December 22, 2004).
41
Personal interview, Prishtina, July 2006. These statements do not necessarily reflect the true situation in
Kosovo, but may be intended to deflect criticism off Kosovan traffickers. See Arsovska, Decline,
Change or Denial..
182
(Box 5). At the prevention phase it is crucial to promote transparency, vetting

on the basis of audits, the appointment of officials to act as ombudsmen and the
creation of an open multi-level organisational culture.42 In SEE countries, for
example, dealing with corruption may require a change of police mentality
which can not be achieved overnight. Promoting local ownership and raising
awareness of corruption among policemen and the public are some of the first
steps towards effective prevention. Mapping sectors vulnerable to traffickingrelated corruption (such as travel agencies, transport companies, border guard
agencies, and consular and immigration offices) is another good starting point
for police investigations.
Check List
At the prevention phase the police should:
Contribute towards the collection and analysis of reliable, up-to-date data and research on human
trafficking.
Make extensive use of existing research on human trafficking, find hot spots of trafficking, help
in the identification of risk populations, and act proactively.
Avoid unsubstantiated generalisations and discriminatory policing tactics. Be well-aware of the
limits of criminal profiling and stereotyping.
Strengthen cooperation with border control agencies as well as immigration and labour control
officers by, among other things, establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication.
Enhance cooperation between police and other concerned parties in checking the validity and
legality of travel and identity documents.
Actively participate, in collaboration with civil society representatives, in awareness campaigns,
helping potential victims to obtain knowledge about the operational methods of traffickers as
well as about their own rights and options.
Support community-led policing and community vigilance committees that would monitor the
local sex trade for evidence of trafficking.
Get involved in relevant social activities outside the scope of police work in order to improve the
image of the police, gain trust among potential victims and build confidence in people. For this,
governments should change policing priorities.
Avoid double standards with regards to victim assistance, protection, treatment of offenders, and
corruption, as well as promote transparency.
Treat corruption as a complex multi-level process. Provide incentives to law enforcement
officials, encouraging them to report on cases of corruption.
42
183
4. Protection
4.1. Victim Identification and Referral Systems
For law enforcement responses to be effective, they must take into
consideration a wide range of issues. The detection and identification of
potential or actual victims is the first step towards helping victims and
prosecuting traffickers. Many investigations start with a declaration of a victim
to the police (Boxes 7 and 12). Then, the police initiate a reactive, victim-led
investigation to rescue the victims and to arrest the traffickers. In the case of
P (Box 7), due to the victims collaboration, the police were able to obtain
information about the trafficking network. The police managed to gain the
victims trust by providing them with translators, assistance with formalities
and protection, and referring them to a shelter. They also noticed that, on three
occasions, the traffickers tried to influence the Chinese interpreters involved in
the case. Some of the victims were civil parties in the trial, receiving financial
compensation of 2,500 EUR per person. The initial victims declaration,
however, was not the same as the one given six months later. Fortunately, the
police also investigated proactively, not relying solely on the victims
statements, which resulted in a successful conviction.
Box 7: Successful Victim-Led Investigation
The case P is about the recruitment, transport and exploitation of Chinese victims forced to pay
(debt bondage) Chinese Triad groups for their illegal transportation to Western Europe. The
investigation began when a victim approached the police in Liege, Belgium, providing
information on the Triads. His family had sold their house to pay for the trip, but the money was
not enough. To pay off his remaining debt of 12,500 EUR, he had to work three more years for
free in a Chinese restaurant in Belgium. The magistrate of Liege sent the information to Bruges
where the restaurant P was located. The police in Bruges found that back in 1996, they had
intercepted several illegal workers in the same restaurant. The police then traced twenty-four
bank accounts across three banks, and also located five houses belonging to the Chinese
exploiters. In the restaurant, the police intercepted other victims who also spoke out. Looking at
the files, the police realised they were dealing with a well-structured criminal organisation that
used mala fide firms as a cover-up and that had been active in the Schengen area for several
years. 43
In many other cases, victims do not dare to file a complaint against their
exploiters. The police must therefore identify them. But victims often stay
43
Based on a Belgian court file. Elements of this case are described in CEOOR, 2006 Annual Report on
Human Trafficking.
184
underground due to their illegal status, and many are traumatised.44 They
tend to blame themselves for what has happened to them, which can stop them
from seeking help. Moreover, systematic isolation makes them dependent on
the traffickers. In some cases, they do not consider themselves victims at all
and refuse to provide information. They may also distrust authorities. Studies
show that only a minority of victims are identified by law enforcement.
Victims often have some contact with law enforcement representatives who fail
to understand the situation and take appropriate action.45 Thus, there is a high
risk of categorising trafficking victims as illegal immigrants and repatriating
them to their country of origin (Box 8).
Box 8: Problems With Identifying Victims
The T case is about four trafficked women. When intercepted in a Belgian prostitution bar, three
of them said they were victims of trafficking, and were taken to a police prison. There, they had
to spend one night together with their exploiter, also arrested by the police. The next day the
police brought the victims to a closed asylum center. The file administrator was absent and the
police were told that all of the women were to be repatriated. The police contacted the file
administrator personally, and the planned repatriation was stopped. The police then brought the
women to a victim shelter.46
The identification of victims can be broken down into several stages: (1) initial
identification to assess if indicators of human trafficking are present;47 (2)
enquiries to corroborate these indicators; (3) further action, such as offering
victims access to recovery and support services; and (4) active review of the
action to further corroborate the indicators or to assess if additional trafficking
indicators are present.48 Thus, once potential victims are identified they should
be offered safe housing, medical, psychological and legal assistance, and other
benefits. When the first contact is made by the investigating authority, the
potential victim must be informed of the possibility of receiving support by an
44
See Cathy Zimmerman et al., Stolen Smiles: A Summary Report on the Physical and Psychological
Health Consequences of Women and Adolescents Trafficked in Europe (London: London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2006).
45
OSCE, Successful Prosecution of Human TraffickingChallenges and Good Practices, (conference

proceedings, Helsinki, September 1011, 2008).
46
Based on a Belgian court File. See CEOOR, 2007 Annual Report on Human Trafficking.
47
Indicators are signs that suggest the possibility of human trafficking and can be discovered through
events associated with the criminal activity, statements from the victim or signs of harm associated with
trafficking. Some indicators are obvious, while others are not.
48
See UN.GIFT, Criminal Justice Responses to Human Trafficking (UNODC working paper, The Vienna
Forum to Fight Human Trafficking, February 1315, 2008), http://www.unodc.org/documents/humantrafficking/Marika-Misc/BP006CriminalJusticeResponses.pdf (accessed June 16, 2009).
185
independent counselling service.49 Establishing a referral system to guide

victims towards assistance and guarantee them a minimum period to recuperate
is essential (Box 9). A rescuer must know how to refer victims to experts for
support. The police should ensure that they do not re-victimise trafficked
persons, for example through improper interview techniques.
Box 9: Optimal Referral Systems
This file concerns an international prostitution network composed of a Belgian manager,
Albanian and Turkish pimps, Nigerian pimps (madams), Turkish and Belgian bodyguards as
well as Italian prostitution bar owners. In one year, the police intercepted more than one hundred
women working as prostitutes, many of whom were trafficking victims. The police guided the
women to a specialised reception centre. They hoped that if the women were in a safe
environment and given proper assistance, they would reveal more information about the
prostitution network. During the hearing, some of them stated that they were not victims of
trafficking. Despite this, the police gave them a multilingual brochure on human trafficking. The
police ensured that social workers from the reception centre were on hand to talk privately to the
victims and to explain the meaning of trafficking status in a friendly environment. The social
workers gave their contact details to each victim to make further contact possible. The case
resulted in the successful prosecution of the pimps and traffickers. 50
Smooth cooperation is often difficult to achieve. During the identification

process, there may be conflicts of interest. For instance, while police focus on
arresting and prosecuting criminal suspects, NGOs are more likely to have the
best interest of the victim/s as their primary objective. Another potential
conflict of interest is between the police investigators and immigration
authorities. Immigration officers will often have deportation of persons residing
illegally in a country as their priority response, whereas law enforcement will
more likely recognise the value of the victim to the criminal investigation.
Moreover, not all victims are treated the same. In some cases, the police
immediately sends the presumed victim to a reception centre. In other cases,
trafficked persons are considered illegal immigrants and treated accordingly.
Also, whether a victim is sent to a reception centre may depend on the quantity
and quality of the information he/she provides. In one human trafficking case
from Italy and one from Belgium, the police told the victims that they could
help only if the persons said they were victims of trafficking. When the victims
reacted negatively, the police chose not to call upon an interpreter and not to
49
50
Based on a Belgian court file. Elements are described in CEOOR, 2007 Annual Report on Human
Trafficking.
186
inform the reception centre. Furthermore, there is sometimes a difference in the

treatment of victims of sexual exploitation and of labour exploitation often
labelled undeclared work. In a 2005 survey by the OSCE, only half of the
responding countries recognised trafficking for labour exploitation as one of
the main forms of trafficking in their jurisdictions. Labour trafficking remains
an invisible problem (Box 10).51
Box 10: Identification of Victims in Atypical Sectors
In the transport sector, victim identification is a challenge. During a road check in Brussels, the
police obtained the odometer of a Polish driver, who admitted carrying out undeclared work.
Being unable to pay the 2,500 EUR fine, he was taken to a police station. He was working
without a work permit or a contract. According to the instructions of his boss, the odometer
records had to be cleared after every journey. He drove 1,900 km without taking breaks and slept
four hours a night. He earned 40 EUR a day, and often stayed in his lorry for seven weeks. His
boss had given him a mobile phone, so that he was always available. He was never asked if he
had taken any breaks. The driver was afraid of talking to the police, assuming there was a danger
of reprisals and that it was not possible to arrest his boss because the main office of his transport
company was in Germany. The traffic police contacted the Belgian Federal Police to ask what
they should do with the victim. The Federal Police advised them to contact the reference
magistrate for human trafficking in Brussels, who, after being shown the facts, asked the police
to contact the labour auditor. The labour auditor sent the police to the public prosecutors office
of the district in which the suspect was living. The public prosecutor ordered the odometer to be
seized. He promised to contact the labour auditor and confirmed that the vehicle would be given
back to the driver after the fine was paid. Nothing was done for the victim and no further
investigation was initiated.52
Victims from atypical sectors are often treated as illegal immigrants or illegal
workers. They are held in detention centres with a view to being repatriated.
One of the reasons for putting a foreigner in a detention centre is the suspicion
of undeclared work. It appears that in many European detention centres, no
51
Ibid.
52
Similar situations can be observed in the horticultural industry, where Romanian victims were not
considered as victims and the majority were repatriated. See CEOOR, 2006 Annual Report on Human
Trafficking, 4647. Also in November 2008 a case of human trafficking for purposes of economic
exploitation involving members of the royal family of Abu Dhabi came to light in Brussels. The widow
of a sheik and her family had rented out an entire floor of the Conrad Hotel in the Belgian capital for a
period of eight months. The family employed 17 service girls. However, these girls were treated as
slaves rather than as employees. They had to be available day and night, were paid a very low wage and
many of them were forced to sleep in the hallway. Moreover, their passports and identification
documents were taken from them to prevent them from escaping no author, Sjeikas ontlopen
wellicht straf, De Standaard July 29, 2008; no author, Payoke biedt slavinnen uit Brusselse
Conradhotel onderdak, De Standaard, November 8, 2008.
187
systematic screening is carried out to detect potential victims.53 Consequently,

detection often depends on the awareness of social workers and the philosophy
of the detention centre. A major challenge in labour exploitation cases is
understanding the difference between sub-standard working conditions and
forced labour. The ILO highlights six elements of a forced labour situation:54
(1) physical or sexual violence and/or threats; (2) restriction of movement of
the worker; (3) debt bondage; (4) withholding or refusal of wages; (5) retention
of passports and identity documents; and (5) threat of informing the authorities.
Reasons for the low number of prosecutions regarding labour trafficking
include: (1) not all states have criminalised labour trafficking; (2) cases are not
identified because victims stay underground; (3) law enforcement agencies
and labour inspectors are not familiar with relevant indicators of exploitation;
(4) authorities focus on the immigration status of the individual rather than on
conditions of exploitation; and (5) there are evidential difficulties in
establishing the standard of proof required.
4.2. Reflection Periods
If a victim is identified, a period of reflection should be offered to him or her
regardless of the immigration status. A reflection period allows victims to
remain in the destination or transit country to recover from their trafficking
ordeal and to make an informed decision on whether or not to cooperate with
police. This can enhance the victims ability to testify, as evidence given by
victims who are traumatised may be unreliable.55 However, many European
countries do not systematically offer reflection periods.56 Instead, the status of
victims is mostly determined during the first police hearing. Victims are either
immediately deported to their country of origin or receive the status of
trafficked persons. Reflection periods are particularly vital when criminal
organisations are involved and victims are scared to make a statement.57
Moreover, many victims distrust the police, do not want to expose their
contribution to illegal activity, and therefore say that they have not been
trafficked. Building trust is therefore essential. During the reflection period,
victims should be protected and assisted.
53
OSCE, Successful Prosecution of Human Trafficking Challenges and Good Practices.
54
International Labour Organization, Tools for PreventionParticipatory Monitoring: Guidelines for

Practitioners in the Fight against Human Trafficking (Geneva: ILO, 2005).
55
56
CEOOR, 2007 Annual Report on Human Trafficking.
57
188
Box 11: Positive Impact of Reflection Periods

In 20042005 trafficking networks brought girls from Romania to Belgium, where they were
exploited in street prostitution or forced into begging. Initially, the victims showed no interest in
the Belgian system for victims of trafficking, and presented the police with fabricated stories. But
then they spoke out, and the police put the victims in contact with shelters for a reflection period.
Social workers, assisting the victims, tried to win their trust. In the end, the victims were a civil
party in this case, and some even testified against the suspects. The criminal clan offered 1,000
EUR to the victims to withdraw their complaints. When this did not work, the victims received
threatening mobile phone messages.58
4.3. Interview Techniques

The purpose of an interview is to establish the facts of the case, to use the facts
to corroborate the victims story and establish his/her credibility, to use the
evidence to identify, arrest and prosecute the traffickers, and to continually
assess the risk to the victim and those associated with the victim.59 Without a
statement from a victim, law enforcement authorities are often left without a
case. Effective interview techniques are, therefore, vital. The needs, safety and
well-being of the victim should be a priority at all times. Trafficked victims are
vulnerable and they should be interviewed in a sensitive manner, ideally by a
trained interviewer.60
Strategic level planning includes the availability and use of resources and staff
and their abilities to interview, recording equipment and the possible need for
translators. Tactical level planning concerns the management and conduct of
the interview. Before conducting the interview, investigators should find out
about the age of the victim, the language, and the country of origin, including
culture and state of development. Risk assessments must ensure the safety of
the victim. If victims are protected, they are more likely to trust the
investigating officers. It is ideal to have two interviewers. One should pose
questions, whilst the other should take notes. Ideally, law enforcement officials
who are specialists in interviewing vulnerable persons should be employed to
interview trafficked victims. The gender of the interviewer matters, too.61
58
Based on a Belgian court file.
59
UN.GIFT, Criminal Justice Responses to Human Trafficking. See also UNODC, Toolkit to Combat
Trafficking in Persons, Chapter 6.
60
UN.GIFT, Criminal Justice Responses to Human Trafficking. See also Barbara Mitchels, Lets Talk:
Developing Effective Communication with Child Victims of Abuse and Human Trafficking (New York:
UNICEF and UNMIK, 2004).
61
Whilst we are not aware of any direct evidence that the gender of an interviewer guarantees better
interview outcomes, some countries have specific legislation requiring female vulnerable witnesses to
be interviewed by female officers. Some scholars have recommended that only women interview girls
189
Translators also have an important role. They must be reliable and unbiased.
Translators are often better able to win the trust of the victim if they have the
same ethnic and cultural background.
4.4. Protection of Victims and Witnesses
Methods used by traffickers to control victims include confiscating travel
documents, isolation and debt bondage, and convincing victims that the police
will arrest and maltreat them if they are identified. Sexual abuse, physical
violence, and threats are also frequent, particularly in cases of sexual
exploitation. Thus, in addition to the detection of victims, the role of the police
in providing protection to trafficking victims, witnesses and their families is
vital. Measures include court security, police escorts, keeping the victim
informed of the status of the legal proceedings, and counselling. More complex
measures include identity protection, secure housing, confidentiality and, in
exceptional cases, relocation to another country.62 Importantly, the duty of law
enforcement officers to protect should not end with the conclusion of a trial.
To be able to protect victims on a continuous basis there is a need for a system
that grants permanent residence to victims, so they are not obliged to go back
to their country of origin where they might be in danger. In the Belgian system,
victims are given residence permits if they satisfy three requirements: break all
contact with the presumed perpetrators of their exploitation, be supported by a
specialised reception centre and, within the forty-five day period of reflection,
make statements or file a complaint against their exploiter. This system,
however, has several disadvantages: victims not interested in assistance lose
their victim status, and only victims who benefit from their trafficking status
have the right to various forms of aid (Box 12).
Box 12: Protecting Vulnerable Victims
Case A
Statements of several trafficking victims revealed the existence of a trafficking network active in
the Netherlands, Belgium and Bulgaria. The victims were forced to give their money to the
exploiters and were sexually and physically abused on a regular basis. Moreover, violence and
death threats were used against their families in Bulgaria. A family member of one of the victims
suspected of having been trafficked for sexual purposes. However, some victims may relate better to
members of the opposite sex. Victims should be given the choice to be interviewed by a man or a
woman.
62
190
was heavily injured and had to be hospitalised, when his sister, a prostitution victim, escaped
from the criminals. The victims were afraid to enter the protection system for trafficking victims
and to be civil parties at the trial. As a result of continuous threats, the victims stories changed
significantly during the trial. In the new testimonies, the victims spoke very positively of the
accused. The Court considered these new testimonies unreliable. According to the judge, the
testimonies pointed to the vulnerable position of the abused victims. The criminals were
sentenced to between five and seven years of prison.63
Case D
This file concerns Bulgarian and Romanian trafficking victims. The investigation started in 2005,
as a result of a statement from a Bulgarian victim who identified her exploiters. Several other
victims testified against the criminals, too. The offenders were considered to be extremely
dangerous, having murdered one prostitute in the past. The Bulgarian leader of the organisation,
D., offered 5,000 EUR for the murder of one victim who had spoken to the Belgian police. The
Bulgarian police informed the Belgian police via INTERPOL that the leader of the group was
planning to kill two victims. The Bulgarian police tried to locate the victims in order to protect
them. Eventually, they were found and put on a bus to Belgium, where their victim status was
confirmed and where they were brought to a shelter. However, the victims wanted to continue
their prostitution work on an independent basis. This was not compatible with the rules of the
Belgian protection system. The victims therefore had to leave the shelter and hide independently
from the criminal network.64
Before victims and witnesses decide to testify against their exploiters, the
police should inform them about the risks involved, since they can never be
fully eliminated. If victims decide to testify, in many European countries,
trafficking victims, like victims of other serious forms of crime, can benefit
from anonymity provisions.65 It is vital that in reports prepared by law
enforcement officials the names and addresses of victims and witnesses are not
openly listed. Unfortunately, victims names often appear in police and court
files. Also, in various sexual and labour exploitation cases,66 letters rogatory
were produced to hear witnesses who had already gone back to their home
countries. In such cases, law enforcement officials should provide full
protection to victims travelling to foreign countries in which the main
perpetrators reside.
63
64
65
In Europe, but also globally, complete anonymity is rarely granted to victims.
66
191
Box 13: Witness Protection Programmes

In 2005, a total of 851 requests were addressed via the Headquarters of the SECI Regional
Center in Romania, a total of 28 per cent of which concerned human trafficking and illegal
migration. The SECI Center has a unique witness protection programme. During 20042005,
from Moldova alone, eighteen trafficked persons were assisted through the programme and
travelled to Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro in order to testify. During the travel to the
countries where trials are taking place, victims receive special around-the-clock protection.
Protection is provided to victims even after their return, and Moldovan police are invited to
attend training courses in witness protection. Moldova is a small country with a small population,
making it difficult to provide people with new identities and addresses. Therefore, Moldova
negotiates with Romania and CIS countries to accommodate possible victims. One of the
challenges is financial support, however.67
There are incidents where corrupt police officials have collaborated with
traffickers, and, instead of helping victims, maltreated them. In other cases,
allegedly for tactical or political reasons, some law enforcement officials
have tolerated acts of exploitation, coercion, and violence. Journalist Ruth
Hopkins writes:
In the Netherlands, the so-called abolition of the brothel ban in 2000 was
intended to decriminalise prostitution. Nevertheless, women trafficking is a
booming business in the Wallen. Vice squad inspectors from the local police
station, Beursstraat, complain that nothing is being done about it. The police,
bound by performance contracts, may only hassle the people traffickers by
fining them for petty crime. We can no longer cope with the daily
confrontation with women who are being raped and beaten up.68
In a conversation with the authors, a police officer from Western Europe

reports:
We see all that is happening on the ground. We know about illegal prostitution
and maltreatment of women in some closed Turkish cafs, but we are not
allowed to do anything to protect these victims. The hierarchy [senior officials
and politicians] does not allow us, because these crimes do not have high
social impact and are happening behind closed doors. The hierarchy do not
want that such information goes in the media, making the citizens feel
insecure. In other cases we tolerate the exploitation of women and we allow
illegal prostitution to go on, because the small-scale pimps are our informants.
They tell us about the big trafficking networks.
67
Council of Europe, Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 47.
68
Personal conversation with Ruth Hopkins. Quote based on the article Slavenhandel op de wallen?
Debalie.nl, October 1, 2005, www.debalie.nl/artikel.jsp?podiumid=digitale&articleid=44036 (accessed
May 26, 2009). Measures were taken against the notorious Turkish traffickers after the media exposure.
192
Such practices can have detrimental long-term effects on the work of the
police. Traffickers are well-aware that cutting links between victims and police
is crucial for their business. Sometimes they even send their accomplices,
dressed up as policemen, into the prostitution bars they control in order to have
sex with the victims. The police, in cooperation with civil society, should work
on building a better image and on gaining trust among victims.
4.5. Socio-Cultural Background
In order to protect trafficking victims, police officers should be familiarised
with socio-cultural factors affecting the attitudes of trafficked persons and used
by traffickers to silence their victims. Knowledge and intelligence on such
practices (e.g., voodoo rituals, revenge killings, honour codes, and machismo)
can help police solve cases.
Box 14: Nigerian Voodoo-Like Rituals
A Nigerian criminal group involved in human trafficking transported Nigerian girls to Belgium,
subcontracting them to local prostitution bars. The network threatened the victims and hired
criminals in Nigeria (who were paid 10,000 EUR per month) to use violence against the victims
families. Some houses in Nigeria were set on fire. A typical Nigerian modus operandi is the
voodoo-like ritual and the oaths associated with it, often using nails, blood and hair.69 This was
one of the tactics used by this group. Many Nigerian girls take an oath before leaving for
Western Europe. They or their families swear to pay off the travel costs to the traffickers. The
oath-takers are threatened by the criminals with divine retribution if they break their oaths. With
such voodoo-like practices, the victims believe that the criminals can make someone sick, crazy
or even die. In this way, the criminals control victims who prefer to stay in prostitution and pay
off their debts.70
There are also other cultural elements useful for understanding the mindset of
traffickers and victims. Men, particularly those from a culture with a traditional
view of masculinity, may not want to admit their victimisation because they
fear that their disclosure of losing control of their lives may lead to perceptions
of diminished masculinity. Trafficked women who suffer sexual abuse may be
reluctant to seek assistance because of the shame and stigmatisation that may
69
The term voodoo is often used to refer to religious rituals used in Southern Nigeria, but it is
inaccurate as the term refers specifically to particular religious practices in the Southern part of the
Republic of Benin and in Haiti. That is why we refer here to the practices as voodoo-like ritual oaths.
70
Based on Belgian court files. See no author, Spain Holds Voodoo Traffickers, BBC News, May 22,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/8063205.stm (accessed June 30, 2009).
193
follow. Cases indicate that women coming from regions with strong traditional
culture, such as Albania, are often afraid that their experiences will bring
shame upon their families, leading the families to renounce them as daughters,
wives or mothers.71 Trafficked and sexually exploited victims are also
sometimes married to their traffickers and pimps, and some do not dare go
against the wishes of their husbands. In some Albanian villages, once a woman
is married, her husband has the right to control her (Box 15).72
Box 15: Subordination of Women
The traditional cultural code, Kanun of Lek Dukagjini, makes the subordination of women
acceptable in many Albanian villages. The Kanun stipulates that a woman is a sack made to
endure and she is to be obedient to her husband. In the Ali case (19972002), the Albanian
victim Bruna was married to an Albanian pimp. In 1997, they left Albania and went to Belgium.
Ali asked his wife to prostitute herself in Antwerp. When the woman was repatriated to Albania
(after a police control), she did not go to her parents but went to live with the parents of her
husband. Ali injured his wife with a knife and threatened her with a pistol. The police also
reported that Bruna had burns on her arms. During the questioning, the police were shocked by
Brunas nervousness. She stated: I am the reason why the people you arrested are in prison now.
They are coming from the same village like me. I really dont want that my family has problems
because of me. Bruna wrote a letter to the judge stating that her husband had never forced her
into prostitution. Ali was convicted for trafficking of people for the purpose of prostitution
(1997) and for being part of a criminal organisation (19972002).73
Cultural traits such as honour, trust, modesty and gratefulness can be easily
exploited by traffickers, and create dependencies that are very difficult to break
(Box 16).
71
Jana Arsovska and Philippe Verduyn, Globalisation, Conduct Norms and Culture Conflict:
Perceptions of Violence and Crime in an Ethnic Albanian Context, British Journal of Criminology 48,
no. 2 (2008): 226246; Jana Arsovska, Understanding a Culture of Violence and Crime: The Kanun
of Lek Dukagjini and the Rise of the Albanian Sexual-Slavery Rackets, European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 14, no.2 (2006): 161184; Jana Arsovska and Mark Craig,
Honourable Behaviour and the Conceptualisation of Violence in Ethnic-based Organised Crime
Groups: An Examination of the Albanian Kanun and the Code of the Chinese Triads, Global Crime 7,
no.2 (2006): 214256.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
194
Box 16: Chinese Tradition

During one investigation involving Chinese victims of trafficking for labour exploitation, several
letters with victims promises were retrieved. The contents typify the power and control that the
criminal networks leader exercised over its victims. One of the letters stated: Proof of promise:
I (a, b, c) am family of X and Y. I feel myself honoured, privileged and very grateful to X who
although very busy has chosen me from so many family members to help me to go abroad. I will
remember this kind gesture forever. I will be always grateful to X and Y who have helped me to
get a better life and escape poverty. For this reason, I want pay a voluntary sum of 10,000 US
dollars as a thanks (the plane ticket and other costs included). I realise completely that with that
amount of money I cannot thank enough those two people. I promise here voluntarily, from the
bottom of my heart, that when I am abroad, I will always listen to X and Y. If I must work in the
restaurant or assist the family, I will work always hard and I will never complain. I will do that
on my own free will. I will do my work as good as possible and I will never be tired. I will never
say bad things about X and Y to a third person. I will remember their kind gesture and all my
future generations will be grateful as well. If I dont respect my word and do not do as I
promised, then my family will always live in unhappiness. All the consequences will be carried
out by me and my family. I confirm my promise solemnly! This is promised by (a, b, c).74
Check List
At the protection phase the police should:
Undergo specialised training to be able to identify indicators of human trafficking, to understand
situations which involve trafficking victims and to take appropriate action.
Undergo professional training in order to understand the difference between sub-standard
working conditions and forced labour. For this, police should cooperate with labour inspectors
and raise awareness about human trafficking among less specialised first-line police officials.
Refer potential or actual victims to protection or support services and establish contact with the
counselling service and the special police unit responsible for protection.
Cooperate with victim shelters, social workers, immigration officers and detention centers in
order to ensure that trafficking victims are not detained, accused, repatriated, re-victimised, or
stereotyped.
Develop standard working procedures to guarantee the physical safety of victims, protect their
privacy and make it safe for them to testify against their abusers.
Establish terms of reference between organisations involved in human trafficking cases and
establish distinctive roles for each organisation in order to overcome conflicts of interests.
Have two interviewers in a trafficking investigation and ask victims whether they prefer male or
female interviewers. Ideally, law enforcement officials who are trained in interviewing
vulnerable persons should interview trafficked victims.
Inform trafficking victims about the risks of testifying against traffickers.
Do not list the names and addresses of victims and witnesses in police/court reports. The privacy
74
195
and identity of trafficked persons should be protected.

Ensure special protection when victims and witnesses travel to countries where traffickers reside
and where trials take place.
Do not tolerate the existence of any inhumane practices due to political agendas, and cooperate
with the media and victim shelters to expose such injustices.
Be familiar with the socio-cultural practices of the key criminal groups operating in their regions.
This can help in better understanding criminal networks and the needs of victims.
5. Prosecution
5.1. Implementation of Laws
To successfully fight human trafficking, laws must be implemented. Many laws
reflecting Western values have been imposed on post-communist societies.
While governments have been ratifying Western laws and international
conventions to become members of the EU and NATO, many citizens have not
internalised the democratic values promoted by these laws.75 Also,
governments (post-communist or not), have implemented laws only
sporadically.
In transitional and developing countries there is also no institutional capacity to
deal with the complex issues covered by some international laws. For example,
according to police sources, the Bulgarian legal system is structurally incapable
of effectively dealing with organised crime cases, many of which relate to
human trafficking.76 Judges have imposed time limits of several months, within
which an enquiry must be terminated. Such limits may be prolonged in the case
of serious crime. Human trafficking falls outside this category because it is not
considered a serious crime under Bulgarian law. If important witnesses are not
present at the trial because they have disappeared, defendants are acquitted.77
75
Marta Valinas and Jana Arsovska, Possibilities and Limits for Restorative Justice in the Kosovo
Case, in Restoring Justice after Large-scale Violent Conflicts: Kosovo, Congo and the IsraeliPalestinian Case, ed. I. Aertsen, et al. (Willan Publishing, 2008), 183212; Jana Arsovska and Philippe
Verduyn, Globalisation, Conduct Norms and Culture Conflict, 227.
76
The European Commission has deplored the lack of results in this country as regards the fight against
high-level corruption and organised crime.
77
Based on personal interviews with magistrates and police. Aspects are mentioned in CEOOR, 2007
Annual Report on Human Trafficking.
196
Box 17: Lack of Effective Implementation of Laws

Case D
In case D, the Bulgarian justice system refused to extradite the leader of a criminal prostitution
network operating in Belgium. When the Belgian authorities asked for Ds extradition, the
Bulgarian authorities started their own investigation, arguing non bis in idem (a suspect can
never be condemned twice for the same facts). The suspect was tried in Bulgaria and sent to
prison for a few weeks. When his lawyer told the authorities that D suffered from epilepsy, the
Bulgarian authorities set him free for medical reasons and granted him house arrest. According to
a victim, the accused provided services to policemen, magistrates and judges, organising sex
parties in Varna, Bulgaria. The victim stated: He has many contacts with Bulgarian policemen
who inform him about everything. He is not afraid of the Bulgarian police or the judicial
authorities. He fears, however, the Belgian police.
Case L
According to police sources, in 20022003 the number of trafficked women in Macedonia was
extremely high. One of the most important cases involved the notorious kingpin of the Balkan
sex-trade, D.B.L, an ethnic Albanian who kept more than 120 Moldovan women as sex-slaves in
brothels located in a village in western Macedonia. Local sources pointed out that many
international and local policemen, as well as politicians, visited the brothels. Under enormous
international pressure, in February 2003, D.B.L. was arrested in Macedonia. He escaped in June
2003, but a few months later he was apprehended in Montenegro. Charged only for Mediation
in Prostitution, he was released in April 2007. According to media reports, the judge
inappropriately handled a number of indictments against the trafficker. The public also criticized
the promotion of another Macedonian judge who had order the release of D.B.L. due to
effective repentance.78
5.2. Intelligence-Led Investigation Techniques

Trafficking networks have become more complex. Some have developed
professional structures, keeping low profiles and using legal companies as a
front for their illegal activities. In recent years, in Europe and beyond, sexual
services have been on offer illegally outside traditional sex establishments,
often in Turkish cafes, (Chinese and Thai) massage salons, (gay) saunas,
couples clubs and (Chinese) hairdressers. Sexual services are also offered for
payment via the Internet.79 The victims receive part of the money, much more
78
Internal police reports (2005). See interview by Sam Vaknin, Human Trafficking in Kosovo and
Macedonia, Los Angeles Chronicle, November 20, 2008,
www.losangeleschronicle.com/articles/85731 and www.globalpolitician.com/25338-human-traffickingprostitution-macedonia-kosovo (accessed May 26, 2009).
79
Internet prostitution appears to be on the increase. There are signs that escorts are using the Internet for
advertising and to mediate between client and prostitute, and that dating sites are used as fronts for
prostitution. It also seems that young male prostitutes work via the Internet, and that clients are
resorting to webcam sex. See Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen et al., Trafficking in Human Beings: Fifth
Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur (The Hague: Bureau NRM, 2007).
197
than in the past. This reflects organisational learning, i.e., the process by which
mismatches are identified and corrected.80 By giving more money to trafficked
persons, criminal groups reduce the risk of victims cooperating with the police.
Therefore, police officials, when possible, should not rely only on victims
statements but must be proactive, basing their investigations on solid
intelligence. In many cases, and when authorised by law, an enquiry may begin
with a combination of human and technical surveillance, undercover
deployments and standard investigative techniques. Law-enforcement
strategies should reflect the geographical, structural and commercial
components of human trafficking. The geographical and structural components
include: (1) State of origin (recruitment and export); (2) State of transit
(transportation); and (3) State of destination (reception and exploitation). The
commercial characteristics mean that, during the trafficking process, the
traffickers are bound to get involved in some of the following activities: (1)
Advertising (recruitment or exploitation); (2) Renting of premises (safe-houses,
brothels, factories, etc.); (3) Transportation (obtaining identity documents and
arranging transit); (4) Communications (recruitment and exploitation); (5)
Financial transactions. Evidence can be collected at any one of these stages.
Traffickers, for example, often use ordinary methods of commerce for the
activities in support of their crimes. The Achilles heel of traffickers lies in
the evidence generated as result of commercial processes. Thus, an
investigation may start by looking at ads for massage parlours. Other
investigative methods, such as analysis of trash and correspondence, and
reviews of wire transfer records, can also reveal pertinent information.
Investigators should aim at touching the criminal groups where it hurts the
most: their finances. Criminal profits and other assets should be traced, seized
and confiscated.
In general, proactive operations are encouraged because they allow the
investigators to agree in advance on the overall strategy best suited for tackling
a criminal network. This includes: agreement as to where the main
investigative focus should be, the tactics employed to collect evidence, the
offences being targeted and the best location for instituting the prosecution.
80
Michael Kenney, When Criminals Out-smart the State: Understanding the Learning Capacity of
Colombian Drug Trafficking Organizations, Transnational Organized Crime 5, no.1 (1999): 97119.
198
Box 18: Proactive Investigation Approaches

The investigation in this case (20052007) started with a declaration by a victim. The police then
discovered various advertisements used by Chinese traffickers to recruit girls in China. Searching
the massage salon where the victim worked, the police discovered that it was a brothel and
identified two other victims. The victims and all other suspects were questioned through a
Chinese translator. Besides thoroughly searching the salon, the police, together with immigration
officials, also investigated the identity documents of the suspects and the victims. Subsequently,
the victims identified the suspects in a line-up through a one way-mirror. The police questioned
all possible witnesses and analysed the mobile phone records of the suspects. Some of the
persons whose contact details were found in the mobile phones were questioned, too. The police
also started financial investigations, looking into the money transfers and the bank accounts of
the suspects. The financial investigation showed that the massage salon had been the object of
another money laundering investigation, and that a bank account with 17,000 EUR belonging to
the suspects had been blocked. The financial investigation led to the confiscation of 60,000 EUR.
Four victims found by the police entered the protection system, claiming trafficking victim
status and presenting as civil parties during the trial. All suspects were successfully prosecuted
and convicted.81
Intelligence-led investigation techniques are important (Box 18). Evidence

based on solid intelligence and diverse sources produces better results in the
long term because, among other things, it leads to the conviction and arrest of
large criminal networks, not only of individual traffickers. A law enforcement
official reports:
The Nigerian file started on the basis of a proactive investigative project. The
goal was to make a detailed analysis of the entire criminal network. We used
financial analysis to detect the flow of the money as well as the role of each
suspect. We analysed the advertisements that tried to attract Nigerian
prostitutes. We then started with phone-tapping. On the basis of the phonetaps, we could specify the different roles of the suspects in the criminal
network. Although I am aware that it is time-consuming to initiate
comprehensive proactive investigations, and [despite the fact that] for political
reasons police and magistrates often focus on quantity rather than on quality
of cases, this was an example of how successful a proactive intelligence
approach can be.
While not always implemented in practice, network analysis is essential for the
effective prosecution of criminal groups. Investigators should focus not only on
individual traffickers but also on the wider networks and their structural and
commercial elements (analysis of the role of travel agencies, transport firms,
night shops, restaurants, firms, etc.).
81
Based on a Belgian court file.
199
5.3. Electronic Surveillance

Electronic surveillance in the form of listening devices or the interception of
communication is a common method used by law enforcement agencies in
dismantling criminal groups. It is preferable where close-knit groups cannot be
penetrated by outsiders or where physical infiltration would represent
unacceptable risks for investigators. This method has proved to be very useful
in dismantling Albanian organised crime groups. Albanian prosecutor Olsjan
Cela argues:82
I dont know why people talk of a strict code of silence applied by Albanian
groups when many Albanian offenders are caught with the use of electronic
surveillance and phone-tapping. Albanian traffickers use their mobile phones
too much and they say everything over the phone. That is why they always get
caught. They should have learned so far that their phones are often intercepted
by police, but obviously many of these groups are not that sophisticated.
Phone-tapping is the best method to go against these groups.
Given its intrusiveness, electronic surveillance is generally subject to strict

judicial control to prevent abuse. Surveillance should always be conducted
carefully and creatively. Where investigators become aware through
surveillance that victims are being harmed, they are obliged to intervene.83
Box 19: Use of Special Investigative Techniques
Case C
This is a case about a criminal organisation engaged in human trafficking between Albania,
Western Europe, and the US. By using special investigative methods (surveillance, phonetapping, etc.) the police identified the Albanian citizen C. as the leader of the organisation. C.
covered his criminal activities under the pretence of the travel agency Go West. For months,
the apartments of the suspects were under surveillance. Above the apartment of C. the police
detected a laboratory with machines used to produce EU visas, American Green Cards, Italian
identity cards, and bank cards. The police seized 1,000 counterfeit passports, 200 Italian resident
cards, 50 identity cards and 450 Italian driving licenses. The Albanian police searched the travel
agency Go West and detected evidence related to illegal money transfers. Ten members of the
group, including C., were arrested, and links to criminals in foreign countries were established.84
82
Personal conversation, Workshop on Ethnic Albanian Organised Crime, Belgian Federal Police,
Brussels, October 23, 2008.
83
UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Chapter 5.
84
In the police action leading to the arrest of the group, nine teams were involved. Only the team leaders
knew about the objective of the operation. Information provided by Albanian Ministry of Interior.
200
5.4. Informants, Infiltration and Undercover Operations

Investigators are often required to work in unfamiliar settings and in
communities that distrust law enforcement authorities. Ethnic community
groups and immigrants rights NGOs can assist them in gaining access to
culturally insulated communities. Law enforcement agencies should seek only
the assistance of organisations with a proven record of assisting trafficking
victims and collaborating with investigating authorities. Sometimes law
enforcement officials can also make use of informants when they work in
unfamiliar settings. An informant is a person who provides information to the
police about a crime. He/she may be a member of the public, a victim of crime,
a criminal or a police officer.85
Networks are often large and traffickers may come into contact with a great
range of people; each one of them is a potential informant. Some informants
are able to provide information from the heart of a criminal organisation and
can be tasked to find specific information. The use of informants, however,
must be carried out in compliance with national laws. In recruiting and using
informants, consideration must be given to the safety of the informant and the
victims. Protection of the informants identity is essential, and the special
techniques used by police (like infiltration) should not be mentioned in the
juridical files accessible to all parties. In the Belgian case AN, the local
police wanted to arrest a pimp, but the federal police stopped the investigations
because the pimp was an informant.
Moreover, potential informants must be carefully screened. Consideration must
be given to the motives for providing information to police; some of those
motives may be unethical or prejudicial to the success of an operation. Thus,
using traffickers, pimps, and prostitution bars as a source of intelligence can be
complicated. Informants can be very manipulative, and they might try to
liquidate their criminal competitors by providing partial information to police.
As a consequence, a juridical file should not start only on the basis of an
informants statement.
Preparing undercover operations is more complex than the simple use of an
informant. Such operations may be used where it is possible for a law
enforcement agent or other person to infiltrate a criminal organisation to gather
85
Informants can be used to provide information about: (1) The structure and nature of the criminal
organisation; (2) Whether potential trafficking victims are at certain premises; (3) When victims are
being moved and where; (4) The money trail of trafficking in persons (how much money is being paid,
where is it being paid from and to, what is the money being used for?).
201
evidence. Undercover operations should only be carried out by trained staff.86

The purpose of undercover policing is to: (1) Determine the nature and extent
of criminal activities; (2) Identify the people involved; and (3) Obtain evidence
that allows offenders to be prosecuted. Once again, the safety of undercover
agents, as well as of victims and their families, should be a key principle in
planning undercover operations.
5.5. Investigation of Finances and Seizure of Assets
An effective campaign against crime requires measures to attack the core
features of the criminal businessthe cash flows (Box 20).
Box 20: A Profitable Business
In a Chinese Triad case, a victim had to pay 13,000 EUR to be transported from China to the
Netherlands. 10,000 EUR was provided as a down payment, while the remaining 3,000 EUR had
to be paid by the family when the victim found employment in Europe. Another Chinese victim
had to pay 22,000 EUR to be brought from China to the UK. Halfway through the trip she had to
provide half the sum. During a search of the homes of the Chinese snakeheads police officers
found a price list for services such as marriages of convenience (8,500 EUR).
A person from Nigeria forced into prostitution had to pay 60,000 EUR to buy her freedom. In a
case involving Thai nationals, where the victims were exploited as prostitutes in Belgian massage
parlours, a turnover of 34,676 EUR was made over a period of 202 days.
Payments in criminal networks are generally made in cash. Often, the money is
also transferred to other countries through Western Union money transfers
(Box 21). This method of payment is primarily used by immigrants anxious to
send money to their families back home or by the victims' families who are still
required to send money to the traffickers for their travel. Moreover, criminal
organisations cannot operate exclusively in a criminal environment, but partly
rely on legitimate or semi-legitimate companies. According to Europol, the
Mafia's widespread use of legal structures makes it difficult to discover a clear
line between what is legal and what is not, and to trace illegal money. For these
86
Staff should have training on: (1) The definition of trafficking in persons in the relevant jurisdiction; (2)
Other laws relevant to trafficking; (3) Defences which have been successfully used in relation to
trafficking; (4) Commercial purposes of trafficking (to help plan objectives for the operation); (5)
Mechanisms used by traffickers to control victims (so operatives understand that force or threats may
not always be present, that control mechanisms may change, and that a person may have been trafficked
even though they were only partially deceived). See UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in
Persons, Chapter 5.
202
reasons, law enforcement agents should frequently conduct proactive financial

and money laundering investigations.
Box 21: Financial and Money Laundering Investigations
This criminal network organised illegal transport of Bulgarian and other victims to Belgium, the
Netherlands and Spain. The court case states: From various declarations and a number of
observations, it appears that several members were active in the organisation, each with a
specific role. In order to be able to conduct their activities, use was made of commercial
structures, such as a bus company with the pretext of transporting tourists, and of financial
institutions for the transfer of money from prostitution to Bulgaria. The head of the network in
Bulgaria owned a chain of restaurants, several cafs, a pawn shop, and a taxi company. He
maintained good contacts with at least ten criminal organisations in Bulgaria, amongst them the
insurance companies VIS and SIC.
The financial investigation conducted by Belgian law enforcement officials showed links
between the commercial structures set up by this network and its leader residing in Bulgaria. The
police investigated the international money transfers with Western Union and the bank accounts
of the suspects. They also investigated the money transfers of the victims because the criminals
in Belgium used the victims names to transfer money to the criminals in Bulgaria.
The Belgian police made use of phone-tapping during the investigation. The phone-tapping
proved the criminal activities in Spain and gave information on the roles of the criminals within
the organisation. It also showed the connection between the arrested criminals in Belgium and
their counterparts in Bulgaria. The police discovered that the sister of the leader was also running
a prostitution network in France. Moreover, the police regularly controlled the Belgian bars
suspected of illegal prostitution and conducted several house, car and bus searches. An
investigation of forged documents was carried out, trash was collected from the suspects homes
and financial documents were analysed. The defendants were convicted by the Belgian Court for
belonging to a criminal organisation. By tracing money transfers, the police also managed to
convict the administrators of the travel agency involved in this trafficking case.87
It is also advisable to conduct proactive financial investigation both during the

pre-arrest investigative phase as well as in the post-arrest phase. According to
the UNODC Toolkit and in line with our findings,88 in the pre-arrest phase,
financial investigation is particularly valuable because:
1. The investigation of financial transactions often provides important
information to law enforcement. For example, investigation of the
purchase of travel tickets may reveal details of travel arrangements,
and credit card expenditure can reveal airlines, hotels, restaurants or
other venues frequented by traffickers.
87
Ibid.
88
UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Chapter 5.
203
2. Pre-arrest financial investigation can identify the amount and location

of criminal assets derived from the crime.
3. Evidence of financial gain supports prosecution, and that same
evidence forms the basis for post-conviction asset-confiscation
proceedings.
4. The ability of law enforcement agencies to identify and confiscate
assets sends a message to criminals that trafficking is not high
profit/low risk.
Regarding the last point, in recent years many Western countries have made
noticeable efforts in identifying and seizing the assets of traffickers. However,
sometimes asset seizure is dealt with separately from the main case. Also,
traffickers use techniques that make it difficult to identify their assets. When
financial transfers have occurred via banking organisations or Western Union,
they are much easier to identify than when they have occurred through the
Hawala system,89 the favoured informal money transfer system in India and
Pakistan, or through bus drivers, as is often the case with Bulgarian criminal
networks. When the funds are transferred via Western Union, the person
making the transfer and the recipient are recorded in a data file. However,
traffickers will frequently use fake names (aliases).
Check List
At the prosecution phase the police should:
Ensure that anti-trafficking laws are implemented and applied properly. Authorities should avoid
the use of double standards.
Not rely only on victims statement but be proactive, ensuring that strategies reflect the
geographical, structural and commercial components of the trafficking networks.
Start an enquiry when authorised under the law on the basis of a combination of solid
intelligence, human and technical surveillance, undercover deployments and standard
investigative techniques.
Not focus only on individual traffickers and isolated incidents but on wider criminal networks
(use of network analysis).
Focus on the Achilles heel of the traffickers, which often lies in the evidence generated as a
result of commercial processes (for example, advertising, renting property, transportation,
89
This system allows the transfer of money without any banking operations. The money is sent through a
third party who acts as the guarantor for transmission into the destination country, in exchange for a
small percentage.
204
communications and financial transactions).

Aim at hurting the criminal groups where it hurts the most: their finances. Some of the
confiscated money should be given to trafficking victims as financial compensation.
Make use of electronic surveillance in the form of listening devices or the interception of
communications, while bearing in mind that traffickers are often aware of surveillance
techniques.
Make use of civil society organisations experienced in working with law enforcement agencies
during investigations in culturally isolated and unfamiliar settings.
Make use of informants in compliance with national laws, and be familiar with any relevant
legislation in their own jurisdiction and abroad.
Consider the safety of the informant and any threat posed to victims of trafficking in using them.
Protection of the informants identity is essential.
Consider the informants motives for providing information to law enforcers since some of those
motives may be unethical or prejudicial.
Ensure that undercover operations are carried out by properly trained staff.
Make sure that proactive financial and money laundering investigations are performed both
during the pre-arrest and post-arrest investigative phase by trained law enforcement agents.
6. Patterns and Problems of International Police Cooperation

Since human trafficking often has transnational characteristics and involves
organised crime groups, international police cooperation is vital. One law
enforcement official stated:90
You have to fight networks with networks. Criminal groups exploit the lack of
cooperation between law enforcement agencies on both national and
international levels. In one case, two brothers (call them Sami and Zakim) are,
at present, the bosses of the criminal Albanian core in Verviers, also
established in the Mons city and the Hainaut province. This group is active in
multi-criminal activities including organised theft, trafficking of people,
prostitution, and so on. With little hierarchy, the structure seems to function
with easy efficacy according to its needs and activities. What is interesting is
that the members of this group were living in one city while operating in
others. This is a good tactic because in Belgium there is sometimes a lack of
cooperation between law enforcement agencies from different cities. So the
offenders pretended to be good citizens in Verviers while committing
various crimes in Brussels, Liege, etc. Similarly, some criminals have been
running prostitution rings in France and sending their madams to control the
prostitutes there, while they have been living in Belgium.
90
Personal communication, Francois F., Belgian Federal Police (September 2006).
205
Europol plays an important role in this respect. Europol is allowed to store and
analyse personal data through a computerised system that has two components:
the Europol Information System (EIS) and the Analysis Work Files (AWF).
The EIS database, shared with authorised users of all EU Member States,
supports the automatic detection of potential cross-border crimes. AWF
Phoenix concentrates on identifying particular structures from the traffickingrelated data.
INTERPOL maintains databases on known criminals, lost and stolen passports,
fingerprints and DNA profiles. Via a network of National Central Bureaus
(NCBs) it helps states to share information globally. In 2003, INTERPOL
established a global police communications system (I-24/7), connecting the
NCBs to each other and to INTERPOL databases. I-link is the new criminal
information management system being developed by INTERPOL to help
connect investigations. The Human Smuggling and Trafficking message (HST)
provides a standardised format for reporting cases of trafficking between
countries but officials say it has proven to be ineffective since only ten
messages have been exchanged so far. MIND/FIND technical solutions enable
frontline law enforcement officers to receive instant responses for queries on
stolen or lost travel documents, stolen motor vehicles and wanted criminals.
Box 22: Network Analysis and International Police Cooperation
Case Bluesky
The British operation Bluesky (20032005) was a co-coordinated response to the large-scale
smuggling of illegal immigrants into the Nexus point of London. British authorities targeted
known human smugglers within the Turkish and Kurdish communities.91 Intelligence indicated
that one Turkish network had facilitators, harbourers and lorry drivers in many countries. The
British officials informed the Belgian authorities about the presence of this smuggling
organisation on their territory. As a result, in October 2005, fourteen people were arrested in
Belgium; twelve of them were sentenced to a total of fifty-five years imprisonment for human
trafficking, criminal organisation, money laundering, weapons trafficking and falsifying
documents. They were also given a 400,000 EUR fine.
Case Wexford
The investigation started with a phone call to the Belgian police. A Turkish man reported that
some of the immigrants found suffocated in a truck in Ireland were his relatives. He explained
that the transport of the immigrants was organised by a person called D (a Turk who lived in the
UK), a man called M (a Turk who lived in France) and an unknown Albanian who lived in
Brussels. The police linked D to several smuggling cases from the Netherlands (operation Huif),
91
Although not properly investigated, there were indications that the Turkish smuggling network was also
a trafficking network. The Turkish smugglers had links with well-known Turkish pimps, and traffickers
often exploited the immigrants.
206
France and Belgium, and alerted other European authorities. By December 2001, police officials
from Belgium, Turkey, Germany, France, UK, the Netherlands, Europol and INTERPOL started
a joint investigation on this case. As a result, all suspects were condemned to prison sentences of
two to ten years. In Belgium, eight people were charged. The British authorities also linked D
with the famous Dover case, where fifty-eight Chinese victims were found suffocated in a truck
heading for Dover from the Netherlands in June 2000.92
Cooperation with Europol and INTERPOL, however, has often proven to be

complicated and bureaucratic. This can have harmful consequences for the
smooth running of some operations. In an interview, one law enforcement
official reported:
If I need some information from country A about case C, I will send an
official enquiry to Europol, although I am aware that it can take several
months until I get an official answer. Therefore, in the same time I will ask my
personal contacts in country A and I will get the required information almost
immediately. Probably after five or six months I will also hear something back
from Europol regarding the same enquiry. It is not an efficient system. It is
very time-consuming and sometimes we feel that it is more efficient to avoid
the bureaucracy. 93
Europol and INTERPOL, despite cooperation agreements and common

projects, are often seen as competitors. INTERPOL is much influenced by the
USA (which contributes most funding), leading Europe to rely on European
law enforcement bodies. Smooth law enforcement cooperation is also
hampered by the fact that sharing sensitive information with international
police organisations is sometimes perceived as quite a risky job.94 Some EU
officials have expressed concern in sending information to INTERPOL because
INTERPOL has 187 Member Countries, many of which are considered highrisk countries with regards to corruption and organised crime, giving rise to
fear that some information might come to rest in the wrong hands. Yet, many
of the cases that Europol officials are dealing with involve offenders from nonEU countries. For example, Albania is not a member of Europol. When it
comes to Albanian offenders in the EU, cooperation between Europol and
Albania is therefore not always smooth. Bilateral police cooperation is
sometimes more efficient than cooperation with large-scale organisations such
92
Both cases are based on Belgian court cases.
93
In a personal conversation with a EUROPOL official, S.H., the author was told that, nowadays,
EUROPOL responds more quickly to requests from member states and timing is much less of a concern
for law enforcement officials (May 18, 2009).
94
Based on interviews with law enforcement officials in Europe.
207
as Europol or INTERPOL. Human trafficking networks obviously benefit from

bureaucratic inertia and a lack of coordination.95
Another issue that serves the criminal interest is the lack of willingness of local
authorities to initiate investigations beyond their jurisdiction. Since police
authorities and prosecutors often need to present tangible figures to the public
and to their superiors, they care more about the quantity than about the quality
of investigated cases. This has serious long-term consequences for the work of
police agencies since only the small players are prosecuted while the key
figures go unpunished. The networks quickly re-build themselves and continue
to operate. Arresting and investigating only parts of criminal networks also
gives a distorted picture of what the notion human trafficking network means
in practice. For example, it is often stated that trafficking networks are
composed of three to five criminals. However, this only reflects the number of
arrested and prosecuted individuals. Careful network analysis illustrates that
these criminal networks are often composed of many more than five
individuals.
Box 23: Partial InvestigationsQuantity Instead of Quality
In one Belgian file dealing with a Turkish human trafficking network active in Belgium from
1995 to 2001, charges for human trafficking were made against two Turkish criminals, E. and C.
The two brothers owned a textile firm and six houses in Belgium, one of which was on Rue
Aerschot, the prostitution centre. In these houses, 120 asylum seekers were living for a number
of months/years, 104 of them ethnic Turks from Bulgaria. Each immigrant paid 125 EUR for a
room in the house of the traffickers, where living conditions were terrible. The traffickers also
exploited the immigrants economically. Both of the prosecuted traffickers received one-and-ahalf years imprisonment for human trafficking and a penalty of 100,000 EUR. The sentence was
light because the investigation focused more on the poor living conditions and less on the
trafficking itself. In order to avoid long trials, during which the criminals usually flee to their
countries of origin, the police tend to charge them for whatever they can prove most easily.
Although there have been indications that this network might have been active internationally, no
further investigation was conducted.
95
Personal interviews with law enforcement officials. See also Ludo Block, Combating Organised Crime
in Europe: Practicalities of Police Cooperation, Policing 2: no.1 (2008): 7481; Ludo Block,
Decentralisation Trends in EU Police Cooperation: Implications for Efficacy and Accountability,
(paper for the Third Challenge Training School on 'Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
in the EU: Which Future for EU's Third Pillar?' CEPS, Brussels, April 1314, 2007).
208
Recommendations
Investigate Effectively and Proactively
The complex nature of human trafficking necessitates preventative, holistic and
proactive police efforts based on solid intelligence analysis. Even though
victims statements play an important role, they are not the polices only means
of opening an enquiry. An enquiry might start with the combination of
surveillance, undercover operations, informants information, financial
investigations and standard investigative techniques. Police should take into
account the geographical, structural and commercial components of trafficking,
and pay attention to the trafficking network, instead of individual traffickers
alone. Evidence generated as a result of commercial processes (for example,
advertising, renting premises, transportation, communications and financial
transactions) is particularly valuable to the police. Moreover, investigations
should focus on the quality of investigations, not on short-term, politically
expedient gains such as arresting low-level suspects.
Step up Cooperation
Police work depends on regular interaction with other institutions. States
should strengthen cooperation between police officers and border control
agencies as well as between police officers and immigration and labour
inspectors by, among other things, establishing and maintaining direct channels
of communication. Issues of distrust, competition, political interference, and
red tape should be addressed in order to improve law enforcement cooperation.
Joint, international and proactive investigations have proven to be essential for
the effective fight against complex trafficking networks, since they allow
investigators to agree in advance on questions of overall strategy.
Protect Victims
Professional training of police on how to detect victims in high-risk and
atypical sectors is essential, too. Police, in cooperation with victim shelters,
social workers and detention centres, should ensure that victims are not
detained, accused, repatriated, and re-victimised. Since many victims exploited
within the EU are residents of their own or another EU country, increased
attention has to be given to factors other than immigration status. Continuous
dialogue and communication between the various partners is essential, as is
comprehensive training of less specialised first-line players. Reflection periods
allow victims to recover, to escape the influence of traffickers, and to be able to
testify against the traffickers. As part of the duty to protect, vulnerable and
209
traumatised victims should be interviewed in a sensitive manner by trained

interviewers. When planning interviews, police must consider issues such as
gender and the optimal number of interviewers.
Raise Awareness
Police, in collaboration with other state agencies and civil society
organisations, should participate in awareness campaigns, helping potential
victims to obtain knowledge about the operational methods of traffickers as
well as about their own rights. Involvement in social activities outside the
scope of police work can help police improve their image and be seen as
trustworthy. In turn, this can lead to information on trafficking cases.
Reduce Corruption
Reducing corruption requires a long-term, multi-faceted strategy that will
change policing mentalities. Changes in legislation and increases in salaries
may provide a good starting point. In many countries, however, corruption is
endemic, thus social and administrative control, implementation of laws,
educational programmes and community-led activities would help. External
inspection systems must be developed. Specialised anti-corruption police units
should be created. Also, a rotating system or social control mechanisms can
help to minimise the temptation for corruption. Moreover, law enforcement
agencies have to set up internal control systems and sanction any wrong-doing.
Other strategies are professional ethics training with an emphasis on
recognising conflicts of interest; strong whistleblower protection; and
administrative and security measures designed to increase transparency,
accountability and oversight.
Understand the Problems of Stereotyping
Finding hot spots of trafficking and identifying risk populations are important
preventive techniques. The police should, however, avoid stereotyping and
discriminatory policing, or at least, should be aware of the limitations of
criminal profiling. Trafficking networks are responsive to law enforcement
pressure. Therefore, generalisations and stereotyping can be misleading.
Understand Different Cultures
Police should be familiar with socio-cultural practices of the key groups
operating in their regions. This can help them to better understand the modus
210
operandi of the criminal networks and to better assist and protect victims of
trafficking.
Engage Civil Society
An effective law enforcement response depends on the participation of all
levels of society. The media, critical scholars, and NGOs are crucial for putting
pressure on authorities to start an investigation against traffickers. Also, more
thought should be placed on the idea of community vigilance committees
that would monitor the local sex trade for evidence of trafficking and help
victims rebuild their lives.
Implement Policies
Effective prosecution of human trafficking cases depends on the will of
political actors to implement relevant laws and regulations that control the
work of the police and other actors. Implementation hinges on the political
acknowledgment of the problem of trafficking.
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CHAPTER 6
Human Trafficking, Organised Crime &
Intelligence
Fred Schreier
Introduction
This chapter discusses the role of intelligence, intelligence services and
intelligence-led operations conducted by all agencies and organisations
mandated with fighting transnational organised crime (TOC) as crucial
components of efforts to counter crime and human trafficking. Because
intelligence is the prerequisite for all measures that aim at effective prevention,
disruption and suppression of TOC and human trafficking, this contribution (1)
explains what intelligence is. Part (2) shows why intelligence is important for
fighting TOC and human trafficking. Part (3) demonstrates the application of
intelligence to counter TOC, as well as the actual and possible contributions of
intelligence-led operations to the fight against human trafficking. Part (4)
explores the patterns and problems of intelligence cooperation. Part (5)
explores some of the implications of intelligence-led operations for democratic
control, supervision, oversight and accountability. Finally, key
recommendations are listed.
1. What is Intelligence?
Though definitions of intelligence abound, a universally accepted definition
remains elusive. The simplest of these is: information plus analysis equals
intelligence. This clarifies the distinction between collected information and
produced intelligence, namely: without analysis, there is no intelligence.
Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is produced after collected data
and information is evaluated and analysed.
At the national level, the purpose of intelligence is to inform government:
providing knowledge and understanding upon which national decisions can be
made. Intelligence produces that particular knowledge that a state must possess
213
regarding the strategic environment, other states and hostile non-state actors to
assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its
politicians, and the organisations and means for implementing security policy,
plan, decide and act in ignorance. Intelligence is production of unbiased
information about risks, dangers and threats to the national vision, the state and
the population, as well as chances and opportunities for the advancement of
national interests. The more accurate and timely the intelligence, the more it
will allow for limited resources to be applied efficiently towards national
security goals and policies.
Intelligence services exist to: (1) support the national decision-making and
policymaking process; (2) ensure early warning; (3) assist good governance;
(4) support national and international crisis management; (5) support national
defence and military operations; and (6) maintain and protect secrets. All
intelligence services have three basic functions: collection, analysis and
counterintelligence. Covert action, the more occasional fourth function, may be
performed by external intelligence services.
Collection is the bedrock of intelligence: the acquisition of data and
information that forms the basis for refined intelligence and knowledge
creation. Without collection, intelligence is little more than guesswork. The
collection process involves open and secret sources, that provide information
that is obtainable in no other way, as well as a number of secret technical
collection disciplines using a variety of methods and means.
Analysis is collation, evaluation and analysis of data and information of all
sources and their transformation into intelligence products. Analyses reflect the
perspicacity of the human mind. No amount of data and information can
substitute for an insightful analyst able to discern the critical policy or
operational significance of an event, action or trend which may be hidden
within a mass of confusing and contradictory information. Analysis and
appraisal occur at all levels of intelligence and can be single source, multisource, or all-source. Assessment is the final step in the analytical process, and
strategic assessment is the final all-source intelligence product of actionable
knowledge provided to government to anticipate risks and reduce uncertainty in
its pursuit of furthering or protecting national political, economic and security
objectives. While analysts must prove their capability to connect the dots, the
overarching goal of analysis is to minimise uncertainty with which
policymakers must grapple in making decisions about national security and
foreign policy. Furthermore, analysis must help to make sense of complex
issues and to call attention to emerging problems or threats to national interests.
214
The importance thereby is not only to determine what is accurate, but foremost
what is relevant to the decision- and policymakers needs.
Counterintelligence is intelligence designed to uncover hostile operations
against the nation; the national effort to prevent foreign intelligence services
and foreign-controlled political movements or groups from infiltrating the
states institutions at home and abroad in order to engage in espionage,
subversion, sabotage and terrorism. It is not security, but intelligence on which
security policies should be based. Straddling the foreign and domestic
boundaries, counter-intelligence consists of offensive and defensive measures
of protection: defensively by inquiries and vetting of civil servants and
employees, through investigations, monitoring of known or suspected agents,
and surveillance activities to detect and neutralise the foreign intelligence
service presence; offensively through collation of information about foreign
intelligence services and their modus operandi, recruiting agents, and initiating
operations to penetrate, disrupt, deceive and manipulate the services and related
organisations to own advantages. Moreover, counterintelligence is an integral
part of the entire intelligence process: to make sure that what is collected is
genuine through continuous evaluation of the reliability of sources and the
credibility of information. It differs from intelligence collection in that it exists
to counter a threat and is to some degree reactive. Results are not generally
produced in the short term, and counterintelligence investigations cannot be
limited to arbitrary time periods.
Covert action comprises activities to influence political, military or economic
conditions, situations and developments abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the own government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.
These may consist of propaganda measures, support to political or military
factions within a specific country, technical and logistical assistance to foreign
governments to deal with problems within their countries, or actions to disrupt
illicit activities that threaten the own national interests or security such as
terrorism, proliferation and organized crime. Covert action is an option short of
military action to achieve objectives which diplomacy and other means of
security policy alone cannot.
These functions or roles of intelligence services are common to most
intelligence systems. How they are distributed between and among the
intelligence organisations differs from state to state. These functions operate
most effectively as part of a process in close conjunction with one another.
Collection of intelligence cannot be done effectively without analysis that
provides guidance or tasking to collectors. Counter-intelligence is necessary
to protect collectors from becoming known, neutralised and exploited by
215
adversaries. A successful program of covert action must be grounded in

effective collection, analysis and counterintelligence. Thus, the nature of
intelligence is such that the several elements of intelligence are parts of a single
unified system whose success depends on all parts working effectively.
1.1 What Types of Intelligence Services Are There?
Four different categories of intelligence can be distinguished that have spawned
separate intelligence services or agencies: foreign, domestic, military and, more
recently in some countries, criminal intelligence.
o
Foreign or External Intelligence Services collect, analyse and produce

intelligence relevant to external security and for warning purposes.
Protection of external security requires knowledge of the risks,
dangers, threats, opportunities and chances, of possibilities and
probabilities of developments, and the likelihood of events and
outcomes. Intelligence is needed on intentions, capabilities, plans and
activities of foreign powers, organisations, non-state groups and their
agents that represent actual or potential threats to the state and its
national interests.
Domestic or Internal Intelligence Services, often also called Security

Services, collect, analyse and produce intelligence relevant to internal
security. Internal security aims to protect the state, the sovereignty,
territory, critical infrastructure, society and people against malicious
acts and hostile activities. What foreign intelligence covers externally,
domestic intelligence does internally, depending on the situation with
different priorities: uncovering terrorism; espionage; sabotage;
subversion; political, ethnic and religious extremism; organised crime,
money faking and laundering; proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); illegal arms dealing; smuggling in certain
commodities, such as arms, narcotics, contraband and people (migrant
smuggling and human trafficking); electronic attacks, hacking and data
theft; dissemination of child pornography, etc.
Military or Defence Intelligence Services collect, analyse and produce

intelligence relevant for defence planning, the armed forces and
support of military operations. Support to defence planning entails
intelligence on foreign military capabilities or vulnerabilities;
doctrines; order-of-battle data; operational concepts; tactics; and
weaponry performance in order to shape the size, types and
216
deployments of the armed forces, to guide military R&D and future

defence acquisitions. Support to military operations encompasses
intelligence for force projection and targeting; to ensure transparency
of the battle-space, localising the centres of gravity; and to enable
decision dominance and the achievement of strategic and operational
objectives.
o
Criminal Intelligences Servicesa more recent institutional

development in response to the growth of organised crimecollect,
analyse and produce intelligence on organised crime groups, their
criminal activities and corruption with the aim to disrupt these
organisations and activities and to prosecute those involved.
The distinction between internal and external intelligence services has never
been absolute. There are states with a single agency having both internal and
external roles. Since risks, dangers and threats are of expanding transnational
reach, impact and consequences, ever more intelligence is collected by the
different services on the same subjects. The traditional divisions between
external, internal and also criminal intelligence are becoming increasingly
blurred. Missions and objectives overlap, enhancing the opportunities for
misunderstandings and rivalries. There is convergence, notably in countering
the pre-eminent threats of terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. Hence,
separation of external and internal intelligence services is becoming more
artificial and thus questionable.
While separation might still be the best practicable solution for great powers
with many large intelligence bureaucracies, it requires an ever greater effort of
coordination and control, better regulated access to each others information,
and assurance of the production of joint assessments and estimates. This is why
smaller countries with fewer resources might prefer to have just one
intelligence organisation. It avoids wasting efforts, resources and time; solves
risks of unhealthy competition and rivalry between the different agencies;
simplifies contacts, liaison, information exchange and cooperation with
intelligence services of other countries; facilitates high subordination of the
intelligence agency in the states hierarchy and cooperation and coordination
with other ministries and agencies; and alleviates control and oversight of
intelligence.1
Among others, the Spanish CNI, the Dutch AIDV, the Turkish MIT, and OSA of Bosnia-Herzegovina
are examples of fused intelligence services that have found their own solutions to overcome the
problem that different rules and laws apply to intelligence operations on national soil and abroad.
217
Today, the tasks assigned to intelligence services have become more complex,
more volatile and more numerous than they ever were. Because of the
expanding need to serve a much broader range of government and other clients
with a growing variety of requirements, and this ever more speedily,
intelligence services have become too demand-driven. The result is that
intelligence services can no longer do everything at once and do it all well.
This is also true for the fight against TOC and human traffickingwhich is
less a national security than a criminal, social and political issue.
2. Why is Intelligence Important for Fighting Transnational Organised
Crime?
Globalisation, accelerating technological innovation and the growing
interdependence and vulnerability of modern states have enhanced the threats,
dangers and risks of the transnational type, especially from non-state actors.
The unholy trinity of transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and TOC has become the pre-eminent security challenge
confronting the world. TOC is growing in volume, geographic reach and
profitability, and is well positioned for further growth because it is in many
ways profiting from globalisation. The growth and spread of TOC increases the
risks of proliferation and catastrophic terrorism as proliferators and terrorists
collude with TOC groups to move money, people and materials around the
globe, while the corruption practiced by TOC is weakening states capacity to
enforce the rule of law.
Unlike traditional threats to national security from rival nation-states, the
threats posed by non-state actors are more difficult to anticipate, assess and
combat. More than ever, intelligence is the prerequisite and most important tool
for the prevention of, and timely counteraction against, clandestinely operating
conspiratorial groups of often unknown non-state actors. The fact that
terrorists, proliferators and TOC groups seek to hide their intentions, plans,
capabilities and information about their activities and gains, and engage in
disinformation, denial, deception and subversion, creates a need for a national
organisation with secret and covert capacities, capable of being tasked to
discover what is kept secret or hidden, and to collect information and foreknowledge of the hidden and unpredictable. Such knowledge cannot be
acquired better, more safely or more cheaply by any other means or
organisation. Thus, intelligence services are a key factor for fighting the preeminent threats and have become the first line of defence.
218
However, countering the pre-eminent threats from multiplying non-state actors

requires not just intelligence services. These threats can only be effectively
counteracted, disrupted, pre-empted and prevented when the activities of all
organisations that are mandated to deal with them are intelligence-driven or
intelligence-led. This requires a radical new approach of more intensive
collaboration, interaction and information exchange by these organisations with
the agencies of the intelligence community. To improve information exchange,
all organisations must be provided with classified, protected communication
means and information management capacities. Moreover, it calls for the
establishment of an intelligence function that produces operational and tactical
intelligence in all organisations where it is absent. Foremost, these intelligence
cells should analyse what is seen, heard and reported by the personnel of their
own organisation, from open sources and from intelligence reports exchanged,
so that they can accomplish their missions in smarter ways, more effectively
and efficiently. This is particularly the case in all organisations that suffer from
budgetary restraints and a lack of other resources. Intelligence-led operations
are often cheaper overall. Prevention and pre-emption is more cost-effective
than simple reaction. Further, proper operational or tactical intelligence allows
better targeted and much more tailored operations, generally requiring less
resources.
As to the countering of TOC, intelligence-led efforts are needed to anticipate
major activities of TOC groups, their operational methods for moving various
forms of contraband, innovations in money laundering, the development of new
markets and, in particular, measures such groups take to counter law
enforcement operations. The latter is of increasing significance, because
eluding law enforcement control is the most important working principle of
TOC. TOC is becoming ever more adept at concealment and disguise, and
exhibits a degree of flexibility and adaptability in methods and modes that pose
an increasing challenge to law enforcement and society at large.
The raison dtre of intelligence is knowledge of intentions, capabilities,
methods and means. And its essence is information plus insights derived from
subject-matter knowledge. Intelligence provides a sound basis from which
inferences can be drawn to guide strategic, operational and tactical activity.
Intelligence analyses and assessments inform decision-making and preventive,
pre-emptive and disruptive actions in ways that make a positive difference in
mission accomplishment. Timely intelligence warns of surprise and looming
crises; identifies threats, dangers, risks and chances; monitors fast-breaking
situations; illuminates issues and detects trends. And intelligence helps
219
policymakers consider alternative options and outcomes. All this is also needed
in other agencies of the security sector that are mandated with fighting TOC.
The increasing sophistication of TOC makes it imperative to disrupt and
demolish network structures instead of merely arresting individual criminals.
But attempts to break up criminal networks will never be effective until all
available information is developed and transformed into intelligence for use by
all government agencies involved in countering TOC. Thus, intelligence-led
operations are needed for the improvement and expansion of the fight against
TOC in a more tailored and effective way. This is particularly true for all law
enforcement agencies, which have to shift their modus operandi to intelligenceled policing. The same approach also redefines the intelligence functions as
they exist or must be developed in other ministries and agencies: border guard,
coast guard2 and customs services. They cannot function effectively without
close cooperation, information and intelligence exchange with passport, visa,
consular, immigration, naturalisation, migration and health services; exportimport, money laundering and financial controls; agencies of the ministries of
communications and transport, air traffic control and others. For some time
now, modern law enforcement has gained great benefits from intelligence-led
policing. What has been learned from intelligence-led policing shows the way
ahead.
2.1 What is Intelligence-Led Policing?
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) can be defined as a business model and
managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to
an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem
reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and
effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.3
Originating in the UK in the 1990s, the ILP paradigm has its foundation in the
recognition of the inability of the traditional reactive model of policing to cope
with the inexorable rise in crime. The police were losing the battle on the
streets and public confidence with it. This brought the rapid growth of private
sector security, which saw police marginalised in some areas of public safety.
2
See the striking difference between the UK and France. The UK with intelligence-led coast guarding,
three times longer sea borders and less than a third of the means of France in patrol vessels, aircraft and
helicopters, has for at least four consecutive years seized more or less the same amount of drugs as
France has with very labour-intensive and time-consuming periodic search and inspection of every
vessel in a defined sea area.
Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing, in Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis, ed.
R. Wortley, L. Mazerolle, S. Rombouts (Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing, 2008), 6.
220
Concomitantly, this resulted in increasing calls for police to be more effective

and more cost-efficient.4
The police search for a new strategy was helped by the 1993 Audit
Commission report into police effectiveness5 that advocated increased use of
intelligence, surveillance and informants to target recidivist offenders, so that
police could be more effective in fighting crime. The aim can be gleaned from
the tactical tasking priorities of the UK National Intelligence Model as
disseminated by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS),6 the four
essential elements of which concentrate on:
o
targeting offenders, especially active criminals through overt and

covert means
management of crime and disorder hotspots
investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents
the application of preventive measures, including working with local

partnerships to reduce crime and disorder.
This focus emphasises that crime is not randomly distributed, with the corollary
that identification of hotspots of criminal activity is a worthwhile pursuit. It
recognises the importance of working within partnerships to achieve crime
prevention and, finally, that there should be a spotlight on targeting criminals
rather than the crime itself. This latter principle is based on research which
shows that a small percentage of active and repeat offenders commit a
disproportionately large amount of crime.
ILP provided an argument for police to reengage with what they consider to be
their core business: fighting crime and arresting serious offenders. Further
publications provided the framework for implementation. To promote the idea
to all police forces of the UK, Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary
identified in 1997 the central tenets of a successful ILP model:7
o
Enthusiastic and energetic leadership that endorses ILP and promotes it

through a Director of Intelligence
Peter Gill, Making Sense of Police Intelligence? The Use of a Cybernetic Model in Analyzing
Information and Power in Police Intelligence Processes, Policing and Society 8, no. 3 (1998): 289-314.
Audit Commission, Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (London: HMSO, 1993).
National Criminal Intelligence Service, The National Intelligence Model (London: NCIS, 2000).
HMIC, Policing With Intelligence (London: Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997).
221
A published strategy that sets the intelligence agenda for a force, as

well as explains what is meant by proactivity
An integrated intelligence structure, so that analysts can work at the

hub of operational policing activities
Criteria to measure performance to determine the effectiveness of the

introduction of the crime intelligence function and the tasking of
operational units
The forging of effective partnerships with local agencies that may be

able to help police combat local crime and disorder problems.
At its most fundamental, ILP involves collection and analysis of information to

produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision-making
at the tactical and strategic levels. It is a model of policing in which
intelligence serves as a guide to operations rather than the reverse. It is
innovative and, by some standards, even radical, but predicated on the notion
that a principal task of the police is to prevent and detect crime rather than
simply to react to it.
Intelligence is the end result of a process that starts with data, becomes
information, that then becomes knowledge andif employed to have an impact
on decisions affecting the criminal environmentintelligence. As Ratcliffe
explains, a computer database can store locations of drug-related incidents and
arrests.8 These records are datawhich can come from open sources (the
media or the Internet), government sources (motor vehicle or drivers license
records), from suspects and informants, police records, and private but lawfully
accessed data (like cellular phone records). When a crime analyst analyses the
data and recognises a new pattern of drug market incidents at a particular street
corner, then this becomes informationwhich is data given meaning and
structure, and the understanding of the implications of that meaning. If the
analyst shares this information with a narcotics intelligence officer and the
officer remembers that this was a favourite corner for a particularly violent
drug set and that the gang leaders have just been released from prison, this
collective understanding of the context of the drug corner now becomes
knowledge. Finally, when the analyst and the narcotics officer take their
knowledge to a senior commander who agrees to mount both a surveillance
operation to arrest ringleaders as well as a problem-oriented policing project to
identify and resolve why the particular corner is attractive to drug dealers, then
Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing.
222
this actionable knowledge becomes intelligence. Crime intelligence is therefore

knowledge that is geared towards action.
Thus, ILP is a conceptual model that uses crime analysis9 and criminal
intelligencecollectively termed crime intelligencein a strategic manner to
determine offenders for targeting. Crime reduction tactics concentrate on
enforcement and the prevention of offender activity with a particular interest in
using crime intelligence against the activities of prolific and serious
offendersfocussing on the small minority of offenders that commit a majority
of crimes. The techniques to be deployed include an expanded use of
confidential informants, analysis of recorded crime and calls for service,10
surveillance of suspects and offender interviews.
Where ILP was revolutionary is in the use of intelligence derived from covert
information as a strategic planning resource rather than as a means to develop
case-specific evidence. Criminal intelligence provides information on prolific
offenders and organised criminal groups while crime analysis provides the
environmental crime context in which they offend. Both are essential to a full
understanding of crime problems and recidivist criminality, and are
prerequisites for good decision-making and effective crime reduction.
Beyond the UK, the attacks of 11 September 2001 served to fuel a growing
international interest in ILP. Realising that a reactive, investigation-focussed
approach was of diminishing comfort to a public seeking prevention and
disruption of future incidents, rather than swift investigations, police in a
number of countries began exploring ILP as a framework for the reduction,
disruption and prevention of crime. In most, if not all, EU member states, there
has been a noticeable shift towards a more proactive ILP approach to tackling
all forms of criminal activity. With its adoption in the US, Australia, New
Zealand and many other countries, ILP is now firmly established within the
worldwide policing lexicon. Most of these police forces have regulated ILP,
and have developed sophisticated crime analysis11 and IT-supported crime
mapping.12 In 2000, authorities in the UK developed a multi-agency
9
See for example: Rachel Boba, Crime Analysis and Crime Mapping (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005).
10
It is well known that service callsas a majority of crime reports dooften cluster predominantly at
specific locations or narrow, easily-defined areas.
11
Austin, Texas Police Department, Intelligence-Led Policing: The Integration of Community Policing
and Law Enforcement Intelligence (Austin: Texas Police Department, no date).; International
Association of Law Enforcement Analysts, Intelligence Led Policing: Getting Started,
Professionalizing Analysis World-wide (Richmond: IALEIA, 2005); National Centre for Policing
Excellence, Practice Advice Introduction to Intelligence-Led Policing (Wyboston, Bedfordshire:
National Centre for Policing Excellence, 2007).
12
ESRI, Crime Analysis, GIS Solutions for Intelligence-Led Policing (Redlands: ESRI, 2007).
223
operational response to tackle organised crime with intelligence-led

operations.13 And based on recommendations from the Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Summit 2002, the US established a National Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Plan14 to promote information sharing and ILP.
The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, the most global
international legal reference in the fight against TOC, contains investigative,
intelligence and preventive legal tools most conducive to the application of
intelligence-led operations. While neither explicitly referring to, nor regulating,
intelligence-led operations, Article 20, on special investigative techniques, is
creating sufficient room for the application of intelligence-led operations. This,
particularly for the appropriate use of controlled delivery and, where [each
state party] deems appropriate, for the use of other special investigative
techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and under-cover
operations, by its competent authorities in its territory for the purpose of
effectively combating organised crime.
Over the last four decades, the standard model of policing15 in the US was
reshaped by the theories of community policing,16 problem-solving policing,17
13
Known as Reflex, this multi-agency approach brings together law enforcement, the intelligence
community and government departments under a common strategy and shared objectives. It is chaired
by the Director General of the National Crime Squad, the operational police organization responsible
for spearheading the fight against serious and organized crime.
14
IACP, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing at the Local, State
and Federal Levels, IACP Intelligence Summit (Alexandria: COPS and International Association of
Chiefs of Police, 2002); The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, The Police Chief, The
Professional Voice of Law Enforcement 70, no.11 (November 2003),
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=137&issue_id
=112003 (accessed February 2009).
15
The standard model of policing relies generally on a one-size-fits all application of reactive strategies
to suppress crime and is based on the assumption that generic strategies for crime reduction can be
applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of the level and the nature of crime or other variations.
Strategies such as increasing the size of police agencies, random patrols across all parts of the
community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-up investigations, and
generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies are all examples of this standard model of
reactive policing. See: David Weisburd & John Eck, What Can Police do to Reduce Crime, Disorder,
and Fear?, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593, no.1 (2004): 4365.
16
Community policing evolved not just as response to the limitations of the standard model, but mainly as
a way to re-establish police legitimacy in communities that had lost confidence and trust in the police. It
is based on the belief that police should consult with the public in determining operational policing
priorities as well as collaborate with them in the search for solutions. The neighbourhood level
empowerment of community officers working with local people on priorities determined by the
community is certainly attractive to politicians and the media, but the lack of clear criteria for success
has hampered efforts to label community policing a success. See: Trevor Bennett, Community
Policing on the Ground: Developments in Britain, in The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing
the Promise, ed. Dennis P. Rosenbaum (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 224-248.
224
Broken Windows18 and CompStat.19 These theories became powerful change

agents for law enforcement agencies interested in providing effective, quality
police services. ILP does not replace the concepts of problem-solving policing,
or the community involvement and neighbourhood maintenance theories, nor
the CompStat police accountability and information sharing practices. It builds
on these concepts (see table) to keep pace with changes in society, technology
and criminal behaviour. Incorporating research findings and advances in ICT,
ILP encourages greater use of criminal intelligence, attends to offenders more
than offences, and offers a more targeted, forward-thinking, multi-jurisdictional
and prevention point of view to the business of policing.20
Table 1: Key dimensions of five policing models21
Standard
model of
policing
Community
policing
Problemoriented
policing
CompStat
Intelligence-led
policing
Easily
defined?
Yes
No
Fairly easy
Yes
Fairly easy, but

evolving
Easily
adopted?
Yes
Superficially
Difficult
Managerially
challenging
Managerially
challenging
Orientation?
Police
admin.
Units
Neighbourhood
s
Problems
Police
admin. Units
Criminal groups,
prolific & serious
offenders
Hierarchical
focus?
Top down
Bottom-up
As
appropriate
for problem
Top down
Top down
Who
Police
Community
Sometimes
Police
Police management
17
Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem Oriented Approach, Crime & Delinquency, no.24
(1979): 236-258; Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990);
Mike S. Scott, Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years (Washington D.C.: COPS
Office, 2000).
18
George K. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, The Atlantic Monthly, (March 1982);
George K. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows, Restoring Order and Reducing
Crime in Our Communities (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
19
CompStat, short for COMParative STATistics, is a management philosophy or organizational

management tool for police departments. It is a multilayered dynamic approach to crime reduction,
quality of life improvement, and personnel and resource management. It employs Geographic
Information Systems and was intended to map crime and identify problems. See: William Bratton &
Jack Maple, Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New Yorks Finest (The
Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lecture 573, 1993) http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/HL573.cfm
(accessed November 18, 2008); Jack Maple & Chris Mitchell, The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad
Guys Out of Business (New York: Broadway Books, 2000).
20
The differences, advantages and disadvantages of these policing systems are well explained in Jerry H.
Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing.
21
Idem.
225
determines
priorities?
managem
ent
concerns/deman
ds
crime
analysts but
varies from
problem to
problem
management
from crime
analysis
from crime
intelligence and
analysis
Target?
Offence
detection
Unclear
Crime &
disorder
problems &
other
concerns for
police
Crime and
disorder
hotspots
Prolific offenders &

crime problems and
other areas of
concern for police
Criteria for
success?
Increased
detections
& arrests
Satisfied
community
Reduction of
problems
Lower crime
rates
Detection, reduction
or disruption of
criminal activity or
problem
Expected
benefit?
Increased
efficiency
Increased police
legitimacy
Reduced
crime &
other
problems
Reduced
crime
(sometimes
other
problems)
Reduced crime &

other problems
3. Intelligence and Counter-Trafficking

3.1. Conceptual Approach for Intelligence Collection, Analysis and
Investigation on Human Trafficking
Intelligence collection, analysis and investigations must reflect the
geographical, structural and commercial components that make up the crime of
human trafficking. Geographically and structurally, these can be expressed as:
o
country of originrecruitment and export
country of transittransportation
country of destinationreception and exploitation
Within these three divisions, the commercial characteristics inherent in the

crime of human trafficking mean that the traffickers are compelled to become
involved in one or more of the following activities at any or all of the three
geographic divisions, irrespective of the nature of the planned exploitation:
advertising; renting, buying and use of premises; transportation;
communications; financial transactions, and so forth. One Achilles Heel of
human trafficking exists in the trail of evidence that will be created within
these commercial imperatives. Human trafficking for any form of exploitation
can only function by utilising these processes to some degree, each one
creating evidential opportunities for the investigator. More important, each of
226
these domains affords intelligence-collection opportunities for law enforcement

and all agencies, offices or inspectorates directly or indirectly involved in the
fight against human trafficking.
Strategic as well as operational or tactical intelligence is needed to effectively
fight human trafficking. Such intelligence is data and information on all aspects
of human trafficking, and on the environment in which it takes place, that have
been subjected to the intelligence process of collection, collation, evaluation,
analysis and dissemination. The purpose of such intelligence is to provide
knowledge and understanding upon which strategic and operational or tactical
decisions can be made by all agencies which contribute to counter-trafficking,
in order to identify, prevent, pre-empt, disrupt, interdict or deter human
trafficking.22
Since there is a need for a broad-based approach to collection and analysis of
intelligence, two important factors must be borne in mind in order to avoid
adopting an approach that is too narrow. First, all intelligence on the structure
and methodology of a human trafficking network, from beginning of the
process to the end, is highly relevant to intelligence collection and analysis on
human trafficking, irrespective of whether they are done in a country of origin,
transit or destination. Recalling the basic philosophy that intelligence is power,
the more all those engaged in fighting human trafficking learn holistically
about the subject, the greater will be their ability to counter it.
Second, it is important to avoid the trap of thinking that the sources of
intelligence are conveniently divided into the three geographical distinctions of
origin, transit and destination countries. While it would be logical to assume
that intelligence on recruitment could best be adduced in the country of origin,
it is also possible that the highest quality information on this topic may be
obtained from interviews held with cooperating victims in the country of
destination. The lesson here is that intelligence sources may be found across
the spectrum of crime, and that all those mandated with fighting human
trafficking should adopt a broad based approach to intelligence collection,
analysis and investigative activities rather than focusing narrowly on offences
committed within their jurisdiction.
22
Taken in amended form from Janet M. Bayda, Robert E. Brown, Vivienne Chin, Yvon Dandurand,
Dillon Johnston, Vincent Cheng Yang, Ian Macdonald, Eileen Skinnider, Karen Shields and Yuli Yang,
Human Trafficking: Reference Guide for Canadian Law Enforcement (Abbotsford, BC: University
College of the Fraser Valley Press, 2005).
227
3.2. What Kind of Data and Information on Human Trafficking is Needed?

Strategic intelligence
The objective of collection and analysis of strategic intelligence is to conduct
an overall intelligence assessment of the various strategic factors that underpin
the existence of human trafficking in a particular state or a group of states, the
risks, dangers and threats they pose, as well as the implications for the own
nation and the neighbours. A large proportion of the data used to generate a
strategic overview of the situation and an overall intelligence assessment is
usually derived from intelligence gathered at the operational level. Areas of
strategic intelligence may include:
23
Socio-economicthematic data that can be gathered relating to factors

such as economic hardship, unemployment, civil unrest, lack of access
to healthcare facilities and medication, the feminisation and
juvenilisation of poverty, absence of economic opportunities, or any
other relevant factors that serve to create and enlarge the supply of
actual and potential victims. Thematic intelligence should equally
include an understanding of all factors that impact upon the demand
side of the cycle.
Culturalthematic intelligence on cultural factors that may affect the

nature of crime and the manner in which it is perpetrated is also
crucial. These may include cultural beliefs and attitudes that are used
by offenders to recruit or exploit victims, or that may affect the attitude
of the victims towards those who exploit them, their fears, their
willingness to collaborate with authorities, or their eventual rescue,
protection and repatriation.23 Common language links may also be a
contributory factor as in the case of human trafficking from Central
and South America into the Iberian peninsula, from former colonies of
the British Empire to the UK or from Albania to Italy.
International relationsthematic indicators relating to historical,

ethnic, cultural, economic or colonial connection between countries
can also be relevant. This could include information about internal and
international conflicts; economic and trade relations and competition;
military cooperation between states, the presences of foreign troops, of
private military and private security companies, or of warlords,
Like voodoo rituals in the case of West African nationals or religious factors that may be relevant,
such as, for example, the sensitive security issues involved with the repatriation of certain Islamic
victims of sexual exploitation to their families in the state of origin.
228
paramilitary and armed crime gangs in a state; as well as on

international or national labour movements; the affinity to corruption
and blackmail; languages, clans and ethnicities, etc.
o
Patterns and profilesintelligence on recurring crime, human

trafficking and smuggling patterns; on patterns of associations,
collaboration and division of labour between TOC groups; on patterns
of deception, camouflage and elusion of law enforcement control; on
transport, visa and identification requirements; on the strengths and
weaknesses of border management, customs, immigration and other
law enforcement and control measures, are all useful predictors that
can be applied in developing prevention and disruption initiatives and
in recognising the profiles of offenders and potential victims.
Operational or Tactical Intelligence
Collection and analysis of operational or tactical intelligence affords immediate

and timely support to counter-trafficking operations and ongoing investigations
by identifying criminals, networks and gangs, and by providing advance
information on their movements, activities and profits. It leads to specific
intelligence-led operations, including arrests, further investigations,
prosecution and seizure of profits. And it may serve to identify and assist
victims and to prevent secondary victimisation.
There are some key areas of intelligence collection and analysis activities at the
operational level. While not an exhaustive list, the following domains require
special attention as common elements may assist in investigations as well as in
prevention measures:24
o
Recruitment methodsuse of deception, coercion, abduction or

kidnapping? What is the person being recruited for?25 Where was the
person or child recruited from? Intermediaries?
Advertising mediainternet; TV; radio; newspapers or printed media;

travel or tourist office; temporary or permanent employment agency;
labour unions; or word of mouth, etc.
24
For a good presentation on profiling the traffickers see: The Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking,
13-15 February 2008, Austria Center Vienna, Background Paper, 016 Workshop: Profiling the
Traffickers, UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT). Equally see: Background
Paper, 017 Workshop: Technology and Human Trafficking.
25
For example: promise of legitimate work in the service, agricultural, construction, or hospitality
industries, or as au-pairs, students, escorts, dancers, models, and factory workers.
229
Stolen or forged passport, travel documents and identity

documentationpreparation; acquisition; payment methods used;
location of agents or forgers; faking methods and means.
Immigration and visa fraudpreparation and acquisition; faking

methods and means; by corruption or blackmail, where and how?
Travel routes and meansroutes followed; mode of travel; patterns of

itinerary; ticket procurement and payment methods, etc.
Rentals or safe house accommodationlocation and provision;

conditions and particulars of accommodation; owner or intermediaries;
access and observation opportunities, etc.
Means of communicationse-mail; mobile phones; telephones; fax

machines; mail; dead-drops; brush passes; codes and ciphers;
steganography, etc. 26
Financial transactions in respect of all of the above activities

modes, methods, means and places used for transactions, payments and
money laundering.
Information from visa sections, consular, customs and migration

servicesall relevant personal data, particulars, conditions and
addresses, phone numbers, etc.
Information from transportation or travel meansairlines; shipping

companies; railway companies; trucking firms; truck, bus and car
rentals; taxi services; tourist or travel agencies.
It is essential that this kind of intelligence is transmitted to those who are in a

position to use it in intelligence-led operations. Expeditious transfer of the
intelligence is often an issue. A vital factor in effective exchange of
intelligence is the speed at which the material can be transmitted to the relevant
agencies or investigators who may be in a position to respond to it. Intelligence
very quickly becomes obsolete in the fast moving field of human trafficking
operations.
26
Steganography is the art and science of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one apart from
the sender and intended recipient even realises there is a hidden message. By contrast, cryptography
obscures the meaning of a message, but it does not conceal the fact that there is a message. Today, the
term steganography includes the concealment of digital information within computer files. For
example, the sender might start with an ordinary-looking image file, then adjust the colour of every
100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabeta change so subtle that no one who is not actively
looking for it is likely to notice it.
230
3.3. Planning Effective Responses

Effective responses to TOC and human trafficking call for collaborative, multiagency, coordinated, well-planned strategic action. Planning for action must be
based on a sound assessment of the problem and of the existing capacity to
respond to it. Intelligence collection, analysis and exchange between all
relevant agencies and across borders are crucial to the success of all measures
in the fight against TOC and human trafficking.
In a world of decentralised, adaptable criminal networks, the time available
between intelligence collection, analysis and operations is dwindling quickly.
Assigning these tasks to separate agencies no longer works. This is why
government has to defragment: to bring together the scattered efforts in order to
be more effective and efficient. The external, internal and criminal intelligence
service, police and law enforcement agencies, financial investigative units,
border management and all other organisations mandated with fighting TOC
and human trafficking must work as one enterprise. Even when their activities
are distributed across different ministries and multiple agencies, all functions
and organisations must be aligned around the same mission, must work
together to achieve the same goals, and must integrate their respective
information seamlessly within the requirements of privacy legislation. In this,
they must aim at harmonising practices, utilising as much as possible common
procedures and standards, common risk assessment techniques, and selection of
equipment and logistics that facilitate interoperability and joint operations.
Ever more states are forming national task forces or specialised interministerial and interagency units, often under the overall leadership of the
criminal intelligence service, for the fight against TOC.27 These assist in
intelligence collection, analysis, assessments and intelligence exchange.
Coordination of intelligence collection, analysis efforts and intelligence
exchange are key functions of such entities. It is important that they all assess
the situation requiring a response. The problem usually presents itself in a
different way in each jurisdiction. Proper assessment of the situation and
careful planning of an intervention are usually the hallmarks of successful
responses. The best assessments are those that are based on existing effective
collaboration and information sharing between the various agencies that need
to be part of the response to the problem.
27
See also: Theda Krger, Jasna Malkoc & Brbel Heide Uhl, National Referral Mechanisms: Joining
Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons, A Practical Handbook (Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR,
2004).
231
For national and international collaboration alike, a concrete plan of action

must be developed to delineate mutually agreed-upon objectives, priorities for
action, and strategies, as well as the many tasks to be achieved, the resources
required, and the respective responsibilities of each agency. There are a number
of examples of regional, national or even local plans of action. UNDP and
other entities have developed handbooks and best practice manuals that provide
useful assessment tools that can be readily adapted to specific circumstances.28
International cooperation is imperative. However, working with others is never
easy. Stories of international collaboration undermined by corruption, noncompliance or absence of trust litter the headlines. But in the case of illicit
trade, the alternative to international cooperation is to cede the field to
traffickers, who will find ways to penetrate even those states that invest the
most in patrolling their borders. Thus, the alternative is not an acceptable one.
Better ways have to be found to make international cooperation against illicit
trade work.
A novel approach that has shown some success is peer review. It is the method
the Financial Action Task Force, the G-8 group of industrial countries antimoney laundering and financial crime outfit, has employed. The model is based
on a few critical countries opting in by meeting a list of qualifications. Not
every country is invited into FATF. The key to FATFs successful operation is
mutual trust, which is generated the only possible waythrough a careful,
deliberative process.
The EU makes adherence to its norms on a wide range of issues, including
prevention of and the fight against illicit trade, a prerequisite for new members.
The shared commitment, as well as the existence of political institutions to
enforce it, means that types of collaboration at which other countries might
balk are more likely to succeed among European countries. What is needed is
some degree of flexibility with regard to the concept of national sovereignty.
The FATF, the EU and other multilateral organisations all limit to a degree the
exercise of sovereignty by their member countries with respect to a specific set
of issues. This approach in fact provides the only hope of limiting the constant
and far more harmful violations of national sovereignty that illicit traffickers
inflict daily on states. The lesson here is a difficult one for governments. It is
that the most effective forms of cooperation to curb illicit trade are also the
28
See, among others, Paul Holmes, Maria Magdalena Rdulescu, and Maria Velikonja, Best Practice:
Law Enforcement Manual for Fighting Against Trafficking of Human Beings (Bucharest: UNDP
Country Office Romania, 2003). http://www.undp.ro/governance/Best%20Practice%20Manuals/
232
ones that invite the most mutual scrutinywhat governments are usually quick
to call meddling. Yet without allowing such meddling, it seems unlikely that
governments will ever trust one another, learn from one another, and work
together fast enough to keep up with trafficking networks.
3.4. What are the Contributions of Intelligence-Led Operations to the Fight
against TOC and Human Trafficking?
Main contributors are the external, internal and criminal intelligence services,
different police and law enforcement agencies, financial investigative units,
border management, and joint operations within the EU framework.
Strategic intelligence, consisting of clandestinely collected information on who
these actors are, their intentions, plans, capabilities and potential impact, is
essential to any government response to this problem. For the collection of
strategic intelligence and the provision of strategic analysis on TOC,
governments primarily rely on their foreign intelligence and security services.
Their relationship with counterparts abroad examining TOC issues play a key
role in their work.
External or Foreign Intelligence Service and Internal Intelligence or
Security Service
While foreign intelligence services may occasionally conduct covert actions
against some of the most notorious TOC groups abroad, they generally do not
participate directly in the fight against TOC through apprehension of criminals,
seizure of illicit or trafficked goods and laundered money, interruption and
closing down of businesses, etc. This remains the mission of law enforcement
jointly with the judiciary, customs, the border guard and coast guard, the
offices of export-import and money laundering controls, and the inspectorates
of the labour, goods, health and intellectual property markets. Rather, foreign
intelligence services concentrate on exploring the influence of TOC groups and
figures within selected countries, what threats this influence presents to the
own national interests, and prognostications for the future.
They may be required to examine the bona fides of certain large commercial
entities operating out of so-called zones of chaos in the former USSR,
Eastern Europe, parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, seeking to do
business in the own country and the region. Due-diligence work of this nature
resulting in individual and company profiles is useful to government and
233
economic policymakers. And intelligence assessments of attempts by TOC

actors to infiltrate, influence, co-opt and corrupt both foreign governments and
the own are of essential interest to government.
The internal intelligence service does comparable work internally. But their
reporting is mainly strategic and primarily serves as valuable aid to national
decision-making involving national interests, policies and strategies to be
pursued with regard to the subject country and for fighting TOC. In this, human
trafficking is not among their top priorities. In comparison with other crimes,
terrorism and proliferation, human trafficking is less a national security issue
than a criminal, social and political issue. The criminal issue is the crimes
against the person which make exploitation possible, as well as offences
involving illegal migration and the illegal earnings gained. Foremost, this
demands a rapid, vigorous and professional response on the part of the criminal
intelligence service together with law enforcement agencies at both the national
and international level.
The main contribution of foreign intelligence and security services to the fight
against TOC is intelligence collection where they are instrumental. Foreign and
domestic intelligence services are able to collect in ways for which law
enforcement, customs, border management, homeland defence and offices
engaged in prevention of proliferation of WMD have neither the resources,
skills, nor special access. International money laundering, for example,
depends on electronic money transfers on which signals intelligence of foreign
intelligence has the monitoring facilities, the duplication of which, due to the
great expenses involved, would be unaffordable for most states. Hence, they do
the largest part of the collection of data and information that is needed in order
to acquire the knowledge about TOC groups, their intentions, plans,
organisation and activities. Such knowledge is then disseminated to all
agencies and organisations that are able to act on it with intelligence-led
operations, but in particular to the criminal intelligence service and to law
enforcement.
Criminal Intelligence Service
Criminal intelligence services are becoming the main contributor and ever
more often the lead investigation agency and overall coordinator of the fight
against TOC. The criminal intelligence service uses crime analysis and
criminal intelligence in a strategic manner to determine offenders for targeting.
In addition, it has an important watchdog function over all intelligence
collection and investigative activities of law enforcement, because all
234
intelligence-led, proactive investigative measures must be implemented in strict

compliance with the legislative and procedural requirements of the country
concerned. This is not just a case of legal and ethical probity, it is a simple case
of professionalism. Intelligence-led, proactive techniques require resources in
time, personnel and equipment to achieve their full potential and it would be
pointless to expend such resources on gathering quality evidence that is ruled
inadmissible in criminal proceedings because of non-compliance with the law.
Not only would non-compliance be pointless, it would serve to discredit the
activity and professionalism of the whole national and regional countertrafficking response, and this must be avoided at all costs.
Intelligence Contribution by Law Enforcement and Police
The intricacies of law enforcement intelligence, the intelligence cycle, analysis
and the legal, ethical and management issues arising from an intelligence
function are presented and discussed in a number of publications.29 Here, we
look at intelligence collection and investigations while focusing on the
intelligence-led proactive side, since law enforcement uses three major
investigative approaches that are not mutually exclusive:
o
reactive investigationvictim-led30
proactive investigationsintelligence generated, police-led
disruptive investigationpolice-led option in cases where the

other options are not possible.31
Experience and best practice have shown that the proactive option is the most
effective method of combating human trafficking.
29
See for three good examples: Paul Holmes, et al., Best Practice: Law Enforcement Manual for Fighting
Against Trafficking of Human Beings; David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for
State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies (Washington, D.C.; Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2004); Joseph A. Schafer, ed., Policing 2020: Exploring the Future of Crime,
Communities, and Policing (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 2007).
30
Reactive, victim-led investigations are well explained in Paul Holmes, et al., Best Practice: Law
Enforcement Manual for Fighting Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 2-4, Section 4 and 6; UNODC,
Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006),
69-70; Yvon Dandurand, et al., Human Trafficking: Reference Guide for Canadian Law Enforcement,
22-23.
31
Also the disruptive investigative option is well explained in the documents cited above.
235
The Proactive, Intelligence-Led Approach

The proactive option provides the means whereby law enforcement agencies
can take steps to combat the traffickers without a complaint and evidence of
victims. Proactive operations are an effective weapon and should be considered
wherever possible. Experience shows that traffickers are particularly vulnerable
to intelligence-led operations. The explanation for this can be found by
considering the crime from the same commercial perspective as that used by
the traffickers. These may vary their modus operandi, alter the routes, switch
their identities and use a range of other tactics to maximise their profits and
avoid detection. But there is one feature of the crime that the traffickers cannot
disassociate themselves from if their business is to be profitable: the need to
market the product by advertising its availability to potential customers. This
commercial imperative creates an Achilles Heel that traffickers cannot
escape and law enforcement can exploit. If the victims can be located so can
the traffickers.
Once it is known where forced labour or sexual exploitation is taking place,
law enforcement can identify and locate traffickers and ensure that they are
effectively prosecuted by sustained efforts based on solid intelligence
collection, analysis and multi-agency collaboration: using a combination of
intelligence, human and technical surveillance, under-cover deployments,
special investigative techniques and means.
The objective of the proactive, intelligence-led option is to use the most
effective and lawful range of investigative techniques as well as surreptitious
entry techniquesdefined as entry by stealthin order to secure sufficient,
sustainable evidence to arrest and prosecute the trafficker, and to identify,
sequestrate and confiscate his or her assets.
For the attainment of this objective, the strategy to follow is to capitalise on the
most promising developments already underway, by deploying the newest
technology. The extraordinary pace of technological innovation is yielding
tools with unprecedented potential to help fight illicit tradetools that
counteract the anonymity-enhancing developments and border porosity of the
recent past. Identification, surveillance, tracing and detection are the new
watchwords of R&D.32 Most of these means are already in use, such as
biometrics, radio frequency identification devices,33 global positioning satellite
32
For a good overview over such developments see: Robert Wallace & Keith Melton, Spycraft: The
Secret History of the CIAs Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda (New York: Dutton, 2008).
33
Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) is an automatic identification method, relying on storing
and remotely retrieving data using tags or transponders that overtake the now familiar barcode as the
236
location-tracking technology, surveillance and eaves-dropping devices,34 other

detection35 and security devices,36 computer and data-mining tools37 as well as
computer network exploitation.38
To achieve its full potential, intelligence gathering has to be conducted
holistically. The potential of front line officers on the beat to gather and
contribute vital intelligence must be recognised and harnessed to the more
specialised work of the counter-trafficking units. Because intelligencegathering activity cannot and should not be separated from the investigation of
the crime, there will always be a degree of duplication, overlap and a blurring
of the functions on the issue of when in-depth intelligence gathering become
actual investigations.
Best practice is to bring investigator and prosecutor closer together in the
investigative process through investigator-prosecutor consultation and planning
best way to identify an item and confirm its authenticity, register its origin and date of manufacture, and
record its price. An RFID tag is an object that can be applied to or incorporated into a product, animal,
or person for the purpose of identification using radio waves.
34
Especially the products born of the revolution in nanotechnology, such as wireless micro-electromechanical sensors as small as a grain of sand in size. Scattering such smart dust sensors that can
detect, compute and communicate by means of 2-way-band radio human trafficking-related activities
and changes in the level of such activities, can vastly improve the gathering of intelligence. Smart dust
makes it possible to track individual traffickers over great distances without detection.
35
These can identify suspect items or pick up traces of drugs, explosives and chemical, biological, nuclear
and radiological (CBNR) materials far more reliably than the standard x-ray machines, traditional metal
and other detectors. Backscatter scanners can contour the body to reveal any foreign items. And
puffers can be used, which blow air on passengers and analyse the particles set loose. Exploiting new
parts of the spectrum, such as hyper-spectral imagery, can be used to identify effluents from buildings
as well as thermal emissions by humans.
36
Today, stores, building lobbies, parking garages, bank transactions, traffic intersections, streets and
subway stations are constantly monitored, videoed or photographed. The combination of the Internet
with digital cameras has made monitoring a very common and inexpensive activity, even at great
distances or from high up in the sky. Satellites and new scanning devices can home in on conversations
and decipher certain people, vehicles, specific locations, or patterns of words.
37
These take detection to extraordinary new levels. Banks are spending considerable sums for
implementation of anti-money laundering software in order to conform to the requirement that they will
know their customers. Behaviour detection applications can monitor hundreds of millions of
transactions that large banks process and immediately spot events that fall into suspicious patterns.
They can also identify patterns not patently obvious from individual items of information through
cluster-, link- and time-series analysis. Crime fighters use similar software for social mapping
logging huge numbers of transactions and interactions to establish the structure and behaviour of
networks. Data-mining software can review in a matter of minutes millions of intercepted radio
messages, phone calls, faxes and e-mails to find individual items of intelligence. With the proper voice
recognition technology, these systems can also match voices contained in thousands of phone
intercepts, even if the speaker changes phones constantly while trying to avoid detection.
38
Attacks on information processing equipment are possible by exploiting equipment emanations and by
direct or indirect access to equipment software. Easier still is network exploitation by remote access to
data and databanks via Trojan Horses, Trapdoors and more sophisticated means.
237
meetings. Before proactive operations are initiated, a review and planning

process is needed that enables the different but interrelated skills and expertise
of the specialists to be combined in the assessment of the proposal and the
selection of the best legal and operational strategies and tactics to protect the
traffickers victims and to secure the objective of successfully prosecuting the
trafficker. There is no point in investigators pursuing evidence-gathering tactics
that may be inadmissible or of no practical use to the prosecutor in the conduct
of the trial. Prosecutors need to be made aware of the operational difficulties
that investigators may encounter in the conduct of the tactical surveillance
options or may encounter in the seizing and securing of evidence. The intention
of such meetings is to conduct a full and frank review of the options so as to
identify and formulate the most effective and realistic plan for success of
proactive, intelligence-led investigations. What such meetings of investigators
and prosecutors should consider in detail is well presented in the UNDP
Manual.39
Intelligence Contribution by Border Management
There are a number of measures states can take to make it more difficult for
traffickers to move people across borders. These are included in the Trafficking
in Persons Protocol and the Migrants Protocol. Under article 11 of both
protocols, states party are required to strengthen border controls to the extent
possible and, in addition to measures pursuant to article 27 of the Organised
Crime Convention, to consider strengthening cooperation between border
control agencies, including by the establishment of direct channels of
communication. Under article 12 of both protocols, states party are required to
ensure the integrity and security of travel documents. Under article 13, they are
also required, at the request of another state party, to verify within a
reasonable time the legitimacy and validity of documents purported to have
been issued by them. In addition, there are the measures recommended by the
OSCE.40
At its most basic, effective border management requires identification of
people and goods, collection and analysis of relevant information, and timely
dissemination of relevant information to help officers make informed
39
Paul Holmes, et al., Best Practice: Law Enforcement Manual for Fighting Against Trafficking in
Human Beings, 4-6.
40
OSCE, The OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, PC.DEC/557, and
PC.DEC/557 Rev.1, July 7, 2005, www.osce.org/documents/pc/2005/07/15594_en.pdf (accessed
November 18, 2008). And the OSCE Action Plan concerning children, PC.DEC/685, July 2005.
238
admissibility decisions regarding travellers and cargo. For this, an integrated

border management environment must be created that enables low-risk persons
and cargo to move conveniently across borders, while law enforcement
agencies must work together to efficiently identify and investigate individuals
of higher risks.
Integrated border management requires promoting increasing cooperation at
three different levels that are central to raising border management efficiency
and effectiveness:41 (1) improving the vertical flow of information within
border services from the ministry to the units working at border posts; (2)
improving horizontal cooperation between officers of the different services
active at the border, as well as among the central ministries responsible for the
services; and (3) international cooperation between agencies involved in border
issues in different countries, which is important for confidence building and to
facilitate joint action on common issues.
With this, the preconditions can be established for: (1) an intelligence-led
approach, understood as border management that relies on information
gathered by, and exchanged among, all relevant agencies within a state, aimed
at decision-making on resources, operations and investigations, and (2)
intelligence-led cross-border cooperation via interstate intelligence sharing
with emphasis on risk assessment and joint investigations, for which
multinational and multi-agency cooperation are imperative to be successful.
Border guard, customs and immigration services are the main actors
responsible for managing the movement of people and goods across borders. In
every country a variety of other actors are involved in tasks related to border
management. While their focus may be differentas are their objectivesthey
should all work towards a common goal: ensuring open but well controlled and
secure borders. Achieving this balanced approach is often a complex and
delicate task.
Border guards can be a civilian or paramilitary law enforcement service. Their
main objectives are: (1) preventing cross-border criminal activities and
unlawful entry; (2) detecting national security threats through surveillance of
all land and water borders; and (3) controlling persons and vehicles crossing
the border at designated points.
41
On this definition of integrated border management, see Guidelines for Integrated Border Management
in the Western Balkans, EU Commission Staff Working Paper, Updated version, January 2007. In the
framework of the CARDS Programme Support to and Coordination of IBM Strategies (contract n
81242), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), together with EU border
management experts, drafted and updated these Guidelines.
239
Customs are a fiscal service whose responsibilities typically include: (1)

ensuring that customs duties are paid; (2) ensuring that all goods are identified
and accounted for when entering the territory of a country; and (3) enforcing
restrictions on entry and exit of goods when this is justified on grounds of
public policy and security; protection of health and life of humans, animals and
plants, of national treasures, or of industrial and commercial property.
Immigration services generally have responsibility for: (1) enforcing
restrictions on the entry and exit of people on grounds of policy or security; (2)
ensuring travellers have the required documents to cross international borders;
(3) raising revenue by issuing entry/exit visas at border crossing points; (4)
identifying and investigating trafficking and smuggling and (5) identifying and
assisting those in need of protection such as victims of human trafficking,
refugees and others seeking asylum.
Border management is one field of state activities that most requires an
integrated approach to be effective. The wide range of national and
international border management agencies with specific roles, and the close
links these must entertain with law enforcement; intelligence and security
services; export-import, financial and money laundering controls; migration
and health services; the non-proliferation, environmental, agricultural, food,
trade and intellectual property inspectors, etc., makes it imperative that all
operate as one enterprise in countering human trafficking. This may include the
defence and military intelligence services and the armed forces. These can
support border management with reconnaissance, surveillance and observation
means to improve control of land and sea borders.42
What is legal and what is illegal is determined by the law and implemented by
state institutions. However, standards and norms are not the same in all
societies, and the level of effective implementation varies widely. When a
transnational element enters crime, successful prosecution often becomes more
difficult. When the criminal acts take place in different jurisdictions, the
criminals can only be successfully tried if all parts of the international
investigative puzzle are laid next to each other and interlinked. This requires
international police and judicial cooperation. Yet there are many obstacles to
such cooperationdifferent legal systems, bureaucratic inertia, the
pervasiveness of corruption in some law enforcement services and judiciaries,
the simple lack of resources or skills, and even linguistic incompatibility.
Nonetheless, enhanced cooperation and exchange of information must stretch
42
Means include UAVs, radars, airplanes and helicopters, infrared, ultraviolet, hyper-spectral, acoustic,
magnetic and movement sensors as well as range of MASINT means.
240
from countries of origin for human trafficking to countries of transit and to

countries of destination. And success requires a clearly defined strategy across
all border management functions, policies to support the strategy, and a
governance and leadership structure that provides continual, clear direction.
4. Patterns and Problems of Intelligence Cooperation
4.1. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Cooperation
More than ever before, intelligence and law enforcement must find new and
better ways to work together to deliver integrated results for the government
and the security and safety of the nation. Valuable insights can derive from
close correlation of information from differing intelligence, security or law
enforcement sources. The US is certainly not the only country that has learned
with painful clarity that failure to share, coordinate and connect available
intelligence can have devastating consequences.43 Thus, much more sharing is
requiredvertically and horizontally, internally and externally.
Bringing law enforcement and intelligence closer together is not without some
challenges. The two communities have long-established roles and missions that
are separate and based on constitutional and statutory principles. Both use the
word intelligence in very different ways. For intelligence services intelligence
means puzzle solving44 or mystery framing45 that is good enough for action.
The goal is policy. The context is a blizzard of uncertainty, often one that
cannot be melted down into clear contours. And the standard is good enough
to act. By contrast, for law enforcement, intelligence is instrumental in another
sense, not for policy but for cases. Intelligence means tips to wrongdoing or
leads to wrongdoers. The goal is convictions. The context is individual cases.
And the standard is that of the courtroomto be beyond reasonable doubt.46
43
See: Steward Baker, Wall Nuts: The Wall Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement is Killing Us,
Slate, December 31, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2093344/ (accessed November 18, 2008).
44
Puzzle solving is seeking answers to questions that have answers, even if these are often and long not
known. Basically, puzzle solving is frustrated by a lack of information. Collecting secrets is crucial in
solving puzzles.
45
Mysteries pose questions that have no definite answers because the answers are contingent, depending
on a future interaction of many factors, known and unknown. A mystery cannot be answered; it can
only be framed by identifying the critical factors, and applying some sense of how they have interacted
in the past and might interact in the future.
46
Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167.
241
Intelligence work is essentially forward-looking, seeking to predict and

forestall emerging threats to the state and society. Law enforcement is
intentionally a reactive tool and usually involves collecting evidence on a caseby-case basis after a crime has been committed with a view to prosecuting the
perpetrator. Investigators seek to determine whether elements of a crime are
present and whether they can be associated with a given suspect or a given set
of facts. Law enforcement becomes proactive when a suspect threatens to break
the law. For intelligence, which must warn, that is simply too late. Intelligence
collection seeks to understand those indications of hostile intent that may be
cause for alarm.
Moreover, police most often want to arrest and charge criminals, while
intelligence services want to leave them in place, at least in the short term, to
see how far their networks lead and where the top bosses are. Thus,
information sharing difficulties abound. Because intelligence services are
careful not to reveal their sources and methods, intelligence officers try hard to
stay out of the chain of evidence so that they cannot be asked to testify in a
court. As a practical matter, that means that intelligences role is limited to
tipping off other agencies.47 Intelligence agencies are unwilling to let covert
intelligence material be used in making a criminal case against the perpetrators
of crimes, while police will not allow evidence crucial to an ongoing
investigation to be passed outside the bounds of the investigation. True,
information used in judicial proceedings is often of a different type than that
collected by intelligence services. It is collected differently, stored differently,
and must usually be shared to some extent with opposing prosecution and
defence attorneys. However, this problem may be still more prevalent in the US
than in Europe, where in most countries initiatives have been undertaken to
enhance the usefulness of information collected by intelligence services for law
enforcement agencies and vice versa.
For information sharing to succeed, there must be trust. Building trust is a
process of change that requires strong leadership, clear laws and guidelines and
advanced technologies to ensure that information sharing serves its purpose and
operates consistently with national values. Both communities must ensure
compliance with the law and make commitments visible to the public. Since
people have a natural tendency to resist change, leaders throughout the law
enforcement and intelligence communities must consistently and repeatedly
deliver the message of change, and ensure that everyone understands the
importance of sharing information. It is no longer enough to share intelligence:
47
Ibid, 167-168.
242
there is a responsibility to provide it. Moreover, the public wants and deserves
collaborative intelligence and law enforcement communities that work together
effectively to prevent harm and destruction. Leaders must understand and
nurture change that emphasizes the responsibility for providing information,
not just for sharing it. They must communicate to their subordinates a
willingness to accept risk in sharing data, and must deemphasise data
ownership. What is also needed is greater inculcation of civic values: that the
success of others is a shared success in service to the nation and its citizens.
Effective training can improve the confidence of community members and the
publics perception that information is being handled appropriately. The right
training, coupled with good policies, clear guidelines and rules, will help
enable sharing and ultimately will help change the cultures of the organisations
involved. These steps, along with intercommunity training, exchange of
lessons learned and the effective use of technology, can open doors for
cooperation that have been closed for too long.
4.2. Cooperation With and Within the EU
The EU has made significant progress in developing an integrated border
management system and for border management agencies operating as one
enterprise. Integrated border management consists of the following five
dimensions: (1) border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the
regulation establishing the Community Code, including the necessary risk
analysis and criminal intelligence; (2) investigation of cross-border crime; (3) a
four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with
neighbouring countries, border control, and control measures within the area of
free movement); (4) cooperation between the authorities in the field of border
management at the national and international level (border control, customs
and police authorities, security services and other relevant authorities); and (5)
coordination and coherence of action taken by member states and institutions.
The key principle is that border management must cover all border related
threats.
The Schengen systemthe Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders48represents an exemplary model of
48
Relevant norms and best practices can be found in the OSCE, Ljubljana Ministerial Council, Border
Security and Management Concept, MC.DOC/2/05, December 6, 2005,
www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/12/17436_en.pdf (accessed November 18, 2008). EU integrated
border management rules are spread across a number of legal and administrative instruments,
representing a multi-layered compilation of provisions, with only the basic ones found in the formal
243
border security management as regards reconciliation of the two opposing

trends, one pushing for the opening of borders to facilitate trade and economic
growth, and the other that calls for efficient prevention of the pre-eminent
threats and combating TOC. The EU disposes of its own agencies for the
production and exchange of intelligence: Europol for criminal and security
intelligence; the Joint Situation CentreSITCENfor external intelligence;
the intelligence division of the EU military staffINTDIVfor military
intelligence; and the EU Satellite CentreEUSCfor imagery intelligence.49
The 11 March 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks have given a strong impetus for
further developments fighting the pre-eminent threats and put intelligence at
the forefront of border security management and policy. The EU Council
reached agreement on political strategic guidelines with the Integrated EU
Border Management Strategy,50 the European Arrest Warrant, on biometrics in
passports, on the establishment of the European border agency FRONTEX, on
the exchange of information on lost and stolen passports with Interpol,51 and on
the introduction of EURODAC that seeks to prevent asylum seekers from
submitting multiple asylum applications in different EU countries. The
European image archiving system False and Authentic Documents FADO52
makes possible the speedy verification of documents and fast, comprehensive
notification of relevant law enforcement or immigration authorities in other
participating states when misuse of a document or a fraudulent document is
detected.
In 2008, the European Commissions communication on an integrated EU
border management strategy suggested the creation of a European Border
texts such as the Treaty on the European Community or the Schengen instruments of 1985-90. Much of
the rest has been adopted through informal arrangements like the Common Manual on external borders
adopted by the Schengen Executive Committee, and the Catalogue of Best Practices drawn up by the
Working Party of Schengen Evaluation.
49
Bjrn Mller-Wille, Building a European Intelligence Community in Response to Terrorism,

European Security Review 22 (April 2004): 3-4.
50
Sergio Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy (CEPS Working Document No. 261, March
2007).
51
The number of stolen or lost travel documents recorded internationally has gone from just over 3000 in
2002 to over 10 million in 2005. This astronomical increase of more than 3000 percent is alarming. It
shows not only the need for improved technological systems to detect false passports but also for
improved training of staff on how to identify counterfeit or forged documents.
52
See: EU Justice and Home Affairs, Making EU Visa and Residence Documents More Secure,
(Europa, Justice and Home Affairs, 2005),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/documents/printer/fsj_freetravel_documents_en.h
tm (accessed November 18, 2008).
244
Surveillance System EUROSUR,53 the main purpose of which is to prevent

unauthorised border crossings, reduce the number of illegal immigrants loosing
their life at sea, and increase the internal security of the EU by contributing to
the prevention of cross-border crime. EUROSUR should support EU member
states in reaching full situational awareness54 at their external borders and in
increasing the reaction capability of their law enforcement authorities by using
new technologies such as satellites. It will provide the common technical
framework for streamlining the daily cooperation and communication between
member states authorities and facilitate the use of technology for border
surveillance purposes.
At the same time, the Commissions communication proposes the introduction
of new tools, including: (1) an entry/exit system, allowing the electronic
recording of the dates of entry and exit of third country nationals into and out
of the EU using the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the Visa
Information System (VIS); (2) facilitate border crossing for bona fide travellers
through the introduction of automated border crossing facilities that read the
biometric datafacial image and fingerprintsin travel documents for EU
citizens and certain categories of third country nationals; and (3) parameters for
the introduction of an Electronic System of Travel Authorisation ESTA, and
the development of common access to EU databases. In addition, the
Commission wants to strengthen the role of FRONTEX by implementing the
current mandate of the Agency in full, in particular by intensifying joint
operations between member states, including sea border patrols. Among
others, the possibility of creating a European Border Guard, improved
cooperation between customs and border control authorities, and better
exploitation of FRONTEX technical equipment by the recently established
Rapid Border Intervention Teams RABITs is foreseen.55
53
See: EUROPA RAPID, Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System
(EUROSUR), press release, February 13, 2008.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/86&format=HT (accessed
November 18, 2008).
54
See: ESRI, Public Safety and Homeland Security Situational Awareness (ESRI White Paper J.9698,
February 2008). http://www.esri.com/library/whitepapers/pdfs/situational-awareness.pdf (accessed
November 18, 2008).
55
See: Franco Frattini, Providing Europe with the Tools to Bring its Border Management into the 21st
Century (Ministerial Conference on the Challenges of the EU External Border Management, Brdo,
Slovenia, March 12, 2008) www.libertysecurity.org/article1939.html (accessed November 18,
2008).
245
Interpol
European governments have been officially working together against organised
crime since Interpol was founded in 1923. Today, Interpol has developed into a
global body. Based in Lyon, it has 186 members, sharing information via a
network of national central bureaus (NCBs). Interpol maintains databases on
known criminals, lost and stolen passports, fingerprints and DNA profiles. In
2003, it rolled out a global police communications system called I-24/7,
securely connecting the NCBs to each other and to Interpol databases, widely
praised as a clever solution to the problem of how to share sensitive police data
electronically in a multilingual environment.56 The cooperation agreement with
Europol was approved by the Council of the European Union in 2001, and
Interpol and Europol have since implemented various joint projects, mainly on
human trafficking, money laundering and counterfeiting.
Europol
The establishment of Europol reflected the ambition to create an integrated
system of police cooperation and analysis across the EU. Europol is the EUs
main tool for assisting investigations into TOC. It gathers and analyses
intelligence on crimes ranging from human trafficking to counterfeiting and
terrorism, and produces an annual threat assessment for member states,57 which
highlights the dangers to the EU from TOC and suggests ways member states
can tackle it. Until 2003, the standard tool for assessing organised crime in the
EU was the annual European Union Organized Crime Report (OCR), which
had met with some criticism regarding its meaningfulness and has been
replaced by the EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). However,
OCTA has also met with fundamental criticism.58 Because many member states
follow their own course, there are substantial obstacles to developing a
56
In 2005, police used I-24/7 to exchange almost 10 million messages worldwide.
57
See: EUROPOL, OCTA 2008 EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2008),
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/
OCTA2008.pdf (accessed November 18, 2008).
58
Tom Van Der Beken, ed. Measuring Organized Crime in Europe: A Feasibility Study of a Risk-Based
Methodology Across the European Union (Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2004); Petrus C. van Duyne &
Maarten van Dijck, Assessing Organized Crime: The Sad State of an Impossible Art, in The
Organized Crime Community: Essays in Honor of Alan A. Block, ed. Frank Bovenkerk & Michael Levi
(New York: Springer, 2007), 101-124; Klaus von Lampe, Measuring Organized Crime: A Critique of
Current Approaches, in Threats and Phantoms of Organized Crime, Corruption and Terrorism, ed.
Petrus C. van Duyne, M. Jager, Klaus von Lampe & J.L. Newell (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers,
2004), 85-116; Klaus von Lampe, Making the Second Step Before the First: Assessing Organized
Crime The Case of Germany Crime, Law & Social Change, no.42 (2004): 227-259.
246
harmonised European approach to assessing TOC, making it difficult for

Europol analysts to make valid cross-European comparisons.
Europols office is organised in a hub-and-spoke system. All member states
send police officers to its headquarters in The Hague. These officers act as
spokes, sharing information directly with each other as well as a hub of
Europol crime analysts. The analysts comb the combined body of European
criminal intelligence for TOC trends and links that can be missed by national or
regional police forces. Since 1999, Europol has focused mainly on developing
analytical abilities that it needs in order to add value to national investigations.
Initial sceptics among police throughout Europe have come to view Europol
more favourably as a potentially useful channel for coordinating the fight
against TOC.
It must be noted that Europol has yet to become indispensable in cross-border
investigations. It has been criticised for inefficiency, cumbersome procedures,
and has been plagued by intra-institutional and political expediencies. But
Europol can only work on the basis of the data that its national contact points
provide, and input from some states has been minimal.59 Recurring lack of trust
constitutes a major obstacle to the development of the Agency, which is also
surrounded by concerns regarding its accountability and democratic control.
However, EU governments want to give the office a greater role in supporting
member states investigations aimed at putting top-level criminals behind bars.
And there are plans that by 2010 Europol will become a full EU agency.
Multilateral Police Cooperation
Efforts to enhance police cooperation in the EU have been taking place for
many years. Articles 29 and 30 of the Treaty on European Union, also known
as Maastricht Treaty, and the Europol Convention provide the legal basis for
EU police cooperation. Major steps have been the creation of the 3rd pillar in
the Maastricht Treaty and the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into
Community law by the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 2 October 1997, and
entered into force on 1 May 1999. In parallel with the Amsterdam negotiations,
the member states came up with the first EU Action Plan to fight TOC, which
recommended the establishment of Europol, EU-level action to fight money
laundering, practical steps to improve cooperation between national police,
customs and judiciaries, and priority areas for harmonisation of laws to fight
59
In 2006, while one member state contributed over 500 pages of criminal intelligence to Europols first
Organized Crime Threat Assessment, another offered only a single page.
247
TOC. The governments added new goals to this list in 2004, renaming it the
Hague Programme. This, and the subsequent Action Plan60 to implement it,
attempted to remedy some shortcomings by both building on existing EU
initiatives and calling for the tabling of new measures at EU level.
Its most important goal has been a promise to revolutionise how European
police forces share information across borders by adhering to the principle of
availability, in effect since January 2008. The principle of availability means
that throughout the EU, police forces no longer need to formally request
information from each other, or rely on informal old boys networks to get
information. Police from one EU country now have access to police files in any
other country, and the law enforcement agency in the other state which holds
this information will make it available for the stated purpose, unless a good
reason is given to the contrary.61 As to cooperation between law enforcement
and intelligence agencies, the Hague Programme called for particular
consideration to be given to the special circumstances that apply to the working
methods of intelligence and security servicesincluding sources of
information, methods of collection and confidentiality.62
Cooperation Within the Framework of Justice and Home Affairs
Combating TOC has also become a priority area for EU legislation and its fastgrowing Police and Judicial Co-operation Matters (PJC), formally Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA). In 2004, member states agreed on a radical expansion of
EU powers in crime and policing, issues which cut to the bone of national
sovereignty. In negotiations on the EU constitutional and reform treaties,
governments agreed to drop national vetoes on decisions about crime and
60
Council of the European Union, Council and Commission Action Plan Implementing the Hague
Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 9778/2/05 REV 2,
JAI 207, June 10, 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/action_plan_jai_207_en.pdf
(accessed November 18, 2008). See also the earlier Commission Communication Council of the
European Union, The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years, COM (2005) 184
final, November 4-5, 2004. http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l16002.htm (accessed November 18,
2008).
61
Programme, 27, point 2.1; Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Framework
Decision on the Exchange of Information Under the Principle of Availability, COM (2005) 490 final,
October 12, 2005. http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33257.htm (accessed November 18, 2008).
62
Programme, 29, point 2.2; Council of the European Union, Council Decision on the Transmission of
Information Emerging from the Activities of Security and Intelligence Services with Respect to Terrorist
Offences, COM (2005) 695 final, December 22, 2005.
248
policing, though law enforcement will remain strictly national. They also
agreed to make it easier for the EU to initiate criminal legislation and align
national court procedures.
Interior and justice ministers now regularly meet in the EUs Council of
Ministersthe JHA Counciland discuss how to implement The Hague
Programme. They do so by closing legal loopholes between member-states
criminal laws, and agreeing legislation and practical steps to make cross-border
police investigations easier. Officials develop new proposals in an enormously
complicated web of committees that make up four different levels of decisionmaking. These include working groups on police, customs and criminal justice
cooperation, and the multidisciplinary group on organised crime. The latter is
a group of national policing experts with powers to evaluate crime-fighting
methods throughout the EU. Officials from both the Council and the
Commission help governments to draft legislation. They also give views on the
effectiveness of previous EU agreements.
Eurojust
A major part of the JHA Council involves replacing the slow Council of
Europe procedures for police and criminal justice cooperation with faster, more
efficient EU rules, such as warrants speeding up the extradition of suspects and
the sharing of evidence between the member states. Eurojust, a unit of senior
prosecutors, judges and police officers nominated by the member states, helps
with making these legal arrangements work in practice. It also has the day-today role of coordinating multi-country prosecutions in the EU. The year 2007
was an important landmark for Eurojustthe historic crossing of 1000 cases
handled, representing an increase of 314 cases or forty-one per cent over
2006.63 It opened seventy-one human trafficking cases, compared to twentynine in 2006. And it aims to establish a centre of expertise on human
trafficking.
63
Eurojust, Annual Report 2007 (The Hague: Eurojust, 2007), 7, 33.

www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200803/20080307ATT23374/20080307ATT23374E
N.pdf (accessed November 18, 2008).
249
The European Criminal Intelligence Model

In 2005, interior ministers agreed on a European criminal intelligence model
(ECIM),64 a policing plan for coordinating investigations against TOC and
intelligence-led policing throughout the EU. The idea is to get police from
different countries to plan investigations together, using the best intelligence
available. The ECIM sets out how the EU can achieve this by ensuring that
national police forces, Europols criminal intelligence analysts and the police
chiefs COSPOL operationsthe Comprehensive Operational Strategic
Planning for the Policework together against the same criminal threats. The
model works in a number of steps. First, member-state police forces share
intelligence with Europol, which draws up an assessment of the overall threat
facing the EU from TOC. Based on this, the Council of Ministers agrees on the
law enforcement priorities that police forces should tackle together. The EU
Police Chiefs then mount joint operations against the criminals and feed back
information and lessons learned into Europol, in time for the next threat
assessment to be prepared.
EU member states tested this new way of working together in 2006. Based on
Europols first threat assessment, EU governments set four regional priorities
in the fight against TOC in Europe: (1) drug trafficking and human trafficking
by African gangs operating in the Mediterranean; (2) Albanian gangs
trafficking both heroin and women from the Balkans; (3) commodity
smuggling in the Baltic Sea region; and (4) illegal factories for synthetic drug
production in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. It is too soon to
tell if governments or police are taking ECIM seriously enough. Nonetheless,
the adoption of a EU law enforcement model is a significant step forward in
coordinating internal security. The police model is also a subtle attempt to
promote use of intelligence-led policing methods throughout Europe. However,
law enforcement cooperation across Europe as a whole has yet to match the
degree of cooperation achieved by criminals involved in TOC. This is due to a
number of basic difficulties.
Different Police Organisations
Europes 1.2 million police officers operate in very different, and at times,
incompatible ways. Ireland, Denmark and Finland each have a single national
police service, centralised under a clearly designated chief, whereas in the
64
See: UK Presidency of the EU 2005, AnnexA European Criminal Intelligence Model, JHA Informal
Media Brief discussed at the Justice and Home Affairs Informal, September 8-9, 2005.
250
Netherlands and the UK the police are decentralised, with the UK having as
many as fifty separate police forces. This means the smaller regional forces
may not be able to answer requests for information or cooperation from
counterparts in other countries. Moreover, in a number of countries, police
have independent powers of investigation, while in others they still take their
lead from national prosecutors. Police answerable to prosecutors tend to be
reactive, acting only after a crime has been committed, and do less preventive
work. This difference in roles means that both police officers and prosecutors
from different countries divide into proactive and reactive when deciding how
TOC should be tackled.65
Different Rules for Investigations and Admissible Evidence
Another problem hampering cooperation is that countries have different rules
for starting investigations and gathering evidence. There are more than twentyseven legal systems in the EU, each one with its own rules for starting
investigations. In the UK, for example, it is illegal to use phone taps as
evidence in court, but police and prosecutors can and do rely on closed circuit
television (CCTV). By contrast, France sees phone tapping as legitimate and
human rights-compliant, but considers indiscriminate use of CCTV footage to
be far more intrusive. In other EU countries, public CCTV cameras are as yet
unknown, or, as in Denmark, even banned by law.
Deficiencies of the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters
Police may be able to get around these differences when working informally
with their foreign colleagues. But they, and the courts, still face a range of
obstacles to the conduct of cross-border investigations and prosecutions. If they
need a witness summons, an order to compel somebody to produce evidence, a
search-and-seizure warrant or an order to freeze bank accounts, they may have
to ask a court in another country to issue one. The main tool for getting this
kind of work done is the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, under which judges approve requests for help
with investigations and prosecutions from abroad. In 2000, the Council of
Europe updated the convention to include requests for undercover operations
65
Hugo Brady, The EU and the Fight Against Organized Crime (Centre for European Reform, Working
Paper, April 2007), http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp721_org_crime_brady.pdf (accessed November 18,
2008).
251
abroad, the interception of phone and Internet communications across borders

and surveillance operations such as controlled deliveries, where authorities
secretly monitor crimes such as drug trafficking to unearth a criminal
network.66 Even revamped, the convention is too complex and inflexible to
provide a basis for modern crime-fighting: the new changes are taking years to
ratify, and requests can take weeks, months and even years to be answered. The
UK, for instance, requires too much detail from countries making requests,
while the Spanish bureaucracy is known to misplace requests altogether.67
The Extra Powers of Police Forces from Schengen Countries
Aside from the pitfalls of formal legal cooperation, European governments
have made efforts to boost operational cooperation among police. This is
particularly true in the now passport-free zone of the EU: the old EU minus
Britain and Ireland, with the addition of Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, and
the exception of Cyprus. Police forces from Schengen countries have extra
powers to pursue crimes with a cross-border dimension. For example, Dutch
officers can carry out surveillance on suspects in Belgium, with or without
prior notification. Italian policemen can follow suspected criminals in hot
pursuit into Austria, until the local police arrive. This is thanks to a patchwork
of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Cooperation is most sophisticated where
countries share land borders, have similar legal systems and face common
threats from the same TOC groups or terrorists. Police in the Benelux countries
assist each other in every day law and order matters. The Nordic countries have
been running joint patrols and police stations in sparsely populated border
regions for years. So too have the Spanish with their French counterparts.
The Headway Made by the Treaty of Prm
In 2005, Austria, the Benelux countries, France, Germany and Spain formed an
information-sharing avant-garde outside the EU by concluding the Treaty of
Prm. It aimed to further the development of European cooperation, to play a
pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation,
especially by means of a much speedier exchange of information, particularly
in combating terrorism, TOC and illegal migration, while leaving participation
in such cooperation open to all EU members. Security cooperation measures
66
Idem.
67
Eurojust, Annual Report 2005 (The Hague: Eurojust, 2005): 46.
252
comprise among other things: sharing of DNA and fingerprint data, common
rules on flight security, vehicle registration and cross-border hot pursuit of
officers without prior consent of the convention parties in urgent situations.
Some observers feared the convention would undermine efforts to facilitate
information-sharing in the EU as a whole, since it involved only a handful of
countries, ignored related initiatives by the European Commission, and created
a new hierarchy within the EU and a new form of the Schengen process. But it
turned out that the Prm Treaty was the best way to encourage wider
information-sharing. Members have acted as a laboratory, working out the
complicated technical arrangements for querying each others police databases
quickly and effectively in a small group.68 The rapid progress has encouraged
the rest of the EU to adopt the Prm system and, in February 2007, the member
states agreed to incorporate the information-sharing bits of the treaty into the
EUs legal order. The goal is that every EU member state will have automatic
access to others DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration databases, a
quantum leap in cross-border sharing of information.69 The challenge for the
future is to make the Prm information-sharing arrangements work well with
twenty-seven countries. Overall, the Prm experience is an important case
study for the future of police cooperation in the EU.
The Way Ahead
Any reform of national policing structures must be based on the countrys
constitutional order and its specific traditions. Not all countries will want to
follow Britain in setting up a powerful separate agency, such as the Serious and
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which integrates several police
organizations devoted to gathering criminal intelligence, as well as law
enforcement parts of the UK customs and immigration services.70 But all
member states should at least have common platforms, such as the French
68
Austrian and German police claim that adopting the Prm procedures produced over 1,500 new leads in
unsolved cases.
69
Council of the European Union, "2781st Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs Council: Main
Results of the Council," Press Release, February 15, 2007.
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/92800.pdf (accessed November 18,
2008).
70
SOCA has powers to use phone tapping, undercover officers and new surveillance techniques to make
sure that previously convicted criminals do not reestablish their networks. SOCA handles all
international cooperation between Britains assorted police forces and their counterparts abroad. It deals
directly with Interpol and Europol, and cooperates with Schengen area countries on behalf of all UK
police.
253
Section Centrale de Coopration Oprationnelle de Police (SCCOPOL), where

representatives from the different law enforcement agencies work together and
are on hand to coordinate investigations with colleagues abroad. In Italy, a
similar unit in Rome maintains such a platform, where representatives from all
six Italian police forces work on TOC.
Another aspect urgently needing improvement for rendering the fight against
TOC more effective is that representatives to both Europol and Eurojust need
to have equivalent powers if either organisation is to function properly. The
obvious way to overcome such challenges would be to merge both Europol and
Eurojust to form a single European law enforcement coordination body,
incorporating also the police chiefs task force. A single body could underpin a
uniform level of cooperation across the EU whatever the national law
enforcement structures. It would prevent duplication in intelligence gathering
and analysis, and ensure better follow-through from investigation to
prosecution in cross-border cases. Both Eurojust and Europol are due to colocate in 2009, the ideal opportunity to initiate this mergerand a convincing
answer to the persistent problems caused by differing legal systems, divergent
traditions and the high risk of duplication of efforts.
One of the most useful things the EU does for improving cooperation against
TOC is also one of the most basic: it helps the member states to copy each
others best practice. EU officials carry out peer evaluations of police
methods in each member state and draw up recommendation for improving
their law enforcement systems based on best practice. If member states aligned
their investigative methods, technology and training, they would benefit far
more from cross-border cooperation. The JHA Council should give more
weight to these evaluations, should agree on headline goals for the use of ICT
and modern police equipment as well as for the adoption of modern policing
methods, including procedures for seizing criminal assets and conducting
financial investigations.71
5. Intelligence Operations, Crime Fighting and Democratic Oversight
External, internal and criminal intelligence services, as well as all the security
sector agencies that conduct intelligence-led operations, have to collect as
much information as possible on threats to the state. Intelligence is wanted on
everything which is, or can become, a danger. However, wherever this involves
intelligence collection on individual citizens there is the danger that collection
71
Hugo Brady, The EU and the Fight Against Organized Crime, 30.
254
activities impinge on human rights and, in particular, on the right to privacy.

Collecting information on individuals immediately raises the issue of respect
for civil liberties, individual rights and freedom. Increased intelligence
collection capacities thus enhance the potential damage intelligence can do to
the vital values of democratic societies: to human rights and, in particular, to
the enjoyment of the rights of freedom of expression, association, and privacy.
This danger is greater today because new threats require a trans-national and
network-based response from the state that involves proactive and closer
operational collaboration between the intelligence and security agencies,
police, customs, immigration, border guard, export-import, financial and
money laundering control authorities and other state bodies. Such an integrated
multi-agency effort can only be successful with greatly enhanced interagency
communication, collaboration and intelligence sharing. Operating as one
enterprise, aligned around the same mission and working together to achieve
the same goals while integrating their information and intelligence seamlessly,
renders democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability more
difficult. Control, even by government, is made more difficult by the very
nature of secret intelligence collection, where government becomes more
dependent on the special knowledge of the experts. International cooperation is
exacerbating the problem. Existing control mechanisms not only tend to be
institutional, focussing on single agencies, but are nationally limited, as each
state looks exclusively at its own agencies, and none looks at the international
network of cooperation as a whole.
Moreover, intelligence is now used in more varied ways, for example for
security screening, and in relation to decisions on entry into a country, to grant
citizenship or to deport aliens. It is therefore essential that there be internal and
external controls and certain limits to intelligence collection activities.
Furthermore, individuals must be better protected against abusive or
illegitimate use of the information collected about them. This is why there is a
need for tighter democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability,
and also for a different kind of control.
Better solutions for these problems can be found: (1) by clear redefinition of
accountability of all intelligence services and all agencies that conduct
intelligence-led operations; (2) by tighter executive control and supervision; (3)
by reinforcing checking mechanisms outside executive control with
independent committees and by strengthening expert accountability; and (4) by
improved complaints mechanisms.
255
Recommendations
Intelligence-Led Operations are Essential
Today, countering the pre-eminent threats from multiplying non-state actors
requires not only security and intelligence services. The threats can only be
effectively counteracted, disrupted, pre-empted and finally deterred and
prevented when the operations of all the security sector organisations mandated
to deal with them are intelligence-led.
Closer Collaboration, Interaction and Information Exchange are Required
Intelligence-led operations require a radical new approach, involving more
close collaboration, interaction and information exchange of all these
organisations with agencies of the intelligence community. And they call for
the establishment of an intelligence function that produces operational and
tactical intelligence in all organisations where it is absent.
Intelligence-Led Operations Are More Effective and Efficient
Foremost, these intelligence cells should do analysis of what is seen, heard and
reported by the personnel of the own organisation, from open sources and from
intelligence reports exchanged, so that they can accomplish their missions in
smarter ways, with more agility, more effectively and efficiently, particularly
by agencies that suffer from a lack of resources.
Good Intelligence Practices Can Save Resources
The more holistic the intelligence collection approach, and the more accurate
and timely the intelligence analysis and assessments on TOC and human
trafficking activities and actors, the more this will allow for limited resources
of all the organisations of the security sector to be effectively used to achieve
the national security goals of countering TOC and human trafficking.
Both Crime Analysis and Criminal Intelligence are Essential
ILP is synonymous with greater integration of criminal intelligence and crime
analysis. Criminal intelligence provides information on prolific offenders and
TOC groups while crime analysis provides the environmental crime context in
256
which they offend. Both are essential for a full understanding of the crime
problems and prerequisites for effective crime reduction.72
Intelligence Must Look at All Aspects of the Problem
Intelligence collection, analysis and investigations must reflect the
geographical, structural and commercial components that make up the crime of
human trafficking, thus must cover the countries of origin, transit and
destination as well as all the commercial human trafficking activities of
advertising, renting and use of premises, transportation, communications and
financial transactions, and so forth.73
Strategic and Operational Intelligence Is Needed
Strategic and operational or tactical intelligence is needed to effectively fight
human trafficking. Strategic intelligence serves for an overall assessment of the
various strategic factors that underpin the existence of human trafficking, while
operational or tactical intelligence must enable specific intelligence-led
operations that lead to arrests, further investigations, prosecution and seizure of
profits.74
Commercial Imperatives Are an Exploitable Achilles Heel
As to investigations by law enforcement agencies, experience and best practice
show that human trafficking is particularly vulnerable to proactive,
intelligence-led operations. The commercial imperative to market the product
creates an Achilles Heel for the traffickers, which law enforcement can fully
exploit. If the victims can be located so can the human trafficking actors.75
72
Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing; Austin, Texas Police Department, Intelligence-Led

Policing; International Association of Law Enforcement Analysts, Intelligence Led Policing;
National Centre for Policing Excellence, Practice Advice Introduction to Intelligence-Led Policing.
73
Paul Holmes, et al., Best Practice: Law Enforcement Manual for Fighting Against Trafficking of
Human Beings, 2-10; OSCE, The OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings;
UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, 81-84; Yvon Dandurand, et al., Human
Trafficking: Reference Guide for Canadian Law Enforcement, 31-34.
74
Yvon Dandurand, et al., Human Trafficking: Reference Guide for Canadian Law Enforcement, 32-34;
Rachel Boba, Crime Analysis and Crime Mapping, 111-164, 165-240.
75
Human Beings, 4-1 Section 4, 4-9, 6-1, 6-3 Section 6; Yvon Dandurand, et al., Human Trafficking:
Reference Guide for Canadian Law Enforcement, 63-68; UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in
Persons, 70-71.
257
Technological Innovation Is Key

The objective of the proactive, intelligence-led option is to use the most
effective and lawful investigative techniques in order to secure sufficient,
sustainable evidence for arrests and prosecutions. The strategy to follow is to
capitalise on the technological innovation that yields high-tech tools with
unprecedented potential to help fight illicit trade and human trafficking.76
Investigators and Prosecutors Should Work More Closely
Best practice for investigations is to bring the investigator and prosecutor
closer together in the investigative process in consultation, planning and risk
assessment meetings, so as to avoid the investigator pursuing evidencegathering tactics that may be inadmissible or of no use to the prosecutor in the
trial, and to acquaint the prosecutor with operational difficulties.77 Such
meetings of investigators and prosecutors serve to decide on the operational
subject and intelligence profile, the operational objective, and on strategies and
tactics to be used to deliver the objective. They also serve to make rigorous risk
assessment in respect of victims and the operation, to establish a risk
management plan, and for proper decision logging.78
Regulation of Intelligence Sharing and Exchange is Needed
Intelligence sharing and exchange have to be clearly regulated nationally and
internationally. Recording, retention, classification, evaluation and
dissemination of all intelligence material must be in strict accordance with the
relevant laws on data protection and confidentiality, and a system for
flagging or labelling intelligence into categories should be established.79
Some Separation is Needed Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Though there is convergence between law enforcement and intelligence since
they have to collaborate ever more closely, some walls of separation should be
maintained in order to prevent the infection of domestic law enforcement by
76
Human Beings, 2-1, 2-10 Section 2, 6-1, 6-3 Section 6.
77
Ibid, 6-1, 6 Section 6.; UNODC, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, 77-81.
78
Human Beings, 6-4, 6 Section 6.
79
Ibid, 4-9, 4-17 Section 4.
258
foreign intelligence methods, and foreign intelligence should not be asked

routinely to help law enforcement bust criminals.
Democratic Control and Oversight Should Not Be Sacrificed
Increased intelligence collection capacities enhance the problems relating to
democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability. In order to
minimise damage intelligence can cause to civil rights and liberties,
accountability must be redefined, executive control and outside checking
mechanisms must be reinforced, and complaints mechanisms must be
improved.
259
CHAPTER 7
Human Trafficking & Migration Management
Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens, Mariela Guajardo (IOM)
[S]uppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse

for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still
grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of mens views, and the
force of their mutual connexions.
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
Introduction
Human trafficking is, in its modern form, a phenomenon that is inextricably
linked to, and shaped by, the dynamics of contemporary global migration,
including the interests, capacities, and structures of nation states, international
and non-governmental organisations, private companies and criminal groups.1
Not to be forgotten are those most often regarded as the central players in this
drama; the migrants who are the victims of the trafficking crime, and the
movement of whom constitutes a direct challenge to the ethos of effective
migration management.
Trafficking in persons is properly decried as a gross violation of human rights,2
and yet the leading international legal instruments that define and address the
1
The views expressed herein are those of the authors writing in their personal capacities, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of IOM. The authors would like to thank Paul Tacon, Mumtaz Lalani,
Sarah Craggs, Lance Bonneau, Anh Nguyen, Rebecca Surtees, Khalid Koser and William Lorenz for
their contribution to this chapter.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights
and Human Trafficking. Addendum to the Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to
ECOSOC. UN document E/2002/68/Add.1, May 20, 2002. Note that, by definition, a human rights
violation is committed by a state against an individual. While most cases of human trafficking involve
criminal acts committed by one individual against another, it is arguable that a state's failure to protect
an individual victim of trafficking from a trafficker constitutes a human rights violation by omission.
For more on this discussion, see Ryszard Piotrowicz, The UNHCRs Guidelines on Human
Trafficking, International Journal of Refugee Law 20, no.2 (2008): 246.
261
problemthe 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime, and its supplementary Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Childrenhave a clear
criminal justice focus, while the human rights dimension is secondary. It is
against the backdrop of this central paradox that this chapter argues for an
effective counter-trafficking response to be rooted within a broader migration
management approach; an approach which emphasises a coherent response to
migration challenges at points of source, transit, and destination, but which also
prioritises the human rights of all migrants as a means of ensuring better
protection for trafficked persons.
This chapter begins by outlining the concept of migration management and by
identifying the key actors and their roles in countering trafficking in persons.
This is followed by a brief review of some current practices that ostensibly aim
to prevent trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute traffickers; including an
assessment of several inherently-flawed assumptions that have been made in its
execution, their implications, and suggestions for their remedy. The chapter
proceeds to situate both the crime of human trafficking, and some good
counter-trafficking practices, within the broader migration management
framework, before concluding with a summary of recent efforts to step away
from unilateral regulatory schemes towards more cooperative management
approaches.
1. What is Migration Management?
The task of formulating a workable global approach to the management of
international migration remains a formidable challenge, and one that will
require a merger of diverse political interests and a dramatic increase in
political will if it is to be realised. The word management has occasionally
been criticised as a euphemism for restriction or control, as a word that
fails to recognise adequately the legitimate human rights concerns of migrants.
As used in this chapter, migration management carries no such implication;
referring instead only to a multilateral and inclusive approach to migration
policy that aims to provide a sustainable benefit to migrants as individuals, as
well as to their sending and receiving communities.
Nation states have sovereign authority to regulate migration to and from their
territories; a function most often exercised by ministries of home affairs,
interior, labour, and foreign affairs, although other ministries may also have
roles, particularly the judiciary in states where it is distinct from the executive
branch. This sovereign authority is, however, balanced by international
262
obligations, including those to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals.

The patchwork of international human rights instruments includes explicit
migration-related rights, such as the right to leave ones own country and return
to it, and the principle of non-refoulement,3 as well as those which are less
explicitly migration-related, such as the right to family unity, which stand as a
small but significant counterweight to state authority to regulate migration.
Where previously the logistical difficulty and prohibitive cost of international
travel had prevented large-scale trans-continental migration, modern
transportation and communications infrastructures have largely negated these
challenges. Today, a states migration regime and border controls are the most
significant determinants in regulating transnational migration flows. Given that
migration is one of the key variables in determining the social and political
fabric of a national community, many states regard the formulation and
implementation of migration policy as central to the exercise of their
sovereignty.
With the complexity of current global migration patterns, states face
fundamental questions about who to allow across international borders, under
what conditions, and how to reconcile decisions in this regard with
international human rights obligations and international refugee law. Further
challenges have been posed with the increase in mixed migration flows4 in
which it is difficult to distinguish migrants with real protection needs from
those without them. The very notion of forced migration is increasingly open
to debate as the traditional concept of a person fleeing persecution or conflict
has now broadened, in the eyes of some, to cover, for example, escape from
severe poverty or environmental degradation.5
Given the diversity of interests, capacities, and migration challenges of each
state, the systems and structures that have evolved to regulate migration vary
considerably between states. Some of these may be identified as good practices
in their respective contexts, but there is likely to be no one system or structure
that would ensure mutually beneficial outcomes for all. Nor are states the only
actors to consider. International organisations also have roles to play. Two of
3
The term non-refoulement derives from the French word refouler which means to drive back or to
repel. In the context of international refugee law, the term non-refoulement makes reference to the
obligations of states to not return a person to a country where he or she is likely to face persecution,
other ill treatment, or torture. See Guy Goodwin Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 201.
See Box 5 for more information on mixed migration flows.
For a discussion on how states have tried to limit the concept of refugee see Goodwin Gill and
MacAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 51.
263
the most established of these are IOM, which aims to support migration
management efforts for the benefit of both migrants and society, and
UNHCR, with its mandate to protect refugees. The private sector also has a
stake in international migration, with recruitment agencies, employers of
migrant labour, or financial companies which facilitate the transfer of
remittances playing a particularly important role. NGOs too are involved, with
many of these having played a critical role in advocating for the rights of
migrants as well as in providing direct assistance to migrants in need.
Box 1 outlines some of the interests to be considered in the migration
management process while Box 2 highlights some non-traditional stakeholders.
Box 1: Interests of Different Actors in the Migration Process6
Countries of Origin
o
Filling labour gaps
Preventing irregular
migration
Migrants
o
Access to labour
markets on acceptable
terms
Protection of jobs
and status of the
national workforce
Promotion of
foreign
employment
Retain links with

family and friends in
country of origin
National
security/public
order/public health
concerns
Retention of
skilled human
resources
Promotion of
legal migration
Refugee/human
rights/protection
obligations
Access to social
security and legal
protection in countries
of origin and
destination, as
required
Family reunification
Protection from
persecution in country
of origin
Improvement in
personal/family/comm
unity situation
Protection of
migrant workers
and support
services
Countries of Destination
Leveraging of the
benefits of
migration
Foreign policy
and trade
relations
Brain gain and
transfer of
knowledge by
being able to
attract migrants
Easy readmission
Foreign policy and

trade relations
Social integration of
migrants
Concerns over
erosion of
national/cultural
identity
Adapted from Nilim Baruah and Ryszard Cholewinski, Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour
Migration Policies in Countries of Origin and Destination (Geneva and Vienna: OSCE, ILO, IOM,
2006), 35-40; and Erica Usher ed., Essentials of Migration Management (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 15-17.
264
back
o
Successful
reintegration of
returning
migrants
Remittances
As migration patterns become increasingly complex and dynamic, and the

diversity of stakeholders, capacities, and interests continues to grow, effective
migration management poses an ever greater challenge to policy makers and
implementers. The way in which these interests are balanced has a direct
impact on counter trafficking.
Box 2: Other Stakeholders
Private Sector
In attempting to meet consumer demands for lower prices, multinational companies outsource
production to suppliers based in countries where labour and other costs of production are lower,
and where labour laws may be less demanding. Although private companies are occasionally
oblivious to the abuse and exploitation of migrant labour that occurs along their supply chains, if
they would take the initiative to adopt and scrupulously enforce fair and non-exploitive labour
standards, and require their suppliers to do the same, they would close an important protection
gap.
Moreover, given that organised criminal groups involved in human trafficking appear to target
certain economic sectors, such as agriculture, food processing, construction, and care and
hospitality to name a few, private companies doing business in these sectors have an opportunity
and a responsibility to prevent the problem, and to protect those migrants who suffer
exploitation. In some cases, private companies have partnered with international organisations to
distribute information materials to migrants considered vulnerable to exploitation; others have
helped rehabilitate trafficked persons by providing skills development and job opportunities, or
support to income-generating projects. In 2005 ILO estimated that there were a minimum of 12.3
million people in illicit forced labour around the world, many of whom are migrants who have
moved across international borders for better opportunities than are available at home. Private
companies have the responsibility, self-interest, and, often, the leverage, to work towards the
elimination of trafficking for forced and exploited labour.
Religious Communities
In some countries, religious organisations are among the most sophisticated social networks, and
have the capacity to mobilise communities and deliver physical, psychological, and spiritual
support to vulnerable people. In addition, many such groups are motivated by theological
principles which encourage inter alia fair and hospitable treatment of those in need, including
foreigners. Although many faith-based NGOs have been heavily involved in efforts to prevent
265
trafficking and protect victims for a number of years, there is considerable scope for the world's
major religious organisations and institutions to play a more dominant role in counter-trafficking,
particularly in source countries in the developing world where their influence is often greatest,
and in rural areas where their capacity for social organisation often exceeds that of the state. In
working to combat the stigmatisation of persons who have been trafficked for sexual
exploitation, in particular, or in countering xenophobia, for example, religious leaders have
occasionally played a pivotal role in shaping the views of the communities they serve. If
religious organisations were to decide to take on the challenge of human trafficking more
comprehensively, at an institutional level, and leverage their religious authority against this
crime, the impact could be dramatic.
Migrant Networks
In many instances, migrant networks can be a helpful ally in the fight against trafficking,
either by helping to engage the general population in prevention efforts, or as a support and
identification network for victims of trafficking. Well-established migrant networks, in
particular, can help their host societies understand situations of abuse and exploitation which
affect them and, where they are close knit, they may be uniquely well placed to help liberate
victims from abusive environments. A person who has been trafficked, for example, may feel
more comfortable seeking and receiving assistance from members of his/her national community
who understand his or her language and cultural values. In some cases, however, migrant
networks can facilitate trafficking in persons between their country of origin and the host country
in which they reside. By facilitating this movement of irregular migrants, migrant communities
are also frustrating law enforcement efforts.
Private companies, religious organisations, and migrant networks or communities all have a
potential to play an important, positive role in preventing trafficking in persons, protecting
victims, and assisting with the investigation and prosecution of traffickers. To play this role,
however, they must be engaged.7
2. Legal Constraints on State Action in Migration Management

An essential part of the migration management concept is that states, as
sovereign entities, have the inherent right to control their borders and decide
who can enter their territory. States also exercise their sovereignty by ratifying
international instruments (see Box 3) and assume international obligations by
doing so. One general obligation that states have assumed by ratification of
inter alia the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, is that of non-discrimination between citizens
and non-citizens in upholding basic human rights. In the migration context, this
creates a situation of dual commitments, in which a state must balance its
7
ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour (Geneva: ILO, 2005), 10.
266
sovereign right to control its border and territory while ensuring the basic rights
of all people, including irregular migrants, found on its territory.8 Moreover,
Jorge Bustamante, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants,
indicates that while states have the authority to determine the admission,
condition of stay and removal of non-nationals this power has to be
exercised in full respect for the fundamental human rights and freedoms of
non-nationals.9
In theory, states are obliged to prioritise the basic human rights of migrants in
their migration management structures, but international law does provide for
exceptions in some cases where national security is at issue. In practice,
however, governments often interpret the national security exception very
broadly, and may fail to realise their human rights obligations when responding
to migration challenges. In addition, despite the national emergency exception
that allows states to derogate from their obligation not to discriminate between
national and non-national,10 certain basic rights are considered non-derogable,
even in situations of national emergency. Non-derogable rights include the
right to life, for example, and the right not to be tortured.
Box 3: Some Key International and Regional Legal Instruments Related to International
Migration and Trafficking in Persons
International
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that every person has the right to freedom of
movement within the borders of each state, that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own and that that everyone has the right to seek asylum. Moreover, articles 3, 4 and
5 of the Declaration make reference to the right to life, liberty and security of person; the right to
be free from slavery or servitude; and the right to not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. Although the Declaration was not originally binding, its content has become
customary international law and can therefore be considered binding on states. The ICCPR
mentions that individuals lawfully residing in a state have the right to liberty of movement. The
ICCPR also makes reference to an individuals right to leave any country, including his own and
that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country (Article 12). Not
8
Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge
Jorge Bustamante, Report to the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of all Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. UN
document A/HRC/4/24, March 20, 2007.
10
In the case of the ICCPR, derogation is permitted in time of public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.
267
only is the ICCPR binding on states that ratify it but, if a state also ratifies the first Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, individuals may also take complaints to the Human Rights Committee
after all national remedies have been exhausted.
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
This Convention and its 1967 Protocol define who is a refugee and sets forth the obligation to
protect those who cannot avail themselves of the protection of their own state. One of the
cornerstones of the Convention is Article 33 which places a duty on states to not return a person
to a country where his or her life is in danger. This principle, also known as non-refoulement, has
become part of customary international law, obliging all states, even those which are not party to
the Convention, to comply. The Convention can also provide refugee protection to victims of
trafficking, provided they satisfy all the elements set forth in the refugee definition enumerated in
article 1A(2).
2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and
Children (UN Trafficking Protocol)
As a supplement to the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, this Protocol has
been the framework for most counter-trafficking interventions since it was opened for signature
in 2000. In force since December 25, 2003, the Protocol offers a clear, internationally-accepted,
definition, and has generally facilitated a helpful convergence of national definitions. The
purpose of the Protocol is to prevent and combat trafficking in persons while aiming to protect
and assist the victim of such trafficking. Although it does offer suggestions for states to consider
in protecting victims of trafficking, it is generally considered a criminal justice instrument
because its mandatory provisions focus inter alia on criminalisation of trafficking in persons,
improving cooperation between law enforcement actors, and strengthening border control.
1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families (ICRMW)
The ICRMW is the first comprehensive international treaty which focuses on the human rights of
migrant workers in the country of destination. Unique to this Convention is the fact that it
explicitly recognises the rights of irregular migrants. Although the ICRMW includes many of the
same principles enshrined in the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it contextually frames these principles to apply to migrant workers
and their families. Even though the convention entered into force in 1990, to this day, the
ICRMW has only been ratified by thirty-nine states, none of which are considered major
destination countries. The most-often cited reason for low ratification is that countries of
immigration are concerned that ratification of this Convention would infringe on their sovereign
right to decide who can enter their territories.
International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions
There are a series of ILO Conventions and Declarations which relate to the rights of migrants.
Among them is the Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 which in certain enumerated
domains states that migrant workers should receive equal treatment with nationals. The Migrant
Workers Convention of 1975 establishes the obligation of States to respect the fundamental
human rights of all migrant workers as well as the equality of treatment principle in areas such as
268
social security, wages and housing. Two ILO Conventions are particularly relevant to countertrafficking work: the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour of 1930 and the
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour of 1999.
Regional
2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
On a regional level, several instruments have an important role in shaping counter-trafficking
policies. The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,
which came into force in 2008, for example, is a comprehensive treaty focusing mainly on the
protection of victims of trafficking and the safeguarding of their rights. It also aims to prevent
trafficking and to prosecute traffickers. In particular, Chapter II, Article 5 of the Convention
promotes a multidisciplinary coordination approach by requiring that each Party shall take
measures to establish or strengthen national coordination between the various bodies responsible
for preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. Article 6 places an obligation on
parties to adopt and reinforce measures for discouraging demand in regards to sexual
exploitation, forced labour, slavery or practices similar to slavery. Articles 7 and 8, respectively
modelled on article 11 and 12 of the UN Trafficking Protocol, cover a range of measures for the
prevention and border detection of transnational trafficking in human beings, as well as measures
of security and control of documents.
2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights
Few international human rights instruments explicitly refer to human trafficking and condemn it
as a violation of human rights. Article 10(a) of the Arab Charter, however, states that slavery and
trafficking in human beings are not only prohibited but also punishable by law while article 10(b)
prohibits the exploitation of persons including that of children in armed conflict.
3. The 3 Ps
The Trafficking Protocol makes clear that states tend to approach the problem
of trafficking primarily from a criminal justice perspective, rather than with a
human rights approach. Not only is the Protocol a supplement to the
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, it also defines the problem
in criminal terms in Article 3, and makes mandatory those sections which refer
to its organised crime dimension. One alternative would have been to frame the
problem in human rights language by defining trafficking from the perspective
of the victim, and requiring that parties to the Protocol implement the
protections outlined in article 6, rather than leaving these as optional. Whether
reflecting a shared mood among states that has mitigated against creating yet
another international protection regime, or as a consequence of the Protocol,
states have largely adopted an approach to preventing trafficking in persons,
protecting victims, and prosecuting perpetratorscommonly known as the 3
Psthat is interpreted through a criminal justice lens.
269
Since the Protocol entered into force in 2003, there has been little evidence to
suggest that trafficking in persons is in decline as a criminal phenomenon.
Indeed, some stakeholders argue that the problem is growing, affecting an
increasing number of people, and earning an ever greater profit for its
perpetrators.11 Because research, either on the number of people trafficked, or
on the profits earned from trafficking, is more speculation than fact, the true
impact of the overall response is probably unquantifiable. There are
nonetheless inherent flaws, rooted primarily in the criminal justice approach, in
many of the interventions that have been devised that would indicate that little
progress has been made to prevent trafficking, protect its victims, and
prosecute its perpetrators. The solution lies in a broader appreciation of
migration dynamics and the additional tools available through a migration
management approach.
3.1 Prevention and Root Causes
The prevention of trafficking in persons is one of the stated purposes of the
Protocol, and is properly prioritised in most of the regional and national laws
and action plans that have been influenced by it. From both the criminal justice
and human rights perspectives, it would seem self-evident that the prevention
of the crime should be preferred to more reactive responses, which involve,
most narrowly, the commitment of state resources to the investigation and
prosecution of the perpetrator(s), as well as to the care and compensation of the
oft-traumatised victim. With the recurrent difficulty of gathering reliable data
on the incidence of human trafficking at global, regional, national or local
levels, and evaluations of prevention efforts few and far between, it is difficult
to assess with any confidence to what extent, if at all, these efforts are
succeeding. Several logical deficiencies inherent in the broad approach to
prevention, when coupled with empirical observation, suggest that they have
not noticeably reduced trafficking in persons, nor can any specific current
practices be identified confidently as successful in preventing trafficking to the
extent that they would be replicable on a large scale.
11
For example, the Council of Europe cites in its Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe
Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings that all indicators point to an increase in
victim numbers. See Council of Europe, Introduction, in Explanatory Report on the Council of
Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/197.htm (accessed December 12, 2008).
270
Source Control
The contemporary approach to prevention finds expression in article 9(4) of the
Trafficking Protocol, which encourages multilateral cooperation to alleviate
factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to
trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity.
Article 9(5) further suggests that states party adopt measures that
discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons,
especially women and children, that leads to trafficking. In short, these subarticles define the approach essentially as one that targets both material poverty
and poverty of opportunity, as well as demand; what are widely considered the
root causes of trafficking.12
What then, the response? By accident or design, much of the anti-trafficking
prevention work that has been done to date reflects the source control strategy
devised to combat the drug trade,13 but emphasising tactics calibrated for a
trade in which human beings are the principle commodity. Article 9(2) of the
Protocol describes these tactics: measures such as research, information and
mass media campaigns and social and economic initiatives. Perhaps most
prevalent have been the widespread information and mass media campaigns,
which are predicated on the assumption that a certain demographic segment of
the general population (young women, for example) lack the knowledge
required to interrogate and deflect the finely-honed sales pitch of the trafficker.
As a result, these campaigns target communities or population groups in source
countries, in hopes of raising the awareness before the trafficker has made the
offer.
But developing the appropriate messages for these campaigns has proven
challenging. As Rutvica Andrijasevic observes, what might appear as a
straightforward strategy of empowerment becomes a quite controversial and
even a badly-chosen practice.14 With some exceptions, these campaigns have
often employed messages that could be termed anti-migration, as much as
they could be termed anti-trafficking; seemingly aiming to convince aspirant
female migrants of the certainty that sexual exploitation and abuse lie at the
end of the migration road. Indeed, some have argued that the net effect of the
12
Sector Project Against Trafficking in Women, Approaches to Prevention, in Challenging Trafficking

in Persons: Theoretical Debate and Practical Approaches, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische
Zusammenarbeit (Eschborn: GTZ, 2005), 76.
13
Moiss Nam, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy
(New York: Anchor, 2006).
14
Rutvica Andrijasevic, Beautiful Dead Bodies: Gender, Migration and Representation in AntiTrafficking Campaigns, Feminist Review 86, no.1 (2007): 41.
271
theory behind these sorts of campaigns has been to decrease viable migration
options for women in particular by encouraging states to increase measures to
control and deter the movement of young female migrants across international
borders in the name of human trafficking prevention.15 Although there appears
to be an increase in the prevalence of more positive messages, often promoting
safe or informed migration or providing aspirant migrants with a range of
information on possible migration opportunities and procedures, most such
campaigns are funded by governments of countries of destination, and remain
wedded to the source control approach.
Root Causes?
Implicit in the notion of prevention is that its primary objective is to address the
root cause(s) as the sine qua non of the problem. This makes the proper
identification of those root causes of critical importance to the development of
prevention strategies. Encouraging states party to cooperate to alleviate factors
that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking,
such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity has
contributed to the popular and prevalent belief that poverty, whether material
poverty or poverty of opportunity, constitute the principle root cause of
trafficking in persons. But logic and empirical observation provide good
reasons to question this.
First, while traffickers typically exploit the aspirations of their victims during
recruitment, aspirations that are often the result of their relative poverty,16 to
attribute poverty as a root cause of trafficking risks conflating and confusing
the root cause(s) of trafficking with broader motivations for migration. And
why, then, single out poverty when migration is generally the consequence of
pull factors, as well as push factors? If, for example, poverty is a root cause of
trafficking, then why not wealth? Wealth is, after all, a key pull factor for most
migration, just as poverty is a key push factor. Neither emphasis is
enlightening. Emphasising wealth would shift the onus for prevention to the
developed countries of destination, as the emphasis on poverty shifts the onus
to developing countries.
15
Mike Dottridge, ed., Collateral Damage (Bangkok: Global Alliance Against Trafficking in
Women/Amarin, 2007), 13-14.
16
According to this theory, an individual makes judgments about his or her welfare that are based not
only on his or her absolute level of material possessions (such as income) but perhaps more importantly
on the relative level of welfare in reference to others in the community. See Oded Stark and J. Edward
Taylor, Relative Depravation and International Migration, Demography 23, no.1 (1989): 2-3.
272
Second, identifying poverty as a root cause of trafficking provides little

guidance on the specific problem of preventing trafficking in persons. If
poverty is a root cause of trafficking, then prevention efforts and resources
should rightly concentrate on the pre-trafficked person at home, where poverty
caused the person to be recruited into the trafficking process. This would
make prevention of human trafficking essentially a footnote to the broader,
long-term, development agenda and perhaps mitigate against specific
interventions attempting to prevent it.
There is no discounting the role that poverty, or even more accurately,
disparity, plays in creating conditions for traffickers to exploit. But poverty is
perhaps better regarded as a condition that reinforces the disparity which
encourages the desire to migrate; thereby aiding the trafficker in selecting the
victim and increasing the effectiveness of the recruitment tactics employed.
There are, however, at least two features of trafficking in persons that may be
more properly regarded as root causes, and which suggest helpful ways
forward. The first is implied, but not explicitly identified, in article 3 of the
Protocol: trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment by means of the
threat or use of force for the purpose of exploitation. With its purpose of
exploitation, which is perpetrated most commonly for financial gain or another
material benefit, it is logical to identify the traffickers motivating influence
profitas a root cause. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which
trafficking were to occur in the absence of the traffickers motivation for profit.
Desire for profit, therefore, would seem a likely root cause of trafficking in
persons.
A second feature which may be regarded appropriately as a root cause is
identified in article 9(5) of the Protocol; namely the demand that fosters all
forms of exploitation. Whether the end user demands low-cost tomatoes, for
example, cut-rate running shoes, or cheap, exotic or unusual sex, a criminal
network will supply the required labour or services. Again, it is difficult to
imagine a scenario in which traffickers would perpetrate the crime of
trafficking in the absence of demand. Taken together, the demand for
unreasonably cheap products, labour or services and the profit motive of the
organised criminal group seem more likely root cause(s) of trafficking in
persons than either poverty or disparity.
The identification of the profit motive of criminal groups and the demand for
unreasonably cheap products and services also provides a logical and helpful
conclusion; essentially, that those who benefit from trafficking in persons
traffickers, and the consumers of trafficked labour, services, and the products
273
of trafficked labour or servicesbear the responsibility for trafficking in

persons.
There can be little doubt about the contribution to the vulnerability of an
aspirant migrant engendered by conditions such as material poverty, poverty of
opportunity, or political, economic and social disparities, and these should be
addressed as part of long-term development strategies. But there is also little
doubt that a disproportionate volume of time, effort, and material resources
have been spent trying to address these root causes, as means to prevent
trafficking in persons in the short-term, often at the expense of features more
likely to lie at the heart of the trafficking problem. The source control approach
appears to have misdirected prevention efforts, and have encouraged a
distortion of anti-trafficking messages that have arguably done more harm than
good.17
While there is no evidence that the strategy of source control has or will
succeed, it is possible that the tactics of information and education and mass
media may retain considerable value if appropriately directed at the true root
causes of the problem in countries (or at points of) destination. To date,
campaigns aiming to reduce the profits of traffickers by curtailing the demand
of their clients have been few, and have been small scale. And yet if one were
to look at other examples of information campaigns that have focused on
consumers (e.g., anti-fur, anti-smoking, energy conservation, recycling, etc.) to
suppress demand, many appear to have proved their worth, particularly when
buttressed with supporting measures such as strict implementation of specific
legislation and policies.18 Indeed, studies increasingly show that consumers,
and those in destination countries in particular, want their choices to match
their human values, and are willing to make changes to their habits of
consumption if presented with the right information that helps them do so.
They are even willing to change their habits of consumption to better reflect
their values if this requires paying more for a particular product or service.19
Those who wish to engage in responsible consumerism become fertile ground
for anti-trafficking messages, and if this significant percentage of consumers
17
Ruth Rosenberg, Best Practices for Programming to Prevent Trafficking in Human Beings in Europe
and Eurasia Report (Maryland: Development Alternatives Inc. for USAID, 2004), 14; Mike Dottridge,
Action to Prevent Child Trafficking in South Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Assessment (Geneva:
UNICEF and Terre des Hommes, 2006), 51.
18
In Greece, a campaign to dissuade people from donating money to child beggars was reported to have
had some success. See Dottridge, Action to Prevent Child Trafficking, 45.
19
See, for example, Michael Rock, Public Disclosure of the Sweatshop Practices of American
Multinational Garment/Shoe Makers/Retails: Impacts on their Stock Prices, Competition & Change
71, no.1 (2003): 24.
274
could be mobilised to make behavioural changes to habits of consumption that

provide traffickers with their profits, perhaps trafficking prevention efforts
might noticeably begin to prevent trafficking.
Contributing Factors
While it is clear that human trafficking prevention efforts should focus on the
primary root causes, which are generally more easily identified in countries of
destination, migration management initiatives in countries of origin can also
have a secondary impact on factors which exacerbate the vulnerabilities of
certain population groups to targeting and recruitment by traffickers. Most
obvious among these are migration information centres, which provide aspirant
migrants with objective and reliable information about migration opportunities
and immigration/emigration procedures, and can help to confirm the credibility
of job offers abroad. The aim of migration information centres is to support
aspirant migrants with an alternative source of migration information to that
which may be provided by smugglers and traffickers, thereby helping them to
make the best migration decisions possible. However, such centres also have
their limitations, and are often less helpful than they could be because of rigid
immigration regimes in many countries which do not correspond to the job-rich
realities of their labour markets. For lower skilled migrants, in particular,
migration information centres may confirm a near absence of migration
opportunities. After being informed of the lack of regular migration options,
many low-skilled migrants will then seek out migrant smugglers or other
agents who intend to exploit them abroad. Such centres may also have the
unintended effect of encouraging the skilled and highly skilled to migrate,
thereby depriving countries of origin of their desperately-needed expertise.
Therefore, for migration information centres to be more effective, they must
balance the needs and interests of countries of destination and origin, as well as
the needs and interests of migrants.
3.2 Protection and the Importance of Identification
Trafficking in persons is part of a much larger narrative, a
narrative we read almost daily in the arrivals of people at
Lampedusa, the Canary Islands, Beitbridge, the Rio Grande, or
on the Yemeni coast; all of whom hope to make even a meagre
living away from home. Despite the well-publicised risks of
mishap along the way, and the deaths of thousands, the boats and
275
trucks keep coming. How many of these individuals are being

smuggled? How many of them are being trafficked? These are
questions we are often asked, but for which there is no easy
answer.20
The UN Trafficking Protocol has three primary objectives, one of which is the
protection and assistance of victims of trafficking. However, this instrument
makes protection suggestions, rather than identifying protection requirements.
Article 6, for example, indicates what states should endeavour to provide
(physical safety) and should consider (appropriate housing; counselling;
medical, psychological, and material assistance; employment, educational and
training opportunities), in appropriate cases (privacy and confidentiality),
although Article 14 ensures that none of the Protocols stipulated criminal
justice requirements can be used to undermine the human rights obligations
found in other international legal instruments.
Many of the Protocols protection-oriented recommendations are now
established in a number of the worlds major destination countries, but fewer
victims than expected are accessing them. Between fiscal years 2001 and 2007,
for example, the United States issued 1,974 persons with T-visas, which allow
the recipient to remain in the United States and eventually apply for residency,
despite the availability of 1000 new T-visas per year.21 Certainly, when one
considers the enormous annual estimates of people trafficked, ranging from
600,000 to 4 million persons,22 and the comparatively few victims that have
been identified for protection purposes,23 one begins to suspect the
methodologies employed both in determining the estimates and in delivering
protection.
20
IOM Deputy Director General Mme Ndioro Ndiaye, Statement on Protection at the UN Thematic
Debate on Trafficking, June 3, 2008.
21
US Department of Justice, Attorney Generals Annual Report to Congress and Assessment of the U.S.
Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington D.C.: DOJ,
2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/human_trafficking.htm (accessed March 29, 2009).
22
Francis T. Miko, Trafficking in Persons: The US and International Response. CRS Report to Congress,
www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL30545.pd (accessed March 20, 2009). The ILO quotes that 2.4 million
people are being trafficked at any given time while 12.3 million people are in forced labour, bonded
labour, forced child labour and sexual servitude. See ILO, Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings
(Geneva: ILO, 2008), 1; ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour, 10.
23
Between 1996/97 and 2009, IOM, for example, has identified and assisted approximately 20,000
victims of trafficking, more than any other single intergovernmental, governmental, or nongovernmental institution.
276
Box 4: Role of Border Guards and Diplomatic Corps in Victim Identification and
Protection: The Case of Ukraine
Border Guards
Ukraine is a country of origin, transit and destination for trafficking in men, women and children.
Over the past several years, the State Border Guards Service (SBGS) has been increasingly
involved in combating trafficking in persons. By terminating trafficking channels and detaining
traffickers, the agency hopes to prevent further cases of trafficking. In terms of identification, the
SBGS tries to identify, not only actual victims of trafficking, but also potential victims.
According to the US Department of State 2007 Trafficking in Persons Report, in 2006 SBGS
closed nine channels of trafficking, prevented forty-three persons from being trafficked, and
detained twenty-nine suspects.
Collaboration with NGO partners is an important component of the agencys counter-trafficking
efforts. The partnership between SBGS and the Faith, Hope, Love NGO in Odessa Oblast
(province) resulted in the timely identification and referral of over 700 victims of trafficking in
Ukraine and other CIS countries. At the border crossing with Poland and Belarus, SBGS has
joined forces with the NGO Volyn Perspectives in establishing a working model for
identification of trafficked persons. Between June 2007 and June 2008, 548 Ukrainian citizens
who had been deported from their host countries were interviewed by Volyn Perspectives staff at
border checkpoints. As a result of these interviews, ninety-six trafficked persons (twenty-eight
men and sixty-eight women) where identified among the deported.
Embassy/Consular Officials
Consulates and embassies are also prime locations from which to initiate counter-trafficking
efforts. Consulates in Kiev are provided with an anti-trafficking hotline number, information
material on human trafficking, and on safe foreign travel. This material, which is available to all
visa applicants, aims to prevent trafficking by informing people of certain dangers which can be
associated with international travel. IOM recognises the important role consular staff can have in
trafficking prevention; therefore, the Organizations offices in Kiev continually provide training
to the diplomatic corps on how to identify victims during the visa application process.
Diplomatic staff in Ukraine are also involved in victim referral. The embassy of Uzbekistan in
Kiev, for example, referred citizens of their country who had been exploited in Ukraine to IOM
offices.
Ukrainian consular and embassy officials abroad also play an active role in victim identification
and protection. In Turkey and the UAE, consular officials met with Ukrainian citizens detained
in local jails and migrant detention centres in order to determine whether any trafficked persons
were being apprehended.
Whom to Identify?
The first big challenge for protection agencies arises when trying to distinguish
trafficked persons from the larger pool of mixed migration flows, particularly
while they are still in transit (see also the chapter of Benjamin S. Buckland in
this book). Are the people washing ashore in Malta or Lampedusa victims of
trafficking, smuggled migrants, or prospective labour migrants who are
277
travelling without documentation? The answer is of critical importance in

countries of destination or transit in which to be positively identified as a
victim of trafficking opens the door to a raft of protection opportunities, while
failing to be identified is likely to result in detention and/or deportation. In
many cases, the answer comes too late for the migrant who must survive an
uncertain and hazardous journey and exploitation before being lucky enough to
encounter an official who has the knowledge and authority to make a positive
determination, and the good will to do so.
The second main protection challenge is implicit in the trafficking process;
namely, that many victims fear their traffickers, often long after they have
escaped their immediate control and, consequently, remain reluctant to seek
protection through official channels for fear of retaliation. Although some
governments have expressed concern that the creation of a reflection period
would open the floodgates to fraudulent claims, no state that has created a
reflection period has yet experienced this.24 Unlike the asylum process
available to refugees, which is thought to have seen considerable abuse, many
victims of trafficking that are entitled to seek protection seem to prefer the
security of anonymity, especially when an organised criminal group has been
noticeably involved in the trafficking process. Additionally, there are multiple
reasons why migrants may exercise caution when sharing their experiences.
Some of the more common reasons include a trafficking experience which has
been too traumatic to share,25 cultural taboos, fear of being stigmatised,26 fear
of the consequences of being implicated as accessories to criminal activity, and
24
A reflection period in this context means a period of temporary residence which is granted to allow a
victim of trafficking to recover from the trauma of his or her experience.
25
The mental health effects of trafficking are well documented. A 2006 report on the health consequences
of women and adolescents trafficked in Europe, for example, suggests that 70% of the women reported
ten or more mental health symptoms associated with depression, anxiety and hostility within the first 14
days. After 28 days, 52% still suffered ten or more concurrent mental health symptoms, and not until
after 90 or more days did this symptom level seem to subside. Cathy Zimmerman and others, Stolen
Smiles: A Summary Report on the Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of Women and
Adolescents Trafficked in Europe (London: The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine,
2006), 12.
26
In a 2007 study of why victims decline assistance, Annete Brunovskis and Rebecca Surtees found that
while many respondents felt that stigma was associated with having worked (albeit forcibly) in
prostitution, stigma seems also to be linked with other characteristics, like failed migration and failure
to return home with money Anette Brunovskis and Rebecca Surtees, Leaving the Past Behind? When
Victims of Trafficking Decline Assistance (Oslo: Fafo, Nexus Institute, 2007), 123.
278
fear of traffickers.27 In some cases, trafficked persons may tailor their stories in
order to receive assistance; in others, they may choose to say nothing at all.
The third main protection challenge has been the significant variance among
protection organisations, including government agencies, in deciding who is a
victim of trafficking. While many agencies offering protection acknowledge
the Protocol definition, most of these have also dispensed with the elements of
the Protocols Article 4, requiring both transnationality and the involvement of
an organised criminal group, either as a result of broader definitions available
under national legislation, or as a matter of practice. Furthermore, there is a
wide diversity of views among anti-trafficking practitioners, even among those
working with the same organisation, in responding to questions critical to
making a positive identification:
o
Is movement an essential component of the trafficking process? If

so, how far does someone need to have been moved? If not, how
does one distinguish between a trafficked person and anyone who
has been exploited?
Is the test for exploitation an objective or subjective test? Is it

relevant that this migrant has understood, agreed, and wants to
work for five dollars a day picking tomatoesbecause it is four
dollars more than she would earn at home for the same work? Is it
relevant to our determination that the minimum wage for this work
in the country in which shes working is five dollars an hour? Is it
exploitative to work for five dollars a day in one country, but not in
another?
What degree of difference must exist between the nature and

conditions of the work that was promised and the nature and
conditions of the work that was performed? Is it relevant, for
example, that he was promised $400 a month, and only earned
$300, or was promised a bed but sleeps on the floor? Where does
one draw the line?
Although a number of international institutions, including IOM, ILO, and the

European Commission, have been, and continue to be, involved in efforts to
develop common standards of identification that would resolve some, or many,
of these issues, the fact that most victims of trafficking that receive protection
27
For a more detailed discussion on how fear can be a factor in the reaction of victims during the
identification process see Rebecca Surtees, Listening to Victims: Experiences of Identification, Return
and Assistance in South-Eastern Europe (Vienna: ICMPD, 2007), 57-61.
279
are identified by a plethora of national-level, advocacy-oriented NGOs and

civil society groups suggests that the implementation of a common standard of
identification will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future.
A final challenge is the general lack of understanding of trafficking and its
indicators among host communities in countries of destination. Given that
much police work relies on the information, tips and complaints of local
residents, identifying victims of trafficking becomes more challenging when
the general public is unaware, when local police conflate trafficking with
prostitution or migrant smuggling, or where xenophobic attitudes are prevalent
and widespread, including where migrants are viewed first as perpetrators of
crime, regardless of their actual involvement.
All of these factors contribute to the broad challenge of identifying victims of
trafficking, which is the critical first step towards ensuring the protection of
trafficked persons. However, it should not be forgotten that national protection
regimes for victims of trafficking are often the only available window through
which vulnerable and exploited migrants can benefit from protection measures.
In the absence of a broader protection regime for all exploited migrants, and
those considered particularly vulnerable to exploitation, many service providers
will seek to use protections available to trafficked persons, and so trigger what
is essentially a criminal justice response, to aid a much broader category of
beneficiaries.
Box 5
Mixed Migration Task Force Somalia
Migration from the horn of Africa to the Gulf, and to Yemen in particular, has increased
dramatically in recent years. While some migrants leave to seek better employment opportunities
abroad, others flee chronic instability, and indeed persecution at home. These different push
factors have led to mixed migration flows in which economic migrants and asylum-seekers
make use of the same smugglers, the same means of transportation, and the same routes, to reach
their final destination.
Service providers throughout this migration circuit have been faced with the difficult task of
trying to provide assistance to groups of migrants with very diverse needs. Moreover, the fact
that protection is usually rendered only when a person meets specific requirements, and can
therefore be placed in certain administrative categories, has made migrants more vulnerable to
human rights abuses.
The resulting protection gap led, in 2007, to the creation of the Mixed Migration Task Force
Somalia. Under the auspices of the United Nations Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC),
the Task Force was created with the purpose of providing a rights-based strategy to the
protection and humanitarian needs of migrants and asylum seekers transiting through Somalia.
280
Its co-chairs, IOM and UNHCR, together with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the
United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), the Danish Refugee Council, and the Norwegian Refugee Council, aim to
provide a regional and cohesive strategy for a pro-active response.
UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP): Forging interagency
cooperation in combating trafficking in persons
Counter-trafficking efforts are usually characterised by a multitude of agencies working
alongside one another, often in an uncoordinated manner, to implement programs in line with
their respective area of expertise. The prevailing notion is that there is so much to be done that a
general strength in numbers approach is the most beneficial. However, not all agencies share
the same perspectives on the issue, nor coordinate effectively when implementing similar
activities leading to project overlap, lack of standardisation and, at worst, division of purpose.
Having recognised the negative effects loose coordination can have on counter-trafficking
activities, agencies working in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (Cambodia, PR China, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) coalesced around the UN Inter-Agency Project on Human
Trafficking (UNIAP) in 2000 to strengthen coordination efforts and build upon the respective
strengths of well-established UN, IO and NGO anti-trafficking programmes in the region.
In its first phase the project worked to create new partnerships and launched several pilot
programmes. In its second phase UNIAP facilitated negotiations between the six governments of
the region leading to the creation in 2004 of the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative
against Trafficking (COMMIT). This initiative is underpinned by a sub-regional plan of action
which provides a framework for coordination. Moreover, the plan of action is a benchmark
document which guides anti-trafficking interventions in several key areas including:
identification of victims and apprehension of perpetrators, legal frameworks and mutual legal
assistance, and safe and timely repatriation. UNIAP, serving as secretariat, is guided by a project
management board composed of the UNDP Resident Coordinator, ILO, IOM, UNICEF,
UNODC and, on a rotational basis, members from other UN agencies, donor representatives, and
a government representative.
UNIAP has positively contributed to promoting broad cooperation and coordination among the
range of anti-trafficking stakeholders, but the project itself is not an implementing entity; rather it
is a facilitator of coordination and consistency in approach. Challenges remain and true impact
will only be achieved if donors and host governments similarly coordinate their inputs toward
building the momentum that is necessary to have a sustained impact on the issue.
How to Protect?
In addition to the challenges of identification, there are unresolved questions
about how best to protect victims. One of the first protection-related questions
typically asked by states is whether victims of trafficking, once identified, have
particular obligations to assist with the investigation and prosecution of their
traffickers, and whether offers of protection should be linked to such
obligations. Contrary to state practice, the rights-based approach answers with
281
an unqualified no. It is often argued that a more effective tactic is to offer

unconditional protection to victims of trafficking on the assumption that this
will encourage more victims to come forward to receive protection and, upon
doing so, that these may then wish to cooperate with law enforcement agencies,
when a requirement to do so may have inhibited them from seeking protection
in the first place.
A second question that has been asked by practitioners is whether all victims of
trafficking require the same protection standards and direct assistance
packages. Protection standards and direct assistance packages for victims of
trafficking have, in large part, been developed with a particular profile in
minda young woman, usually from Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia, who
has been trafficked into sexual exploitation and prostitution. Indeed, the
Protocol, with its express consideration of especially women and children
has contributed to this focus. Increasingly, however, as organisations discover
the diversity of purposes for which people are being trafficked, questions arise
about the applicability of expensive components of the standard assistance
package, such as safe houses, psychosocial counselling, etc. to all cases.
Advocacy-oriented protection agencies often promote the principle that the
highest standard of care should be available to all persons identified as victims,
but states, which must bear the political and financial costs of such protection
regimes, wonder whether a male victim trafficked into a situation in which his
earnings are 2050 per cent less than he was promised upon recruitment, really
requires, for example, temporary residence through a reflection period. These
questions are thrown into starker relief given that some protection actors
overlook the Protocols Article 4 requirements and identify people who have
been exploited more by the vagaries of the labour market than by the deliberate
actions of organised criminal groups as victims of trafficking.
Questions such as these are then coupled with a general inconsistency of
protection measures available to trafficked persons across borders. As has
already been noted, the Protocol is a criminal justice tool, rather than a
protection tool, and states that are party to it are not obligated to institute a
standardised national protection framework for victims; they need only
consider and endeavour to provide protection in appropriate cases.28
This, of course, has created a patchwork of protection regimes throughout the
world which can result in the availability of aromatherapy treatment for victims
in some countries, while in others, victims are prosecuted for minor legal
28
Granted, had victim protection been a mandatory feature of the Protocol, it is likely that far fewer states
would have agreed to become parties to it.
282
infractions directly related to the trafficking experience, such as illegal entry.29

The greatest progress towards creating protection obligations for states, and
then standardising them across borders, has been made in Europe. With the
coming into force of the Council of Europe Convention in 2007, protection
obligations are now standardising throughout the European Union, although
even in Europe there remains considerable distance between the law and its
implementation, particularly by national law enforcement agencies.
A Broader Protection Context
Given the difficulties inherent in the identification of victims of trafficking,
some international actors, including IOM, are encouraging a needs-based
approach to protection, particularly in the context of mixed migration flows.
Rather than screening for indicators of trafficking as a first step, this approach
calls for an assessment of the protection needs of vulnerable migrants in order
to provide humanitarian assistance based on their trauma, hardship or
condition, as opposed to their migration category. A migrant who washes
ashore on a beach in Italy, for example, should be screened first for any
immediate medical needs, and provided with food and water, warm clothing,
and appropriate accommodation as necessary. Once his or her physical
condition has been stabilised and secured, any psychosocial needs should be
addressed. Should a victim of trafficking be positively identified through this
process, then additional protection measures specifically designed to ensure the
security of victims of trafficking facing credible threats from organised
criminal groups would become available. In sum, rather than screening first to
divide vulnerable migrants into legal categories before offering protection to
those selected as bona fide victims of trafficking or refugees, the priority
should be to respond unconditionally to the humanitarian needs of all
vulnerable migrants, regardless of legal status. By creating a needs first
protection framework for all vulnerable migrants, the safe space created may
circumvent some of the existing identification hurdles, and encourage
trafficked persons to share their experiences.
3.3 Prosecution
Alongside prevention of trafficking in persons, and the protection of its
victims, prosecution stands as the 3rd P, and the only one that focuses directly
29
IOM Field Reports.
283
on the criminal responsible. However, it is a fact that attempts to investigate

and prosecute traffickers have resulted in comparatively few successes (on the
difficulties of prosecuting traffickers, see also the chapter by Allison Jernow in
this book). Statistics collected by the US Department of State on the number of
prosecutions of traffickers show that between 2003 and 2007 there were an
average of 6,509 prosecutions, resulting in 3,361 convictions.30 Even
accounting for the likelihood that an additional number of traffickers have been
convicted for other crimes related to the offence of trafficking, when set
alongside the estimated annual numbers of victims traffickedbetween
600,000 and 4 millionthe disparity indicates an epic failure.
Admittedly, trafficking in persons is still a new crime in most countries, and
while widespread ratification of the Protocol came quicklythe Protocol
entered into force only three years after it was available for signatureit has
taken longer for states to promulgate corresponding national legislation.
Furthermore, some prosecutors have suggested that the trafficking offence
places too great a burden of proof on the state, prompting some jurisdictions to
relieve its prosecutors of the obligation to establish the means in article 3(a)
by means of threat. The task of prosecuting trafficking offences is further
complicated by the difficulty of identifying victims, and the reality that few of
those identified wish to support a prosecution, as well as the challenges of
gathering evidence to prosecute traffickers in the absence of the victim's
testimony, such as the unique risks posed to police agents who attempt to
infiltrate human trafficking syndicates.31 Added to this are the complexities
(and expense) of prosecuting a crime for which the perpetrators and evidence
are often scattered across countries, and the challenge of securing the
cooperation of law enforcement officials in other jurisdictions, sometimes on
the far side of the world.
One reason for this may be that the criminal justice approach to combating
trafficking may be too narrow to properly address such a cross-cutting and
dynamic problem. Although somewhat speculative at this early stage, one
wonders at the impact on human trafficking if prosecutors, and a states
criminal justice machinery in general, focused not exclusively on the narrow
crime of trafficking, but on broader migrants' rights issues, particularly in
countries of transit or destination, where exploitation and abuse of migrants is
30
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington D.C.: Office of the UnderSecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, 2008), 37.
31
See, for example, Amy O'Neill Richard, International Trafficking in Women into the United States: A
Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime (Washington D.C.: Centre for the Study
of Intelligence, 2000), 32.
284
more likely to occur. Such an approach could include prosecutions related to

discrimination and abuse of migrants, including those who do not enjoy a
regularised legal status. A court in Greece, for example, has held that a local
employer who had exploited the labour of an irregular migrant was liable to
pay in restitution wages the migrant would have earned had he been legally
employed.32 This approach would require increased support to labour
inspectors so that they may conduct regular inspections of industries in
economic sectors in which migrants often experience exploitation and abuse,
including agriculture, food processing, construction, textiles, and care and
hospitality.
3.4 Are the 3Ps enough?
Prevention, protection and prosecution, when interpreted through a criminal
justice lens, have produced results far more modest than should be expected
given the impact of trafficking on human lives, and the expenditure of
resources in attempting to counter it. The problem needs to be viewed from a
wider angle: one in which anti-trafficking prevention is aimed at consumer
demand along with the criminal motivation for profit, rather than at the
motivations of aspirant migrants, but where migration management tactics,
such as migration information centres, can have a secondary, anti-trafficking,
impact; where protection of exploited migrants, and those considered
particularly vulnerable to abuse, is prioritised over the complex and often
insoluble task of distinguishing victims of trafficking from those who find
themselves in situations of exploitation which are substantially similar; and
where state actors with broader migration-related portfolios, such as labour
inspectors, are considered alongside core criminal justice actors as part of the
prosecutorial response.
But even should this broader view prevail, the 3-Ps approach would remain
inadequate without the addition of a 4th P: Partnerships, which is the
cornerstone of the migration management approach.
4. Partnerships
Implicit to the migration management concept is the idea of collective
administration; that popular migration across international borders is addressed
32
Supreme Court of Greece, Decision 1788/2001.
285
bilaterally or multilaterally, while balancing the needs and interests of countries

of origin and countries of destination, as well as matching the needs and
interests of migrants with labour market demands.
However, the framework for such multilateral migration management at a
global level is lacking. States that have agreed to limit their sovereign authority
to ensure freer trade are reluctant to sign on to any global conventions that
would limit their sovereign authority to determine who can enter their territory,
and for how long those who are granted entry can remain. This process has
been particularly noticeable in relation to the slow entry into force of the 1990
ICRMW, whose ratification is largely limited to countries of origin.
States are beginning to understand the need for multilateral and comprehensive
processes to manage migration and deal with trafficking; and they are
beginning to act on this need at a regional level. This common understanding
allows us to describe this process as bottom-up, whereby a group of states
sharing common concerns come together voluntarily to develop collective
solutions.33 Other forms of multilateral processes and frameworks, both formal
and informal, are therefore underway in this field.
4.1 Formal Processes
Of the formal regional processes in the world, the European Union (EU) is
perhaps the most developed and integrated, especially in relation to migration
management. The fundamental principles outlined in the treaties, and the
decisions taken by the Council of the EU, are held to override national laws,
and its activities embrace three pillars: economic harmonisation, a common
security and foreign policy, and justice and home affairs. In terms of migration
management, the Schengen Agreements have seen the creation of an internal
space of free movement, as well as a harmonisation of external border policies.
Under the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, the EU has engaged in
cooperation between member states to counter trafficking. In 2002, the EU
issued a Framework Decision obliging member states to ensure that there was a
common definition of trafficking, stiff penalties for perpetrators, and a
commitment to victim protection regardless of their immigration status.34 More
33
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, The Role of Regional Consultative Processes in Managing
International Migration (Geneva: IOM, 2001), 2.
34
It is important to note that divergent approaches to victim protection still exist in Europe. Spain, who
signed the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in July 2008, for example,
passed a National Plan of Action against trafficking in persons in December 2008 that targets only
286
generally, under the pillar of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, the EU
has created a number of institutions such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex to
facilitate cooperation between, and common understandings among, the law
enforcement and other agencies of the member states on inter alia human
trafficking.
Under the second pillar, the EU has also sought to use foreign policy tools to
manage migration. Under the comprehensive approach outlined at the
Tampere Summit in 1999, the EU stressed the need for cooperation on
migration management, and recognised the importance not only of addressing
cooperation and border control issues, but also the political, human rights and
development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit that they
believed forced people to migrate.35 Through negotiations with other regional
actors, such as the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and
the North African and Eastern Mediterranean countries of the Barcelona
Process, the EU has attempted to put these goals into practice. The Cotonou
Agreement between the EU and ACP, for example, not only stressed respect
for legal migrants rights but also aimed to promote development programmes
that support the economic and social development of the regions from which
migrants originate, using the EUs position as the largest trading entity in the
world and leveraging its significant aid budget to tackle perceived root
causes.36 These formal processes show how states can come together to create
migration management structures that apply to a whole region and not just
within their own territory.
Another regional organisation which has placed a considerable emphasis on
trafficking is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In
2001, ECOWAS issued a Declaration of Action Against Trafficking and a Plan
of Action to ensure that this declaration was translated into reality. This Plan of
women who have suffered from sexual exploitation. While Spain recognises other forms of exploitation
in Article 138 bis of their Criminal and Penal Code, the National Plan of Action expands the protection
scheme to women who have suffered from sexual exploitation by granting them a thirty day reflection
period and social as well as judicial assistance. Government of Spain Aprobado el Plan Integratl de
Lucha Contra la Trata de Seres Humanos con Fines de Explotacin Sexual. http://www.lamoncloa.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Referencias/_2008/refc20081212.htm#PlanIntegral (accessed March 5,
2009).
35
Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions. October 15 and 16, 1999,

http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm (accessed March 11, 2009).
36
European Commission Directorate-General for Development and Relations with African, Caribbean
and Pacific States, Partnership Agreement APC-EC (Cotonou Agreement) (Belgium: European
Communities, 2006); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Outsourcing of Migration Management: EU,
Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy (working paper, Copenhagen:
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006).
287
Action focused on the formulation and implementation of legislation,

protective and preventive measures, cooperation, training and capacitybuilding, as well as creating a structure for monitoring and evaluation.
Moreover, ECOWAS commitment to the creation of a zone of free movement
similar to the EUs suggests that the interregional approach to migration
management could also be an effective model for the future,37 and indeed the
ECOWAS-ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) Joint
Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons suggests that such processes are
underway.
These formal processes have important limitations, however. Although the
regimes they create are legally binding, they nonetheless present challenges. In
the EUs case, particularly, they reflect an understanding of the prevention and
fight against trafficking based on the formally-expressed concerns of countries
of destination about trafficking from outside the region, brought together by
their ability to demonstrate similar levels of social and economic development
and institutional capacity and presenting a relatively united front against the
outside world. The comprehensive approach that emerges from these
discussions is in fact an approach aimed solely at countries of origin and
transit, which does not address demand in the countries of destination.38
The interregional negotiations at which this united front is presented, moreover,
begin to take on the characteristics of traditional bilateral negotiations: the
relative power and different interests of the actors involved creates a highly
politicised atmosphere, and actors seek to impose their worldviews, rather than
having to build a consensus. The results are therefore not comprehensive, and
the process fosters resentment and competition rather than cooperation.39
Finally, this united front can also be perceived as imposing unilateral
conditions, ignoring the legitimate interests of states outside the region. This
was a key element of the polemic surrounding the Return Directive adopted by
the European Parliament in June 2008 and put into force in January of 2009.
The directive, it was argued, would mainly affect countries and citizens from
outside the EU, yet their interests had not been taken into account. Thus, while
it is clear that formal processes play an important role in countering trafficking,
there are some areas in which complementary forms of intergovernmental
engagement could prove useful in developing positive cooperation between a
37
Aderanti Adepoju, Migration in West Africa (Geneva: GCIM, 2005), 815.
38
Tom Obokata, EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings: A

Critical Appraisal, Common Market Law Review 40, no.4 (2003): 934.
39
Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Outsourcing of Migration Management, 11-12.
288
range of stakeholders with differing outlooks and interests for migration

management and against trafficking.
4.2 Informal Processes
Rather than solely relying on rigid frameworks and competitive negotiations,
the role of loose and ongoing discussions involving governments, civil society
and academia among others in the field of trafficking is of great importance in
that it helps identify common perceptions and helps build on a concerted
approach to fighting trafficking. Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs)
provide an important means of facilitating these kinds of discussions.
RCPs can be understood as frameworks for regular and sustained discussion
between governments and other stakeholders on migration issues. By bringing
together government representatives from countries of origin, transit and
destination, NGOs and academics in an environment conducive to discussion
between equals rather than competitive negotiation, these processes facilitate
understanding, trust, best-practice sharing and cooperation on mutuallyidentified areas of common interest between actors who may not otherwise
meet on a regular basis.40 This process of discussion among equals in a
depoliticised, off-the-record environment allows actors to move beyond the
roles that negotiations force them to take on; bound neither by interstate power
relations nor official public positions, actors can more freely discuss the
migration issues that they face and suggest new departures from established
policy.41 Indeed, where there are actors within the RCP willing to put human
rights on the agenda RCPs provide fora that lower the costs of sharing
information, developing best practices, and increasing states capacity to
promote and enforce migrants human rights.42
The repeated nature of the discussions means that understandings develop and
converge over time as the different actors in the process take account of the
experiences and situations of the other, and come to trust the motives of other
actors.43 In relation to migration management and the development of anti40
Ibid., 4.
41
Randall Hansen, Interstate Cooperation: Europe and Central Asia, in Interstate Cooperation and
Migration: Berne Initiative Studies, ed. Gervais Appave and Frank Laczko (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 17.
42
Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Addressing Immigration,
The University of Chicago Law Forum 369 (2007): 381.
43
Klekowski von Koppenfels, The Role of Regional Consultative Processes, 19; Joanne van Selm,
Immigration and Regional Security, in International Migration and Security: Opportunities and
Challenges, ed. Elspeth Guild and Joanne van Selm (London: Routledge, 2005), 20.
289
trafficking measures, this convergence of understandings is of critical

importance, as these areas are understood differently depending on the context:
the concept of exploitation, for example, is highly contested in the absence
of a global political consensus on minimum employment rights and crosssector norms regulating employment relations, while legal definitions of the
activities that make up trafficking can vary from country to country within the
same region.44 This consensual process is also important as it gives
governments a sense of ownership over the results: rather than having
definitions imposed on them, governments can feel that the outcomes are the
result of cooperation in which they have had an equal part.45 Finally, it gives
actors a chance to engage in networking and informal information-sharing.
Some of the strengths of RCPs can also be considered weaknesses. While the
non-binding nature of RCPs allows for a more candid dialogue between
countries of origin, transit and destination, their informal nature is also a
limitation, as states do not have an obligation to incorporate measures into their
national legislation. Moreover, while RCPs have the benefit of addressing an
important issue in international migration, that of intra-regional migration,
inter-regional migration does not play a predominant role in most processes.46
It is also difficult to attribute RCPs with concrete achievements and results as
these processes rarely have clear indicators of what constitutes success.
Concomitantly, most RCPs do not engage in monitoring or evaluation.47
Another weakness of RCPs is their exclusionary nature; as state-led processes,
RCPs often prevent civil society from participating. Interventions by delegates
during a workshop on Regional Consultative Processes revealed that few
RCPs admitted either NGOs or the private sector into their proceedings.48
Lastly, regional consultative processes can be drawn-out ventures which take
years to materialise. The Budapest process, for example, did not shift into a
more operation phase until nine years after their initial meeting in 1991.49
44
Bridget Anderson and Julia OConnell Davidson, Is Trafficking in Human Beings Demand-Driven? A
Multi-Country Pilot Study (Geneva : IOM, 2003), 89; International Human Rights Institute, In Modern
Bondage: Sex Trafficking in the Americas (Chicago: International Human Rights Institute, DePaul
College of Law, 2005), 50.
45
Hansen, Interstate Cooperation.
46
Klekowski von Koppenfels, The Role of Regional Consultative Processes, 52.
47
Ibid., 47.
48
Global Commission on International Migration, Summary Report of the GCIM-IOM Workshop on

Regional Consultative Processes, April 14-15, 2005, Geneva,
www.iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/rcps/gcim/Summary_Wo
rkshop_Report.pdf (accessed on March 6, 2009).
49
290
Of the many RCPs currently underway, three of these display characteristics,

outlined below, which can be identified as particularly relevant to the
development of migration management policies to fight trafficking.
The Bali Process
The Bali Process grew from the Regional Ministerial Conference on People
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime co-chaired
in February 2002 by the Foreign Ministries of Australia and Indonesia. After a
second meeting in 2003, the participants agreed to continue a program of
practical cooperation to combat people smuggling and trafficking in the
region.50 It was out of this agreement that the regular series of meetings and
workshops that constitute the Bali Process has grown. The Process brings
together forty-two core countries from Asia and Oceania as well as involving
the participation of European, African and North American countries and
international organisations.
The Process incorporates a range of activities focusing on capacity-building
and practical workshops to fight trafficking and people smuggling, with the
actors choosing which aspects they wish to be involved with. Its activities have
been practical in scope, developing model legislation in line with the UN
Trafficking Protocol (although neglecting the victim protection aspect) and
dealing with aspects such as document fraud and identifying and targeting
traffickers in the region.51 While the central anti-trafficking focus of the
Process has been on technical cooperation, there has been a longstanding
recognition that the conference should focus on tackling the root causes
including by increasing opportunities for legal migration between states,
something that was reiterated as a future direction of the Process in 2004. Over
time, this concern has moved up the agenda, along with a focus on the demand
side.52 Meanwhile, workshops under the process have been run for participants
on the best practices in relation to refugee law and irregular migration; others
have also focused on sharing best practices in victim support in countries of
destination and origin.
50
Bali Process, About the Bali Process, Bali Process.net,

http://www.baliprocess.net/index.asp?pageID=2145831401 (accessed December 2, 2008).
51
Gareth Larsen, The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related
Transnational Crime, in Interstate Cooperation and Migration: Berne Initiative Studies, ed. Gervais
Appave and Frank Laczko (Geneva : IOM, 2004), 45-6.
52
Ibid., 47.
291
Despite being voluntary, there is some evidence that this process is facilitating
the exploration and development of important norms, moving beyond technical
cooperation and law enforcement approaches to more contested areas of the
fight against trafficking. Moreover, these norms are being voluntarily adopted
in a concrete fashion. For example, a year after its introduction, eighteen
countries had made use of a model legislation on trafficking.53
The Puebla Process
The Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) was triggered by a shared
concern among Central and North American countries over increased irregular
migration. In 1996, countries of the region came together in the Mexican city
of Puebla where they vowed to address the issue of migration management,
particularly links between migration and development, human trafficking, the
human rights of migrants and technical cooperation.
Member states (Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the United States)54
have different migration perspectives as RCM brings together origin,
destination and transit countries. Member states meet once a year at a viceministerial level while holding other meetings and workshops together with
NGOs throughout the year. Furthermore, NGOs, which belong to the Regional
Network for Civil Organizations on Migration (RNCOM), are able to issue a
parallel joint communiqu at every vice-ministerial meeting55 and attend the
workshops on trafficking in human beings and consular issues. Although civil
society appears to be present in the process, members of the RNCOM often
criticise the lack of comprehensive dialogue with the member states.56
One of RCMs main goals is to combat human trafficking within the region. As
set out in the 2007 Action Plan, the forums strategy focuses on three main
aspects. Firstly, the RCM encourages member states to enact national
legislation which addresses the issue of trafficking as a criminal offence. This
forums approach to trafficking is quite comprehensive, however, in that it not
only focuses on the criminal aspect of the phenomenon but also considers
aspects of prevention and victim protection within the framework of existing
legislation. Secondly, the Puebla Process works on strengthening multilateral
53
Bali Process Ad Hoc Experts Group II, 2003.
54
Observer states include Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Peru.
55
Regional Conference on Migration, http://rcmvs.org/pagina_n2.htm (accessed March 5, 2008).
56
Personal communication of author with a member of the RNCOM.
292
cooperation in exchanging information and best practices to combat trafficking

in persons; this in light of the complex and transnational nature of the
phenomenon. Concrete activities in this rubric include workshops on best
practices in investigation and prosecution of traffickers.57 Lastly, the RCM,
through various media outlets, publicises the results of efforts and programmes
to prevent trafficking in persons.
RCM is perceived to be a highly effective multilateral organism in that it has
contributed to the exploration of common policy options and better
coordination among national agencies dealing with migration by using
pragmatic and concrete steps.58 This is particularly the case in terms of issues
related to human trafficking whereby countries lack the necessary data on the
occurrence of the phenomenon and where, until recently, member states lacked
a legal framework in which to address the issue as a crime. However, as with
any other informal process, the Regional Conference on Migration has its
limitations. The April 2007 Regional Guidelines for Special Protection in
Cases of the Repatriation of Child Victims of Trafficking, for example, while
cited as an effective tool in facilitating the process of return,59 has also been
criticised for not being an effective tool in effective reintegration of child
victims of trafficking.
The achievements of the RCM point towards ways in which countries with
divergent migration characteristics can come together in a regional forum in
order to address mutual concerns and propose innovative ways in which to deal
with common problems related to migration management.
The Colombo Process
The Colombo Process grouped ten of the major countries of origin for labour
migration from Asia in 2003. In contrast to the Bali Process, it has no specific
mandate to deal with trafficking; however, two of its major thematic areas of
concern focus on Protection of and Provision of Services to Migrant Workers
and Capacity Building, Data Collection and Inter-State Cooperation,
especially in relation to Increasing cooperation with destination countries in
57
The sharing of best practices has led to approval of the Regional Guidelines for Special Protection in
cases of Return of Child Victims of Trafficking. See Regional Conference on Migration, XII Meeting
of the Regional Conference on Migration: Declaration, (New Orleans, April 26-27, 2007),
http://rcmvs.org/XII_RCM.htm (accessed December 11, 2008).
58
59
Some IOM field staff, for example, mention how it is now easier to identify the ministry in charge of
overseeing the return process in the country of origin.
293
the protection of migrant workers and access to labour markets; and enhancing
cooperation among countries of origin.60 Key goals of this RCP therefore
focus on preventing the exploitation of migrant workers, and so the outcomes
are important in creating a migration management regime between countries of
origin and destination that will effectively undermine and prevent trafficking.61
The recommendations that have emerged from the ministerial discussions have
focused on a range of measures that provide information to migrants before
their departure and during their time in the country of destination, to simplify
the migration process, empower migrants, regulate employment agencies and
ensure the proper enforcement of contracts. Although progress on the different
recommendations has been uneven, nonetheless it is clear that these discussions
have had important policy outcomes. Sri Lanka, for example, has created
regional offices of its Bureau of Foreign Employment and employed 400
officers to enable prospective migrants to have access to information about safe
migration without having to travel to Colombo, as well as making these
services free of charge. Other countries such as Nepal, Vietnam, the Philippines
and Sri Lanka are entering into Memoranda of Understanding with
governments to ensure that their workers contracts are correctly enforced.
The Colombo Process recognition of the need for dialogue and partnership
with governments of countries of destination gave rise to an important initiative
that provides a strong example of the value of RCPs in bringing together
countries with differing interests to talk candidly about controversial topics.
The Abu Dhabi Dialogue brought together ministers from the countries of
destination of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as from the
Colombo Process countries to outline and discuss a collaborative approach on
managing labour migration. The Declaration that came from these discussions
marks a significant step forward for the protection of migrant workers in the
GCC region as the countries of destination recognised the need for:
the provision to all workers of good living and working conditions,
their protection including through promotion and implementation of
transparent policies and practices including for recruitment and
employment according to the national laws and regulations of countries
of origin and destination [as well as] the joint responsibility of
countries of origin and destination to enforce compliance by
60
Colombo Process, Background, Colombo Process,

http://www.colomboprocess.org/about_process.php#mem (accessed November 2, 2008).
61
This is especially important in a region where human trafficking is conceived of as relating only to
prostitution.
294
recruitment agencies and other parties engaged in the recruitment

process with the requirements of national laws and regulations
pertaining to the employment of temporary contractual labour, thus
providing further protection to workers.
The governments committed to building partnerships on different issues,
notably focusing on Preventing illegal recruitment practices and promoting
welfare and protection measures for contractual workers, supportive of their
well being and preventing their exploitation at origin and destination.62 As a
concrete outcome of this discussion, the United Arab Emirates Ministry of
Labour issued a report on The Protection of the Rights of Workers in the United
Arab Emirates, which acknowledges the issues involved in migrant worker
protection and emphasises the importance of legislation and enforcement to
protect migrant workers.63
The strength of RCPs is also their weakness: their informal nature means that
their activities lack the systematic follow-up mechanisms that more formal
systems use to ensure that standards are equally-applied. However, they can
certainly complement more formal mechanisms, providing a trust-building
forum for debate on a basis of equality, information-sharing and networking on
and raising awareness of trafficking issues in a bottom-up and non-adversarial
manner. Where there has been an element of financial support, they have
already proved to have some impact in building capacities to combat human
trafficking. Their flexibility makes them ideal in developing broad networks of
cooperation and partnership which, as acknowledged by the 4P approach, is
essential to any effective counter trafficking strategies.
5. Conclusions
Human trafficking cannot properly be addressed as a stand-alone issue. Any
interventions must take into account the broader migration management
framework. This includes the need for governments of countries of origin and
destination to work together to establish more legal channels for migration,
taking into account both labour supply and demand, as well as the rights and
aspirations of individual migrants, and matching these through more systematic
62
Abu Dhabi Declaration, http://www.hicmena.org/documents/Abu%20Dhabi%20Declaration%20(migrants).doc (accessed March 10, 2009).
63
UAE Ministry of Labour, The Protection of the Rights of Workers in the United Arab Emirates: Annual
Report 2007 (Abu Dhabi: Ministry of Labour, 2008),
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session3/AE/UPR_UAE_ANNEX2_E.pdf (accessed
January 10, 2009).
295
planning. These channels should include provision for safe and dignified
employment for migrant women who make up almost 50 per cent of all
migrants. 64
The sovereign right of a state to determine who is allowed into its territory does
not absolve it from obligations to protect the rights of all migrants on its soil,
including irregular migrants. The Trafficking Protocol must be seen for what it
is, namely a criminal justice treaty. It must not be used to limit the protection
and assistance afforded to those vulnerable migrants not identified as victims of
trafficking.
Migration is an enormously complex phenomenon that requires multifaceted
and multi-sectoral interventions to address its myriad dimensions. A full
discussion on how to effectively counter human trafficking within a global
migration management framework would require an exploration of the linkages
between human trafficking and migration and the areas of trade and labour. In
this short chapter we have perforce limited ourselves to focusing on the core
trafficking issue of human rights protection and how this might be strengthened
through migration management policy tools.
The following broad measures should be considered as important steps toward
establishing a migration framework that more effectively protects the rights of
all migrants while contributing to a reduction in human trafficking.
Recommendations
Protection Based on Needs
Recognising that the identification of trafficking victims remains problematic,
initial protection for exploited or otherwise abused migrants should be based on
their actual needs. Service providers should spend more time addressing the
protection needs of vulnerable, abused, and exploited people, rather than
applying labels or determining the category into which a particular migrant
should be inserted. This approach should be accompanied by continued efforts
to develop common standards for identification of trafficked persons, such as
those being carried out by IOM, ILO, the European Commission, and others.
Only once essential protection and humanitarian needs are addressed should it
become important to distinguish victims of the crime of trafficking from those
migrants who have suffered from, for example, the vagaries of the labour
market.
64
IOM, World Migration Report (Geneva: IOM, 2008), 10.
296
The Importance of Labour Laws

Recognising that human trafficking and exploitation largely occur in the
informal sector, governments should ensure that informal and unregulated work
activities are brought within the protection of labour laws so that all workers
national and foreignenjoy the same labour rights. In this regards, more
consideration should be given to the UN Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families as a tool to protect migrants
from human trafficking.
Prevention Campaigns Need to Work Positively
Prevention measures in countries of origin should aim to work positively with
migrants and people intending to migrate, to empower them so that they are
able to do so in a safe and dignified way. Migrant Information Centres and
other mechanisms that inform potential migrants about migration options and
their rights in countries of destination, as well as allowing them to verify the
legality of job offers, are important tools in this respect. Any public
information campaigns designed to contribute to the prevention of human
trafficking should be careful to avoid disseminating an anti-migration message.
More Research on Demand
Major contributing factors to human trafficking include poverty, gender
inequalities, and discrimination in countries of origin, but the root cause lies in
the demand for cheap, flexible and unprotected labour in countries of
destination, as well as the large and easy profits to be made from this illicit
trade. More research on demand for all forms of trafficked and exploitative
labour, including the role of states and the private sector, should be undertaken
to fully understand the issues and to explore the responses needed.
Raise Awareness in Destination Countries
Governments of destination countries, especially in a time of economic crisis,
should actively engage in raising public awareness of the benefits migrants
bring to society. Only with the support of their constituencies will governments
be able to establish more legal migration channels. This should be accompanied
by an increased effort towards combating xenophobic attitudes.
297
Increase Cooperation
Governments should strengthen efforts to ensure cooperation between countries
of origin, transit and destination on combating trafficking and protecting
victims. RCPs have proved to be a useful mechanism through which to foster
this cooperation especially where they establish working or expert groups on
relevant issues. It is also important to acknowledge as equal the needs and
interests of all states, whether they be primarily countries of origin, transit, or
destination.
298
CHAPTER 8
Human Trafficking & Peacekeepers
Keith J. Allred
Introduction
The modern scourge of human trafficking is driven by a number of supply and
demand pressures related to the global economy.1 Both men and women are
trafficked to provide agricultural and sweatshop labour; children are trafficked
for various forms of child labour, including begging, brides and camel jockeys,
and for child prostitution. There is a small market for human trafficking in
order to procure organs for transplant.2 And finally, what is considered by
many to be the largest single reason for trafficking moves women to where
there is a demand for commercialised sexual services.3
In light of increasing international efforts to combat human trafficking, it is
ironic that international troops posted abroad on peacekeeping and other
military missions should contribute to this demand for women trafficked for
prostitution. There is a growing and substantial body of evidence that deployed
peacekeepers have created or contributed to the demand for sexual services,
and that substantial numbers of women have been trafficked to meet that
demand. Forces intended as the solution to one international problem have
aggravated another: human trafficking. Beyond the indirect support they
provide by seeking sexual services and patronising women who may have
been trafficked, there is evidence that a small number of peacekeepers have
1
The views expressed herein are the author's own views, and not the views of any component of the US
government.
For an example of one domestic organ-selling operation in which the donors are misled and then
taken advantage of, see Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Caveat Donor, Atlantic Monthly (December 2008),
www.theatlantic.com/doc/200812/0rgan-transplant-india (accessed May 15, 2009).
The breadth of the global human trafficking market is described in a number of official reports, the
most notable being the US State Departments annual Trafficking in Persons Report. The 2008 edition
is available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105501.pdf (accessed May 15, 2009).
The UNODC offers A Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, available at:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html
(accessed April 15, 2009).
299
actually engaged more directly and substantially in the trade in trafficked

women.
The correlation between peacekeepers and human trafficking brings a number
of adverse consequences to the fore. The credibility and legitimacy of a
peacekeeping mission will suffer when the public becomes aware that
peacekeepers are involved in the trafficking of women. Peacekeeper
involvement in human trafficking supports organised crime by purchasing its
services and thereby funding its operations. When organised crime grows in
power and influence in any troubled area, the peacekeeping mission of
strengthening civil society is antagonised and countered by increased criminal
activity. Sexually transmitted diseases may increase among peacekeepers,
trafficked women, and the balance of the local population. Beyond this, the
international community recoils at the thought that its peacekeepers are
engaged in so perverse an activity as human trafficking.
This chapter will identify the group of actors referred to here as
peacekeepers, and examine the variety of ways in which peacekeepers
support human trafficking. It will consider and evaluate corrective actions
being implemented by various states and international organisations; identify
corrective measures that still require evaluation and implementation; and
conclude with a list of recommendations for further reducing the correlation
between peacekeepers and trafficking. While there have been some recent
positive movements in addressing this problem, there are also many obstacles
yet to be overcome. The chapter concludes with cautious optimism that the
international community is moving in the right direction.
1. Who Are The Peacekeepers?
Readers may be inclined to think of peacekeepers in a narrow and limited
sense, as an international force of military personnel wearing the blue helmet of
the United Nations (UN). This chapter treats the concept of peacekeepers more
broadly. Any UN intervention brings with it a host of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), private military contractors, and an entire array of
internationals that exponentially increase the actual presence arising from the
intervention well over the formal number of troops.4 A 2008 study of child
sexual abuse allegedly committed by peacekeepers found that offenders ran
4
Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith, Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United
Nations Intervention (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 2008), 7.
300
the breadth of local and international NGOs, UN agencies, and other actors
involved in international humanitarian operations, including members of
religious groups participating in the mission.5 The study found perpetrators
from twenty-three different humanitarian, peacekeeping and security
organisations, even as it identified uniformed peacekeepers as the most likely
perpetrators. [S]taff at every level, from guards and drivers to senior managers
. . . [were] identified as having been involved. Most were men, but some were
women.6 The same can be said of any deployment of international troops or
civilian personnel abroad, whether UN-sponsored or not. Their presence tends
to bring an increased demand for sexual services, and adds to the demand for
trafficked women and girls.
A 2008 study of child sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers found that offenders ran the
breadth of local and international NGOs, UN agencies, and other actors involved in international
humanitarian operations.
As of December of 2008, the UN reports the presence of 11,511 police, 77,571

military personnel, and 2,630 observers abroad conducting sixteen different
peacekeeping missions.7 The number of persons associated with NGOs,
international organisations and religious groups who may be present in a
peacekeeping operation must be added to these numbers. Thus, while
uniformed military personnel comprise the great bulk of a peacekeeping force
in terms of absolute numbers, peacekeepers are actually a diverse lot, from a
diverse group of domestic and international organisations. By virtue of this
great diversity, they are also subject to a host of different legal, jurisdictional
and contractual regimes that make a single solution to the problem of
peacekeeper sexual abuse elusive.
In addition to this diverse group of people who are associated with
peacekeeping missions, many nations maintain military forces abroad on a
variety of missions and operations not associated with the United Nations or
5
Corina Csky, No One to Turn to: The Under-Reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Aid
Workers and Peacekeepers (London: Save the Children, 2008): 89.
Ibid. Cskys study concluded that peacekeepers are the most likely offenders not only because they
make up the largest contingent of emergency personnel, and because they are armed, provide muchneeded security and therefore have a position of power over the populations they serve, but also
because they contain a significant number of personnel with discriminatory attitudes towards women.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Monthly Summary of Contributors of

Military and Civilian Police Personnel,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/Yearly06.pdf (accessed January 15, 2009).
301
with peacekeeping. Navies deploy and make port visits. There are international
forces deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and the horn of Africa, among other
places, for missions other than peacekeeping. These forces often include
civilian officials and employees of contractors who assist in the mission. The
United States alone maintains more than 200,000 military personnel
permanently posted abroad in places like Japan, Korea, Italy, and Germany
who are not involved in peacekeeping missions of any kind. Other NATO
countries have about 31,400 troops assigned to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,8 and some 15,000 deployed in
Kosovo.9 Even this partial list illustrates the breadth of the international
presence in missions abroad, and the demand for sexual outlets these military
and civilian personnel may create during their missions. The combined total
approaches 350,000 personnel, mostly men, away from their homes, and almost
always assigned to vulnerable and troubled areas of the world. Some of these
military personnel contribute to the demand for sexual services that has tended
to create a demand for trafficked women.10
Not only are peacekeepers a diverse group of soldiers and civilians from many
different countries and organisations, the nature of their contribution to human
trafficking is varied. Recent history has seen peacekeeper involvement in
activities that range from the most benign to the most active. On the active end
of this spectrum, peacekeepers have been identified buying and selling
individual women for sexual services, transporting trafficked women in UN
vehicles, and engaging in (or overlooking) document forgery to facilitate the
movement of trafficked persons.11 They have also engaged in more passive
8
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army
Strength and Laydown (NATO & ISAF, 2009),
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat_081201.pdf (accessed May 15, 2009).
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Information on Troops in Kosovo,

http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/ kfor_placemat.pdf (accessed May 15, 2009).
National commitment figures for 2008 may be found at
http://www.nato.int/issues/commitment/index.html (accessed May 15, 2009).
10
Of course, the demand for trafficked women is much larger than the peacekeepers contribution.
11
In Sarajevo, for example, Human Rights Investigator David Lamb reported allegations that a Pakistani
monitor drove two trafficked women in a UN vehicle to a Sarajevo hotel for a sexual liaison. One
American International Police Task Force officer allegedly bought a trafficked woman and kept her for
several months until he was repatriated. A Criminal Investigation Division report identified several US
contractors who were engaged in white slavery, in that they bought women for their private
ownership. See generally Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in
the Siege of Sarajevo (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 129130; Hopes Betrayed:
Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution,
Human Rights Watch 14, no.9(D) (November 2002): 3233; Sarah Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels:
Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2005).
302
types of support for human trafficking, such as patronising, protecting and

facilitating brothels that they know, or probably should know, employ
trafficked women, and even failing to report or investigate suspicions that
women are being kept against their will.12 Finally, some of the peacekeepers
who patronise these establishments may have no idea that they are supporting
organised crime, or enjoying a tryst with someone who has been forced into
prostitution and deprived of her freedom to do otherwise. Thus, there is a broad
range of awareness among peacekeepers about the potential connection
between their desire for sexual services and the possibility that women are
being trafficked to satisfy those desires.
The problem of peacekeepers has recently moved closer to centre stage in the
debate over the hazards of peacekeeping operations. The United Nations,
NATO, the European and African Unions, as well as individual nations that
contribute troops to peacekeeping operations (PKO), are coming to the
realisation that the mere presence of their peacekeepers creates a demand for
sexual services. There is a growing awareness that peacekeeping operations
create this demand in part by introducing thousands of mostly male personnel,
who are not amenable to trial or punishment under local domestic law, into
countries where social order has been damaged and the rule of law itself has
been weakened. The United Nations and the United States Army have learned
especially painful lessons in this regard. NATO13 and the European Union,
aware of the issues by virtue of the increasing public debate, have also recently
turned their attention to the issue.14 The UN Security Council, the United States
Congress, NATO headquarters and the Council of the European Union have all
changed the rules under which their forces deploy in an effort to elevate
standards of personal behaviour, to increase pre-deployment training and
awareness, and to reduce their footprint in the demand for sexual services.
2. A Brief History of Peacekeepers and Trafficking
Long before the United Nations or any other multinational organisation began
sending peacekeepers abroad, uniformed military personnel on foreign postings
have been demanding sexual services from the local population. Roman
General Quintilius Varus provoked an insurrection among the ancestors of
12
Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels, 1938.
13
NATO, NATO Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, June 29, 2004,
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-traffic.htm (accessed May 15, 2009).
14
European Union, Generic Standards for ESDP Operations, May 23, 2005 Council of the European
Union http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st09/st09004.en05.pdf (accessed May 15, 2009).
303
modern Germany in the early years of the last millennium by his philandering
and rapacious appetite for their wives and daughters. Military historian Edward
Shepherd Creasey describes Varuss attitude in these words:
Accustomed to govern the . . . natives of Syria . . . Varus thought that
he might gratify his licentious and rapacious passions with equal
impunity among the high-minded sons and pure-spirited daughters of
Germany. When the general of any army sets the example of outrages
of this description, he is soon imitated by his officers and surpassed by
his still more brutal soldiery. The Romans now habitually indulged in
those violations of the sanctity of the domestic shrine, and those insults
upon honor and modesty, by which far less gallant spirits than those of
our Teutonic ancestors have often been maddened into insurrection.15
Within the past two centuries, American troops deployed on the border with
Mexico during the Mexican-American War of 184647, Japanese soldiers
during World War II, and multinational troops in Vietnam during that war all
provide well-known examples of soldiers requiring sexual outlets while on
foreign assignments.16 Kathleen Moon has written critically of the involvement
of American military personnel in arranging brothels for American soldiers
rest and recreation during the Korean War.17 She argues that Korean women
were routinely treated as chattel, and that the US Government organised the
women into quasi-official brothels for the pleasure of American military
personnel. During the Vietnam War, American medical officers inspected and
certified prostitutes sexual health in an arrangement that has been criticised as
far too much official involvement in organised prostitution.
It is difficult to identify with accuracy when UN peacekeepers began
contributing to human trafficking. The UN was organised in 1947, and sent its
first peacekeepers abroad in 1948.18 Reports of peacekeeper misconduct began
15
Edward Shepherd Creasey, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the Western World (New York: Barnes and
Noble Publishing, 2004, Originally Published 1851), 126. Varuss abuse of the Germanic people
induced a patriot named Arminius to lead a revolt against Rome in 9 A.D. that ultimately liberated them
from Roman domination.
16
Emily Nyen Chang, Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry,
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 15 (2001): 621632.
17
Katherine H.S. Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997); Susan Brownmiller, Against our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 93 et. seq.
18
The first United Nations peacekeeping operation was UNTSO, established in 1948 to monitor the
ceasefires and armistice agreements remaining after the 1948 Israeli war of Independence. The United
Nations lists the duration of this mission as 1948 to present. See: UN, Peacekeeping Timeline 1948
2008, DPKO, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/timeline.pdf (accessed January 14, 2009).
304
to appear in large numbers in the early 1990s. During the 1992 peacekeeping
operation in Somalia, peacekeepers were identified as part of the demand for
sexual services that led women to engage in prostitution.19 During the 1992
1993 UN mission to Cambodia, the number of prostitutes rose from 6,000 to
25,000, including an increase in the number of child prostitutes.20 During the
early 1990s missions to Cambodia and Somalia, the first complaints of
peacekeeper abuse of the local population, including murder, rape and other
forms of sexual violence, were reported.21 In 2000, US civilians and Jordanian,
Pakistani and German troops from the mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina were
investigated for human trafficking.22 In 2003, Italian, Danish and Slovak
peacekeepers were repatriated from Eritrea for having sex with minors.23
Incidents involving peacekeepers and sexual abuse of the native population
have been reported in peacekeeping missions to Angola, Cambodia, East
Timor, Liberia, Mozambique, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.24 Cynthia
Enloe writes that Almost as soon as the peacekeeping mission to Cambodia
began, there were reasons to be concerned,25 and asserts that UN soldiers and
staff assigned to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) quickly
embarked upon the routine sexual abuse of the local population. UNTAC
mission head Yasushi Akashi outraged many by saying boys will be boys.26
The French contingent on that mission reportedly had its own field brothel,
and the Bulgarian contingent reportedly had its own prostitution ring in the
19
Vanesssa Kent, Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Workers: Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse, in Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Chiyuki Aoi,
Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United Nations University Press 2007), 45.
20
Csky, No One to Turn to, 10.
21
Kent, Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers, 46.
22
Colum Lynch, Misconduct, Corruption by UN Police Mar Bosnia Mission, Washington Post, May
29, 2001.
23
Csky, No One to Turn to, 10.
24
Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, Ramesh Thakur, eds. Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping
Operations (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 3233; Julia Stuart, Dark Side of
Peacekeeping: Kofi Annan is Calling for UN Troops to be sent to Liberia, The Independent (London),
July 10, 2003: 45; Daniel Pallin, Sexual Slavery in Bosnia: The Negative Externality of the
Marketplace, Swords and Plowshares 13, no.1 (Spring 2003): 2743,
http://www.american.edu/sis/students/sword/Back_Issues/3.pdf (accessed December 28, 2008).
25
Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993), 33.
26
Ibid. cited in Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeepers: A Gendered Analysis
(Bounder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 13; Aoi, de Coning, Thakur, eds. Unintended
Consequences, 32.
305
north eastern part of the country.27 Various estimates suggest a three- to

fourfold increase in the number of prostitutes in the country when the
peacekeepers arrived.28
Sarah Mendelson undertook a detailed examination of the correlation between
peacekeepers and prostitutes in the Balkans during 2005. After several trips to
the area and interviews with military personnel of several troop contributing
countries (hereinafter TCC), she found that brothels appeared overnight as
soon as the peacekeepers began to arrive.29 Indeed, some reports indicate that a
chain of brothels had already been opened before the arrival of the first
peacekeepers to the region.30 [T]he sex slave trade in Bosnia largely exists
because of the UN peacekeeping operation. Without the peacekeeping
presence, there would have been little or no forced prostitution in Bosnia, said
David Lamb, a regional human rights officer in Bosnia during 20002001.31
Graa Machels 2001 study, entitled The Impact of War on Children, reported
that in half of the post-conflict country case studies from the 1990s, the arrival
of peacekeepers was also associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution.32
The sex slave trade in Bosnia largely exists because of the UN peacekeeping operation. Without
the peacekeeping presence, there would have been little or no forced prostitution in Bosnia.
Human rights investigator David Lamb
Some peacekeepers actively profited from the sex trade, buying and selling
women for their own service, transporting trafficked women in UN vehicles, or
27
Shikuko Koyama and Henri Myrttinen, A Gender Perspective, in Unintended Consequences of

Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United
Nations University Press), 32.
28
Ibid., 33.
29
Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels.
30
John Picarelli, Trafficking Slavery and Peacekeeping: The Need for A Comprehensive Training
Program, A Conference Report (Turin: UNICRI and TraCCC, 2002), quoted in Marie Vlachov,
Trafficking in Humans: The Slavery of our Age, Connections: The Quarterly Journal (Winter 2005):
89.
31
US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, The U.N. and the Sex Trade in
Bosnia: Isolated Case or Larger Problem in the U.N. System: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights. 107th Congress., 2nd Session, April 24, 2002; Daniel
Pallen, Sexual Slavery in Bosnia: The Negative Externality of the Market for Peace Swords and
Plowshares XIII, no.1 (Spring 2003): 31.
32
Graa Machel, The Impact of War on Children: A Review of the Progress Since the 1996 United
Nations Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
306
otherwise becoming actively involved in the trade in trafficked women.33 Other

peacekeepers simply patronised the establishments, perhaps not realising that
they were using the sexual services of women who had been brought there
against their will.
Beyond this individual connection with trafficking, Mendelson also
documented a high-level unwillingness to upset this established order.34
Investigator David Lamb testified before the United States House of
Representatives that high-level UN officials had made efforts to conceal
peacekeeper offences associated with human trafficking.35 In addition, UN
peacekeepers took with them or destroyed hundreds of files pertaining to
human trafficking when the UN mission in Bosnia changed hands in favour of
the European Union.36 This deliberate act prevented potentially embarrassing
information about UN involvement in human trafficking from falling into EU
hands, where it might have become public.
In the fall of 2004, the UN was publicly humiliated by newspaper accounts of
sexual assaults by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC).37 The accounts reported 150 allegations of sexual assault by
peacekeepers, including sixty-eight cases of rape, paedophilia and
prostitution.38 Most of the allegations involved peacekeepers from Morocco,
Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa, Tunisia and Uruguay. The UN SecretaryGeneral asked Jordanian Prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, an experienced
and distinguished diplomat, to travel to the DRC and conduct an investigation.
He found the allegations to be true. Numerous peacekeepers had taken
advantage of Congolese women in a variety of circumstances. Some had raped
33
Testimony of David Lamb, US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations,

Subcommittee on International Relations and Human Rights, Hearing on The UN and the Sex Trade in
Bosnia: Isolated Case or Larger Problem in the UN System? 107th Congress, 2nd Session, April 24,
2002, 68. See also the testimony of Martina Vandenberg, at page 56. Colum Lynch, Misconduct,
Corruption by UN Police Mar Bosnia Mission, Washington Post, May 29, 2001 (reporting that one
IPTF officer bought a Moldovan woman for $2,900); Jennifer Murray, Who will Police the PeaceBuilders? The Failure to Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian
Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, Columbia Human Rights
Law Review 34, no.475 (Spring 2003): 502504 and sources cited therein.
34
See: Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels, 19 et seq.
35
Lamb, Hearing on The UN and the Sex Trade in Bosnia
36
Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels, 6364.
37
These reports appeared in numerous papers around the world. See, e.g., Maggie Farley, 150 Cases
Found in U.N. Sex Abuse Inquiry in Congo, The Los Angeles Times, November 23, 2004; Colum
Lynch, U.N. Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo, The Washington Post, December 15, 2004.
38
Kent, Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers, 47. Prince al-Hussein reports 16 allegations
against civilians, 9 against civilian police, and 80 allegations against military personnel, for a total of
105 allegations.
307
the women, using UN vehicles to travel to the location of the rape. Some had
raped women or children, and then given them some sort of food item to make
the transaction appear to be a consensual, compensated one. On some
occasions, desperate women who had lost their husbands or livelihoods
crawled into the UN compounds through holes in the fence, and offered
themselves in exchange for some food or money, and UN peacekeepers took
advantage of the condition of these local women.39
The sum of these investigations gives depth and body to the assertion that UN
peacekeepers have been creating or contributing to the demand for sexual
services since at least the early 1990s. When the number of sex workers in a
peacekeeping area rises dramatically just as the peacekeepers arrive, it is
reasonable to assume that some of the women have been trafficked to meet
their demands. In some of these operations, it is quite clear that this is the case.
The reports of abuse in the DRC appear to have brought the long-standing
problem to a head, at least for the UN. Prince al-Hussein documented
widespread and ongoing problems with peacekeeper sexual abuse.40 He
reported a perception that whistleblowers would not be protected,41 and
described an inexcusable refusal of contingent commanders to cooperate
with his investigation, much as Sarah Mendelson and David Lamb had
documented in the Balkans.42 These comments may have been toned-down
allusions to material contained in an earlier draft of his report. According to
published accounts of the earlier draft, the Prince found evidence of
peacekeeper obstruction of UN investigations into the crimes, paying or
offering to pay witnesses to change their testimony, threatening investigators
and refusing to identify suspects.43 Clearly, the presence of peacekeepers in a
39
United Nations, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their
aspects, UN document A/59/710 24 March 2005, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N05/247/90/PDF/N0524790.pdf?OpenElement (accessed April 23, 2009).
40
Ibid.; Susan A. Notar, Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and
Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, American University Journal of Gender, Social
Policy & the Law 14, no.413 (2006).
41
United Nations, Comprehensive Review, 8.
42
See text accompanying notes 36 and 37 supra.
43
See, e.g., Lynch, Misconduct, Corruption by UN. Referring to an earlier confidential UN draft
version of Prince al-Husseins report, Lynch wrote, [t]he report alleges that a Moroccan contingent
stationed in Bunia threatened a U.N. informant investigating child prostitution. The Moroccan
peacekeepers also spread the word that a U.N. child-protection advocate looking into allegations of
child prostitution and rape by U.N. peacekeepers had better be careful when she went out at night, the
report said. The report cites cases in which peacekeepers from Morocco, Pakistan and possibly Tunisia
were reported to have paid or attempted to pay witnesses to change their testimony regarding alleged
sexual abuse. It also charges that Moroccan military officials refused to provide the names of
Moroccan soldiers present at the location of an alleged rape.
308
host nation represents not only a likely increase in demand for trafficked
women, but a reasonable likelihood that peacekeepers will obstruct any
investigation into their trafficking-related activities.44
3. The United States Experience
Ironically, Prince al-Husseins report was delivered almost simultaneously with
a similar eruption in the United States. In May of 2002, a local Fox News
television station began a series of investigative reports on the inexplicably
large number of Korean massage parlours operating in the Cleveland, Ohio,
area. The reporters followed a chain of clues until they found themselves in the
red-light districts of Seoul, where they discovered a large number of American
soldiers there as patrons, many of whom were aware that the women working
there were Filipina, Russian, or Eastern European, and that they were not free
to leave.45 US Army Military Policemen (unaware that they were being taped
by hidden cameras) told the reporters that the women had had their passports
taken away, and that the women had to work until they could earn their
passports back. When the report was finally aired, it included videotape of
American military personnel in Korea, both patronising and appearing to
protect brothels where they knew that many of the women had been trafficked
from outside of Korea, and were being kept against their will.
44
Evidence of trafficking in Iraq and Afghanistan is beginning to surface, but connections to the military
forces deployed there are not yet clear. With respect to Iraq, see Rania Abouzeid, Iraqs Unspeakable
Crime: Mothers Pimping Daughters, Time, March 7, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1883696,00.html (accessed March 8, 2009); with
respect to Afghanistan, see IOM, Afghanistan: Human Trafficking Survey Documents Abuse,
Recommends Action (Kabul: IOM, September 2008),
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/afghanistan/iom_repo
rt_trafficking_afghanistan.pdf (accessed March 9, 2009). American contractor Kellogg, Brown and
Root (KBR) has been sued in the US District Court for human trafficking related to forced labour,
rather than forced prostitution. Dana Hedgepeth, KBR, Partner in Iraq Sued in Human Trafficking
Case, Washington Post, August 28, 2008, A 13; KBR, Human Trafficking Victims File Lawsuit
Against U.S. Military Contractors in Iraq, Press Release, August 27, 2008,
http://www.cmht.com/cases_kbr.php (accessed June 2, 2009).
45
For example, the reporter asked one soldier So you keep these places safe? and the soldier responded
Yeah, thats what we do. Thats our job. Elsewhere on the tape, a soldier reported All these bar
owners buy girls at auction. These girls have to earn however much money it takes to get their
passports back. Finally, a soldier explained They [the women] are told to come here to make some
money. And no they dont make money. They just make enough to buy their passports back. Because
the people in Russia get them a visa, passportthe whole nine yards to work in Korea. They get off the
plane and Korean nationals who work at the airport take the visa and passport away and put them in a
line at the side. And they go to auction. Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of DoD
Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Phase I-Korea (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense,
2003), 3, http://www.dodig.osd.mil/fo/Foia/H03L88433128PhaseI.PDF (accessed April 17, 2009).
309
The reaction was immediate. Thirteen congressmen wrote to the Department of

Defense Inspector General (DODIG) asking him to investigate the apparently
inappropriate arrangement between the Army and the brothels. The
Congressmen were concerned by the broadcast, which depicted women
(implied to be prostitutes) in the off-post establishment as victims of human
trafficking and suggested that the military leadership in Korea, by providing
Courtesy Patrols to monitor Service member behaviour in off base bars,
essentially condoned the illegal activities that occurred there.46 Beyond the
appearance of merely condoning illegal activity, the Members of Congress also
expressed concern about the appearance of a more direct and substantial
involvement, i.e., that American soldiers [in Korea] are knowingly procuring
the services of trafficked persons and that some of these soldiers may even be
ordered to protect and patrol the brothels.47
Like the investigation of Prince al-Hussein, the DODIGs response was swift.
He conducted a thorough, global and extensive48 investigation into
Department of Defense efforts to combat human trafficking, addressing not
only the allegations that had surfaced in Korea, but conducting a separate
investigation into the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.49 The
Inspector General concluded that the relationship between the Army courtesy
patrols and the brothels was overly familiar, but did not conclude that the US
Army was directly involved in prostitution or in the trafficking of women.50
Although the Armys involvement in trafficking in Korea turned out to be
much less direct than the sexual assaults by UN peacekeepers in the DRC, both
organisations began moving in similar directions to combat the problem.
Following these embarrassing incidents, the US Department of Defense and the
United Nations have each begun to address the correlation between the
presence of their peacekeepers and the demand for sexual services that results
in an increased demand for trafficked women. NATO and the European Union
have likewise changed the rules under which their troops deploy, with a view
46
Ibid., 2.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid. These are the words of the DoD Inspector General. Sarah Mendelson was not impressed. She
characterised the DODIGs investigation as superficial and pro forma. Had investigators followed
leads she believes they should have followed, they would have found evidence of contractor complicity
in human trafficking, she asserts. See Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels, ix.
49
Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in

Persons, Phase II-Bosnia-Herzegovina (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2003),
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/fo/Foia/HT-Phase_II.pdf (accessed January 15, 2009).
50
Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in

Persons, Phase I-Korea, 10.
310
towards increasing the level of expectations for peacekeeper conduct while on

mission, reducing sexual offences and the trafficking of women to provide
sexual services. These efforts have taken a number of directions, but fall
generally into efforts to increase pre-deployment education and training, raising
the bar of personal conduct, and facilitating the discipline of offenders.
While there have been recommendations to provide a better mechanism for the
financial compensation of victims, this issue remains troublesome. Some
authors advocate that TCCs simply pay compensation to the victims of their
armed forces misconduct.51 The OSCE examined the issue of compensation
for trafficked and exploited persons under the criminal, civil and labour laws of
several OSCE nations, with particular emphasis on the legal systems of
Albania, France, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Each nation has its own mechanisms for
financial compensation, but most require the active participation of the
trafficked person in a legal proceeding. Although there have been some
successful claims against traffickers/exploiters, they have been limited to cases
where the trafficker or exploiter has been prosecuted and convicted (in a
criminal claim) or had been located and sued in a civil action.52 In France, the
UK, Romania and the US there is a possibility of compensation from a state
fund, subject to certain conditions.53 In sum, like many victims of crime, there
is little available for victims of human trafficking or peacekeeper sexual abuse
in the way of financial compensation.
3.1 Pre-Deployment Education and Training
The demand for sexual services by peacekeepers is created to some extent by
peacekeepers with differing levels of awareness of the problem, and of their
responsibility for causing women to be trafficked. Relatively few peacekeepers
are actively and consciously engaged in the business of trafficking, or sexually
assault women in the mission areas. For these few, a criminal prosecution or
other discipline would be appropriate. This issue will be discussed below.
51
For a discussion of this problem and one proposal to correct it, see Catherine E. Sweetser, Providing
Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping Personnel, New York University Law
Review 83, no.1643 (2008).
52
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Compensation for Trafficked and
Exploited Persons in the OSCE Region (Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR, 2008),
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2008/05/31284_1145_en.pdf (accessed April 20, 2009).
53
Ibid.
311
The lions share of the demand for sexual services probably comes from
uninformed peacekeepers who merely seek sexual satisfaction, and who see
commercial sex providers as a reasonable outlet for that desire. These
peacekeepers may have different levels of awareness of the larger issues of
human trafficking and organised crime that make those women available. Or,
perhaps they know something of the womens plight, but were not responsible
for creating it and do not see that they are furthering it by being patrons. The
US military personnel filmed in Korean brothels are representative of this
group. For troops such as these, part of the answer is education about human
trafficking, its connection with organised crime, and the adverse impact it has
on a mission when peacekeepers patronise these establishments.
The US Armys reaction in Korea is a sterling example of such an educational
campaign. As a result of the DODIGs report about the unduly familiar
relationship between the US Army and human trafficking in Korea, General
LaPorte required an intensive educational campaign to make visiting American
forces aware of it. Every military person, family member, and contractor or
employee who arrives in Korea for duty, including sailors arriving for a port
visit, are exposed to an educational lecture about human trafficking and its
connection with deployed forces. The presentation also describes areas that
have been placed off-limits to American personnel because of their association
with trafficking.54 The educational effort is reinforced during the members
tour in Korea by advertisements regularly broadcast on Armed Forces
Television stations that remind Americans in Korea that trafficking is a crime,
that no American may be associated with or support it, and that there is a
hotline number available for reporting of establishments or individuals who are
suspected of involvement. The Commanding General appears in person to
denounce trafficking and to affirm that there will be zero tolerance for it.55
Similar efforts are in place for peacekeepers deploying to UN Missions. Some
of these training modules are online, and can be accessed in a number of
languages via the internet. Sarah Mendelson, speaking to the US Congress in
2005, reminded us that there are ingrained attitudes about human trafficking
that she characterises as indifference (it is not part of our mission to address
social ills such as human trafficking), denial (these women are willingly
54
Copies of the training presentation and the television advertisements are in the possession of the author.
55
The text of Lieutenant General Campbells television spot is Listen up! Prostitution and human
trafficking is a worldwide menace that diminishes basic human dignity. US Forces Korea has a zero
tolerance policy when it comes to participating in such malicious activity. I want all military personnel,
DoD civilians and contract personnel and their family members to make sure the word is loud and clear.
Human trafficking is illegal, wrong and will not be tolerated!
312
employed as prostitutes, and are not trafficking victims or our boys are not
involved), misperception (human trafficking is the same as prostitution, and
that is good for the morale of deployed troops) and even acceptance (thats
the way it is), that are hard to divorce from the realities of human trafficking,
and that a few training modules will not be enough to change those
attitudes.56
Indeed, to be effective in changing behaviour, training must be reinforced if the
desired behaviour is not achieved, and it must be accompanied by genuine
organisational efforts to make the training stick. Many of the organisations
that send peacekeepers abroad supplement their training with significantly
more demanding expectations for peacekeeper conduct while deployed.
3.2 Raising the Bar of Personal Conduct
Codes of Conduct
Many of the nations now sending military personnel and other peacekeepers
abroad have begun to raise the bar by insisting on higher standards of personal
conduct while on mission.
UNICEF Core Aspects of Codes of Conduct57
UNICEFs Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
in Humanitarian Crises considers the following to be core aspects of every Code of Conduct:
o
Sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers constitute acts of gross

misconduct and are therefore grounds for termination of employment;
Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of
the age of majority or age of consent locally. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not
a defence;
Exchange of money, employment, goods, or services for sex, including sexual favours
or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour is prohibited. This
includes exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries.
Sexual relationships between humanitarian workers and beneficiaries are strongly
56
Testimony of Sarah Mendelson, House International Relations Committee, Sub-committee on Africa,

Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Combating Human Trafficking: Achieving Zero
Tolerance, March 9, 2005, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts050309mendelson.pdf (accessed
March 3, 2009). See also the introduction to Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels, where she expands on
these arguments.
57
UNICEF, IASCTFR Report (New York: UNICEF, 2002),

http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/IASCTFReport.pdf (Accessed April 23, 2009).
313
discouraged since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics. Such
relationships undermine the credibility and integrity of humanitarian aid work.
o
Where a humanitarian worker develops concerns or suspicions regarding sexual abuse

or exploitation by a fellow worker, whether in the same agency or not, s/he must report
such concerns via established agency reporting mechanisms.
Humanitarian workers agencies are obliged to create and maintain an environment

which prevents sexual exploitation and abuse and promotes the implementation of their
code of conduct. Managers at all levels have particular responsibilities to support and
develop systems which maintain this environment.
These standards are often in the form of codes of conduct, and are introduced
to prospective peacekeepers in pre-deployment training settings, where the
peacekeepers are asked to subscribe to them. In 2005, the Council of the
European Union published Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP
Operations, in which the EU asserts its expectation that peacekeepers should
be aware that both prostitution and the pornographic industry have established
links with organized crime and human trafficking Sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse violate universally recognized legal norms and standards. They
constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore grounds for disciplinary
measures. Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex,
including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or
exploitative behaviour, is prohibited.58 The United Nations Code of Conduct
for Blue Helmets also outlines the standards of expected personal behaviour in
explicit terms that call for conduct that [befits] the dignity of a disciplined,
caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier 59
UN Code Of Personal Conduct For Blue Helmets
1.
Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined,
caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest
integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peacekeeper and do not
abuse or misuse your authority.
2.
Respect the law of the land or the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs
and practices.
3.
Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You
are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admiration.
58
Council of Europe, Generic Standards for ESDP Operations, 8.
59
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets (New
York: United Nations), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/Conduct/ten_in.pdf (accessed May 15,
2009).
314
Neither solicit nor accept any material, reward, honor or gift.

4.
Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical, or psychological abuse or

exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and
children.
5.
Respect and regard for human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak.
Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particularly when dealing with prisoners,
detainees or people in your custody.
6.
Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and
property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits.
7.
Show courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the mission,
including other United Nations contingents, regardless of their creed, gender, rank or
origin.
8.
Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the
host country.
9.
Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or traffic in drugs.
10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of
official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United
Nations.
The US Department of Defense supplemented the actions of General LaPorte

by its own Code of Conduct, in the form of a zero tolerance policy applicable
to all US personnel worldwide. The policy prohibits US troops and their
contractors from being complicit in any way in trafficking in persons.60
Former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instructed subordinate
commanders at all levels to ensure their units are trained to recognize
indicators of this serious crime to work with host nation law enforcement to
identify businesses and establishments that are involved in trafficking for
sexual exploitation and take appropriate steps to put those establishments
off-limits to DoD membersmilitary, civilian and contract civilian. No leader
in this Department should turn a blind eye to this issue.61
60
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Department of
Defense, Policy Memorandum, January 30, 2004; see also Donald Rumsfelds memo of September 16,
2004, available at http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-policy1/static/xdocs/opa/static/SD%20091604.pdf (accessed January 14, 2009).
61
Ibid. Copies of the Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz Policy Letters are also at Department of Defense Inspector
General, Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Arlington, VA: DoD, November
21, 2006), Appendix D, http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/IE/Reports/TIP%20Final-E.pdf (accessed
April 17, 2009).
315
Off-Limits Areas
Pre-deployment training and raising the bar by means of codes of conduct are
good, but a strong command effort to reinforce those efforts is better. General
LaPorte did this in Korea by adding to an already existing list of off-limits
areas62 any establishment that was suspected of being involved in human
trafficking. Whereas military police had in the past patrolled these areas to
ensure a safe environment for troop recreation, they now patrol them to ensure
that no American military personnel are present to patronise them. By
identifying human trafficking as an unacceptable human rights abuse and
criminal behaviour, and by placing all their businesses off-limits to American
personnel, General LaPorte effectively removed American personnel in Korea
from the demand for trafficked women.63 Subsequent monitoring has shown
this to be an effective means of reducing human trafficking there. As a result of
the US initiatives, prostitution is harder to find. Charles Johnson, the USFK
Action Officer for the Prostitution and Human Trafficking (P&HT) Working
Group, describes the changes in this way:
I have seen the results [of placing these establishments off-limits]. In
20002002, I was assigned to the 2d Infantry Division, at Camp Casey,
Tongduchoen (TDC) Korea. TDC was notorious for the strip of bars
outside the front gate of Camp Casey, and the bars in Toko-ri outside
neighboring Camp Hovey. You could not go into a bar, or walk down
the street at night without being propositioned. If walking alone,
ajumas (old Korean ladies) would try to pull you into alleys to see
some pretty young girl. This past February, I was in TDC conducting
a P&HT check. I was not propositioned at all, the ajumas are gone. The
bars now have Filipino "juicy" girls who will sit with a customer for a
$10$20 drink. The MPs and Courtesy Patrols now play "morality
police" ensuring no inappropriate touching is going on. I will not tell
you prostitution is not going on it is just much more under the table
more difficult. Now service members must look for it, versus three
years ago when it was pushed at them in the bars and on the streets.64
62
These included open bodies of water where personal safety was at issue, and drug stores where illicit
drugs might be sold.
63
General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander, United Nations Command, Commander, Republic of KoreaUnited States Combined Forces Command, and Commander, US Forces Korea, Statement before the
House Armed Services Committee and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September
21, 2004, 1, www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-09-21LaPorte.pdf. (accessed January 19,
2009).
64
Charles M. Johnson, Action Officer, US Forces Korea PH&T Working Group, e-mail message to
author, November 25, 2005.
316
Prince al-Hussein likewise recommended the establishment of off-limits areas,

and several peacekeeping contingents have employed them before and after his
report.
In 2003, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Timor
Leste issued an order barring UN staff from visiting places where prostitution
takes place and imposed a curfew on military personnel. Individual contingents
issued similar orders for their members. The Australian contingent limited the
number of drinks its members could consume.65 Of course, it is easier to
control the activities of military personnel than the various groups of civilians
who are present in the mission area, as they are not subject to military
discipline and often do not live in barracks.66 Even so, military personnel
comprise the vast majority of peacekeepers on any mission, and are the most
likely to engage in sexual offences against the local population.67 Imposing and
enforcing off-limits areas and curfews, even when they apply only to the
military contingent, will of necessity reduce the patronage of establishments
engaged in human trafficking and drive the prostitution business underground.
This, like education and codes of conduct, diminishes demand for sexual
services and effectively helps solve the problem of human trafficking for
sexual service to peacekeepers. In addition, the SRSG can issue a circular
barring UN civilian staff from visiting places where prostitution takes place. If
these areas are already being patrolled by military personnel to ensure that no
peacekeepers are there to patronise them, civilians will likewise be deterred
from being there. Even spotty compliance with such an order by civilians
associated with the mission will be enhanced by the military patrols. The
combined effect of the education, codes of conduct, off-limits areas and
enforcement programmes should go a long way towards reducing the demand
for sexual services, the resultant human trafficking to provide those services,
and should significantly diminish the revenues of organised crime.
3.3 Facilitating Discipline of Offenders
In his Comprehensive Report, Prince al-Hussein noted the perception that
crimes committed in peacekeeping areas will go unpunished and that this
perception has contributed to a sense of impunity among peacekeepers.68 The
65
Koyama and Myrttinen, A Gender Perspective, 36.
66
Ibid.
67
See text accompanying note 5, supra.
68
United Nations, Comprehensive Review, para. 13.
317
perception is largely true, and flows from a number of factors. Oftentimes, the
domestic courts and police systems in the mission area are not operational or
are inadequate to try foreigners. In addition, peacekeepers have various levels
of immunity that protects them from prosecution by local authorities in any
event. In addition, there is a long history of peacekeeper involvement in
criminal offences with few, if any, successful prosecutions by any authority. By
far the most common result of peacekeeper criminal misconduct in a mission
area is for that peacekeeper to be repatriated to his home country. Various
civilian members of the peacekeeping mission also have some type of official
immunity that discourages prosecutions, and many contractors are able to leave
a peacekeeping area without consequence when suspicion begins to focus on
them.
TCCs that supply peacekeepers for UN assignment do so under a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the UN. That MOA protects military
personnel from local jurisdiction and ensures that they will only be subject to
discipline by the nation to which they belong.69 This limitation protects the
military forces assigned to peacekeeping operations from trial in the domestic
courts where they are assigned, and essentially gives them complete immunity
from a prosecution in the host country.70 UN employees and other civilians on
mission fall into different categories and have different levels and types of
protection from prosecution while on mission. While this chapter lacks space
for a complete examination of the types of immunity, suffice it to say that all
military and most civilian personnel attached to a peacekeeping operation have
considerable protection from criminal prosecution by the local jurisdiction.71
Article 105 of the UN Charter confers upon UN officials such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of the UNs
functions.72 The Charter is supplemented by the Convention on the Privileges
69
Kent, Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers, 4546.
70
United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Model Status of Forces Agreement for
Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc A-45/594 (October 9, 1990); Dieter Fleck, ed. The Handbook of the
Law of Visiting Forces (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Annex F, 603.
71
For a more detailed analysis of immunity on peacekeeping missions, see Francoise J. Hampton and Al
Kihara-Hunt, Accountability of Personnel, in Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations,
ed. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United Nations University Press
2007), 196215, and Keith J. Allred, Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the
Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It, Armed Forces and Society 35 (2005):
523.
72
Charter of the United Nations, Article 105 asserts that (1) The Organization shall enjoy in the territory
of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its
purposes. (2) Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization
318
and Immunities of the United Nations, which broadens the immunities from
arrest and civil process to include a host of other UN employees and agents
posted abroad.73 While some of these civilian members of a peacekeeping
operation have only functional immunity, which protects them from
prosecution for acts performed in the course of their official duties, their actual
protection is broader than one might expect. Protecting peacekeepers from the
exercise of such jurisdiction positively impacts a Peace Support Operation and
enables it to perform its work free of local interference.74 Frederick Rawski
argues that subjecting peacekeepers to local jurisdiction would have a
devastating impact on staff recruitment and that local forces opposed to the
presence of peacekeepers could seriously hamper the mission with vexatious
and troublesome litigation.75
Immunity for UN personnel is in accordance with established international
practice and is generally a good thing. It prevents national authorities from
interfering inappropriately with the important international work of the UN in
those countries. But the perception that UN personnel have immunity from any
criminal consequence, even for a serious offence against a citizen of the
country where they serve, may embolden peacekeepers and lead them to take
liberties while on mission they would never dare to take at home. Bosnian
authorities complained to Human Rights Watch investigators that they had no
authority to pursue employees of private military and security companies, i.e.,
NATO contractors, given their immunity from arrest, detention and
prosecution. One police officer complained that When we find that a foreigner
is involved, this is the biggest problem for us. We cant do anything against
themthey are above the law.76
The immunity granted by these conventions is only functional; it applies only
to members of the UN staff who are acting in their official capacities and
performing official functions. The Security Council is authorised to waive the
immunity of the Secretary General, who in turn is authorised to waive the
immunity of a UN Staff member.77 On rare occasions, the Secretary General
has issued such waivers. A UN training manual for law enforcement personnel
shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions in connection with the organization.
73
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. 13 February 1946.
74
Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U. N. Peacekeeping

Operations, Connecticut Journal of International Law 18 (2002): 11617.
75
Ibid. See also, Sweetser, Providing Effective Remedies.
76
Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, 130.
77
The process for waiving immunity is described in Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive, 114.
319
notes that The immunity of UN officials has been waived in relation to a

number of staff members who have committed criminal offences, including
sexual offences. In Kosovo, the immunity of a civilian police officer that was
suspected of rape was waived in order to allow for an investigation and
prosecution in the mission area.78 Thus, waiver of immunity is possible, but it
applies only to UN staff personnel, and is used very rarely. The Department of
Peacekeeping Operations well understands that routine waiver of immunity for
peacekeepers would significantly complicate the recruitment of forces willing
to serve. And what is more, the courts in the host nation may be unable to
provide an adequate trial for an alleged offender, making the existence of
immunity immaterial.
The goal of enhancing accountability for criminal conduct committed in a
peacekeeping area, then, requires a willingness to waive immunity whenever
the severity of the charged offence appears to require it, and when the host
nation courts and police systems are capable for providing a fair trial. In many
cases, these two criteria do not seem to coexist in any peacekeeping area, and
the result is that there are simply very few prosecutions, even for serious
criminal offences, by the host nation. That means that in most cases, an
offender must be disciplined by and in his home country, far from the evidence,
the witnesses, and the community in which the offence occurred.
Although the UN Peacekeeping MOA reserves for the sending state the
exclusive right to punish its own soldiers, there are a number of ways how that
can be done. Some countries have legal systems that permit them to hold
military courts outside their national borders. Other TCCs require their soldiers,
when accused of an offence committed abroad, be returned home to stand trial
in that nations domestic courts. A portable military court trying an offence that
allegedly occurred in a peacekeeping area will have better access to witnesses
and evidence than one held back in the TCC.79 In addition, victims and their
78
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Trafficking in Human Beings and
Peace-Support Operations; Pre-deployment/In-service Training Programme for International Lawenforcement Personnel (Turin: UNICRI, 2006), 6667.
79
Data concerning the outcome of trials held after peacekeepers have returned home are generally hard to
come by. The United Nations University Press, however, has published reports that In Timor Leste,
the Jordanian contingent gained a particularly notorious reputation for sexual assault. The first case of
rape occurred before their arrival in Timor Leste, during a 45 minute stopover at Darwin Airport in
Northern Australia. Further cases of rape and bestiality followed. According to a UN source
interviewed by us, several members of the contingent were court-martialed and executed upon their
return to Jordan . . . In 2000 several Australian peacekeepers . . . were accused of sexually harassing
Timorese women. They were repatriated and dishonorably discharged. According to a UNTAET
worker based in the area at the time, several of the engineers in the Japanese PKF contingent were
accused of harassing adolescents at a local orphanage in the enclave of Oecussi, and were reportedly
320
countrymen can see the process, hear the evidence, give their evidence by
testifying as witnesses, and hear the verdict of the court after a fair and open
trial under the accuseds own legal system. Noting that many TCCs do not have
the ability to hold military trials abroad, Prince al-Hussein recommended that
countries whose legal systems do not currently allow them to hold trials abroad
modify those laws to permit it.80 Because the majority of criminal offences
reported in past peacekeeping missions have been committed by military
personnel, ensuring their accountability will go a long way toward holding
violators accountable.
There are other efforts in play to reduce the connection between deployed
troops and prostitution. In 2007, the US President added a new offence to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice that exposes US military personnel to
criminal prosecution for patronizing a prostitute.81 The use of a prostitute
will be criminal when it is both wrongful (usually defined to mean without
legal justification or excuse) and prejudicial to good order in discipline in the
armed forces or of a nature to bring discredit on the armed forces.82 Lithuania
announced in 2004 that its troops cannot be prosecuted for patronising
prostitutes, but that they will face an unspecified moral or disciplinary
assessment for doing so.83 Norwegian troops will be disciplined for
patronising prostitutes at any time and place.84 Other nations contributing
peacekeepers may choose to discipline their troops in the way that is most
consistent with their national laws and military codes. For some countries,
confined to their barracks when not on duty following several incidents. Koyama and Myrttinen, A
Gender Perspective, 3233.
80
United Nations, Comprehensive Review.
81
18 USC 834. The elements of the offense are (1) the accused had sexual intercourse with another
person not the accuseds spouse; (2) that the accused compelled, induced, enticed or procured such
person to engage in an act of sexual intercourse in exchange for money or other compensation; (3) that
the act was wrongful, and (4) that under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces. Executive Order 13447 (Annex), September 28, 2007.
82
10 USC 934. Discredit means to injure the reputation of. This clause in Article 134 makes
punishable conduct which has a tendency to bring the service into disrepute or which tends to lower it
in public esteem. Manual for Courts-Martial , 2008 ed., para.60.c.(3), Article 134. As of this writing,
the author is unaware of any reported prosecutions under this article.
83
Lithuanian Defence Vice-Minister Jonas Gecas has indicated that Lithuanian troops using sex services
of women involved in prostitution cannot be prosecuted but that they face moral and disciplinary
assessment. No author, Lithuanian Army will not Tolerate Promotion of Sex Slavery by TroopsDefense Vice Minister, Baltic News Service, July 28, 2004.
84
The Norwegian Armed Forces Code of Conduct prohibits the purchase of sexual services and relations
that might otherwise weaken confidence in the impartiality of the force. Norwegian military personnel
who violate the code are subject to punishment. Brita Schawlann, Senior Advisor, Norwegian Defence
Ministry, e-mail message to author, January 13, 2006.
321
where prostitution is legal, there may be reluctance to discipline troops for

doing abroad what they could legally do at home.85
The ability to prosecute criminal conduct in the peacekeeping area may also
require better forensic evidence. In most peacekeeping missions, there is no
capability to collect and examine body fluids or other samples, and this helps
assailants avoid identification. Prince al-Hussein recommended that the UN
begin sending forensic scientists and their equipment on peacekeeping missions
to facilitate the collection and identification of body fluid samples in sexual
assault cases.
Many prosecutions of alleged offences by peacekeepers must of necessity take
place in the peacekeepers home nation after his return from a PKO. In certain
of these cases, Prince al-Hussein determined that the prosecution of alleged
offenders was rendered impotent or seriously undermined because the evidence
had not been collected in such a way as to make it admissible in the offenders
national courts. The solution, he reasoned, was to bring legal advisors from
each TCC to the PKO, to supervise the collection of evidence against an
alleged offender from his home country and thereby to enhance the likelihood
of a successful prosecution.
The matter of discipline, then, depends on factors such as the viability of the
host nation courts and legal systems, the severity of the offence (human
trafficking or sexual abuse are more likely to warrant prosecution than merely
patronising a prostitute) and the Secretary Generals willingness to waive
immunity so an offender can be tried in the host nation; the ability of the TCC
to hold on-site courts-martial for military personnel; the quality of the evidence
collected and its compliance with TCC national law and modern evidence
gathering techniques; and the TCCs laws that may or may not criminalise the
peacekeepers conduct.
For most peacekeepers, it is probably accurate to say that patronising a
prostitute, even one that has been trafficked, is not a crime. Engaging in human
trafficking or sexually abusing the host nation population certainly is. Violating
an order placing an area off-limits may or may not be, depending on whether
the order applied to the troops in question, and whether their national
authorities desire to enforce it. At the end of the day, holding peacekeepers
responsible for their conduct while on mission will continue to be a patchwork
quilt of issues that will require a patchwork of solutions. For some offenders,
repatriation may continue to be the only real discipline that is ever imposed, but
85
Prostitution is legal in some countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands.
322
the issue of peacekeepers and their sexual relations with the host nation citizens
is increasingly visible, with increasing demands for accountability.
4. Compensation in Lieu of a Conviction, Anyone?
In light of the lack of certainty that offenders will be punished for criminal
misconduct, there is growing agitation for another compensation mechanism
for victims of sexual assault or human rights abuses. Prince al-Husseins
Comprehensive Review recommended that a mechanism be developed for
compensating local victims for sexual assault when the perpetrator cannot be
identified.86 Even when the perpetrator can be identified, there may be a need
for a compensation system where a consensual encounter that has left the
local woman pregnant with a peacekeepers baby. Prince al-Hussein reasoned
that in order to retain its international reputation, the UN should provide a
mechanism for compensating these women for the costs of raising a child
alone. This reminds us of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Womens argument that the UN may lose its moral force if it fails to
respond when those within the United Nations system violate human rights.87
At present, there is no mechanism for compensating victims of peacekeeper
misconduct.88 The UN sometimes pays claims for damage to persons and
property, and did so in the DRC in 1965.89 There are claims review boards
assigned to each peacekeeping mission, and these boards hear and consider
claims against the UN itself or against a TCC, but the statute of limitations is
six months, and there is a $50,000 cap on damages.90 They have been criticised
86
United Nations, Comprehensive Review, 22.
87
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Integration of the Human Rights of
Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/68, February 29,
2000, 59.
88
Sweetser, Providing Effective Remedies.
89
In a series of global settlements with the victims states of nationality, the UN settled claims for
excesses commit by ONUC troops against persons and property in Congo. Chanaka Wickremasinghe
and Guglielmo Verdirame, Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Human Rights in the Course
of UN Field Operations, in Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of
Transnational Human Rights Litigation, ed. Craig Scott (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 474, citing
J.A. Salmon, Les accords Spaak-U Thant du 20 fevrier 1965, Annuaire franaise de droit
international 11, no.468 (1965).
90
Daphna Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and

Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, American Journal of International Law 94 (2000):
406; 409. Section 329 of the Privileges and Immunities Convention imposes on the United Nations
some obligation to provide compensation. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, February 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T.S. 1418, art. VIII 329.
323
as too slow and unwieldy.91 The United Nations tends to see claims against
individual peacekeepers who commit civil wrongs, or who engage in criminal
conduct against a local national, as something that should be answered by the
TCC. Thus, like the effort to hold individual peacekeepers accountable in
criminal or disciplinary hearings, current efforts to obtain compensation from
the United Nations are a patchwork of often unsatisfactory provisions that may
or may not result in satisfaction of a claim that has been filed. A streamlined
mechanism for hearing and adjudicating claims of sexual or other abuse against
local nationals in peacekeeping areas would go a long way towards correcting
some of the misbehaviour of peacekeepers in post-conflict areas of the world.
The claims adjudication process could be established through a modification of
the MOA under which peacekeepers serve, and of the terms of reference of the
claims review boards that are currently in existence.92
5. Conclusion
The very nature of a peacekeeping operation, given its patchwork of military
and civilian constituents drawn from a host of governmental and nongovernmental organisations from around the globe, usually precludes a single,
simple solution. The involvement of peacekeepers in human trafficking
involves the personal conduct of peacekeepers, may affect their careers and
livelihoods and may threaten potential embarrassment to the TCCs whose
personnel are involved. As a result, each of those states has a strong interest in
protecting their national reputations and the rights of their personnel. Where the
proposed solution requires additional funding, the challenges of finding those
funds further complicate the solution.
There is some hope that pre-deployment educational efforts will do much to
educate peacekeepers about the problem of trafficking, and the likelihood that
the women they may consider patronising in sexual encounters while on
mission are actually victims of human trafficking. The increased standards of
expected behaviour represented by newly developed codes of conduct,
reinforced by clear off-limits areas that are patrolled by military police, should
go a long way towards limiting the demand for trafficked women that
peacekeeping forces currently provide. The American experience in Korea has
demonstrated that a sustained commitment to this single initiative can
significantly reduce the demand for trafficked women by driving it
91
Ibid., 88 and note 114.
92
Sweetser, Providing Effective Remedies.
324
underground and putting perpetrators at greater risk of punishment for

patronising suspicious establishments.
All of these efforts are appropriate and should be instituted vigorously. Adding
female peacekeepers to every contingent as quickly as they can be recruited
and trained will help temper the conduct of their male colleagues, further
steering them away from demand for trafficked women. Whether the SRSG in
any mission is a woman or not, the SRSG should make it clear to his or her
military and civilian assistants that they will be expected to faithfully and
vigorously enforce the Codes of Conduct and off-limits areas established for
mission personnel.
With relative ease, but some expense, the UN can also provide legal advisors
and forensic investigators to enhance each missions ability to respond to and
investigate complaints of misconduct. Making commanders responsible for the
treatment of women in peacekeeping areas will translate into downward
pressure on troops in the field. Countries that continue to provide ill-disciplined
troops who engage in misconduct or obstruct investigations may need to be told
that their contributions are no longer wanted. It is unlikely that UN or TCC
authorities will be able to eliminate every instance in which their troops or
citizens create demand or support for trafficked women in a peacekeeping
operation. But there is much that is being done, and much that can yet be done,
to reduce peacekeeper involvement in trafficking situations.
Recommendations
Pre-deployment Training on Trafficking and Organised Crime
Pre-deployment training should continue to stress the problems of human
trafficking, its connection with organised crime, and the adverse impact upon
the mission when organised crime can sell illegal goods in a mission area.
Peacekeepers should understand that patronising prostitutes very likely fuels
organised crime and that this diminishes their ability to complete their
missions.
Codes of Conduct that Prohibit Sexual Abuse
Codes of conduct that prohibit sexual abuse of the local population should
clearly be construed to include patronising prostitutes if there is any suspicion
that they may have been trafficked. This connection must be a clear part of predeployment training.
325
Pre-deployment Training on Off-Limits Areas

Pre-deployment training should continue to make it clear that off-limits areas
have been established to prevent peacekeeper involvement with criminal
elements in the mission area; that they are for real and that they will be
patrolled. Failure to observe off-limits areas will result in administrative or
punitive sanctions applied by the TCC, or repatriation ordered by the SRSG.
Creation of Off-Limits Areas
The SRSG and military commander in each peacekeeping mission should
identify areas suspected of involvement in or support for human trafficking,
and place them off-limits for all mission personnel, military and civilian,
including contractors. Military, UN and civilian members of peacekeeping
missions arriving in a mission area should be required to attend an inprocessing lecture that clearly informs them of the state of human trafficking in
the area, clearly identifies off-limits areas, and reminds them of the likelihood
of punitive or administrative sanctions should they enter the off-limits areas.
Personal Commitment of Civilian and Military Commanders
The personal commitment of civilian and military commanders is invaluable as
a means of reinforcing peacekeeper understanding regarding human trafficking.
Military Commanders of peacekeeping missions should personally ensure that
their troops understand that human trafficking is unacceptable, and that any
involvement in it, including patronising prostitutes in the mission area or
entering off-limits areas, will be punished. Civilian leaders should do the same
with peacekeepers who report to them.
Patrols of Off-Limits Areas
Vigorous patrols of off-limits areas should become a standing part of every
peacekeeping operation to reduce to the absolute minimum peacekeeper
patronage of organised criminal establishments. These patrols will further deter
peacekeeper presence in areas where trafficked women are thought to be held,
and will be able to identify and report violators, even if there is no power to
apprehend them.
Immediate Repatriation for Rule Violators
Immediate repatriation for violating the off-limits areas should be authorised to
further deter violations. Repatriation is clearly a minimal punishment compared
326
to a criminal charge, but it may pose a significant threat of lost income, and
will be a significant deterrent for peacekeepers in violation of these
proscriptions. The SRSG and military commanders will have discretion to
waive repatriation where warranted, but peacekeepers should understand at the
outset that their jobs are on the line if they break the rules.
Evaluation of Commanders
The SRSG and military commanders of peacekeeping missions should be
evaluated on the extent of their personal efforts to control their troops and
address organised criminal issues such as trafficking in weapons, drugs and
persons. This will generate downward pressure on subordinate commanders to
ensure peacekeeper understanding of and compliance with mission codes of
conduct and off-limits areas.
Modified MOAs
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations should modify its MOA with
TCCs to require each TCC to have a mechanism for dealing with claims for
peacekeeper abuse of the local population. The mechanism should have an
abbreviated hearing or fact finding process, a limit on the amount of
compensation available, a time limit on the filing of claims, and a standard of
evidence that will protect peacekeepers and TCCs from merit-less claims. The
author suggests a cap of 5,000 dollars for claims made within six months of the
alleged misconduct, and proven by clear and substantial evidence. Such a
system, while imperfect, would be sufficient to bring real relief to many
victims of peacekeeper abuse, and would generate real pressure on TCCs to
control their personnel.
On-site Courts Martial
TCCs that are not currently empowered to hold on-site courts-martial should be
actively encouraged to modify their domestic legislation to permit them. This
includes not only the legal authority to hold extra-territorial trials, but the
investigative capacity and assets (judges, prosecutors, defence counsel,
investigators, interpreters) that may be necessary to conduct the trials.
Emphasis on Education and Prevention
The emphasis with respect to peacekeepers should be on education and
prevention of their creating demand for trafficked women. A small number of
327
peacekeepers commit criminal offences or become actively involved in

trafficking, and there should be provision for holding them accountable. But
the majority of peacekeepers contribute to trafficking in a more subtle way, by
creating demand for, and patronising, women who have been trafficked for
sexual services. When this demand is suppressed with education, command
involvement, off-limits areas and the enforcement of Codes of Conduct, there
will be far fewer women trafficked to peacekeeping areas, and far less money
placed in the coffers of organised criminals there.
328
CHAPTER 9
Human Trafficking, Prosecutors & Judges
Allison Jernow
Introduction
The Three Ps approach to human trafficking assigns a straightforward role to
criminal justice agencies.1 Police, prosecutors and judges are responsible for
investigating offenders, charging them with trafficking offences, trying them in
courts of law, and convicting and sentencing them. In many countries,
observers have questioned the effectiveness with which criminal justice actors
have performed these functions. After all, the number of estimated human
trafficking cases is very high and the number of prosecutions is relatively low.
More fundamentally, critics have charged that states overwhelming emphasis
on human trafficking as a law and order problem or a border control
problem has resulted in flawed policies and the over-prioritisation of the
criminal justice response. In this view, locating the United Nations (UN)
Trafficking Protocol in the framework of the UN Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime is a kind of original sin. It establishes a false dichotomy
between trafficking victims and smuggled migrants, conceptualises
trafficking only as a problem of transnational organised crime, and provides
almost no mandatory victim protections. Some, perhaps many, feel that the
criminal justice approach to trafficking marginalises, or is incompatible with, a
human rights based approach to trafficking victims.2
The Three Ps are commonly described as prevention, prosecution, and protection. UNODC refers to the
Three Ps as the guiding framework in combating trafficking. See, e.g., UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Report on the Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking, Document
no.CTOC/COP/2008/CRP.1, 2 July 2008.
This author uses the term victim to refer to a person who has sustained harm as the result of an act or
omission that is criminal in nature. Doing so is in keeping with the broad definitions of the term
victim in international instruments and is not intended to restrict the view of the victim to his or her
role in any criminal proceeding. More specific terms such as witness or injured party are used
where appropriate. The author nevertheless recognises that the term victim can be construed as
emphasizing an individuals passivity.
329
To redress this imbalance, some civil society groups have called for an end to
the use of the trafficking victim as a tool of criminal justice and for an
approach that focuses on the victims needs as the central concern.
Recommendations include implementing victim assistance and protection
measures that are not contingent on cooperation with law enforcement and
using various investigative techniques to obtain evidence that will reduce or
eliminate the need for direct victim testimony. Some have suggested that
reconceptualising the trafficked individual as one whose human rights have
been violated, rather than as simply a crime victim, will ensure that he or she
has rights independent of the criminal justice process. These criticisms have
some validity. Any state response to trafficking that relies only on criminal
justice is insufficient.
This chapter posits, however, that the criminal justice response is necessary.
Furthermore, it is a fundamental part of a human rights approach to trafficking.
This is true both at the level of the concrete, specific justice system response to
the individual who has been harmed, and at the level of the overall functioning
of the criminal justice system. Criminal justice actorsdefined here to include
law enforcement agencies, prosecutors offices, and courtscan and should be
the key players in protecting victims rights and ensuring access to benefits and
services. At the same time, criminal law is intended to serve the greater public.
There are societal interests in seeing offenders apprehended and punished and
deterring further crimes. An exclusively victim-oriented perspective would risk
undermining the values that the criminal justice system is supposed to represent
and protect. The goals of the criminal justice system and the individual victim
are sometimes in conflict, but removing the victim from the criminal justice
equation or abandoning the focus on prosecution are not solutions.
There are other judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms for victims to access
justice. Non-governmental organisations and legal aid lawyers in some
countries have been active in filing civil law suits against traffickers or in
bringing cases before international human rights tribunals.3 In others, labour
courts and employment tribunals have played a significant role in obtaining
awards of unpaid wages or compensation for violations of workers rights.
Although important, these mechanisms are not a focus of this chapter because
3
See, for example, Bureerong v. Uvawas, 959 F. Supp. 1231 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying defendants
motion to dismiss in civil case brought by Thai workers against sweatshop owners in Los Angeles);
Siliadin v. France, Application No. 73316/01 European Court of Human Rights, Judgment dated 26
July 2005 (finding that France had violated positive obligations to protect applicant from forced labour
and servitude in case brought by nongovernmental organisation on behalf of domestic worker from
Togo).
330
they are not coercive. The individual victim chooses to file a civil law
complaint or to bring a case before an employment tribunal. Criminal justice is
unique in that it exercises coercive power over not just the defendant, whom it
seeks to apprehend and punish, but also the victim.
This chapter is both descriptive and prescriptive. After a brief review of the
relevant UN, European Union (EU), and Council of Europe (CoE) instruments
in the field of human trafficking and victim protection, parts two and three
present common features in prosecuting trafficking defendants and protecting
victims. Part four confronts the tension between these two functions. Part five
offers concluding thoughts and recommendations. The geographical focus is
based on the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
region, whose fifty-six participating states span Europe, Central Asia, and
North America.
In addition to trafficking as a global phenomenon that is endlessly debated
and denounced, there is traffickingthe crime that happens to a particular
individual and that requires a specific response. This chapter concerns the
latter. Whatever else trafficking might be, trafficking is also a real and
tangible violation of an individuals rights. Responding to that individual
violation by investigating and prosecuting the offender is the role of criminal
justice. For a variety of reasons, we must acknowledge not just the role of
criminal justice in combating trafficking but also the role of the victim in
criminal justice.
1. International and Regional Instruments
The trafficking conventions of the UN, EU and CoE all impose an obligation to
criminalise. They vary in terms of their orientation towards the victims of
trafficking, and are largely silent on the actual procedures that should be used
to investigate and prosecute traffickers. All three instruments require that
penalties reflect the serious nature of the crime, but only the EU Council
Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted in
July 2002, states that the maximum penalty for aggravated forms of trafficking
should be not less than eight years imprisonment.
As has been noted extensively in the trafficking literature, the main instruments
reflect state preoccupations with secure borders, illegal migration, and
organised crime. The strongest protections for victims are found in the Council
of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, which is
intended to supplement the limited or non-existent protection scheme of the UN
331
Trafficking Protocol. The European Convention on Trafficking also specifies

that it applies to all forms of trafficking whether national or transnational,
whether or not connected with organized crime.4 Under the European
Convention on Trafficking, potential victims shall not be removed from a
country until the identification process is completed; parties shall adopt
measures to assist and protect victims; such assistance is not conditional on a
victims willingness to act as a witness; parties shall offer recovery periods
of at least thirty days to individuals when there are reasonable grounds to
believe the person is a victim; parties shall also offer renewable residence
permits based either on a victims personal situation or the requirements of an
investigation or criminal proceeding. The CoE also established a monitoring
mechanism, known as GRETA, composed of independent technical experts.
Trafficking instruments should not be read independently of general crime
victim instruments, some of which are legally binding and all of which
demonstrate an international political commitment to safeguarding some rights
for crime victims. Recent crime victim instruments such as the EU Council
Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the Standing of Victims in Criminal
Proceedings reflect the widespread acceptance of the UN Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the General
Assembly in 1985, as well as recommendations of the Committee of Ministers
of the CoE.5 Access to justice and fair treatment, restitution from the offender,
assistance, and some mechanism to apply for state-based compensation are
now recognised as rights held by crime victims, although implementation of
these rights is lagging in many countries.
In addition, there are two legally binding instruments on compensation to crime
victims. The European Convention on Compensation of Victims of Violent
Crime provides that, when compensation is not fully available from other
sources, the state shall contribute to compensate those who have sustained
serious bodily injury or impairment of health directly attributable to an
intentional crime of violence and to the dependants of persons who have died
as a result of such crime. Furthermore, compensation is to be awarded even if
the offender cannot be prosecuted or punished. The Convention on
Compensation entered into force in 1988 and has been ratified by twenty-two
4
European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Article 2, opened for signature
16 May 2005, entered into force 1 February 2008 (hereafter European Convention on Trafficking).
See especially Recommendation No. R (85) 11 on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of
Criminal Law and Procedure; Recommendation No. R (2000) 11 on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation; and Recommendation No. R (2006) 8 on
Assistance to Crime Victims.
332
states. Within the EU, Member States are bound by the EU Council Directive
of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims. The EU Council
Directive requires states to ensure that their national rules provide for the
existence of a scheme on compensation to victims of violent intentional
crimes.
What general crime victim instruments lack, however, is any reference to the
specific needs of trafficking victims, such as secure and stable residence in a
destination country or protection against prosecution. In 2002 the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights issued Recommended Principles and
Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking.6 The Recommended
Principles provide that trafficked persons shall not be detained, charged or
prosecuted for illegal entry into destination and transit countries, or for
involvement in unlawful activities to the extent that such involvement is a
direct consequence of being trafficked. States shall provide protection and
physical and psychological care to trafficked persons and such protection and
care shall not be conditioned upon the willingness of the person to cooperate
with law enforcement. During legal proceedings, states shall offer temporary
residence permits to victims and witness. Similar protections are offered to
trafficking victims by the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human
Beings, adopted by the Permanent Council in 2003. These protections are
referred to but are generally weaker under the European Convention on
Trafficking. Thus Article 26 of the European Convention only requires parties
to provide for the possibility of non-criminalisation of victims for their
involvement in unlawful activities to the extent that they have been compelled
to do so.
2. Prosecuting Offenders
2.1 Overview: How Many and What Kind of Cases?
Playing the numbers game is difficult. Trafficking, like most crime, is a
clandestine activity. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates
that worldwide there are 2.45 million people in forced labourdefined to
include both economic and sexual exploitationas a result of human
trafficking.7 In the developing world, most of these cases tend to be cases of
economic exploitation. In transition and industrialised countries, however,
6
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social
Council, E/2002/68/Add.1 (20 May 2002).
International Labour Organization, A Global Alliance against Forced Labour (Geneva: ILO, 2005), 10.
333
sexual exploitation appears to be the most common form of forced labour and
the main route into it is trafficking. According to the ILO, there are 470,000
victims of trafficking in industrialised and transition countries.8 Whatever the
reality of the overall estimate, it is clear that prosecution numbers are a tiny
fraction. A report on Eurojust, based on data from a questionnaire as well as the
United States (US) Trafficking in Persons Report, suggested that there were
approximately 4,600 trafficking investigations and almost 900 convictions in
EU Member States in 2003.9
There is very little empirical research on what happens in trafficking
investigations and prosecutions. To date, analyses of legal and policy
frameworks have dominated the research agenda. Nevertheless, the data that is
available from recent reports on prosecutions in some developed and transition
countries within Europe, as well as reports from the US, present a picture of
actual practice by prosecutors and courts.
Almost all the cases involve sex trafficking. There are at least three reasons for
this. First, the historical origin of the term trafficking is firmly rooted in the
movement of (white) women across borders for immoral purposes. Recall,
for example, the International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave
Traffic (1904) and the Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons
and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949). The UN Trafficking
Protocol represents a paradigm shift in that it defines exploitation to include
forced labour, slavery, and servitude, concepts that were traditionally protected
by human rights and labour rights instruments. Yet even the Trafficking
Protocol, in its very name, signals that women and children are of special
concern. Certainly media and even government portrayals of trafficking victims
have tended toward the sensationalistic and titillating. Sex slaves is the term
preferred both by newspapers and policy makers.10 This stereotype of a woman
or girl chained to a bed in a brothel11 obstructs any view of exploited workers
as trafficking victims. Recognising the extreme vulnerability of many migrant
Ibid., 14, Table 1.2.
Boudewijn de Jonge, Eurojust and Human Trafficking: The State of Affairs (Amsterdam: University of
Amsterdam 2005), 19; 20. The author notes that definitions varied from country to country and that
some countries included smuggling investigations and convictions in their figures.
10
For an excellent discussion of trafficking discourse in the US, see Wendy Chapkis, Trafficking,
Migration and the Law: Protecting Innocents, Punishing Migrants, Gender and Society 17 (Dec.
2003): 929.
11
Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and
Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Georgetown
Immigration Law Journal 21 (Spring 2007): 337.
334
workers, both regular and irregular, would require an acknowledgement of the

inadequacy of both labour laws and migration policies.
Second, in many countries there is no specific legislation on labour trafficking.
This is true despite the fact that the ILO Forced Labour Convention, requiring
criminalisation of forced labour, is one of the oldest and most widely ratified of
ILO conventions. Violations of workers rights are seen as matters for civil
rather than criminal enforcement. Some labour inspectorates have the power to
refer employers for criminal sanctions but many do not. Moreover, labour
inspectorates are famously under-resourced and, in some countries, certain
sectors such as agriculture and domestic work are exempt from the application
of labour standards. Work in the informal sector or work performed without an
official employment contract may also be beyond the reach of labour laws and
disregarded by inspectors.
Third, even in those countries with laws criminalising labour trafficking, the
legislation is recent and the concept is poorly understood. In Germany, for
example, there were 454 investigations into sex trafficking in 2007. That same
year, there were just ninety-two investigations into trafficking for economic
exploitation.12 In the Netherlands, the National Rapporteur reports that five of
the first seven cases brought under the new labour trafficking statute, enacted
in 2005, resulted in acquittals.13 One counter-example is the US, where Civil
War-era laws prohibiting involuntary servitude have been used to prosecute
labour cases, primarily in the sectors of agriculture, domestic work, begging,
and sweatshops. But even there, sex prosecutions far outnumber labour ones.
Between 2001 and 2007, the federal government prosecuted forty-six cases of
labour trafficking and 110 cases of sex trafficking.14 Worldwide, the US
Trafficking in Persons Report records 3,427 convictions for trafficking
generally, of which only 326 are for labour cases.15
There is tremendous heterogeneity in the actual charging decisions. Many
potential trafficking cases are ultimately charged under another provision of
12
Bundeskriminalamt, Human Trafficking in Germany: 2007 National Situation Report (Wiesbaden:

Bundeskriminalamt, 2007), 5 & 11.
13
Heleen de Jonge van Ellemeet, Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human
Beings, email message to author, November 3, 2008.
14
Attorney Generals Annual Report to Congress and Assessment of the U.S. Government Activities to
Combat Trafficking in Persons Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington DC: Department of Justice, May 2008),
2728.
15
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2008)
(hereafter TIP Report). Although the accuracy of this data is questionable, given the large number of
countries that either do not record such figures or do not disaggregate sex and labour trafficking cases,
the TIP Report is one of the few sources of trafficking statistics.
335
law. Provisions related to smuggling, pimping and procuring are the most
common. This reflects also the dominant view of trafficking as an offence
closely related to both prostitution and irregular migration, rather than one
linked to the exploitation of a persons labour or services. In other words, a
potential trafficking case gets broken down into lesser prostitution and
immigration offences, rather than violations of labour law. Thus, in a study of
trafficking cases in Germany, the author found that trafficking charges were
dropped more frequently than other charges, such as pimping, promotion of
prostitution, and migrant smuggling, and, as a result, suspects in trafficking
investigations were more frequently convicted of those other charges.16
According to the Swedish National Criminal Police, in 2005 there were seven
defendants convicted of trafficking, but twenty-five of procuring and related
offences.17 In Italy, only 7 per cent of trafficking investigations resulted in
charges under Article 600 (placing or holding a person in conditions of slavery
or servitude). Of the remainder, the majority were for migration and
prostitution offences.18 In Poland, researchers report that the trafficking
provision is almost never used and instead most cases are brought under a
provision penalising enticement into prostitution abroad.19
There is also variety within any given country. Conny Rijkens research in the
Netherlands found that in some districts, only cases in which there is an
element of force are prosecuted, either as a consequence of actual policy or due
to lack of capacity to prosecute other cases.20 In Macedonia, there were
striking differences among trial courts. While the Tetovo court heard the largest
number of cases charged as trafficking, in Gostivar the most common offence
was mediation in prostitution.21
Charging decisions are related to a number of legal and evidentiary
considerations, including how well police and prosecutors understand the
substantive law, attitudes towards victims, and the time-consuming nature of a
16
Annette Louise Herz, Trafficking in Human Beings: An Empirical Study on Criminal Prosecution in
Germany (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law 2006), 1011.
17
Swedish National Criminal Police, Trafficking in Human Beings for Sexual Purposes: Situation Report
no.8 (Stockholm: Rikskriminalpolisen, 2006), 19.
18
Ernesto U. Savona and others, Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants into Italy (Trento:
Transcrime Joint Research Center, 2003), 127.
19
Elaine Pearson, Human Traffic, Human Rights: Redefining Victim Protection (London: Anti-Slavery
International, 2002), 212.
20
Conny Rijken, Trafficking in Persons: Prosecution from a European Perspective (The Hague: T.M.C.
Asser Press, 2003), 210.
21
Coalition All for Fair Trials, Combating Trafficking in Human Beings through the Practice of the
Domestic Courts (Skopje: All for Fair Trials, November 2005), 12.
336
full-fledged trafficking investigation. For example, a review of indictments

filed in Turkish courts showed that prosecutors sometimes used the terms
trafficking in people and smuggling of people interchangeably, although
they are distinct in the criminal code.22 In a report on Kosovo, the OSCE
alleges that, due to widespread failure to understand the legal elements of
trafficking, as defined in Article 139 of the Provisional Criminal Code,
potential trafficking cases were not adequately investigated.23 In the
Netherlands, the National Rapporteur writes that performance targets
concerning how many cases should be referred to the public prosecutor result
in a preference for quick-hit cases instead of taking on longer-lasting
(complete) THB cases.24
2.2 Role of Organised Crime
The number of defendants in any one investigation tends to be relatively low,
especially considering theories about the prevalence of organised crime in
human trafficking. Boudewijn de Jonges 2005 study of Eurojust found that
reports by national members mentioned few genuine highly complex
networks, leading her to ask whether trafficking was not a Eurojust-typical
crime.25 Annette Herzs research in Germany also found little evidence of
organised crime, defined as a stable, mafia-like criminal organisation. Instead,
offenders were mostly family members, shared the same ethnic group, or were
acquaintances.26 Similar findings have also been reported in Macedonia,
Sweden and the Czech Republic.27 A study specifically of women trafficked
into Germany from Romania, conducted in 2004, presents a more varied
picture. Offenders in 76 per cent of the cases fell under the category of
organised crime, based on the structured group definition of organised crime
used in the Transnational Organized Crime Convention. Most groups, however,
22
Galma Jahic, Human Trafficking: Victims Rights Protection in Turkey (OSCE-ODIHR workshop
paper, May 2009), 67.
23
OSCE Legal System Monitoring Section, A Legal Analysis of Trafficking in Persons Cases in Kosovo
(Vienna: OSCE, October 2007), 1113.
24
Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Trafficking in Human Beings: Fifth Report of the Dutch
National Rapporteur (Amsterdam: Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, 2007), 9596.
25
de Jonge, Eurojust and Human Trafficking, 24.
26
Herz, Trafficking in Human Beings, 24.
27
Coalition All for Fair Trials, Criminal Justice Responses to Organized Crime (Skopje: All for Fair
Trials, February 2007), 2829; Ivana Travnickova et al., Trafficking in Women: The Czech Perspective
(Prague: UNODC/UNICRI and Institute for Criminology and Social Prevention, April 2004), 69;
Swedish National Criminal Police, Trafficking in Human Beings for Sexual Purposes, 19.
337
were very small and were usually made up of a recruiter, transporter and
exploiter. Interviews in Germany and Romania confirmed that the criminal
groups involved in trafficking in persons vary in size and complexity and that
usually very small groups can be found engaging in trafficking activities
alongside very large and highly complex networks.28
The lack of evidence of large criminal groups may stem from the failure to
pursue investigative leads in foreign countries. According to Conny Rijken,
prosecutors in the Netherlands often could not charge defendants with
participation in a criminal organisation because they chose not to send requests
for information to other states.29 It is also possible, as a number of researchers
have suggested, that most trafficking involves disorganised crime.30 The
absence of organised crime structures, however, does not mean that offenders
cannot be charged with crimes of conspiracy. Some countries also enhance
penalties if the offence involved a certain number of participants, regardless of
whether an actual organised crime structure was involved.
Reports emphasising the role of organised crime in trafficking tend to
concentrate on sex trafficking. One may reasonably assume that organised
crime is less likely to be a feature of trafficking that occurs in other economic
sectors, although organised criminal groups may be involved in irregular
migration routes. As police and prosecutors become more familiar with the
concept of labour trafficking (or trafficking for forced labour) and investigate
legitimate economic sectors for evidence of criminality, there may be a
decreased emphasis on finding evidence of organised crime. In other words,
offenders may be people who operate bona fide businesses in illegitimate ways,
or whose illegal actions only extend to some workers. Convicted offenders in
labour trafficking cases in the US, for example, have included licensed farm
labour contractors and large factory owners.31 In Belgium, labour trafficking
defendants have included restaurant and shop owners and construction site
supervisors.
28
UNICRI, Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany: Comprehensive Report (Turin: UNICRI,
March 2005), 69.
29
Rijken, Prosecution from a European Perspective, 237.
30
David A. Feingold, Human Trafficking, Foreign Policy (September 2005): 28; David E. Guinn,
Defining the Problem of Trafficking: the Interplay of US Law, Donor and NGO Engagement and the
Local Context in Latin America, (paper presented at Criminal Trafficking and Slavery: The Dark Side
of Migration Workshop, University of Illinois, February 2006); Jo Goodey, Migration, Crime and
Victimhood: Responses to Sex Trafficking in the EU, Punishment & Society 5 (2003): 415431.
31
See, for example, United States v. Ronald Robert Evans, 2006 WL 221629 (M.D. Fla. 2006), and
United States v. Maria Garcia, 2003 WL 22956917 (W.D. New York 2003) (farm labour contractors),
and United States v. Kil Soo Lee, 472 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (garment factory owner).
338
2.3 Identification of Cases

Although it is widely assumed that victims of trafficking do not report to the
police, some studies show that the number of victim-initiated investigations is
not insignificant. For example, in the Czech Republic an analysis revealed that
police reports by victims triggered the investigation in eight out of fifteen
cases.32 In Germany, three different studies documented that victims filed
police reports in about one-third of the cases.33 In Bosnia & Herzegovina, a
majority of domestic trafficking victims and more than 20 per cent of foreign
trafficking victims were self-referred, often through the use of hotlines.34
Researchers in Italy report that the notitia criministhe notice of crime that
begins the preliminary investigationcomes from the reports and spontaneous
statements of victims in areas where exploitation is most intense.35 In some
cases, family members of victims or third parties approached the police. In the
US and Italy, labour trafficking investigations were commonly based on tips
from nongovernmental organisations, labour inspectors, and trade unions.
More typically, however, police began investigations on the basis of
information encountered during routine crime control operations. The use of
stop and search operations in red light districts was considered of primary
importance in Germany. In the most active prosecutors offices in Italy, police
conducted close surveillance in certain areas in order to identify members of
criminal organisations suspected of trafficking and smuggling. In Brescia, for
example, police adopted systematic monitoring procedures that included
checks on nightclubs and on streets used by prostitutes.36
Police control measures such as these might be effective in identifying victims
of sex trafficking, yet one consequence observed in South Eastern Europe is a
change in the modus operandi of traffickers. In response to raids on bars and
nightclubs, prostitution shifted to private apartments and hotels, where women
were more isolated and susceptible to abuse.37 A similar response appears to
32
33
Travnickova, Trafficking in Women, 75.

Herz, Trafficking in Human Beings, 7; Bundeskriminalamt, Human Trafficking in Germany: National
Situation Report (Wiesbaden: BKA, 2007), 6; UNICRI, Trafficking in Women from Romania into
Germany, 75.
34
ICMPD, Listening to Victims: Experiences of Identification, Return and Assistance in South-Eastern

Europe (Vienna: ICMPD, 2007): 51 and note 20.
35
Savona, Trafficking and Smuggling in Italy, 207.
36
Ibid., 206207.
37
Barbara Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe: 2003 Update on Situation
and Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, including the UN
Administered Province of Kosovo, and Romania, (Sarajevo: UNDP, November 2003), 193; Nicole
339
have occurred in Netherlands following the licensing of sex businesses.

Operators opened unlicensed businesses or located prostitution in new venues
such as tea houses or massage parlours to avoid administrative checks.38
Moreover, routine police controls and surveillance will be far less effective if
the suspected scene of exploitation is a construction site, meat packing plant or
garment factory floor. As the Experts Group on Trafficking noted, in order to
investigate labour trafficking, agencies responsible for the control of working
conditions and financial investigations related to black labour ... have to be
made more sensitive and to be mobilised for the fight against trafficking.39 In
this regard, ILO has published manuals aimed at encouraging other sectors,
including labour inspectors, government agencies monitoring employment
recruiters, and trade unions, to become involved in identifying forced labour
and human trafficking.40
Box 1: United States: Human Trafficking Taskforces
In more than forty cities across the United States, government agencies have organised taskforces
that combine police and prosecutor units with other government agencies and nongovernmental
organisations. In El Paso, Texas, for example, the human trafficking taskforce includes
representatives of law enforcement offices, the US Department of Labor, the US Attorneys
Office, and local community-based groups that work with migrants, sexual assault victims, and
family violence victims. The idea is to both spread awareness of human trafficking to help
identify victims and to work with local organisations to provide victim support and services.
2.4 Investigative Techniques

Whether an investigation is reactive or proactive influences the type of
investigative measures used. When victims are in immediate danger or if
children are involved, the correct response is to focus on rescuing the victims
rather than on building a strong evidentiary foundation for a later prosecution.
In some sectors, investigations will almost always be reactive. Thus
Lindstrom, Transnational Responses to Human Trafficking: The Politics of Anti-Trafficking in the
Balkans in Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans, ed. H. Richard Friman and Simon
Reich (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 77.
38
Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Fifth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, 7576.
39
EC, Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings (Brussels: European Commission,
December 2004), 124.
40
See, e.g., ILO, Trafficking for Forced Labour: How to Monitor the Recruitment of Migrant Workers
(Geneva: ILO, 2006); ILO, In Search of Decent WorkMigrant Workers Rights: A Manual for Trade
Unionists (Geneva: ILO, 2008); ILO, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Handbook for Labour
Inspectors (Geneva: ILO 2008).
340
investigations into the exploitation of domestic workers, because of the

intensely private sphere where the crime occurs, are almost always triggered by
victim escapes.
Investigators rely on a wide range of techniques: witness interviews,
surveillance, telephone interceptions (wiretaps), video cameras, obtaining
cooperation from witnesses and lower-level co-conspirators, and searching
premises and seizing evidence. The statement by the Belgian National
Rapporteur is typical: [T]echniques such as observation and phone-tapping are
invariably key resources on which to base an investigation and gather
evidence.41 There is, obviously, a sequence to investigative steps. Telephones
cannot be tapped unless numbers are known. Locations cannot be searched
without addresses and, in some countries, sufficient probable cause to obtain a
warrant. Prosecutors and law enforcement agents stress the importance of
coordinating the stages of an investigation. It is important to keep in mind that
not all investigative techniques are available in all states. Some states lack the
technological capacity for wire-tapping mobile phones, for example. In some,
electronic surveillance requires a court order, making it a more time-consuming
and potentially difficult process. Similarly, the requirement for a court order
prior to the search of a residence or business varies from state to state.
Sometimes investigations are characterised as intelligence-led or
integrated. Intelligence work usually refers to tactics such as electronic
eavesdropping and asset tracing. (See Fred Schreiers chapter for more on
intelligence and human trafficking). Integrated investigations refer to
investigations that target the whole criminal chainfrom low-level recruiter to
exploiter. Pleas for more intelligence work are often made as part of an effort
to reduce dependency on victim testimony.42 Thus, the OSCE Action Plan to
Combat Trafficking in Human Beings encourages participating states to
explore alternative investigative strategies to preclude the need for victims to
be required to testify in court.43
41
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, Belgian Policy on Trafficking in and
Smuggling of Human Beings: Shadows and Lights (Brussels: Centre for Equal Opportunities and
Opposition to Racism, November 2005), 98.
42
De Jonge, Eurojust and Human Trafficking, 29; EC, Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking, 123;
Goodey, Migration, Crime and Victimhood, 423426; Fiona David, Law Enforcement Responses to
Trafficking in Persons: Challenges and Emerging Good Practice, Trends and Issues in Crime &
Criminal Justice, no.347 (December 2007): 16; Mike Dottridge, Introduction, in Collateral
Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on Human Rights Around the World, ed. Global
Alliance Against Traffic in Women (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007), 15.
43
OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 557, 24 July 2003, PC.Dec/557. See also OSCE Ministerial
Council Decision No. 14/06, adopted 5 December 2006, encouraging participating states to develop and
341
In practice, however, even intelligence-led investigations begin with the

statements of victims and witnesses. Old-fashioned intelligence (human
intelligence) provides the informationtelephone numbers, addresses, names
and aliases, routesthat is the essential starting point for any other kind of
investigation. For example, prosecutors in Genoa, while acknowledging the
importance of telephone and other electronic interceptions, also emphasised
that these methods on their own do not yield an accurate reconstruction of
criminal dynamics, at least not in cases where exploitation prevails over the
smuggling of migrants; the method must be used in conjunction with other
sources of investigative information.44 In Belgium, researchers reported that
victims were able to offer relevant information about the networks, links with
other underground systems, the routes used by traffickers and trends in the use
of violence and corruption. In some cases, this type of information [was] the
start of the process for breaking up a network.45
Box 2: The Netherlands: The Programmatic Approach and the Sneep Case
Police and prosecutors in the Netherlands have adopted a programmatic approach to
trafficking. This involves analysing not just the criminal offence but the way that the offenders
function in society at each stage of the criminal process. The programmatic approach seeks to
involve administrative prevention with criminal law enforcement by identifying barriers that
must be overcome by traffickers. For each barrier, the model specifies the relevant enforcement
bodies. In the Sneep case, for example, investigators studied border controls, housing, identity
documents, and financial flows in an investigation of two Turkish-German brothers and their coconspirators. Within the housing sector, municipal authorities, housing corporations, housing
inspectors and private parties did background checks, verified identity documents, and reported
patterns of behaviour. In July 2008, six defendants were convicted of participating in a large and
violent trafficking network that had forced as many as 100 women into prostitution. Seventeen
victims testified at trial, although some tried to withdraw their earlier statements. According to
one observer, the court ignored victim attempts to recant because there were signs of
intimidation. Sentences ranged from 8 months to 7 years. In addition, three defendants were
ordered to pay 50,000 in compensation to several of the victims.46
Criminal justice actors in all countries studied emphasise the importance of

victim participation in the criminal justice process, especially during the
use advanced investigative methodology, in particular to allow cases of trafficking to be identified and
prosecuted without relying only on victim testimony.
44
45
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, Belgian Policy on Trafficking, 113.
46
Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Fifth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, 9697; No
author, Six Get Heavy Sentences in Dutch Human Trafficking Trial, USA Today, 11 July 2008; La
Strada International Newsletter, 11 July 2008.
342
investigation but also during the hearing of the case. In those countries with
fewer resources to devote to other investigative techniques, direct victim
testimony may be the only evidence against the offender. In the Czech
Republic, witness testimony was described as absolutely essential means of
proof.47 In Germany, the availability of victim testimony was directly linked
to the rate of successful convictions on trafficking charges.48 In the US, victims
are the key witnesses in every trafficking trial.
In one typical trafficking prosecution in the US, involving Mexican migrants
who had escaped under cover of darkness from an abusive farm labour
contractor, investigators executed a search warrant on the residence-office of
the target.49 Investigators also issued subpoenas for all of her bank records and
cell phone records. The search produced numerous items of evidence
corroborating various aspects of the victims stories. For example, the victims
had recounted how they were transported from the Mexican border in an
overcrowded van and how the driver had made various stops for gasoline and
to purchase fast food. The investigators found receipts from gas stations, fast
food restaurants, and toll plazas that were used to reconstruct a timeline
showing that the van had travelled across ten states (a distance of more than
4,000 kilometres) in less than two days. The search warrant also uncovered lists
of workers and debts owed, false time sheets, and forged identity cards. The
bank records showed that money was wired to contacts in Mexico on a regular
basis. However, none of the documentary evidence could demonstrate that the
victims were repeatedly threatened with physical violence, warned not to leave
the farm, denied food, and not paid for their work. Thus the paper trail alone
supported charging the farm labour contractor with migrant smuggling. But the
words of the victims, some of them as young as fifteen, showed that this was
actually a case of severe exploitation and justified charges of labour trafficking.
The ability to cooperate with low-level offenders depends to some extent on
individual state practices with regard to plea bargaining. Under Article 26 of
the Transnational Organized Crime Convention, states party shall consider
providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating the punishment
of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation
47
48
49
United States v. Maria Garcia, 2003 WL 22956917 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying defendants motions to
dismiss forced labour counts); see also U.S. Department of Justice, Six Indicted in Conspiracy for
Trafficking and Holding Migrant Workers in Conditions of Forced Labor in Western New York,
(Press Release, June 18, 2002), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/June/02_crt_360.htm. For this
description of the case, the author also relies on her personal knowledge.
343
or prosecution of a covered offence. In Italy, Article 11 of Law 228/2003,

which permits lighter sentences for states witnesses, was enacted to promote
such cooperation.50 Prosecutors in Perugia, for example, report that their most
serious cases relied on statements of co-conspirators. Such individuals were
able to provide detailed inside information on the structure and method of the
enterprise.51 In the US, where plea bargaining is common, some successful
trafficking prosecutions have been built on the testimony of cooperating
witnesses. For example, in US v. Ronald Evans Sr., a case against a farm labour
contractor in Florida who paid his workers in crack cocaine, alcohol, and
cigarettes, five co-defendants, including the lead defendants son, pled guilty
before trial. Two of them received reduced sentences for substantial
cooperation with the government.52
2.5 Following the Money
In both developed and transition countries, relatively little use has been made
of procedures for either a complete financial investigation, including tracing of
assets and pre-judgment seizure, or international cooperation, such as mutual
legal assistance requests or recent European mechanisms and institutions.
Financial investigations serve both evidentiary and pragmatic purposes. First,
they allow investigators to develop a more detailed picture of an operation and
may lead to evidence supporting additional defendants or additional charges,
such as money laundering or financial fraud. Financial information can also
serve to corroborate a victims or witnesss statement, thus enhancing
credibility. Second, financial investigations can lead to the discovery of assets
that are not only evidence of a victims claim for compensation but also may be
used to satisfy such a claim. The Transnational Organized Crime Convention
clearly envisions a close connection between the use of financial tools and
prevention and prosecution efforts. It requires states both to criminalise money
laundering and to adopt measures to enable confiscation of proceeds and as
well as property used in the commission of criminal offences. States are also to
adopt measures to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of
proceeds for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
50
51
Ibid., 211.
52
Florida Labour Camp Owner Sentenced on Federal Charges (USAO Middle District Florida Press
Release January 26, 2007); Matt Galnor, Labor Camp Supervisor Admits Drug Conspiracy, The
Florida Times-Union, July 13, 2006.
344
Many states have specialised financial investigatorsRegional Asset Recovery

Teams in the UK, the Criminal Assets Confiscation Bureau in the Dutch Public
Prosecution Serviceand have the necessary legislation in place. In practice,
however, financial investigations are infrequent and freezing of assets is
extremely rare. This means that an offenders assets are never identified, traced
and held. If they are not identified, they cannot be seized for payment of a
compensation order or fine.
The Dutch National Rapporteur found that although there were some routine
efforts to gather financial informationsuch as interviewing suspects and
witnesses about income and proceeds and paying attention to financial
information when conducting a searchit was much less common to request
transaction information from banks or to collect financial information from
abroad.53 Of sixty cases studied, information was requested from abroad in only
seven. In many more investigations, however, indications of cash flows going
abroad, or assets held abroad, were found.54 One recent positive step was the
publication of a Manual on Financial Investigations in Human Trafficking
Cases in 2005. The manual, issued by the Dutch Human Trafficking Expert
Group, includes questions to ask trafficking victims to assist in calculating
financial profits.55
It also appears that very little use is made of pre-judgment procedures to freeze
assets. In Germany in 2007, measures to seize assets were taken in only 3 per
cent of the cases.56 In Macedonia, assets were seized in advance in only one
case out of thirty-eight observed.57 The rate in the Netherlands was slightly
higher. Out of sixty cases, prejudgment seizures were used in twelve and
money attachments in five.58 Ion Vizdoga, Director of the Centre for the
Prevention of Trafficking in Women in Moldova, reported that court
compensation orders were almost never executed due to the inability to seize
the assets of convicted defendants.59
53
54
Ibid., 117.
55
Ibid., 114.
56
Bundeskriminalamt, Human Trafficking in Germany: 2007 Situation Report, 6.
57
All for Fair Trials, Criminal Justice Responses to Organized Crime, 47.
58
59
Ion Vizdoga, Criminal Justice and the Trafficking Victim (remarks made at the ODIHR Human
Dimension Seminar Side Event, Warsaw, May 2006).
345
Box 3: United Kingdom: Use of Pre-Trial Restraining Orders

The Crown Prosecution Service successfully applied for pre-trial restraining orders on seven
bank accounts, five vehicles, and the defendants 250,000 house in the investigation of a
gangmaster who was charged with violations of immigration law and money laundering.
Prosecutors alleged that Victor Solomka supplied Russian and Eastern European workers, most
of whom were irregular migrants, to a variety of companies in northern Scotland. He paid them
below-standard wages and pocketed the difference. He was convicted in February 2005 and
sentenced to seven years in prison.60
2.6 International Cooperation

Even outside the area of financial investigations, international cooperation
efforts are limited. Herzs analysis of trafficking cases in Germany showed that
only 21 per cent of the investigations made use of the Interpol information
system and just 6 per cent issued requests for mutual legal assistance.61 The
process proved fruitful, however, because those cases that used international
cooperation were more likely to lead to a conviction for trafficking. In
Moldova, an analysis of trafficking trials from 2002 to 2005 showed that
international cooperation was used in just 15 per cent of the cases, although all
the cases concerned trafficking across borders.62 According to the Transcrime
Centre in Italy, two large prosecutors offices reported, respectively, the use of
just two and three letters rogatory requests in the previous five years. The
procedure was seen as complicated, time-consuming, and in some cases an
empty formality. Informal cooperation was the preferred route.63 In Turkey,
very few courts attempted to contact victims who had returned to their
countries of origin. In one case where such an attempt was made, the Ministry
of Justice was requested to translate the whole case file (including the
indictment, relevant articles of Turkish Criminal Code, and victims statement
provided to police) and transfer it to the relevant courts in the victims home
country no reply was ever received.64
60
CPS to Confiscate Gangmasters Illegal Assets after Guilty Verdict, Crown Prosecution Service Press
Release, February 3, 2005; Jason Bennetto, Gangmaster who Arrived Penniless Guilty of a 5m
Racket, The Independent, February 4, 2005.
61
62
Vizdoga, Criminal Justice and the Trafficking Victim.
63
Savona, Trafficking and Smuggling in Italy, 237. Rogatory letters are formal written requests from one
jurisdiction to another for assistance in the administration of justice. They typically involve requests for
examination of witnesses but might involve other aspects of a criminal investigation as well.
64
Jahic, Human Trafficking.
346
Many members of Eurojust report very limited international cooperation.

Most prosecutions only concern the part of the criminal chain which happened
to be present in the jurisdiction of the prosecuting authority.65 This strong
national focus hinders international investigations. The most common form of
international cooperationa request for mutual legal assistance (MLA)is
usually done for a limited purpose rather than to build a genuinely international
case. De Jonge attributes this to several reasons, including a negative structure
of incentives in relation to international cooperation. International cooperation
takes time and resources, which are always scarce, and efforts expended abroad
are not reflected in the numerical targets.
Countries cited specific obstacles to obtaining international cooperation,
including frustratingly bureaucratic procedures, lengthy delays, language and
organisational barriers, and problems posed by different legal systems. Czech
judges called international cooperation awkward, scarcely flexible, and too
slow.66 Several countries also mentioned concerns about the reliability of their
foreign counterparts.67 Based on her research in the Netherlands, Rijken writes
that practitioners consider the need for mutual legal assistance to be an
obstacle in a criminal case and [it] is avoided as much as possible, even if this
is at the cost of the indictment of one or more related offences.68 Similarly, in
the Transcrime study, almost all the prosecutors interviewed stressed the
inadequacy of the traditional provisions for judicial collaboration such as
letters rogatory to request legal assistance.69 In Ukraine, the Office of the
Prosecutor General noted that investigators often failed to comply with
complicated procedures concerning requests for legal assistance.70
Box 4: Cooperation between Italy and Poland: Terra Promessa
In July 2006, Italian Carabinieri and Polish police initiated an investigation into the trafficking of
Polish workers in farms in Puglia. This resulted in a raid on five labour camps, resulting in the
release of 120 victims and the arrest of more than twenty-five suspects. Coordination of the joint
65
De Jonge, Eurojust & Human Trafficking, 28.
66
67
Herz, Trafficking in Human Beings, 14; Savona, Trafficking and Smuggling in Italy, 235.
68
Rijken, Prosecution from a European Perspective, 239.
69
70
ABA ROLI, Training Module on Strengthening Capacities of Law Enforcement Officials to Apply
Mechanisms of Mutual Legal Assistance in Investigation and Prosecution of Human Trafficking
Criminal Matters (Kyiv: ABA ROLI, January 2008).
347
police action was undertaken by Europol, while exchange of evidence and the issuing of
European Arrest Warrants were coordinated by Eurojust.71 Notably they did not establish a Joint
Investigation Team, a procedure envisaged by the Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime, but rather used a Mirror Investigation procedure. Poland explained that such a method
was useful when the establishment of a Joint Investigation Team could be difficult or would
take too much time.72
2.7 Trafficking as Transnational Crime

Some experts have questioned the emphasis on the transnational aspects of
trafficking.73 The Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings warns that
[i]nterpretations of the Trafficking Protocol that concentrate on the process of
bringing a person into exploitation, rather than the final forced exploitation that
they face, are in their nature flawed and limited States should criminalise
any exploitation of human beings under forced labour, slavery or slavery like
conditions.74 Even the Report of the Secretariat of the Conference of the
Parties to the Transnational Organized Crime Convention states that
concentrating solely or heavily on the movement and transportation
element may prove in many cases to be a partial approach.75
This critique, when aimed at rhetoric on combating trafficking, seems quite
justifiable. The heart of the offence is or should be the actual exploitation.
Policymakers, however, repeatedly frame anti-trafficking measures in terms of
border security and preventing illegal migration.
Yet the transnational angle appears quite different in countries of origin. An
inability or unwillingness to pursue the main exploiters, rather than the lowlevel recruiters within the reach of domestic law enforcement, means that those
responsible for the greatest injury to the victim go unpunished. When that
happens, the nature of justice is questionable. Assets go unseized and victims
receive little in the way of redress or compensation. Thus, the transnational
aspect of a case may be critical in a country of origin. Under the European
71
The Ministry of Interior and Administration, Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Human Beings
in Poland (Warsaw: The Ministry of Interior and Administration, 2008), 8; Europol and Eurojust
support Italian and Polish Operation Against Human Traffickers (Press Release, The Hague, July 18,
2006).
72
Annex II (Member States) to the Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime report to the Council of
the European Union, 25 April 2007, at 18.
73
Jo Goodey, Migration, Crime and Victimhood; Jacqueline Berman, (Un)Popular Strangers and
Crises (Un)Bounded: Discourses of Sex-Trafficking, the European Political Community and the
Panicked State of the Modern State, European Journal of International Relations 9 (2003): 37.
74
EC, Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking, 53.
75
Analytical Report of the Secretariat, CTOC/COP/2005/3/Rev.1, para. 34.
348
Convention on Trafficking, states should be able to exercise jurisdiction in

cases in which the victim is a national, regardless of the nationality of the
offender, but asserting jurisdiction is different from actually being able to
produce the offender in court. In several cases American prosecutors have
successfully returned offenders who fled their jurisdiction. In 2005, two men
charged with forcing deaf-mute Mexican immigrants to beg were finally sent to
New York after a seven-year legal battle against extradition.76 They were each
sentenced to 105 months imprisonment. In another case, Theresa Mubang, a
woman who had been convicted of involuntary servitude, escaped to her native
Cameroon prior to being sentenced by an American court.77 Because the US
had no extradition treaty with Cameroon, her return was obtained through the
use of voluntary cooperation channels. Cameroonian members of Interpol,
working together with US investigators from a variety of law enforcement
agencies, located Mubang in her home town of Bamenda. She was arrested
there and immediately flown back to the United States to begin serving an
eighteen-year prison sentence.78
Finally, the transnational nature of most trafficking offences highlights the
particular vulnerabilities of both regular and irregular migrant workers.79 As
documented elsewhere in this book, a migrant who arrives in a country of
destination burdened by large fees to smugglers will be more susceptible to
workplace exploitation. A regular migrant whose work permit ties him or her to
a particular employer may be unable to leave an abusive situation for fear of
losing residency rights. Migrants who are dependent on employers for most of
lifes essentialshousing, food, transportation, access to jobs,
communicationare often effectively trapped. Ignoring the transnational
element could mean losing sight of the role played by migration and the way
that migration policies can create or exacerbate systemic vulnerabilities.
76
Helen Peterson, 20 Indicted in Deaf Mexican Slavery, New York Daily News, August 21, 1997; Pair
Extradited to US in Exploitation of Deaf, Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2005.
77
Ruben Castaneda, Woman Convicted of Enslaving Girl Flees: Authorities Seek Silver Spring Resident
Sentenced to 17 Years, Washington Post, March 3, 2005.
78
US DoJ, Case Updates, Anti-Trafficking News Bulletin (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice,
August 2005), 5.
79
Trafficking can, of course, also be an entirely domestic offence. The United States has prosecuted a
number of agricultural trafficking cases in which the victims were US citizens, typically either
homeless or mentally disabled men. In Brazil, enslavement of Brazilian men as unpaid laborers on
plantations in the Amazon region is common. The extreme remoteness of such plantations and the use
of violence by supervisors prevent workers from escaping. The structural characteristics of irregular
migration means that such migrants are usually more vulnerable to exploitation than a worker who is
either a national or who has legal residency.
349
2.8 Conviction and Sentencing

In some countries, there is a relatively high rate of dismissal for trafficking
charges by courts. Thus, in Germany between 2003 and 2004, courts dropped
almost half of all trafficking charges.80 In Ukraine, one judge reported that out
of every ninety cases, at least ten are sent back to the prosecutors office
because of inadmissible or insufficient evidence.81 Similarly in Poland, during
a five-year period there were 191 completed preliminary investigations. Of
these, thirty-nine investigations were suspended, usually due to lack of
evidence.82 Researchers in Albania reported that in 2002, 176 trafficking cases
were dismissed due to insufficient evidence or procedural errors.83 In Turkey, a
review of 120 human trafficking cases filed at courts in Istanbul, Ankara,
Trabzon and Antalya found that only two defendants were convicted, and they
were convicted of mediation in prostitution rather than trafficking.84
Trafficking is a serious violation of human rights. The EU Framework Decision
requires an eight-year minimum sentence in cases of aggravated trafficking and
the European Convention on Trafficking requires parties to adopt sanctions that
are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Nevertheless, actual sentences of
imprisonment are low. In the Czech Republic, observers of the judicial process
suggested that judges imposed extremely mild sentences in order to avoid
having convictions appealed.85 In Sweden, sentences for seven defendants
convicted of trafficking ranged from three to five years. In Poland, almost all
the sentences for 151 convictions were less than five years and one-third of the
convictions resulted in a suspended sentence.86 In Ukraine, more than half of
the defendants convicted in 2006 received probation rather than prison
sentences. In Germany, victims lawyers and counselling centres complained
that even in severe trafficking cases involving rape, penalties were light.
Moreover, if the sentence of imprisonment is less than two years, it can be
served as probation. If the offender is a foreign national, he or she generally
80
81
Interview by author, Kyiv, June 2008.
82
Pearson, Human Traffic, Human Rights, 212.
83
Sarah Stephens and Mariska van der Linden, Trafficking of Migrant Workers from Albania: Issues of
Labour and Sexual Exploitation (Geneva: ILO, 2005), 37.
84
Jahic, Human Trafficking, 66. Note that Turkish courts have a high rate of acquittal generally,
apparently because prosecutors are more likely to be audited when they fail to indict than when they
indict a case on weak evidence.
85
86
350
only serves half the prison term before release and deportation.87 NGOs have
criticised consistently low sentences, fearing they convey the message that
trafficking is not taken seriously by law enforcement. In the Netherlands, the
average custodial sentence for the most serious trafficking charge was twentyseven months.88 The Dutch Rapporteur has wondered whether courts were
sufficiently conscious of the nature and gravity of the offence.89
Recently some countries have showed slight improvements. In Macedonia, the
average sentence in 2002 was below the legal minimum. Between 2005 and
2006, the average sentence reached the statutory minimum of four years.90 In
the Netherlands, the average sentence imposed in 2006 was twenty-seven
months, up slightly from the previous average of twenty-five months.91 In
2006, Ukraine was placed on the Tier 2 Watch List by the US Government TIP
Report. 92 In June 2007, the Prosecutor General ordered prosecutors to take a
more aggressive stance on sentencing and to appeal cases in which the court
ordered probation. As a result during the second half of 2007, the share of
convicted trafficking offenders receiving jail time rose to 44 per cent, up from
thirty-six per cent during the first half of the year.93 The US Government
removed the country from its watch list.
Prison sentences cannot, of course, be viewed in isolation. Typical periods of
incarceration vary greatly among countries, even within the EU. Furthermore,
sentencing patterns are likely to look different depending on whether the case is
prosecuted in a country of origin or a country of destination. In countries of
origin, the defendant is usually the recruiter, whose knowledge and culpability
may be relatively low. Or, conversely, evidence showing a greater degree of
involvement and hence criminal responsibility may be lacking if international
cooperation measures are not pursued.
87
UNICRI, Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany, 106.
88
Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Sixth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur (The Hague:
Bureau of the National Rapporteur, July 2008), 36.
89
90
Coalition All for Fair Trials, Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 7374; Coalition All for Fair
Trials, Criminal Justice Responses to Organized Crime (Skopje: All for Fair Trials, February 2007),
4849.
91
Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Sixth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, 36.
92
State Department, TIP Report (Washington, DC: US Department of State 2007).
93
State Department, TIP Report (Washington, D.C: US Department of State 2008).
351
3. Protecting Victims
3.1 The Overview: Failing to Protect
Despite frequent government claims to adopt a victim-centred approach, the
mistreatment of trafficking victims has been well documented. This is
especially true in destination countries, where fears of uncontrolled illegal
migration appear to trump even criminal justice priorities and lead to the
expulsion or administrative removal of both potential trafficking victims and
those who are officially recognised as victims. Although trafficking cases do
get prosecuted in countries of origin, the removal of the victim from the scene
of actual exploitation invariably means that it is both impossible for victims to
access justice in those countries and much more difficult for law enforcement
to achieve its goalsnamely the successful conviction and incarceration of the
most culpable offenders. Cases that are prosecuted without victim participation
are weaker cases, which may account for the relatively high percentage of
convictions on non-trafficking charges.
Where a case goes forward in the absence of a victim, perhaps using lesser
charges or relying on a prior written statement of the victim, a host of related
victim rights that are enshrined in international instruments are disregarded.
Victims not only lose support services. They also lose their rights to be heard
during the proceedings, to be informed of the progress of the criminal case and
the release or incarceration status of the offender, and to file claims for
compensation. In those countries that permit victims of certain crimes to have
the status of injured or damaged parties in the criminal case, the absence of a
victim means that he or she cannot present evidence, question offenders, or
receive free legal assistance. Article 27(2) of the European Convention on
Trafficking is intended in part to address this by providing a means for
authorities to refer a complaint by a victim to authorities in the country where
the offence occurred, but there is no evidence that this provision has been used
effectively or at all.
In countries of origin, victim services and witness protection programs are
either non-existent or dependent largely on grants from international
organisations and donor countries. In other words, there is no government
commitment to providing victim services. For example, in Moldova, the Centre
for the Prevention of Trafficking in Women, which provides free legal
representation to victims in criminal and civil cases, is funded by the Danish
and American governments and a Swedish NGO called the World Childhood
Foundation. La Strada-Ukraine receives its funding from a variety of Western
European governments, the European Commission, OSCE/ODIHR, and Anti-
352
Slavery International. Often there is widespread distrust of law enforcement as

well as fear of stigmatisation as a victim of trafficking. Victims who have
returned, voluntarily or otherwise, to their countries of origin do not fear
expulsion but they have still have no guarantees that they will be able to access
justicedefined as obtaining redress for the wrongs done to them.
3.2 Arrested and Expelled
Under the European Convention on Trafficking, if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a person is a trafficking victim, that person shall not be
removed from the territory until the identification process is complete.
Furthermore, the importance of victim testimony in trafficking cases is
emphasised repeatedly by police and prosecutors. Nevertheless, in many
countries, potential victims are summarily arrested, detained, and expelled. For
example, in Germany, deportation measures were commenced against 55 per
cent of the victims in the files studied.94 Migrant trafficked persons in Poland
are usually deported within 48 hours.95 Even in the Netherlands, which offers
trafficking victims temporary residency through the B-9 procedure,
miscommunication and poor identification practices means that trafficking
victims sometimes end up being held in detention facilities for illegal aliens.96
In the UK, despite high-level publicity given to raids on sex trafficking rings, it
is common to deport all suspected victims as illegal migrants. This happens
both because front-line police officers are unfamiliar with trafficking and
frequently refer potential victims to immigration authorities and because of
government fears about uncontrolled migration. Even when government
ministers describe sex trafficking as a modern-day form of slavery and state
that police raids have rescued such victims, there is no guarantee against
deportation. The British Home Secretary defended such practice, saying that
doing otherwise would be likely to act as a pull factor.97 Nongovernmental organisations have rejected this argument, as did the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights.98 Because there is no legal
94
Herz, Trafficking in Germany: An Empirical Study, 18.
95
96
97
Alan Travis, Sex Trafficking Victims Rescued by Police May Face Exportation, The Guardian,
October 4, 2007; see also Audrey Gillan & Julie Bindel, Home Office Defers Expulsion of Women
Held in Brothel Raid, The Guardian, October 5, 2005.
98
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Trafficking (Parliamentary Joint

Committee on Human Rights, October 2006), 65.
353
mechanism in the UK for a temporary stay for victims of trafficking, their only
option is to apply for asylum or subsidiary protection on human rights grounds.
These claims are frequently denied.99
In addition, despite both binding and non-binding international commitments,
trafficking victims in many destination countries face prosecution for violating
immigration or prostitution laws. Such practices contravene both the OHCHR
Recommended Principles and Guidelines and Article 26 of the European
Convention on Trafficking.
Between 2003 and 2007, POPPY Project, an organisation funded by the UK
Office for Criminal Justice Reform that provides accommodation and support
to victims of sex trafficking, assisted fifty-five women who had been detained
under either the Immigration Act or by custodial powers. In many cases they
were detained despite government authorities possessing evidence indicating
that the women were trafficking victims.100 In Kosovo, the OSCE has
documented cases of police charging women for prostitution or illegal stay,
even when they also deemed those same women to be victims of trafficking. In
one case, the women were found guilty of prostitution and sentenced to twenty
days imprisonment on the same day that they were also heard as injured
parties/witnesses in an investigation against the offenders for trafficking.101 In
Moldova, the law protects trafficking victims from criminal liability for
offences committed in connection with being trafficked only if he or she
cooperates with law enforcement.102 In Albania and the Russian Federation,
women who withdraw their statements against offenders or refuse to give
statements at all have been charged with providing false testimony.103 Even the
possibility of being prosecuted has a chilling effect on victims willingness to
give statements that might reveal their own involvement in illegal activities.
Sometimes law enforcement authorities simply seem to have their wires
crossed, as a result of conflicting priorities. After a highly publicised raid of a
meatpacking plant in Iowa revealed hundreds of irregular migrants from
Guatemala, many of whom were minors, federal prosecutors charged nearly
99
Sarah Richards, Hope Betrayed: An Analysis of Women Victims of Trafficking and their Claims for
Asylum (London: POPPY Project, February 2006), 3 and 9.
100
Sarah Stephen-Smith, Detained: Prisoners with No Crime (London: POPPY Project, 2008), 5.
101
OSCE, A Legal Analysis of Trafficking in Persons Cases in Kosovo, 2021.
102
Angelika Kartusch & Katy Thompson, Trafficking in Persons, Witness Protection and the Legislative
Framework of the Republic of Moldova: An Assessment (Vienna: OSCE, December 2003), 34.
103
Stephens & van der Linden, Trafficking of Migrant Workers from Albania, 37; Elena Turukanova,
Identification, Assistance and Protection of Victims of Trafficking in the Russian Federation (Warsaw:
ODIHR, February 2008).
354
300 of them with document fraud for the use of fake social security and
residency cards. Most of the workers pled guilty immediately and were
sentenced to five months in prison. The minors were scheduled for deportation.
Just a few months later, state prosecutors charged the same meatpacking plant
managers with thousands of violations of child labour laws for employing
workers under the age of eighteen in dangerous conditions.104 An editorial in
the New York Times deplored the situation as follows: By treating illegal lowwage workers as a de facto criminal class, the government is trying to inflate
the menace they pose to a level that justifies its rabid efforts to capture and
punish them.105
Individuals who are rescued in raids and who do not immediately identify
themselves as unwilling participants are likely to face expulsion. Thus in the
UK, a raid on a brothel in Birmingham, described by police as an antitrafficking operation, resulted in the release of nineteen women from Eastern
Europe.106 Immediately following the raid, however, many of the women were
denied access to lawyers and were held in detention. Six were eventually
deported. The Home Office explained, At no point did any of the women
indicate that they were trafficked into the UK, nor did they indicate any undue
distress or reluctance to return to their home country.107
In the US, a nine-month investigation of a sex trafficking ring culminated in
simultaneous raids of a number of brothels in the San Francisco area and the
release of more than 100 Korean nationals. Most of the twenty-nine people
charged pled guilty to violating immigration laws and some of the plea
agreements read like descriptions of debt bondage. For example, one defendant
admitted in her plea hearing that she obtained women through brokers and
paid the brokers for transportation debts of $10,000 to $15,000. She then held
the womens passports until they had paid off their debts through prostitution at
her massage parlour.108 Two individuals were charged with sex trafficking,
which domestic law defines as using force, fraud or coercion to cause
104
Julia Preston, Meatpacker Faces Charges of Violating Child Laws, The New York Times, 9 September
2008.
105
The Jungle Again, The New York Times, August 1, 2008.
106
Joan Smith, The Ugly Truth about Cuddles, The Independent, October 2, 2005; Michael Horsnell,
19 Sex Slaves Rescued in Raid on Massage Parlour, Times Online, October 1, 2005.
107
Audrey Gillan & Julie Bindel, Home Office Defers Expulsion of Women Held in Brothel Raid, The
Guardian, October 5, 2005; Steve Johnson, Brothel Boss Jailed after Police Raid, Birmingham Mail,
August 31, 2006.
108
US DoJ, Two San Francisco Brothel Owners Plead Guilty (US Department of Justice Press Release
July 7, 2006).
355
another person to engage in a commercial sex act.109 However, almost all of the
women rescued in the raid were interviewed by federal law enforcement agents
and prosecutors and determined not to be trafficking victims.110 They were
placed in immigration detention and eventually deported. Lawyers for the
women stated that if their clients identif[ied] themselves as voluntary or
consenting participants in their migration or employment at any point,
authorities deem[ed] them ineligible.111
Both the UK and US stories illustrate what happens when an individual does
not match the law enforcement picture of a passive victim who is under the full
control of the traffickers at all times. Confusion persists about who is an illegal
migrant, who is a willing prostitute, and who is a victim of trafficking. In
practice, the boxes drawn around these categories are not only unhelpful, they
fail to recognise the complexity of individual situations.112
3.3 Prevented from Participation in Legal Proceedings
The right to be heard during proceedings is required under the UN Trafficking
Protocol, the European Convention on Trafficking, and the Council Framework
Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings. In addition, the
European Convention provides for legal assistance and free legal aid and the
Council Framework Decision provides for legal advice free of charge where
warranted and free legal aid when victims have the status of parties in the
criminal case. These rights are rarely upheld.
In destination countries, if trafficking victims are not identified as such and are
expelled, they will not be able to exercise their right to be heard. In some
destination countries, lawyers representing accused traffickers exploit the
practice of repatriating victims by repeatedly delaying court proceedings. Thus
in Turkey, victims might stay in a shelter for as long as four or five months
while awaiting repatriation by IOM. When trials are postponed at the request of
109
Homeland Security, 29 Charged in Connection with Alien Harboring Conspiracy; 2 Individuals

Charged in Connection with Sex Trafficking (US Department of Homeland Security Press Release,
July 1, 2005).
110
Two of the women were deemed victims of trafficking but when one decided not to cooperate with law
enforcement, she was held in detention as a material witness for the case. Grace Chang & Kathleen
Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the
Field(s), Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 3 (2007): 333; Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect
Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, Boston
University Law Review 87 (February 2007): 166.
111
Chang & Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking, 333.
112
See Smuggling & Trafficking: Crossover & Overlap in this book.
356
the defence, the victim is often not available to testify. If the defence counsel
does not have the opportunity to cross-examine a victim about her written
statement, the statement cannot be admitted as evidence.113 This practice has a
direct impact on conviction rates. An OSCE study found no convictions on
trafficking offences since the trafficking law was enacted in 2002.114
When trafficking cases are prosecuted in countries of origin, victims confront a
range of other barriers to their participation. Criminal procedure codes may
lack victim provisions and legal aid systems are likely to be less developed.
Victims are commonly not informed of their rights and do not receive adequate
witness protection. They lack legal aid and have no confidence in the courts.
Observers in courtrooms in a number of countries report that victims are not
advised of their rights and are subjected to improper or insensitive questioning
by judges. In Moldova, ILO researchers reported that, [t]he lack of a solid
witness protection programme, in addition to distrust of the legal system and
fear of repercussions by the trafficker[s] means that very few victims agree to
testify against their perpetrators.115
Box 5: South-eastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Centre: Facilitating Witness
Testimony at Trial
This regional law enforcement organisation with twelve member nations, based in Bucharest, has
been instrumental in locating trafficking victims who have been returned to their countries of
origin and providing physical protection and transportation for witnesses at court hearings. For
example, the majority of victims testifying in trafficking cases in Macedonia had their
appearance arranged by the SECI Centre. One witness testified via video conferencing system
from Moldova for a court in Macedonia.116
3.4 No Compensation from Any Source

Compensation is a central part of access to justice. Laws providing for
compensation from the offender (sometimes termed restitution) are required
under the UN Trafficking Protocol, the European Convention on Trafficking,
and the EU Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims. If
compensation from the offender is not available, state-funded compensation is
113
Jahic, Human Trafficking, 69.
114
Ibid., 66.
115
Eduard Mihailov et. al, Forced Labour Outcomes of Migration from Moldova: Rapid Assessment
(Geneva: ILO, 2005), 51.
116
Coalition All for Fair Trials, Criminal Justice Responses to Organized Crime, note 82; SECI Center,
Activity Report (Bucharest: SECI Center, 2005), 13.
357
mandatory under the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of

Violent Crimes. In addition, the EU Council Directive relating to
Compensation to Crime Victims provides that all member states shall establish
a scheme of compensation for victims of violent intentional crimes.
Although many states provide for the theoretical possibility of obtaining
offender-based compensation, usually through a civil lawsuit or as a claim
attached to the criminal prosecution, in practice crime victims rarely receive
compensation from the offender.117 The reasons are varied. The offender may
have fled the jurisdiction, may not be charged with an offence or might be
charged with an offence for which there is no damaged party provision, may
not be convicted, or may be insolvent. Very few victims file claims for
compensationeither within the criminal case or as an attached civil case
and only victims who have legal representation are successful in such claims.
Reasons include low levels of awareness, the lack of free legal aid, and fear of
revenge or retaliation by the defendants. In trafficking cases in Albania
between 2002 and 2006, there was only one criminal case that awarded
compensation and no claims for civil compensation (which, unlike criminal
compensation, includes moral damages) were filed. As in a number of other
countries, the police, prosecutors and courts in Albania are not obligated to
inform crime victims of their rights, including the legal right to claim
compensation. According to the Tirana-based Centre for Legal and Civic
Initiatives, lack of knowledge, time and expense are only some of the factors
influencing the failure to file a claim. There is also a general lack of culture in
claiming damages.118 Similar findings were reported in the Russian
Federation, where NGO advocates were aware of no compensation claims by
sex trafficking victims.119
3.5 Spain: Easing Procedures for Claiming Compensation
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a civil claim for compensation is
automatically included in the criminal case unless the victim has explicitly
renounced the right or opted to file a separate suit in civil court. Prosecutors are
117
See, generally, Katy Thompson & Allison Jernow, Compensation for Trafficked and Exploited Persons
in the OSCE Region (Warsaw: OSCE-ODIHR, May 2008).
118
Centre for Legal and Civic Initiatives (CLCI), The Development and Implementation of Albanian
Legislation: A Tool in the Prevention and Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 30 (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
119
Ibid., 94; Elena Turukanova & Fedor Sinitsyn, Identification, Assistance, and Protection of Victims of
Trafficking in the Russian Federation (Warsaw: OSCE-ODIHR, February 2008).
358
under a legal obligation to request compensation for any injured party. The
result is that the civil claimant does not need a lawyer in order to claim
compensation from the offender.
There are further difficulties related to the failure of a court to order a
compensation award or the inability of most private parties to trace and seize
assets. In the Netherlands, criminal courts made no decision at all on
compensation in 59 per cent of cases in 2006.120 Even in the US, which has
mandatory criminal compensation for all victims of violent crime, rates of
actual payment appear to be low. This is due partly to the inability of
authorities to trace and seize assets and partly to the fact that many convicted
defendants no longer have substantial assets.121
Box 6: Sweden: State Agency Responsible for Enforcing Victims Civil Compensation
When a victim is awarded civil compensation, the court forwards the decision directly to the
national debt collection agency. The agency then sends the victim a letter asking permission to
enforce the claim on the victims behalf. This service is free of charge.
3.6 Promising Practices

The ability of trafficking victims to access justice, participate in a meaningful
way in legal proceedings, be protected from retaliation, and file claims for
compensation is significantly influenced by two developments. First, in both
destination and origin countries the importance of an active civil society and a
well-developed culture of victim rights cannot be overstated. The meaningful
exercise of rights granted under international law depends very much on the
assistance of NGOs and legal aid. Second, in a few countries there are
programmes granting trafficking victims reflection periods and short- or longterm residency permits. Where such programmes exist, they are invariably
linked to the provision of benefits and services, either through government
service providers or government-supported NGOs. Thus secure residency plus
professional counselling and assistance translates into access to justice.
120
Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Sixth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, 16 and Table
2.9
121
US Government Accountability Office, Criminal Debt: Court-Ordered Restitution Amounts Far

Exceed Likely Collections for the Crime Victims in Selected Financial Fraud Cases (Washington DC:
US GAO, January 2005); US Government Accountability Office, Actions Still Needed to Address
Deficiencies in Justices Collection Processes (Washington DC: US GAO, March 2004); Stephanie
Smith, Women Smuggled into US, Forced into Prostitution, Try to Recoup $1 M, Palm Beach Daily
Business Review, April 8, 1999.
359
When victims receive support and counselling from NGOs, they are much
more likely to cooperate with law enforcement and to be effective witnesses. In
Germany, a much higher percentage of victims who received assistance from a
counselling centre agreed to testify and were granted a temporary residence
permit than those who received no assistance.122 Treatment possibilities such as
attending vocational training or language courses or getting a job had a
psychologically healing effect on the victims and very often persuade[d] them
to stay in Germany for the duration of the trial. When this happened, the court
trials were often successful and resulted in the sentencing of traffickers.123
Similarly, in Italy, prosecutors reported that NGOs played a significant role in
stabilising and protecting victims and persuading them to collaborate with law
enforcement.124
Compensation is increasingly on the agenda of advocacy organisations.
Victims who are assisted by NGOs are also more likely to file claims for
compensationwhether as damaged or injured party claims within the criminal
case or as civil claims or before state compensation boardsand to have those
claims be successful. In the United States, legal aid and NGO attorneys have
been active in filing civil lawsuits for trafficking victims. In the UK, the
POPPY Project has taken the lead in bringing test cases before the statefunded compensation board. In countries of origin, some NGOs provide legal
representation to women who are witnesses or damaged parties in criminal
cases. For example, in Moldova, the Centre for Prevention of Trafficking in
Women represented more than 400 women in court over a three-year period. 85
per cent of them received help in filing claims against the offenders. Most
claims related to moral damages and the average amount claimed was 50,000
Lei (about 3,600).125
Box 7: United Kingdom: Awards from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority
(CICA)126
CICA is a state-funded compensation program that grants financial awards to crime victims for
both physical and psychological injuries. In June 2007 CICA made its first awards to trafficking
victims. The recipients were two young Romanian women who had been sexually exploited for a
number of years. They had been witnesses in a criminal case against the offenders. One woman
122
Trafficking in Human Beings in Germany: 2004 Situation Report, 18.
123
UNICRI, Trafficking in Women from Romania into Germany, 49.
124
125
Center for the Prevention of Trafficking in Women Activity Report 2003-2006 (Chisinau: Association of
Women in Legal Careers, 2006), 1819.
126
Mark Townsend, Sex Slaves Win Cash in Landmark Legal Deal, The Observer, 16 December 2007.
360
was awarded 66,000. The other was awarded 36,500. The awards were intended to compensate
both for sexual abuse and for loss of earnings/opportunity during the period when they were held
by the traffickers. Since then, additional victims of sex trafficking have received awards from
CICA under a new and more liberal interpretation of its guidelines. The women all received
assistance from POPPY Project and pro bono representation from the law firm Lovells. POPPY
Project and Lovells gathered documentation showing that the women had suffered on-going
injuries and also successfully argued that the women had not been complicit in their exploitation.
Box 8: Netherlands: Applying the Labour Law Model to Sex Club Owners
The Social Information and Investigation Service (SIOD) of the Ministry of Social Affairs is
responsible for investigating violations of social benefit laws. In one case the police and SIOD
jointly investigated several sex clubs that recruited women from Eastern European countries. The
sex club owners registered the victims with the Aliens Police and arranged an application for
independent entrepreneur status. The women were told that they could work legally in the
Netherlands. Refuting the defendants argument that the women were self-employed, SIOD
gathered evidence proving that the club owners were actual employers and that they had failed to
fulfil statutory obligations to their workers. They were prosecuted for employment fraud and
SIOD also filed a confiscation claim for 1,500,000 in illegally obtained profits.127
Box 9: United States: Professional Victim-Witness Coordinators

Every federal prosecutorial unit has a victim-witness coordinator whose role is to coordinate the
delivery of information and services to victims and witnesses. Victim-witness coordinators work
closely with law enforcement investigators and prosecutors. Through victim-witness
coordinators, victims receive information about the progress of cases and the availability of
services, such as counselling and compensation. In emergencies, victim-witness coordinators
arrange transportation, housing, and protection through witness security programs. In addition,
victim-witness coordinators train prosecutors and law enforcement on the requirements of the
Crime Victim Rights Act of 2004 and the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim Witness
Assistance, both of which contain mandatory provisions concerning the implementation of
victims rights.
The European Convention on Trafficking and the EU Council Directive on

Residence Permits for Third-Country Nationals both mandate reflection periods
and residence permits in certain circumstances. In addition, the Recommended
Principles and Guidelines urges states to consider [p]roviding legislative
protection for trafficked persons who voluntarily agree to cooperate with law
enforcement authorities, including protection of their right to remain lawfully
within the country of destination for the duration of any legal proceedings.
The European Convention was to some extent based on pre-existing practices
127
361
in three countriesthe Netherlands, Belgium and Italywith respect to

victims of trafficking who are irregular migrants. In the US, there is no formal
reflection period but there are provisions for both a short-term stay and a longterm residency which can be converted into permanent status. The four
countries all have a developed NGO network and a culture of support for crime
victims rights generally. All four countries also have high numbers of
successful prosecutions of trafficking cases.
In 1988 the Netherlands became the first country to adopt temporary residency
rights for trafficking victims. The B-9 regulation (Chapter B-9 of the Aliens
Act Implementation Guidelines) provides for a three-month reflection period. If
the victim decides to press charges, the complaint is treated as an application
for a temporary residence permit and the Immigration and Naturalisation
Service (IND) must make a decision within twenty-four hours as to whether to
grant the permit. Although this should mean that the granting of the residence
permit is independent of the prosecutors decision to initiate an investigation, in
practice the two are linked. Anti-Slavery International reports that the IND or
the police often consider the issue of the temporary permit to stay dependent
on the decision of the prosecutor to initiate proceedings.128 If the case leads to
a conviction, the victim is granted a permanent residence permit on the grounds
that returning to the country of origin would be dangerous for the victim. If the
case does not lead to a conviction but more than three years have passed, then
the victim may be entitled to a permanent residence permit on humanitarian
grounds.129
In Belgium, the law provides for a reflection period of 45 days. If victims make
a declaration or lodge a complaint, they are issued a provisional residence
permit by the Immigration Service that is valid for three months and extendable
for another three. They may also receive a work permit. The Immigration
Service must then confirm with the Public Prosecutors Office or the Labour
Auditor that there is a pending legal procedure, that the person concerned is
willing to cooperate and can be considered a victim of trafficking, and that the
person has severed all connections with the suspected offenders. Then the
victim is issued a certificate of registration that provides for 6 months
temporary residence and can be renewed for the duration of the legal
proceeding. If a conviction results, the victim will receive an open-ended
residence permit. In certain other situations where the victim has cooperated
but no conviction was obtained, such as when the offender has died or left the
128
129
362
country, the victim may also receive an open-ended residence permit.130 During
the reflection period, provisional residence, and temporary residence periods,
the victim must accept the mandatory assistance of one of three specialised
centresPayoke, Pag-Asa or Surya. These centres provide psychological
counselling, medical assistance, legal assistance and, if necessary, secure
accommodations.
In Italy, there is no specific provision for a reflection period but Article 18 of
the Immigration Consolidation Act, adopted 25 July 1998, provides for a
special residence permit.131 This is a six-month permit that may be renewed for
one year or longer. It is conditioned upon the permit-holder participating in a
program of social assistance and integration, which is usually run by an NGO.
There are two routes to obtaining the Article 18 permit: the judicial path and
the social path. In the judicial path, the victim files a complaint against the
offender and cooperates in the police investigation. In the social path, the
victim is not required to file a complaint. Instead, a public social services
organisation or an NGO brings the request to the attention of the Questura
(district police headquarters) on the victims behalf. Eventually, the individual
can apply for permanent residency.
Although the social path does not require a formal complaint, the victim is
expected to give extensive information to the police through the social
services organisation and may also be called upon to testify in any criminal
proceeding.132 However, it relieves the victim of pressing charges and it does
not make the granting of a permit contingent upon the victim having relevant
information about the offenders or the realistic possibility of the offenders
being prosecuted.
In the US, there is no formal reflection period. Instead a person who is certified
by the government as a victim of a severe form of trafficking and is willing
to cooperate with reasonable requests by law enforcement will be issued a
temporary form of residence called continued presence. This is renewable for
the duration of the criminal proceedings. Certification as a victim entitles the
person to a work permit and access to certain social benefits and free legal aid.
Following the conclusion of the criminal case, the victim may apply for a T
visa, which is a form of long-term residency that can later be converted to
130
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, Belgian Policy on Trafficking, 43 and note
146.
131
Article 18 of Legislative Decree No. 286 of 1998.
132
Associazione On the Road, Social Protection and Assistance Interventions Addressed to the Victims of
Trafficking: Description of the Italian System (Martinsicuro: Associazione On the Road 2003), 1.
363
permanent residence status. To obtain a T visa, the victim must show that he or
she has complied with reasonable requests from law enforcement and that he or
she would suffer extreme hardship upon return to the country of origin. It is
contingent on cooperation but it is not contingent on actual prosecution or
conviction of an offender. In fact, T visas have been granted to victims even
though offenders were never identified or charged. Since 2001, the government
has granted 1,974 T visas to victims of human trafficking and their immediate
family members.133
Box 10: Norway: Changing the Law for Victims Who Testify
In Norway, several victims who were told by police that they would probably receive permission
to stay in the country and who testified as witnesses in a trafficking case then had their
applications for residency rejected by the government. Norwegian counselling organisations
began advising victims not to cooperate with law enforcement because they would be putting
themselves in danger and had little hope of receiving permission to stay.134 As a result, the
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion sent new instructions to the Directorate of Immigration
to provide residence permits to victims of trafficking who testify in criminal cases.135
The granting of residence permits and other such benefits have been used
against witnesses at trial. For example, in a 2005 trafficking case in Stockholm
City Court, the judge suggested that the testimony of victim-witnesses who had
received benefits might be less than credible.136 In Australia, defence counsel in
a sex trafficking case drew attention to the fact that the police had helped a key
witness apply for work authorisation and argued that the witness had an ulterior
motive for participating in the prosecution.137 Commenting on the Sneep case,
one Dutch Member of Parliament stated that the granting of residence permits
was problematic because [i]n the courtroom it can be a point for the defence to
say that you bought a witness.138
133
US DoJ, Attorney Generals Annual Report to Congress and Assessment of the U.S. Government
Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, May 2008),
21.
134
No author, News Facts, La Strada International, 12 June 2008.
135
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, Witnesses in Human Trafficking Cases to be Granted
Residence in Norway (Oslo: Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion Press Release, 11 November
2008).
136
Swedish National Criminal Police, Trafficking in Human Beings for Sexual Purposes: Situation report
No. 8 (2006), 9.
137
Fiona David, Prosecuting Trafficking in Persons: Known Issues, Emerging Responses, Trends &
Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice, no.358 (June 2008): 3.
138
No author, Violent People Traffickers on Trial, Radio Netherlands/Expatica, July 11, 2008.
364
Such concerns, however, may be overblown. First, if the practice of short-term

residence permits is routinerather than made on an ad hoc or exceptional
basisthen there will be less of an appearance that any individuals testimony
is biased. Second, prosecutors and police can make attempts to elicit full
statements from victims prior to informing them about potential immigrationrelated benefits, to ensure that such statements are not tainted by a desire to
obtain such benefits.139 Third, the use of surveillance, statements from other
witnesses, bank records, and other documentary evidence should corroborate a
victims testimony in every possible respect. In Italy, prosecutors voiced their
fears that the granting of Article 18 permits might be used by defence counsel
to question witness credibility at trial but on balance concluded that the
usefulness of Article 18 far outweighed any potential dangers.140
4. Prosecution and Protection: A Necessary and Awkward Reconciliation
Criticisms of the criminal justice systems use and misuse of victims and calls
for a human rights-based approach are well-founded. There are promising
efforts, but in many ways and in many countries criminal justice is failing
victims of trafficking. There are those who argue that victims should not be
simply an instrument of criminal justice aims and that victims should be
released from any obligation to cooperate with law enforcement.141
Specifically, neither compensation nor residency status should be conditioned
on a willingness to cooperate with law enforcement.142 There are, however, a
139
Note that this practice, however, may violate victims rights to information and statutory and procedural
obligations on criminal justice authorities to provide such information as soon as possible. Of course a
victims right to information should trump any prosecutorial concerns about potential witness bias.
140
141
See, e.g., Conny Rijken & Dagmar Koster, A Human Rights Based Approach to Trafficking in Human
Beings in Theory and Practice, (May 2008) available at SSRN: http//ssrn.com/abstract=35108
(accessed April 24, 2009); Pearson, Human Traffic, Human Rights, 35.
142
See, e.g., Alliance Expert Co-ordination Team Joint Statement on Compensation (ODIHR Human
Dimension Implementation Meeting, October 2008) (calling on governments to ensure that the right to
compensation is not contingent on cooperation with law enforcement); EC, Report of the Experts
Group on Trafficking, 105 (advocating that residence permits should be granted to identified trafficked
persons, independent of their willingness to co-operate as a witness and regardless of whether the
perpetrators are prosecuted); Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, Statement to the Fourth
Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
October 14, 2008 (urging states to end practice of making assistance to trafficked persons conditional
on their agreeing to cooperate with law enforcement officials).
365
number of practical and normative considerations for preserving the

cooperation requirement in both cases.143
It is difficult to talk about law enforcement cooperation without first unpacking
two different boxes: first, the box of rights that victims may claim, and second,
the different kinds of cooperation. Clearly many victim rights apply regardless
of whether or not victims cooperate with law enforcement in the prosecution of
criminal cases. Thus, obligations to treat crime victims with respect, to inform
them of the progress of proceedings, to protect their privacy, and to provide
certain kinds of assistance are incumbent on states regardless of cooperation.144
Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (2006) 8 specifies that services
should be granted independent of the identification, arrest, prosecution or
conviction of the perpetrator.
It is only in terms of residence permits (but not reflection periods which are by
definition pre-cooperation) and compensation that the picture becomes more
complex. To obtain a residence permit, the relevant international instruments as
well as domestic law require cooperation. Even Italy requires that the victim
provide information to law enforcement, although he or she is not required to
file a formal complaint; the victim may also be called upon to testify in
criminal proceedings. As for compensation, there is a de facto if not de jure
requirement that a victim cooperate with authorities in order to obtain
compensation.
The cooperation to obtain a residence permit requirement is intended to
induce a victim to provide information in return for a longer period of
residency. It has the added benefit of giving a victim a secure and stable status
during the duration of a criminal case and perhaps longer. To strike the right
balance between law enforcement and victim considerations, the residence
permit should not be conditioned on a victim providing useful evidence, or
even on the arrest and indictment of a perpetrator. Events such as arrest and
conviction are beyond the individual victims control. All that should be asked
of victims is that they are willing to give whatever information they have in
their possession. It would probably be unrealistic to expect a state to grant legal
143
This discussion assumes a functioning justice system and effective rule of law conditions. It is thus
most applicable to developed countries, which tend to be destination countries. Where a criminal justice
system is completely corrupt and protection against reprisal is nonexistent, witness cooperation is not
advisable. See Mike Dottridge, A Handbook on Planning Projects to Prevent Child Trafficking (Terre
des Hommes, Geneva, January 2007).
144
See, e.g., the UN Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime, the European Convention on
Trafficking, and the EU Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal
Proceedings.
366
authorization to stay in the territory without receiving some information that

leads to the conclusion that the person is in fact a victim of trafficking. The
source of this information is the victimalthough the transmittal route may be
through an NGO as it is in Italy and the US. In Belgium, the Centre for Equal
Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEEOR) reached a similar
conclusion: We are certain the Belgian model strikes a pragmatic, operational
and fair balance between humanitarian and law enforcement components of the
policy.145
In terms of compensation, both offender-based and state-funded compensation
require victim cooperation. Seizure of an offenders assets, whether
accomplished through civil law or in the context of the criminal case, requires
meeting some burden of proof. Where a civil claim is appended to the criminal
case, courts usually apply civil laws of evidence. In either a separate civil claim
or a claim within a criminal case, the court must determine that the victim has
substantiated his or her losses and that the relevant evidentiary burden has been
met. In common law jurisdictions, the state also assumes the role of enforcing
the compensation order. Even in some civil law jurisdictions, a state debt
agency may be charged with enforcement. Where the state has seized assets as
criminal proceeds, distribution of those assets to individuals who claim to have
been harmed by the offender is also done on the basis of evidence of those
claims. Thus, an individual cannot reach into an offenders pockets (or bank
account) without intervention in some form by the state. To exempt a
trafficking victim from cooperating with these requirements would seriously
threaten the procedural rights of the offender.
Compensation from state funds, which exist in some form in most EU member
states and are mandated under both the European Convention on the
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes as well as EU Council Directive
2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004, also requires victim cooperation. Although state
compensation funds do not require a criminal proceeding, they do require some
indication that a crime in fact occurredusually in the form of a report to the
police about the crimeas well as willingness to cooperate with law
enforcement. The Explanatory Report to the European Convention on
Compensation provides that, in order for compensation to be payable to the
victim from public funds, the victim must have sustained an injury that is
directly attributable to the crime, a relationship of cause and effect being
proven.146 In the UK, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority may have
145
Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, Belgian Policy on Trafficking, 59.
146
Explanatory Report of the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes
para. 19.
367
imposed the additional de facto requirement that there actually be a criminal

conviction; if so this would be a worrisome trend. On a positive note, in the US
the Office for Victims of Crime, which issues policy guidance to the individual
state-run funds, encourages consideration of potential barriers to timely reports
to law enforcement, such as cultural or language differences, psychological
factors, and shame or trauma.147 Once again, in order for a state fund to
distribute money to crime victims, it needs the victim to document that the
crime has occurred. The largesse of the state is conditioned in part on the hope
that more people will report crimes and that more crimes will get solved.
In order to unpack the second boxcooperationwe should distinguish
among its various forms. This helps us move away from an all or nothing
model. While full-blown cooperation might mean testifying in a criminal
proceeding against an offender, there are lesser forms of cooperation that are
very useful to criminal justice actors and should be valued. Giving a statement
to police and prosecutors that enables them to begin a criminal investigation is
cooperation. Providing information that allows the relevant authorities to
evaluate a persons claim to trafficking victim status is a form of cooperation.
Cooperation should not require, at least not initially, the filing of a criminal
complaint. Various jurisdictions have provisions for criminal investigations to
be initiated without a victim filing a formal charge, and both the European
Convention on Trafficking (Article 27) and the EU Council Framework
Decision (Article 7(1)) require that investigations not be dependent on the
report of the victim. Minimal cooperation requirements make sense because
they fulfil the states obligations to investigate potential crimes and to ensure
that the distribution of either seized assets or state compensation funds is made
on a sound evidentiary basis.
There are also fundamental normative concerns at work here. While criminal
justice systems generally should recognise the rights of victims and do a much
better job of protecting those rights, it is equally important that victims
advocates recognise the function of criminal justice and the central role that
victims play in the effective investigation and prosecution of cases. Whether
construed as a violation of domestic criminal law or of human rights,
trafficking offences must be taken seriously and investigated and prosecuted
effectively. Despite the limitations of law enforcement, prosecution is an
important part of the response to trafficking and, whats more, it is a response
mandated by human rights norms.
147
Final Program Guidelines for VOCA Crime Victim Compensation Grant Program, Federal Register
66, (16 May 2001): 27158.
368
First, victims of trafficking should not be exempt from the rules of criminal
procedure that govern all other witnesses, many of whom are also the survivors
of violent and traumatic crimes. In other words, when a court summons a
witness, that witness is under a compulsion to testify. It violates fundamental
principles of equality and fairness if different categories of victims are
accorded different treatment. That does not mean that a judge or prosecutor
cannot recognise the especially vulnerable status of some victims, whether that
vulnerability is determined by characteristics of the victim or the offence.
Many countries have rules governing the treatment of vulnerable witnesses and
provide courtroom procedures that, to some extent, shield such witnesses. In
Denmark, the defendant but not the defence counsel may be removed from the
courtroom during the examination of a victim or witness. In Scotland,
vulnerable victims are defined as anyone for whom there is a significant risk
that the quality of their evidence may be diminished by reason of fear or
distress in connection with giving evidence at trial. Vulnerable witnesses are
entitled to special measures that include the use of a screen in the courtroom,
giving testimony by video link from outside the courtroom, the assistance of a
supporter while giving evidence, and increased use of prior statements made in
certain circumstances.148
In some jurisdictions, pre-trial depositions are commonly used as evidence-inchief during the main trial proceedings. Thus, in Belgium and the Netherlands,
witnesses often testify via pre-trial statements. In Italy, widespread use has
been made of the incidente probatoriowhereby a witness or victim gives a
statement in advance of trial but in the presence of the judge and defence
counsel. The incidente probatorio is used when it is likely that the witness is
being subjected to violence, threats, or promises of money or other benefits
intended to induce him or her to give false information or not to testify at
all.149
To carve out a special category for trafficking victims would not only violate
basic principles of equality, it might also threaten offenders procedural rights
to a fair trial.150 Simply put, trafficking victims should not be exempt from the
same procedural rules that govern the testimony of other crime victims. The
Council of Europe has recognised this. Commenting on Article 12(6), which
provides that access to assistance should not be conditional on a victims
148
Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004.
149
150
In Doorson v. The Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights observed that the use of
anonymous statements by witnesses could raise issues under Article 6 of the European Convention.
369
willingness to act as a witness, the Explanatory Report states that where it is

compulsory to give evidence if requested to do so, the provisions of Article
12 cannot be relied upon to refuse to act as a witness.151 Similarly, in comments
on the recovery and reflection period, the Explanatory Report states that the
[d]ecision to cooperate or to not cooperate with competent authorities does not
exclude the obligation to testify when it is required by a judge. Someone who is
legally required to do so therefore cannot use Article 13(a) as a basis for
refusing to testify.152
Second, the prosecution of serious crimes, including trafficking, is not subject
to the control of the individual victim. Although many criminal justice systems
have gradually become more responsive to victims needsa result of the
growing victims rights movement(s) of the 1970s and 1980s, especially in
Western Europe and North Americathe prosecutor ultimately serves the
interests of society at large and not the individual victim of crime. Thus,
according to the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, they are supposed
to protect the public interest, taking proper account of the position of the
suspect and the victim.153 In a similar vein, the Council of Europe Committee
of Ministers Recommendation on the Role of Public Prosecution provides
public prosecutors as public authorities who, on behalf of society and in the
public interest, ensure the application of the law taking into account both the
rights of the individual and the necessary effectiveness of the criminal justice
system.154 In Villagran-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights emphasised that the duty to investigate crimes is the states
own legal duty and not one that depends upon the initiative of the victim or
his family.155
Third, the idea that there could be effective substitutes for direct victim
testimony is unrealistic in the majority of cases.156 Surveillance, electronic
eavesdropping, and asset tracing are all important components of a thorough
investigation but, as discussed above, it is difficult to imagine the kind of
151
Explanatory Report on the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human
Beings (2005), Para. 170.
152
Council of Europe Explanatory Report, Para. 176.
153
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, adopted by the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.
154
Recommendation Rec (2000) 19, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 6
October 2000.
155
Villagran-Morales et al v. Guatemala, Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19

November 1999, para. 226.
156
For examples of such proposals, see EC, Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking, 123; Goodey,
Migration, Crime and Victimhood, 426.
370
evidence that would substitute for direct victim statements. Nor are electronic
eavesdropping and surveillance likely to be options if the investigation is
triggered by a victim escape, which will also put the offenders on notice of
possible law enforcement activity. Prosecutors and law enforcement have
repeatedly stressed the centrality of victim testimony. Unlike murder cases,
which typically feature a corpse, or assault cases, where there is usually
medical and visual documentation of injury, most trafficking cases cannot be
prosecuted without testimony by the victim about his or her experiences. The
defining characteristic of trafficking is exploitation. Where the exploitation is
forced labour, the inquiry must be into the voluntary nature of the work or
services provided.157 That is a subjective question. It depends on the individual
persons perception of an offenders statements and actions. Without that firsthand account, trafficking is likely to get prosecuted as some lesser crime and
the concept of trafficking as an offence against the will of the person is
diminished.158
Finally, states have a duty, grounded in human rights law, to prosecute
trafficking. This duty exists independently of the UN Trafficking Protocol,
although it is certainly strengthened by it. There is a clear international norm to
prosecute grave crimes and violations of human rights and to give victims
effective access to justice. In a series of cases, the European Court of Human
Rights has held that where fundamental values and essential aspects of private
life are at stake, the failure to provide a criminal law response violates the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.159
In the case of Siliadin v. France, the European Court interpreted the
Convention to impose positive obligations on states to provide effective
criminal law prosecution and punishment for those who violate the Article 4
prohibition on slavery, forced labour and servitude.160 Similarly, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has held that states have legal duties to
157
Note: The ILOs view is that forced sexual services comes within the scope of forced labour. Although
the ILO does not take a stand on the legalization of prostitution, it recognises the commercial sex
industry as an economic sector. See, for example, Lin Lean Lim, The Sex Sector: The Economic and
Social Bases of Prostitution in Southeast Asia (Geneva: ILO, 1998).
158
The Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR) expressed similar concern
about the enactment of recent labour trafficking that eliminated any requirement of proving means.
The Centre feared that cases involving acts of violence and threats of reprisals, factors that are the
most difficult to prove and often mostly based on the statements of victims, would only be treated in a
limited way that could ultimately erode the status of the trafficked person. Centre for Equal
Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, Belgian Policy on Trafficking, 112.
159
X & Y v. The Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80, Judgment dated 26 March 1985; M.C. v. Bulgaria,
Application No. 39272/98, Judgment dated 4 December 2003.
160
Siliadin v. France, Application No. 73316/01, Judgment dated 26 July 2005.
371
investigate and punish violations of the rights embodied in the American

Convention on Human Rights. Where the acts of private parties that violate
the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense
by the government, thereby making the state responsible on an international
plane.161 The human rights perspectiveand not just the criminal justice
perspectivethus requires prosecution.
5. Conclusion
Some observers of the criminal justice response to trafficking have urged
victim-centred prosecutions in the belief that it will make investigations more
effective and result in higher conviction rates. This is true generallyas the
experience of countries with established victim rights cultures has borne out
but it is not always true. There will be times when the interests of the victim
and the prosecutor collide. A prosecutor wishes to pursue a case. A victim does
not wish to cooperate. The prosecutor faces the unhappy choice of compelling
the victim to testify as a witness or dropping the case. Where to strike the
balance is often up to the individual prosecutor.
The coercive power of the criminal justice system over defendants is wellestablished. What is less frequently recognised is the coercive nature of
criminal justices interactions with individual victims of crime. The experience
of trafficking victims is by no means unique. What happens to unwilling
participants in the machinery of criminal justice is often similar regardless of
the nature of the underlying offence.
Witness the history of the domestic violence movement in the US. For decades,
domestic violence cases were not taken very seriously by law enforcement and
charges against violent and abusive partners were often dismissed when the
victim became recalcitrant or recanted. The womens rights movement
successfully lobbied for no drop policiesprosecution policies that pursued
domestic violence charges against offenders regardless of the individual wishes
of the victim. Some jurisdictions even adopted mandated participation
policies that required the woman to sign statements, be photographed, and
appear in court throughout the proceedings. In other words, non-cooperation
was not an option. Battered women faced arrest and imprisonment if they
refused to cooperate.
161
Velasquez-Rodgriguez Case, Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 28 July 1988.
See also Villagran-Morales, Judgment of 19 November 1999.
372
In the domestic violence context, no drop and mandated participation

policies illustrate the classic tension between what the individual wants and
systemic societal goals. The victim wants to be left alone and the state wants to
punish criminal conduct and deter future violence. There is no right answer
here. In one recent trafficking case in the United States, the victim, a woman
from India, worked as a domestic servant for a family. She had no wish to see
the couple prosecuted because she feared what would happen to the familys
small children if the parents were imprisoned. The prosecutors worked out a
plea arrangement that did not involve prison time for the offenders, but did
involve payment of compensation to the victim. In another case, a different
prosecutor might make a different judgment call. The tension may be resolved
on a case-by-case basis, but it is a tension inherent in all systems of public
justice and cannot be willed or legislated away.
For domestic violence prosecutions in the US, no drop policies are often
accompanied by support services and counselling for battered women. Such
programmes do not undo the coerced nature of participation, but do recognise
that the state has a role to play in healing and prevention that goes beyond
simply incarcerating offenders. A similar approach can be observed in the best
practices of programmes for trafficking victims. Those states that have
residence permits for victims require some degree of cooperation in the judicial
process. They also provide shelter, education, job training, legal aid, and
psychosocial assistance. According the crime victim significant participatory
rights in legal proceedingsa trend we see reflected in international
instruments, domestic law, and the Statute of the International Criminal
Courtis another example of attempting to reconcile the demands of criminal
justice with the interests of the victim. What we are left with is an awkward
compromise between prosecuting offenders and protecting victims. It is
imperfect but it is better than no compromise at all.
Policy Recommendations
Implement International Standards Concerning Trafficking and Crime Victims
Ratify the applicable international instruments and monitor their enforcement.
For states within the Council of Europe, the European Convention on
Trafficking and the European Convention on Compensation guarantee
important rights for trafficking victims and crime victims generally, including a
reflection period, temporary residence, and access to state-funded
compensation schemes. In addition, states should adhere to the standards
reflected in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
373
Crime and Abuse of Power, the OHCHR Recommended Principles and

Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, and Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers Recommendation 85(11) on the Position of the Victim
in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure.
Look Beyond Sex to Identify and Prosecute Other Forms of Trafficking
Trafficking exists in many different economic sectors. To effectively
investigate trafficking cases, criminal justice actors need to involve other
partners, including labour inspectors, trade unions, and nongovernmental
organisations. Criminal justice actors also need to learn to view severe
violations of labour law as potential crimes. States should recognize the
connection between abuse of workers rights and trafficking, as well as the
ways that structural or systemic vulnerabilities of migrant workers, especially
undocumented migrant workers, can lead to exploitation and trafficking.
Match Resources with Rhetoric
States should invest the appropriate time, energy and resources needed to
conduct full-scale trafficking investigations rather than opt for easier cases on
lesser charges. The individual case agent or street-level police officer needs to
know that the commitment to investigating trafficking is matched with
sufficient time and investigative tools.
Follow the Money
Financial investigations should be conducted to identify and perhaps seize
assets at an early stage of investigation. In addition to criminal proceeds, other
assets should also be identified and frozen if appropriate. Such funds can be
used at a later date in the event that a court awards compensation or orders
payment of a fine. Financial investigations can also provide evidence that
corroborates witness statements.
Corroborate Victim and Witness Statements
Full-scale investigations should include gathering evidencein the form of
documents, bank records, witness statements, surveillance, and electronic
interceptionsthat corroborate victim testimony. If and when a victim does
testify, he or she will be less subject to attacks on credibility if there is
corroborating evidence.
374
Impose Appropriate Penalties

Light sentences may reflect an outdated view of trafficking as similar to
prostitution or pimping. Sentences should be commensurate with penalties for
other severe crimes that involve violations of individual rights.
Protect Victims from Arrest and Summary Deportation
Potential victims should not be charged for involvement in offences that are the
result of being trafficked. Nor should they be summarily expelled or deported
without an investigation to determine whether they are victims. Individuals
should be viewed as potential crime victims rather than as illegal
migrants/law-breakers.
Make Victims Rights a Reality
Victims need to be informed of their rights if they are to be able to exercise
them. Impose the legal obligation on all criminal justice actors to inform
victims of their rights in criminal proceedings, including their rights to
information, to be heard, to compensation and to protection. The obligation to
provide information to victims should be part of the job description and
performance evaluation of each criminal justice actor. Make victim rights
legally enforceable so that victims have a remedy if their rights to information
and to be heard are violated by criminal justice actors. Consider using standard
forms as checklists for the provision of information to victims to ensure that it
is always provided and provided consistently. Also, consider the use of
professional victim advocates within criminal justice agencies. In some
countries, police are required to refer crime victims to victim counselling
centres unless a victim chooses to opt out of the referral process.
Recognise that Compensation is Part of Access to Justice
To make filing compensation claims easier, ensure that victims are informed of
the right to seek compensation from the offender and, where applicable, from a
state fund. Streamline application procedures and provide assistance with
completing application forms, if necessary by referral to an appropriate victim
service provider or counselling centre. Law enforcement investigators and
prosecutors should be under an obligation to document a victims
losses/injuries and provide such documentation to the court, with an
opportunity for the victim to supplement the record if necessary. Criminal
courts should consider such claims within the context of the criminal case
375
wherever possible. Collection of compensation orders can be improved by

using national debt collection agencies.
Have Realistic Expectations about Cooperation
A victim should not be held responsible for the eventual success of an
investigation and decisions about residency status should be independent of the
outcome of a prosecution. The obligation to cooperate with law enforcement
should be limited to law enforcement requests that are reasonable. In other
words, if the victim is not able to identify the offender or is too traumatised to
give a statement, it would be unreasonable to expect him or her to testify.
Consider graduated cooperation models. The initial expectation on a
trafficking victim should only be that he or she provide the information that
will allow authorities to make a reasonable determination to treat him/her as a
victim. Expecting a victim to file a complaint in order to initiate a criminal
investigation may not be realistic in many cases. Full cooperationmeaning
testimony in court in a trial against the offendermay not be necessary in
many cases. Ensure that trafficking offences can be prosecuted independently
of a victim filing a complaint, or else that an advocacy NGO can file the
complaint on behalf of the victim.
Provide Cross-Border Access to Justice and Ex-Official Complaints
Create channels for victims who have been returned to countries of origin to
have meaningful participation in legal proceedings against offenders, including
access to compensation funds.
Dont Do It Alone
Build partnerships with NGOs and other members of civil society that can
provide care, support, counselling and legal advocacy services for trafficking
victims. Such partnerships are also valuable sources of information about the
needs of victims and can teach criminal justice agencies and actors how to
make the justice system more responsive.
Recommendations for Civil Society/Victim Advocacy Organisations
Recognize the Broader Goals of Criminal Justice
Holding wrongdoers accountable and ending impunity for perpetrators of
human rights violations are important goals of international and domestic
376
justice. Many human rights instruments require the investigation and

prosecution of abuses. To achieve those systemic goals, victims must play a
part in the process. Without a trafficking victims testimony, many trafficking
crimes cannot be prosecuted as such. Moreover, the lack of victim testimony
may impede a defendants rights to a fair trial.
Create a Victims Rights CultureFor All Victims
Forging alliances with advocacy organisations that represent other types of
victims (domestic violence, child abuse, street crime) or other interest groups
(migrants, farm-workers, etc.). helps build a broad culture of support and
concern for victims. Cultural change can lead to institutional changes.
Inform Victims and Others of Rights under International and Domestic Law
Making sure victims are aware of their rights is the first step toward
implementation. Educate criminal justice actors about existing rights.
Information strategies should be tailored to specific audiences.
Focus on Criminal Procedural Law
Changes in procedural law are often as important as changes in substantive
law. Moreover, changes in procedural law work to the benefit of victims of all
crimes and do not link a victims access to benefits, information, and services
to a particular charging decision.
Document Injuries and Losses
Gather evidence of a victims injuries and losses (photos, medical records,
payslips) and provide such evidence to investigating officers. Encourage
victims to file compensation claims, either as pendent civil claims or separate
cases, depending on the legal system. Publicise positive outcomes.
377
PART 3: Cooperation
379
CHAPTER 10
Combating Human Trafficking: Improving
Governance Institutions, Mechanisms &
Strategies1
Phil Williams
Introduction
Global governance has become a highly fashionable concept. In many areas,
however, a large gap continues to exist between concept and effective
implementation. This is certainly true in governance efforts to combat
trafficking in human beingsalthough it has to be acknowledged that
considerable progress has been made since the mid-1990s, when trafficking in
human beings, especially women and children for the commercial sex trade,
was recognised as an important but undesirable accompaniment to
contemporary globalisation. The 2000 United Nations Protocol on the
Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of Trafficking in Humans, which
supplements the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, placed the
issue squarely on the global agenda. In the same year, the United States passed
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which established the goals of
punishing traffickers, protecting victims of trafficking, and preventing
trafficking. The scope of the act was global, and the US Congress, displaying
an enduring penchant for what George Kennan termed a legalistic moralistic
approach to international relations, mandated that the Department of State
develop an annual report card in which states were formally graded on their
efforts to combat trafficking in human beings.2 Those countries which receive
poor grades might be subject to sanctions, in that they become ineligible for
non-humanitarian, non-trade-related economic assistance from the United
States. Although both the US act and the UN Protocol placed human trafficking
The author would like to express his appreciation to two anonymous referees and to Cornelius
Friesendorf for their very constructive and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
381
firmly on the global agenda, little progress appears to have been made in
containing let alone reducing what has become a lucrative global business.
Against this background this chapter seeks to identify ways in which
governance institutions and mechanisms to combat human trafficking can be
strengthened. It looks initially at the limits of governance, both in general and
specifically in relation to combating human trafficking. It then suggests that the
networks involved in human trafficking are agile and difficult to combat,
especially because they operate within a dynamic market characterised not only
by a high demand for forced labour and commercial sex but also a ready supply
of trafficking victims. In short, human trafficking poses enormous challenges to
governance and law enforcement, and, at times, these challenges seem to be
overwhelming. Even if it is something which is unlikely to be eliminated,
however, more effective steps can be taken to contain or even reduce the scope
of the problem.
Consequently, the next section of the paper focuses on the various kinds of
networks involved in human trafficking, highlighting their vulnerabilities.
Attention then focuses on how these vulnerabilities might be exploited in
various kinds of attack strategies. The problem is that attacking only the
criminal networks which function in these markets without in any way stifling
the market dynamics simply leads to a more rapid turnover of these networks.
Consequently, counter-network attacks have to be part of a broader approach
which seeks to disrupt and if possible alter the market dynamics.
After suggesting ways in which this might be done, attention is turned to the
development and strengthening of global governance institutions, international
cooperation, and law enforcement mechanisms to combat human trafficking in
ways that overcome the inhibitions and limitations which have hitherto
characterised these efforts. A key theme of the analysis is that the issue is not
just about inter-governmental cooperation and networking; it is also about
strategy. It also needs to be emphasised that the creation of more effective
governance networks is ultimately no more than a means to an endwhich is a
massive reduction in what is a contemporary form of slavery.
1. Limited Governance, Agile Networks, and Powerful Markets
1.1 Limited Governance
To some extent, of course, law enforcement and judicial networks have already
emerged as a bottom-up response to globalisation. This phenomenon was
elucidated in the mid-1990s by Ethan Nadelmann in an incisive analysis of law
382
enforcement cooperation to combat transnational drug trafficking.3 Not only

did Nadelmann argue that cross-border cooperation was vital when confronting
drug trafficking networks which spanned national borders, he also highlighted
some of the difficulties of establishing effective cooperation, especially with
countries where corruption was systemic.4 More recently, Anne-Marie
Slaughter has noted that networks of government officialspolice
investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislatorsincreasingly
exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global crime and
address common problems on a global scale.5 She acknowledges, however,
that while these government networks are a key feature of world order in the
21st century they are underappreciated, under-supported, and underused to
address the central problems of global governance.6
Yet, this should not be a surprise. State-based legal systems are an important
inhibition on cooperation across national borders. Moreover, in the 21st century
governance within many nation-states is woefully inadequate. Expectations
about the emergence of governance mechanisms beyond the nation-state and
especially at the global level, therefore, should be tempered by realism, history,
and a recognition that gaps in national governance almost inevitable translate
into even larger gaps in global governance. In a world where the predominant
units remain sovereign states, global governance is inherently limited; in a
world where many of these states lack capacity for both resource extraction and
service provision, and suffer from legitimacy deficits, global governance
inevitably contains holes and gaps that are not easily filled. In some respects
the problem is even worse than this suggests. Weak states are characterised by
limited border controls, ineffective laws, the absence of a compelling concept
of collective good or public interest, and inadequate provision for the citizenry.
Moreover, other typical state functions are not carried out with either efficiency
or effectiveness. Not surprisingly, these weaknesses act as a hot-house for the
growth of trafficking organisations.
Even allowing for the problems stemming from weak states, there is another
difficulty associated with governance mechanisms to combat human
trafficking. Governments have become so accustomed to dealing with each
other that they have really been unprepared for the diversity of actors,
3
Ethan A. Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of US Criminal Law Enforcement
(University Park PA: Penn State University Press, 1993).
Ibid.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004), 1.
Ibid.
383
including trafficking organisations and networksplaying major roles in

contemporary global political and economic life. Because trafficking is
generally a transnational activity, only collective, multilateral or transnational
responses will succeed in having a major impact. Trafficking networks often
present moving and difficult targets for governments, partly because of their
agility and partly because of their ability to use national sovereignty for
defensive purposes, retreating to safe havens when international pressure is on
them. Indeed, many trafficking organisations engage in jurisdictional arbitrage,
exploiting both jurisdictional asymmetries (highly divergent laws and
penalties) and jurisdictional voids (countries in which there are no effective
laws and regulations or no effective implementation of the laws and regulations
against trafficking and its profits).
Consequently, no government, no matter how powerful, can adequately
respond to transnational trafficking in isolationalthough clearly some
governments could do a lot more to deal with internal trafficking in people.
While it is important not to ignore internal trafficking, transnational human
trafficking is a distributed problem that requires a distributed solution. In many
instances, however, reluctance to engage in distributed responses is driven by
concerns about ceding or relinquishing national sovereignty, particularly in the
areas of law enforcement and national security. Ironically, as Moises Naim has
noted, the aversion of governments to multilateral action for the sake of
protecting their sovereignty is often a moot point. Their sovereignty is
compromised daily by stateless networks that break laws and cross borders
in pursuit of trade Without new forms of codifying and managing
sovereignty, governments will continue to face a large disadvantage in their
efforts to combat trafficking.7 Yet, multilateral responses alone are not enough,
particularly as the strategies which emerge are often diluted compromises that
do not adequately reflect the scale of the challenges that are faced.
In view of all this, it is hardly surprising that, in spite of the grandiose rhetoric
about the evils of trafficking, the various global and regional initiatives, and the
annual scorecards issued by the United States, policies to combat human
trafficking remain a low priority for many (if not most) governments. The low
priority is reflected in the paucity of resources devoted to criminal justice in
general and to combating trafficking in human beings in particular. In many
cases, this is simply a result of the constant and often mundane tradeoffs of
energy and resources that are inherent in government. The upshot, however, is
that all too many governments have failed to give efforts to combat human
7
Moises Naim, The Five Wars of Globalization Foreign Policy (JanuaryFebruary 2003): 2937 at 36.
384
trafficking the resources or attention they deserve. Penalties for human

trafficking have remained grossly inadequate, law enforcement agencies have
not been trained and equipped either to investigate adequately or to provide
victim support, and only NGOs and international organisations have managed
to keep the issue alive. Even in the United States, where trafficking in women
was placed firmly on the policy agenda during the Clinton presidency, an
exploratory study of a limited number of local police agencies revealed not
only the paucity of local law enforcement preparation to deal with trafficking
but also general attitudes that would not promote a proactive and informed
response to this crime.8 Much the same appears to be true in the European
Union. As the European Commission working document on monitoring and
evaluating the EU Plan on combating and preventing trafficking in human
beings noted,
the total number of cases investigated in the EU was 195 in 2001, 453
in 2003, 1,060 in 2005, and 1,569 in 2006. Despite the upward trend,
the number of criminal proceedings is still not high enough to reflect
the presumed scale of the crime, especially given the fact that about
500,000 people might be trafficked to Europe every year according to
IOM estimates. In 2006, 180 cases were recorded of this offence being
committed against children. As regards trafficking for labour
exploitation, the legislative framework has been recently completed,
and thus implementation is even less advanced. The conclusion has to
be that, trafficking in human beings is still a low-risk crime concerning
both trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation.9
The weaknesses of the efforts to combat human trafficking are perhaps even
more obvious in the global figures for indictments and convictions of
traffickers in human beings. According to the US State Departments Global
Law Enforcement data, presented in the Trafficking in Persons Report 2008,
Deborah Wilson, William Walsh, and Sherilyn Kleuber, Trafficking in Human Beings: Training and
Services in US Law Enforcement Agencies. Police Practice and Research 7, no.2 (May 2006): 149
160.
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Working Document: Evaluation and

Monitoring of the Implementation of the EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for
Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Human Beings, COM 2008 657 Final (Brussels: EU
Commission, October 17, 2008), 3, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0657:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed May 18,
2009).
385
the number of prosecutions and convictions for the five years from 2003 to
2007 is broken down as shown in Table 1.10
Table 1.
Year
Prosecutions
Convictions
2003
7,992
2,815
2004
6,885
3,025
2005
6,178
4,379
2006
5,808
3,160
2007
5,682 (490 for forced labour)
3,427 (326 for forced labour)
Although there are always several ways to explain such trends, the declining
number of prosecutions is a cause for concern, especially as there is no
evidence that the scale of the problem has decreased during this five-year
period. As highlighted in Figure 1, the reduction in prosecutions is offset to
some degree by a significantif unevenimprovement in the conviction rate.
Overall though, the figures remain remarkably modest, to say the least.
Figure 1.
10
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington DC: US Department of State,

2008), 37, www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/ (accessed May 18, 2009).
386
All this is not to suggest that combating trafficking is simply a matter of will
and commitment. Even when will and commitment are accompanied by the
allocation of significant resources, anti-trafficking policies encounter many
problems, not the least of which are the inhibitions on and obstacles to
cooperation among law enforcement agencies, at all levels. It is often forgotten
that most police departments and law enforcement agencies are local and not
national and have a narrow perspective within a specific jurisdiction. Another
closely related inhibition to cooperationand one which is rarely given the
attention it deserves is that incentive structures both locally and within national
law enforcement agencies are typically tied to short-term tactical results rather
than long-term strategic impact. The transnational dimensions of human
trafficking have inherently low priority because they require complex and
lengthy investigations, which demand significant resources and manpower,
have uncertain results, and do not necessarily yield tangible short-term benefits.
Moreover, the system of rewards and penalties in almost all bureaucracies is
based on metrics that are easily identified and readily counted, on narrow
notions of organisational missions and on political salience and expediency.
And this is in countries with well-developed and relatively efficient criminal
justice and law enforcement systems.
In many countries, however, law enforcement agencies are lacking in highlytrained personnel and funding. This is certainly the case for many source and
transhipment countries for human trafficking; consequently, they lack the
capacity required for effective international cooperation. Another problem for
many developing countries and countries in transition is that law enforcement
is not widely trusted by society and is susceptible to corruption by organised
crime and trafficking networks. Consequently, countries with lower levels of
law enforcement corruption are loath to share information with thema
reluctance that is intensified by the way in which law enforcement has become
one of the last bastions of national sovereignty. Sometimes this reluctance and
suspicion comes across as a form of condescending arrogance which further
hinders communication and cooperation.
An additional problem for combating human trafficking is that some countries
still lack legal instruments to combat trafficking within their national
territories, let alone the laws and mandates which underpin international
cooperation. The UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons noted that
between the Protocol on human trafficking entering into force in 2003 and
November 2008, 45 per cent of the 155 countries examined put in place laws
387
against trafficking in persons.11 Equally impressive, almost half of the countries

had developed a specific national plan against human trafficking or created a
specialised police unit.12 Although, at one level, progress has been remarkable,
it is worth emphasising that many international regimes are characterised more
by cosmetic conformity and tacit defection than by enduring efforts to live up
to norms and standards by passing appropriate laws and implementing them
effectively. Even in the European Union, for example, major gaps remain. As a
European Commission working paper in October 2008 noted, the past years
have witnessed a dynamic process of approximation of legislation in the
Member States, in the field of both criminal law and victim assistance.
However, the figures available indicate a serious gap between the legislation in
force and actual implementation. Figures concerning criminal proceedings are
still not high enough. In the field of victim assistance and protection, in
particular, a critical lack of effective implementation must be underlined.13
What makes this critique particularly powerful is that it focuses on
governments, which not only have significant resources and expertise, but have
also developed strong habits of cooperationas in the European Union. Yet,
different laws on personal privacy and the handling of data have hindered and
complicated the sharing of critical information. In spite of the progress,
therefore, governance efforts to combat human trafficking remain fragmented
and ad hoc in form, partial and incomplete in substance, and still inadequate to
meeting the challenge of a global problem, the scale and scope of which are
still not fully understood. The situation is worsened by the formidable problems
governments have to confront in their efforts to combat illicit transnational
networks and markets.
1.2 Agile Networks
It has to be acknowledged that human traffickerslike other kinds of
traffickershave many advantages over governments and law enforcement
agencies. These include: the capacity to hide human trafficking in the huge
volume of travel facilitated by globalisation; the initiative in terms of the
11
United Nations Office of Drug And Crime (UNODC), Global Report on Trafficking in Persons
(Vienna: UNODC, February 12, 2009), 24,
http://www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/humantrafficking/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf (accessed May 18,
2009).
12
Ibid., 25.
13
Commission of the European Communities, Evaluation and Monitoring of the Implementation of the
EU Plan, 5.
388
methods, timing, and routes used for human trafficking; and the capacity to
neutralise or overcome some control mechanisms and regulatory measures
imposed by governments through corruption and co-option. In addition, as
suggested above, trafficking organisations have the ability to use multiple
jurisdictions and thereby ensure that their activities are distributed in ways that
make them very difficult to counter. Sometimes it is not even clear which
countries own the problem. Moreover, network organisational forms appear
to have a degree of flexibility, a capacity for adaptation, and a resilience that
make them difficult for hierarchical and bureaucratic structures to counter.
Networks also vary significantly, in size, scope, structure, membership, and
purpose. Some networks can be understood as organisations; others operate
inside formal organisations; others are anything but organisations with formal
structures. Some networks are purely social or political; others are related to
the operation of markets, which can be either licit or illicit, or even some
combination of the two.
The notion that networks have lots of advantages over hierarchies has recently
been challenged by an analysis which suggests that both the threat from
networks and the difficulties they present to hierarchical organisations
attempting to combat them have been exaggerated. In a provocative and
important, if ultimately unpersuasive, article Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and
Calvert Jones contend that the prevailing pessimism about the ability of states
to combat illicit networks is premature. The advantages claimed for networks
vis--vis hierarchical organizations are often not well characterized or
substantiated. Although they tend to enjoy flexibility and adaptability,
networks have importantand often overlookedstructural disadvantages that
limit their effectiveness.14 A key part of their argument is that clandestine
organizationswhether terrorist groups, guerrilla movements, or drugsmuggling enterprisesface a unique set of constraints that distinguish them
from their legal commercial counterparts.15 The authors claim that many illicit
networks may be prone to inefficiencies and short life cycles, but that this
has been ignored because of the focus on the advantages rather than the
weaknesses of networks.16 In addition, they contend that the disadvantages
claimed for hierarchies are often based on bad management and are not
inherent to form law enforcement agencies enjoy several advantages over
14
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why AlQaida May be Less Threatening Than Many Think, International Security 33, no.2 (Fall 2008): 744
at 8.
15
Ibid., 11.
16
Ibid., 17.
389
clandestine networks, such as centralized information processing monitoring of

activities, formal training, and reliable organizational memory. All this,
combined with a significant force advantage, implies that states can inflict costs
on illicit networks with a greater efficiency, and for longer periods of time,
than illicit networks can with regard to states.17 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and
Jones offer some important examples which show that networks are sometimes
slow to respond to law enforcement efforts and that they can be degraded and
even dismantled.18
This argumentwhich emphasises the weaknesses not strengths of networks
and the strengths rather than the weaknesses of bureaucraciesis an important
counterweight to assessments which exaggerate the strength of networks and
ignore their weaknesses. Indeed, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones challenge the
notionwhich they see as the new conventional wisdom even though
governments have been very slow to accept, let alone implement, this
wisdomthat it takes a network to defeat a network, arguing, in effect, that
it takes a hierarchy to defeat a network.19
Some parts of this thesis are persuasive in relation to states where lawenforcement and intelligence agencies are unusually well-resourced and
relatively efficient. Even in such cases, however, the transnational and
distributed nature of many illicit networks ensures that even when a single state
can hurt one part of the network, other segments are out of reach and immune
from damage. The critique also ignores the fact that members of networks are
socially embedded in particular societies which enables them to overcome
some of the information limitations and communications failures described by
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones. Closely related to this, networks tend to be
edge organizations which are far closer to the environment in which they
operate than are hierarchical, bureaucratic organisations.20 Indeed, hierarchical
bureaucratic structures are all too often arthritic, with organisational cultures
that erode flexibility, reward conservatism, and stifle innovation. Moreover
these structures operate through standard operational procedures that inhibit
cooperation with other agencies even at the domestic level, let alone across
national borders. Extolling the virtues of bureaucracy, and ignoring
17
Ibid., 4243.
18
Ibid., 1933.
19
The argument that it takes a network to defeat a network was initially developed by John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001).
20
David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information
Age (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2003).
390
organizational pathologies, bureaucratic politics and the dominance of

standard operational procedures, does not produce a compelling argument.21
Another problem is that Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones exhibit the same kind
of selection bias that they criticise. Whereas network theorists focus on
strengths rather than weaknesses, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones buttress their
arguments by focusing on unsuccessful or failed networks, largely ignoring the
fact that these particular networks are often the most unsophisticated and inept
of their kind. There is little recognition in their analysis that law enforcement
acts, if often inadvertently, as a Darwinian selection mechanism weeding out
the weakest and most vulnerable and leading to the survival of the fittest in the
criminal world. Consequently, what they see as government and law
enforcement success was, in some cases at least, little more than picking lowhanging fruit.
Perhaps most important, however, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones genuflect to
power differentials between states and illicit networks but then largely ignore
the imbalance. Given the power differentials, the ability of networks to
confront states with serious and persistent problems suggests that other
considerations are at playand it seems likely that one of these considerations
is the network form. Even states with fully developed criminal justice systems
and effective and efficient law enforcement agencies, for the most part, find it
easier to deal with familiar and conventional security challenges posed by other
states than with the more dynamic problems posed by networks. This not
surprising: the whole thrust of the Westphalian state system has been
organisation for diplomacy and the use and threat of force in relation to other
competing and cooperating state entities. Responding to networks poses
different kinds of challenges and, although states are sometimes successful in
meeting these challenges, success is often based on an allocation of resources
that is asymmetrically large. In the final analysis, it is not surprising that states,
historically, have obtained some success in combating networks; what is more
surprising is the level of effort and resources this has required given the paucity
of resources deployed by networks. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, considerable
analysis has been done of how non-state actors with limited power are able to
challenge and undermine states with much greater powera phenomenon
typically described as the asymmetric threat problem.
21
See, for example, Harold L Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in
Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1967) and Graham T. Allison, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
391
None of this is meant to deny that illicit networks suffer from certain
deficiencies and weaknesses, nor is it to ignore the inescapable tradeoffs
between, for example, security and efficiency.22 Such tradeoffs, however, also
exist in business networks, as is revealed by Ronald Burts analysis of the
inherent tensions between brokerage (which is essential for openness and
vision) and closure (which is necessary for trust and cohesion).23 Similarly,
tradeoffs between redundancy and duplication (which enhance resilience) on
one side and economy and streamlining on the other confront both licit and
illicit networks. Different networks, of course, deal with such tradeoffs in
different ways, with illicit networks often accepting the costs of redundancy
because of the additional resilience it can provide in the face of attacks by law
enforcement.
1.3 Dynamic Markets
It also bears emphasis that what confounds governments is not only networks
but also the operation of markets. The inability of governments to control licit
markets has been evident in the USs continued trade imbalances, in the
financial contagion in currency markets in 1998 and in the global financial
crisis which began in 2008. The inability to control illicit markets is even more
striking.24 Indeed, even when law enforcement is able to destroy trafficking
networks, the illicit market or markets in which these networks operate
continue to exist so long as prohibitions and regulations are not universally
accepted as desirable. For those who want to consume illicit or highly taxed
products, use psychotropic drugs, or frequent prostitutes, prohibition and
regulation are hindrances to be overcome. For those who meet this demand,
illicit markets create enormous and tempting opportunities. Even if one
acceptswhich this author does notthat Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones are
right to emphasise the success of governments against illicit networks,
therefore, the issue then becomes one of explaining why this has not translated
into an equal level of success against illicit markets. This is certainly evident in
the demand for forced labour and for women and girls and, to a lesser extent,
young men and boys for the commercial sex trade.
22
See Carlo Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks (New York: Springer, 2008), 63.
23
Ronald Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
24
On this point the author is particularly grateful for several vigorous discussions with Professor R.
Thomas Naylor of McGill University.
392
Indeed, one way of looking at the phenomenon of human trafficking is to

understand it as a complex, emergentand highly profitable market which is
constantly evolving and adapting in ways that complicate if not negate efforts
to combat it. The realities of the market for human beings and the trafficking
business which feeds this market, although compelling, have often been
obscured by government rhetoric, moral simplicity, and a failure to recognise
the complexity of the issues involved. Part of the difficulty is that data on
human trafficking remains grossly inadequate, thereby helping to fuel
unchallenged assumptions and assertions. One UN official even referred to it as
a knowledge crisis.25 Anecdote too easily becomes a substitute for analysis
and much solid research still needs to be done before governments have an
accurate assessment of the main contours of the problem.
Although human trafficking is far from new, the scope of the phenomenon, the
ease and speed with which this and other forms of trafficking can be carried out
in a globalised world, and the ability of transnational criminal groups,
(however structured) to operate across borders are unprecedented, giving the
modern market for human beings a scale and scope that are remarkable. The
market for human beings is made up of a series of local, national and regional
markets, all of which are interlocking parts of a global market. This is not
surprising: trafficking in all sorts of commodities, including human beings, has
grown along with licit trade (sometimes in a parasitic relationship and
sometimes simply as a parallel activity) to become a truly global phenomenon.
The increased speed of trade, finance, communications, and transportation
significantly augment the capacity of traffickers to operate effectively.26
Transaction costs have been reduced for traffickers in human beings just as
they have for firms engaged in legitimate trade and transportation.
If most discussions of human trafficking acknowledge the way in which
globalisation facilitates the process, however, they neglect the benefits which
accrue to some people. Most obviously, those directly involved in organising
human trafficking find it very lucrative. Trafficking obeys the laws of the
market, brings substantial profits to those who organise the supply, and
augments this with some positive secondary effects and multiplier benefits
often created by corruption payments. Ignoring the benefits, therefore, oversimplifies the trafficking problem and makes it appear more malleable than it
really is.
25
Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (Vienna:
UNODC, 2006), 6.
26
The same was true in the late nineteenth century. See Edward J. Bristow, Prostitution and Prejudice:
The Jewish Fight against White Slavery 18701939 (New York: Schocken Books, 1983).
393
Moreover, even though human trafficking completely undercuts arguments that

organised crime tends to be victimless, for many women there are so few
economic alternatives that going to another country and becoming involved in
prostitution often appears the least unattractive of an appalling set of choices.
For many men, migration to work abroad is the least bad of a difficult set of
choices although many of them have little or no idea that they will be in
conditions which constitute forced labour. Being trafficked, therefore, can be a
conscious, voluntary, and deliberate decision, or people can migrate with no
little or notion of their fate (even it is usually if ill-informed about the extent of
the victimisation, the accompanying violence, and the levels of servitude and
exploitation).
Whatever the case, human trafficking is not going to disappear. The global
economic downturn in 2008 and 2009 will probably have contradictory
consequences. On the one hand, it might increase the supply as men and
women in developing countries see their only hope in irregular migration; on
the other the reduction of wealth might reduce the demand for women for
commercial sex while increasing the demand for cheapand often forced
labour. The expansion of supply will continue to be accentuated by the youth
bulge which characterises many developing countries such as those in West
Africa. Global urbanisation is an additional factor which not only makes it easy
for traffickers to concentrate their recruitment efforts, but also removes some of
the norms and inhibitions often associated with more rural societies, thereby
ultimately making victimisation easier.
The implication of all this is clear: attacking the symptoms without also doing
something about the underlying problems is a recipe for failure, if not futility.
And because the problems are structural rather than transient in nature,
adequate responses are particularly difficult to formulate and implement. If this
suggests that expectations need to be modest, it is clear that improvements can
be made and governance mechanisms strengthened and enhanced. Yet
cooperative mechanisms need to be combined with a more strategic approach
which attacks the markets for commercial sex and forced labour and the
networks which link the demand and supply sides of these markets.
Against this background, the analysis here suggests that a counter-market
approach is essential since the victims of human trafficking are being treated
simply as commodities.27 Within this overall approach, however, considerable
emphasis needs to be placed on attacking the trafficking networks since these
27
See Phil Williams, Trafficking in Women and Children: A Market Perspective in Illegal Immigration
and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade, ed. Phil Williams (New York: Cass, 1999), 145170.
394
provide the critical facilitators and connectors between the supply and demand
sides of the market.
2. Trafficking Networks
2.1 A Network Typology
The difficulty in developing a counter-network strategy in the area of human
trafficking is that too little is known about the structure and operation of these
networks. As Rebecca Surtees has observed, focusing on the victims of
trafficking and the gross human rights violations inherent in the trafficking
business has been important in bringing the issue to public attention, but it is
still essential to:
understand who traffickers are and how they operate, to manage crime
reduction and to anticipate future developments in the trafficking
industry studies of the criminals can shed light on the circumstances
and opportunities out of which trafficking arises and the methods that
are used to organize it. This knowledge forms the basis for planning
effective law enforcement and for the legal, social and economic
reforms that will cause traffickers to reassess the economic benefits to
them of pursuing this kind of criminal activity.28
As she observes, understanding the who is complemented by understanding
how the trafficking business is organised and the various steps that have to be
achieved.29 The idea that criminal organisations can be understood in terms of
both patterns of relationships and patterns of activity has been even more fully
articulated by Carlos Morselli, particularly in relation to car-theft rings.30
Although Morselli talks in terms of crime scripts, these can also be understood
as a set of activities which have to be implemented for the crimes to be carried
out effectively. Another way of seeing this is simply as a business process
model. By examining the structure of trafficking networks and combining this
with an understanding of the processes which are involved it should be possible
to identify points of leverage.
Unfortunately, with a few notable exceptions, empirical studies of the criminal
networks involved in human trafficking have been neglectedat least outside
28
Rebecca Surtees, Traffickers and Trafficking in Southern and Eastern Europe: Considering the Other
Side of Human Trafficking, European Journal of Criminology 5, no.1 (2008): 3968 at 42.
29
Ibid.
30
Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, chapter 7.
395
law enforcement. Drawing on those studies which have been done, the analysis
here suggests that there are several dimensions along which groups can differ.
These include: size, degree of organisation and sophistication, stability in terms
of the network players, the structure of the networks, and the nature of the
network activities.
The size of the network. Networks can be small or large, truncated or extensive.
Sometimes determining the size of the network is difficult because it is not
always possible to distinguish relationships that are inextricably related to the
criminal activities being carried out from those who are incidental to the illicit
operations.
Composition of the network. Networks can be made up of individuals or of
groups. This will depend partly upon the nature of the commodity being
trafficked, partly upon the location of the market, and partly upon the barriers
to entry. Networks composed of groups tend to be somewhat more powerful
than those composed simply of individuals.
The degree of organisation of the network. As suggested above, some networks
can be understood as organisations while others cannot. Network organisations
typically have a more enduring structure than what might be termed transaction
networks, in which the only relationships are often-one off commercial
arrangements.
The type of network structure. Some networks have a core of organisers who
oversee and direct most of their activities; others are decentralized and selforganizing, but come together in ways which are very effective and very
difficult to counter.31 Often these emergent networks have a clear division of
labour among the various groups involved.
The level of trust within a network. A great deal has been written about the
importance of trust and bonding mechanisms in criminal networks, Indeed, one
reason why some organised crime is ethnically based is the degree of trust
naturally existing among members who speak the same language and have the
same background. Yet, some criminal organisations and networks are diverse
ethnically, and seem to find mechanismswhich can range from escrow-like
arrangements to the likelihood of violence in retaliation for betrayal, defection,
or incompetence which seem to compensate for the absence of trust.
31
Michael Kenney, The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organization in the
Colombian Cocaine Trade, Global Crime 8, no.3 (August 2007): 233259 at 244.
396
Putting these characteristics together, it is clear that trafficking networks can

consist of individuals or groups, that relationships can be ad hoc and sporadic
or more enduring, that trafficking networks can be organised top down or
bottom up, that networks can be specialised in their activities or have a broader
portfolio, and that they can operate with greater or lesser degrees of trust
among those involved. Essentially though, these can be boiled down to five
different kinds of network.
Flux networks. Some networks can be understood as transactional rather than
organisational. Individuals or groups come together on an ad hoc basis rather
than doing business with the same people time and again. These can be
described as flux networks which are constantly shifting and amorphous, in
which linkages are constantly being made then abandoned, in which
cooperation is short term for a specific transactions or set of transactions, in
which trust is limited and there are lots of defections.32 These are unstable
networks with little structure. Damian Zaitch described Colombian cocaine
firms in the Netherlands as informal, small, mutating, and decentralised. Some
are individual enterprises; others adopt the form of temporary partnerships
between two or three people. These coalitions are often formed solely for a
single project, with some of the people involved also engaging in legal
activities or in other coalitions.33 The participants in these networks can range
from those who engage only sporadically in criminal activity to small-time
career criminals who move from one type of criminal activity to another to
those who specialise in a particular form of trafficking. From a law
enforcement perspective, flux networks are not particularly powerful or
dangerous since they tend to have limited impact in terms of their ability to
engage in systemic corruption, and rarely develop symbiotic relationships with
political elites. The difficulty, however, is that these amorphous and fluid
networks make constantly moving targets with few, if any, critical nodes whose
removal could cripple them. In the case of women trafficking, small-time
traffickers who exploit individual womenand which the author has
characterised elsewhere as friend and fianc operationstend to be part of
these flux networks.34
32
Damian Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (New York:
Springer, 2002), 286.
33
Ibid., 297.
34
See Phil Williams, Trafficking in Women: The Role of Transnational Organized Crime in Trafficking
in Humans: Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions, ed. Sally Cameron and Edward Newman
(Tokyo: United Nations University, 2008), 126158.
397
Broker networks. One step up from the flux network is another kind of
transactional network characterised by a greater degree of predictability, not
least because of the existence of people with particular skills, good contacts,
and reputations for trustworthiness. These networks are based on some stability
of membership, repetitive rather than one-off contacts, and a critical role for
brokers who are the key to connectedness and enable the network to function
with efficiency and predictability. These brokers are obviously a key target for
law enforcement: the difficulty is that even if they identified and removed from
the network, others might simply step in and replace them.
Chain networks. The third kind of network is what can be described as a chain
network, in which commodities or, in this case people are simply moved from
one individual or group to another as they pass from supplier or source
countries to market or demand countries. The chain network has more
predictability than a flux network but lacks the flexibility of a broker network
and is vulnerable to the removal of a key link. In practice, as Gerben Bruinsma
et al. have shown, many of the criminal networks involved in human
trafficking, especially trafficking in women:
can generally be typified as a chain with at both ends some smaller
clusters: one rounds up the women and the other draws them in and
exploits them or sells them on to other persons in our country. The
clusters are isolated from each other: the persons at both ends of the
chain networks do not know each other or only superficially and the
links between the clusters are made by a few persons who maintain
what are principally instrumental relationships with each other. The
cohesion of the criminal network is extremely low, as is the density of
the network. In addition, the criminal networks are not usually large.
The persons who take care of the links between the clusters occupy a
strategic bridging position. They link the clusters to each other by
pairing up the market parties.35
By targeting and removing those who act as strategic bridges or boundary
spanners, the network can be disrupted at least temporarily.
Mesh networks.36 If chain networks are only as strong as the weakest links, this
problem is circumvented in the fourth type of network, which is characterised
here as a mesh network. In the context of Colombian drug trafficking, this kind
35
Gerben Bruinsma and Wim Bernasco, Criminal Groups and Transnational Criminal Markets, Crime,
Law and Social Change 41 (2004): 7994 at 88.
36
This term was suggested to me by a DoD official in September 2008.
398
of network has been very effectively described by Michael Kenney as

independent nodes that perform specific tasks and transact directly with other
nodes without mediation and oversight by core groups relations among
different groups are characterized by horizontal rather than vertical
accountability. Drug shipments proceed through a series of arms-length
transactions among independent nodes that often coordinate their activities on
an ad hoc basis.37 Although Kenney uses the term chain network, he
recognises that there are in fact multiple chains and multiple combinations of
groups along the way. Moreover, these groups have a stable, enduring quality.
They come together in what is often a division of labour but, as they work
together, develop a relationship based on experience, knowledge and
reputation. Mesh networks tend to have a known population of individuals and
groups which have developed a degree of trust, and have established corruption
linkages which facilitate the illicit flows. The mesh metaphor recognises that
these networks have multiple paths to reach the same destination and
consequently have a high degree of resilience. Although they have some of the
dynamism of the flux networks in that there are alternative contacts and
relationships which can be exploited, this is combined with a greater continuity
of business relationships, which both builds and builds on trust. Finally,
compared with flux networks they exhibit a greater degree of stability or
continuity in the membership (both at the individual and group levels) of the
network. Good examples of a large mesh network in the drug trafficking
business were the Northern Valle groups in Colombia which played a large role
after the fall of the Medellin and Cali organisations.
Hub or core networks.38 Some large networks are characterised by a broad
portfolio of criminal activities, a clear division of labour, and a steering group
which provides the overall guidance and control. According to a 2007 threat
assessment by the Police Sub-Directorate on Organized Crime in Greece,
criminal gangs in the country were recruiting Albanians, Romanians,
Bulgarians, and Turks, all with specialisationsthe Albanians in break-ins
and drug trafficking, Romanians in human trafficking, Bulgarians in fraud and
the Turks in illegal immigration.39 The report also concluded that organized
crime activities seemingly unrelated to each other are proving to be pieces of
a joint, centrally controlled criminal network active in different areas at the
same time: illegal immigration networks or international criminal gangs active
37
Kenney, The Architecture of Drug Trafficking, 244.
38
See Kenney, The Architecture of Drug Trafficking, 242.
39
Yiannis Souliotis, A Classified Report on Organized Crime, I Kathimerini (Athens, in Greek),

October 7, 2007, 38.
399
in the sex trade are getting involved in drug trafficking cases, and are
controlled by common decision-making centres.40 This seems to be facilitated
by calls through satellite phones or the internet and conversations in chat
rooms which are no longer the exception but the rule for criminal groups.41
The relationship between the hub or core of the network and its other
constituent parts varies. One possibility is a command and control network in
which the core not only provides the overall direction of the network but also
operates through a hands-on control and oversight structure. Another is that the
core of the network acts as sponsor and facilitator to smaller groups which
operate what can best be understood as a franchise. In his research on Sweden,
John Picarelli found classic cases of franchises. Three groups involved in the
trafficking of women to Sweden operated through a franchise system in which
a Russian criminal organisation, the Kemetova group based in Estonia,
sponsored small groups of entrepreneurial women traffickers and then collected
10 per cent of their profits.42 The group seems to have had a much broader
portfolio but was in a position where it could encourage and benefit from
additional criminal profit-seeking without being deeply involved. In other
instances, core groups specialise in particular activities. The Cali drug
trafficking organisations of the 1980s and the 1990s can be understood as a
core command and control network headed by the Rodriguez-Orejuela
brothers, Santa Cruz Londono and one or two other key individuals.
Although this typology is provisional and needs to be refined through further
empirical investigation, it is a useful starting point since it disaggregates the
kind of networks involved in human trafficking, highlights the strengths and
weaknesses of various network structures and recognises that networks can
evolve and even morph from one type to another. Even if this classification
helps to understand the variety of individuals and groups, as well as the various
forms of cooperation and collaboration involved in human trafficking,
however, it has serious limitations. One of the difficulties comes from what
former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, once termed the known
unknowns. Although it is possible to have a general understanding of human
trafficking, it is not clear how much of the trafficking business is controlled by
broad-based criminal organisations or by specialised groups, or by mesh
networks as opposed to the small friend and fianc operations and flux
networks described above. The unknown unknowns add further murkiness.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
See the chapter of John Picarelli in this volume.
400
2.2 A Network Case Study

In October 2002, Operation Girasole, a major international effort to break up
trafficking operations, culminated in a series of arrests and asset seizures in
several countries.43 Girasole not only disrupted a major trafficking network but
also highlighted methods and modalities used by criminals to circumvent laws
and migration restrictions. It revealed a very successful and sophisticated mesh
network of criminal organisations working together in ways that were mutually
profitableif sometimes rather surprising. The network uncovered by Girasole
was characterised by: a multiplicity of criminal individuals and organisations
engaged in high levels of cooperation; the use of front companies and
legitimate business for criminal purposes; the transnational scope of its
operations; the specialised role of the impresarios who initially recruited the
women; the ability of diverse groups and individuals to act in concert for the
sake of mutual profit; links from the underworld to the upperworld to bring
the women to Italy and other European Union countries; and the continuous
and systematic financial exploitation of the women. This last characteristic was
particularly pernicious. As one report noted, the young women were provided
with false passports bought by the gang for a few hundred thousand lire, but
which they [the women] were forced to pay 8-10 million lire for by means of
their job in the clubs. Nothing was free for the sex slaves: they paid out
50,000 lire per night to sleep squashed together in concentration camp-style
apartments.44 A fee was even charged for the trip from their houses to the
night clubs.
The Girasole operation was Italian in origin and leadership but involved
extensive cooperation with law enforcement agencies in a number of other
countries. Europol also played a major role in supporting the investigation,
assisting with coordination and providing analytic support that was helpful in
identifying the main contours of the network, its operational methods, and its
inclusion of people who would not normally be considered criminal but who
assisted in the provision of legitimate cover for the women to come to Italy.
The operation yielded considerable insight into a large mesh network that
brought together criminal organisations from different countries, ethnic
trafficking networks, and criminal controlled or influenced companies in an
extensive cooperative venture which was highly sophisticated in scope and
operations.
43
Francesco Grignetti, Large-Scale Trafficking of Slave Girls From EastTraffic Between Russian
Mafia and Albanian Clans80 Arrested, Turin La Stampa (in Italian) October 3, 2002, 11.
44
Flavio Haver, Sex Slave Trade: 100 Arrests, Milan Corriere della Sera (in Italian), April 10, 2001,
14.
401
In 2001, the Carabinieri Special Operational Unit (ROS) began to investigate a

transnational criminal network involved in trafficking women from Eastern
Europe for prostitution in Italy, possibly in response to the murder of a
prostitute. It was subsequently discovered that large numbers of women had
been brought from Russia and placed in sexual servitude in a variety of clubs
and brothels. The first phase of the operation resulted in 105 individuals
including a large contingent of Albaniansbeing detained in Italy. It also
revealed that womenfrom Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Colombia, Somalia, and Tunisiawere being subjected to high levels
of violence both en route and on arrival in Italy. They were forced to become
prostitutes after being raped by their Albanian protectors who were linked to
the Camorra in Naples and the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta.45 Girls who fought the
system were viciously killed and at least three murders were believed to have
occurred. Ten cases of classic Cosa Nostra murder rituals were also
identified.46 Those arrested were charged with mafia-style criminal
association, enslavement, illegal immigration, forging documents, and drugs
trafficking. Nine night clubs were seized, along with one hotel and several
apartments in which the young women were housed.47 The criminal activities
were clearly very lucrative.
The second phase of the operation was aimed at the disruption of the wider
trafficking network including those who facilitated the entry of the women into
the European Union. Although the Carabinieri still played the leading role, law
enforcement agencies in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain
and Netherlands assisted in the operation. Moreover, cooperation extended
beyond the European Union to Albania, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania,
Switzerland, Russia and Ukraine. Europol provided analysis of the intelligence
gathered not only in Italy but in all the relevant countries and offered a
comprehensive assessment of the modus operandi and the structure of the
criminal network. Europol also helped to identify the major participants and
their respective roles and responsibilities in the network, highlighting critical
nodes and links and delineating points of vulnerability in the network which
could be exploited by targeted disruptive measures. Although it was not
portrayed in this way in Europols announcement and press conference on
Girasole, what Europol really did was provide intelligence for transnational law
enforcement efforts to engage in what Arquilla and Ronfeldt term netwar.48
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
See Arquilla and Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars.
402
The concept of netwar refers to crime and conflict short of war in which the
adversaries used networked organisational forms. In the case of Girasole law
enforcement agencies in several countries formed a transnational law
enforcement network to fight a major criminal networkwith some success.
The arrests in October 2002 were concentrated in Italy, with eighty arrests
made and thirty-two people charged. Proceedings were also initiated against
people in Germany, Austria, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland. One of the arrests in
Poland was of an Italian, Antonio A., who seems to have been a key figure in
the network. Antonio had reportedly been in Poland for three weeks but had
been kept under police surveillance and was arrested in Krosno. Italian police
also arrested a 53-year-old Polish woman, Irena G. who recruited women and
trafficked them to Italy, where she also employed them.49
Radio Tiberi, one of the leading figures in the network, owned clubs in Italy
and was suspected of paying local police to allow his operations to continue
without interference. Radio was reported to be one of the major organising
figures and described as ruthless capable of all sorts of crimes, and
highly dangerous.50 He used front men and women to control the women in
his recreational clubs which were also hubs for drug distribution, and was a
prime example of someone who combined trafficking of women and control of
prostitution with involvement in drug retailing. In market terms, it was Radio
who provided much of the demand for the women and established the outlets
for prostitution.
Others in the network included several Italians linked both to Albanian groups
and the Ndrangheta. One of the Albanians frequently travelled to Montenegro
to purchase women. In some cases women were bought from Serb criminalsa
relationship that illustrates once again that politics and ethnic animosity are no
barrier to criminal cooperation. For their part, the Serbs purchased the women
from East European traffickers and then sold them to Albanians to be brought
into Italy. Supply operations involved an intricate mesh network of different
groups with differing roles and responsibilities.
In Naples, Vincenzo and Luigi Calazzo were arrested. They appeared to be
involved primarily in the money laundering aspects of the trafficking business.
Others taken into custody included leading members of the Farao-Marincola
49
Jakub Kowalski and Jozef Matusz, Italian Pimp Arrested in Krosno Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw),
October 4, 2002.
50
Haver, Sex Slave Trade.
403
clanwhich apparently supplied the cocaine that was distributed through the
night clubs.51
The other key components of the network were Russian and Ukrainian
organised crime groups. Considerable concern was generated by the
involvement of Russian criminal organisations which combined their power of
intimidation with considerable sophistication and a capacity to extend their
reach into most aspects of the business. Russian and Ukrainian criminal
organisations were behind a network of criminal controlled companies which
played a critical role in the trafficking process. Indeed, one of the most
significant aspects of the operation was the infrastructure of Ukrainian travel
companies and travel agencies and hotels in Austria, Italy, Germany, France
and Spainall of which facilitated the trafficking process. The individuals and
companies based in Ukraine, along with their associates in Western European
travel agencies, facilitated illegal immigration into the EU by means of
Schengen visas that were fraudulently obtained. The tourist agencies had the
girls arrive by regular bus trips and with tourist visas, the complaisant hotelkeepers came up with false reservations.52
What the Carabinieri termed a closely woven collusive network extended
beyond the travel agents and hoteliers to encompass people who facilitated the
acquisition of residence visas and permits by providing forged documents for
certifying attendance at university courses, arranging marriages of convenience
or devising similar schemes.53 This was reflected in the arrests which included,
not only the usual suspects such as night-club managers and madams, but also
lawyers, complicit hotel-keepers, and a university professor in Rome who
provided at least one false university certification for a Russian girl, enabling
the criminals to obtain a residence permit for her.54 Marco Presciutti, UBF
welterweight boxing world champion, was charged with recruiting several
women from outside the European Union and forcing them to become
prostitutes.55
Operation Girasole sought not only to arrest the members of the trafficking
network but also to dismantle the infrastructure that facilitated the process.
Consequently, three travel agencies in Ukraine were seized, while elsewhere
four hotels, thirteen apartments and nine nightclubs were shut down or
51
Ibid.
52
Grignetti, Large-Scale Trafficking of Slave Girls.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Haver, Sex Slave Trade.
404
confiscated. Both the arrests and these seizures were a blow to criminal
enterprises that had an inherently expansionist quality about them. As one
report noted: the girls were sent to the West in a continuous cycle; there were
terminals in the various countries to welcome them, and by paying handsomely
they would find the way to obtain pseudo-legal entries; the capital obtained
from the prostitution of those girls was immediately reinvested in Russia to
feed the circuit and in thousands of other dirty businesses.56 Operation
Girasole interrupted the cycle and temporarily at least dented a major criminal
network which involved cooperation among some of the newer criminal
entities and some of the more established and traditionally hierarchical groups.
If the network had some hierarchical nodes, what made it both effective and
lucrative were the transnational connections and the flexibility it displayed.
3. Attacking Networks: Identifying and Exploiting Vulnerabilities
In spite of the notion that it takes a network to fight a network and in spite of
the partial success of Operation Girasole, there is no simple or straightforward
strategy for attacking networks. Even in the case of Girasole, the Russian and
Ukrainian components of the network remained largely intact, in the most part
because of the inadequacies or even corruption of law enforcement agencies in
these countries. Indeed, this highlights the limitations of counter-trafficking
networks even when they have impressive results. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to think comprehensively about attacking human trafficking networks. Even
acknowledging the diversity of networks involved in human trafficking, and
that different networks have different kinds of vulnerabilities, there are also
some common or overlapping vulnerabilities common to all kinds of networks.
Consequently, some of the methods for attacking networks remain the same,
irrespective of the network configuration.
Attacking the networks connecting the demand and supply sides of the market
in trafficked people has both legal and operational dimensions. In order to
strengthen the legal framework, it is necessary to develop specific antitrafficking laws and regulations. Many countries have laws explicitly directed
against organised crime. They include in their criminal codes penalties for
criminal association, for criminal conspiracy or for patterns of racketeering
activities. Many have also introduced some measures to conform with the UN
Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which
56
Grignetti, Large-Scale Trafficking of Slave Girls.
405
supplemented the Palermo Convention Against Transnational Organised

Crime.
In addition, efforts to achieve at least cosmetic conformity with the minimum
standards set by US law are assessed annually in the United States annual
Trafficking in Persons Report, which is modelled on the certification process
related to the cooperation of other nations with US efforts to combat drug
trafficking. The report places those governments fully in compliance with the
minimum standards set forth in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
in Tier one; governments which are making significant efforts to comply in
Tier Two; and governments which are making no significant efforts to meet
these standards in Tier three. Significantly, where there is some doubt about the
significance of the efforts the governments are placed on the Tier Two watch
list rather than relegated immediately to Tier three. There are several problems
here. First, the bar is not very high, which gives the assessment an inherent bias
towards grade (or ranking) inflation. Second, an apparent reluctance to place
states with woefully inadequate efforts to combat human trafficking in Tier
three has led to 40 states being on the Tier 2 watch list, with only 14 placed in
Tier three. Third, the emphasis on significant efforts rather than results
encourages states to create anti-trafficking laws and regulations which do little
or nothing to deal with the problem. In addition, some of the United States
assessments are highly politicised, as is evident in the placement of North
Korea, Iran and Cuba in Tier three.
The implication is that the United States needs to overhaul its assessment
system to focus on measures of effectiveness rather then measures of effort.57
Examining implementation might prove far more revealing than a focus on the
legal framework itself. For example, even in many countries with penalties for
human trafficking, the penalties are too low to create a sufficient level of risk to
deter traffickers. Moreover, the emphasis on treating trafficked persons as
victims rarely filters down clearly enough to stop police treating trafficked
women coerced into prostitution in particular as illegal immigrants rather than
as victims. Having said all this, the need for countries to be pressured into
taking effective measures against human trafficking is indisputable. Such
measures are an essential complement and supplement toalthough certainly
not a replacement forlaws directed against organised crime (whether in the
form of attacking a criminal enterprise or trying to prove criminal association
or a pattern of racketeering), since not all those involved in human trafficking
are members of criminal organisations. Some are simply crooked businessmen
57
The author is grateful to Paul Shemella and Edward Hoffer for this distinction.
406
who engage in both licit and illicit activities; others in the area of women
trafficking and forced labour are essentially opportunistic but ruthlessly
entrepreneurial amateurs who act alone and do not meet the requirements for
the UN definition of organised crime which envisages a group of three or more.
A focus on human trafficking as a crime is also particularly useful when the
networks involved are fluid and amorphous rather than the tightly-knit criminal
families that are the more traditional targets of anti-organised crime legislation.
Such measures help to increase the risks faced by those involved in human
trafficking. As Ernesto Savona has persuasively argued, however, the risks and
costs of criminal activities such as human trafficking must be both increased
and distributed more widely and more evenly.58 Only if this is done, does it
become difficult for the traffickers to find safe havens and sanctuaries from
which they can operate with impunity. Crucial to achieving this is greater interoperability of legal systems, a goal that is more realistic and acceptable than
notions of complete harmonisation. Indeed, a degree of inter-operability that
allows for dual criminality combined with the extension of mutual legal
assistance treaties and extradition treaties to encompass major kinds of
trafficking activities, could significantly increase the degree of risk faced by
traffickers, irrespective of where they are operating. In this connection, it bears
emphasis that Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and extradition
treaties allow the international community to compensate to some degree for
the inadequacies and shortcomings in the criminal justice systems of weak
states.
Attacking trafficking networks through more comprehensive and better
distributed laws needs to be accompanied by operational attacks on these
networks. This is not as easy as it sounds. Perhaps the first and most important
prerequisite for attacking networks is to think in network terms. Although this
seems obvious, many law enforcement personnel and prosecutors still think in
terms of hierarchical traditional mafia-type criminal organisations. Even
putting aside the issue of whether or not the Mafia was ever really as pyramidal
as many commentaries suggested, it is necessary to recognise that simply
because an organisation lacks a clear hierarchy does not mean that it is
ineffectual, inefficient or harmless. Recognising that trafficking operates
through various kinds of network is the beginning of wisdom in efforts to
degrade and dismantle networks. Indeed, in recent years, the capacity for
network analysis has been enhanced by the development of increasingly
58
See Ernesto Savona and Phil Williams, eds. The United Nations and Transnational Crime (London:
Cass, 1996).
407
sophisticated software tools. These tools are extensively used in law

enforcement for investigations at the tactical level; they can be used even more
effectively for strategic mapping of trafficking networks and identifying points
of vulnerability for attack.
A second prerequisite for effective attacks on networks involved in human
trafficking is the fusion of operational law enforcement and law enforcement
intelligence in a cohesive task force which operates at various levels, national,
regional, and at times even global. Some of the requirements are very familiar:
telephone toll analysis along with surveillance of meetings involving members
of the network are used extensively in law enforcement agencies in many
countries and allow analysts to determine patterns of communication and
interaction and, therefore, to map the network. In order to determine the kind of
network being targeted in an operation, however, it would also be useful to mix
network methodologists with policemen who are highly experienced and
practical but recognise the importance of understanding their target. Once a
network is under surveillance and there is a centralised point for data collection
and assessment, it is helpful to probe the network for knowledge elicitation.59
Probing strategies could be implemented through undercover operations, such
as controlled deliveries, as well as the short-term arrest and temporary removal
of people believed to be critical figures in the network. By monitoring
telephone conversations within a network that has just lostif only
temporarilysome of its members, it would be possible to see how the
network responds to stress, perhaps even making it possible to identify key
defence mechanisms which could subsequently be neutralised. Once
intelligence has been acquired, it also needs to be shared as widely as can be
done without compromising the mission.
In terms of operational strategy, one of the keys is to target critical nodes and
connections. Yet this is easier said than done, not least because it requires
detailed understanding of the network structure and the kind of nodes and
connections which might actually be critical to the kind of network being
attacked. The notion of criticality itself can be understood as nodes or
connections which are high in importance and low in redundancy. Nodes or
connections which are important but are also high in redundancy or substitution
59
David Snowden, Complex Acts of Knowing: Paradox and Descriptive Self-Awareness, Journal of
Knowledge Management 6, no.2 (May 2002): 100111.
408
capacity can be regarded as sub-critical. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to

identify at least five kinds of critical nodes in networks.60
Leadership nodes. These are particularly important in a hub or core network.
Successfully attacking the leaders in a core network can leave the network
without clear direction. On the other hand, it can also create smaller less
identifiable networks. Where taking out the leadership nodes is accompanied
by attacks on other dimensions of the organisation, then it is possible to
dismantle a core network almost completely. This has been done in the drug
trafficking business, and was perhaps most obvious in the attack on the Cali
drug trafficking organisation in Colombia in the mid-1990s and more recently
in the attack on the Gulf drug trafficking organisation in Mexico and the arrest
and subsequent extradition of its leaders, Osiel Cardenas.
Nodes in the network with a high degree of actor centrality.61 In networks,
some members have a high concentration of direct links and act as key hubs
and are often critical in terms of communications and facilitation of flows
within the network. Brokers sometimes play this role although there is
dynamism to their linkages which sometimes makes them difficult to identify
and to target. Moreover, in broker networks there is a certain degree of
unplanned redundancy with multiple brokers playing key roles and, therefore,
able to substitute for one another.
Nodes in the network which have a high concentration of indirect links.62 In a
simple chain network, nodes with what is sometimes termed high betweenness
centrality (for example, B and C in a chain from A to D) make attractive
targets for efforts to break-up supply operations. Bruinsma and Bernasco have
suggested that many women trafficking networks to the Netherlands are
characterised by cliques or groups connected by a chain network.63 In this
instance, taking out one or two nodes in the chain would certainly create a
short-term disruption.
Nodes in the network which connect across structural holes or act as what is
sometimes termed boundary spanners.64 Someone who has contacts in
60
This draws in part on the pioneering study by Malcolm Sparrow, Network Vulnerabilities and
Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement, International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 5, no.3 (Fall 1991): 255274.
61
Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, 1217.
62
Ibid.
63
See Bruinsma and Bernasco, Criminal Groups, 88.
64
See Ronald Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1995). The author is also grateful to Professor Kevin Kearns, University of Pittsburgh,
for pointing out the importance of the notion of boundary spanners.
409
another country for example can be important in linking up criminal

individuals or organisations operating only at the national level. Nodes at the
intersection of the criminal and the legal worlds can also be important in the
trafficking business. For example, the facilitators who deal with travel agents
or hotel managers and staff play a very important role in enabling trafficking
networks to carry out enduring and large-scale operations. In some cases, of
course, it is necessary to target not simply the critical nodes in the criminal
network, but also those in the legitimate world who act as their support
structure, entre point, and cover. This might require the identification and
arrest of politicians, bureaucrats and complicit police who are linked to the
criminals, facilitate their activities, and profit to some degree or another from
them. In other instances, it requires going after businesses, such as newspapers
and apartment owners, which, in one way or another, act as facilitators or
provide infrastructure for human trafficking.
Nodes which are critical not so much in network terms or as facilitators of
communications and connections within the network, but in terms of the
substantive tasks or functions the network has to carry out to ensure the
success of its illicit activities. In human trafficking networks, these tasks range
from recruiters at the supply end, through the facilitators, drivers, and minders
en route, to the managers and exploiters at the demand side.65 Critical nodes
might also include those who manage the proceeds, whether these are put
through a money laundering cycle in an effort to make them appear legitimate
or simply re-invested in the illicit business. The difficulty is that, apart from the
facilitators and money-managers (and the latter specialists are only likely to be
present in larger networks), roles in human trafficking are perhaps not as highly
specialised as in other criminal businesses such as drug trafficking where
chemists, for example, have a critical substantive role.
Although a network attack strategy appears largely a matter of identifying and
then systematically removing critical nodes and connections, it is actually more
complex than this suggests. There are, for example, inescapable tradeoffs. If
law enforcement agencies using electronic surveillance have successfully
identified key communications nodes within a network, and are monitoring
these to obtain a more comprehensive snapshot of the network, at what point do
they move from exploitation of these nodes to their removal?
Perhaps even more difficult is determining exactly which kind of network is
involved in the trafficking, and developing an appropriate strategy. Core
networks, once identified as such, are vulnerable to decapitationalthough the
65
Bruinsma and Bernasco, Criminal Groups, 85.
410
core leadership often has considerable resources at its disposal and is therefore
able to deploy an array of defensive measures which makes them an elusive
target for law enforcement. With enough effort, however, such networks can be
brought down.
Mesh networks are more difficult to deal with because they exploit multiple
pathways which, in effect, transcend the typical and simple supply chain.
Attacking mesh networks in which groups share risk, specialise in specific
tasks, but differ in terms of personnel, routes and method from one
consignment to the next is particularly difficult. This is not to imply that they
are invulnerable. Operation Girasole targeted what appears to have been a mesh
network while in June 2007, Greek authorities succeeded in dismantling a
similar kind of network involved in the sexual exploitation of women,
arresting seventy-three people.66 The network included:
Greeks, Albanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Moldavians and Romanians,
each of whom had distinct roles in the network. The recruitment of the
victims was handled by Russians, Ukrainians and Moldavians active in
their home countries, the forged documents were handled by the
Romanians, Bulgarians and Greeks, while the distribution of the
women in apartments in Athens and their transport to their clients were
handled by the Greeks and Albanians.67
Using the Internet and advertisements to recruit women, the traffickers charged
between 25,000 and 30,000 Euros to move them to Greece where the women
were forced into sexual exploitation and kept there by threats to harm their
families.68 It was not clear whether this network specialised in human
trafficking or if this was simply one part of a much broader set of criminal
enterprises. Nevertheless, it does appear to have been a classic mesh network,
with different potential sources for the women, a variety of suppliers of false
documentation and transporters and even some variation in the network endusers. And at the end of the day, it was brought down by law enforcement.
Chain networks, of course, are much more vulnerable at least to disruption by
focusing on the arrest of the transportation and facilitation nodes between
source and destination countries. The limitation in this is that transporters and
facilitators are replaceable, although not always easily. Yet, even this
replacement process creates opportunities, as it might be possible to insert
66
Souliotis, A Classified Report on Organized Crime.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
411
undercover operatives as substitute links in the transportation and facilitation

chain.
Broker networks are harder to attack directly, as they have considerable
dynamism. Nevertheless they are a prime target for attacks on the bonds which
hold networks together, or trust-busting operations.69 Brokers depend on
reputation and are susceptible to reputational harm. They can also be identified
through undercover sting operations, both on the demand and the supply sides.
Such operations also offer a very good way of introducing risk into the
networks activities.
Ironically, flux networks, which initially appear to be the weakest and least
worrisome, because of their limited impact for corruption, are also the most
difficult to target through counter-network strategies because they are so
dynamic, have low entry and exit barriers, and have limited linkages. In effect,
their weaknesses and limitations become their strength. They lack critical
nodes which can be readily identified and removed, connectors and
collaborators are few, and successes yield very limited results in terms of
number of people arrested.
This leads to an important conclusion: Attacks have to go beyond the network
itself. As suggested above, it is essential to focus not only on attacking
networks but also the markets within which they operate. While networks
facilitate the operation of both licit and illicit markets, the drivers are the
markets themselves and the profits they generate. Consequently, attacking
networks is necessary but not sufficient to make progress which goes beyond
the law enforcement front. Although such attacks make the market less
profitable and more risky, they do not alter the fundamental dynamics of
supply and demand. The question arises, therefore, about the best ways to do
this. The next section explores some of the possibilities.
3.1 Attacking Markets
In thinking about attacking markets it is necessary to go after both ends (supply
and demand) and the middle. This is particularly the case for the market in
human beings, where the market facilitators greatly outweigh market inhibitors.
These facilitators range from poverty and desperation in supply countries,
official corruption and indifference among officials and police in supply,
transhipment, and destination countries, and government policies which
69
See Robert J. Bunker, ed. Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (London: Routledge, 2005).
412
explicitly or tacitly accept flourishing commercial sex industries and demand

for cheap labour in unregulated economic sectors in the destination countries.
The paucity of inhibitors is in striking contrast. There is no real deterrent to
human trafficking, the risks are low and the profits at various stages in the
trafficking process, but most especially at the enslavement and exploitation
end, are very high. For criminals, however they are organised, rational,
economic decision-making encourages initial entry into the market and efforts
to remain in this market.
The aim, therefore, must be to change this calculationfor traffickers, and
those who exploit the trafficked persons, whether entrepreneurs using forced
labour, brothel owners who use trafficked women, or the men who frequent
prostitutes. Changing the incentive structure is critical. At the very least, this
requires that traffickers face much higher risks of apprehension, indictment and
conviction as well as much longer sentences.70
Efforts also have to be made to decrease opportunities. One approach that was
very popular in the late 1990s was a focus on educating more women in more
places in the hope of reducing naivety, gullibility, wishful thinking, and a
concomitant willingness to be trafficked. Although such campaigns made
women more sensitive to the risks inherent in irregular migration, they did little
if anything to change the migration incentive structure and, therefore, to reduce
or stop the flow. For people in extremely difficult social and economic
conditions, almost any alternative can look appealingespecially if it is in an
uncertain future as opposed to an all too certain present. Some observers have
argued, therefore, that the supply side can only be diminished by going after
root causes such as disintegration of the family, marginalisation and alienation,
severe gender discrimination and the like. The difficulty is that this approach
involves elements of social engineering which at best have long-term impact.
Moreover, as with the drug trafficking business, supply side disruption has
limited impact.
A complementary approach, therefore, is to recognise that prevention strategies
are limited and to put more emphasis on mitigation and harm reduction,
treating trafficked women as victims, and giving priority to rescue and
rehabilitation, both of which deserve more attention than they currently receive.
Without the law enforcement attack on the networks, however, women who are
70
In some countries, this is beginning to happen. In one case in 2006 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for
example, a convicted trafficker received eight years imprisonment as well as six years for money
laundering. In addition, his apartment was seized to provide compensation for victims. See USAID,
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Trafficking in Persons Action Guide to Combat TIP (20072008) (Pristina:
USAID, 2008).
413
taken out of the commercial sex trade will simply be replaced by new victims.
In other words, victim assistance and support programmes which have been
developed primarily by NGOs need to be combined with the best of the current
law enforcement efforts (and some significant enhancements). Sometimes,
tensions arise between the two approaches: the extent to which trafficked
women can be used as witnesses against the traffickers as opposed to simply
being protected and reintegrated into society can become contentious. In fact,
the systematic development of more effective witness protection programmes
seems likely to enhance the viability of prosecutions. The European
Commission Working Document of October 2008 suggests that prosecutions
can even be strengthened by better protection for the victims of trafficking. In
countries where there are a significant number of assisted victims, statistics on
criminal proceedings are higher. This implies that a human rights-centred
approach is needed not only to protect victims' rights but also in the interest of
justice.71 Simply knowing that harm reduction of victims is not inconsistent
with effective prosecution of perpetrators is a step forward; recognising the
synergies between the two is even more beneficial.72
At the same time, it is probably necessary to recognise the impossibility of
efforts to stamp out prostitution. Although anti-prostitution activists do not like
the acceptance of the commercial sex trade, in some circumstances, perhaps all
that can be done is to protect the women from ill-treatment and to seek to
ensure that they obtain the proceeds from their business, rather than simply
working for the enrichment of others. Not all those who earn money from
commercial sex have been trafficked. Moreover, the sex industry could be the
subject of improved regulations to protect sex workers and to eliminate, or
greatly reduce, the involvement of criminals. Yet, it is important to avoid the
situation which has arisen in the Netherlands where prostitution is legal but
trafficking of women has increased.
Decreasing opportunities also has a demand-side equivalent and demand can be
understood as a two-level process both of which need to be targeted. At the
first level, it is important to make the exploitation of trafficked women a much
more serious offence than currently by going after the brothel owners, and
pimps who are involved in trafficking of womenif only as end-users. One
way of doing this is to link them explicitly to the trafficking process and
prosecute them as part of the trafficking chain. In addition, it should be
71
Commission of the European Communities, Evaluation and Monitoring of the Implementation of the
EU Plan, 5.
72
For more information please see Allison Jernows chapter on judges and prosecutors in this volume.
414
possible to establish and implement asset seizure and asset forfeiture laws
against those who exploit victims of trafficking. As in Operation Girasole, this
would facilitate the seizure of night-clubs and other premises used by the
criminals for prostitution and would be even more effective if extended to their
other property. Reducing the profit in human trafficking is difficult, and not a
complete response, but is an important component of a more comprehensive
approach at the first level of demand. In contrast to the drug arena, very little of
this has been done on the effort to combat human traffickingand this is a
shortcoming which needs to be rectified.
Efforts also have to be made to attack the second level of demandthe
customers who pay for commercial sex. Here emphasis should be placed on
education of the customers to make them aware that, in effect, they could be
complicit in the trafficking process. They need to be made sensitive to the
degradation and despair that they might be tacitly condoning with their actions
and actively encouraging with their money and to recognise that without them
there would be no profit for the traffickers. In addition, efforts could be made
to enable customers to distinguish between trafficked persons and other sex
workers and to recruit them into detecting trafficked persons and knowing how
to react if they suspect that someone has been trafficked. A more punitive
element could be added by making sex with trafficked women an offence and
by associated name and shame publicity. The difficulty here, of course,
would be implementation, as proving customers knew a woman was a
trafficking victim might be difficult. Nevertheless, focusing on the customer
rather than penalising the prostitutes could be useful in reducing demand.
A similar approach might be possible with forced labour. Knowledge about the
use of forced labour, especially involving children, can lead to boycott of goods
and hurt the businesses involved. The difficulty though is that much forced
labour such as domestic servitude is not publicised and is not susceptible to
actions of this kind. Moreover, many countries have not explicitly opened or
acknowledged the fact that some industries, particularly labour-intensive ones,
might not survive in the absence of cheap unprotected labour. This connection
needs to be publicly recognised and the necessary resources allocated to
agencies which are responsible for ensuring that illicit and criminal labour
practices are prevented, investigated, and prosecuted.73
73
Whitney Shinkle, Preventing Human Trafficking: A Review of Current Efforts (Transatlantic

Perspectives on Migration, Policy Brief 3, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, August 2007),
http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/GMF%20Materials/PreventionofHumanTrafficking.pdf
(accessed May 18, 2009).
415
Nevertheless, regulation for sectors that are currently subject to little or no

regulation, along with more forceful inspection and enforcement, could have
some impact. The Czech Republic, for example, has created a new elite forced
labour unit within the police which coordinates with labour inspectors who
enforce labour laws pertaining to working conditions.74 This has resulted in a
major increase in prosecutions.75
All of this highlights the need for a holistic approach which overcomes the
limits and inadequacies of attacking only criminal networks by simultaneously
attacking the market within which these networks operate. At the same times, it
is clear that a counter-market strategy which neglects the networks which link
supply and demand is also insufficient. Without a law enforcement component,
neither a rights-based nor a market approach will have much success.
Accordingly, the next section of this paper seeks to articulate some of the ways
in which a comprehensive strategy can be more effectively developed and
implemented.
3.2 Enhancing Governance and Enforcement to Combat Human Trafficking
Human trafficking has all the characteristics of a complex system,
characterised by emergent behaviour, network relationships, high degrees of
resilience, and a remarkable degree of adaptability in response to law
enforcement efforts to interfere with the business. For governments to respond
more effectively and carry out the counter-network and counter-market strategy
described above, they need to create a system that looks remarkably similar to
the one they are trying to destroy. To paraphrase John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt, it takes an emergent complex system to fight a complex system.76 To
some extent this is already in evidence. The approach to combating human
trafficking, inadequate though it is, represents a bottom-up emergent response.
It can be argued, however, that this response could be enhanced significantly
by some elements of a top-down approachalbeit one which facilitates
bottom-up activities. Leadership is important. In this connection, probably the
most important single improvement would be for more governments to give
combating human trafficking a higher priority. Trafficking in human beings is
74
US Embassy, Bratislava, DCM Silverman Addresses Interior Ministry Conference on Trafficking in

Persons (paper presented at the Embassy of the United States, Bratislava, Slovakia, November 26,
2007).
75
Ibid.
76
The author is grateful to David T. Moore for this observation.
416
still a low priority within the criminal justice system of many countries.
Different attitudes to prostitution, tacit acceptance of prostitution in some
localities, and a tendency still to treat women involved in the sex trade as
perpetrators rather than the victims of crime also mean that even where human
trafficking is treated as a serious crime it is not always targeted vigorously.
Similarly, many of those who are trafficked for forced labour are treated first
and foremost as illegal immigrants to be deported rather than as victims to be
protected. A major part of the challenge, therefore, is to make countertrafficking a much higher priority.
This, in turn, has to be manifest in more effective laws against human
trafficking. Many countries continue to have inadequate laws, enforcement is
often both problematic and misguided (for example, treating women who have
been trafficked for commercial sex as criminals rather than victims, or simply
failing to provide adequate levels of protection and assistance), and on those
occasions when penalties are enforced they are often ridiculously low. The fact
that too many states continue to provide safe havens for traffickers and
trafficking further reduces the effectiveness of the modest efforts at
international law enforcement cooperation which are currently in place. These
issues can only be overcome by a concerted effort to raise the priority of
combating human trafficking and by both exerting pressure on and enhancing
capacity in those countries which still lack legal instruments and serious antitrafficking activities. If high-level commitment to countering human trafficking
is essential, this does not provide the overall strategy which is needed.
While it would be ideal if there was a single global agency with the
responsibility for formulating and implementing a counter-human trafficking
strategy, this is not the case now, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, different international institutions and national agencies can play
specialised but complementary roles, depending on their particular capabilities,
resources, and mandates. The United Nations has been critical in the area of
norm creation, particularly through the Palermo Convention and the Protocol
on Trafficking in Human Beings, and the UNODC has also been important in
training and assistance. Most recently, UNODC has played an important role in
the effort to provide a real global assessment which offers an improved, albeit
still imperfect, understanding of the dimensions of the problem. For their part,
Interpol, Europol, and other regional law enforcement networks are critical in
information-sharing activities and in providing analytic support for counternetwork and counter-market initiatives.
This mix of institutions provides a useful bottom-up response to governance.
Indeed, so long as critical functions are identified and implemented
417
appropriately, the issue of who does what is secondary. One important

initiative, however, would be for a global effort to enhance cooperation among
representatives of the major institutions, agencies, and organisations involved
in efforts to combat human trafficking. At the very least, this should include the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Financial Action Task Force,
the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Interpol and Europol, as
well as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
International Labour Organization, the International Organization for
Migration, and the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF). Other
appropriate bodies could also be involved. The purpose would be to work out at
least a broad division of labour, to ensure that particular problems did not fall
through the gaps, to coordinate rather than duplicate efforts so that scarce
resources are utilised most effectively, and to identify systematically where
these organisations can most effectively work together. To have any chance of
success, this would require the creation of an ad hoc coordinating group which
would meet regularly in an attempt to minimise duplication of effort and
resources and bring a degree of coherence and purpose to what are currently
largely ad hoc and uncoordinated initiatives.
In fact, coordination and cooperation need to be enhanced at five distinct
levels:
o
The national level where different government agencies in the

intelligence and law enforcement communities often fail to share
intelligence, inform one another about operations, or coordinate their
efforts for maximum impact.
Among multiple governments affected, in one way or another, by

trafficking, whether it is in source, transhipment, or destination
countries.
Among international organisations and agencies with responsibility

either for combating one or more forms of trafficking or for mitigating
the consequences of trafficking.
Among governments, international organisations and relevant NGOs,

which not only provide major contributions to our understanding of
trafficking but also focus attention on the problem, helping to create
awareness and set the political agenda.
Between governments and the private sector, which need to work more
closely together to ensure that wittingly or unwittingly businesses do
not facilitate trafficking. Cooperation is required at all levels from
418
governments sharing of information about potential infiltration of

particular industries to efforts, especially by firms in industries that are
particularly important or useful to human trafficking, to police
themselves in some way.
One way of seeing this is in terms of the creation of anti-trafficking networks.
In order for these networks to operate effectively, however, the creation of trust
is essential. This is not easy when issues of language, culture and national
sovereignty are all involved. Nevertheless, it can often be done on a personal,
informal level. To return to Ethan Nadelmanns work, as he showed some years
ago, informal relationships among police create trust networks similar to those
found among criminals. When a policeman can pick up the phone and call his
counterpart in another country, then it is possible to exchange useful
information, and even to develop common targets of investigation. One way of
facilitating this process is through capacity building, especially training, which
can lead to the creation of informal networks of trust and affiliation.
In some cases, these networks of trust among law enforcement and intelligence
personnel in different countries will be maintained for the long haul; in others
they will be created for specific missions against specific targets. The
temporary network of the multi-national task force is extremely valuable and
can yield excellent short-term results in specific investigations or against
specific targets. The longer-term transnational network of officials from
various countries who have developed mutual trust and respect and can operate
together informally is even more valuable, if it is extended beyond two or three
countries and beyond law enforcement agencies to other government
departments and from there to the private and non-profit sectors, incorporating
personnel and specialists from the NGO world. One way of thickening and
extending networks in ways which would enhance operational cooperation as
well as knowledge about human trafficking and how it can best be combated
would be to establish human trafficking intelligence units in as many
governments as possible and create a network of these institutions based on the
Egmont Group model of financial intelligence units. The Egmont network
operates through a common intra-net which facilitates rapid and relatively
secure information sharing. This is accompanied by annual meetings and expert
assessments of money laundering trends and mechanisms. Something similar
could be done in relation to countering human trafficking and would provide a
platform for deepening and broadening international cooperation.
Questions inevitably arise about the optimum size of the networks created to
combat human traffickingespecially at the operational level. There is no
single answer to this, however, apart from the somewhat trite observation that
419
they need to be as large as necessary but as small as possible, or as inclusive as

necessary but as exclusive as possible. In the final analysis, however, the size
of law enforcement networks to combat human trafficking might be less
important than who is involved. A large network among demand countries in
Western Europe, for example, would be based on increasingly dense habits and
patterns of cooperation and would probably be very effective. The more diverse
a law enforcement network becomes and the more it incorporates members
from transhipment and source countries where the integrity of law enforcement
is an issue, however, the greater the prospect that information will be leaked
and operations undermined or even neutralised.
One way of dealing with this is simply to accept some information leaks as the
price of cooperation. The Italian-American working group on combating
organised crime which held its first meeting in 1984 worked even though
initially it was clear that information was being supplied to the Italian Mafia.
Over time, as corrupt police were weeded out and as cooperation intensified,
this became far less of an issue. While this might not occur in every case,
incorporating a counter-corruption element into transnational enforcement
networks and task forces, through vetting the members, could also help to
minimise the problem.
Another perspective is to focus on knowledge-creation and knowledge-sharing
and how they can be strengthened through the development of mechanisms at
several interlocking levels. If the development of a more comprehensive
assessment of the traffickers and the dynamics of the various markets in human
beings is to be achieved, it is essential to incorporate assessmentsfrom all
possible sources raging from intelligence agencies to NGOs that are based on
an enhanced understanding of the trafficking process, the underlying market
dynamics, the nature of the participants in the trafficking business, the methods
and modalities of trafficking, the profits that accrue and how and where they
are distributed, re-invested, and laundered. These assessments require the
creation of a knowledge base that: (1) involves pooling of data-bases; (2) is
network-based; (3) crosses national borders and is shared by intelligence and
enforcement agencies in multiple jurisdictions; (4) makes full use of the
knowledge provided by the NGO community, which often has detailed
information about local conditions relating to human trafficking; (5) makes use
of information from the private sector; and (6) considers potential ways in
which trafficking networks might successfully adapt to, and circumvent, law
enforcement efforts. A knowledge-base of this kind is essential in human
trafficking but provision also needs to be made for cross-referencing the data in
420
ways that reveal otherwise hidden connections between human trafficking and,
for example, trafficking in drugs.
There would, of course, be difficulties. Some law enforcement information
would be operationally sensitive, while information provided by intelligence
agencies would have to be sanitised in ways that would not disclose sources
and methods. One way to deal with this would be to create a multi-tiered
system with different levels of access, but with a constant effort to make access
as broad as possible while not compromising intelligence gathering, operations,
or investigations. For example, a lot of the basic non-sensitive data could be
housed at UNODC and made available through web-access to law enforcement
agencies, NGOs and researchers. The more operational material would be
much more restricted but could be accessed through Interpol, which has control
systems for data already in place and has a global communications
infrastructure which could be exploited much more fully than currently is done.
Whatever the precise arrangements for cooperation in knowledge-creation and
information-sharing, it is clear that efforts have to be made to develop a much
more comprehensive understanding and assessment of human trafficking. Even
though the UNODCs 2009 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons provided a
useful preliminary assessment on the scale and scope of the problem, the
Executive Director of UNODC emphasised that knowledge remained
fragmented and understanding was incomplete. As he noted, policy can be
effective if it is evidence-based, and so far the evidence is scanty. The kind of
approach recommended here is designed to overcome this problem. It would
also make it possible to reconcile divergent assessments of the kind which have
arisen between UNODC and the US State Department in assessing opium and
heroin production. Greater knowledge and shared understanding of all
dimensions of human trafficking would provide a basis for more refined and
effective strategies and policies.
This would also enhance understanding of how well both the international
community and specific governments are doing in their responses to human
trafficking. Defining success in countering human trafficking is particularly
difficult. For some feminists, for example, reducing trafficking is synonymous
with reducing prostitutionwhich is their overall goal. For others, prostitution
is not the problem; rather it is the exploitation of prostitutes by pimps and
others involved in the commercial sex trade. This clash between principle and
pragmatism might be inescapable. Approaches designed to reduce the size of
the markets, to reduce the scale and scope of trafficking, to reduce the number
of victims and to minimise harm to others, and to make human trafficking less
profitable and more risky, for example, are subject to the criticism that they do
421
not go nearly far enough. Yet such approaches recognise the persistent nature
of the trafficking business as well as the difficulty of interventions designed to
change market choices. Strategy, as much as politics, is about the art of the
possible. A realistic strategy requires realistic goals that, in turn, yield tangible
measures of success.
Such measures need to be both quantitative and qualitative, encompassing
obvious indicators such as number of arrests, indictments, and convictions for
trafficking offences, or the number of trafficked women who are rescued, as
well as less obvious and less tangible assessments. Assessments of the impact
of deterrence strategies as well as other preventive measures, such as education
campaigns, are less easily quantified but are nonetheless significant and are
also included.
It would also be helpful to know what works and what does not. In this
connection, law enforcement networks could learn from both the military doing
after-action assessments and from business in terms of the development of
bestor at least most effectivepractices.
As part of a comprehensive anti-trafficking strategy, it also important to make
it more difficult for the traffickers to profit financially from their activities. In
part, this requires that any governments that have not already made human
trafficking a predicate offence for money laundering do so as soon as possible.
It also requires that governments introduce anti-money laundering measures
that exceed the requirements enshrined in the recommendations of the G-8s
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). While measures such as cash transaction
reports and suspicious activity reports, along with requirements for due
diligence and know your customer, make it more complicated for criminals
(including those involved in human trafficking) to launder the proceeds of their
activities, the results are not commensurate with the self-congratulatory
approach sometimes adopted by the FATF. One specialist has argued very
persuasively that law enforcement seizures of criminal proceeds are
substantially less than one per cent of global criminal proceeds.77 Even
acknowledging this and accepting the limitations of anti-money laundering
measures, it would still be worthwhile to link these efforts more directly to
combating human trafficking.
In this connection, it is worth emphasising that travel agencies, transportation
firms, and hotels which collude with trafficking networksespecially the
77
See Raymond Baker, Capitalisms Achilles Heel (New York: Wiley, 2005).
422
larger onesare not only facilitators of the trafficking process but are natural
conduits for illicit financial transactions. As such, they lend themselves very
naturally to the kinds of money laundering that have become prevalent as
tighter regulations in the financial system have led criminals to look elsewhere
for laundering opportunities. The implication is that measures for asset seizure
and asset forfeiture should be used as part of a direct attack on underlying
trafficking infrastructures. The seizure of assets from facilitators would send a
strong message about the dangers of being involvedeven if only indirectly.
The assets seized could also be used for victim assistance programs, especially
in the area of women trafficking.
The final component of the counter-human trafficking strategy being
enunciated here encapsulates this requirement for what might be termed agile
law enforcementthe adoption of intelligence-led policing and other measures
that are forward-looking and proactive, combined with the maintenance of a
capacity for adaptability and flexibility. In effect, law enforcement and
traffickers are in an adversarial relationship that, like other adversarial
relationships, is in large part a battle of wits. In these circumstances, it is
essential for governments to develop a capacity for strategic anticipation that
not only allows them to pre-empt certain human trafficking activities, but also
to respond rapidly to adjustments or innovations made by the traffickers after
they have encountered setbacks. In effect, any anti-trafficking strategy must
incorporate potential responses by traffickers to successful law enforcement.
From the law enforcement perspective, the process is one of displacement;
from the trafficking perspective, it is one of adaptability. Whichever way the
process is characterised, however, some degree of planning is required to
ensure that the traffickers remain on the defensive and are not always one step
ahead.
In the final analysis, of course, there are no easy and simple solutions to human
trafficking. The mix of variable geometry institutional cooperation, knowledge
creation, and strategic thinking outlined here is no exception. It is presented
with a clear recognition that it needs refinement, but in the hope that it might be
a stimulus for discussion and provide a broad framework for an action plan.
Even if a comprehensive approach of this kind is adopted, however, it does not
guarantee success; without such an approach though continued failure in efforts
to combat human trafficking is inevitable.
423
Recommendations
Think in Network Terms
Think in network termsmost criminal organisations in a globalised world are
network-based rather than traditional hierarchies.
Human Trafficking Requires a Distributed Solution
Recognise that transnational human trafficking is a distributed problem that
requires a distributed solution and that reluctancedriven by concerns about
ceding or relinquishing national sovereigntyto engage in distributed multinational or transnational responses needs to be overcome. By clinging to the
formalities of sovereignty, governments are simply allowing the substance of
sovereignty to be eroded.
Focus on Real and Tangible Measures
In terms of enforcement, focus on real and tangible measures of effectiveness
such as the number of indictments and convictions, not on levels of efforts such
as whether laws are in place. Even if they exist, unless they are adequately
enforced they are meaningless.
Attacking Trafficking Networks is Essential
Even in a human rights-based approach to combating human trafficking,
attacking trafficking networks should be recognised as essential as these
networks provide the critical facilitators and connectors between the supply and
demand sides of what is a market in human commodities.
Recognise Network Variation
Recognise the variations in networks in terms of size, composition and
structure, determine what kind of networkflux, broker, chain, mesh or core
is involved and develop strategy accordingly.
Target Critical Nodes
Identify and target critical nodes which can be leadership nodes, those nodes
with a high concentration of direct or indirect links, nodes which act as
boundary-spanners and cross from the criminal to the legitimate worlds, and
nodes which carry out specialised substantive tasks.
424
Develop Knowledge-Creation and Knowledge-Sharing Mechanisms

Develop knowledge-creation and knowledge-sharing mechanisms at several
interlocking and reinforcing levels, with varying degrees of sensitivity. These
knowledge-sharing mechanisms would offer opportunities for developing
evidence-based policies and strategies.
Enhance Cooperation
Enhance cooperation at national, regional and global levels and incorporate
international agencies, the NGO community and the business community.
Develop a Comprehensive or Holistic Strategy
Develop a comprehensive or holistic strategy in which various components are
mutually reinforcing. Recognise, in particular, that attacking networks and
attacking markets are complementary approaches.
Focus on the Profits
Incorporate into the enforcements efforts a focus on the profits of trafficking
and, where feasible, seize infrastructure that is used.
Transform Human Trafficking into a High-Risk, Low-Profit Activity
The bottom-line recommendation is to transform human trafficking from a lowrisk, high-profit criminal activity to a high-risk, low-profit activity.
425
CHAPTER 11
Problems of Anti-trafficking Cooperation
Barbara Limanowska, Helga Konrad
Introduction
Over recent years, cooperation among and between governments, international
organisations, and NGOs against human trafficking has increased. This has
helped to dismantle criminal networks and protect victims of trafficking.
However, results are limited and many problems remain. This chapter discusses
these problems and their origins, and also makes suggestions for overcoming,
or mitigating, obstacles to anti-trafficking cooperation. The chapter shows that
insufficient cooperation is part and parcel of the failure to systematically
protect the human rights of trafficking victims.
Actors fighting trafficking agree that coordinating anti-trafficking efforts is
key. The aim of cooperation is to disrupt traffickers networks, put traffickers
and their accomplices in jail and protect and assist victims in a way that will
enable them to find a way back to normal life. Even better, efforts should
prevent people from becoming trafficked in the first place. Coordination and
cooperation are essential because human trafficking is a very complex,
multifaceted problem that cannot be solved single-handedly. No single ministry
or agency, or even a country, is capable of dealing with this problem alone;
coordination is crucial.
Although human trafficking over recent years has been a topic raising much
concern on the political level, only relatively few states have come to see it as
their responsibility to protect individuals from trafficking and to provide
effective assistance and remedies to victims. Countries in Europe and
elsewhere have by now created shelters, hotlines, return programmes, and other
relief measures. However, these are frequently island solutions rather proper
national referral mechanisms (NRMs). Several countries still have no or
inappropriate coordination structures bringing together the various antitrafficking actors. There are problems of cooperation among government
agencies, for example between the police and the judiciary. Moreover,
coordination structures have tended to work in closed loops, failing to network
427
with or open up to other actors. Thus, the police talk to the police, and NGOs
talk to NGOs. International cooperation, especially between countries of
destination and origin is still insufficient.
To the extent that coordination takes place, gatherings have often been used by
organisations an an opportunity to present their own activities, rather than as an
occasion to jointly develop and implement policies or change tracks. In
practice, coordination has often amounted to talk shops without tangible and
binding outcomes. A lack of cooperation has numerous costs. First of all,
relatively few trafficking cases have been successfully prosecuted, due to a lack
of evidence (which is based almost exclusively on the testimony of the victims,
while hardly any additional evidence is secured). Secondly, a lack of effective
cooperation between institutions tasked with protecting trafficked persons has
often led to abuses of the rights of such persons and their further victimisation.
If networking has posed a problem within countries, it has proven even more
challenging across borders. Human trafficking is a crime often committed by
international criminal networks. These can only be disrupted by prosecuting
perpetrators along the entire continuum of exploitation. However, too few
investigations systematically link criminal activity in countries of origin with
that in countries of destination. There is no systematic method for following up
with repatriated victims. Once a trafficked person is repatriated, there is no
coordination between governments to ensure that those responsible in countries
of origin are brought to justice or to ensure protection of the victims.
Frequently, cross-border legal assistance gets bogged down in red tape. There
is almost no evidence that governments in source countries take responsibility
for the protection of their nationals upon their return. On the contrary, in many
countries trafficked persons are arrested upon repatriation and socially
stigmatised, preventing their reintegration. Moreover, most victims receive
little or no assistance for reintegration.
This chapter argues that the effectiveness of anti-trafficking cooperation is very
much influenced by, and reflects, contradictions present in the anti-trafficking
model developed to implement the UN Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime. The focus on transnational organised crime has resulted in the
dominance of security over human rights, including with regard to
considerations on the protection and assistance of victims and prevention in
countries of origin. The chapter discusses the evolution of anti-trafficking
measures and the problems with their practical implementation in South
Eastern Europe from 2001 to 2006 (many of the problems discussed have not
been resolved yet). This is a region that has attracted many anti-trafficking
428
programmes implemented by a variety of actors. It therefore offers valuable

lessons for anti-trafficking efforts in the region and beyond.
1. Problems of Cooperation
In 2000, the Stability Pact Task Force on Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings for South-Eastern Europe (SPTF) for the first time brought together
international organisations dealing with human trafficking, law enforcement
agencies and NGOs in the SPTF Coordination Team.1 The countries that
were participating in the initiative were countries of origin, transit and
destination in South Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Kosovo),
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Romania. Together, supported by
SPTF, they signed the Anti-Trafficking Declaration of South Eastern Europe in
Palermo that commits them to address the phenomenon of trafficking in
human beings by implementing effective programmes of prevention, victims
assistance and protection, legislative reform, law enforcement and prosecution
of traffickers.2 These initial attempts were followed up in 2004 with the
establishment of an Alliance against Trafficking in Persons, under the aegis
of the OSCE Special Representative. The Alliance did have some success, due
to its access to multiple information sources, and also because it influenced the
decisions of governments, agencies, and institutions such as the European
Commission.
Several coordination mechanisms have been established to stimulate deeper
reflection on, and coordinated action against, human trafficking, and to foster
dialogue with and among countries of origin, transit and destination. The goal
is to provide practical background information to governments as decisionmaking aids and frame concerted anti-trafficking strategies. One can
distinguish between different types of coordination:
o
Horizontal cooperation between organisations of the same type, within

a country and also between countries of origin and destination (NGOs,
shelters, social services, police, border police, etc.) to exchange
experience and contacts, share information, and be able to refer clients.
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings; South Eastern
Europes Struggle Against Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: Stability Pact, May 2004).
Stability Pact, Anti-Trafficking Declaration of SEE, http://www.stabilitypact.org/trafficking (accessed

February 10, 2009).
429
Case-focused cooperation between organisations dealing with different

aspects of trafficking (local chapters of police, border police, NGOs,
medical services, social services, etc.) to follow concrete cases, transfer
clients, and effectively prosecute traffickers.
Vertical cooperation between different levels of the same institution

(police, border police, prosecutors, etc.) to share information, develop
model procedures, coordinate action, and monitor and evaluate.
International cooperation between political bodies from sending and

receiving countries to establish legal standards, procedures, and the
scope and standards of cooperation.
All these types of cooperation have been created. In Europe, the Stability Pact
Trafficking Task Force proposed national and regional cooperation models,
with the State Coordinators3 as the responsible body in each country. Based on
this model, the OSCE has proposed the National Referral Mechanism4 system,
which expanded the State Coordinators model to include all agencies involved
in the process of victims identification, protection, assistance and
reintegration. The Netherlands has proposed a different model of National
Rapporteur, envisioning the creation of a body focused not so much on
coordination but rather on monitoring of anti-trafficking agencies and
organisations.
As the result of these attempts, mechanisms for inter-agency cooperation to
combat trafficking were developed to cover all types of organisations and
aspects of trafficking. In the early 2000s, these mechanisms were developed to
such an extent that anti-trafficking state coordinators from South Eastern
Europe were continuously travelling from one coordination meeting to another
and reporting on their work, presenting newly established institutions, model
procedures, projects and programmes. Most projects were initiated by
international organisations offering support to countries of destination.
The Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings developed a Regional Plan of Action as
a model for national plans of action for the countries of the region. Implementation of the plans is
coordinated by national coordinators appointed by the governments. The major areas of concern
according to the model are research and assessment, raising of awareness and preventionaddressing
social and economic causes, victim assistance and support, return and reintegration assistance, law
reform, law enforcement, international law enforcement, cooperation and coordination. For more
information, see: http://www.osce.org/odihr/attf/index.php3?sc=Action_Plan (accessed May 22, 2009).
OSCE/ODIHR, Handbook on National Referral Mechanisms: Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of
Trafficked Persons (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004),
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2004/05/12351_131_en.pdf (accessed May 22, 2009)
430
However, the response was not as effective as anticipated, especially in the area
of victim protection, due to various obstacles.5
1. Technical: language and communication barriers, a lack of access to
information, a focus on different groups of trafficked persons,
differences in standard operating procedures, etc.
2. Differing levels of conformity with international laws and regulations
regarding trafficking and labour standards, different legislation and
practices regarding prostitution, etc.
3. Different approaches to trafficking (state security vs. human rights) by
different types of institutions; controversies between countries of origin
and destination, with destination countries and international
organisations dominating policy priorities. Divergent priorities of, and
competition between, institutions.
4. Simple financial obstacles such as a lack of resources for antitrafficking work in the countries of origin, as well as corruption,
shadow economies, organised crime, forced labour, and prostitution.
These problems are interrelated and determine the type, scope and results of
cooperation. While countries of origin are willing to participate in antitrafficking institutions, they also try to minimise any focus on the involvement
of their own citizens in trafficking, both as perpetrators and as victims.
Countries of origin underline the socio-economic causes of trafficking, such as
poverty and a lack of legal migration opportunities for their citizens to the
countries where there might be employment. In countries of destination, the
focus is on foreign victims and traffickers (mainly in the sex industry). Other
factors tend to be neglected, such as: the involvement of their own citizens in
trafficking and as victims, root causes of exploitation, such as lack of
implementation of labour laws and lack of legal protection for migrant workers.
While most European countries have signed and ratified the Trafficking
Protocol, not all of them have amended domestic laws. For example, in some
countries trafficking is understood as trafficking of women for the purpose of
prostitution only. Laws relating to trafficking, such as laws on migration,
minors, labour, and prostitution vary, which negatively impacts on cooperation.
The diversity of anti-trafficking actions results from the differing mandates of
institutions. While governmental institutions tend to focus on state security
5
B. Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe (Warsaw: OHCHR, OSCE,

UNICEF, 2002), 140.
431
issues, NGOs focus more on individual rights. There is also competition for
resources and turf between organisations with a similar outlook, for example
those offering assistance to victims and also among international organisations
that are trying to negotiate a space for themselves, offering services to
governments.
A scarcity of resources often translates into cooperation problems. While all
institutions are obliged to cooperate, institutions that do not have the means to
participate in meetings, translate materials, or go on study visits have trouble
cooperating. In most cases, funding is provided by countries of destination (on
projects that reflect their priorities) and channelled though international
organisations. The anti-trafficking agenda thus reflects the interests of donors.
Rhetorically, cooperation should include all types of institutions, including
those protecting victims and addressing root causes of trafficking in countries
of origin. But since many of these institutions are short of funds, institutions
focusing on prosecution and anti-migration measures (often financially better
endowed) dominate cooperation mechanisms.
2. Cooperation and the Palermo Trafficking Protocol
In the 1990s, a Dutch NGO trying to draw attention to growing sex tourism
from the Netherlands to Thailand triggered a public discussion on trafficking in
human beings. The NGO organised protests at Schiphol airport and send
information to the media about Dutch tourists in Thailand using prostitutes who
were often underage. At the same time, the number of Thai women working in
the Dutch sex industry begun to increase. It became apparent that at least some
of them were brought to Europe against their will. Women contacted by street
workers were telling stories that clearly described common patterns of abuse
and exploitation.
For NGOs in the Netherlands supporting sex workers rights, it became
obvious that many migrant prostitutes (other groups that were clearly visible
were women from the Dominican Republic and Poland) were victims of crimes
as they had been cheated and were not protected against violence and
exploitation. The Foundation against Trafficking in Women (Stichting tegen
Vrouwen Handel)6 was created. While the organisation was determined to help
victims trying to escape from traffickers, its capacities were limited because
victims were treated as illegal migrants and faced deportation and because
6
In 2007, STV decided on a name change and is now the Coordination Centre Human Trafficking
(CoMensHa).
432
traffickers were not seen as criminals, unless it was possible to prove concrete
acts of violence such as beatings or rape. Exploitation of migrant women in the
sex industry was not recognised as a crime, in the Netherlands as well as in
countries of origin.
At the same time, knowledge increased about trafficking in women from
different parts of the world (Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America) to other
EU member states. Moreover, organisations promoting the rights of prostitutes
became better organised and connected. NGOs, facing cases of trafficked
women who were not able to obtain any assistance and knowing of perpetrators
who went unpunished, realised that the 1949 Convention against Trafficking in
Women and Exploitation of Prostitution of Others was insufficient.
Yet there was another important, although not official, document, The Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Victims of Trafficking7 was a document
prepared by NGOs in 1994 to establish international standards of protection. It
was based upon international human rights standards. Its authors hoped that the
UN would adopt it, thus paving the way for the prosecution of traffickers and
assistance to victims, i.e., give them the status of victims of crime instead of
illegal migrants, protect them from secondary victimisation and offer
compensation for damages. The minimum standards was intended to protect
victims from deportation, offer a basis for protection and assistance during and
after identification and set out guarantees for voluntary safe return, resettlement
and reintegration. It was non-discriminatory and paid particular attention to
gender-related problems common in trafficking for sexual exploitation.
After several years of lobbying by NGOs it became apparent that there was no
political will within the UN to adopt the document. However, trafficking was
now recognised as a serious international problem, also due to media reports on
migrant women forced into prostitution. As a consequence, there was an
opportunity to add anti-trafficking provisions to the new Convention against
Transnational Organized Crimein the form of the Palermo Trafficking
Protocol. The NGOs using the Standard Minimum Rules document were able
to participate in the process of writing the Convention. However, the focus of
the Protocol was unmistakably on combating crimethe language used in the
Protocol was very weak in relation to victim protection and addressing the root
causes of trafficking.
7
Foundation against Trafficking in Women (STV), Global Alliance against Trafficking in Women
(GAATW) and International Human Rights Law Group (now Global Rights), Human Rights Standards
for the Treatment of Trafficked Persons (Bangkok: GAATW, 1999), http://www.notrafficking.org/content/PDF/human_rights_standards_for_the_treatment_of_trafficked_perso.pdf
433
Placing trafficking within the TOC Convention had three main consequences:
1. The focus on prosecution of traffickers, not protection of the victims
was the aim of the Trafficking Protocol. This translated into a lack of
clear, binding provisions for protecting trafficked persons. Moreover,
law enforcement agencies became the key anti-trafficking actors,
usually tasked with coordination and cooperation on the national level,
while human rights NGOs were marginalised.
2. The definition of trafficking was extended, now including trafficking
for non-sexual purposes.
3. The Convention directly influenced legislation in the countries that
ratified it. It obliged countries to criminalise trafficking and take
measures to combat and prevent the problem.
Concern about the lack of human rights protection in the TOC Convention was
voiced not only by NGOs but also by international organisations. From the
beginning, two UN agencies (UNOHCHR and UNICEF) and the OSCE had
promoted a human rights approach. Soon after the adoption of the UN
Traffiocking Protocol both UN agencies proposed standards and guidance on
prevention and protection. The Recommended Principles and Guidelines on
Human Rights and Human Trafficking, issued by UNOHCHR in 2002,8 were
intended to promote and facilitate the integration of a human rights perspective
into national, regional and international anti-trafficking laws, policies and
interventions. After being approved by the ECOSOC, the Guidelines were
promoted in South Eastern Europe, among others by the SPTF.
In addition, UNICEF, in collaboration with governments and NGOs in South
Eastern Europe (SEE), has developed Guidelines on the Protection of the
Rights of Child Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe.9 These guide
the protection of and assistance for child victims of trafficking from
identification to reintegration and recovery, addressing governments and state
agencies, international organisations and NGOs. However, neither set of the
Guidelines was binding for UN member states; they merely showed the
direction that states should take to fulfil their obligations arising from the
8
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on
Human Rights and Human Trafficking, report to the Economic and Social Council, E/2002/68/Add.1.,
July 2002.,
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.2002.68.Add.1.En?Opendocument (accessed
June 2, 2009).
UNICEF, UNICEF Guidelines for the Protection of the Rights of Children Victims of Trafficking in
South Eastern Europe (New York: UNICEF, June 2003).
434
various UN human right instruments in relation to the protection of victims of

crime.
3. Defining Trafficking and Implications for Cooperation
The definition of trafficking in human beings (see the introduction to this book)
is contained in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, especially Women and Children, which supplements the UN
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime adopted by the UN General
Assembly in November 2000. The UN distinguished between trafficked
persons and smuggled migrants, defining migrant smuggling as the
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State party of which the
person is not a national or a permanent resident.10 In principle, the smuggling
of persons constitutes an illegal border crossing and is therefore a violation
against the security of the state. In contrast, trafficking in human beings is a
violation of the rights of the individual; the victims are the trafficked persons.
The Trafficking Protocol therefore uses the term victim (yet without defining
a victim), whereas the Smuggling Protocol does not (see also the chapter of
Benjamin S. Buckland in this book).11 The focus of the TOC Convention and
its Protocols is on law enforcement and organised crime. Although the
Trafficking Protocol determines that trafficked persons are to be granted
protection, it soon became obvious that the language is relatively unspecific:
Unfortunately, there is little guidance in either instrument regarding
how the identification process is to be undertaken and by whom. This
is especially important because identifying an individual as a trafficked
person carries different responsibilities for a State party than is the case
if that person is identified as a smuggled migrant. It is hoped that States
parties will address such issues in the near future.12
The Palermo Trafficking Protocol stresses the need for a comprehensive
approach (addressing prevention, protection and prosecution issues) and
cooperation among the actors involved. It foresees cooperation, among others,
10
UN, Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Art.3a. UN A/55/383, November 2,
2000., http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/index.htm
11
Please compare: OSCE, Europe against Trafficking in Persons (conference Report, Berlin, October
1516, 2001), 103.
12
Kofi Annan, Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons and the Protection of Their Human Rights, note
by the UN Secretary-General, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/26 (New York: UN, July 5, 2001), 3
435
in the areas of assistance to and protection of victims, repatriation, prevention,

information exchange and training (see text box).
Article 8
Repatriation of victims of trafficking in persons
1. The State Party of which a victim of trafficking in persons is a national or in which
the person had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of
the receiving State Party shall facilitate and accept, with due regard for the safety of
that person, the return of that person without undue or unreasonable delay.
2. When a State Party returns a victim of trafficking in persons to a State Party of
which that person is a national or in which he or she had, at the time of entry into the
territory of the receiving State Party, the right of permanent residence, such return shall
be with due regard for the safety of that person and for the status of any legal
proceedings related to the fact that the person is a victim of trafficking and shall
preferably be voluntary.
3. At the request of a receiving State Party, a requested State Party shall, without undue
or unreasonable delay, verify whether a person who is a victim of trafficking in persons
is its national or had the right of permanent residence in its territory at the time of entry
into the territory of the receiving State Party.
4. In order to facilitate the return of a victim of trafficking in persons who is without
proper documentation, the State Party of which that person is a national or in which he
or she had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of the
receiving State Party shall agree to issue, at the request of the receiving State Party,
such travel documents or other authorisation as may be necessary to enable the person
to travel to and re-enter its territory.
5. This article shall be without prejudice to any right afforded to victims of trafficking
in persons by any domestic law of the receiving State Party.
6. This article shall be without prejudice to any applicable bilateral or multilateral
agreement or arrangement that governs, in whole or in part, the return of victims of
trafficking in persons.
Article 9
Prevention of trafficking in persons
1. States Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other
measures:
(a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and
436
(b) To protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from
revictimisation.
2. States Parties shall endeavour to undertake measures such as research, information
and mass media campaigns and social and economic initiatives to prevent and combat
trafficking in persons.
3. Policies, programmes and other measures established in accordance with this article
shall, as appropriate, include cooperation with non-governmental organisations, other
relevant organisations and other elements of civil society.
4. States Parties shall take or strengthen measures, including through bilateral or
multilateral cooperation, to alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women
and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of
equal opportunity.
5. States Parties shall adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures, such as
educational, social or cultural measures, including through bilateral and multilateral
cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons,
especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.
Article 10
Information exchange and training
1. Law enforcement, immigration or other relevant authorities of States Parties shall, as
appropriate, cooperate with one another by exchanging information, in accordance with
their domestic law, to enable them to determine:
(a) Whether individuals crossing or attempting to cross an international border with
travel documents belonging to other persons or without travel documents are
perpetrators or victims of trafficking in persons;
(b) The types of travel document that individuals have used or attempted to use to cross
an international border for the purpose of trafficking in persons; and
(c) The means and methods used by organised criminal groups for the purpose of
trafficking in persons, including the recruitment and transportation of victims, routes
and links between and among individuals and groups engaged in such trafficking, and
possible measures for detecting them.
2. States Parties shall provide or strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration
and other relevant officials in the prevention of trafficking in persons. The training
should focus on methods used in preventing such trafficking, prosecuting the
traffickers and protecting the rights of the victims, including protecting the victims
from the traffickers. The training should also take into account the need to consider
human rights and child- and gender-sensitive issues and it should encourage
cooperation with non-governmental organisations, other relevant organisations and
437
other elements of civil society.

3. A State Party that receives information shall comply with any request by the State
Party that transmitted the information that places restrictions on its use.
Cooperation with NGOs is mentioned explicitly only in relation to assistance,

training and prevention of trafficking. While NGOs were, when the Protocol
was drafted, the principle organisations that were assisting victims of
trafficking and often facilitating their return to countries of origin, they are not
mentioned in Article 8, which refers to repatriation. As Article 8 states: return
shall be with due regard for the safety of that person and for the status of any
legal proceedings related to the fact that the person is a victim of trafficking
and shall preferably be voluntary (emphasis added). NGOs from the
beginning argued that victims should have the right to stay, at least temporarily
in the country of destination and should not be treated as illegal migrants and
deported. The Protocol does not offer this option (with an exception for
witnesses in anti-trafficking cases). It is therefore not surprising that the
Protocol does not foresee any role for NGOs in the process of preferably
voluntary return. Deportations of illegal migrants are governed by other laws
and are the matter of the state and law enforcement agencies.
Assistance to victims is foreseen in Article 6, which states that each State Party
shall consider implementing measures to assist victims of trafficking in
appropriate cases, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, other
relevant organizations and other elements of civil society.13 The Protocol is
weak in relation to protection and general in relation to prevention. Human
rights concerns are not properly expressed, and cooperation with human rights
organisations is foreseen only in appropriate cases.
These shortcomings led the UNOHCHR to prepare Recommended Principles
and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking.14 The document,
issued in 2002, is based on existing UN human rights instruments that prescribe
the protection measures trafficked persons are entitled to in accordance to UN
13
Article 6. Assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking in persons

3. Each State Party shall consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological
and social recovery of victims of trafficking in persons, including, in appropriate cases, in cooperation
with non-governmental organizations, other relevant organizations and other elements of civil society,
and, in particular, the provision of: (a) Appropriate housing; (b) Counselling and information, in
particular as regards their legal rights, in a language that the victims of trafficking in persons can
understand; (c) Medical, psychological and material assistance; and (d) Employment, educational and
training opportunities.
14
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines.
438
human rights treaties. Guideline 11 is entirely dedicated to cooperation and

coordination between States and regions. In addition to law enforcement
cooperation and the adoption of labour migration agreements in accordance
with existing international standards, Point 3 of Guideline 11 foresees
Elaborating regional and sub-regional treaties on trafficking, using the
Palermo Protocol and relevant international human rights standards as a
baseline and framework, and Point 2 Offering technical and financial
assistance to States and relevant sectors of civil society for the purpose of
promoting the development and implementation of human rights-based antitrafficking strategies.15
The Principles and Guidelines recognise that fighting trafficking requires
cooperation between the state agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations.16 Cooperation frameworks should not only pertain
to law enforcement, but also promote victim identification,17 facilitate labour
migration agreements to eliminate trafficking and related exploitation,18 and
assist the development and implementation of human rights-based antitrafficking strategies.19 International human rights organisations used the
Principles and Guidelines to promote human rights based anti-trafficking
strategies in which law enforcement agencies were one of the partners adopting
a human rights based approach.20
Yet the main source of standards for law enforcement cooperation was the
much more concrete Organized Crime Convention. Several articles of the
Convention are dedicated to inter-agency cooperation in areas of: international
cooperation for purposes of confiscation (Article 13), mutual legal assistance
(Article 18), joint investigations (Article 19), transfer of criminal proceedings
(Article 21), and law enforcement cooperation (article 27).21 The provisions do
not exclusively pertain to human trafficking. But they incorporate antitrafficking action into a broader context of international cooperation by police,
border police, criminal justice actors and other state agencies tasked with
15
Ibid., Guideline 11, Point 2 and 3.
16
Ibid., Guideline 11, Point 12.
17
18
19
20
See, for example, Sector Project against Trafficking in Women, ed., Challenging Trafficking in
Persons. Theoretical Debate and Practical Approaches (Eschborn: GTZ, 2005).
21
UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,

General.Assembly Resolution 55/25, annex I, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no.49), 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49
(Vol. I) 2001.
439
fighting organised crime. In the light of the Convention, cooperation with

NGOs and international agencies as foreseen in the Trafficking Protocol was an
exceptional concession that should help, in appropriate cases, to build a state
security system, the development and implementation of which is dominated
by law enforcement agencies.
4. Anti-trafficking Efforts in Practice
The definition of trafficking in the Protocol reflects the complex nature of the
problem. It can be broken down into acts, means, and purpose. Only a
combination of these elements constitutes the crime of human trafficking. To
operationalise the Convention, human rights organisations use the OHCHR and
UNICEF Guidelines as well as their own interpretations of international and
domestic legislation emphasising protection and prevention. What victims an
NGO focuses on depends on their interests and mandate. Their work therefore
usually does not cover all types of trafficking.
Law enforcement agencies tend to place human trafficking among other types
of international organised crime such as trafficking in arms and drugs and
smuggling of migrants, and tend to use the same methods to combat all of
them. As trafficking in human beings occurs together with the smuggling of
migrants and trafficking in arms and drugs, law enforcement agencies have
problems with seeing trafficked persons as victims of crime and using human
rights standards and methods to treat them accordingly. Instead, they focus on
members of organised crime groups. Unless they can be useful as witnesses in
trafficking cases, victims are simply treated as illegal workers and, if found in
countries of destination, as illegal migrants to be deported. The Protocol
definition can lead to skewed interpretations by other actors as well. Depending
on their mandate, and similar to NGOs, international organisations tend to
focus on specific aspects of anti-trafficking, such as the protection of human
rights of specific groups of trafficked persons while ignoring other aspects,
such as the prevention of irregular migration, the prosecution of traffickers, and
the protection of children. The media focuses on trafficking for the purpose of
sexual exploitation.
Singling out specific aspects is problematic because the distinction between
trafficking and smuggling, or trafficking and labour exploitation or prostitution,
is often not clear on the ground (see also the chapter by Benjamin S. Buckland
in this volume). This is reflected in data and information on trafficking
440
collected from governments, international agencies, NGOs, and other sources.22

Sources did not always refer directly to trafficking, as defined in the UN
Protocol, but instead to:
o
The number and/or situation of illegal migrants
The number and/or situation of female migrants working in the sex

industry
The number of girls deported to their country of origin
The number of women and girls assisted in returning to their country of

origin
The number of women not allowed to cross a border for various

reasons
The number of smuggled women or women trying to cross a border

without valid documents
Factors influencing peoples decisions to migrate
This indicates that anti-trafficking actors interpret the Palermo definition of

trafficking differently. Some may label all situations relating to the migration
of (especially young) women trafficking, especially when the women work
or are willing to work in the sex industry. Most governmental institutions
involved in anti-trafficking work ignore trafficking for forced labour or internal
trafficking. Governments hardly acknowledge trafficking of children for forced
labour as trafficking. A further problem is that data and information are not
reliable and that they relate to actions taken against illegal migrants, rather than
against trafficking. Moreover, state authorities understand anti-trafficking
efforts as anti-migration action intended to prevent economically motivated
migration, especially of women. Last, fieldwork shows that uncertainty affects
particularly women working in the sex industry in places controlled by
organised crime groups that do not pay the women and restrict their freedom of
movement. These women tend not to consider themselves as trafficked persons,
although they would be defined as such under the Trafficking Protocol.23
Such uncertainty results from the fact that the Convention says what trafficking
is but not who the victims are. It is therefore difficult to use the definition.
Some groups are included (such as exploited children and women working in
the sex industry), while others are excluded (such as internally trafficked
22
Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe, 3.
23
Ibid., 3.
441
persons or migrant men forced to work in agriculture or construction).

Interpretations of the Protocol depend on political and economic factors as well
as on institutional mandates. Most counter-trafficking efforts in the area of
victim protection have focused on assisting their return. For example, the most
common anti-trafficking action in South Eastern Europe, in early 2000, were
police raids on brothels. After the raid, IOM (or NGOs using the IOM model)
would interview victims and, after arranging necessary documents, return them
to their country of origin. Return was the final outcome of programmes that
were supposed to offer protection and assistance to victims of trafficking. In
a majority of cases against their will.24 Therefore, protection measures funded
by the EU and other donors have been very limited, focusing almost
exclusively on short-term housing/sheltering until return documents are ready.
This has everything to do with national security and almost nothing to do with
a human rights approach.
5. The Influence of Countries of Destination
As shown above, most NGOs have focused on protecting the human rights of
exploited migrant workers, women and children. Law enforcement agencies, on
the other hand, tend to perceive trafficking as one type of international
organised crime, which law enforcement agencies give priority to fighting,
along with measures against irregular migration. The definition of trafficking in
the Protocol is broad enough to accommodate both human rights and organised
crime focused approaches.
The EU and the USAthe biggest donors for anti-trafficking activitieshave,
in practice, largely limited their anti-trafficking efforts to the security concerns
stressed by the Organized Crime Convention. This approach is reflected in
agreements with, and recommendations for, other countries, as well as in
financial support for certain types of programmes and projects. Countries that
wish to join the EU or receive financial support from the US have been obliged
to act in conformity with their anti-trafficking models.
The EU Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for South Eastern
Europe,25 and, in particular, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements,26
24
See: Ibid., 139148.
25
The Stabilisation and Association Process for South Eastern Europe (SAP), initiated by the EU in 1999,
includes political dialogue, regional cooperation, trade, movements of people and goods, capital and
services, justice and home affairs as well as fighting corruption and organised crime (including
trafficking).
442
prepares for possible EU accession. In return, SEE states have accepted EU

conditionality rules. The SAP regards human trafficking exclusively in the
context of security, organised crime, and illegal migration. The SAP texts do
not oblige or encourage SEE states to use a human rights approach to
trafficking or to protect the rights of trafficked persons. Instead, they focus on
hard anti-migration and organised crime measures:
the authorities in the countries of the region (should) work together to
respond effectively to the common threats to the regions and the EUs
security which come from organised crime, illegal immigration and
other forms of trafficking. In many cases, e.g., on visa policy, a
common approach by all the countries will be needed to deal with the
threat effectively.
While intergovernmental and non-governmental human rights organisations
advocate for a human rights approach and support SEE states in introducing
human rights based policies, other institutions, especially the EU, give priority
to state security, promoting the creation of an effective migration control
system and anti-organised crime cooperation.27
Another source of cooperation and policy has been the US State Department
and its annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP). The report clearly states
that trafficking is a human rights violation. The 2004 edition of the report
highlighted the three P's of prosecution, protection, and prevention.
Acknowledging that a victim-centred approach to trafficking requires us
equally to address the three R'srescue, removal, and reintegration.28 In
reality, however, countries have been, and continued to be, judged first on their
prosecutorial efforts and the conformity of domestic legislation with
international law, rather than on their human rights record. The TIP Report
does not include information on the protection of victim rights, such as the
need for at least a temporary stay in the country of destination, or the same
treatment for all victims regardless of their nationality, legal status in the
country of destination or their willingness to co-operate with law enforcement.
26
The Stabilisation and Association Agreements establish formal mechanisms and benchmarks for each
country of the region to develop standards similar to those which apply in the EU. The standards reflect
the political, economic and institutional criteria established by the Copenhagen European Council in
1993 and are basic entry requirements for the countries that aspire to join the EU. Criteria pertain,
among others, to opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons to return, respect for
human and minority rights, and regional co-operation.
27
See also: Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe, 7073
28
US Department of State, Introduction to the Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington D.C.: US

Department of State, June, 2004), http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/34021.htm (accessed May
22, 2009).
443
Countries are also not judged on having (or not) long term prevention
programmes addressing root causes of trafficking or for (not) including
prevention of trafficking into poverty reduction strategies and development
agendas.
The US can use sanctions against countries that do not conform to the TIP
Report criteria, such as the blocking of assistance (except for humanitarian,
trade-related and certain development-related purposes) and vetos against
funding from international financial institutions. But the TIP report does not
mention the need to support countries, especially countries of origin, that
cannot offer long term re-integration support for returning victims and long
term prevention programmes aimed at high risk groups and the eradication of
the root causes of trafficking. While the UN Palermo Trafficking Protocol
states that States Parties (sic) shall take or strengthen measures, including
through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to alleviate the factors that make
persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as
poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity, this is not reflected
in the SAP agreements.
Thus, human rights organisations have been advocating for a human rights
approach. But the EU and the US, and institutions implementing the policies of
major donors, have given priority to measures focused primarily on state
security of countries of destination. In SEE, international donors have stopped
funding certain activities, such as the provision of shelters for trafficked
persons, arguing that governments of the countries concerned should finance
these programs themselves. Using the same argument, international donors are
also reluctant to support reintegration programmes.
6. Cooperation and the Lack of a Human Rights Approach29
To illustrate the contradictions inherent in anti-trafficking cooperation, it is
worth examining two aspects of cooperation: cooperation between law
enforcement agencies and human rights organisations and their approaches
with regard to victim identification and reflection periods; and international
cooperation in the area of return and re-integration of victims, intended to
prevent re-trafficking.
29
The criticisms in the following section apply specifically to SEE and are drawn from extensive regional
fieldwork. They also apply, however, in many cases outside the region.
444
6.1 Cooperation between law enforcement agencies and human rights

organisations
After signing and ratifying the Palermo Trafficking Protocol, the governments
of South Eastern European countries were strongly committed to antitrafficking. As a result, national coordination structures were created. Antitrafficking efforts reflected international law, especially the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, and were co-ordinated by the Stability
Pact Trafficking Task Force. By 2005, SEE had the best regional antitrafficking system in Europe and Central Asia.30 The system, that the states
opted to follow as it did not have a formal mandate to coordinate national
efforts, is based on the Regional Plan of Action developed by the SPTF in 2001
in cooperation with OHCHR, OSCE and UNICEF. Several steps were taken:
o
National Co-ordinators were appointed in all SEE countries
National Committees and thematic working groups were established
National Plans of Action were developed (with the exception of

Kosovo)
There was close co-operation between domestic anti-trafficking actors

and international organisations
There was good regional co-operation and sufficient political will to

continue the process after the waning-out of the SPTF in 2004
However, the creation of this cooperation system has not always translated into
effective anti-trafficking measures. Programmes developed as part of National
Action Plans have not been fully implemented, and cooperation among
governmental agencies, as well as between governments and non-governmental
partners, has often been insufficient. Moreover, programmes implemented by
international agencies have at times been inadequately co-ordinated with local
partners and not fostered local ownership. SEE governments have recognised
their responsibility, reformed legal frameworks, and established anti-trafficking
structures. But implementation has proven more difficult than expected.
One main problem is victim protection.31 Special anti-trafficking police units
have been created, police trained, and guidelines and law enforcement
30
This part of the article is based on: Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe.
31
According to the OHCHR Principles and Guidelines and the SPTTF regional documents approved by
the states of the SEE, all victims should have the right to be identify as such and offered assistance.
They also should have the right to a reflection period in a safe shelter to decide whether they want to
claim the status of victim of trafficking and/or testify against traffickers.
445
cooperation with NGOs developed. Yet, police, when faced with potential
cases of trafficking, are often still unable to identify victims, leading to
arbitrary decisions. Usually, presumed victims are perceived as guilty of
prostitution or illegal migration, rather than victims of crime, especially when
they refuse to cooperate with the police and give statements as evidence. Police
decisions are based not so much on an assessment of the persons situation, but
on the persons usefulness as a prosecution witness. In most cases, victims not
having been identified as such, have been put into detention centres and
deported as illegal migrants, without being given a reflection period.
In many cases where victims have been seen as useful to a prosecution, they
were interviewed and placed in a shelter, again without being granted a
reflection period. In such cases, placement in a shelter is offered as an
alternative to deportation. It is thus not a voluntary option; instead, it resembles
a form of detention, less harsh than imprisonment, but a deprivation of liberty
all the same. Unsurprisingly, shelter staff are perceived as an extension of law
enforcement, rather than as being responsible for the wellbeing and protection
of the rights of their clients. Shelter staff are also not allowed to decide, in case
of foreign victims, whether the assisted person needs more long-term
assistance. Given these circumstances, many presumed victims are not willing
to share their stories or testify against traffickers. Police therefore does not see
them as victims, leading to their deportation.32 Hence, in reality, law
enforcement agencies deal with victims from the narrow perspective of
criminal investigations. At the same time, governmental institutions focusing
on law enforcement (such as Ministries of Interior) are responsible for
coordinating anti-trafficking responses. They therefore establish rules of
cooperation for NGOs. These rules reflect state security concerns and often
force shelters to breach human rights standards. For example, Ministries of
Interior and NGOs have signed agreements. As the police are usually the
institution referring victims of trafficking to NGOs, they receive a list of NGOs
they are supposed to cooperate with. By bringing trafficked persons to a shelter
they are in the position to enable the chosen NGO to implement their activities,
prove their effectiveness and justify the need for donors support. Police benefit
from this arrangement as well, as NGOs return the favour and assist police in
obtaining evidence and statements from victims. Usually both sides are
unaware that these practices are equivalent to a (continuing) violation human
rights.
32
See: Barbara Limanowska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Collateral Damage, ed. Mike Dottridge
(Bangkok: GAATW, 2007).
446
From the perspective of the victim, the option to remain in the country of
destination (with the exception of Italy) is almost non-existent. Being identified
as a victim can therefore be worse than being simply deported, as it may mean
a prolonged stay in a shelter, police interviews, and being labelled a prostitute
after return to the home country. These are not good incentives to participate in
assistance projects. From the perspective of law enforcement, the prosecution
of traffickers relies heavily on evidence from victims. Lack of such evidence is
therefore problematic. For human rights NGOs, the inability to fulfil their
mandate and protect their clients constitutes failure as well. This identification
dilemma inherent in the anti-trafficking modelwho should identify victims,
what should be the criteria for their identification, and how can NGOs be
included in this processis still, after many years of discussions, very visible
on the ground and is an obstacle to effective inter-agency cooperation.
The practical applicability of another element of the protection system
reflection periodsraises concerns as well. It is difficult for victims to benefit
from this instrument as long as granting agencies (usually migration or
foreigner departments and Ministries of Interior) are not convinced of its
usefulness. The question is how to ensure both effective prosecution and victim
protection.
There is also no system for conducting risk assessments for repatriated victims,
nor for ensuring the protection of victims rights in their countries of origin.
OSCE member states in 2006 committed themselves to conduct risk
assessments to ensure that return of victims is done with due regard for their
safety.33 This places the responsibility to provide victims with adequate
assistance on both parties, not only countries of origin but also countries
repatriating/deporting trafficked person. But this commitment has still not been
translated in practice.
There are doubts as to whether the anti-trafficking cooperation model can work
as long as victims are not identified and protected. These shortcomings have
been discussed for several years now, yet without having been resolved in
practice. They show that the model approach to combating trafficking has not
been able to resolve the conflict between protecting victims rights and the
preferences of migration and law enforcement agencies resenting interference
from outside. The model as a whole is therefore questionable.
33
OSCE, Enhancing Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Including for Labour Exploitation,
Through a Comprehensive and Proactive Approach, MC.DEC/14/06, (Vienna: OSCE, 2006),
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2006/12/22551_en.pdf (accessed June 2, 2009).
447
Involving the governments of the countries that had trafficking problems and
building cooperation structures supported by international agencies originally
aimed at shifting responsibility for anti-trafficking work and for victim
assistance from NGOs and foreign donors to governments. Ratification of the
Protocol started this process. Unfortunately, many governments saw taking
responsibility as equivalent to exercising control over the activities of human
rights NGOs working with and for victims. At the same time, governments
focused on transnational organised crime and irregular migration, which led
Ministries of Interior or their equivalents, and law enforcement agencies, to
dominate anti-trafficking efforts.
As the international community initiated and supported cooperation and
coordination efforts, it quickly became apparent that systems such as National
Coordinators and National Plans of Action lacked effectiveness. National Plans
of Action were mostly compilations of various activities, usually financed and
conducted by IOs and NGOs (including awareness raising campaigns and
training activities), instead of systematic, sustainable plans endowed with
sufficient financial and personnel investment from governments. OSCEsponsored National Referral Mechanismssystems of cooperation and
coordination of anti-trafficking institutionswere never fully understood and
implemented, even in Serbia, where NRMs were first developed.34 In many
countries, a lack of understanding of NRMs, and anti-trafficking more
generally, has led to the creation of coordination bodies. Governmental
institutions represented in these bodies have dominated policy-making and
implementation, with no transparency and evaluation of results. As a
consequence, no (or only very few) victims were identified. Moreover, as
NGOs created parallel systems (for shelters, for example), there has been a lack
of coordination between governments and NGOs.
Local NGOs were given an inferior role. Even when NGOs were included in
coordinating bodies (such as National anti-trafficking Commissions in SEE),
they were often excluded from the decision making process, and their opinions
and expertise were not taken into account. In the area of victim assistance,
well-established, experienced NGOs promoting the rights of victims were
replaced by new organisations willing to accept the conditions of governments
and international organisations. In some cases, governments were also
establishing their own assistance services based on the old structures of social
34
See: OSCE/ODHIR, National Referral Mechanism: Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked
Persons. A Practical Handbook (Warsaw: OSCE/ODHIR, 2004),
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2004/05/12351_131_en.pdf (accessed May 22, 2009).
448
welfare systems, replacing existing shelters with new ones or establishing their
own NGOs to better control the process and the funds.
It must be remembered that there is competition between NGOs and
governments for foreign funds allocated to anti-trafficking. Governments do
not trust NGOs who rely on foreign donations, accusing them of exaggerating
problems to obtain funding. Mistrust is also caused by different priorities and
working methods. Furthermore, there are accusations on both sides about
inaccuracy and manipulation of estimates of the numbers of people being
trafficked. Indeed, governments and NGOs have often presented divergent
information on trafficking, especially in relation to the numbers of assisted
victims and the scale of the trafficking problem.
Another problem is that just because an anti-trafficking project is run by an
NGO, the protection and well being of victims is not automatically given
priority. Co-operation agreements between governments (mostly law
enforcement agencies), international organisations (in many countries IOM is
the agency responsible for assisting governments on migration related issues),
and NGOs describe, among other issues, the responsibilities of NGOs. While
NGOs are provided with security and funding, agreements restrict NGOs
freedom of manoeuvre and their ability to protect the rights of their clients.
Moreover, in many countries, after governmental anti-trafficking structures had
been established, new organisations with little experience in anti-trafficking
replaced NGOs with more experience. These new NGOs often do not base their
work on human rights principles; they are more like income generating
institutions or private contractors ready to implement any project proposed by
their government or by international organisations. Also, there is no common
understanding or clear vision of the ways in which NGOs should be included in
anti-trafficking teams, nor of the ways in which their activities should
contribute to the implementation of National Action Plans. This problem
results not least from the absence of external or internal evaluation mechanisms
for anti-trafficking activities, as well as the absence of a mechanism monitoring
adherence to human rights standards, especially with regard to identification,
referral, and protection. The presence of willing NGOs and the lack of effective
evaluation and monitoring systems indicate that the anti-trafficking cooperation
model neglects the effects of cooperation on the people that are to be protected.
On the other hand, The Netherlands, Belgium, or Germany show that, in
countries with strong human rights based NGOs, mechanisms of protection and
monitoring can be part of anti-trafficking cooperation.
449
6.2 International Cooperation

The reintegration of victims of trafficking, in addition to identification and
protection, as discussed above, is another indicator that anti-trafficking
operations are successful. Return to the country of origin and reintegration are
seen as the main options open to victims of trafficking. However, the capacity
of countries of origin to socially reintegrate victims is rarely questioned. Under
conditions of poverty, unemployment, and a lack of effective social support
structures and resources, it is not realistic to expect countries of origin to
develop programmes and measures offering returning victims the necessary
long-term support. Countries of origin thus depend on international support to
build their capacities for creating social inclusion programmes. Sustainable
reintegration is necessary. After all, the factors that forced people to take their
chances and resort to irregular migration in the first place, and in the process
become victims of trafficking, do not disappear after their return but are
reinforced by social stigmatisation and other problems.
By 2008, almost all reintegration programmes in the SEE region continued to
be small in scale, and the help they offered, while invaluable, was ad hoc and
not sustainable. There is considerable need, not only for reintegration, but also,
and indeed primarily, for prevention. However, governments of countries of
origin have not yet included prevention and reintegration programmes into their
National Plans of Action against trafficking in a meaningful way, as well as,
more broadly, into poverty reduction and anti-discrimination strategies.
Systematic prevention seems to be beyond the financial and technical capacity
of SEE governments and implementing agencies.
International cooperation in this field is very weak. International documents on
trafficking deal with reintegration in an overly general manner35
Recommendations for supporting reintegration developed by international
organisations reflect the absence of legal opportunities for victims of
trafficking to remain in the country of destination, thus stressing repatriation.36
In most countries of destination, return and reintegration are the only legally
available option open to victims of trafficking. The problem is that SEE
policymakers and implementing agencies have not yet developed clear
standards even an understanding of how to ensure reintegration (or in more
general terms, social inclusion) of returning victims of trafficking. Indeed,
35
See: Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, 8991.
36
The Trafficking Protocol (Article 8) obliges countries of origin to accept and facilitate the return of
trafficked persons with due regard for their safety and without undue or unreasonable delay. And, as
mentioned further above, the Trafficking Protocol states that returns shall preferably be voluntary.
450
countries of origin are not obliged to offer the possibility of social inclusion at
all.
It seems that the theory and practice of reintegration is still not well
understood, in SEE and beyond. There is little information about the meaning
of reintegration and the obligations of states to support trafficked persons after
their return. In the new millennium, SPTF documents stressed these issues.37
Combining prevention and reintegration, with a focus on addressing root
causes of trafficking, was the model developed and proposed by OHCHR,
OSCE and UNICEF, working in SEE under the coordination of the SPTF. The
ILO has since proposed a similar approach (with a focus on labour market and
the rights of migrant workers and their families).38 However, there has been no
coordinated effort so far to discuss experiences and ways of promoting and
implementing reintegration.
The strategies mentioned in the SPTF documents, approved by the countries of
the SEE region, are very general,39 relating less to reintegration and more to
general assistance, such as the active prevention of stigmatisation, legal
assistance, social, medical and psychological care, shelter, counselling,
material assistance, skills training, and job counselling.40 Only the skills
training and job counselling elements indicate that assistance should be long
term and lead to the social including of returned trafficked persons. While
international documents have not paid much attention to reintegration, agencies
on the ground working with returned victims of trafficking recognise the need
for reintegration. Assisting agencies have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact
that some women are trafficked several times, and that the lack of long term
support and options after return make them easy prey for traffickers.
Reintegration has started, therefore, to be seen not only as humanitarian help
offered on an individual basis, but as necessary for empowering victims to
break the trafficking circle.
37
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, National Programmes to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings
(National Plans of Action) Background Paper (Vienna: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Task
Force on Trafficking in Human Beings, 2001); Angelika Kartusch, Reference Guide for AntiTrafficking Legislative Review with Particular Emphasis on South Eastern Europe (Vienna: Ludwig
Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, September 2001).
38
ILO, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislators and Law
Enforcement (Geneva: ILO, 2004).
39
UNICEFs guidelines on the Protection of Child Victims of Trafficking from 2003, were approved and
promoted by the SPTF in the SEE region. The Guidelines proposed standards for reintegration of child
40
Cathy Zimmerman, Mazeda Hossain, Kate Yun, Brenda Roche, Linda Morison and Charlotte Watts,
Stolen Smiles: The Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of Women and Adolescents
Trafficked in Europe (London: WHO and LSHTM, 2006).
451
But as governments are not obliged by international law to provide them,

international organisations and local NGOs provide most reintegration
programmes, with only limited support from governments of countries of
origin, undermining their effectiveness and sustainability. While they depend
on funding from abroad, international actors do not focus on reintegration,
despite the significant attention paid to trafficking in the Balkans. In 2001, the
SPTF presented to donors programmes proposed by SEE countries. Not even
one project on the prevention of trafficking was chosen. Worse, in some cases,
funding for anti-trafficking programmes resulted in the shifting of attention and
support away from issues of development, equality and human rights to state
security and migration. Many anti-trafficking programmes funded not only by
governments of destination countries but also by independent foundations and
UN agencies did not focus on human rights, development and nondiscrimination. Instead, they promoted anti-migration projects that reflected the
narrow interests of countries of destination, rather than seek long-term
solutions and social change. The main focus was on information campaigns in
the countries of origin, warning against irregular/labour migration that could
result in trafficking and on protection projects in destination countries that
aimed at returning foreign sex workers (who often were not identifying
themselves as victims of trafficking) to their countries of origin.
By 2008, there still was no structure for coordinating anti-trafficking
programmes and needs between SEE countries and international donors, and
among donors. Intergovernmental institutions have arranged donor meetings
(such as OSCE in Serbia). Although useful, such meetings have not been
continued. The role of the SPTF as an intermediary between domestic
government institutions and NGOs, on the one hand, and international donors,
on the other, was crucial. When the SPTF was closed down in 2004 with the
aim of inaugurating the transition of its central anti-trafficking leadership role
in the region to the SEE countries themselves and thus providing for
national/regional ownership, coordination between and among domestic and
international institutions has become even more difficult.
Recommendations
Shifting Human Rights to the Centre of Anti-trafficking Efforts
In the first decade of the new millennium, various institutions began to develop
models for human rights-based anti-trafficking strategies. The ratification of
the Protocol and, consequently, the criminalisation of trafficking created legal
grounds for anti-trafficking efforts. However, anti-trafficking cooperation has
452
not been a smooth process. Often, there has been a lack of cooperation and
networking between governmental agencies and NGOs and among local and
international NGOs. Moreover, and related to this point, many victims have not
been given protection in the prosecution phase. These problems result not least
from the fact that, in practice, cooperation has been determined by the needs of
implementing state agencies, respect for human rights in a given country, the
strength of NGOs, interpretations, and political willrather than theoretical
frameworks. There are doubts as to whether implementing agencies can
properly coordinate their work given that the cooperation model is de facto
dominated by state security measures and the interests of countries of
destination to reduce migration, rather than human rights concerns. Human
rights concerns should therefore be at the centre of all anti-trafficking efforts.
Moreover, clear rules of cooperation between NGOs and governmental and
intergovernmental organisations, including transparent evaluation and
monitoring systems, need to be established.
Strengthen Protection
Anti-trafficking efforts in South Eastern Europe have so far focused on the
prosecution of traffickers. Moreover, they have been dominated by law
enforcement agencies, with ministries of interior tasked to coordinate efforts
and to establish cooperation modalities. This model has often been detrimental
to the protection of trafficked persons. In this system, there is no space to
effectively coordinate and implement projects focused on protecting victims
rights. Protection should therefore be given greater prominence. Human
trafficking must not be seen primarily or exclusively from the perspective of
national security nor exclusively in the context of organised crime; and it must
not be seen only as a fight against illegal migration. It is essential to raise
awareness of the fact that trafficking in human beings is both a security issue
and a human rights concern. In fact, security and human rights considerations
are often two sides of the same coin. This is the case, for example, with regard
to the need to improve protection for victim-witnesses testifying against their
traffickers.
Pay Special Attention to Migrants
The criticisms in this chapter are common knowledge among everyone working
on trafficking. Recalling them makes it possible to understand that problems
with anti-trafficking cooperation are not related only to the complexity and
international nature of the crime. First of all they are result of conflicting
approaches, agendas and mandates of states and institutions, which focus,
453
variably, on state security and human rights. The problems discussed in this
chapter are also part of a broader debate on labour migration and the protection
of migrants rights. Human rights NGOs have managed to draw attention to
victims of trafficking and proposed special protection measures. UN member
states accepted that vulnerable groups (especially women and children) exist,
and that extreme forms of exploitation should be eradicated and special
instruments offered to law enforcement agencies to combat trafficking. But the
States which agreed the UN Trafficking Protocol appeared unwilling to afford
special protection to victims of trafficking, and to migrants more generally.
What is needed is a comprehensive move towards the protection of migrants
rights. For victims of trafficking that means, among other measures, granting
them compensation and the right to an extended stay in the country of
destination to get access to justice and to safeguard their own security and
future.
Strengthen Prevention
The emphasis on control, deterrence and immediate repatriation of victims of
trafficking is often the beginning of a vicious circle which perpetuates human
trafficking and plays into the hands of traffickers. Combining prevention and
reintegration would encourage more work to be done with potential victims and
high risk groups. To achieve this, prevention and social inclusion should be
integrated into governmental poverty reduction and anti-discrimination
strategies. Potential and actual victims should be included in existing initiatives
for disadvantaged groups (scholarships, job placements, social support,
vocational training etc.). Special attention should be given to the reintegration
of children, preferably through family reunification (when appropriate).
Prevention is empowerment, the development of life skills and employment
opportunities for high risk groups; it mitigates the root causes of trafficking.
Prevention should therefore be the priority for governments, international
organisations, and donor agencies.
Support NGOs
Given the central position of NGOs in effective cooperation models and in
protection and prevention, it is crucial to build the capacities of NGOs,
especially NGOs working on the local level who put human rights concerns at
the centre of their work. It is crucial to create and/or strengthen networks of
support services, so that victims can turn to and immediately access a
supportive environment that will ensure for them a necessary initial period of
recovery, prior to a decision to participate in prosecution efforts or not. Studies
454
that looked at depression, anxiety and hostility of victims at different times

(when victims first entered assistance and support services, two to six weeks
later, and three months after) highlight the beneficial effects of post-trafficking
assistance and long-term protection provided by NGOs.41 They also point out
that there are no quick fixes, and that long-term psycho-social support is
needed. Therefore, states must cooperate closely with NGOs to ensure that
(potential) victims are properly treated, as well as identified (identification
should not be exclusively carried out by police, but rather jointly done by
police and NGOs). This does not mean that all responsibility, including
financial, is shifted to NGOs. Governments continue to be responsible for the
well-being of victims of trafficking. To sustainably run shelters and hotlines
and offer counselling services, NGOs require multi-year funding.
More Evaluation
It is important to assess how actors anti-trafficking obligations are translated
into action and to identify major issues and gaps of implementation on the
ground. So far, monitoring and evaluation have been neglected. At best, actors
reported on project outputs and outcomes, without independent assessment.
What is needed is independent external evaluation based on professional
methodologies, informed by trafficking expertise. This requires that monitoring
and evaluation are adequately resourced as an integral part of all antitrafficking projects, as well as better exchange of information among agencies
supporting and implementing anti-trafficking programmes. Better datagathering is needed, too. A growing number of states identify and keep count
of victims of trafficking and of traffickers. But data is frequently not
disaggregated by sex, age, and year of registration. Even more crucial is to
ensure that personal data is protected in the process in accordance with
international standards and to process the data and transform information into
effective operations and policies. Instituting national rapporteurs or
observatories to collect and publish such data is therefore essential.
Better Implementation
Many European countries have created anti-trafficking structures. But full
implementation is moving ahead rather slowly for lack of timeframes and
because it is unclear who is supposed to do what. And when there are
timeframes, compliance lags behind. In addition, an ownership problem is
created by the fact that governments of destination countries increasingly
41
Ibid.
455
channel funds earmarked for the implementation of anti-trafficking measures to

international organisations. This shifts governmental responsibilities onto
international organisations and prevents governments of countries of origin
from effectively coordinating national implementation.
Establish and Implement National Plans of Action
To improve anti-trafficking coordination, all countries should follow the
example of South Eastern Europe and create National Action Plans. These long
term, comprehensive plans must address all dimensions of human trafficking
trafficking for sexual exploitation, but also trafficking for labour exploitation,
domestic servitude, forced marriage, trafficking in organs, etc. In particular,
they need to take account of the special assistance and protection needs of child
victims of trafficking, as well as of internal trafficking. National Action Plans
are valuable since the assign responsibility to, and divide tasks between,
governments and NGOs. To be effective, they must include clear timeframes
and budgeting as well as monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
Create National Working Groups
Multi-disciplinary working groups, headed by national coordinators acting on
the basis of national action plans, have proven important for coordinating antitrafficking at the national level. However, they need the right size to be
effective. They must not be too large. But they should be more than small interministerial groups unwilling to integrate input from NGOs and international
organisations. Further, working group members need training in coordinating,
planning, streamlining and implementing anti-trafficking measures.
Establish and Strengthen National Coordinators
A further measure that helps improve anti-trafficking action and coordination is
institutionalising National Coordinators. These would head anti-trafficking
working groups and ensure coordinated interaction between different
governments, international organisations, and NGOs, both domestically and
internationally. Several countries have institutionalised this role. However,
National Coordinators have only been partly successful. One important reason
is that National Coordinators holding high-ranking positions within
governments, due to their position, could promote national strategies and
effectively coordinate anti-trafficking efforts. However, their workload means
that they often cannot spend much time on anti-trafficking. Those in
subordinate positions, on the other hand, not having much say over policy-
456
making, cannot streamline efforts. To alleviate this problem, national

coordinators need access to governmental resources and should be working
full-time on anti-trafficking.
Improve Domestic and International Cooperation
Improving anti-trafficking efforts requires improved cooperation on various
fronts. First, better cross-border cooperation is needed, given the often
transnational nature of trafficking. Such cooperation should not aim at
deterrence at the border. The over-emphasis by governments on the act of
illegal border-crossing fails to address the multifaceted nature of trafficking in
a meaningful and effective way. Second, as mentioned above, law enforcement
agencies, other parts of governments and NGOs need to closely cooperate and
better coordinate their activities. It is impractical and unacceptable to
disaggregate the notion of law enforcement from assisting and protecting the
victims of this crime. Third, cooperation between police and prosecutors often
leaves much to be desired. The implementation of comprehensive referral
mechanisms should therefore be accelerated.42 National as well as
Transnational Referral Mechanisms, which have built-in mechanisms
protecting rights of the trafficked persons, including risk assessments for
returning trafficked persons and a system of data protection based on
international standards, are important (see the chapter on Transnational
Referral Mechanisms in this book).
Train Law Enforcement Agencies
Law enforcement officers need continuous training to better identify and
properly refer trafficking victims. Moreover, they need to be informed about
how to cooperate with NGOs working on victim protection and prevention.
Anti-trafficking training should become part of the regular training curricula
for law enforcement officers, as well as prosecutors and judges.
42
The European Commission (EC) issued Recommendations on the Identification and National Referral
of Victims of Trafficking to Services on October 18, 2007, the first EU Anti-Trafficking Day. These
recommendations, based on the OSCE/ODIHR handbook on NRMs, have a new quality in that they
systematically describe the sequence of actions and measures required, from the very start of the
identification process via the coordination of all relevant stakeholders (with a view to responding in an
integrated and strategic manner), to good judicial practice, fully protecting victims human rights
throughout the entire process.
457
Take a Holistic View of Trafficking

The criteria of success in fighting human trafficking can never be reduced to
one single field of action. It is also important to address all forms of human
trafficking. So far, the focus has been predominantly on sex trafficking, while
hardly any attempts have been made to detect and properly prosecute bonded
labour and trafficking for non-sexual purposes such as labour exploitation,
domestic servitude, and begging.
Muster Political Will
Whether the steps suggested above will be taken depends, primarily, on
political will to put theory into practice. Political will means more than political
leaders labelling trafficking a priority. It is more than government officials
gathering periodically in inter-ministerial meetings. Political will is about
proactive leadership on the issue. It means regular and consistent efforts
towards better results; the review of policies and their adaptation as
circumstances change and as new knowledge becomes available; the
determination to bring about change; and searching for new knowledge on the
scope and nature of trafficking. A truly comprehensive and multi-pronged
approach is needed, bringing together those who work in poverty reduction,
development, education, in employment sectors, in human rights and labour
rights protection as well as those who address issues of corruption, organised
crime, migration and legal reformand last, but not least, politicians who care.
458
CHAPTER 12
Improving International Counter-Trafficking
Cooperation: Transnational Referral Mechanisms
Mariyana Radeva, Elisa Trossero, Martijn Pluim (ICMPD)
Introduction
Human trafficking is a two-fold security risk: Often linked to transnational
organised crime, it constitutes a risk to states, particularly through money
laundering, corruption, and illegal migration. The complex nexus between
trafficking and these issues is outlined in other chapters of this book.1
Trafficking also undermines human security, with trafficked persons being both
psychologically and physically abused. The 2004 Report of the EU Experts
Group on Trafficking in Human Beings emphasises:2
In the context of a human rights-based approach, human security is of
central importance. Trafficking in human beings is related to human
security in a number of ways Violations of individual security and
the lack of economic development belong to the root causes of human
trafficking. Security policy in its traditional perception articulates the
protection of national state borders by military and diplomatic
strategies The Group wants to highlight a concept of security and
policies to go with it that address the need for personal security and
economic development that has an influence on individual prosperity,
thus concentrating on people and not only on states.3
See, for example, the chapter of John Picarelli on organised crime and that of Leslie Holmes on
corruption.
The Experts Group was set up in 2003 to advise the European Commission on initiatives to combat
trafficking.
EU Experts Group, Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings (Brussels: European
Commission, December 2004), 86.
459
To fight trafficking, various stakeholders must cooperate. Bringing all relevant

actors together can be challenging. An institutionalised mechanism for the
referral of victims that brings together a broad range of actors is much needed.
This is all the more true in case of a transnational referral mechanism (TRM)
relevant to trafficking crimes committed in more than one country. The goal of
a TRM is to facilitate cross-border cooperation related to the referral of
victims, thus ensuring that trafficked persons are effectively assisted by the
relevant actors in different countries and that their respective needs and rights
are guaranteed. A TRM is thus a response to complex transnational security
risks, linking governmental and non-governmental actors across borders in a
joint effort to protect victims and prosecute traffickers. It must be noted that a
TRM aims to be a comprehensive tool, addressing all forms of trafficking. This
chapter outlines the structure and implementation of a TRM.
1. Structure of the Transnational Referral Mechanism
A TRM refers to mechanisms and the associated procedures designed for the
comprehensive assistance and transnational support of trafficked persons.4 The
TRM integrates the process of referral from initial identification through return
and assistance between countries of transit, destination and origin. This
involves cooperation between different government institutions and nongovernmental actors. The TRM encompasses five standard operating
procedures (SOPs) which reflect the main phases of the transnational referral
process:
SOP 1: Identification
SOP 2: Crisis Intervention/First Assistance
SOP 3: Assistance and social inclusion
SOP 4: Voluntary return, legal stay and/or resettlement
SOP 5: Criminal proceedings and compensation claims
ICMPD, Transnational Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking (TRM): GuidelinesDraft

(Vienna: ICMPD, June 2008).
460
Source: ICMPD, Transnational Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking.

These SOPs are included in one manual: the TRM Guidelines. Each SOP
includes several measures that answer four questions: WHAT is to be done;
WHEN is action to be taken; WHO should be involved; and HOW should the
action be executed. Accordingly, every action includes a step-by-step
implementation guide. The TRM is a flexible tool that builds upon existing
structures and procedures at the national, bilateral and multilateral level. Its
structure is not prescriptive: actors are not obliged to implement the procedures
sequentially. Instead, they can select those measures that would contribute most
to the effective handling of a particular case. In short, the TRM, in practice,
functions as an -la-carte menu: the usage is left up to practitioners.
Yet, it should be understood that a TRM does not offer a comprehensive onesize-fits-all solution to the issue of trafficking. Moreover, the creation of such a
mechanism is not a onetime activity; rather, it has to be regarded as a
continuous process on which all involved actors continue to work in
coordination with their international counterparts.
461
In order for authorities to address trafficking as a risk to the state and to the
individual, a holistic and integrated approach is needed, as highlighted in the
Report of the Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings. The key
elements of this approach are multidisciplinary cooperation and coordination
between all involved actors and stakeholders, including civil society and labour
organisations.5 There is a shift away from emphasising the role of power
ministries (such as interior and defence) with more consideration being given
to the role of soft ministries (such as social protection, labour, health, or
family). Furthermore, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also contribute
to the sustainability of the TRM. As the Experts Group report argues: The role
of civil society actors, in particular independent NGOs, should be more
extensively recognised also because of their critical role in maintaining and
strengthening democratic process and in monitoring and advocating
implementation of human rights commitments by states.6
The efficacy of the TRM is a product of the commitment of the relevant actors
to use it to its full potential. The TRM is meant to be used across the entire
national range of anti-trafficking actors. It assumes involvement from police
officers, border guards, judges and prosecutors, as well as NGOs, embassy
officials, representatives from social and labour ministries, specialists dealing
with minors and national anti-trafficking coordinators.
As the national anti-trafficking bodies are structured differently in every
country where they exist, the exact composition of actors involved would
naturally vary from country to country. It is, however, important that as many
relevant actors apply and participate in the TRM in order to ensure a more
efficient response. The TRM guidelines also include the contact details of
relevant actors in participating countries, listed so as to correspond to the five
SOPs.
2. Emergence of the TRM
The TRM was conceived and first implemented on a large scale in ten
countries of South-Eastern Europe (SEE),7 following a June 2006 initiative
from USAID and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development
5
EU Experts Group, Report of the Experts Group, 18.
EU Experts Group, Report of the Experts Group, 18.
ICMPD, The Programme to Support the Development of Transnational Referral Mechanisms (TRM)
for Trafficked Persons in South-Eastern Europe (June 2006June 2009), ICMPD,
www.icmpd.org/725.html?&no_cache=1&tx_icmpd_pi1[article]=472&tx_icmpd_pi1[page]=476
462
(ICMPD). SEE is seen as a pilot region for the implementation of a TRM.8 It is

a region that has seen much hardship, value change, redrawing of borders and
economic disparity. Transnational cooperation is therefore not necessarily a
pre-existing condition in the region. In addition, several of the countries shared
comparable political systems in the past, and thus a similar institutional
heritage and similar institutional challenges. Additionally, two of the current
TRM countries, Bulgaria and Romania, are already European Union (EU)
member states, and most of the others are aiming at full membership.
Accordingly, their legislation and approaches to organised crime share some
characteristics with those of EU countries.
Since 2008, four more EU Member States have begun to participate in the
development of a TRM process via the so-called TRM EU project.9 Thus, by
mid-2009, fourteen countries participated in the TRM process. This number is
not significant against the backdrop of the number of countries attempting to
fight the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings. However, it would not be
feasible to implement such a mechanism for the first time across a larger
number of countries, given the institutional, organisational and legislative
differences between any two countries in this regard.
The TRM in SEE particularly addresses the needs of adult victims of
trafficking. In partnership with UNICEF, specific measures for the referral of
child victims were included later in the process. Despite the increased
international awareness of trafficking in minors, this area remains to be
expanded into a more comprehensive version of the TRM.
The fight against trafficking has been a recurring priority for SEE states for a
number of years. An initiative started by the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe, the Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings (SPTF), managed to
elevate the issue on the policy ladder. Most countries involved have made
remarkable progress in terms of developing legislation, capacity building and
training. Yet, when the TRM was conceived in 2006, the referral of victims of
trafficking across borders was dealt with mainly on an ad-hoc basis and relied
upon personal contacts between officials. Efficient and comprehensive SOPs
were largely absent, creating serious gaps in protection and assistance and also
8
Initiatives similar to the TRM may exist outside Europe. The team working on the TRM has not, at this
stage, researched any parallels between the TRM and similar programmes.
For more information on the TRM-EU project, see ICMPD, Development of a Transnational Referral
Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking Between Countries of Origin and Destination (TRM EU),
ICMPD,
www.icmpd.org/861.html?&no_cache=1&tx_icmpd_pi1[article]=1356&tx_icmpd_pi1[page]=1358
463
undermined the sustainability of the system. This underscored the pertinence of

a system which allows individuals in one country to be referred for assistance
and protection to another, i.e., a Transnational Referral Mechanism. These gaps
became particularly evident when partner institutions from two or more
countries came together to discuss how to resolve a particular case. Study
visits, taking place in the framework of the TRM, brought officials together.
Below is an excerpt from the study visit report of the Macedonian delegation to
France.
Box 1
A Macedonian minor victim was promised that she would marry a man in France. However,
instead she was trafficked through and exploited in Serbia and Italy. Finally she was taken to
France where she was handed over to the family of the man she was supposed to marry. She was
trafficked for sexual and labour exploitation and also forced to perform criminal acts. Her
exploitation in France lasted for about nine months. The victim managed to call her parents in
Macedonia, who informed the Macedonian police and gave them the telephone number from
which their daughter had called. The Macedonian authorities made contact with the French
authorities through INTERPOL. The French authorities found the location where the victim was
being held (via the telephone number), then moved her to a shelter for vulnerable children.
Finally, she went back to Macedonia by plane.
However, the French police had not identified the minor as a victim of human trafficking, and
therefore not provided her with sufficient assistance. The shelter was not appropriately secured
and its location was public information. Hence, the traffickers were waiting for her while she was
in the shelter. When she returned to Macedonia, the Macedonian police took her statement and
identified her as a victim of trafficking. The Macedonian police, again with the assistance of
INTERPOL, made contact with the French authorities and began an investigation of the
traffickers in Macedonia. The French authorities were reluctant to become involved in the case
since she had not been identified in France as a victim of trafficking. During the study visit it was
noted that the French authorities might reopen the case in order to investigate the perpetrators.
The Macedonian officials agreed to provide their French counterparts with the relevant
information.10
By mid-June 2009, representatives of the countries involved in the TRM agreed

that they had begun to speak a common language of transnational
cooperation in anti-trafficking.11 The SOPs had been adhered to, and the list of
contacts from the TRM had been turned into a tool, used in the daily work of
10
Internal Study Visit report
11
ICMPD, Conclusions of the Final Regional TRM Seminar (seminar conclusions, Ohrid, 23 June
2009).
464
practitioners. According to the practitioners involved, cooperation has become

more institutionalised, less problematic and more practical.
3. From National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs) to the TRM
The TRM does not replace any existing national anti-trafficking structures; it is
meant to build upon NRMs, where they exist, and take them a step further to a
transnational level. An NRM is a cooperative framework established at the
national level (for example, involving some statutory organisations and civil
society) that delineates referral strategies to support and protect victims of
trafficking.12 The TRM and the NRM involve the same actors and are based on
the same human rights principles.
Accordingly, the TRM should be closely coordinated with a countrys NRM.
Indeed, one of the main preconditions for successful transnational cooperation
is an established national response. In this sense, the existence of NRM
structures in most of the SEE countries serves as a stepping stone for
transnational efforts. This interconnectedness may create challenges: while
most SEE countries tend to have NRMs, this is not the case for Western
Europe. Yet, an NRM and a TRM for one country could also be developed in
parallel, as has been the case for some TRM SEE countries (e.g. Bulgaria,
Kosovo,13 and Romania).
A TRM adds an entirely new level of complexity to victim referral, when
compared to the NRM. On the national level, the actors involved in the NRM
are based in the same country, speak the same language, are bound by the same
overarching interest to protect their own citizens and, in a very general sense,
are subjected to one authority (the government of that country). On the
transnational level, different interests, priorities, languages, criminal codes and
criminal procedures can hinder cooperation. An additional difficulty is the
language of communicationoften officials from various countries relevant to
one case of transnational trafficking are not able to speak the same language.
Furthermore, some countries have an obligation to communicate through their
Ministries of Foreign Affairs in all matters that involve international partners.
International institutions can promote international cooperation. The role of
international organisations in the framework of the TRM is of a technical,
12
OSCE/ODIHR, National Referral Mechanisms: Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked
Persons. A Practical Handbook (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR 2004), 15.
13
Under UNSCR 1244
465
facilitating natureproviding transnational contacts if these are required, as

well as contributing expertise and resources. The rest is done by national actors
at an international level, to ensure national ownership, one of the underlying
principles of the TRM.
A TRM caters to the specific needs of each country that applies it. In SEE, the
TRM already reflects the national legislation, anti-trafficking structures and
national priorities.14 This national adaptation inevitably creates discrepancies
between the different versions of the TRM. In practice, this means that while
the SOPs remain the same, the answers to the questions Who, When, What and
How may differ. For example, while the Ministry of Interior of Croatia is the
sole body that can carry out official identification, in Serbia the identification
interview is led by the Coordination and Protection Agency for Victims of
Trafficking. Yet these discrepancies do not override the principle of
international cooperation.
National responses to trafficking may vary since states use different definitions
and tools, task institutions with different mandates, and face different patterns
of trafficking. Within the context of the European Union, entities such as the
EC Group of Experts on Trafficking in Human Beings, and documents such as
the EU Action Plan15 and various Council Directives, have reduced these
differences to some extent. It is also noteworthy that it was among the priorities
of the Czech Presidency of the European Union (1 January30 June 2009) to
draft a new Council Framework decision on combating trafficking in human
beings. On a practical level, meetings between SEE countries and their EU
counterparts facilitate the recognition of differences and stimulate efforts for
overcoming them (although, in 2009, these meetings did not include all twentyseven EU member states). The TRM study visits are an important step in this
regard. The EU and its member states, however, must still match rhetoric and
action. As the EU Commission reported in fall 2008:
All stakeholders involved in the implementation of the EU Action Plan
have taken action and achieved some results. However, some measures
have not yet been implemented. Moreover, it is still difficult to assess
the real impact of actions that have been implemented on the actual
development of anti-trafficking policy. Although the Commission and
14
The ten SEE countries involved in the TRM SEE have, between June and November 2007, adapted the
general TRM guidelines to their national anti-trafficking legislation. Thus, each country has a national
version, yet with the same structure and the same general principles.
15
EU Council, EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for Combating and Preventing
Trafficking in Human Beings (OJ 2005/C 311/1 (Brussels: EU Council, December 12, 2005)
466
the Council have been particularly active in the field of victim

assistance and protection, the factual situation shows substantial
weaknesses.16
By creating a transnational network composed of institutions that also
participate in the NRMs, the TRM contributes to a more comprehensive
implementation of counter-trafficking strategies.
4. The TRM in Practice
Since the late 1990s, numerous EU documents have listed organised crime as
one of the key threats to the security of EU member states, and emphasised the
need to adopt a comprehensive approach against organised crime and other
non-traditional security problems. The EU is ideally equipped to address
problems through social, developmental and economic measures. However, it
has proven difficult to address both states perceived security needs and the
human security of citizens and migrants, especially where transnational
cooperation is needed. Numerous counter-trafficking provisions exist, but they
need to be translated into practice. The TRM addresses this gapit extends the
practical how-when-who-what answers also to the international realm.
One important European instrument is the Council of Europe (CoE)
Convention. It was adopted on May 16, 2005, and entered into force on
February 1, 2008. By late 2008, the convention was signed by forty states and
ratified by nineteen of them.17 Chapter VIInternational cooperation and
cooperation with civil societyrelates directly to the TRM. Below are a few
(non-exhaustive) examples of the relationship between general provisions of
the Convention and their translation into action in the TRM guidelines.
16
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Working Document: Evaluation and

Monitoring of the Implementation of the EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for
Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Human Beings, COM 2008 657 Final (Brussels: EU
Commission, October 17, 2008).
17
Council of Europe, Status of Signature and Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, www.coe.int/t/DG2/TRAFFICKING/campaign/Flagssos_en.asp (accessed December 8, 2008).
467
Council of Europe Convention
TRM Guidelines
Article 10Identification of victims
SOP Identification. Measure 1: Initial Referral
Each Party shall provide its competent

authorities with persons who are trained and
qualified in preventing and combating
trafficking in human beings, in identifying and
helping victims, including children, and shall
ensure that the different authorities collaborate
with each other as well as with relevant
support organisations, so that victims can be
identified in a procedure duly taking into
account the special situation of women and
child victims.
WHAT: The referral of a person assumed to be

a victim of trafficking to the institution that
acts as a central point of information, referral
and initial support for presumed victims and
that should nominate the case manager.
WHEN: After the person is identified as a
presumed victim of trafficking.
WHO: The body that is the first point of
notification of suspected cases of trafficking.
Depending on the country, this could be the
national coordinating institution, police or
service providers.
HOW: Suspicions of trafficking should be
reported to the first point of notification, which
should be known to all institutions that might
get in contact with trafficked persons.
Article 33Measures relating to endangered

or missing persons
1. When a Party, on the basis of the
information at its disposal has reasonable
grounds to believe that the life, the freedom or
the physical integrity of a person referred to in
Article 28, paragraph 1, is in immediate
danger on the territory of another Party, the
Party that has the information shall, in such a
case of emergency, transmit it without delay to
the latter so as to take the appropriate
protection measures.
2. The Parties to this Convention may consider
reinforcing their co-operation in the search for
missing people, especially missing children, if
the information available leads them to believe
that she/he is a victim of trafficking. To this
end, the Parties may conclude bilateral or
multilateral treaties with each other.
Measure 4: Family Tracing

WHAT: If the victim expresses the wish to
return home and stay with her/his family, the
family may have to be traced (this procedure
does not apply when victims seek asylum).
WHEN: Simultaneously with the security
assessments.
WHO: The case manager from the country of
origin or a focal point from the institution
responsible for repatriation, in close
cooperation with NGOs if the victim is not
returned by an NGO.
HOW: Via NGO/IO networks or national
authorities.
In addition, the TRM offers a new approach to the existing legal framework
governing relations between victims, perpetrators, and the location of a crime.
Individual trafficking operations are often conducted in multiple countries,
involve nationals of yet other countries, and are subject to the jurisdiction of a
468
third set of countries. Functioning systems for exchange of information across

borders, for mutual legal assistance, and for expedient and secure transportation
are preconditions, but also accompanying elements of a functional TRM.
International cooperation is addressed throughout the TRM guidelines:18
countries of origin, destination and transit might have to contact each other to
establish or confirm the identity of the victim, or gather further evidence, as the
example below illustrates.
Box 2
A Macedonian victim of trafficking, identified in Croatia, was returned to Skopje. The
Macedonian and Croatian authorities discussed the status of the trafficked person, the way the
person had been exploited, and the identity of the trafficker. With the help of the TRM
Guidelines, the authorities were able to contact their most relevant counterpart in the process.
The most challenging question pertained to the physical return of the trafficked person.
Discrepancies in the standards for safe return made the process cumbersome, thus pointing to the
need for unified procedures. The relevant actors on both sides admitted that following the TRM
guidelines would have facilitated the process.
The TRM is being implemented at a time when the EU is attempting to lay the
foundations for a common migration and asylum policy. The difference
between the TRM and a common policy is that the TRM does not require the
harmonisation of legal systems and institutional structures. A flexible tool for
the coordination of anti-trafficking efforts by practitioners, it can accommodate
the particularities of each country in which it is implemented. This flexibility
constitutes the TRMs greatest advantagethe mechanism provides specific
answers, but is broad enough to accommodate differing legal systems and
national anti-trafficking structures.
Part of the difficulty in implementing a TRM is that some national officials are
reluctant to put into practice non-binding guidelines, so long as the officials
respective governments have not officially endorsed the guidelines. The
adoption of the TRM as a part of national anti-trafficking strategies thus
commits national actors to implementing the TRM. In this respect, Macedonia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina provide examples of good practices. In Macedonia,
the TRM guidelines have been adopted by the Council of Ministers.19 In
18
ICMPD, Transnational Referral Mechanism, 31.
19
Government of the Republic of Macedonia, National Commission for Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings and Illegal Migration, Standard Operating Procedures For Treatment Of Victims Of Trafficking
In Human Beings (Skopje: Government of Macedonia, 2008).
469
Bosnia-Herzegovina and also in Kosovo,20 the TRM has been incorporated into
the National Anti-Trafficking Action Plan for 20082009.
The TRM is an essential part of a national anti-trafficking strategy. It
complements, and may even substitute existing manuals, regulations,
guidelines and procedures, in order to streamline the referral process. More
generally, the TRM is part of multi-level counter-trafficking security
governance.21 Such a system forgesat times unlikelyalliances between
various actors by creating an institutional framework linking various actors and
institutions. The TRM seeks to create a stable trans-border network that covers
all aspects of the trafficking process, from identifying and assisting victims to
prosecuting criminals. Counter-trafficking policies must be multifaceted,
integrating law enforcement and criminal justice responses with migration,
labour, human rights, and social policies. By bringing together the various
institutions specialising in different elements of counter-trafficking, the TRM
facilitates communication across national and institutional boundaries.
5. TRM and Trust
Fighting trafficking raises the issue of accountability. Both the increased
degree of complexity at the transnational level and the involvement of multiple
actors decrease accountability. National institutions such as parliaments
provide accountability at the national level but do not exist or do not have the
same robust mandates at the international level. This is why promoting trust is
crucial. Confidence-building measures during the Cold War provide valuable
lessons. While such measures pertained to military security, their underlying
premise that cooperation depends on partners trusting one another can be
applied to other spheres as well.22
The TRM relies on trust: After all, participating individuals and institutions
entrust foreign counterparts with the well-being, or even the life, of a victim of
trafficking. At the same time, the TRM promotes trust. Serving as a
confidence-building measure among anti-trafficking actors, the mechanism
20
Under UNSCR 1244.
21
On this concept and an application to counter-trafficking, see Cornelius Friesendorf, Pathologies of

Security Governance: Efforts Against Human Trafficking in Europe, Security Dialogue 38, no.3
(2007): 379402.
22
For a discussion of confidence-building measures and an application to the non-military sphere, see
Heiner Hnggi, Good Governance Of The Security Sector: Its Relevance For Confidence-Building
(Paper presented at the Seminar on Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good Governance
of the Security Sector Matter?, New York, October 16, 2002).
470
facilitates communication: it provides a contact list of the most relevant actors

and defines communication lines. The contact list mirrors the structure of the
TRM guidelines and enumerates the institutions, departments and in many
cases the individuals responsible for each particular SOP in the TRM
countries.23 This list, when updated regularly and distributed to all relevant
anti-trafficking actors, has the potential to counteract staff turnover and thereby
make the referral process more efficient.
Box 3
In order to prepare national actors to use the TRM guidelines, training was organised between
February and May of 2008. Overall, 750 practitioners took part in thirty training events in
Southeastern Europe. The events focused on the practical implementation of TRM guidelines,
with participants working on real or simulated cases. Members of the National Multidisciplinary
Implementation Team from each country (representing ministries of interior, ministries of social
welfare, NGOs, prosecutors offices and other relevant institutions) trained their own colleagues.
This form of cascade training ensured national ownership of the guidelines, as well as
providing for continuity and sustained commitment.
The TRM encourages multidisciplinary actors on a multilateral and bilateral

level to meet in person. Ideally, such meetings will become institutionalised
and more frequent over time. Trust is especially important with regard to the
exchange of information about the victim and the trafficking case. Such
exchanges should be in accordance with the data protection laws of
participating countries, with due respect for the well-being of the victim. The
TRM SOPs pay particular attention to the victims right to privacy and
confidentiality. They are in full accordance with the ethical considerations in
Guideline 6.6 of the UNs Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human
Rights and Trafficking, which calls on states to:
ensure that trafficked persons are effectively protected from harm,
threats or intimidation by traffickers and associated persons. To this
end, there should be no public disclosure of the identity of trafficking
victims and their privacy should be respected and protected to the
extent possible, while taking into account the right of any accused
person to a fair trial. Trafficked persons should be given full warning,
in advance, of the difficulties inherent in protecting identities and
23
ICMPD, Transnational Referral Mechanism.
471
should not be given false or unrealistic expectations regarding the

capacities of law enforcement agencies in this regard.24
The guiding piece of legislation in this field is the Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995, which makes
explicit the need for the consent of victims at every step of the referral process.
With regard to evidence-gathering with the support of victims, the TRM thus
prescribes that neither countries of origin nor their consular services shall be
contacted in order to collect evidence if there is no consent on the part of the
victim and if the security of the victim could be jeopardised prior, during or
after the trial.25 The box below illustrates the need for trust among the actors
involved in a transnational referral.26
Box 4
To ensure that the victim will be received and assisted by a service provider upon arrival,
referring and receiving service providers have to constantly and promptly exchange information
to coordinate the return process. The following notifications are recommended:27
o
Notification of request for assistance by the referring organisation
Confirmation of request for assistance by the receiving organisation
Reintegration assistance request by the referring organisation
Reintegration assistance confirmation by the receiving organisation.
24
R. Surtees, Handbook on Anti-Trafficking Data Collection in South-Eastern Europe:

Developing Regional Criteria (Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy
Development, 2007), 27. Further, guideline 8.9 of the UN Recommended Principles and
Guidelines on Human Rights and Trafficking calls on states to protect, as appropriate, the
privacy and identity of child victims and to take measures to avoid the dissemination of
information that could lead to their identification.
25
26
27
Adapted from IOM, Direct Assistance for Victims of Trafficking (Geneva: IOM, 2007).
472
The information provided by the referring organisation to the receiving organisation should
include:
o
Name of the victim
Date of birth and place of residence in the country of origin (if returning to
country of origin)
Any suspected or actual medical condition or vulnerability of the victim
Security and risk assessment
Short outline of assistance needs
Estimated date and time of departure, if applicable
Any other relevant information.
Based on this information, as well as on direct consultation with the referring organisation, it is
up to the receiving organisation to determine whether or not the referred person is eligible for
assistance and if assistance can be provided.
6. From a Programme to a Concept

The elements outlined in this chapter show the evolution of the TRM from a
pilot programme into a concept that can be exported and further developed in
other regions. Effective transnational cooperation in the referral of trafficked
persons requires effort, vision and action. The TRM programme conceptualizes
the manner in which this could be achieved efficiently and encourages national
actors to reach out to one another.
Recommendations
Monitor and Evaluate the Implementation of the TRM
At the time of the publication of this book it remained to be seen what exactly
the pilot TRM programme can and cannot achieve. Even though significant
progress had been made, as of June 2009 not enough time has passed for the
involved actors to conduct an objective evaluation of the usage of the TRM
Guidelines in the resolution of actual trafficking cases. Several drafts of the
TRM Guidelines were produced between June 2006 and March 2009. The
TRM now requires monitoring and evaluation. Different models of evaluation
existfrom independent institutions, such as national rapporteurs, to selfevaluation of each implementing body. High expectations are invested in the
Group of Experts on action against trafficking in human beings (GRETA), the
body responsible for monitoring implementation of the Council of Europe
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. An evaluation of
473
the TRM needs to show to what extent the SOPs have been followed and
implemented in practice, and should also facilitate the updating and upgrading
of the TRM. The most appropriate way to find out how effective the TRM is
would be for national institutions responsible for coordinating the antitrafficking responses to evaluate their own work against the backdrop of the
TRM.
Improve NRMs
The TRM is only one additional building block in larger counter-trafficking
efforts. It is intended to rest upon a solid national base. Although it can be
developed in parallel, as in some SEE countries, in the long run a TRM cannot
function without an effective NRM. Even in those countries that have national
anti-trafficking coordinators, often the will and/or political clout to implement
both the NRM and TRM are lacking. Without an institutional recognition of the
problem of human trafficking and at least initial attempts for a structured
national response, it is difficult to implement an effective mechanism for
transnational referral. What is needed are national coordinating institutions, a
functioning NRM, trained law enforcement and judicial personnel, active
NGOs, and governments that recognise these NGOs as cooperation partners.
Regularly Train National Counter-trafficking Actors on the Implementation of
the SOPs
By mid-2009, ten countries were using the TRM guidelines, while the
additional four EU countries involved in the TRM-EU project were beginning
to adapt the TRM guidelines to their specific needs. Already at this stage it had
become clear that counter-trafficking actors require training to familiarise
themselves with the TRM. National-level training helps to crystallize the
actors respective roles in the context of the TRM SOPs, thus providing a more
solid basis for transnational cooperation. Using the contact list to work on case
studies and practicing the skills needed for international cooperation essentially
complement the day-to-day work of counter-trafficking actors.
Counter-trafficking Actors from Different Countries Should Regularly Meet
Cooperation hinges on trust. In Southeastern Europe, the region for which the
TRM was developed as a pilot programme, international cooperation in general
has partly been imposed from above on state authorities throughout the years.
But trust was not a given, not least due to the regions recent pastand trust
has to come from within a country. The experience in the region underlines that
474
representatives of the main anti-trafficking actors (such as ministries of

interior, prosecutors offices, service providing NGOs) should hold regular
meetings within the framework of the TRM. At such meetings, trafficking
cases may be discussed, with due respect to data protection. This would allow
actors to learn from one another and to exchange information.
Assess Possibilities for Geographically Expanding the TRM
By mid-2009, the TRM existed as a pilot programme in Southeastern Europe.
A sign that the TRM works is that other countries have opted to join the
programme. To the extent that the TRM promotes international cooperation in
the process of referral of trafficked persons, it should be exported to other
regions.28 Implementation of the TRM would be facilitated by countries
sharing common political and legislative features. Any assessment should
evaluate existing NRMs, modes of international cooperation, and the
willingness and capacity of relevant actors to participate in an institutionalised
mechanism for referring victims across borders. The region whose members
share the greatest legislative similarity is the EU. Southeastern European states
participating in the pilot TRM project have now conducted study visits to EU
countries and communicated their positive impression of the TRM. To increase
the number of participating countries, a train-the-trainer approach may be
applied, in that countries more experienced with the TRM help others in
implementing analogous initiatives. Recalling the EU commitment to fight
organised crime and to protect victims, one would expect all EU member states
to establish a TRM.
Take Into Account Individual Circumstances Within an Institutionalised
Framework
Every case of trafficking needs to be looked at individually, with particular
attention to the needs and rights of each victim. Notwithstanding this needstailored approach, an institutionalised framework of SOPs should be developed
in order to ensure efficient referral. The ultimate goal of a TRM is to assist and
support people who have been exposed to cross-border human trafficking in a
coordinated and effective manner.
28
An assessment was conducted in Ukraine in SeptemberOctober 2008.
475
CONCLUSIONS
Improving Counter-Trafficking Efforts Through
Better Implementation, Networking & Evaluation
Introduction
This book is both practical and analytical.1 It is practical in that each chapter
provides recommendations for reducing human trafficking. It is analytical,
pointing out that there is no one technical solution to trafficking and that even
seemingly positive trends such as tougher law enforcement are problematic.
The book shows that the story of counter-trafficking is rife with obstacles,
trade-offs, and unintended consequences. Progress has been made and lessons
have been learned. Yet the global counter-trafficking system is still deficient,
whether one applies criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, or legitimacy.
This concluding chapter, drawing on the chapters in this book, discusses
challenges of counter-trafficking.2 It argues that better counter-trafficking
action hinges on progress being made in three areas. First, more systematic
policy implementation is needed. Second, counter-trafficking networks should
be stealthier and better coordinated. Third, counter-trafficking actors should
1
An earlier draft of this concluding chapter was presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association, New York City, February 1518, 2009, and at a meeting of the
Women's & Children's Advocacy Centre, Geneva, February 6, 2009. For comments and criticism I
thank the conference participants, as well as Beate Andrees, Benjamin S. Buckland, Austin ChoiFitzpatrick, Sarah L. Craggs, Mike Dottridge, Blanka Hancilova, Allison Jernow, Laurent Knubel,
Mumtaz Lalani, Chris Pallaris, Albrecht Schnabel, and Louise Shelley. Many thanks also go the
interviewees (who are cited anonymously) and to the individuals and institutions contributing to this
book. All of the shortcomings of this concluding chapter are my responsibility. Moreover, the views
expressed here do not necessarily represent the opinion of DCAF, the chapter authors, and those who
have sent me comments on previous versions.
Additional sources include scholarly writings and news reports. Moreover, this chapter draws on
interviews with counter-trafficking actors conducted from 2005 to 2008 especially in Southeast Europe.
With the exception of Southeast Asia, no other world region has seen as large a number of countertrafficking programmes as the Balkans. By early 2009, the topic was largely off the agenda of
international donors and governments in the region. Yet for many years, the region was a testing ground
for counter-trafficking, and thus offers valuable lessons.
477
give higher priority to research on trafficking and to assessing the impact of

their efforts, including negative effects.
The three areas of implementation, networking, and research/evaluation are
overlapping and reinforcing: Policy implementation hinges on smooth
networking and evaluation; only an accountable security sector can be an
effective and efficient one. Good networking facilitates policy implementation
and is a precondition for policy evaluation. Research and evaluation are
preconditions for implementation and effective coordination and cooperation.
One may argue that this book is published too late, as trafficking is no longer as
much of a priority issue for donors as it was in the middle of the first decade of
the 21st century. However, the fact that issues are no longer at the top of policy
agendas does not mean they have been resolved. Those with money and
influence put issues on the agenda for various reasons, only one of which is the
real nature of a problem. Even though numerous academic treatise and
practical manuals on trafficking have been produced, many gaps remain. By
combining a practical and analytical approach, this book helps to close these
gaps.
One may equally argue that this book is published too early, since human
trafficking has been on the international security agenda only since the late
1990s, making policy evaluations difficult. However, as John Picarelli shows in
his chapter, trafficking and counter-trafficking have a long history. And while
it is true that it is too early to judge the impact of counter-trafficking efforts, the
same, as the famous adage holds, applies to the French Revolution.
This book comes at the right time. Much time has passed since countertrafficking began to preoccupy security actors (over a hundred years ago,
people were concerned about what at the time was labelled the White Slave
Trade). It is easier now to say what works and what does not than it would
have been a few years ago. History also shows that the elimination of
trafficking is unlikely, and that counter-efforts are problematic. This book
contributes to counter-trafficking by answering as many questions as possible.
Yet its contributors also do a service to those formulating and implementing
counter-trafficking policies (and, albeit indirectly, to vulnerable people) by
questioning common assumptions. Without asking the right questions, finding
the right answers is elusive.
478
1. Implementation
Implementation is about what happens between an intended policy and action
on the ground.3 Policies must be translated into practice. Policies may have
intrinsic value, by shaping norms of appropriate behaviour. But generally,
policies must be implemented to have any effect.
A distinction can be made between output, outcome, and impact.4 Output
would be a new international convention or national law. An outcome would be
the result of legal measures, such as the conviction of traffickers and the
protection of victims. Hence, implementation is partly about output producing
outcome. However, outcome may merely yield tactical success, to use military
language. What really matters is impact, i.e. strategic success. A policy has
impact when it changes the nature of a problem. Ultimately, whether countertrafficking efforts matter depends on whether they reduce trafficking. One can
speak of success only when output leads to outcome and when outcome leads
to impact.
This book, as well as other studies, shows that the implementation of countertrafficking agreements lags behind.5 Since the late 1990s, governments have
created global, regional, and national counter-trafficking instruments. These
still have loopholes, whether because of the failure to ratify international
agreements, the failure to translate these agreements into national law, the
failure of governments to allocate enough resources to make them effective, or
the weakness of international instruments themselves (on the latter
shortcoming, see the chapter of Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens, and
Mariela Guajardo). Agreements focused on human trafficking as well as legal
instruments, including soft law, obliging states to protect human rights (see the
chapter of Allison Jernow), are not properly applied. Moreover, countertrafficking instruments are often too complicated to allow the cop on the beat
See Laurence J. O'Toole Jr., Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects, Journal
of Public Administration Research 10, no.2 (2000): 263288, here p. 266.
For an early treatment of these concepts, see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965). For an application, see Ursula C. Schroeder and Cornelius
Friesendorf, Statebuilding and Organized Crime: Implementing the International Law Enforcement
Agenda in Bosnia, Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no. 2 (2009): 137-167.
See, for instance, European Commission, Evaluation and Monitoring of the Implementation of the EU
Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for Combating and Preventing Trafficking Human
Beings (Brussels: EC, October 17, 2008), COM(2008) 657 final; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, A Legal Analysis of Trafficking in Persons Cases in Kosovo (OSCE: Pristina,
October 2007).
479
to translate them into action.6 Similarly, a lack of comprehensible and

implementable legal frameworks leads criminal justice actors to press charges
for pimping, smuggling, or money laundering, instead of for trafficking. Yet
generally, progress has been made. Within a relatively short time span, states
have produced much output. Many states have created new counter-trafficking
laws, action plans, and special police units.7 The output of international
organisations has been impressive, too.
Output has also translated into outcome. Numerous traffickers have been
convicted over recent years in many countries; the business is no longer as lowrisk as it once was. However, conviction rates remain deeply unsatisfactory.8
This indicates that it is much easier to sign a convention, adopt a law, or create
a National Action Plan than it is to prosecute traffickers, to prevent trafficking
and to protect trafficked persons. While few official documents fail to mention
the three Ps, counter-trafficking lags behind rhetorical commitments. And,
while implementation has been skewed towards coercive practices,
prosecutorial successes have been limited, and coercive practices have often
undermined the protection of trafficked persons and the prevention of
trafficking.9
The shortcomings of implementation are even more obvious when studying
impact. If moving from output to outcome has been problematic, moving from
outcome to impact has been even harder. Even though little is known about the
overall impact of counter-trafficking efforts, due to a lack of research (see
further below), there are no signs that trafficking, when looked at from a global
perspective, has been reduced, local and regional successes notwithstanding.
Moreover, even presumed instances of success are not necessarily the result of
better law enforcement. A case in point is the Balkans, where a possible
reduction of trafficking has coincided not only with greater law enforcement
pressure, but with relative economic improvement, the withdrawal of most
international peacekeepers, and other contingent factors.
The contributors to this book have pointed at numerous implementation gaps.
Most importantly, trafficking operations are still likely go undetected. Related
to this problem, security agencies are not sufficiently intelligence-led. As Fred
6
According to an official of the Council of the EU: I am a lawyer, and I sometimes cannot understand
these documents. Interview, Brussels, January 2007.
For an overview of such output, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons (Vienna: UNODC, February 2009).
See UNODC, Global Report, 25; 3844.
For an insightful analysis, see Barbara Limanowska, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern
Europe (Sarajevo: UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE, 2005).
480
Schreier shows in his chapter, especially traffickers need to advertise is an

Achilles heel that law enforcers could exploit. Intelligence-led strategies and
tactics have gained in salience as traffickers have resorted to more
sophisticated methods. Yet human trafficking still does not attract the same
attention as terrorism or the trafficking in drugs, weapons, or nuclear material.
Moreover, many apprehended traffickers are not sentenced to appropriate
prison terms.
A serious problem is the continuing lack of human rights protection afforded to
victims of trafficking, as noted by Benjamin S. Buckland, Allison Jernow, and
Barbara Limanowska and Helga Konrad in this book. It is well known that the
deportation of trafficked persons often violates their rights, the protection of
which are enshrined in numerous international agreements. Deportation also
deprives prosecutors of victim-witnesses. Yet deportation continues (officially,
this practice is often labelled as repatriation or return; such terms are
euphemisms to many of those affected). Deportation is only the most obvious
example of border security concerns trumping criminal justice concerns over
the prosecution of traffickers, and of measures that often violate the human
rights of trafficked persons, as well as of refugees, asylum seekers, economic
migrants, and other vulnerable groups.10
Existing provisions protecting trafficked persons are largely insufficient.
Reflection periods, for instance, tend to be too short to allow a traumatized
person to make decisions that might endanger the person and his or her
family.11 Many victims face the dilemma of whether to testify and incur high
risk for themselves and their families (due in no small part to weak victim
protection), or be deported. Often, they are not even offered this option.
Authorities often fail to identify trafficked persons; they fail to make the
imaginative leap to recognize a trafficking situation as such.12 Or even if they
do, authorities send trafficked persons back anyway. In many cases,
governments even disregard minimal obligations towards trafficked persons,
10
On the negative consequences of counter-trafficking policies, see Global Alliance Against Traffic in
Women, Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on Human Rights Around the
World (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007); Dina F. Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending
Immigration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of
Traffickers, Human Rights Quarterly 26, no.2 (2004): 221272; Benjamin S. Buckland, Neither Seen
Nor Heard: The Unintended Consequences of Counter-Trafficking and Counter-Smuggling, in
Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences, ed. Christopher Daase
and Cornelius Friesendorf (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
11
Mike Dottrige, Introduction, in Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on

Human Rights Around the World, ed. Mike Dottridge (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007), 15.
12
I owe this term to John Picarelli.
481
not offering the reflection periods, residency permits, and social support that
victims are entitled to.13 To make matters worse, as pointed out by
Limanowska and Konrad, there has been a lack of sustainable, systematic
prevention through proper reintegration of trafficked persons. While donors
have spent a great deal on protection and prevention, funding often does not
trickle down to vulnerable groups.
Another shortcoming is the failure to reduce demand for services provided by
trafficked persons, ranging from commercial sex to cheap agricultural products
or construction.14 As Phil Williams shows in his chapter, reducing crime means
attacking criminal markets. In other words, attempts to disrupt and alter
markets lead to strategic advantages, while attacks on individuals, groups, and
networks at best result in tactical victories.15 A market-based approach is twopronged. Addressing the supply side of crime will be ineffective without
demand reduction.
A host of conditions hampers implementation. Some of these are technical
and can be alleviated through more training (institutions have produced
valuable training material, much of which is referenced in this book). Border
guards and police need training to identify trafficked persons; police,
prosecutors, and judges need to know how to interview victims of trafficking
after identification; and law enforcement and criminal justice actors need
training to better cooperate with one another.16 Picarelli underlines that police
must be trained in understanding the structure of the trafficking groups they are
13
For analyses of insufficient protection in Germany, see Annette Louise Herz, Menschenhandel: Eine
empirische Untersuchung zur Strafverfolgungspraxis (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 274275;
Ricarda Rolf, Die Bekmpfung des Frauenhandels mit den Mitteln des Strafrechts, des ffentlichen
Rechts und des Zivilrechts (Osnabrck: V & R unipress, 2005), 9699 and 238247; Ulrike Mentz,
Frauenhandel als migrationsrechtliches Problem (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001). The failure of
European countries to protect was confirmed in an author interview with a trafficking expert seconded
to the EU Commission, Brussels, January 2007.
14
On the reduction of demand for trafficked labour, see Kevin Bales, Understanding Global Slavery: A
Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 154171.
15
See also Moiss Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global
Economy (New York City: Doubleday, 2005); H. Brinton Milward and Jrg Raab, Dark Networks as
Organizational Problems: Elements of a Theory, International Public Management Journal 9, no.3
(2006): 333360.
16
Shortcomings of coercive efforts are particularly visible in fragile democracies. In Bosnia-Herzegovina,

for instance, police often do not know how to testify in the courtroom, use special investigative
methods, and better apply rules and evidence. Interview with US embassy official, Sarajevo, June
2008. However, such shortcomings mark counter-trafficking police work in established democracies,
too.
482
trying to dismantle. Indeed, there is evidence that training has led to the arrest
of traffickers.17
Police officers, border guards, and others confronted with human trafficking on
the ground also need training to adequately protect the human rights of
trafficked persons. In many cases, negative attitudes towards prostitutes,
illegal migrants, and other undesirables lead to human rights abuses.
Security sector officials who have received training and who work with NGOs
tend to change their attitudes.18 Ideally, training should help officials to
understand the complex definition of human trafficking as laid out in the
Palermo trafficking protocol. All too often, law enforcement agencies misapply
and misinterpret the definition.19
At the same time, as underscored by Benjamin S. Buckland in his chapter,
counter-trafficking interventions should not lead to arbitrary distinctions
between individuals deserving protection and those who supposedly do not.20
The wrong kind of training can cause more harm than good. Informing
diplomats and local staff dealing with visa applications about trafficking should
not lead these officials to simply no longer issue visas to arbitrarily defined
groups; such discriminatory practices only benefit smugglers and traffickers.
For training to be effective, it must raise awareness about unintended
consequences. Hence, counter-trafficking training is not straightforward, but
requires good trainers and methods. Often, the effectiveness of training has
been undermined by the hiring of too many trainers, some of whom have not
pursued sophisticated approaches. Also, often the same institutions, good at
writing funding proposals, secured training tenders, but then hired trainers
whose training was unsatisfactory.21
Capacity building is crucial, too. Jana Arsovska and Stef Janssens, in their
chapter, reveal the difficulties faced by states wishing to keep pace with
innovative traffickers. Some improvements are straightforward. For instance,
many countries require that the accuser faces the accused, which weights
heavily upon victim-witnesses. A more systematic use of video technology, as
well as prior statements (given outside the presence of the defendant) would
17
Telephone interview with Brussels-based trafficking expert, October 2006.
18
Interview with members of NGOs, Sofia, Bulgaria, July 2006.
19
Mike Dottridge, Introduction, 4.
20
See also Penny Green and Mike Grewcock, The War Against Illegal Immigration: State Crime and the
Construction of a European Identity, Current Issues in Criminal Justice 14: no.1 (2002): 87101.
21
I thank Mike Dottridge for his comments on this point.
483
ease the psychological burden on those frightened by traffickers.22 Capacitybuilding is particularly important for coping with new trends such as Internet
child pornography that are difficult and costly to investigate.23
While many challenges are of a more technical nature, removing obstacles to
better policy implementation requires, to a great extent, political will, without
which implementation gaps will not be narrowed. The lack of political will
reflects vested interests or ideological biases or both. Trafficked persons have
often become poster children for promoting the criminalisation or
decriminalisation of prostitution, tougher border controls, measures against
organised crime, and other issues.24 A Europol official, deploring the practice
by states to deport victims of trafficking to their home countries before trial,
says: There are plenty of recommendations on how to fight human trafficking.
But there is political resistance. It is frustrating.25 A comprehensive strategy is
required to alter, in the words of Phil Williams, the dynamics of human
trafficking markets. Whether this strategy can be put in place depends on the
generation of political will in various areas.
Protect Human Rights
Political will determines the protection of the human rights of vulnerable
groups, especially migrants, whether trafficked or not (see the chapter of
Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens, and Mariela Guajardo). Decision-makers
need to acknowledge the continuum of exploitation that many migrants face,
instead of arbitrarily protecting some and punishing others. Given the
ascendancy of anti-foreigner political parties in many countries, as well as the
tendency of people to use migrants as scapegoats in times of economic crisis,
elevating the status of migrants is a formidable challenge.26 Fewer people
might get trafficked if destination countries provided more legal migration
opportunities, such as visas for migrants that would fill labour shortages in
22
Interview with NGO staff, Zurich, October 2006.
23
Interview with Bosnian prosecutor, Sarajevo, June 2008.
24
The term poster child is taken from Galma Jahic and James O. Finckenauer, Representations and
Misrepresentations of Human Trafficking, Trends in Organized Crime 8, no.3 (Spring 2005), 2440,
here 33.
25
Interview, June 2008.
26
See Jef Huysmans, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, Journal of Common
Market Studies 38, no.5 (December 2000): 751777; Liza Schuster, A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut:
Deportation, Detention and Dispersal in Europe, Social Policy & Administration 39, no.6 (December
2005), 606621.
484
areas such as nursing, child care, or agriculture.27 Moreover, officials need to

be more responsive to peoples needs. For instance, the consular sadism that
many migrants face when applying for visas facilitates corruption and helps,
first and foremost, dodgy intermediates, including traffickers.28
Avoid Political Opportunism
Mustering political will is a continuous challenge. Fighting human trafficking
is too important to be subjected to political games. Counter-trafficking should
be informed by objective needs, not political opportunism. Yet in reality, it
often is. In Southeast Europe, international actors, in early to-mid 2000, put
much pressure on Balkan states to address trafficking. Counter-trafficking
activities received generous funding, especially visible ones that allowed
donors and governments in the region to show that they were fighting the
problem. Vulnerable groups such as victims of domestic violence received
comparatively little attention. By 2008, the situation had become worse, in that
even counter-trafficking was under-funded.29 The topic was no longer high on
the agenda, with international donors pushing governments in the region to
fund activities themselves, yet with these governments spending their scarce
resources on other issues. Human trafficking thus reflects the fads of politics.
All too often, politicians (with the help of the media) have used emotive
language about human trafficking, but then failed to invest the resources
needed to respond adequately to the problem.
Better Regulate Labour Markets
As a corollary to the protection of vulnerable groups, especially migrants, net
destination countries (and those countries with high levels of internal
trafficking) should reduce their dependency on cheap, unregulated labour. As
emphasized by Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens, and Mariela Guajardo, all
workers should enjoy the same rights. Fighting trafficking is about offering
27
See House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights: Human Trafficking,
26th Report of Session 20052006, Volume 1, HL Paper 245I, HC 1127I, 13 October 2006
(London: The Stationery Office), para. 110; Misha Glenny, Migration Policies of Western European
Governments and the Fight Against Organised Crime in SEE, Southeast European and Black Sea
Studies 4, no.2 (May 2004): 250256.
28
The term consular sadism is cited from: International Crisis Group, EU Visas and the Western
Balkans, Europe Report, no.168, November 29, 2005, 9.
29
Interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, 2008. See also the chapter of Limanowska and Konrad
in this book.
485
better pay and workplace conditions, creating a more transparent and mutually
beneficial migration system, the inspection of work sites and, if necessary, the
enforcement of labour laws and regulations. This requires co-opting actors into
the counter-trafficking security governance system that hitherto have been at
the margins, such as labour inspectors and employment agencies.30
Pay More Attention to All Forms of Trafficking
Counter-trafficking actors have so far largely focused on victims of sex
trafficking. Women forced into prostitution have caught the attention of actors
that normally share little common ground, yet have united on this one issue
(conservative Christian groups and feminist organisations are an example of the
rather odd alliances that are the result). Men trafficked into the sex industry or
working under slave-like conditions on fields or in factories have not had such
a lobby; the same holds true for children forced into begging or for women
exploited as domestic workers. There not only is a continuum of exploitation,
there is a broad spectrum of exploitation, too. In the words of one NGO
worker: There are so many people who do not receive help because they do
not neatly fit into one category.31 The UN trafficking protocol treats the term
exploitation is a malleable way, not least to allow states flexibility in how they
address prostitution.32 But the fact that the Protocol can, to a certain extent, be
interpreted differently is no excuse for not sanctioning obvious human rights
violations.
Improve Socio-Economic Conditions
It is crucial to muster political will to mitigate the socio-economic root causes
of trafficking. For instance, the European Unionone of the main countertrafficking actorsshould more systematically employ development, foreign
aid, trade, and other instruments against trafficking. To cite just one example,
30
See Beate Andrees, Addressing Labour Market Dimensions, in Challenging Trafficking in Persons:
Theoretical Debate & Practical Approaches, ed. GTZ Sector Project Against Trafficking in Women
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 141146.
31
Interview, Kosovo, August 2006.
32
H. Richard Friman and Simon Reich, Human Trafficking and the Balkans, in Human Trafficking,
Human Security, and the Balkans, ed. H. Richard Friman and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 119, here 9. For a critique of the protocol, see Janice G. Raymond, The New
UN Trafficking Protocol, Womens Studies International Forum 25, no.5 (SeptemberOctober 2002):
491502; Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocol on Trafficking and Migrant
Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, Human Rights Quarterly 23, no.4 (November 2001): 9751004.
486
by allowing Moldova to import more wine, the EU would help reduce poverty
in Europes poorest country.33 While applying coercion may be easier than
using soft instruments, the latter better address the causes of the problem. It
is often argued that prevention is expensive. For sure, significantly reducing
trafficking risks hinges on a better distribution of wealth, less discrimination,
and other goals that may appear distant. However, freeing people from slavelike conditions is cheap.34 The same holds true for re-integrating trafficked
persons. Coercion may have more public relations value, but it is also more
expensive. Even when acknowledging that the poorest are generally not the
first to get trafficked, by improving economic prospects, fewer people would
be willing to endure exploitative situations. Getting exploited people to testify
against their exploiters is difficult not least because some of those exploited
may be better off than beforeparadoxically, exploitative relationships can be
mutually beneficial.35 By creating viable alternatives to exploitative
relationships, donors would make it more difficult for traffickers to find
labourers.
Pay More Attention to Internal Trafficking
Another issue that warrants more attention is internal trafficking. Past countertrafficking activities have focused on people crossing international borders. Yet
in many countries, internal trafficking is seen to be on the rise, partly because
recruiting domestic victims allows traffickers to cut costs and to reduce risks
emanating from stepped-up law enforcement.36 Efforts to cope with internal
trafficking have been haphazard. Partly, this is due to the conflation between
trafficking and irregular migration. Moreover, major counter-trafficking
institutions are better geared to deal with cross-border trafficking than with
internal trafficking. Practices mirror the UN Trafficking Protocol, which, after
33
Telephone interview with an official of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),
Rome, September 2006. On the weaknesses of EU counter-trafficking policies, see Jacqueline Berman
and Cornelius Friesendorf, Coercive Governance as Crime Control: EU Foreign Policy and the Fight
Against Human Trafficking, European Foreign Affairs Review 13, no.2 (2008): 189209; Mirjam Van
Reisen and Ana Stefanovic, Lost Kids, Lost Futures: The European Unions Response to Child
Trafficking (International Federation Terre des Hommes, Geneva, 2004); and Heli Askola, Violence
Against Women, Trafficking, and Migration in the European Union, European Law Journal 13
(2007): 204217.
34
See Bales, Understanding Global Slavery, 12.
35
See Vanessa E. Munro, Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of Degradation and Exploitation in the
Context of Sex Trafficking, Journal of Law and Society 35, no.2 (June 2008): 240264, here 260.
36
Interviews with law enforcement officials and NGO personnel in several Southeast European countries,
20052008.
487
all, is an addendum to a transnational counter-crime convention (it must be

noted, though, that the Council of Europe Convention is an improvement since
it does not explicitly require transnationality). A more troubling reason for the
neglect of internal trafficking is that governments find it more convenient to
present trafficking as an imported problem instead of a partially homemade one
(see the chapter of Arsovska and Janssens). Political will is needed to adapt
institutional structures to new faces of an old problem. As the US Department
of State writes, counter-trafficking efforts should focus on the exploitation and
control of a person through force, fraud, or coercionnot on the movement of
that person.37
Improve Prosecution
Surprisingly, the prosecution of traffickers has lagged behind, too, even though
this P has largely overshadowed protection and prevention. Tough rhetoric
notwithstanding, governments often do not provide the financial, human, and
technological resources needed to arrest and sentence traffickers (as well as
tending to overlook trafficking occurring in sectors other than the sex industry).
This is problematic because, as Phil Williams shows, dismantling criminal
networks, although not sufficient, is necessary for making progress against
trafficking. In late 2008, the British government decided to close an antitrafficking police squad that reportedly had operated to great effect (after heavy
public criticism, the decision was reversed).38 This example shows that fighting
human trafficking is often topped by other concerns.
Law enforcement capacities are scarce in any country. Reallocating resources
to counter-trafficking may well benefit drug traffickers or murderers. This is
especially because prosecuting human trafficking tends to be more resourceintensive than prosecuting other forms of crime. Whether returns are worth the
investments depends, among other factors, on the type of criminal network.
Small networks that do not diversify into other criminal activities may not be
worth spending much law enforcement time and money on. Still, the gap
between professed outrage and feeble implementation should be narrowedin
order to reduce trafficking and also because placating trafficking as a grave
37

June 2008), 19.
38
See Rachel Williams, Human Trafficking Police Unit to Close, The Guardian, November 10, 2008,
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/10/human-trafficking-police-prostitution (accessed February 23,
2009).
488
threat raises public expectations that, if unfulfilled through successful

prosecution, will undermine citizens belief in the value of such rhetoric.
Fight Corruption
In many poor and unstable states, low salaries of police, border guard agencies,
prosecutors, judges, or prison guards hamper counter-crime efforts. Accepting
bribes is often the only way for officials to sustain themselves and their
families. Efforts of international donors to improve the technical capacities and
know-how of domestic actors and to foster a spirit of non-corruption must be
complemented by an increase in salaries. While this approach may clash with
the Security Sector Reform objective of fostering local ownership due to a risk
of donor dependency, increasing salaries is a necessary stopgap measure to
improve crime-fighting. It is costly, but so is crime.
Balance Efficiency and Legitimacy
Counter-trafficking efforts must be legal. Counter-trafficking efforts should not
constitute a full-blown attack on civil liberties, and intelligence-led actors
should adhere to the law. The fight against organized crime should reinforce,
not undermine, democratic norms. While an image has been created of human
trafficking as being dominated by large-scale, sophisticated organised crime
groups, especially labour trafficking involves a variety of small-scale
profiteers.39 Yet organised crime groups are indeed responsible for much
human trafficking, and intelligence-led strategies are essential for arresting
perpetrators, as Fred Schreier, John Picarelli, Jana Arsovska and Stef Janssens,
and other contributors to this book have shown. Laws and administrative
directives should create the legal basis for special investigative techniques
(such as undercover policing and technical surveillance) and asset forfeiture.
Putting police cooperation on a firm legal footing is crucial, too. Many police
officers face bureaucratic hurdles when collaborating with their (foreign)
counterparts, and as a consequence resort to informal cooperation channels.
This accelerates law enforcement, but makes prosecution less transparent,
raising issues of data and human rights protection. Counter-trafficking
networks must therefore balance speed and accountability.
39
See Beate Andrees, Forced Labour and Trafficking in Europe: How People Are Trapped in, Live
Through and Come Out (working paper no.57, February 2008, Geneva, ILO).
489
Cut the Link Between Peace Operations and Trafficking

Training peace operations personnel, including private contractors, on countertrafficking is crucial. Things have improved since the 1990s, when
international personnel caused a boom in trafficking especially in the
Balkans.40 But the zero-tolerance message needs constant re-iteration and
institutionalization, as Keith J. Allred shows in his chapter. Preventing
internationals from fuelling crime in crisis zones requires political will by
nations contributing personnel to peace operations and the right attitude of
individual commanders. The prosecution of wrong-doers is the best indicator
for whether zero-tolerance policies are taken seriously. It should no longer
happen, as it did, that NATO and the UN are not even informed about whether
a violator withdrawn from an operation was tried by the troop-contributing
state.41
However, zero-tolerance policies have not broken the link between foreign
deployment and local prostitution. Observers in Kosovo argue that
commanders of some foreign military contingents do not try to prevent their
soldiers from visiting prostitutes while on leave in neighbouring countries.
Moreover, some commanders were unfamiliar with the problem of
trafficking.42 Hence, there are divergent interpretations of zero-tolerance
policies as well as a continuing lack of institutionalized awareness-raising and
pre-deployment training. Keith Allred offers valuable advice on how to avoid
the exacerbation of trafficking by international personnel. While some
measures are controversial, such as the criminalization of patronage, others are
straightforward, such as increasing the number of women in peace operations.
This non-comprehensive list underscores that implementation of countertrafficking policies hinges on political will. Political will is required to mitigate
two other problems as well: insufficient cooperation among counter-trafficking
actors, and the lack of monitoring and evaluation of counter-trafficking policies
and projects.
40
See: Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for
Forced Prostitution, Human Rights Watch 14, no.9 (2002); Sarah E. Mendelson, Barracks and
Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2005); Keith J. Allred, Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces
Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It, Armed Forces & Society 33,
no.1 (2006): 523.
41
Interview with a senior military officer, NATO School Oberammergau, October 2006.
42
Interviews with members of international organizations and NGOs, various parts of Kosovo, October
November 2008.
490
2. Cooperation
All chapters in this book stress the importance of cooperation among countertrafficking actors. Cooperation has improved somewhat, due to innovative
structures such as Transnational Referral Mechanisms (see the chapter of
Mariyana Radeva, Elisa Trossero, and Martijn Pluim). However, this book
reveals significant cooperation problems. Cooperation is more an ideal than
empirical reality. This is the case whether it concerns intra-service, interservice, or international cooperation; or cooperation among coercive security
sector actors or between those focusing on coercion and those focusing on
prevention and protection. Without better cooperation, human trafficking will
continue to thrive. In order to move forward, it is crucial to understand the
obstacles to better cooperation. Of these, there are many.
Firstly, there are different worldviews and ideologies. Counter-trafficking
brings together police officers, border guards, prosecutors, development
experts, NGOs, employees of transport companies, hotel receptionists, and
many others. Even if everyone shared a concern for human rights, divergent
personal and professional backgrounds would impede cooperation. This is a big
problem on the national level, and an even bigger one at the international level,
where different cultures and languages add to the fuzziness of governance.
Even within any one institution, views may clash, with different departments
lobbying against trafficking in different ways.43 An NGO worker says: There
is no overall strategy, only a large number of programmes that are not properly
coordinated. Hence, there is no sustainability.44
A panacea to this problem does not exist; it is an inherent feature of, and the
price to pay for, non-hierarchical, flexible modes of national and transnational
governance. But cooperation would be enhanced if individuals and institutions
better understood the perspective of their counterparts and acknowledged their
own personal and professional biases. More interaction would foster empathy.
To be effective, interaction should include those often left out of the equation,
such as trade experts whose decisions have a major impact on migration flows,
employment agencies, or labour inspectors. Importantly, the private sector
should be better integrated into counter-trafficking initiatives. Governments
should, for example, provide more incentives to companies for hiring formerly
trafficked persons in order to reduce the risk of re-trafficking.45 Many mistakes
43
Interview with a member of a UN organisation, Geneva, March 2006.
44
Interview, Sofia, July 2006.
45
Interview with OSCE representative, Kosovo, August 2006. See also Sebastian Baumeister und Susie
Maley, The Role of the Private Sector in Developing Youth Careers, in Challenging Trafficking in
491
have been made with re-integration in the past; for instance, too many people
have been taught hairdressing and too few IT skills.46 Traffickers are
innovative. So must be those confronting them.
Equally crucial, cooperation arrangements must no longer reflect narrow and
self-defeating coercive biases. Limanowska and Konrad show that the
dominance of coercive security sector actors has been a major flaw in such
arrangements. While their analysis focuses on Southeast Europe, their criticism
applies to other world regions as well. The legacy of the Palermo Trafficking
Protocol, with its emphasis on prosecution and its vagueness on protection and
prevention, is ubiquitous. The Protocol is both cause and consequence of
coercive practices that may serve states narrow interests, yet that are
detrimental to the interests of trafficked persons and to counter-trafficking
efforts more generally. To repeat the mantra of this book, a shift to a human
rights approach is warranted. This approach places people who have been or
might be trafficked at centre-stage and assesses strategies on the basis of their
impact on those individuals.47
Bureaucratic complexity is a further obstacle to cooperation. Bureaucracies
often work slowly and inefficiently, especially large ones. Talks with EU
officials reveal, for instance, that some officials working on organised crime
within the Council do not know their counterparts in the Commission.48 A EU
Council official describes the Unions external crime-fighting machinery as
follows: A few years ago, it was small and chaotic. Now it is big and
chaotic.49 Rotation of personnel, inefficient information sharing mechanisms,
and other factors account for such deficiencies.
Moving towards more flexible networks is a must, in counter-trafficking as in
counter-terrorism and other fields where numerous actors pool material
resources and know-how. But the effects of networking are ambivalent. Greater
effectiveness and efficiency may come at the cost of less transparency, as
mentioned above. In addition to informality, the fact that international
organisations and NGOs implement projects on behalf of states can lead to a
Persons: Theoretical Debate & Practical Approaches, ed. GTZ Sector Project Against Trafficking in
Women (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 8185. Trafficked persons do not consent to have their
trafficking experience being revealed to an employer or future employer. It is therefore important to
find ways of employing victims of trafficking in ways that respect their right to privacy (I thank Mike
Dottridge for his comments on this point).
46
Interview with UN official, Kosovo, August 2006.
47
Dottrige, Introduction, 7.
48
Interviews, Brussels, January 2007.
49
Interview, Brussels, January 2007.
492
mismatch between the intention of donors and the action of implementing

agencies, especially in cases of sub-contracting and sub-sub-contracting.
Again: the more actors are involved, the more oversight becomes an issue.
There are also less benign causes of cooperation problems. Crime-fighters
and criminals live in symbiosis: Crime-fighters depend on crime for
institutional survival, and criminals benefit from high profits artificially
inflated by law enforcement (the so-called crime tax).50 The fight against
trafficking has evolved into a large industry whose participants face a moral
hazard: Even though they do try to abolish trafficking, actors are also
concerned about funding. Consequently, unsubstantiated claims about
trafficking have been made. Moreover, actors have engaged in turf battles,
failed to devise common strategies and divisions of labour, failed to share data
and information, and made insufficient efforts to learn from past mistakes.
Duplication of efforts, unhealthy competition, and other inefficiencies have
stymied prosecution and have not been in the interests of trafficked persons
either.51 According to one UN official: It is scandalous how much money has
been spent on anti-trafficking, and how little of that money has been used to
support trafficked people.52 Cooperation problems partly account for this
failure. Competition is terrible, says an experienced official from an
international organisation. An official from one UN agency operating in Bosnia
said that her agency was at war with another UN agency.53 The director of
one Bulgarian NGO describes the counter-trafficking landscape as a jungle.54
Better cooperation would lead to more efficient resource allocation. Institutions
should emulate the practice of companies that have moved from negative
competition toward co-opetition, a model of interaction marrying
cooperation and positive competition.55 Trafficked persons would be the most
obvious beneficiaries. Yet counter-trafficking actors would benefit as well,
through a pooling of material resources and knowledge and the ability to
develop specialized capabilities (instead of diversifying into various areas to be
50
See Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca and London: Cornell
51
The pursuit of parochial interests has hampered security governance in various fields. On the problems
of international statebuilding efforts, see International Crisis Group, Bosnia: Reshaping the
International Machinery, ICG Balkans Report, no.121, Sarajevo/Brussels (November 29, 2001).
52
Interview, Geneva, September 2006.
53
Interview, Sarajevo, August 2006.
54
Interview, Sofia, July 2006.
55
See Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 1819; 3234.
493
eligible for funding from various sources). Governments have most leverage
for encouraging cooperation. As Barbara Limanowska and Helga Konrad show
in their chapter on Southeast Europe, governments have preferred to work with
NGOs willing to implement any kind of counter-trafficking activity. This
practice, besides increasing competition among NGOs, has deprived
experienced NGOs of funding just because their human rights focus made them
cumbersome partners for governments. In addition to promoting the protection
of human rights, genuine support for NGOs also helps to check corruption, as
stressed by Leslie Holmes.
Instead of pouring money into awareness-raising campaigns not based on
cutting-edge public relations expertise,56 or into training programs that
duplicate others,57 donors should make funding conditional upon cooperation.
Furthermore, providing funding for longer periods of time would mitigate
against the project-driven nature of counter-trafficking activities. Moreover,
donors should handle bureaucratic requirements more flexibly. These benefit
large institutions who know how to apply for grants, and reduce smaller
institutions knowledgeable about local conditions to a subservient role.58 NGOs
in (non-EU member) Balkan states, for example, have had little choice other
than to associate with large EU-based NGOs,59 a practice violating the
principle of local ownership. Of similar importance, donors should coordinate
their funding priorities, by devising common strategies. Donor countries tend to
simply inform each other about their respective priorities, if at all.60 Regular
meetings are needed in which participants agree on divisions of labour. This
requires donors as well as recipient countries to strengthen national anti56
For example, in Kosovo children were shown the film Lilja 4-ever. Yet since the context was not
always explained, the value of showing this disturbing film is questionable. Interview with NGO staff,
Pristina, August 2006. According to the same interviewee, putting up [anti-trafficking] billboards is a
waste of money. To ensure that their campaigns have a positive effect, campaigners should work with
local NGOs, target specific groups, and use peer-to-peer training. Donors should emphasise the
message rather than their own role in anti-trafficking projects. Telephone interview with public
relations expert who has worked on counter-trafficking campaigns in the Balkans, October 2006. Most
importantly, prevention programmes must not be misused for the purpose of preventing people from
migrating, as stressed by Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens, and Mariela Guajardo in their chapter.
For insightful criticism of counter-trafficking information campaigns, see Cline Nieuwenhuys and
Antoine Pcoud, Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns, and Strategies of Migration Control,
American Behavioral Scientist 50, no.12 (August 2007): 16741695.
57
In Southeast Europe, some police and border guards have participated in several similar training
programs offered by different institutions. Interviews, various Balkan countries, 2006.
58
On the failure of internationals to empower domestic actors, see AnnJanette Rosga, The Traffic in
Children: The Funding of Translation and the Translation of Funding, PoLAR: Political and Legal
Anthropology Review 28, no.2 (2005): 25881.
59
Interview with EU Commission official, Brussels, January 2007.
60
Interview with ambassador of EU member state, Macedonia, July 2006.
494
trafficking coordinators. As Limanowska and Konrad show, coordinators often

have insufficient political clout and material resources to streamline countertrafficking initiatives into a coherent strategy.
Corruption is an additional impediment to better cooperation. This book,
especially the chapter of Leslie Holmes, has cited evidence showing that
corruption fuels trafficking, both in rich and poor countries. The fight against
trafficking and corruption thus underscores that Security Sector Reformthe
creation of effective and democratic politiesis not only a challenge in postauthoritarian, transition, and war-torn countries, but even in stable
democracies. Many security practitioners do not share information and
intelligence with their counterparts due to a lack of trust. For instance, the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007 has made the
coordination of Justice and Home Affairs activities even more cumbersome
than before. A Council official, asked about the implications of Bulgarias and
Romanias EU accession for crime-fighting, says: Representatives from old
EU member countries now exchange information on corridors, not inside the
meeting room.61
This example illustrates trade-offs of cooperation. Fighting a complex problem
requires the cooption of a large number of actors. To counter new practices
such as the recruitment of victims by lover boys and the proliferation of
Internet child pornography, psychologists, social workers, and police with
knowledge of computer forensics are needed. Fighting human trafficking thus
forges complex national and international coalitions. Yet the greater the
number of individuals and institutions involved, the more trust becomes an
issue. And trust is the element that needs to be constantly in production to
optimize the networked organization.62
To minimize the risks of cooperation, many security practitioners resort to
informal channels or create small groups.63 Such coping mechanisms enhance
the effectiveness and efficiency of crime-fighting, yet, due to their informal and
exclusivist nature, raise issues of legitimacy. Counter-trafficking perfectly
epitomizes a major problem in contemporary governance: how to reconcile
61
Interview, Brussels, January 2007.
62
Holohan, Networks of Democracy, 35 (emphasis in the original).
63
The United Kingdom, for instance, has forged counter-trafficking networks with officials from a few
selected countries that serve as main countries of origin of trafficked persons to the UK. In Scandinavia,
counter-trafficking benefits from high levels of homogeneity and trust. Networking among officials
from the region is relatively smooth due to deep institutional ties at all levels and in all policy fields,
similar laws and traditions, and the small size of the countries that allows officials to quickly get to
know their counterparts.
495
moving towards networked forms of cooperation involving a variety of actors

that are decentralized and that complement one another (the strength of weak
ties64) with the need to steer such complex networks towards a common
goal.65 Again, there is no universal recipe for dealing with this challenge. But
the chapters of Leslie Holmes, as well as of Jana Arsovska and Stef Janssens,
include recommendations for how to fight trafficking-related corruption, an
essential element of trust-building and cooperation.
3. Research and Evaluation
Counter-trafficking efforts operate in a partial knowledge void. There is a
dearth of information on the scope, most prevalent types, loci, and modi
operandi of trafficking. This is due to the covert and often transnational nature
of trafficking, the social stigma attached to trafficking, the lack of a definition
that lends itself to operationalisation, incoherent data collection efforts, and
other obstacles.66 As Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Francesca Bosco, and Anvar
Serojitdinov show in the first chapter of this book, valuable efforts to better
understand the nature of the problem have been undertaken, yet much remains
unknown. Most importantly, it is unclear how big the gap is between the
relatively small number of identified victims and the actual number of victims.
Also, John Picarelli and Phil Williams underscore the need to better understand
the types of organised crime networks involved in human trafficking and better
identify the critical nodes that can be attacked.
One assertion inviting more empirical scrutiny is the link between human
trafficking and other forms of crime, such as drug trafficking and terrorism.
Given that there are good reasons why human traffickers would not want to
diversify,67 this link should not be simply assumed. After all, flawed
assumptions may lead states to use sledgehammers instead of more refined
tools appropriate for addressing specific types of crime. This book provides
64
Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, American Journal of Sociology 78, no.6 (May 1973):
13601380.
65
See Patrick Kenis and Keith G Provan, The Control of Public Networks, International Public
Management Journal 9, no.3 (2006): 227247.
66
See Frank Laczko and Elzbieta Gozdziak, ed., Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global
Survey, offprint, Special Issue of International Migration 43: 12 (2005); Bales, Understanding Global
Slavery, 136138.
67
For a discussion, see Rey Koslowski, Economic Globalization, Human Smuggling, and Global
Governance, in Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, ed. David Kyle and Rey
Koslowski (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 337358, here 348
349.
496
some evidence showing that human trafficking and other types of crime merge.
More (standardized) primary data collection is needed to better understand the
mechanisms of crime.
It is equally important to monitor counter-trafficking efforts and assess their
impact. A lack of monitoring and evaluation is due to the lack of primary data,
as well as the fact that institutions are weary of criticism. Much money has
been spent and many policy tools have been applied, but surprisingly little is
known about the effects of counter-trafficking efforts. According to a US
government agency, there is little or no evidence to indicate the extent to
which different types of effortssuch as prosecuting traffickers, abolishing
prostitution, increasing viable economic opportunities, or sheltering or
reintegrating victimsimpact the level of trafficking or the extent to which
rescued victims are being re-trafficked.68 Similarly, the United Nations reports
that information gathered on trafficking does not show whether countertrafficking efforts have reduced human trafficking.69
Improvements are necessary on various fronts. The most obvious one is to
provide more funding for research on trafficking and counter-trafficking and to
enable the production of knowledge that is as objective as possible. Research
into clandestine activities is imprecise, difficult, and often dangerous. Yet,
without such research, policymakers do not know when, where, and how to act.
Most importantly, more reliable estimates on the volume of trafficking are
needed to evaluate the impact of counter-trafficking policies and initiatives.70
According to the UN, member states lack the ability to say with any precision
how many victims of human trafficking there are, where they come from or
where they are going.71
It is important that research be impartial and that inconvenient results are not
suppressed. Susan Woodward writes that counter-crime efforts in the Balkans
are driven by politics and policy, not by knowledge and research.72 The same
68
United States Governments Accountability Office (GAO), Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy,
and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad, GAO-06-825, (Washington
D.C.: GAO, July 18, 2006), 25.
69
UNODC, Global Report, 13.
70
See United States Governments Accountability Office (GAO), Human Trafficking: Monitoring and
Evaluation of International Projects Are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements, GAO-07-1034
(Washington D.C.: GAO, July 2007).
71
UNODC, Global Report, 69.
72
Susan L. Woodward, Enhancing Cooperation Against Transborder Crime in Southeast Europe: Is

There an Emerging Epistemic Community?, in Fighting Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, ed.
Ekavi Athanassopoulou (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 724, here 9.
497
holds true for counter-trafficking. One prominent expert on prostitution argues

that central claims in the fight against trafficking are exaggerated,
unverifiable, or demonstrably false.73 Especially the abolitionist drive during
the Presidency of George W. Bush has been severely criticized.74 Due to
ideological bias and opportunistic behaviour, governments try to downplay
trafficking problems in their countries, and even actively obstruct informationgathering efforts. Indeed, researchers and activists, as well as security
practitioners, face threats from traffickers as well as pressure from
governments and international organizations. It is therefore not surprising that
many official publications paint a rosy picture of trafficking problems and
counter-efforts. The politicization of counter-trafficking research causes
problems not only for researchers but also for security practitioners. A
Scandinavian police officer complained that after compiling voluminous and
detailed information on organized crime for Europols Organised Crime Threat
Assessment (OCTA), little of the information made its way into the report,
presumably for political reasons. As a consequence, the officer was reluctant to
provide any information for the subsequent report.75
Striving for unbiased research is not the same as depoliticising countertrafficking. As discussed above, counter-trafficking is very much a political
issue, and not amenable to technical solutions. Democratising countertrafficking is about allowing many people to participate meaningfully in
counter-trafficking discourses and practices, whereas a technocratic approach
enables few people to decide over the distribution of costs and benefits.
However, political action should be informed by sound, unbiased research, in
order to take into account all causes and consequences of trafficking and
counter-trafficking.
In addition to de-politicising research activities, institutions should make
greater efforts to improve and harmonise methodologies for measuring human
trafficking. According to the UN, even similarly situated countries with
compatible legal systems are counting different things.76 Moreover, the
73
Ronald Weitzer, The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and Institutionalization of a
Moral Crusade, Politics & Society 35: 3 (September 2007), 447474, here 458. See also David A.
Feingold, Think Again: Human Trafficking, Foreign Policy (September/October 2005): 2632.
74
See Gretchen Soderlund, Running From the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against Sex Trafficking
and the Rhetoric of Abolition, NWSA Journal 17, no.3 (Fall 2005): 6487; Jacqueline Berman, The
Left, the Right, and the Prostitute: The Making of U.S. Antitrafficking in Persons Policy, Tulane
Journal of International and Comparative Law 14 (2006): 269293.
75
I thank Benjamin S. Buckland for sharing this information with me, which was based on a talk with the
police officer in fall 2008.
76
UNODC Global Report, 11.
498
methodologies upon which estimates are based are based are often dubious.77
Once figures have been published, they tend to assume a life on their own,
being continuously re-cited, even as doubts over their accuracy mount.78
Flawed methodologies thus contribute to skewed perceptions of the problem
and to flawed efforts to counter it.
Another shortcoming is the frequent failure of counter-trafficking institutions
to learn. A lack of institutional learning affects not only counter-trafficking.79
One symptom of deficient institutional learning is the failure to document
lessons learned. Without storing information on past projects and making this
information available to members of the institution and, depending on the
sensitivity of the information, outsiders, an institution is unable to constantly
adapt to a dynamic environment.80 Too many counter-trafficking projects are
initiated without prior study of past projects, leading to the wheel being
reinvented or, worse, to mistakes being repeated.81
To make counter-trafficking policies and projects more effective, efficient, and
legitimate, it is crucial to assess their consequences. Of systematic assessment
there are astonishingly few. To the extent that institutions do evaluate the
consequences of their activities, they prefer to use output and outcome
indicators. These lent themselves to quantification (seminars organized,
billboards put up, officials trained, reports produced, or, as mentioned by Jana
Arsovska and Stef Janssens, police investigations conducted). Hardly any
efforts are made to study the impact of counter-trafficking activities on
77
78
On the problems of Europols Organised Crime Threat Assessment, see Petrus C. van Duyne, OCTA
2006: The Unfulfilled Promise, Trends in Organized Crime 10, no.3 (September 2007): 120128.
Similarly, it is not clear how the US has produced its widely-cited figure on the global volume of
trafficking.
In another context, see Francisco E. Thoumi, Can the United Nations Support Objective and
Unhampered Illicit Drug Policy Research? A Testimony of a UN Funded Researcher, Crime, Law &
Social Change 38, no.2 (2002): 161183.
79
See Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government
Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
80
Information technology holds great potential to facilitate institutional learning. See Holohan, Networks
of Democracy, part III.
81
In this, there is a parallel to police reform efforts. On the latter, see Gordon Peake and Otwin Marenin,
Their Reports Are Not Read and Their Recommendations Are Resisted: The Challenge for the Global
Police Policy Community, Police Practice and Research 9, no.1 (March 2008): 5969.
499
trafficked persons, other vulnerable groups, the size and structure of the
trafficking industry, and society at large.82
No doubt, such assessments are methodologically tricky. The size and structure
of the trafficking industry depends on numerous conditions (only one of which
is counter-trafficking efforts) interacting in complex ways. As with efforts
against drugs, terrorism, and other illicit activities, isolating the effects of these
efforts from changes in development, demography, or gender is challenging.83
Yet there are indicators showing whether policies have protected people,
reduced trafficking, or caused collateral damage. Studying the effects of
counter-trafficking policies in a non-biased, open-minded manner again
requires political will. Institutions tend to perceive assessments as threats since
such assessments may reveal that programs have not worked or that they were
harmful. Yet in the medium and long run, institutions, and society at large,
benefit from impact assessments that, after all, help avoid pouring good money
after bad.
This book offers some answers for how to improve counter-trafficking. Of
equal importance, however, it shows that there are no magic pills against
trafficking, raising questions without purporting to offer answers. Challenging
common assumptions is essential for avoiding mistakes; innovation is about
thinking outside the box. Below is a brief discussion of some of the issues that
evaluators may consider.
The most obvious issue is the impact of tighter border controls on trafficking
and migration. Reinforcing borders helps politicians score political points.
Most security practitioners and trafficking experts argue that border controls
make migrants reliant on the services of smugglers and traffickers. Yet there
are no conclusive answers regarding the impact of border controls on migration
and on migrants.84 They may reduce overall migration, by preventing those
unable or unwilling to resort to illicit channels to leave their country, and by
deterring others contemplating a change of location. Tighter border controls
may also have a neutral effect on the number of people migrating to a country
82
For an innovative approach for measuring the effects of counter-trafficking efforts, see International
Organization for Migration, Handbook on Performance Indicators for Counter-Trafficking Projects
(Geneva: IOM, 2008).
83
For a discussion of the causal impact of drug policies, see Cornelius Friesendorf, US Foreign Policy
and the War on Drugs: Displacing the Cocaine and Heroin Industry (London and New York: Routledge,
2007), Chapter 1; on the effects of nation-building efforts, see James Dobbins, Michele A. Poole, Austin
Long, Benjamin Runkle, After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
84
On different effects of border controls, see Koslowski, Economic Globalization, 350351.
500
without valid papers.85 Or, more stringent controls may indeed push people into
the arms of migrant smugglers and smugglers who are also traffickers.
However, while the more sophisticated criminals are able to translate increased
operational risks (resulting from stepped-up law enforcement) into profit, less
sophisticated groups will be caught. And whether smart criminals are able to
maintain or increase their revenues depends on the willingness and ability of
migrants to pay higher smuggling fees or to incur higher smuggling debts, as
well as on the preparedness of criminals to increase levels of exploitation and
extortion to offset higher operational costs. More empirical research is needed
to study these various and often paradoxical effects.86
In the meantime, one should not invest much hope in migration control as a
major lever against irregular migration. Instead, net destination countries
should reduce demand for cheap, unregulated labour, raise workplace
protections for all workers, and ensure sufficient opportunities for legal
economic migration. Not much is known about the effects of migration
controls, but enough is known to say that they are not a panacea against
trafficking. The only way to achieve near perfect control over the people
leaving and entering a country is to erect Berlin-style walls (i.e., to go far
beyond what the US has been doing at its border with Mexico, or what the EU
has done at the Schengen border). This is not politically feasible, given that the
benefits of globalisation are valued more highly than their downsides. Countertrafficking thus exemplifies the paradox of control efforts running parallel to
the increased and desired transnational exchange of people, goods, capital, and
services.87
Research should also illuminate the potentially adverse consequences of
privatised migration control (carrier sanctions, and so forth) on the rights of
migrants. To the extent that these innovative measures seem to prevent some
migrants from being trafficked, yet prevent persecuted people from fleeing, the
costs would outweigh the benefits.
85
See, for instance, Rob Taylor, Australia Government Sees No Illegal Immigrant Influx, AlertNet,
November 25, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SYD378178.htm (accessed January 15,
2008).
86
For a discussion, see Rey Koslowski, Economic Globalization, 337358. Valuable research on the
impact of stricter border controls include Khalid Koser, Asylum Policies, Trafficking and
Vulnerability, special issue 1, International Migration 38, no.3 (2000): 91111.
87
Peter Andreas, Transnational Crime and Economic Globalization, in Transnational Organized Crime
and International Security: Business as Usual?, ed. Mats Berdal and Mnica Serrano (Boulder, CO.:
Lynne Rienner, 2002), 3752.
501
Related to this point, more attention should be paid to the consequences of

granting more rights to trafficked persons. Many governments reason that
providing more rights (especially the right for victims to stay in the country of
destination) would lead migrants to falsely claim the status of trafficked person
to avoid deportation. The United Kingdom initially did not want to ratify the
2005 Council of Europe Convention since it feared that individuals wanting to
stay in Britain would claim the rights enshrined in the Convention.88 The case
of Italy, which couples services to trafficked persons with the obligation to
participate in social integration programmes, suggests that this alleged effect is
exaggerated.89 The alleged dilemma facing governments could well be an
artificial one, providing an excuse to governments for not affording protection.
Yet given the scarcity of research, it is difficult to assess the validity of the
claim that circumscribing rights prevents abuse.
Another promising area of research pertains to smugglers and traffickers. As
John Picarelli shows, the link between trafficking and organised crime is a
complicated one. Criminologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and
others should pay more attention to traffickers and trafficking groups and their
cultural embeddedness.90 Research could reveal, for example, whether the
popular adage holds true that traffickers are sophisticated and states are not.
Overestimating traffickers ability to evade law enforcers is risky because state
agencies, especially those lacking institutional and material capacity, may
refrain from going after the traffickers. It would also be interesting to study
more closely how traffickers respond to law enforcement pressure. Common
wisdom holds that policing is good for victims. Yet is this true, given that
police pressure can increase traffickers operational costs and thus lead them to
subject victims to ever worse forms of coercion and exploitation? Little is
know, too, about how traffickers as well as migrants respond to awarenessraising campaigns. According to network theorists, criminalised actors and
88
See Buckland, Neither Seen Nor Heard.
89
Interview with trafficking expert seconded to the EU Commission, Brussels, January 2007. For a
critical perspective on Italys policy, see Isabel Crowhurst, The Provision of Protection and Settlement
Services for Migrant Women Trafficked for Sexual Purposes: The Case of Italy, in Trafficking and the
Global Sex Industry, ed. Karen Beeks and Delila Amir (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 217
228.
90
Valuable works include Rebecca Surtees, Traffickers and Trafficking in Southern and Eastern
Europe, European Journal of Criminology 5, no.1 (2008): 3968; Jana Arsovska, Understanding a
Culture of Violence and Crime: The Kanun of Lek Dukagjini and the Rise of the Albanian SexualSlavery Rackets, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 14, no.2 (2006):
161184.
502
their licit opponents engage in a battle of the story.91 Understanding the

enemy means understanding the discourse of traffickers, i.e., their strategies to
win the confidence of people they are planning to exploit. Furthermore, more
light needs to be shed on how relations between smuggled persons and
smugglers around the issues of payment and debts relate to trafficking. The
common claim that all smuggled migrants who have to repay large debts to a
creditor are in debt bondage or are trafficked deserves empirical scrutiny.
The most controversial issue surrounding trafficking pertains to prostitution.
Some scholars have analysed the effects of different prostitution regimes on
trafficking.92 However, the debate over prostitution is informed more by
emotions than rational cost-benefit analyses. The Swedish model that
criminalises demand for commercial sexual services has become increasingly
popular even outside of Sweden. But important countries of destination
continue to favour the legalisation of prostitution (although not the demand for
services from trafficked persons), arguing that criminalisation pushes the
industry underground. There are other arguments against criminalising demand,
too, such as the fact that NGOs and police often receive tip-offs about
exploitative conditions from clients of prostitutes, who would no longer contact
anyone if threatened by sanctions for having bought sex.93 Most contributors to
this volume have stayed clear from this politically charged debate. More (nonbiased) research is needed on the effects of different prostitution regimes.
4. Institutionalizing Better Implementation, Networking, and Evaluation
Implementation, networking, and evaluation would be improved through
institution-building. Institutions help actors move from zero-sum solutions
(whereby the gain of one actor is the loss of another) to absolute gains
(whereby all actors cooperate in order to improve the lot of everyone).94 In
91
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), in Networks and Netwars: The
Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2001), 125, here p. 20.
92
See, for instance, Ministry of Justice and the Police of Norway, Purchasing Sexual Services in Sweden
and the Netherlands: Legal Regulation and Experiences, (report by a Working Group on the legal
regulation of the purchase of sexual services, October 8, 2004); Julie Bindel and Liz Kelly, A Critical
Examination of Responses to Prostitution in Four Countries: Victoria, Australia; Ireland; the
Netherlands; and Sweden (London: Child and Woman Abuse Studies Union, London Metropolitan
University, 2003).
93
Interview with NGO staff, Zurich, October 2006.
94
See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
503
policy areas where governments clearly dominate (such as arms control),

institutions mitigate cooperation problems by facilitating trust and informationsharing. The same effect can be obtained with regard to networks comprising
state, para-state, and non-state actors. Indeed, coordination problems here are
even greater due to the large number and the diversity of actors.
Institutions may have executive competencies. At the most extreme, an
institution would sanction actors violating counter-trafficking standards. In
other policy fields, states have created strong monitoring and complianceenforcing mechanisms (one of the most impressive examples is the dispute
settlement procedure of the World Trade Organization). Applied to countertrafficking, this would be a maximalist approach, and a politically unfeasible
one. Neither governments nor international organisations or NGOs want to be
subjugated to external rulethe fear of losing autonomy tops concerns over
competition and duplication. Even at a national level there are few coordination
mechanisms with teeth, as Barbara Limanowska and Helga Konrad show in
their chapter. Internationally, concerns about state sovereignty exacerbate
concerns of states and institutions about any loss of autonomy. Widespread
resentment against the US practice of putting countries into different tiers and
threatening them with sanctions depending on their perceived countertrafficking performance is a clear sign in this regard.
A more minimalist approach would be to create a clearing house that collects
and disseminates data and information on the scope and types of trafficking in
different countries and regions; changes in trafficking routes and methods;
factors that make individuals and groups vulnerable; profiles of traffickers;
international conventions, soft laws, national laws, and national action plans;
lists and web links to counter-trafficking training material; the phone numbers
of counter-trafficking hotlines; specific counter-trafficking initiatives and
points of contact;95 and assessments of counter-trafficking projects.96 To
strengthen small, local organisations (now often left out of information loops) a
clearinghouse could also publish project tenders. Best use should be made of
the Internet. Visual aids such as interactive maps showing migration patterns,
95
For lists of points of contacts, see, among other sources, Barbara Limanowska, Trafficking in Human
Beings in South Eastern Europe; International Organization for Migration, Networking to Fight Human
Trafficking in Europe, Programme Report, (Brussels: IOM, February 2008), 3341. However, lists of
contacts are quickly outdated. Online updates would be more efficient.
96
The Trafficking in Persons Report issued annually by the US Department of State continues to be the
prime source of information on trafficking and counter-trafficking. However, the practice whereby the
US ranks countries counter-trafficking performance has been widely criticized, on the ground that the
US violates standards, too, and that the report reflects other US policy priorities. See Dottridge,
Introduction, 1820.
504
smuggling and trafficking hot spots, and routes help decision-makers to

comprehending the dynamic nature of the problem.
Now, institutions often inadvertently work on similar projects. Moreover, their
staff, as well as concerned citizens, are forced to keep up with current
trafficking and counter-trafficking trends, or to track training material by
consulting a variety of disparate sources. There is too much information, as
institutions produce vast numbers of reports, many of which are dull to read
because they praise the efforts of the institutions issuing the report. What
applies to rule of law efforts more generally applies to counter-trafficking
strategies as well:
Many experts are loath to admit that they do not know something about
their area of expertise because it could affect a decision to hire them
again. Reports are written primarily by people who are paid by
those who receive the reports. The writers job is to provide
information in such a way as to meet the clients expectations. One of
those expectations is implementation success that will justify ongoing
new funding. Thus, there are very few reports detailing mistakes or
failures. Where they exist, implementers know how to describe them as
successes.97
Incentive structures following the laws of the market lead to the production of
biased material. At the same time, there is too little information: Critical
material is often not shared, or it disappears within a sea of information. To
obtain material, individuals frequently rely on personal contacts. Yet
maintaining personal networks is time-consuming, as network nodes and links
constantly change. Moreover, networks are not necessarily democratic since
they often privilege those with money and influence (and also good IT
infrastructure). There is also a risk of not being able to retrieve information
due, for example, to the absence of electronic archives; and without the storage
of information, learning becomes impossible.98 A clearing house would
aggregate material, classify it to make it easily useable, and include technical
features that allow readers to post comments.
Staff would need to constantly update contact information and classify new
data and information coming in. A pilot project could focus on one region only,
97
Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad:
In Search of Knowledge, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2006), 137160, here 151 and 154.
98
See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on
Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007), 243.
505
and then extend its geographic reach.99 For publishing data, information, and
analyses, push and pull methods can be combined: Institutions can send
material to the clearing house (push method), and its staff could ask partner
institutions for material or, alternatively, simply download information from
partner websites.100 Citizens might also help with data collection. The webbased Ushahidi service, for instance, allows ordinary people to document
human rights violations using mobile phones or digital cameras and upload this
data to the web.101 Applying this practice to counter-trafficking raises data
protection and security issues. But improved technology and a clearing house
staff that would screen incoming data would minimize risks. It is likely that a
clearing house will develop a dynamic of its own: Once it offers a critical mass
of data, information, and analysis, institutions will want to contribute material
to promote themselves, allowing the clearing house to grow.
Importantly, the institution should be independent. Its staff should be able to
decide what information to publish and how. Arguably, even biased and badly
written reports should be published since they tell important stories about the
authors and sponsoring institutions. Computers are dumb. Even though content
management systems enable the classification of material in a way that allows
users to easily sift through vast quantities of material, it still takes human
beings to do the classification. And one person or institution, even if
knowledgeable about trafficking, should not have the power to censor the
publication of material. Instead, the informed public should decide whether
reports on trafficking and counter-trafficking are of high quality, and use them
as yardsticks for holding institutions accountable.
A clearing house would thus facilitate public discourse on trafficking and
counter-trafficking. As it is, counter-trafficking reflects asymmetric relations of
power (for instance, Ministries of Interior tend to be more powerful than
human rights NGOs, which explains the law enforcement bias of countertrafficking efforts). Public policies should not reflect power, but good
arguments and deliberation. By creating a level information field and by
99
A valuable project in this regard is the Trafficking in Persons Clearinghouse of the Good Shepard
Social Justice Network, focusing on Australia and the Asia Pacific region. See
http://www.goodshepherd.com.au/justice/clearinghouse/ (accessed June 17, 2009). Another noteworthy
initiative is the website www.humantrafficking.org, which focuses on the Asia-Pacific region as well
and which offers access to news reporting on human trafficking.
100
Downloading from partner institutions websites is a cost-efficient method used by the Zurich-based
International Relations and Security Network ISN. See http://www.isn.ethz.ch (accessed June 17,
2009).
101
See www.ushahidi.com (accessed February 10, 2009). I thank Chris Pallaris for telling me about this
website.
506
institutionalising feedback mechanisms, a clearing house would subject

counter-trafficking actors to greater public scrutiny and allow the better
arguments to win. In the past, even if actors documented problems and
mistakes, they rarely shared such lessons with other institutions. A clearing
house would facilitate the sharing of lessons learned, for instance by
commissioning or conducting independent evaluations of counter-trafficking
programmes and projects. By highlighting achievements and shortcomings, a
clearing house would promote reputational controlone of the main
mechanisms for controlling large, complex policy networks. Reputational
control presumes public knowledge of how an actor behaves towards others.
Under this condition, actors have an incentive to behave well toward each
other even if they are only occasionally linked and do not necessarily share the
same beliefs.102 By informing the taxpayer and counter-trafficking institutions
about the amount of money spent on which project and to what effect, a
clearing house would put pressure on institutions to strive for better results
(ideally in terms of impact and not only of output and of outcome).
Since it compels transparency and allows donors to know whether their
investments are going to good use, most institutions would perceive a strong
clearing house as a risk. It may reveal, for instance, that there are several
hotlines and awareness-raising projects in the same country or even the same
city. Or, reports may reveal that counter-crime projects have exacerbated
human rights violations. To reduce reputational risks, assessments do not need
to be made public, or not in total (also, no sources and methods of countertrafficking operations should be revealed, so as not to make the lives of
criminals easier). However, confidentiality and censorship should not be taken
too far. One of the main tasks of a strong, independent institution, possibly
headed by an international Special Rapporteur, would be to point out the extent
to which states fail to honour their anti-trafficking commitments. An element of
naming and shaming is inevitable for promoting the implementation of
human-rights based counter-trafficking strategies and for ensuring better policy
coordination.
Instead of eschewing criticism, both donors and implementers should
appreciate opportunities for improving their performance and learn from the
past. To this end, they should, to quote Fred Schreier in this book,
deemphasise data ownership. For institutions, the risks of greater scrutiny
and transparency would be outweighed by the advantage of saving time and
money. Institutions would better know what others are doing, which
102
Kenis and Provan, The Control of Public Networks, 236.
507
programmes have worked best, and where the risk of duplication is greatest. A
clearing house would also accelerate the harmonization of data gathering
methods, technical standards, and vocabularies. The problem of different data
sets, as well as donors supporting different data collection methods,103 has still
not been solved.104 By making methods and data collection projects public, and
by suggesting common standards, a clearing house would work to the benefit
not only of taxpayers and victims of trafficking, but also of counter-trafficking
actors themselves.
The clearing house would need a regular budget whose size does not constantly
change with the whims of donors. Not much money would be required since
the main focus would be to create and maintain a user-friendly website that
would offer counter-trafficking actors and the public data, information, and
analysescosts would be small in comparison to the waste caused by nontransparency and duplication. It is generally difficult to secure and maintain
funding for clearing houses, even if costs are not exorbitant. The risk of
running out of money can be reduced by numerous donor committing funding,
with each spending only a little.105
States, international organisations, and NGOs would be wary of creating, and
participating in, a strong, independent institution. For instance, entrenched
interests and concerns about autonomy stand in the way of building a
meaningful system of measurement on the current definition of trafficking, and
of allowing any one actor to impose common standards on what is being
measured and on how to measure it.106 As a consequence, it will be difficult to
eliminate the risk of gathering information that institutions say is about
trafficking but that is based on divergent methodologiesmaximalist
solutions, even if desirable, are not politically feasible. A second-best solution
would be a clearing house that becomes stronger over time. While it might
never be given the right to impose counter-trafficking strategies or
methodologies, it would propose standards that more and more actors would
then adopt. Only a strong institution would stand the chance of improving
implementation, cooperation, and evaluation. To create such an institution,
more public pressure, and much time, is needed.
103
This was the case in Kosovo in 2007. Interview with NGO staff, Pristina, December 2007.
104
See, however, Federal Ministry of the Interior of Austria and International Organization for Migration,
Guidelines for the Collection of Data on Trafficking Human Beings, Including Comparable Indicators
(Vienna: Ministry of the Interior and IOM, February 2009).
105
I thank Albrecht Schnabel for his comments on this point.
106
I thank Mike Dottridge for his comments on this paragraph.
508
Conclusion: Counter-Trafficking and the Security Sector

The underlying assumption of this book is that security sector responses to
human trafficking, especially coercive ones, are not sufficient for reducing
trafficking. Whether trafficking will increase or decrease hinges on political
will to better address problematic aspects of globalisation, such as crime and
poverty, as well as on wars and natural disasters, and on many other contingent
conditions. The counter-trafficking security sector, even if including state
social service providers, international organisations, NGOs, the media, and
private businesses, has little bearing on most of these conditions.
However, the security sector has a major, necessary role to play. This book
suggests ways for improving security sector strategies against trafficking. Yet
the chapter authors also reveal shortcomings of implementation, cooperation,
and evaluation. Only by better translating rhetorical commitments into practice,
by improving the interplay between coercive and non-coercive strategies, and
by better understanding the nature of the problem will progress be made against
human trafficking.
509
Notes on the Authors

Keith Allred holds a Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from the University of
Washington, and is a US Navy military judge. Between 2003 and 2005 he was
Associate Dean at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, where his research focused on human trafficking. Between 2007 and
2008 he presided over the first military commission trial held in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
Jana Arsovska holds a Ph.D. in Criminology from the Catholic University of
Leuven, Belgium, and is Assistant Professor in International Criminal Justice at
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the City University of New York. She
has published widely on organised crime, human trafficking and restorative
justice.
Francesca Bosco is Assistant Programme Coordinator within the Emerging
Crimes and Counter Human Trafficking Unit at UNICRI. Since 2006, she has
been involved in the Institute's activities and programmes to counter organised
crime, including trafficking in persons, violence against women, counterfeiting,
and cybercrime.
Benjamin S. Buckland is assistant editor of the Refugee Survey Quarterly and
a consultant on governance and corruption issues at The Ethicos Group. He has
worked on DCAFs trafficking project since 2007. He has published on
trafficking and smuggling, as well as on human rights and refugee issues.
Richard Danziger has been Head of the IOMs Counter Trafficking Division
based in Geneva since 2004. He was IOM's original focal point for the Bali
Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related
Transnational Crime and is currently a member of the World Economic
Forum's Global Agenda Council on Illicit Trade.
Cornelius Friesendorf is Lecturer at the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main
and Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK).
He writes about peace operations and strategies against serious crime, with a
geographical focus on the Balkans and Afghanistan. Between 2007 and 2009
he was a Fellow at DCAF.
511
Mariela Guajardo has been working in the Assisted Voluntary Return and
Counter- Trafficking Division of IOM headquarters in Geneva since 2008. She
holds a Master of Arts degree in Migration Studies and has training in
international relations and international refugee law. Her research interests are
human rights of migrants, post-national citizenship and the politics of
immigrant integration.
Leslie Holmes is Professor of Political Science at the University of Melbourne,
and a recurrent Visiting Professor at the Centre for Social Studies in Warsaw
and the University of Bologna. He has published widely on corruption and
organised crime, and is a member of the UNDPs Anti-Corruption
Practitioners Network.
Stef Janssens is Associate Researcher at the Interculturalism, Migration and
Minorities Research Centre (IMMRC), Faculty of Social Sciences, Catholic
University of Leuven, Belgium. In his research he focuses on human
trafficking. Previously he was advisor to the Belgian parliamentary
commissions on human trafficking and organised crime.
Allison Jernow is a senior legal officer at the International Commission of
Jurists. Previously she worked as a consultant for the OSCE and the ILO on
issues related to forced labour, human trafficking, hate crimes, and victims
rights. An American-educated attorney, she was formerly a prosecutor for the
U.S. Department of Justice, specialising in civil rights crimes.
Helga Konrad is International Consultant on Combating Trafficking in
Persons. Until 2006, she was Special Representative of the OSCE. From 2000
2004 she chaired the EU Stability Pact Task Force on Human Trafficking for
South Eastern Europe. In her capacity as Austrian Federal Government
Minister she hosted, in 1996, the first EU-Conference on Trafficking in
Women.
Barbara Limanowska is an expert on human trafficking and womens rights.
She has worked as a consultant on anti-trafficking for the OHCHR in BosniaHerzegovina and as an adviser to several international organisations, including
UNICEF, OSCE and UNDP. As co-founder of La Strada Poland and
programme manager at GAATW, she has first-hand experience in working
with trafficked persons.
512
Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia is Human Trafficking Focal Point and Program

Coordinator within the Emerging Crimes and Counter Human Trafficking Unit
at UNICRI. Since 2001, she has been involved in the Institute's activities and
programmes to counter organised crime, including trafficking in persons,
drugs, and art and antiquities.
Jonathan Martens is a Programme Specialist with IOM. He has worked on
issues related to irregular migration since 2000, and has served with IOM in
South Eastern Europe, Southern Africa and Geneva. Publications to which he
has contributed include International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms
and Key Challenges (2006).
John T. Picarelli is a Social Science Analyst at the International Center of the
National Institute of Justice in Washington DC. He is an expert in transnational
threats and international criminal justice issues, specifically international
organised crime, terrorism and trafficking in human beings. He earned his
Ph.D. at American University in 2007.
Martijn Pluim is Director for Capacity Building at ICMPD. Among others, he
is responsible for ICMPDs anti-trafficking activities. In 2008 he became a
member of the European Commission's Human Trafficking Expert Group. He
is also on the Board of PAG-ASA, a Belgian NGO providing support for
Mariyana Radeva is Project Officer with the Anti-Trafficking Programme at
ICMPD, focusing on South-Eastern Europe. Holding a Masters degree in
European Studies, she specialises in migration policy and the migrationsecurity nexus. In addition to her native Bulgarian, she is fluent in English and
German and has advanced knowledge of Croatian.
Fred Schreier is a consultant with DCAF. He received a M.A. in international
relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva,
and a M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford,
USA. A retired colonel, he has served in various command and general staff
positions and, as a senior civil servant, in different functions in the Swiss
Ministry of Defense.
Anvar Serojitdinov is Assistant Programme Coordinator within the Emerging
Crimes and Counter Human Trafficking Unit at UNICRI. He is also a Ph.D.
513
candidate at the Center of Studies on International Security and European

Cooperation, University Pierre Mends Grenoble II, France.
Elisa Trossero manages the Anti-Trafficking Programme at ICMPD and has
extensive experience in counter-trafficking activities in the European Union
and in South-Eastern Europe. Trained in human rights law, she also holds a
degree in comparative criminal law from the University of Turin.
Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of
Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He has
published extensively in the field of international security and in recent years
has focused primarily on transnational organised crime.
514

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Study Group Information

Cornelius Friesendorf (Ed.)

Strategies Against Human

Vienna and Geneva, September 2009

PART 1: Issues ............................................................................................... 33

PART 2: Actors ............................................................................................. 167

Human Trafficking, Organised Crime & Intelligence .................................... 213

PART 3: Cooperation ................................................................................... 379

Antonio Maria Costa

revealing that counter-trafficking is rife with trade-offs and unintended

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States

Association of South-East Asian Nations

Analysis Work Files

Coalition Against Trafficking in Women

Closed Circuit Television

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination

Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism

Commonwealth of Independent States

Comprehensive Operational Strategic Planning for the Police

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Department of Defence Inspector General

Democratic Republic of Congo

Economic Community of Central African States

European Criminal Intelligence Model

UN Economic and Social Council

Economic Community of West African States

Europol Information System

European Migration Network

European Security and Defence Policy

EURODAC European Dactyloscopie

European Investigation and Prosecutorial Cooperation

European Police Office

European Border Surveillance System

False and Authentic Documents Online

Financial Action Task Force

Fixed INTERPOL Network Database

European External Borders Agency

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women

Government Accountability Office

Gulf Cooperation Council

Garda National Immigration Bureau

Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings

Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking in Human

Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency

International Criminal Court

International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

International Centre for Migration Policy Development

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all

Information and Communication Technology

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

International Labour Organization

Immigration and Naturalisation Service

International Criminal Police Organization

International Organization for Migration

International Research on Criminal Policy

Justice and Home Affairs

Law Enforcement Agency