EC302 Lecture 1
EC302 Lecture 1
EC302 Lecture 1
Lecture 1- Introduction
October 2015
About me:
Ronny Razin
[email protected]
4.01, 32 Lincoln Inn Fields
Mondays, 11:15-12:15
OccupyWallStreet
The revolution continues worldwide!
Crowd-funding:
1. Information aggregation.
2. Preference aggregation.
3. Legitimacy, Participation and engagement.
Economics
1. Information aggregation.
2. Preference aggregation.
3. Legitimacy, Participation and engagement.
Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy
For a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by
authentic deliberation.
Deliberative democracy
Fishkins model (legitimate deliberation)
Five characteristics essential for legitimate deliberation
Information: Accurate and relevant data is made available to all
participants.
Substantive balance: different positions are compared based on
their supporting evidence.
Diversity: all major positions relevant to the matter at hand and
held by the public are considered.
Conscientiousness: participants sincerely weigh all arguments
Equal consideration: views are weighed based on evidence,
not on who is advocating a particular view.
Deliberative democracy
Other Models and common themes
Cohen (ideal deliberation), Guttman and Thompson (reasoning
based)
Common themes:
1. Deliberation as a key factor.
2. Rational: based on evidence and information.
3. Reason based.
4. Consensus as a goal.
5. Dynamism.
Deliberative democracy
An Economist`s thoughts:
Deliberative democracy
In practice
Occupy movement.
Deliberative polls.
Rational Based.
The importance of institutions. (culture as equilibrium).
Information aggregation.
Preference aggregation.
Legitimacy, participation and engagement.
Legitimacy,
participation and
engagement
Preference aggregation
The voting
paradox
Legitimacy,
participation and
engagement
Preference aggregation
Arrow's
Impossibility
Theorem
Information aggregation
The crowd and the Ox
Information aggregation
The crowd and the Ox
Information aggregation
The moral of the story
Information aggregation
Research questions
Information aggregation
Condorcet's jury theorem
Information aggregation
Condorcet's jury theorem
Theorem:
as the number of Jurors increases, the probability that they choose
the right thing converges to one!
Information aggregation
Accounting for incentives
Information aggregation
Results
Caveats:
Unanimity rule maximizes the probability of convicting the innocent
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer)
Information aggregation
Results
Caveats:
Unanimity rule (Feddersen and Pesendorfer)
Information aggregation
Results
Caveats:
Unanimity rule (Feddersen and Pesendorfer)
costly information acquisition, (Martinelly, Persico, Balazs and Gershkov)
votes used to signal to politicians, (Piketty, Razin, Shotts, Meirovitch)
behavioral voters and Media, (Ortoleva and Snowden, Razin and Levy, Gul and Pesendorfer)
other information structures?
Information aggregation
Implications
Elections are enough, we do not need deliberation when we have
enough people.
More generally, "Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets
(Or Hayek's Challenge to Habermas)", Cass R. Sunstein
Deliberation
A Benchmark
Adding a stage of deliberation before the voting.
Results:
1. Adding deliberation does not increase welfare and sometimes
might decrease it. (Austen-Smith and Feddersen)
2. Deliberation washes out the importance of the consensus level,
but for unanimity rule. (Gerardi and Yariv)
3. No role for dynamics in deliberation. (Gerardi and Yariv, Dekel and Piccione)
Deliberation
Further results: Hazards of Deliberation
In individuals, insanity is
rare; but in groups, parties,
nations, and epochs it is the
rule.
Deliberation
Further results: Hazards of Deliberation
Deliberation
Further results: Hazards of Deliberation
Herding behaviour, Reputation. (Callander, Fey, Banerjee...)
Group think and Group polarization, risky and cautious shifts, (Janis,
Stoner, Sunstein, Eliaz Ray and Razin)
Hidden profiles.
Interaction Process analysis (IPA), large groups base decisions
on smaller number of people. Bales (1950)
Caveat: (small) Groups make participants more rational? (Bornstein,
Bornstein and Yaniv, Cooper and Kagel...).
Deliberation
is useless
Deliberation
is useful
Deliberative
Democracy
Deliberation
is useless
the weight of
the ox
Deliberation
is useful
Deliberative
Democracy
Lovely in theory, but people don't have the time to commit to informed
direct democracy...
the weight
of the ox
Deliberation
is useless
Deliberation
is useful
"should we
use online
deliberation?"
Deliberative
Democracy
the weight
of the ox
Deliberation
is useless
Deliberation
is useful
Empirical question!
"should we
use online
deliberation?"
Deliberative
Democracy
BUT,
Outline of course
Outline of course