AKParty Response to

Criticism: Reaction or
Over-Reaction?
by lter Turan

In Brief: On January 8, around

1,100 academics (mostly Turkish
but more than 300 foreign)
issued a statement calling on
the government to stop its armed
measures to counter PKK actions.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoans
reaction, soon emulated by the
government as a whole, was both
unusually strong and problematic.
Why did the government choose to
move harshly against the signatories
and insist that their declaration be
met with sanctions? A first argument
is that the government has been
deeply immersed in dealing with an
emergency that, if not terminated,
may become an existential question.
A rival explanation focuses on
the intentions and the purported
agenda of the government. Will the
government cool down, or will it
become more hardline?

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Turkeys security forces are engaged in a long, drawn

out, and patience-testing campaign in several towns in
southeastern Turkey, trying to dislodge elements of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that has taken over
sections of these towns. Those who get their information either from the newspapers or the evening
news both of which, in large part, rely on officially
furnished documents and briefings very likely have
in their minds a picture of PKK irregulars holding
the residents of the areas they have seized as hostages.
They have dug ditches in the streets to prevent motorized access to homes and other facilities where they
have situated themselves. They have set up remotecontrolled explosives that can be activated when police
or military vehicles cross, often producing casualties.
They have driven trucks loaded with explosives into
housing complexes where the families of government
and security officials live. They have fired at ambulances that have come to take away the wounded,
rendering rescue operations difficult and sometimes
impossible. They have even thrown hand grenades
and fired explosives at schools, presumably to prevent
Turkish education.
Although it is confined to a specific region of the
country and distant from major metropolitan centers,
the general public perceives the fighting as some
kind of war. As opinion has become more and more

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polarized, a large majority has both tended to blame

the PKK for having brought to an end the peace that
had prevailed in the country over the last few years
and totally identified with the governments efforts to
terminate the PKK challenge through military means.
That government actions might have contributed to
ending the relative peace, and the possibility that the
security forces may have used more force and less
carefully than necessary is not even entertained. It is
not particularly popular to criticize the security forces
or to suggest that a peaceful solution should be sought
to bring the conflict to an end. So when on January
8, around 1,100 academics (mostly Turkish but more
than 300 foreign) issued a statement calling on the
government to stop its armed measures, the reaction of the public, including the government and the
president, was immediate and strongly negative. This
reaction was exacerbated by fiery language in the statement, calling for an end to what it described as the
Turkish governments unilateral use of force against its
citizens, and saying that the signatories would not be a
party to the governments crime.
It is not unusual for governments or public opinion
to get upset with statements from academics. In the
middle of a security campaign against a terrorist
organization, patience and understanding may be
even more difficult to maintain than at other times.
But the presidents reaction, soon emulated by the
government as a whole, was both unusually strong and
problematic. President Recep Tayyip Erdoan considered the statement an act of treason and encouraged
university administrations and the Council on Higher
Education to deal with its authors. He also asked that
public prosecutors take note that the signatories had
extended support to terrorists. Not surprisingly, the
governments stance soon generated further reaction.
More than 1,000 academics added their signatures to
original the statement as an act of sympathy. Another
group of academics, while not expressing an opinion
on the contents of the initial statement, drew attention to the fact that expression of ideas was a democratic right and the rights of the signatories should

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be respected. Soon, members of foreign academic

communities and international professional associations began to issue statements, asking the government
to respect the liberties of the signatories, some making
additional references to academic freedoms and a
peaceful resolution of Turkeys Kurdish problem.
Such developments might have been predicted. If the
government had chosen to ignore the statement, there
was a good chance that it would not have received
as much attention as it did. In a society where the
daily political agenda changes very quickly, it could
have been forgotten in a few days. Why then, did the
government choose to move so harshly against the
signatories and insist that their declaration be met with
sanctions? Two divergent lines of explanations have
been offered.

If the government had

chosen to ignore the
statement, there was a
good chance that it would
not have received as much
attention as it did.
The first argument is that the government has been
deeply immersed in dealing with an emergency that, if
not terminated, may become an existential question. In
the final analysis, a terrorist organization must not be
allowed to take over sections of towns and run them
independently as if a central government does not
exist. In the middle of a security campaign, therefore,
the government tends to view any criticism as seriously undermining its campaign. The proponents of
this view point to the fact that the PYD, the Syrian
branch of the PKK, employed a similar strategy to
successfully take over the administration of Kobane
district, but that the PKK made an error in judgment
in thinking that the same strategy could be employed

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in Turkey. They failed to appreciate the power of the

Turkish state and mistakenly expected all citizens of
Kurdish origin to side with them. Some proponents
of this argument also add a conspiratorial dimension
to the affair, suggesting that the statement was no
innocent declaration but part of a carefully crafted,
probably international, plan whereby after students
came back to campuses from their winter break, large
student demonstrations would be incited across the
country, extending support to the PKK.
A rival explanation focuses on the intentions and the
purported agenda of the government. The defenders
of this view dwell on the point that the government announced the suspension of the so-called
Peace Process in June 2015, the same time as the
majority AKParty experienced substantial losses in
the parliamentary elections both against the nationalists (MHP) and against the mainly Kurdish ethnic
Peoples Democracy Party (HDP) in Turkeys southeast. Losing its parliamentary majority, the AKParty
adopted a new strategy to regain its votes and then
move to a new election. Accordingly, on one hand,
the party adopted a strongly nationalist line to woo
those votes that had gone to the MHP. On the other
hand, in terminating the peace process, it encouraged
voters in the southeast to reconsider their choice of
party if they wanted peace to be maintained. Since the
HDP was closely identified with the PKK, some voters
felt that supporting the HDP would only help bring
violence back. The strategy, which appears to have
been designed and implemented mainly by Erdoan,
worked. In November, the AKParty returned to
government with a substantial parliamentary majority,
though somewhat short of 330 that it would need to
change the constitution and convert Turkey from a
parliamentary to a presidential system. Supporters of
this argument usually add that the country has already
moved into a de facto presidential system despite the
presence of constitutional provisions to the contrary,
and that the system is becoming more authoritarian.
The academicians statement provided the government with an opportunity to silence the universities,

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one of the few remaining institutions that the government had yet failed to bring under its full control,
by showing all that those who criticized government
policies would be exposed to sanctions.
Both lines of argument may have their merits and
shortcomings in explaining the governments behavior.
The fact, however, is that even under conditions of
duress, it is not typical for governments in democratic systems to publicly harass academics and invite
administrators and courts to apply sanctions. Several
of those who had signed the statement were taken in
for questioning by public prosecutors and their homes
and offices searched. No arrests have been made,
however. The Council on Higher Education, the top
administrative body of the Turkish university system,
has also asked university administrators to initiate

It is not typical for

governments in democratic
systems to publicly harass
academics and invite
administrators and courts to
apply sanctions.
disciplinary action against those that have signed the
statement. Some enthusiastic university administrators had already started investigations before receiving
instructions from the Council. Because the signatories
have been university-affiliated individuals, the governments position has been sometimes criticized for not
observing academic freedom. The question is, in fact,
not one of academic freedom in the narrow sense, but
of the freedom of expression, an unalienable right for
all citizens in a liberal democratic system.
The governments response to the statement has generated significant criticism internationally and raised
questions about the nature of the Turkish political
system. Many international professional associa-

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tions and networks of scholars have issued statements

demanding the Turkish government stop procedures
initiated against those academics exercising their
democratic rights. Similar sentiments have been
echoed by global political leaders, including U.S. Vice
President Joe Biden on his recent visit to Turkey. So
far the government insists that those who had signed
the statement had done something wrong and should
be sanctioned. Is this a tempest in a teapot, (i.e. the
government continues to be upset that it was criticized
in the middle of a security campaign, but will eventually cool down) or is it thunder before a storm (i.e.
another step in quieting centers of criticism against the
government, therefore building a more authoritarian
system)? Many intellectuals hope that it is the tempest,
but fear that it may be thunder. Only time will tell.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary

are the views of the author alone.

About the Author

lter Turan is an emeritus professor of political science at
Istanbuls Bilgi University, where he also served as president
between 1998-2001. His previous employment included
professorships at Ko University (1993-98) and Istanbul
University (1964-93), where he also served as the chair of the
International Relations Department (1987-93), and the director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle
East (1985-93).

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about
Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and
U.S. writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from
on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs,
please visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/turkey.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
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