ERECE VS.

MACALINGAY

Atty Erece was the Regional Director CHR Region 1. Macalingay et al were Ereces
subordinates. Macalingay et al were complaining that Erece had continuously denied them
from using the company vehicle. That Erece had been receiving his Representation and
Transportation Allowance yet he prioritizes himself in the use of the vehicle. The issue
reached the CSc proper which found Erece guilty as charged. Erece contends that he was
denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and
their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of
the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his CounterAffidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to
submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the
CSC over his objection. Macalingay et al then submitted their Position Paper and Formal
Offer of Exhibits. Erece submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it
should not be construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants.
Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure, still
Erece should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Erece had been denied due process.
HELD: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he
failed to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the
opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.
Judicial Due Process vs Administrative Due Process
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all

objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an
actual hearing always essential. . . .

Datu Pax Pakung Mangudadatu vs

HRET & Angelo Montilla
November 25, 2010
Due Process Administrative Bodies HRET Service of Summons
Datu Pax and Montilla were rivals in the Congressional elections in 2007. Datu Pax won the
elections. Montilla contested the results of the elections before the HRET. The Secretary of
HRET the issued the summons to Datu Pax to his quite remote residence in Sultan Kudarat.
Datu Pax was required to file a reply within ten days from receipt. The summons was
received by a certain Aileen Baldenas. 43 days past and no answer was received from Datu
Pax as he was unaware of the summons. HRET then considered such inaction as a general
denial to the protest. Datu Pax later learned about the protest against him and he
coordinated with his lawyers to appear on behalf of him and to present the answer as well
as to file counter protest. He alleged that he does not know of a Baldenas nor was she a
part of the household. HRET denied his motion and had proceeded to the recount as
prayed for by Montilla.
ISSUE: Whether or not Datu Pax was denied due process by reason that he did not receive
the summons personally.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Datu Pax. The summons to Datu Pax should not have been
delivered via registered mail as the same is susceptible to fraud. The HRET should have
made use of its own servers to make sure that the summons is personally received by Datu
Pax. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (which is in one way or the other adopted by the
2004 HRET rules on summons) provides that:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests)
personal service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on
jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason should election cases (which
involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of
service of summons under the Rules of Court.

Department of Education
Godofredo Cuanan

vs

November 6, 2010
574 SCRA 41 Remedial Law Due Process Certiorari; when available Service of
Summons
In 1996, Godofredo Cuanan, while being a school principal in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija,
was charged for sexual harassment. DECS Region III created an investigating committee
and the latter found Cuanan guilty as charged. Consequently, the Regional Director
caused the forced resignation of Cuanan.
In 2000, then DECS Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed the decision of the Regional
Director and denied Cuanans Motion for Reconsideration. Cuanan appealed to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) which reversed Gonzales decision in January 2003. The CSC
issued a copy of the resolution to Cuanan and DepEd, however, it seems that Dep Ed was
not able to receive the copy as it requested a copy thereof again. The next month, Cuanan
requested to be reinstated; the same was indorsed by the District Superintendent.
In March 2003, the new DECS Secretary (Edilberto de Jesus) received a copy of the CSC
resolution. In April 2003, de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration but without furnishing a
copy to Cuanan. In July 2003, de Jesus filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration; no
copy was furnished to Cuanan again.

In October 2004, CSC reversed its decision and found Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment.
Cuanan filed a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. He averred that the CSC
decision in January 2003 had already become final and executory when de Jesus filed the
MR. The CA reversed the decision of the CSC.
DECS assailed the reversal as it averred that the proper remedy availed of by Cuanan
should have been a petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuanans petition for certiorari was proper.
HELD: Yes. The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA. It is true that under the rules, the remedy
of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for
review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the
resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition
dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to
wit:
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
(c) when the writs issued are null and void; or
(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In the case at bar, (c) above is the applicable exception. Cuanan was not furnished any
copy of the MR filed by DECS. As such, he was deprived due process for he never got the
chance to comment on the MR. Hence, the decision rendered by the CSC on the said MR is
void.
Here, Cuanan was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the
proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object, then a
certiorari petition is in order.
At any rate, Cuanans petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition for
review, the petition having been filed on November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from
receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No. 041147, clearly within the 15-day
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. Such move would be in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial

Relations
November 6, 2010
69 Phil. 635 Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process in Administrative Bodies
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Motion For New Trial; Grounds
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of
said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained
by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by
the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due

process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.

American Tobacco Company vs

Director of Patents
November 6, 2010
67 SCRA 287 Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process; Administrative Bodies

The American Tobacco Company (ACT) was a party to a trademark case pending before
the Philippine Patent Office. ATC challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules
of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear
inter partes proceedings.
ATC argued that the same set of Rules provides that all judgments determining the merits
of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him
hence it is improper for the director to designate a lower ranking official as hearing officers
to hear the case; that it is clear that under the Rules, the Director must personally hear the
case otherwise, there will be a violation of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of hearing officers other than the Director of Patents
is a violation of due process.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to
hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion
does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the
aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised
are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same
officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is
supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due
process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the
part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said
officer. It is, however, required that to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the
purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations
must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NLRC 175 SCRA 277 MEDIALDEA, J.

FACTS
1. Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisor
leadman since January 1963 up to the time when his services were terminated on
May 18,1983.
2. In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner
company for electrical services at his residence.
3. Private respondent Signo facilitated the processing of the said application as well
as the required documentation for said application. In consideration thereof, private
respondent received from De Lara the amount of P7,000. Signo thereafter filed the
application for electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company.
4. Since De Laras residence was not yet serviceable, certain employees of the
company, including respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the
sarisari store at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the subdivision, is
applicant de Laras establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the latter.
5. As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Laras residence were
installed and made possible. However, due to the fault of Power Sales Division of
Petitioner Company, Fernando de Lara was not billed for more than a year.
6. Petitioner conducted an investigation of the matter and found respondent Signo
responsible for the said irregularity in the installation. Thus, the services of the
latter were terminated.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed from Petitioner Company on
grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
HELD
There is no question that herein respondent Signo is guilty of breach of trust and
violation of company rules, the penalty for which ranges from reprimand to
dismissal depending on the gravity of the offense. However, as earlier stated, the
respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiter found that dismissal should not be
meted to respondent Signo considering his 20 years of service in the employ of
petitioner, without any previous derogatory record, in addition to the fact that
Petitioner Company had awarded him in the past, 2 commendations for honesty. If
ever the petitioner suffered losses resulting from the unlisted electric consumption
of de Lara, this was found to be the fault of petitioners Power Sales Division. We
find no reason to disturb these findings. Well established is the principle that
findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect
but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to
evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or
office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave

abuse of discretion. This Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions,
that notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of
trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too
severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in
the service of his employer.

Diosdado Guzman vs National

University
July 5, 2015
142 SCRA 699 Political Law Bill of Rights Due Process Due Process in Educational
Institutions

n 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU)

barred them from enrolling in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was
due to the students fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass
actions within the university premises; that such mass actions were violative of school
policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that Guzman et
al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of
both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado Guzman et al in the
case at bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed
which school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may
be expelled from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not
necessarily a trial type one) to determine Guzman et als liability or alleged participation in
the said mass actions.

Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others
to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations. Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due
process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that
no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in
the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after
due investigation shall have been conducted.
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon
the students without due investigation such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

BABELO
BERINA,
MARILOU
ELAGDON,
ERNESTO
ROBERTO
and
JESUS
SORIAO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MARITIME INSTITUTE, TOMAS CLOMA and JAIME CLOMA, respondents.
Babelo Beria, Marilou Elagdon, Ernesto Roberto and Jesus Soriao are students of the Philippine
Maritime Institute, PMI for short. In their petition which is styled FOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
EQUITABLE REMEDY WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, they claim that PMI, five weeks after
school had started, posted sometime in August, 1981, a notice that there would be a 15% increase
in tuition fees retroactive to the start of the current semester; that the students met and took positive
steps in respect of the problem; that their representatives held dialogues with the school
administration; "that, in reaction to these legitimate student activities and without compliance with
due process respondents commencing on October 15, 1981 issued expulsion orders against Jesus
Soriao, Ernesto Roberto, and Babelo Berina and an indefinite suspension against Marilou Elagdon;"
that the penalties were imposed without due process and had the effect of negating the petitioners'
right to free speech, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances. The petitioners pray
that the expulsion and suspension orders be annulled and that while the case is pending resolution
they be restored to their status as students of the PMI,
On November 10, 1981, We required PMI and its officers who were included as respondents to
comment on the petition. We also issued a temporary restraining order commanding the
respondents to refrain from carrying out the expulsion and suspension orders.
PMI filed its comment as required where it said that the 15% increase in tuition fee had been
authorized by the Ministry of Education and Culture; and denied that the action taken against the
petitioners was in response to their activities in connection with the tuition fee increase. The
comment also advances the arguments that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition
because it involves "matters that are well within the competence and jurisdiction of the lower courts
to pass upon, as even more serious matters and cases of greater consequences are normally
brought before them at the first instance prior to any appeal to the Supreme Court, and there are no
valid and impelling excuses to warrant a direct recourse to the Highest Tribunal in the judicial
hierarchy."
We are not called upon to determine the validity or propriety of the tuition fee increase of 15% five
weeks after the classes for the current semester had started. The issue in this case is limited to the
question as to whether or not the petitioners were denied by the respondents their constitutional
rights to due process, free speech, peaceful assembly and petition to redress of grievances. Treating
the petition as having been filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as the petitioners assert, We
have no doubt that there is no absence of jurisdiction.
Typical of the expulsion orders is that which was issued to petitioner Jesus Soriao on October 15,
1981, which has been marked as Annex A of the petition and which reads as follows:
For conduct unbecoming as a Cadet, you are hereby dropped from the roll of
students of the School.
That your actuations and behavior as reported and seen leave no other recourse
hence this action.

That on September 9th, you with another student was (sic) caught inside the STC
Building, distributing leaflets, enticing and coercing other students to join the slated
demonstration.
In the subsequent days, you were caught again by the undersigned campaigning and
distributing leaflets, enjoining other students to join the boycott.
That all these actions are contrary to MEC regulations and directives that appropriate
action had to be taken.
For your guidance.
The suspension order which was issued for Marilou Elagdon on October 20, 1981, which has been
marked Annex C of the petition reads:
Please be informed that C/miss ELAGDON, Marilou is hereby suspended from her
classes for conduct unbecoming of a Cadetee as against the rules and regulation of
the School.
Let the above-named student see the undersigned and in the meantime she
remained suspended until clearance is given by this office.
For your guidance.
The comment does not positively assert that in imposing the expulsion and suspension orders there
was observance of due process which simply means that the petitioners should have been given an
opportunity to defend themselves. It was only after the petitioners had said in their reply that the
respondents failed to traverse the denial of due process that the latter invoked the legal presumption
"that the ordinary course of business has been followed" (Sec. 5(q), Rule 131, Rules of Court)."
It is obvious from the expulsion and suspension orders that the petitioners were denied due
process,res ipsa loquitur. For the orders are bereft of the sides of the petitioners. Hence the legal
presumption of regularity cannot be availed in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the expulsion and suspension orders are hereby set aside but
without prejudice to the power of the respondents to formally charge the petitioners for violation(s) of
reasonable school rules and regulations and after due notice to hear and decide the charge. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA

TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES
YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER
EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN
AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES,
JR., respondents.

Facts:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente
and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were
expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting
private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic
freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against
respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion
for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate
writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent
Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from
expulsion to exclusion.5
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, 19 pursuant to CHED Order No.
4

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration 22 before the Office of

the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all
denied in a Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
The ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby
restrained and enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995
ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-inintervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
in the courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to
forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to
enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat.
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by
petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the
second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in
contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll
him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September 20,
1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary
injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE
University as well as your subordinates, agents, representatives,
employees and any other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf,
to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995
ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU,
and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution
of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of
petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow
them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation
from said school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of

preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's

September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 18196, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private
respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other
private respondents were to be excluded.38

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner

Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus,
private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner
DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution
No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution
No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in
petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary
injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 9574122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review
decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action
on their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private
respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial

evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is
proportionate to their misdeed.

Held:
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners 53 that while CHED
Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it
nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because
of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle
of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge
CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and
complete their degree courses until their graduation.
It
is
the
power
of
disciplinary
of higher learning.

CHED,
not
DECS,
supervision
and
cases
decided

which
has
the
review
over
by
institutions

On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An
Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof
and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED,
provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In
pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher
Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the
President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both
public and private institutions of higher education as well as degreegranting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and
private.

The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No.
7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers
and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and
objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective
operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development
of higher education.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997
areANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14,
1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor
of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the
names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its
rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.