CORRECTED COPY

USSOCOM DIRECTIVE 525-21

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 336215323
USSOCOM DIRECTIVE
Number 525-21cc

4 May 2000
Military Operations
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
Table of Contents

Section I.

Section II.

Paragraph

Page

General
Purpose ...............................................................................................
Scope..................................................................................................
Applicability .......................................................................................
Definitions ..........................................................................................
References ..........................................................................................

1
2
3
4
5

2
2
2
2
3

Introduction
Overview ............................................................................................
Personnel Recovery Categories ...........................................................
Assisted Recovery Methods ................................................................
SOF Support to Personnel Recovery Operations..................................

6
7
8
9

3
5
6
8

10
11
12

9
9
9

13
14
15
16

14
14
14
15

Section III. Policy and Responsibilities

DoD Policy .........................................................................................
USSOCOM Policy ..............................................................................
Responsibilities...................................................................................
Section IV.

USSOCOM Personnel Recovery Council

Purpose ...............................................................................................
Composition........................................................................................
Responsibilities...................................................................................
Proponent............................................................................................

Pages: 36

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Paragraph

Page

Appendixes

Glossary

A - Training ........................................................................................
B - Command and Control ..................................................................
C - Legal Considerations ....................................................................
D - Evasion Considerations.................................................................

A-1
B-1
C-1
D-1

...........................................................................................................

GL-1

Table
C-1. Legal Status ..................................................................................

C-2

SECTION I -- GENERAL
1. Purpose. This directive provides a framework for personnel recovery (PR) as it pertains to Special
Operations Forces (SOF). It prescribes policies, procedures and responsibilities for PR within
USSOCOM and its components and forms the basis for understanding the unique contribution of SOF to
the PR mission area.
2. Scope. This directive addresses PR which encompasses, but is not limited to, Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR), Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), Evasion and Recovery (E&R), Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE), and coordination of forcible or negotiated recovery options.
SOF will have varying degrees of responsibility across all sub-tasks. This directive does not pertain to
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or counterterrorism operations, which are addressed in
other publications and are not components of PR although PR may occur during the course of these
operations.
3. Applicability. This directive applies to all USSOCOM Components and Theater Special Operations
Commands to include:
a. Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command (HQ USSOCOM).
b. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).
c. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).
d. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
e. Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM).
f. Theater Special Operations Commands (SOC)
g. Separate Special Mission Units (SMU) under the Combatant Command of USCINCSOC
4. Definitions. See Glossary, Section II.

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5. References. See Glossary, Section III.

SECTION II -- INTRODUCTION

6. Overview.
a. Personnel Recovery is the aggregation of military, civilian, and political efforts to recover captured,
detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas.
This includes the recovery of U.S. personnel or others designated by National Command Authorities
(NCA). PR includes, but is not limited to CSAR; SERE; E&R; NAR; and the coordination of negotiated
as well as forcible recovery options. PR occurs primarily through military actions, however, nongovernmental actions, other U.S. Government (USG) approved action, or diplomatic initiatives can also
play an important role. In some cases, a combination of all actions may be used.
b. PR is an issue of national importance. Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. Service members
placed in danger of isolation or capture while participating in government-sponsored activities overseas is
one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense (DoD). This priority is based on four enduring
principles:
(1) Americans place great value on the sanctity of human life. When the President commits forces
overseas, Americans have a moral obligation to do everything in our power to bring our personnel home
safely.
(2) By inculcating in the minds of our Armed Forces personnel the knowledge that if they become
isolated we will recover them, we build confidence and a willingness to exert their utmost in times of
great stress.
(3) When our armed forces possess an effective personnel recovery capability, we deny our enemies
a valuable source of intelligence and political leverage against our government.
(4) Our highly trained personnel are a valuable and limited resource that we cannot afford to lose.
c. PR is built around the following five specific tasks that occur in varying degrees during each PR
incident:
(1) Report. Reporting includes immediate secure voice reporting of all incidents using required PR
report formats, preparing additional reports as directed by the theater Joint Search and Rescue Center
(JSRC) and the Joint Forces Commander (JFC), and recording all information received about a given
incident.
(2) Locate. Locating involves all actions taken to locate an isolated person and to pass the resulting
information to the appropriate organizations for coordination and action.

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(3) Support. Providing support for PR involves planned efforts once the isolated person is located.
This support also includes family support during a PR incident.
(4) Recover. Recovering includes coordinating all efforts to recover the isolated person using any
of the capabilities available and acceptable to the NCA.
(5) Repatriate. Repatriating isolated personnel is the final task and involves all efforts to smoothly
return the isolated persons to their previous life or their remains to the next of kin.
d. These five specific PR tasks represent the interrelated subsystems and are the core of how DoD
supports and recovers an isolated person(s). The success of the PR system also relies on several other
factors relevant to the recovery of individuals to include:
(1) Individual Training. Individuals who have the potential to become isolated require adequate
preparation and training in order to assist their own recovery and stay free and survive the ordeal.
Individual preparation should include training on peacetime and combat situations and environments,
policy, force structure, and operational concepts in order to enable potential evaders to support their own
recovery.
(2) Support Agencies. Supporting and coordinating agencies from other communities are essential
for successful mission accomplishment. These supporting agencies provide functional expertise
specifically related to the support and recovery of an isolated person(s). This expertise is available at all
levels of the joint command. Agencies supporting PR include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Department of State (DOS), Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the United States Joint Forces Commands (USJFCOM) Joint Personnel
Recovery Agency (JPRA).
e. Recovery methods range from basic search and rescue (SAR) missions performed in a permissive
environment to highly complex Recovery Mechanisms (RM) executed in a high threat environment.
Regardless of the situation, personnel must be knowledgeable of recovery procedures and be prepared to
assist in their own recovery to the greatest extent possible. Evader recovery falls into two basic
categories: assisted and unassisted recovery operations. Recovery planning should fully evaluate
available assets and projected conditions to determine the best method of recovery depending upon the
threat, the condition of the isolated personnel, and the type of recovery forces available to execute the
mission. Isolated personnel or evaders may recover, or be recovered, to friendly control in a number of
ways:
(1) They may be recovered as the result of planned military/government operations.
(2) They may be assisted or recovered as the result of contact with the local populace after
accidental contact, after seeking an act of mercy, or after the evader encounters opportunists seeking some
form of gain. Motivation for assistance may be for monetary or material gain, political recognition,
patriotism, hatred of a common enemy, religious convictions, or compassion for another human in trouble.
(3) They make their way to friendly or neutral territory without assistance.

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f. Most PR operations extend across Service and national lines of responsibility. The capability and/or
availability of recovery assets determines the potential for successfully recovering isolated personnel. A
single recovery system, force, or organization is not suitable in all situations. Instead, recoveries may be
conducted as joint or combined operations. To increase the probability of success for PR missions, a mix
of conventional and unconventional recovery systems should be available for employment. Operational
flexibility and multi-system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery operations. Local
conditions should be considered as factors to be exploited or overcome. Establishing alternative recovery
systems or adapting standardized recovery systems to local conditions increases the potential for success.
7. Personnel Recovery Categories.
a. Unassisted Recovery (Escape & Evasion). In unassisted recovery, evaders independently make
their way back to friendly control. Evaders may simply hide and survive in a single location while waiting
to be overrun by friendly forces or evade back to friendly or neutral territory. Unassisted recovery is
normally a backup option as a hedge against the failure of outside or assisted recovery efforts. Successful
unassisted recovery depends largely on the evaders will and ability, personal background, physical
condition, pre-mission evasion preparation, and previous combat survival and SERE training. Because
extended unassisted recovery is always a possibility, an Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) and evasion
equipment and aids should always address such evasion contingencies. Evaders may need to travel long
distances over unfamiliar terrain, suffering long periods of hunger, thirst, and exposure. The primary
concern of evaders facing these situations is reaching a location where recovery can be effected. Airdelivered or pre-positioned supplies (caches) of evasion or survival equipment can significantly improve
the evaders potential for success. Unassisted recovery may change to assisted recovery if an evader is
successful at signaling or communicating with friendly forces, or if the evader reaches a pre-determined
recovery point or a point where contact with a manned recovery mechanism or a CSAR force can take
place. When possible, following an EPA can facilitate the assistance.
b. Assisted Recovery Operations. Assisted recovery operations involve support to aid the recovery of
personnel. This support may be provided by indigenous personnel acting on their own motivation or it
may make use of aerial, surface, and subsurface conventional and unconventional forces.
(1) Indigenous Assisted Recovery. Unplanned assisted recoveries may occur when local people in
enemy-held areas assist evaders in returning to friendly control. An issued blood chit may be used to
solicit aid from unplanned contacts with the local populace. Evaders should attempt to turn a dangerous
situation into assistance when faced with accidental or unwanted contact with indigenous people by using
their blood chit. People involved in indigenous assistance that may lead to recovery include:
(a) Opportunists. Some individuals or groups may detain an evader for personal reasons such
as the expectation of monetary or material gain or political recognition for the evaders safe return.
(b) Accidental Contacts. After inadvertent contact, individuals may decide to help an evader
they encounter anticipating the blood chit reward or for other personal reasons.
(c) Acts of Mercy. Individuals who perform acts of mercy without expectation of monetary
reward or are sympathetic to the plight of the evader.

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These are individuals an evader has intentionally selected in the hope that they will provide assistance in a
life-threatening situation. Blood Chit use may help eliminate indecision.
(2) Conventional/Non-conventional Assisted Recovery. PR operations to provide support and/or
assistance for the purpose of recovering distressed personnel. These recovery operations may take two
different forms: PR operations executed specifically to recover personnel, and PR operations that result
from the re-direction of some other mission. See paragraph 8 for further discussion on assisted recovery
methods.
(a) Examples of missions executed specifically to recover personnel include SAR, CSAR, and
NAR missions. NAR includes Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) which is inherently a SOF
recovery mission.
(b) Examples of re-directed personnel recovery include Direct Action (DA) and Special
Reconnaissance (SR) missions re-tasked to aid or recover distressed personnel.
8. Assisted Recovery Methods. Conventional and unconventional forces may employ a variety of
procedures to recover isolated personnel. The specific method is dictated by the situation and mission
analysis. Methods include:
a. Search and Rescue (SAR). The use of aircraft, national assets, surface craft, submarines,
specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.
The unique capabilities of SOF to rapidly deploy and conduct all-weather, long-range operations may
make SOF a theater commander in chief's (CINC) only option in a SAR situation. SAR is conducted in a
permissive environment.
b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). CSAR is a specified task to effect the recovery of distressed
personnel during wartime or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Joint doctrine states that
each Service Component and USSOCOM is responsible for performing CSAR for their respective forces.
SOF conducting CSAR in support of their own forces is known as self-recovery. If CSAR is conducted in
support of a components military operations that has exceeded the CSAR capabilities and/or availability
of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components, then the operation is referred to as
Joint CSAR (JCSAR). CSAR/JCSAR forces may employ any one of a variety of procedures to recover
isolated personnel. The specific method of recovery employed will be dictated by the situation. Several
CSAR recovery methods are listed below:
(1) Single Unit. This method employs a single type of vehicle, normally a helicopter or flight of
helicopters, to penetrate hostile or denied territory without support of a Combat Search and Rescue Task
Force (CSARTF). While this is the preferred method of recovery, terrain, enemy activity, and
meteorological conditions may suggest using other methods.
(2) Combat Search and Rescue Task Force. This method involves forces committed to a specific
CSAR operation to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated personnel during wartime or
contingency operations. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and
protect the rescue vehicle(s) from enemy air or ground attack.

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(3) Low-visibility Options. The general concept of employing specialized teams and/or SOF
recovery operations is to place isolated personnel in company with a highly trained unit as soon as
possible and to move them to an area of friendly control. Low visibility operations are recovery mission
requiring surface operations to provide a survivor/evader any medical treatment or environmental
protection necessary, escort to friendly lines, or linkup and handoff to other forces. SOF refer to low
visibility options as unconventional assisted recovery. This method of recovery is discussed below.
c. Unconventional Assisted Recovery. The UAR concept has developed from an appreciation of
current DoD and Other Government Agencies (OGA) capabilities to establish and maintain evasion,
escape, and recovery capabilities adequate to augment the entire spectrum of contingency missions. UAR
differs from conventional recovery operations in the degree of physical and political risk, operational
techniques, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and
indigenous assets. UAR operations differ from intelligence-related activities in their operational focus.
The development and use of a recovery team (RT) and recovery mechanism (RM) require specialized
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used by small, specially trained and configured organizations
capable of independent operations where the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or
infeasible. SOF may conduct or support UAR activities unilaterally or with resistance forces, partisans,
third-country nationals, and OGA. Assisted recoveries are either deliberately planned or unplanned and
take place as a result of chance. Planned recoveries include:
(1) Follow-on Missions. SOF conducting other operations can be re-directed by the JFC, through
the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC), to conduct assisted recovery. SOF
used in this capacity are normally executing deliberate missions for the JFC so a conscious decision must
be made as to the risk of both the evader and the SOF unit. If tasked to include potential recovery actions
as part of their initial planning, SOF teams operating in or near a known evader location can move to the
area; locate, contact, authenticate, and recover the evader; and move to an exfiltration point. Redirecting
infiltrated SOF to perform recovery operations precludes continued performance of the original Special
Operations (SO) mission; therefore the decision to redirect is normally made by the JFC in coordination
with the JFSOCC with input provided by the JSRC.
(2) Recovery Team. The JFC can task the SO component to plan and execute direct action missions
to complement the theater PR program. SOF elements develop specific, detailed plans to complement
other PR capabilities. Normally developed in peacetime and periodically updated to maintain currency,
these preplanned DA missions focus on providing SO recovery support in existing Selected Areas for
Evasion (SAFE) and/or other designated recovery areas to provide the JFC recovery options in areas
where the employment of other PR assets is either infeasible or unacceptable. These recovery operations
may be conducted as stand-alone missions or may complement RM operations.
(3) Recovery Mechanism. RMs support E&R operations, particularly in cases where U.S.
unconventional forces or allied personnel support or direct the activities of the mechanisms. RMs can
support both conventional and unconventional recovery operations. A RM or elements thereof may effect
the recovery of personnel through different operational areas and environments. Other mechanisms or
groups, operating independently or collectively, may also determine it is in their interest to assist evaders.
RM operations require extensive peacetime/pre-crisis planning and normally involve inter-agency
coordination/cooperation. The theater SOC is normally tasked by the JFC to plan and execute RM
operations in support of the theater PR plan in coordination with the JSRC.

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9. SOF Support to Personnel Recovery Operations. SOF provides support to the theater PR effort in a
variety of ways and may be tasked to support any of the categories of recovery mentioned above. One of
the greatest strengths of SOF is their ability to respond across the spectrum of conflict.
If a crisis develops, SOF are normally on hand and often offer a regional and cultural understanding to go
along with their unique training and specialized equipment. This capability often makes SOF the best or
only option for conducting PR missions. USSOCOM has Title 10 United States Code (USC)
responsibilities for personnel recovery (Subsection 167) principally under the following missions but
possibly under other mission areas as well.
a. Principal Missions.
(1) Direct Action (DA). DA is a combat operation conducted by SOF in hostile or denied territory
beyond the operational capabilities of tactical weapons systems and conventional military forces. DA
missions to locate, recover, and restore to friendly control persons held captive, isolated, or threatened in
sensitive, denied, or contested areas may be conducted when the priority of the operation is sufficiently
high to warrant planning and conducting a special operation. Detailed planning, rehearsals, and in-depth
intelligence analysis characterize SOF recovery missions. They routinely employ unconventional tactics
and techniques, covert or clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat
elements. Examples of PR related DA missions are rescuing U.S. or allied POWs or using ground forces
to locate, identify and recover downed aircrews.
(2) Special Reconnaissance (SR). SR operations encompass a broad range of intelligence
collection activities, to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. SR supports PR
efforts by locating and surveilling hostage, POW or political prisoner detention facilities. Operational
elements conducting SR can be redirected to conduct Direct Action to recover and restore to friendly
control persons held captive or isolated in sensitive, denied or contested areas.
(3) Unconventional Warfare (UW). UW encompasses a broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. UW
includes E&E that encompass the procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other
selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly
control. SOF can be employed in a clandestine manner to support recovery. SOF can assist in recovery
operations before or during hostilities to support recovery of friendly personnel. SOF are normally used
in specified or designated areas such as SAFEs or other pre-determined recovery sites. SAFEs and predetermined recovery sites are pre-designated, allowing SOF the ability to request the appropriate
intelligence support and conduct a thorough analysis of the area before insertion. In addition, SOF may
unilaterally develop or provide support to establish a recovery mechanism. The use of indigenous forces
or third-country nationals as a RM to recover evaders may provide added operational flexibility. UW
operations behind enemy lines are conducted clandestinely and at times may be covert.
(4) PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA). These SOF principal missions are intrinsic to PR through their
direct access to NGO, private voluntary organizations (PVO), and diplomatic channels. This access also
includes their influence upon the target audience.
b. Collateral Activities.

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(1) JCSAR. SOF are often tasked to provide JCSAR for other components due to their unique
capabilities and the unavailability of other forces to conduct the mission. Even when other CSAR forces
are available, SOF may be tasked with the mission to provide an additional capability not found in other
components.
(2) Special Activities (SA). SA are highly compartmented and centrally managed and controlled.
Whether supporting or conducting a special activity, SOF may perform any of their primary wartime
missions subject to the limitations imposed by the NCA. Special activities may require oversight,
interagency coordination, and/or control of SOF by other government agencies (OGA).

SECTION III POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

10. DoD Policy. It is DoD policy that preserving the life and well-being of U.S. military, DoD
emergency-essential civilian employees and DoD-essential contractor service employees placed in danger
of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. DoD has a
moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of U.S. personnel by adversaries, and reduce
the potential of captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States.
11. USSOCOM Policy. This document establishes the basis for SOF PR doctrine. SOF are responsible
for the self-recovery of special operations personnel, unconventional assisted recovery and, when directed
by a theater CINC, JCSAR.
a. Self-recovery. USSOCOM maintains a Service-like responsibility to perform CSAR in support of
its own operations consistent with capabilities and assigned functions and in accordance with the
requirements of the supported commander. SOF must maintain an inherent and/or organic capability to
conduct self-recovery within its core mission force structure. Self-recovery must be an inherent part of
every SO mission and includes both self-CSAR and emergency exfiltration operations.
b. Unconventional Assisted Recovery. SOF develop and execute UAR across the spectrum of
conflict in all environments. UAR may be conducted unilaterally, with indigenous assets, or in
conjunction with other government agencies. SOF may develop a unilateral UAR capability for its own
force protection. CGUSASOC is designated USCINCSOCs proponent for UAR matters.
c. Joint CSAR. When CSAR requirements exceed theater joint CSAR capabilities, SOF may be
directed to perform JCSAR missions. However, JCSAR taskings may be at the expense of core SOF
mission readiness and/or capabilities. SOFs normal operational area or environment coupled with their
unique ability to penetrate hostile defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep
within hostile or denied territory at night or in adverse weather make SOF highly suited for this mission.
AFSOC/CC is designated USCINCSOCs proponent for CSAR/JCSAR matters.
12.

Responsibilities.

a. USSOCOM

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(1) DoDD 2310.2 directs USSOCOM to perform the following tasks:

(a) Ensure that sufficient personnel recovery capabilities (facilities, equipment, training, and
personnel, etc) are developed, programmed, and budgeted to accommodate USSOCOM PR requirements
and the SOF requirements of the Combatant Commands.
(b) Establish an office of primary responsibility for coordinating all personnel recovery matters
and notify the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), US Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM), and JPRA of the office designated.
(c) Provide results of USSOCOM inspection programs regarding PR matters to DPMO,
USJFCOM, and JPRA.
(d) Ensure SOF are trained to the appropriate level (A, B, and C) of Code of Conduct training as
directed in DoD Directive 1300.7.

Conduct applicable pre-deployment refresher training prior to deployment of personnel

participating in contingency operations.

In coordination with the Combatant Commands, develop standards for determining

personnel requiring Level C, high-risk-of-capture training or exploitation training.

Ensure DoD civilians and emergency essential contract personnel receive appropriate
levels of SERE training commensurate with theater admission and Combatant
Command requirements prior to deployment to overseas locations.
(e) Establish repatriation plans in accordance with DoD Instruction 2310.4 incorporating
guidance from the Combatant Commands and JPRA.
(f) Comply with the provisions of DoD Instruction 2310.5, Accounting for Missing Persons, for
determining the status of missing persons, and for the systematic, comprehensive, and timely collection,
analysis, review, dissemination, and periodic update of information related to such persons.
(g) Provide Flag Officer representation to the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) and
appropriate representation to the Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group (PRTWG).
(2) CJSCI 3270.01 directs USSOCOM to perform the following tasks:
(a) Designate an OPR/point of contact that coordinates all aspects of PR.
(b) Perform CSAR in support of own operations consistent with capabilities and assigned
functions and IAW the requirements of the supported combatant commander.

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(c) Facilitate effective SERE, Code of Conduct (CoC), and CSAR training; categorize
USSOCOM members by risk of capture during peace, war, and MOOTW as determined by combatant
commanders. Identify training shortfalls and deficiencies through appropriate Service or warfighting
channels and include the PR/OPR as an addressee.
(d) Provide USSOCOM members appropriate equipment and training to facilitate their
successful return to U.S. control in the event of isolation. The PR/OPR is responsible for advising the
components about appropriate equipment and training.
b. Staff Functions.
(1) USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy (SOOP) shall:
(a) Provide command oversight of the USSOCOM PR program for USCINCSOC.
(b) Validate PR related desired operational capabilities and requirements.
(c) Serve as the USSOCOM principal representative on the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group
(PRAG).
(2) USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy, Plans Division (SOOP-PD) shall:
(a) Serve as the USSOCOM personnel recovery proponent to coordinate all aspects of the
USSOCOM PR program.
(b) Chair the USSOCOM personnel recovery council (PRC).
(c) Provide guidance, command policy, and procedures for the conduct of personnel recovery by
promulgation, receipt of proposed changes, and revision of this directive.
(d) Serve as point of contact (POC) for coordination of PR matters with all components and
activities outside USSOCOM.
(3) USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy, Training Division (SOOP-OT) shall:
(a) Ensure mechanisms are in place that ensure SO personnel classified as significant or highrisk-of-capture (HRC) and exploitation receive Level C SERE training, and training on conventional and
unconventional recovery procedures.
(b) Ensure that all SO personnel are trained in the Geneva Convention and the Law of Armed
Conflict.
(c) Ensure all SO personnel are receiving adequate and appropriate training related to the Code
of Conduct in accordance with DoD Directive 1300.7 and Service specific guidance.
(d) Ensure that PR activities are included in joint and combined training exercises.

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(4) USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy, Doctrine and Education Division (SOOPPJ): Provide educational and doctrinal guidance for the conduct of personnel recovery by promulgating,
reviewing, and revising, USSOCOM and joint doctrinal publications.
(5) USSOCOM Center for Intelligence and Information Operations (SOIO) shall:
(a) Forward to the DIA and JPRA internally developed intelligence requirements relating to PR.
(b) Evaluate SAFEs nominated by components and sub-unified command and forward them to
DIA.
(c) Coordinate and validate intelligence support requirements for PR.
(d) Validate Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G ) requirements and forward to
appropriate agencies
(e) Serve as the focal point for PR Command, Control, Communication, Computers and
Intelligence (C4I) related initiatives and developments
(6) USSOCOM Center for Force Structure, Requirements, Resources, and Strategic Assessments
(SORR) shall:
(a) Incorporate PR related tasks into the Strategic Planning Process (SPP).
(b) Provide assessments of the PR mission area to identify deficiencies and recommend solutions
to the deficiencies.
(c) Provide PR related material requirements as identified in the SPP.
(7) USSOCOM Center for Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) shall:
(a) Ensure approved PR-related equipment is acquired and available for requesting units.
(b) Provide a technology expert to represent USSOCOM on the DoD PR Technology Working
Group.
c. Component Commanders
(1) Designate an OPR/POC to coordinate all aspects of PR.
(2) Establish a PR council to address Service-unique issues, develop doctrine/TTP, and identify
issues for elevation to higher headquarters.

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(3) Determine shortfalls in PR capabilities and identify doctrinal, organizational and materiel
solutions.
(4) Establish a program of routine inspections of PR capabilities, training and equipment.
(5) Incorporate PR tactics, techniques, and procedures into component training programs and
standard operating procedures.
(6) Ensure SO personnel meet theater admission requirements for SERE/CoC training.
(7) Identify significant or HRC and exploitation personnel.
(8) Ensure all personnel committed to a hostile environment are familiar with tactics employed by
PR forces.
(9) Ensure personnel who may be subject to isolation or capture while in hostile territory receive
Service required or USCINCSOC directed SERE/CoC training and Geneva conventions and laws of
armed conflict training.
(10)

Identify and nominate key personnel for indoctrination into all national PR programs.

d. Unit Commanders
(1) Based on inherent capabilities, prepare to conduct recovery operations for their own forces, and
prepare to conduct training to provide mutual PR support to other units.
(2) Ensure Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREP) and Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) forms are
properly prepared, maintained, reviewed and classified.
(3) Ensure all applicable assigned and attached personnel are familiar with this publication, JCSAR
and UAR SOPs, SERE techniques and procedures, CSAR Special Instructions (SPINS), SAFEs, and other
pre-designated evasion points for contingency operations.
(4) During the operational planning phase, forward requirements for blood chits and PR products
(evasion aids) to the component PR office, or functional equivalent, as soon as the need becomes apparent.
(5) Ensure personnel who may be subject to isolation or capture while in hostile territory receive
Service-required or USSOCOM directed SERE/CoC training prior to deployment.
(6) Ensure personnel who may be subject to isolation or capture while in hostile territory receive
training in the Geneva Conventions and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
(7) Ensure HRC personnel have or receive the appropriate CoC training and theater specific SERE
preparation, to include a familiarization with conventional and unconventional recovery procedures, prior
to employment.

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e. Theater Special Operations Commands. The theater SOC coordinates and directs operations of
SOF during assigned operations. Theater SOCs must clearly communicate theater-specific personnel
recovery requirements so that USCINCSOC can train and prepare forces to meet the needs of the theater
combatant commanders. Individual Service SOF components maintain proficiency in the tactics,
techniques, and procedures required to support PR operations. The theater SOC is organized to meet the
unified command SO requirements. PR staff functions are normally assigned to the following SOC staff
elements:
(1) SOJ2 (Intelligence). Supports the JFSOCC PR activities.
(2) SOJ3 (Operations). Administers the JFSOCC focal point system and special access programs.
Plans, coordinates, and directs PR activities and other sensitive SO controlled by the JFSOCC.
(3) SOJ5 (Plans and Policy). Identifies UAR and other PR requirements that support the JFC
campaign, concept, operation, and supporting plans. These requirements are coordinated with the SOJ2
and SOJ3

SECTION IV - USSOCOM PERSONNEL RECOVERY COUNCIL

13. Purpose. This directive establishes the USSOCOM PR Council. The primary purpose of the Council
is to establish a core group of special operations PR experts to identify and resolve issues, coordinate PR
related taskings, interface with the PR community and provide expertise during a crisis. The council shall:
a. Advise USCINCSOC on initiatives for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of PR throughout
SOF.
b. Serve as the mechanism for jointly developing, planning, and evaluating implementation of
command-wide PR initiatives and for reviewing PR tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment.
c. Serve as a forum for exchange of information among the USSOCOM staff, the Component
Commands, USJFCOM, and government agencies responsible for the conduct of PR.
14. Composition. The PR Council will include representatives from all the USSOCOM centers and from
the Component Commands. The SOOP Plans Division Chief will chair the Council.
15. Responsibilities.
a. The PR Council Chair shall:
(1) Convene and preside at all Council meetings. The PR Council shall meet quarterly or at the call
of the chair.
(2) Establish administrative and procedural arrangements for the PR Council.

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(3) Approve the agenda and supporting documents for council meetings and ensure issues are
addressed comprehensively.
(4) Invite representatives from other DoD components and Government Agencies to attend specified
council meetings as appropriate.
(5) Designate lead responsibility for staff proposals and presentations.
(6) Maintain a record of all PR Council proceedings and disseminate meeting minutes.
(7) Prepare recommendations for approval by the appropriate Director, Deputy Commander in Chief
(DCINCSOC) or Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (CINCSOC).
b. PR Council members shall:
(1) Act as the point of contact for their respective staff/component for PR matters.
(2) Develop topics for the agenda and submit them to the Chair.
(3) Provide technical and/or analytical expertise in specific areas.
(4) Consider the issues, problems, and viewpoints that are presented during meetings and tender
recommendations.
16. Proponent. The proponent for this directive is the Operations, Plans and Policy Center (SOOP), Plans
Division (SOOP-PD). Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements directly to:
USSOCOM, ATTN: SOOP, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323.
(SOOP-PD)

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

DELL L. DAILEY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

LEO M. SMITH, JR.

Chief, Command Information Services Division, SOCS-DP-S
DISTRIBUTION: A; C
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APPENDIX A
TRAINING

A-1. Policy. USSOCOM policy requires all operational forces to obtain SERE Level C training with the
priority going to national mission and Major Theater of War (MTW) apportioned forces followed by all
remaining personnel as required.
A-2. Background.
a. DoD Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of
Conduct, 23 December 1998, mandates that DoD personnel who plan, schedule, commit, or control the
use of the Armed Forces shall fully understand the Code of Conduct and ensure that personnel are trained
and educated to support it. Code of conduct and SERE training provide soldiers the necessary skills to
survive and evade in a hostile environment, to conduct themselves during captivity, and to return with
honor. The CoC is applicable across the spectrum of conflict (evasion to recovery and wartime captivity
to hostage situations).
b. DoD Instruction 1300.21, Code of Conduct Training and Education, establishes three levels of
training and provides guidance to support each level. The levels and applicability of SERE/CoC training
are:
(1) Level A: All members of the armed forces. Focus is familiarity with the CoC and the
individuals legal and moral responsibility to comrades, the Service, and the Nation. This training is given
to all personnel upon entry into military service.
(2) Level B: Personnel whose military role entails moderate risk of capture and exploitation. Level
B is primarily academic instruction on SERE/CoC basics. Practical application and/or exercise of
survival, evasion and recovery instruction is encouraged but not required. Practical application and/or
exercise of resistance during simulated captivity is prohibited. Training may be conducted in-unit or at a
Service run formal training location.
(3) Level C: Personnel whose role entails relatively high risk of capture and exploitation.
Academic, field, laboratory, practical application, and/or exercise of all aspects of SERE/CoC are part of
the course curriculum performed under the supervision of Service qualified instructors. Training is
conducted at four formal sites around the US.
(4) Other Training. Other training programs provide specialized CoC and/or SERE training based
on the unique requirements of the units or personnel receiving the training. Selected USSOCOM
personnel are trained in the following programs:
(a) SV82A, Joint Service Training Program (JSTP).
(b) SV83A, Special Survival Training.

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(c) SV91A, DoD High Risk Survival Training.

(d) SV93A, DoD Hostage Survival Training.
c. The intent of this training is to provide subject matter guidance for use in ascending levels of
understanding and to direct the Military Services to increase each Service members depth of knowledge
depending on his or her needs. Training at levels B and C should include more detailed information on
coping skills, complex problem solving, leadership and command topics. This development includes the
complex circumstances of detention that are not incident to an armed conflict by a foreign power (e.g.,
governmental detention and terrorist captivity as a result of operations other than war that require special
instructions).
d. The degree of knowledge required by members of the Armed Forces is dictated by the Service
members susceptibility to capture, the amount of sensitive information possessed by the Service member,
and the potential captors or detaining powers likely assessment of the Service member usefulness and
value. Designation of personnel to these levels shall be determined by the Military Service concerned.
Current Service regulations prescribe CoC and SERE training requirements and responsibilities.
e. Code Of Conduct and SERE training enhance an individuals readiness to survive, evade, resist and
escape. They provide an individual with the skills to integrate into established DoD evasion, escape and
recovery systems that support captured and isolated U.S. personnel in conflict and peace. Individuals who
have the potential to become isolated require adequate preparations to survive the ordeal. Individual
preparation includes training on policy, force structure, and operational concepts to support their recovery
and repatriation.
A-3. Training for Evasion. Successful PR is dependent on effective pre-deployment/pre-mission
preparation and training. To adequately prepare HRC personnel for contingency operations, they need to
be thoroughly trained in the following areas:
a. Legal status of Evaders/POWs (see Appendix C).
b. Evasion & Recovery preparation and available equipment (see Appendix D).
c. Evasion TTPs to include initial actions, surface navigation, evasive travel and camouflage.
d. Signaling and communication TTPs to include radio discipline, codes, use of aircrew alpha sub-call
signs, team and individual call signs, signaling devices, Recovery Activation Signals (RAS), and Ground
to Air Signals (GAS).
e. Environmental hazards, health risks, and personal protection specific to an area of operation.
f. Information on the indigenous population and the captivity environment.
g. Conventional and unconventional assisted recovery methods.
h. The types of PR intelligence data available for their potential area of operation.

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A-4. Continuation Training. Evasion continuation training (classroom and field) at the unit level is
essential to keep HRC personnel adequately prepared to participate in combat operations. PR training
should continue throughout an individual's career so pursue all opportunities for joint PR training. All
HRC personnel should receive survival/evasion field refresher training at least every 3 years and
participate in evasion field exercises whenever possible.
A-5. Proponency. Each component serves as the proponent for matters pertaining to SERE/CoC training
for their respective forces.

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APPENDIX B
COMMAND AND CONTROL
B-1. Policy. Existing joint CSAR and SOF doctrine adequately address command and control of SOF
during personnel recovery operations. Normally, SOF retains command and control of SOF.
Circumstances exist where SOF may be TACON to the component tasked with the execution of a
conventional JCSAR.
B-2. Background.
a. Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, 26 January 1996, describes
command and control of SOF during personnel recovery missions as follows:
(1) Control of SOF should remain with the JFSOCC on personnel recovery missions that are
characterized by detailed planning, preparation, possible rehearsal, and thorough analysis.
(2) The JFSOCC may relinquish TACON of SOF forces when they are necessary to conduct specific
joint CSAR operations. However, if SOF is required for joint CSAR operations because of its penetration
capabilities or because it is the only CSAR in theater, then TACON normally remains with the JFSOCC.
b. In accordance with Joint Pub 3-50.2, situations where a component maintains operational control
(OPCON) for a personnel recovery mission are as follows:
(1) When components conduct CSAR missions with assigned forces in support of their own isolated
personnel, these forces are under component OPCON.
(2) When a component is unable to conduct a CSAR operation for their personnel, the JSRC is
notified and, based on recommendations by the JSRC, the JFC may task another component to complete
the CSAR mission. In this case, the component tasked to conduct the CSAR mission maintains OPCON
of its component forces.
c. In accordance with Joint Pub 3-50.2, situations where a component may relinquish TACON of a
personnel recovery mission to another component are as follows:
(1) When a component needs augmentation to complete a CSAR mission, the Joint Search and
Rescue Center (JSRC) is notified. Based on recommendations by the JSRC, the Joint Force Commander
(JFC) may task one or more other components to assist. While tasked to augment, augmenting forces
should normally be under the TACON of the CSAR mission commander of the component requesting
augmentation.
(2) When a component is unable to conduct a CSAR operation for their personnel and there is no
other component capable of completing the CSAR operation, the JFC may direct joint force components
by mission type orders to provide specific CSAR capabilities to support JCSAR operations. These orders
should designate supported and supporting commanders. Based upon these mission type orders, the
component commanders make specific capabilities available.

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The JFC should determine the command relationship to be used by the designated component commander
with JCSAR responsibilty when employing these forces in a JCSAR operation. Normally, the JFC should
delegate TACON of those forces to the designated component commander. If TACON is delegated,
component commanders relinquish TACON of CSAR forces made available to the designated component
commander when these forces are committed to JCSAR operations.
d. During joint operations, the JSRC is the focal point for all joint CSAR coordination. JFCs normally
exercise command authority for CSAR either through a designated component commander whose Rescue
Coordination Center (RCC) has been designated by the JFC to function also as the JSRC or through a
designated JSRC director, if the JSRC is part of the JFC staff.
e. JP 3-05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, 17 April 1998, does not specifically address PR
command and control but does allow for situations where TACON of SOF assets may be passed to the
JFACC or other component commanders when appropriate. Recent operations demonstrated that passing
TACON of SOF to the JFACC for the execution of CSAR is acceptable and allows for the integration and
control of all the air assets (CAS, CAP, C2, etc.) needed to successfully execute a CSAR mission.
However, lessons learned indicate that the full spectrum of command and control of JCSAR operations
must be exercised prior to mission execution. In addition, SOF operating with Combat Air Forces (CAF)
assets must have time to train together to fully integrate all air assets and enable them to exercise their
respective missions prior to real-world execution. The lines of command must be clearly articulated and
streamlined so multiple layers of communication are not required for command interface.
f. Doctrine for command and control of unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) operations is
evolving, however UAR operations do not require the same level of integration and coordination with
conventional units as a CSAR operation. For this reason, and due to the sensitive nature of UAR, SOF
should maintain command and control during the execution of a UAR. Unique organizations such as a
UAR Coordination Center (UARCC), which is the functional equivalent of a conventional Rescue
Coordination Center (RCC), may serve as a focal point for UAR coordination.

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APPENDIX C
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

C-1. General Considerations. Potential evaders need to know their rights and responsibilities under the
Code of Conduct and applicable international laws.
a. Code of Conduct Responsibilities. An evader remains a combatant while continuing to avoid
capture. Article II of the Code of Conduct states in part:
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my
command while they still have the means to resist.
b. Laws Governing Evasion. SOF missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues.
Federal laws and Executive Orders, Federal agency publications and directives, and theater rules of
engagement may affect SOF mission execution. These guidelines become especially critical during
sensitive peacetime operations when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political
agreements may affect mission planning, execution, and post-conflict activities. Commanders should seek
legal review and advice during the planning and execution of special operations. Evader actions are
governed by a variety of international laws, conventions, and certain foreign domestic laws, depending on
the type of conflict.
C-2. Legal Aspects of Evasion During War.
Under established international law, an evader is considered a lawful combatant until captured. This
means the evader is authorized to continue to engage in armed conflict subject to the laws of armed
conflict. Once captured, an evader becomes a prisoner of war (POW) and becomes a non-combatant
subject to the laws/international agreements covering the treatment of POWs. An escapee from POW
status (POW Escapee) remains a non-combatant and may not commit any belligerent acts, carry weapons,
or engage in armed resistance.
As stated above, a legal distinction is made between an evader and a POW Escapee. Table 4 outlines the
differences.

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Table C-1. Legal Status.

EVADER
Combatant--may commit acts of violence
against legitimate military targets without being
liable for prosecution by the enemy under
international law for violation of the local
criminal laws.

POW Escapee
Not a combatant--may not commit any belligerent
acts, carry weapons, or engage in armed resistance.
May be charged under the laws of the Detaining
Power for certain violent acts committed against the
military or civilian population while escaping or
avoiding recapture. However, offenses committed
with the sole intention of facilitating escape and
which do not entail any violence against life or limb,
such as offenses against public property, theft
without intent of self-enrichment, the drawing up or
use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian
clothing, should only result in disciplinary
punishment by the detaining power. An escape is
considered to be successful when the POW Escapee
rejoins his or her own armed forces or those of an
Allied Power or leaves the territory under the control
of the Detaining Power or one of its Allied Powers.
POW escapees received by neutral powers may be
left at liberty and may be assigned a place of
residence. POW Escapees should be allowed to
return to their own nation from neutral territory.

Evader who crosses into neutral country is

subject to detention by that country for the
duration of the war.

C-3. Specific Guidance for Evaders.

a. Wearing of Enemy Uniforms. Persons captured while fighting in enemy uniforms have
traditionally been subject to severe punishment by the capturing power and treated as spies. It is,
however, still permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile territory to use enemy uniforms to
evade capture, as long as no other military operations are conducted while so attired. Persons who use the
enemy's flag, uniform, insignia, markings, equipment, or emblems solely for evasion and escape are not
lawfully subject to punishment on that account, as long as they do not attack the enemy, gather military
information or engage in similar operations. Again, although permissible, using enemy uniforms while
evading is inadvisable.

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b. Treachery and Perfidy. Ruses of war are legitimate so long as they do not involve treachery or
perfidy on the part of the person resorting to them. They are, however, forbidden if they contravene any
generally accepted rule. For example, it is a violation of international law to kill, injure, or capture the
enemy by feigning civilian status, sickness or wounds, or by falsely indicating intent to surrender or
negotiate. It would be unlawful to feign surrender and attack the enemy when they come forward to take
you prisoner. However, it is permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile territory to feign civilian
status while engaged in E&E, though they should avoid combatant or espionage activities while dressed as
civilians. Evaders who feign civilian status solely for evasion and escape are not lawfully subject to
punishment on that account if captured. In practice, of course, it may be difficult for a military member to
establish this if apprehended in civilian clothing. From a practical standpoint, all potential and actual
evaders may at some time consider the possibility of trying to disguise themselves as local (enemy)
people, by putting on civilian attire in the expectation of passing as natives. This could be extremely
dangerous. Where the evader's race is different from that of people indigenous to the area, the procedures
should be adopted only if there is no other alternative. In such cases, successes have occurred when
disguised evaders used this deception technique when or where details could not be closely scrutinized or
seen such as staying at a distance, moving in low light conditions, or in foul weather or fog. Even in an
area where racial dissimilarities would not betray the evader, such mannerisms as walking, eating, and
even smoking, along with unfamiliarity with the language, would more than likely quickly bring on
suspicion, leading to investigation and capture.
c. Other Evasion Techniques. Under certain circumstances, the adoption of varying degrees of
disguise may be logical, appropriate, and required. For instance, if the population density is such that
movement in uniform is not possible, the evader may be required to adopt some sort of disguise in order to
transit the area. Likewise, if contact with an indigenous assistance group has been established, the evader
may be required to wear a disguise to facilitate movement within an assisted escape and evasion. In these
instances, the evader should respect the judgment of the assistance group. In doing so, evaders need to
understand that in the event of capture, they will likely be treated exactly like members of the assistance
group unless they can convince their captors that they are Americans. If the evaders assistants have
decided to disguise them in civilian clothing, they should retain Military I.D. and at least some of their
uniform. Such items as insignia, identification tags, US Armed Forces/Geneva Conventions Identification
Card, and blood chit, used as proof of status, would probably be the most convincing in the event of
capture, but are no guarantee that the evader will be treated differently from the civilian assistants.
4. Legal Aspects of Evasion During MOOTW. Legal considerations for evasion and escape during
peacetime operations in sovereign countries differ from those during war. The protection provided by the
Geneva Conventions for evaders as belligerent and POW Escapees does not apply in a situation where
either conflict does not exist or, if it does exist, the US Government is not directly involved. Foreign
domestic laws govern illegal entry, acts of violence, theft, etc. US military personnel are subject to these
foreign domestic laws while operating in the target country. Violations of foreign domestic laws may be
necessary to execute an operation; however, once the operation is completed, physical force or violence
and theft may aggravate an individual's legal position and release if captured. Use of force may be
necessary to protect the military member's life; however, it should be kept to a minimum. Legal concerns
may be irrelevant because political factors and the target country's relationship with the US may dictate
the treatment of US personnel captured in an operation.

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APPENDIX D
EVASION CONSIDERATIONS

D-1. Planning for Evasion. All personnel subject to isolation in hostile territory must be prepared to
evade. Successful evasion is dependent on effective prior planning. Evasion planning needs to
incorporate, at a minimum, information available from the following sources.
a. Intelligence briefings. Information on the mission route, enemy defenses and troop dispositions,
status of the US/Allied military situation, changing attitudes of the enemy populace, etc., is essential when
planning potential evasion.
b. SAFE Area Intelligence Description (SAID). SAIDs are designed to assist evaders by providing allsource information on an area under hostile conditions.
c. E&E area studies, based on operational or contingency planning requirements, meet similar criteria
as a SAFE, but differ in that not all SAFE selection criteria can be met due to prevailing political, military,
or environmental factors in the region.
d. SERE guides and bulletins provide general information which is the foundation for more specific
information (found in evasion charts, SAIDs, and current intelligence briefings) that can be used to build a
sound evasion plan.
e. Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP). A DoD form (DD 1833) with information used by a recovery
force to identify and authenticate an evader. Personnel prepare this form to provide a personal means of
confirming freedom from duress to a recovery force.
f. Designated Recovery Area Description. Details on designated recovery areas that may be used to
supplement SAFEs.
g. Evasion Plan of Action (EPA). Personnel prepare this tentative course of action before executing a
mission which may put them in an isolated and evasion situation. The plan is applicable to individuals or
small groups. The EPA is intended to improve a potential evader's chances of successful evasion and
recovery. The evader provides recovery forces with a source of information on initially planned actions
and movement. (The recovery force is aware that all possibilities cannot be addressed).
D-2. Evasion Strategies.
Along or within the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)/Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT).
Attempts to penetrate the FEBA/FLOT should be avoided. Unit authentication numbers and/or locally
developed codes may assist the evaders to safely make contact with friendly forces. Evaders may also be
able to move away from the FEBA/FLOT and more easily contact friendly recovery assets. Individuals
isolated in front of advancing friendly units may elect to take cover and wait for the friendly units to
overrun their position. After most enemy units have moved on, evaders could try to link up with other
isolated friendly elements and return to friendly forces. Attempting contact at night or during active
combat is not recommended.

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An evader linking up with anyone should first ensure they are friendly. Place something solid
(bulletproof) between them, make a noise or movement to enable detection, and allow them to make
contact. Never surprise anyone in a combat environment.
b. Extended evasion (time or distance) should always be planned for. Extended evasion differs from
short-range evasion in several respects and the evader must be prepared for both because it is impossible
to predict how long it will take or how far an evader may have to travel. Every alternative should be
considered prior to determining a course of action. Factors that might be unimportant to the short-range
evader may be major problem areas in extended evasion. Things to consider include:
(1) Distance from friendly forces may be greater. The evader may be discouraged by the knowledge
that hundreds of miles of travel over a period of months may be necessary.
(2) Conditions such as travel restrictions, security checks, and border crossings are more prevalent.
These conditions must be anticipated. Information on specific border areas should be obtained and
studied. Knowing the customs of the local people may provide valuable information to aid evasion.
(3) Care of equipment and consumables. Shoes, clothing, and supplies must be maintained to assure
the evader the maximum use. The isolated person in enemy-controlled territory must decide what
equipment to keep and how and where to dispose of the remainder.
(4) Unplanned assistance during evasion. Under some circumstances, especially when seriously
injured, it may become necessary to seek assistance from local people in order to survive. This should be
done only as a last resort. Even when evaders do not require emergency assistance and are doing
everything possible to avoid contact with local people, unplanned contacts may occur. All such contacts
are very risky, but if handled properly such contacts could be turned into a source of lifesaving assistance
during evasion.
D-3. Support to Evaders. When an evader is isolated deep in hostile territory and early recovery will
not be possible, PR planners may support the evader with pre-positioned caches and resupply operations.
D-4. Evasion Aids. Evaders are challenged by the elements, terrain, hostile military forces, and the local
populace. To overcome these challenges and be successful, potential evaders must receive adequate
training, information, and equipment, prior to initiating their mission. Whenever possible, potential
evaders need to carry evasion aids on their person. Since the incident which causes their isolation in
hostile territory may be sudden and unexpected, evaders may be quickly separated from their equipment
or may not have time to select those items which would be most useful to them during evasion. Space
considerations and clothing configurations may limit the number of evasion aids which evaders can carry.
As a minimum, potential evaders should carry on their person: evasion charts or other maps of the area;
extra compass; a blood chit; a pointee-talkee or other means of communicating with the native populace;
fireflies, general reference materials to facilitate recall of basic medical, survival, and/or cultural
information; items to enhance protection from the elements and provide camouflage; fireflies; a signal
mirror; and equipment which permits verbal and visual communications with a recovery force, day and
night.

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D-5. Recovery Procedures.

a. Recovery planning must fully evaluate available recovery assets, the condition of the isolated
person, and projected threat conditions to determine the best method of recovery. Tasking SOF to conduct
PR is appropriate in the following circumstances:
(1) Equipment and personnel are available.
(2) The operating environment requires the special capabilities of SOF.
(3) The priority for recovery of isolated personnel is sufficiently high to warrant a special operation.
Mission analysis reveals feasibility.
b. Contact Procedures. The JSRC, assisted by component representatives, joint and unit intelligence,
and operations specialists, will ensure that appropriate contact procedures are developed for use in the
joint operating environment. The JSRC will also ensure that joint force components are familiar with the
contact procedures by publishing them in the ATO SPINS and any Operations Plans.

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GLOSSARY
SECTION I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFSOC
AMC
ATO
C4I
C2
CA
CAF
CAP
CAS
CIA
CINC
CoC
CSAR
CSARTF
DA
DIA
DoD
DOS
DOT
DPMO
E&E
E&R
EPA
FEBA
FLOT
HRC
HQ USSOCOM
ISOPREP
JCSAR
JFC
JFSOCC
JPRA
JSOC
JSRC
JSTP
LOAC
M,C,&G
MOOTW
NAR
NAVSPECWARCOM
NCA
NEO

Air Force Special Operations Command

Airborne Mission Commander
Air Tasking Order
Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence
Command and Control
Civil Affairs
Combat Air Forces
Combat Air Patrol
Close Air Support
Central Intelligence Agency
Commander in chief's
Code of Conduct
Combat Search and Rescue
Combat Search and Rescue Task Force
Direct Action
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
Evasion and Escape
Evasion and Recovery
Evasion Plan of Action
Forward Edge of Battle Area
Forward Line of Troops
High-Risk-of-Capture
Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command
Isolated Personnel Reports
Joint CSAR
Joint Forces Commander
Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
Joint Special Operations Command
Joint Search and Rescue Center
Joint Service Training Program
Laws of Armed Conflict
Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
Military Operations Other Than War
Non-conventional Assisted Recovery
Naval Special Warfare Command
National Command Authorities
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

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NIMA
NGO
NRO
NSA
OGA
OPCON
OPR
POC
POW
PR
PRAG
PRRC
PRTWG
PVO
RAS
RCC
RESCORT
RESCAP
RM
RT
SA
SAFE
SAID
SAR
SARTF
SERE
SMC
SMU
SO
SOAL
SOC
SOF
SOIO
SOOP
SOOP-OT
SOOP-PD
SOOP-PJ
SORR
SPINS
SPP
SR
SRU
TACON
TTP

4 May 2000

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Non-Governmental Organizations
National Reconnaissance Office
National Security Agency
Other Government Agencies
Operational Control
Office of Primary Responsibility
Point of Contact
Prisoner of War
Personnel Recovery
Personnel Recovery Advisory Group
Personnel Recovery Response Cell
Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group
Private Voluntary Organizations
Recovery Activation Signal
Rescue Coordination Center
Rescue Escort
Rescue Combat Air Patrol
Recovery Mechanisms
Recovery Team
Special activities
Selected Areas for Evasion
SAFE Area Intelligence Description
Search and Rescue
Search and Rescue Task Force
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator
Special Mission Unit
Special Operations
USSOCOM Center for Acquisition and Logistics
Theater Special Operations Commands
Special Operations Forces
USSOCOM Center for Intelligence and Information Operations
USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy
USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy, Training Division
USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy, Plans Division
USSOCOM Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy, Doctrineand Education
Division
USSOCOM Center for Force Structure, Requirements, Resources, and Strategic
Assessments
Special Instructions
Strategic Planning Process
Special Reconnaissance
Search and Rescue Unit
Tactical Control
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

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UAR
UARCC
UARM
UART
USASOC
USC
USCINCSOC
USG
USJFCOM
UW

4 May 2000

Unconventional Assisted Recovery

Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center
Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism
Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team
United States Army Special Operations Command
United States Code
United States Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command
U.S. Government
United States Joint Forces Commands
Unconventional Warfare

SECTION II--DEFINITIONS

Act of Mercy. In evasion and recovery operations, assistance rendered to evaders by an individual or
elements of the local population who sympathize or empathize with the evaders cause or plight. (JP 1-02)
Assistance Mechanism. Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations, together with material
and/or facilities in position, or that can be placed in position by appropriate U.S. or multinational agencies,
to accomplish or support evasion and recovery operations. (JP 1-02)
Assisted Recovery. The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside
source. (JP 1-02)
Airborne Mission Commander (AMC). The AMC serves as an airborne extension of the executing
components RCC and appoints, as necessary, the on-scene commander. (Joint Pub (JP) 3-50.2)
Authenticate. A challenge given by voice or electrical means to attest to the authenticity of a message or
transmission. (JP 1-02)
Authentication. The process whereby the identity of an evader is confirmed during wartime or MOOTW
in an uncertain environment. ( JP 3-50.2).
Authenticator. A symbol or group of symbols, or a series of bits, selected or derived in a prearranged
manner and usually inserted at a predetermined point within a message or transmission for the purpose of
attesting to the validity of the message or transmission. (JP 1-02)
Blood Chit. A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to
the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. (JP 1-02)
Bona Fides. Good faith. In evasion and recovery operations, the use of verbal or visual communication
by individuals who are unknown to one another to establish their authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and
truthfulness. (JP 1-02)

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Cache. In evasion and recovery operations, source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items
such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from
exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to
support evaders in current or future operations. (JP 1-02)
Clandestine Operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies
in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation
in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of
sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on
operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery
of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. CSAR is accomplished in a nonpermissive environment. (JP 1-02)
Combat Survival. Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from
friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and
conduct after capture. (JP 1-02)
Contact Point. In evasion and recovery operations, a location where an evader can establish contact with
friendly forces. (JP 1-02)
Contact Procedure. Those predesignated actions taken by evaders and recovery forces that permit linkup between the two parties in hostile territory and facilitate the return of evaders to friendly control. (JP 102)
Covert Operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit
plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is
placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (JP 1-02)
Designated Area for Recovery (DAR). A point, area, or corridor selected from J2/J3 consolidated input,
based on enemy order of battle (EOB), operations, and available terrain which offers cover or
concealment. DARs are managed by the JSRC and published via the Air Tasking Order (ATO), Special
Instructions (SPINS), and orders, and are designed to supplement selected areas for evasion (SAFEs).
DARs may be selected to support isolated personnel and their evasion or to directly support planning and
preparation of all rescue forces. Therefore, the intent of a DAR must be clear and concise. DARs are not
currently used in all theaters.
Escapee. Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in getting free. (JP 102)
Evader. Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory that eludes capture. (JP 1-02)
Evasion. The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid
capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. (JP 1-02)

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Evasion Aid. In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to
assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointeetalkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment.
(JP 1-02)
Evasion and Escape (E&E). The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other
selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly
control. (JP 1-02)
Evasion and recovery (E&R). The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery
forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful repatriate of personnel isolated in hostile
territory to friendly control. This method includes, but is not limited to, recovery by surface craft,
submarines, SOF aircraft or ground and sea teams, and RM. (JP 1-02)
Evasion and Recovery Area. A designated area in hostile territory that offers an evader or escapee a
reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he can be evacuated. Differs from a SAFE
area in that all conventional selection criteria may not be met because of prevailing political, military, or
environmental factors.
Evasion Plan of Action (EPA). A course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which
is intended to improve a potential evader's chances of successful E&R by providing recovery forces with
an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's actions and
movement. ( JP 3-50.3).
Guerrilla. A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. (JP 1-02)
Handover/Crossover. In evasion and recovery operations, the transfer of evaders between two recovery
forces. (JP 1-02)
High-Risk-of-Capture (HRC) Personnel. US personnel whose position or assignment makes them
particularly vulnerable to capture by hostile forces in combat, by terrorists, or by unfriendly governments.
( JP 3-50.3).
Identification. The process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown detected
contact. (JP 1-02)
Identify. A code meaning Identify the contact designated by any means at your disposal. (JP 1-02)
Isolated personnel. Military or civilian personnel that have become separated from their unit or
organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or
recovery. (JP 1-02)
Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP). A DoD Form (DD 1833) which contains information designed
to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. (JP 1-02)

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Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR). A combat search and rescue operation in support of a
components military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that
component and/or requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. (JP 1-02)
Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by
supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and
combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility
is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a
multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and
rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn
from each joint force component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical.
Joint Search and Rescue Center Director. The designated representative with overall responsibility for
operation of the joint search and rescue center. (JP 1-02)
Load Signal. In evasion and recovery operations, a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate
the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (JP 1-02)
Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR). All forms of ground recovery conducted by an entity,
group of entities, or organizations in enemy-held or hostile areas that are designated, trained, and directed
to contact, authenticate, support, move, and/or exfiltrate U.S. military and/or other designated personnel to
friendly control through established procedures and/or infrastructure. (Proposed)
Non-governmental Organizations (NGO). Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain
a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Non-governmental
organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups
with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Non-governmental
organizations is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)
Operational Control (OPCON). Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders
at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in combatant command.
OPCON may be delegated and is authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate
forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish
the mission. (JP 1-02)
Overt Operation. An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 1-02)
Personnel Recovery (PR). The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured,
detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas.
That includes the recovery of U.S., allied, coalition, friendly military or paramilitary, and others
designated by the National Command Authorities. Personnel Recovery includes, but is not limited to
Combat Search and Rescue; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape; Evasion and Recovery; Nonconventional Assisted Recovery; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options.
Personnel Recovery may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other
U.S. Government-approved action and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options.
(DoDD 2310.2)

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Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC). The function of the PRRC is to help informed decision
making by OSD principals if personnel (be they U.S., allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary,
and others as designated by the NCA) become captured, missing, or isolated in uncertain or hostile
environments and denied areas The PRRC shall accomplish this by addressing issues impacting on the PR
incident and by expeditiously developing coordinated policy options for the NCA. (DoDI 2310.3)
Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO). Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations
involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United Statesbased. Private voluntary organization is often used synonymously with the term non-governmental
organizations. (JP 1-02)
Pointee-Talkee. A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a foreign
language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. (JP 1-02)
Recovery. The return of captured, missing, or isolated U.S. Government personnel or others to friendly
control, with or without assistance, as the result of planning and operations, or action taken on the part of
the evaders or prisoners (DoDD 2310-2). 2. In evasion and recovery operations, the return of evaders to
friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual
actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders
themselves. (JP 1-02)
Recovery Activation Signal (RAS). In PR operations, a precoordinated signal from an evader that
indicates his presence in an area to a receiving or observing source that indicates I am here, start the
recovery planning. (JP 3-50.3)
Recovery Force. In evasion and recovery operations, an organization consisting of personnel and
equipment with a mission of seeking out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control.
(JP 1-02)
Recovery Mechanism (RM). That entity, group of entities, or infrastructure in enemy-held or hostile
areas that is designed to receive, support, move, and/or exfiltrate military or other designated personnel to
friendly control. (DoDI 2310.3)
Recovery Site. In evasion and escape usage, an area from which an evader or an escapee can be
evacuated. (JP 1-02)
Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP). An aircraft patrol provided over a CSAR objective area for the
purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Its primary mission is to protect the SAR task
force (SARTF) during recovery operations. (JP 1-02)
Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by
supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat
search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or
component. For Navy component operations, this facility may be called a rescue coordination team. Also
called RCC (or RCT for Navy component). (JP 1-02)

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Rescue Escort (RESCORT). Fighters or armed helicopters capable of operating close to the altitude,
speed, and endurance regimes of recovery helicopters and are assigned primarily to provide protection for
the helicopters from surface threats. (JP 3-50.2)
SAR Bullseye. A geographic reference point used for CSAR operations whose latitude and longitude are
published in the CSAR Spins. Also known as SARDOT.
Search And Rescue (SAR). A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of isolated
personnel in a permissive environment.
Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC). The designated person or organization selected by the
JSRC Director to direct and coordinate support for a specific search and rescue mission. (JP 1-02)
Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTF). All assets assigned to a MC to execute a SAR/CSAR mission
(e.g., helicopters, RESCAP, RESCORT, RMC, electronic warfare assets, ships, ground teams.) (JP 1-02)
Search and Rescue Units (SRU). Any unit, aircrew, or person who may find themselves involved in a
CSAR incident. Each person is responsible for assisting as able, or as directed, during the incident. (JP 350.2)
Selected Area for Evasion (SAFE). A designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees
a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until they can be evacuated. (JP 1-02)
Tactical Control (TACON). Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or
military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local
direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
(JP1-02)
Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). UAR is the umbrella term that encompasses the conduct of
Non-conventional Assisted Recovery by Special Operations Forces. (Proposed)
Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism (UARM). UARM encompasses all SOF activities
related to the creation, coordination, supervision, command and control, and use of Recovery Mechanisms
either in support of Commanders of Combatant Commands, or as directed by the National Command
Authorities. UARM is an integral part of DoD Non-conventional Assisted Recovery. (Proposed)
Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team (UART). A designated SOF recovery team that is trained and
equipped to operate for an extended period of time in hostile territory in support of PR. (Proposed)

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SECTION III--REFERENCES

GL-1. The following references apply to the development of this directive and provide information on PR
policy and operations:
Title 10, United States Code.
DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, 30 June 1997.
DoD Instruction 2310.3, Personnel Recovery Response Cell Procedures, 6 June 1997.
DoD Instruction 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government
Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel, (Draft)
DoD Instruction 2310.5, Accounting for Missing Persons, (Draft)
DoD Instruction 2310.X, Non-conventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense, (Draft).
DoD Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct, 23
December 1988.
DoD Instruction 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education, (Draft)
DoD Directive 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in
Danger Areas Abroad (Short Title: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations), 5 November 1990.
DoD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SO/LIC)), 22 March 1995.
DoD Instruction 1300.18, Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures, 27 November
1991
MCM-213-98, Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency Concerning DoD-CIA Mutual Support in Policy, Research and Development,
Training, Planning, and Operations for Personnel Recovery (U), (S) 7 October 1998.
CJCS Instruction 3270.01, Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense (S), 1 July 1998.
CJCS Instruction 3270.02, Evasion and Recovery Crisis Response Procedures, 15 July 1994.
CJCS Instruction 3110.01B, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1998
DJS Memorandum 1103-92, DoD US POW/MIA Program
Defense Planning Guidance 2001-2005, April 1999.

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Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 April 1998.
Joint Pub 3-50, National Search and Rescue Manual, Volume I, National Search and Rescue System,
February 1, 1991.
Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, 26 January 1996.
Joint Pub 3-50.21, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CSAR, 23 March 1998.
Joint Pub 3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery, 6 September 1996.
NSA Personnel Recovery Concept of Operations for National Intelligence Support (S), 21 May 98.
USCENTAF Instruction 10-101, Personnel Recovery Procedures, 31 January 1997.
USEUCOM Directive 55-13, Personnel Recovery, 6 July 1998.
USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery, January 1999.
DoD National Intelligence Community Support for Personnel Recovery (S), March 1999

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