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ReformedEpistemology
Reformed epistemology is a thesis about the rationality of religious belief. A central claim made by the
reformedepistemologististhatreligiousbeliefcanberationalwithoutanyappealtoevidenceorargument.
There are, broadly speaking, two ways that reformed epistemologists support this claim. The first is to
argue that there is no way to successfully formulate the charge that religious belief is in some way
epistemically defective if it is lacking support by evidence or argument. The second way is to offer a
descriptionofwhatitmeansforabelieftoberational,andtosuggestwaysthatreligiousbeliefsmightin
factbemeetingtheserequirements.Thishasledreformedepistemologiststoexploretopicssuchaswhena
beliefforming mechanism confers warrant, the rationality of engaging in belief forming practices, and
whenwehaveanepistemicdutytoreviseourbeliefs.Assuch,reformedepistemologyoffersanalternative
toevidentialism(theviewthatreligiousbeliefmustbesupportedbyevidenceinordertoberational)and
fideism(theviewthatreligiousbeliefisnotrational,butthatwehavenonepistemicreasonsforbelieving).
ReformedepistemologywasfirstclearlyarticulatedinacollectionofpaperscalledFaith and Rationality
editedbyAlvinPlantingaandNicholasWolterstorffin1983.However,theviewowesadebttomanyother
thinkers.

TableofContents
1. Introduction
2. TheOriginsofReformedEpistemology
a. Reformed
b. Epistemology
3. KeyFiguresinReformedEpistemology
a. WilliamAlston
b. AlvinPlantinga
c. NicolasWolterstorff
4. EvidenceandRationalBeliefinGod
5. ClassicalFoundationalism
a. RejectingClassicalFoundationalism
6. ThePositiveCaseinReformedEpistemology
a. TheChristianMysticalPractice
b. TheParityArgument
c. WarrantedChristianBelief
7. ObjectionstoReformedEpistemology
a. GreatPumpkinObjection
b. Disanalogies
c. ReligiousDiversity
i. ReligiousBeliefisEpistemicallyArbitrary
ii. CompetingBeliefFormingPractices
d. SensibleEvidentialism
8. ReferencesandFurtherReading

1.Introduction
HereisanargumentagainsttherationalityofbeliefinGod:
(1)BeliefinGodrequirestherightkindofevidenceinordertoberational.
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(2)NosuchevidenceexistsforbeliefinGod.
(3)Therefore,beliefinGodisnotrational.
TheideahereisthatinorderforbeliefinGodtoberational,thereneedstobeanappropriaterelationship
betweenbeliefandevidence.Whatisappropriate,accordingtothosewhoendorsetheaboveargument,is
that the belief in question be based on good evidence. This argument is sometimes referred to as the
evidentialist objection to believe in God. According to the reformed epistemologist, philosophers have
historicallytakenpremise1toberatherintuitive.Asaresult,discussioninvolvingtherationalityofbeliefin
God focused almost entirely on premise 2. Thus, philosophers who defended the rationality and
justification of belief in God would have done so by responding to premise 2 and providing evidence for
God's existence. The evidentialist objection fails, they claim, because sufficient evidence does exist for
rational belief in God. According to the reformed epistemologist, then, theists (historically anyway) who
rejectpremise2wouldsimplyendorsethefollowingargument:
(1)BeliefinGodrequirestherightkindofevidenceinordertoberational.
(2*)SuchevidencedoesexistforrationalbeliefinGod.
(3*)Therefore,beliefinGodisrational.
Forthetheistwhodefendsthisargument,findingtherightkindofevidencethatissufficientforrational
beliefinGodbecomestheirchiefaim.Theproblem,accordingtothereformedepistemologist,isthatsuch
amoveisunnecessary.Thereis,inotherwords,amucheasierwayaroundtheevidentialistobjectionthe
rejectionofpremise1.Thus,forthereformedepistemologisttheproblemwiththeevidentialistobjection
liesnotwith2,butwith1.WhyassumethatbeliefinGodisinanywaysubjecttothedemandsof1?Belief
inGod,arguesthereformedepistemologist,canberationalwithoutinferencefromevidenceorargument.
Ifthiscentralclaimistrue,1isunderminedandtheevidentialistobjection(asitstands)fails.

2.TheOriginsofReformedEpistemology
Reformedepistemologyfirstappearedintheearly1980sbuttheviewowesadebttomanyotherthinkers.
The influences on reformed epistemology can be divided into two groups: reformed influences and
influencesfromwithinepistemology.

a.Reformed
ReformedepistemologywasfirstclearlyarticulatedinacollectionofpaperscalledFaith and Rationality
edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff in 1983. The reason for reformed in reformed
epistemologyisaresultoftheclearinfluencesfromthereformedtheologicaltraditiononthisview.Twoof
the leading proponentsPlantinga and Wolterstorfftaught at Calvin College and they take inspiration
fromimportantreformedthinkerssuchasJohnCalvinandAbrahamKuyper.
The most explicit appeal to the reformed tradition is found in Alvin Plantingas work. Plantinga, when
wondering how theistic belief might be grounded, suggests that we consider that Calvin may have been
rightwhenhesaidthatGodhascreatedhumanswithaninnerawarenessofhimselfanditisthissensus
divinitatis that is responsible for theistic belief. Plantinga also engages with and criticizes reformed
thinkerswhorejectnaturaltheologysuchasKarlBarth(SeePlantinga1983).
Despite the important role thatreformed thoughthas played in the early days of reformed epistemology,
and, in particular, in the thinking of some of its key proponents, the central tenets of reformed
epistemologydonotdependonthistradition.Plantingahastriedtomakethismoreexplicit.InWarrant
andChristianBeliefhearguesthattheideashefindsinCalvinarealsofoundinThomasAquinas.Infact,
thereisnoreasontobelievethattherewontbenumeroustraditionswithinChristianthoughtthatcould
alsoadoptsomethingliketheviewdefendedbyreformedepistemologists.Furthermore,theviewcouldbe
easilyadaptedbyotherreligionsparticularlymonotheisticreligions.
In light of this, the word reformed in reformed epistemology is best thought of as describing the
inspiration behind the position rather than its core claims. Objections to reformed thought, or to
Christianitymoregenerally,mayleavereformedepistemologyunscathed.
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b.Epistemology
As well as being influenced by the reformed tradition, reformed epistemology draws on work in
epistemology. The philosopher who has most clearly been influential to reformed epistemologists is
ThomasReid,aScottishPresbyterianminister.Reidsepistemologyisdistinctivebecauseoftheimportance
he places on describing the belief forming faculties that give rise to our beliefs. These faculties are
dispositionstoformcertainbeliefsinresponsetobeingtriggeredincertainways.Thesedispositionscan
vary over time and we can gain some and lose others through training or habit. But some of our belief
dispositionsareinnatewearesimplybornwiththem.AccordingtoReidtheseinnatedispositionscannot
ultimatelyberationallygroundedbyus,butwemustrelyonthemnonetheless.
This Reidian picture of epistemology has had a significant influence on reformed epistemology.
Accordingly, reformed epistemologists argue that in order to understand whether or not our religious
beliefsarerationalwemustconsiderwhatsortsofbeingweareandtheinnatebeliefdispositionsthatwe
have.

3.KeyFiguresinReformedEpistemology
Thoughperhapsnotasufficientcondition,therejectionofpremise1aboveisatleastanecessarycondition
when it comes to identifying key figures within reformed epistemology. Below, then, we discuss three
philosophers who reject the idea that belief in God is rational only when inferred from good evidence.
These philosophersWilliam Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorffare key figures within
religiousepistemologyandwerecentralinthedevelopmentofreformedepistemology.

a.WilliamAlston
William Alstons first major contribution to reformed epistemology comes in a pair of essays Religious
Experience and Religious Belief and Christian Experience and Christian Belief (the latter of these
appearsinFaithandRationality,whichiseditedbyAlvinPlantingaandNicholasWolterstorff).Hisaimis
to argue that Christian Practice (CP) is justified. CP is the practice of forming certain kinds of beliefs in
responsetocertainexperiences.ThesortsofbeliefsinquestionarethosesuchasGodwillprovideforhis
peopleorGodwillforgivethesinsofthetrulyrepentant.TheyarebeliefsaboutGodandhisactivities
andAlstoncallsthesebeliefsMbeliefswhereMstandsformanifestation(Alston1983:104105).
AlstonwishestoshowthatthosewhoengageinCParejustifiedinmuchthesamewaythatwearejustified
in engaging in a different practiceperceptual practice (PP). PP is the very familiar practice of forming
certainperceptualbeliefsinresponsetoperceptualexperiences.
AlstonarguesthatthereisnononcircularjustificationavailableforPPthisisbecauseouronlyaccessto
thephysicalworld,thatPPgivesusknowledgeof,isthroughPPitself.TheonlyjustificationwehaveforPP
isthatwedonothavesufficientreasonforbelievingthatitisunreliable.CP,claimsAlston,isjustifiedby
thesamestandard.ThosewhoclaimthatweneedsomeindependentreasonfortrustingCPareholdingit
toahigherepistemicstandardthanPP.
AlstonwentontoofferabooklengthdefenseoftheseideasinPerceivingGod.InPerceivingGodAlston
spendssignificanttimediscussingobjectionstowhatheisnowcallingChristianMysticalPractice(CMP).
Heconcludesthatalltheobjectionsfailandthattheyareguiltyofoneoftwothings:epistemicimperialism
ordoublestandards.HedescribesepistemicimperialismasrequiringthatCMPbelikePPinsomeway,ifit
is to be justified, without any epistemic support for that requirement. Objections are guilty of double
standardswhentheyseektoapplyastandardtoCMPthatPPwouldnotmeet(Alston1991:248250).

b.AlvinPlantinga
Alvin Plantinga has authored and edited a number of books and essays on reformed epistemology.
Plantingas earliest work on the topic, God and Other Minds, represents an initial attempt to undermine
theevidentialistobjection.InGodandOtherMinds,Plantingaassumesthat(2)isgenerallycorrect.There
isnt, according to Plantinga, sufficiently good evidence for belief in Godat least not in the way that is
demandedbytheevidentialist.Plantingasapproachatthispoint,then,istoarguethatthereisadouble
standardwithregardto(1).SowhiletheevidenceandargumentsforbeliefinGodarefarfromconclusive,
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theyare,infact,onparwithotherbeliefsthatwetaketoberational.Forexample,astheargumentgoes,we
takethebeliefthatothermindsexisttoberationaldespitethefactthatphilosophicalargumentsinitsfavor
suffermanyofthesameproblemsthatplaguetraditionaltheisticarguments.Thus,concludesPlantinga,if
my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational so,
therefore,isthelatter(1967:271).ThisisthefirstofPlantingassocalledparityarguments.
Inmorerecentliterature,however,Plantingaabandonsthisearlierparityargumentasawaytodealwith
theevidentialistobjector.ThisisdueinparttothefactthatinGodandOtherMindsPlantingaassumed,
liketheevidentialistobjector,thatthewaytogoaboutdiscussingtherationalityofreligiousbeliefwasto
firstconsidertheevidenceinitsfavor.HereisPlantingadiscussingthisassumption:
Iwassomehowbothacceptingbutalsoquestioningwhatwasthenaxiomatic:thatbeliefinGod,ifitis
to be rationally acceptable, must be such that there is good evidence for it. This evidence would be
propositionalevidence:evidencefromotherpropositionsyoubelieve,anditwouldhavetocomeinthe
formofarguments.Thisclaimwasntitselfarguedfor:itwassimplyasserted,orbetter,justassumedas
selfevident or at least utterly obvious. What was taken for granted has now come to be called
evidentialism (a better title would be evidentialism with respect to belief in God, but thats a bit
unwieldy).(2000:70)
Plantinga, then, initially attempted to confront the evidentialist objection by merely pointing out its
inconsistent nature. In more recent literature, however, Plantinga adopts a new, bolder approach in
response to the evidentialist objection. He directly confronts the evidentialist by showing that it is
motivated by a failed theory of justificationnamely, classical foundationalism. Crucial to the argument,
then,isthebeliefthattheevidentialistobjectionarisesfromtheinfluenceofclassicalfoundationalism.A
detailedresponsetoclassicalfoundationalismisfoundinchapter3ofWarrantedChristianBelief.Theidea
presentedinWCBisnotthat(1)isappliedinconsistently,butthatthereisnogoodreasontothinkthat(1)
istrue.
As well as this negative approach to challenging the evidentialist objection Plantinga also seeks to offer
somethingmorepositive.Inhisbook,WarrantandProperFunction,Plantingaseekstoofferanaccountof
warranthis term for whatever it is that makes the difference between true belief and knowledge. In
Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga applies his account of warrant to religious belief and argues that
thereisnowaytoshowthatreligiousbeliefisnotwarrantedwithoutfirstassumingthatitisfalse.

c.NicolasWolterstorff
Nicholas Wolterstorffs defense of some of the central claims of reformed epistemology is perhaps less
significantthantheprevioustwofiguresthatwelookedat,buthiscontributionsarecertainlymorewide
reaching. His earliest contribution is his book Reason within the Bounds of Religion. In this book
WolterstorffisgrapplingwiththequestionofhowtobeaChristianandascholarandhowonesfaithought
to relate to and impact upon ones reasoning. Though we find no explicit formulation of reformed
epistemologyhere,itisclearthatheisattemptingtodevelopaviewinwhichreligiousbeliefsareneither
subordinatetonorindependentofourotherbeliefs.
His most explicit contribution to reformed epistemology comes in the collection of essays that he edited
withAlvinPlantingacalledFaithandRationality.InhispaperentitledCanbeliefinGodberational?he
considerswhatobligationsrationalityplacesuponus,andinparticularwhetherrationalityrequiresthatwe
onlybelieveinGodonthebasisofevidence.Wolterstorffarguesthat:
A person is rationally justified in believing a certain proposition which he does believe unless he has
adequatereasontoceasefrombelievingit.Ourbeliefsarerationalunlesswehavereasonforrefraining
theyarenotnonrationalunlesswehavereasonforbelieving.Theyareinnocentuntilprovedguilty,not
guiltyuntilprovedinnocent.(Wolterstorff1983:163)
HethenturnstoapplyingthistobeliefinGod.HeobservesthatpeoplecometobelievethatGodexistsina
varietyofwayssuchasfromtheirparents,orinresponsetoanoverwhelmingsenseofguilt,orbyfinding
peaceinthemidstofsuicidaldesperation.Inmanycases,beliefinGodseemstobeimmediate(thatis,not
baseduponotherbeliefs)andsolongasthepersonwhoformsthebeliefhasnoadequatereasontogiveup
theirbeliefthenthatbeliefwillberational.
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MorerecentcontributionsfromWolterstorffcomeinhisbooksDivineDiscourseandJustice.Intheformer
heisengagedinaphilosophicaldiscussionoftheclaimthatGodspeaks,andinthelatter,heisdefending
anaccountofhumanrights.Althoughthesebooksarenotaboutreformedepistemologytheyareinformed
by it. Wolterstorff is still engaged in showing how certain religious beliefs can be rational. Furthermore,
Wolterstorffisclearlyputtingintopracticesomeofthekeyclaimsofreformedepistemology.InJusticeitis
clearthatWolterstorffisseekingtoshowhowsomereligiousclaimsinteractwiththediscussionofhuman
rightsin doing this, Wolterstorff treats the religious claims as standing on equal footing with the non
religious claims. What this means in practice is that he does not attempt to justify religious claims on
groundsacceptabletothenonreligious,butneitherdoeshetreatreligiousclaimsasimmunetocriticism.

4.EvidenceandRationalBeliefinGod
Accordingtothereformedepistemologist,objectionstotherationalityofbeliefinGodoftenrevolvearound
theclaimthatbeliefinGodlackstheappropriateevidence.Inordertoseethis,wecan,followingPlantinga,
identify two distinct types of objectionsnamely, the de facto and de jure objections. The de facto
objection,historicallyanyway,istheformmanyreligiousobjectionstraditionallytake.Thatis,thereligious
skepticoftenquestionstherealityortruthofthereligiousconvictionbeforedirectlyconsideringepistemic
questions. De facto objections take many forms, with perhaps the problem of evil being the most well
knownanddiscussedinphilosophicalliterature.Astheargumentgoes,abenevolentandomnipotentGod
cannotpossiblyexistgiventheamountofunnecessaryorgratuitousevil.
Incontrasttothede facto objection, there is an epistemic objectionor as Plantinga calls it, the de jure
objection.ThedejureobjectionignorestheontologicalstatusofGodsexistenceandinsteadfocusesonthe
justificationandrationalityofbeliefinGod.ThedejureobjectoraskswhetherbeliefinGodisirrational,
unjustifiable,orepistemicallyirresponsible.Thisobjectioncomesinvariousformsaswell.Forsome,belief
in God is irrational as it is the result of some cognitive malfunction. Belief in God is so irrational, it is
claimed,thatitcouldhaveonlybeeninventedbymad,deludedpeoplewhobasetheirbeliefoninsufficient
justificationorargument.Forothers,thiscognitivemalfunctionisakintobeliefinSantaClausandnotthe
kindofbeliefanadultcouldjustifiablybelievein.BeliefinSantaClaus,forwhichthereisnoevidence,is
akintobeliefinGod,forwhichthereisnoevidence.Nomatterwhichlinethedejureobjectortakes,what
seems to unite these objectors is the idea that belief in God lacks the kind of epistemic justification
necessary for rational belief. And for many dejureobjectors there is the assumption, as Plantinga notes,
thathavingarationalbeliefinGodrequires(propositional)evidenceinordertohaveadequateepistemic
support.Callthistheevidentialistdejureobjection.Sowhatmotivatesthedejureobjection, then, is the
idea that belief in God both requires and lacks the appropriate evidence. The central claim of the
evidentialist position is that one ought to believe only when one has the appropriate evidence. Thus if
theismisindeedsimilartobeliefinSantaClaus(forwhichthereisnogoodevidence),thenitseemsthat
beliefinGodisindeeddubiousandthenatureoftheevidentialistdejureobjectionbecomesabitclearer:
belief in God is rational only if its justification depends on evidence. Theism, however, lacks the
appropriateevidenceandisthereforeirrational.
Whatmakesreformedepistemologyuniquehereistheresponsethatisgiveninreplytothiscritcism.The
assumedmoveherewouldbetotryandshowthatthereisadequateevidencefortheism.Instead,though,
thereformedepistemologistrejectstheevidentialistassumption(andonsomeaccountsmightevengrant
that there is insufficient inferential evidence). While there are perhaps several ways to get around the
evidentialist assumption, the most wellknown account is offered by Plantinga. Plantinga argues, for
example, that the evidentialist assumption is undermined given that it is motivated by a failed theory of
justificationnamely,classicalfoundationalism.

5.ClassicalFoundationalism
In order to undermine the evidentialist objection, reformed epistemologists have sought to argue against
whattheytaketobetheunderlyingepistemologicalviewthatmotivatestheobjection.Theviewthatthey
identifyasplayingthisroletheycallClassicalFoundationalism.
ClassicalFoundationalismholdsthattherearetwokindsofbelief:basicbeliefsandnonbasicbeliefs.The
basicbeliefsarerationalevenwhennotheldonthebasisofotherbeliefs,whereasnonbasicbeliefsareonly
rational when supported by basic beliefs. The reason why classical foundationalism motivates the
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evidentialistobjectionagainstbeliefinGodisbecauseoftherestrictionsitputsonwhatcanreasonablybe
abasicbeliefonwhatisaproperlybasicbelief.
Accordingtotheclassicalfoundationalist,theonlybeliefsthatareproperlybasicfallintotooneofthethree
followingcategories:
evidenttothesenses,
incorrigible,or
selfevident.
This means that any belief that does not fall into one of these categories can only be rational if it is
supportedbybeliefsthatdofallintothesecategories.Withthisframeworkinplaceitseemsquiteeasyto
formulatetheevidentialistobjectionagainstbeliefinGod.ThisisbecausebeliefinGoddoesnotseemtobe
evidenttothesense,incorrigibleorselfevident.Giventhis,then,wecanclaimthatbeliefinGodisonly
rational if it is supported by adequate evidencethat is, by other beliefs that are evident to the senses,
incorrigibleorselfevident.
Itispossibletofindhistoricalexamplesofargumentsalongtheselines.Forexample,hereisJ.L.Mackie
discussingtherationalityofbeliefinGod:
Ifitisagreedthatthecentralassertionsoftheismareliterallymeaningful,itmustalsobeadmittedthat
theyarenotdirectlyverifiable.Itfollowsthenthatanyrationalconsiderationofwhethertheyaretrue
or not will involve arguments it [whether God exists] must be examined by either deductive or
inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation for in such a
contextnothingelsecanhaveanycoherentbearingontheissue.(Mackie1982:4,6)
Mackie is not alone is these demands. John Locke placed similar demands on religious belief by boldly
claimingthatthosewhodoassentto(religious)beliefwithoutevidencetransgressagainsttheirownlight
anddisregardtheverypurposeofthosefacultieswhicharedesignedtoevaluatetheevidencenecessaryfor
belief.
The reformed epistemologist contends that thisview has been the dominant one among both theists and
atheistsalike,andsothequestionofwhetherornotbeliefinGodisrationalhasfocusedonwhetherornot
thereisadequateevidenceforthatbelief.Itisforthisreasonthatreformedepistemologistshaveseentheir
firsttaskasbeingtoshowwhyclassicalfoundationalismfailsasaccountofwhatittakesforabelieftobe
rational.

a.RejectingClassicalFoundationalism
Thecaseforrejectingclassicalfoundationalismrestsontwokeyarguments.First,classicalfoundationalism
classes a large number of beliefs that we typically take ourselves to know as irrational. Second, classical
foundationalismisselfreferentiallyincoherent.
The first problem raised against classical foundationalism is that it classes beliefs such as the world has
existedformorethanfiveminutes,otherpersonsexistandhumanscanactfreelyasnotproperlybasic.
These beliefs, claims Plantinga, (along with a great many others) are accepted by the vast majority of
rationalhumansyet,theargumentsforthesebeliefsareremarkablyweak.Mostpeoplewhobelievethese
thingscanoffernoargumentsfortheirbelief,andthosewhocan,stillseemtoholdthebeliefwithagreater
degreeofcertaintythantheargumentwouldseemtowarrant.Plantingawritesthattheproblemofother
minds is to explain how it is that the very common belief that other humans have a mental life could be
justified.Plantingathinksthatthebestargumentistheargumentfromanalogythatweobservethatour
ownmentaleventssuchasbeinginpainareaccompaniedbycertainbehaviors,suchasgraspingthearea
wherethepainislocated,andtheninferfromthisthatwhenothersareexhibitingsimilarbehavior,they
arealsohavingtheassociatedmentalevent.Thisinferencefromasinglecasehardlyseemstojustifythe
beliefthatthereareotherminds,butifitcanbeshowntobesufficientitwouldstillbeimplausibletoclaim
thatonlythosewhohaveknowledgeoftheargumentarerationalintheirbeliefthatothermindsexist.This,
perhaps, would not be so troubling if it were not the case that so many beliefs that do not meet the
requirementssetdownbyclassicalfoundationalismarebelievedinabasicwaybymostrationalhumans.
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AnthonyKennyhaspointedoutthattherearemanybeliefsthat,althoughwecanfindsomeevidencefor
them,shouldnotbethoughtofasbeingbaseduponthatevidencebecausetheevidenceisbelievedwithless
strengththanwhatitisevidencefor.HesuggeststhatthebeliefthatAustraliaexistsisjustsuchabelief:
IfanyoneofthereasonsforbelievinginAustraliaturnedouttobefalse,evenifalltheconsiderations
Icouldmentionprovedillusory,muchlessofmynoeticstructurewouldcollapsethanifitturnedout
thatAustraliadidnotexist.(Kenny1983:19)
ThesamegoesforbeliefssuchasIamawakeorhumanbeingsdie.Ifthesebeliefscanberationalonlyif
they are based upon evidence then the classical foundationalism seems to suggest that we should hold
manyofourbeliefswithmuchlesscertainty,andgiveupmanyotherverystronglyheldbeliefs.
Plantingas second objection is that classical foundationalism is selfreferentially incoherent. Classical
foundationalism itself is not selfevident, neither is it incorrigible, and it is certainly not evident to the
senses.Thismeansthatifitistomeetitsownstandardstheremustbeanargumentfrompremisesthatare
selfevident,incorrigible,orevidenttothesenses.Noargumentpresentsitself,anditiscertainlydifficultto
seewhereonewouldstart,especiallyinlightofsomeofthecounterintuitiveconsequencesoftheclassical
foundationalismhighlightedabove.
Its worth noting here that not all reformed epistemologists think the connection between classical
foundationalismandevidentialismissoobvious.Therearetwomainlinesofcriticismthatcanbemadeto
Plantingasargumentsagainstclassicalfoundationalism.Thefirstistoquestionthelinkbetweenclassical
foundationalismandtheevidentialistobjection,andthesecondistoclaimthatPlantingahasfailedtoshow
thatclassicalfoundationalismisanuntenableposition.
ThisfirstcriticismcanbefoundamongPlantingasfellowreformedepistemologists:
[I]f[Plantinga]issayingthatnoonehasexplicitlypresented[theevidentialistobjection]asfollowing
fromsomeotherdevelopedandarticulatedpositionthatisprobablytrue,butitremainstobeshown
that anyone has done that with respect to classical foundationalism either. But if the claim is that no
other epistemological theory could plausibly serve as a reason for the evidentialist denial, that is
palpablyfalse.(AlstoninTomberlinandvanInwagen1985:296)
[Plantingas]discussionputsusinthepositionofseeingthatthemostcommonandpowerfulargument
for evidentialism is classical foundationalism, and of seeing that classical foundationalism is
unacceptable.Buttodeprivetheevidentialistofhisbestdefenseisnotyettoshowthathiscontentionis
false.(Wolterstorff1983:142)
The criticism from Alston and Wolterstorff is that Plantinga has done nothing to persuade us that the
evidentialistobjectionhasnoforceatbesthehasshownthatnopreviousarticulationoftheobjectionis
successful (supposing that it is correct that all previous versions of the argument rely on something very
muchlikeclassicalfoundationalism).
The second response to Plantinga can again be found in Alston (Alston in Tomberlin and van Inwagen
1985: 296299). Alston observes that Plantinga has not shown that the defender of classical
foundationalism cannot argue for classical foundationalism from premises that are properly basic by her
lights. Alston agrees that it is hard to see how this might be done but denies that this supports the
conclusionthatitcannotbedone.
Plantingascritiqueofclassicalfoundationalismnotedabovemightbeunderstoodasanegativeapproach.
The responses from Alston and Wolterstorff, then, are directed at this negative approach. Plantinga,
however, also offers a different, more positive approach to the issue of proper basicality. He asks us to
reconsiderwhatmightbeclassifiedasproperlybasic.Ratherthanselectcriteria,andthencategorizeour
beliefs accordingly, we should amass examples of beliefs that we take to be properly basic, and the
circumstancesinwhichtheyareconsideredproperlybasic.Afterthisprocess,Plantingasuggeststhatone
couldthenproposecriteriafollowingreflectionontheseexamples.Though,itsimportanttokeepinmind
thatnotalloftheexamplebeliefswillqualifyasgenuinelyproperlybasic(despiteanyinitialappearancesto
thecontrary).
But who is to decide the set of examples, and how do we weed out bad examples without any criteria?
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Plantinga deliberately gives no definitive answers to these questions. According to Plantinga, it is the
responsibility of each community to decide what it considers to be properly basic and to take that as a
startingpointtherecanthenbeanexchangebetweentheexamplesandthecriteriathattheyareusedto
justify,eachrefiningtheother.Theclaimisnotthatthosebeliefsthatareheldbyonesowncommunityto
beproperlybasicareproperlybasicrather,theclaimisthatthisisthebeststartingpointforenquiry.It
maybethatyourcommunityhasgotitwrongaboutwhatbeliefsareproperlybasic,buthopefullythiswill
berevealedbyfurtherreflection.
Accordingthereformedepistemologist,thereisnoneutralstartingpointforphilosophicalenquiry,soitis
up to each community to assess their own starting point, and take that as a defeasible foundation for
inquiry.Communitiesarenotfree,however,todecidewhatbeliefsarebasicforthem.Whatwebelieveis
rarely within our own controlfor example, one cannot simply decide to believe that the moon does not
exist.Thismeansthatthereisanobjectivefactaboutwhateachcommunitydoestakeasitsstartingpoint.
Itmightbeobjectedthatthisisarbitrary,butPlantingacontendsthatthereisnosetofbeliefsthatwillbe
entirelyuncontroversial,andthereisnocriteriaofproperbasicalitythatismoreconvincingthanthebeliefs
thatmostpeopletakeasproperlybasic.Orperhapssomewillagreethatalthoughthismethodiscorrect,it
isstillimplausiblethatbeliefinGodshouldbeproperlybasic.Inthecaseofperceptualbeliefstheground
for them is obvious, even if how they are grounded is not clear. God, if he exists, is surely much more
remote,andhisexistenceisnotthesortofthingthatcanbeknowninthebasicway.
Plantingarespondsbypointingoutthat,withintheReformedtraditionatleast,beliefinGodisconsidered
tobegrounded.AccordingtoJohnCalvin,oneoftheimportantfiguresintheReformation,humanseach
haveanaturaltendencytobelievethatGodexistswhenplacedincertaincircumstances,infactheclaims
that God daily discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe (Plantinga 2000: 66).
Plantingadoesnotargueforthetruthofsuchaposition,rather,hementionsittoshowthathisclaimthat
beliefinGodcanbeproperlybasicisnotadhoc,butisinfactimplicitlytheviewheldbyalargenumberof
people,andtheReformedtraditionmorespecifically.ItisnotnecessarythatPlantingaknow,orevenhave
goodreasontobelievetheclaimsmadebyCalvinandothers,aslongasitistruethatthereareexperiences
thatservetogroundbeliefinGodthenthatbeliefwillbeproperlybasiconthoseoccasions.Itisduetothis
appealtoreformedthinkersthatthisviewhascometobeknownasreformedepistemology.
Onthesurface,reformedepistemologybearssomesimilaritytofideism.Fideismistheclaimthatbeliefin
Godisnotrational,butmustbeaccepteduponfaithitisusuallyclaimedthatthisbeliefisindependentof
reason,orinmoreextremecasesthatitisopposedtoreason.Thereformedepistemologistwillagreewith
thefideistthatargumentsarenotneededtojustifybeliefinGod,butwhatabouttherelationshipbetween
reasonandbeliefinGod?
Itisclearfromwhathasalreadybeendiscussedthatthereformedepistemologistwillnotsubscribetothe
moreextremefideismbecausetobelievewhatisproperlybasicisnottobelievewhatisopposedtoreason.
What is, at first, less clear is whether to believe in God in the basic way is to believe independently of
reason. Plantinga considers a distinction between reason and faith suggested by Abraham Kuyper
(Plantinga1983:88),thatthedeliverancesofreasonarethosebeliefsthatarebasedonargumentationand
inference, whereas the deliverances of faith are beliefs that are held independently of argument and
inference. On this understanding of faith, anything held in the basic way will be taken on faith. For
example, this definition would suggest that 2+1=3, external objects exist and I am awake, are all held on
faith.Thisisnottheunderstandingoffaiththatthefideisthasinmind,sinceitdoesnotservetodrawa
distinction between faith and reason. Plantinga explains that there is no reason for the reformed
epistemologisttothinkthatbeliefinGodisindependentof,oropposedto,reason:
Belief in the existence of God is in the same boat as belief in other minds, the past, and perceptual
objects in each case God has so constructed us that in the right circumstances we form the belief in
question.ButthenthebeliefthatthereissuchapersonasGodisasmuchamongthedeliverancesof
reasonasotherbeliefs.(Plantinga1983:90)
Reformedepistemologists,unlikefideists,holdthatreligiousbeliefisrational,butunliketheevidentialist,
theydenythatthisrationalityisduetothebeliefsbeingbaseduponevidence.

6.ThePositiveCaseinReformedEpistemology
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Sofar,muchofwhathasbeensaidherehasbeenfocusedonunderminingacertainsortobjectiontothe
rationalityofreligiousbelief.Thesecondsignificantstrandtoreformedepistemologyconcernsprovidinga
descriptionofthewayinwhichreligiousbeliefscanberational.

a.TheChristianMysticalPractice
In Perceiving God William Alston seeks to describe and defend what he calls the Christian Mystical
Practice (CMP). This is the practice of forming beliefs about God in response to certain kinds of
experiences.
Alston first argues that there are no nonquestionbegging way to show that any basic belief forming
practiceisreliableonewillalwayshavetoappealtothepracticeitself.Inlightofthiswecannotrequire
thatbeliefformingpracticesenjoyindependentsupportbeforeweengageinthembecausethissupportwill
never be available. It may be that some practices can be ruled out due to being inconsistent, but no
adequatereasoncanbefoundforthinkingthatanyofourbasicbeliefformingpracticesarereliable.
InsteadAlstonarguesthatitisreasonabletoacceptsociallyestablishedpracticesthosepracticesthathave
demonstratedstabilityoveranumberofgenerationsandwhicharedeeplyembeddedinourpsyche.Such
practicesprovideprimafaciejustificationforthebeliefsthattheyproduce.Furthermore,ifthesepractices
arenotshowntobeunreliablethenthebeliefsthatresultfromthemarerational.
Alston claims that CMP is one of these practices. Christians have been forming beliefs in this way for
centuries,andthepracticeisdeeplyembeddedintheculture.Thismeansthatengaginginthepracticeis
primafaciejustified.AndaslongastherearenoadequatereasonsforthinkingthatCMPisunreliablethen
thebeliefsthatresultfromthispracticewillbejustified.
AlstongoesontoarguethatmanyofthereasonsforthinkingthatCMPisunreliableexhibitoneorbothof
two flaws: imperialism and double standards. Objections such as that CMP must be unreliable because
mostnormaladultsdonotpracticeitis,Alstonargues,guiltyofimperialism.ItimposesastandardonCMP
that requires it to be more like the Senseperceptual Practice (SP) for no good epistemic reason. Why
should we expect practices that are used by all the population to be the only ones that are reliable? An
example of an objection that imposes a double standard would be requiring that the outputs of CMP be
independently verifiable. Alston argues that no basic belief forming practice meets this requirement
including SP, so requiring something like this of CMP is to apply a standard that one would not apply
acrosstheboard.

b.TheParityArgument
The beginnings of the parity argument can be seen in Plantingas early writings as far back as God and
Other Minds. There, Plantinga argues that belief in other minds and belief in God are in the same
epistemological dilemma all of the arguments in their favor fall short when it comes to philosophical
scrutiny.Yet,asPlantingastates,ifbeliefinothermindsisrational,soismybeliefinGod.Butobviously
theformerisrationalso,therefore,isthelatter.AsPlantingasthinkinghasdeveloped,sohashisparity
argumentasitrelatestorationalbeliefinGod.Thekeydifferenceinhisthinking,ashenotesinWarranted
ChristianBelief,isthathenolongertakesproofsastheonlywaytojustifybeliefinGod.Thismajorshiftin
Plantingasthinkingopensthedoorforamoredaringparityargument,namelythatinthesamewaythat
perceptual experiences are justified, belief in Godthrough the divine senseis also justified and should
thusenjoythesameepistemicstatusasordinaryperceptualexperiences.
PlantingasparityargumentforrationalbeliefinGodfollowsaspecificpattern.Thefirstgoalistohighlight
thosebeliefsthatwetaketobebothrationalandbasic.Inotherwords,itneedstobethekindofbeliefthat
isrationaldespitenotbeinginferredfromanyevidenceorargument.Further,itmustbethesortofbelief
that if held hostage to evidential demands it would have devastating epistemological results perceptual
beliefs,itisthought,arespecificallywhatPlantingaislookingfor.ConsiderforexamplethebeliefthatIsee
a clock hanging on the wall. It would be difficult to present any noncircular or nonquestion begging
evidence to justify my belief. Yet, this is what the evidentialist demands. So if we can disregard the
demandsoftheevidentialistinthecaseofperceptualbeliefs,thenperhapsthedemandstheevidentialist
places on belief in God should be reconsidered as well neither can produce the required (nonquestion
begging) evidence, but surely in the case of our perceptual beliefs it cant be said that we as agents are
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unjustified, epistemically irresponsible, or irrational in our belief. This of course raises further questions
aboutevidentialdemands.This,then,isthefirstparallelthatPlantingaandotherreformedepistemologists
make.Thesecondparalleldealswiththesimilaritiesbetweenperceptualandreligiousexperiences.
Perceptual beliefs arise from some perceptual experience the belief arises suddenly with the cognizer
havingnocontrolovertheinitialbelief.Theperceptualbeliefthatarisesfromtheexperienceisprimafacie
justified.ThomasReid,whoseinfluenceonreformedepistemologyisofnote,arguedthatwhatweperceive
isnotonlyirresistible,butitisimmediatethatis,itisnotbytrainofreasoningandargumentationthat
wecometobeconvincedoftheexistenceofwhatweperceive.Perceptualbeliefs,accordingtoReid,are
notinferredbutimmediatelyknownbytheperceiver.Theparallelsbetweenperceptualbeliefsandbeliefin
God,onPlantingasaccountanyway,areimportant.TheideaisthatbeliefinGodandperceptualbeliefsare
bothimmediateandtheresultofourcognitivefaculties.Thus,ifsomeperceptualbelieflikeIseeatreeis
primafaciejustified, then belief in God, if it arises in the same manner (for example, the result of some
cognitivefaculty),isalsoprimafaciejustified.
So what is this special faculty that gives rise to belief in God in an immediate noninferential fashion?
Plantinga uses a term that is well known to most in the reformed tradition called the sensus divinitatis.
Calvin,whoPlantingacreditswiththesensusdivinitatis,claimedthatonecanacceptandknowthatGod
existswithoutanyargumentorevidence.Asaresultoftheworkingsofthesensusdivinitatis,beliefinGod
is properly basic and is not inferred from any evidence or argument. Plantingas position is summed up
nicelyhere:
Calvins claim, then, is that God has created us in such a way that we have a strong tendency or
inclinationtowardbeliefinhim.Thistendencyhasbeeninpartoverlaidorsuppressedbysin.Wereit
notfortheexistenceofsinintheworld,humanbeingswouldbelieveinGodtothesamedegreeand
withthesamenaturalspontaneitythatwebelieveintheexistenceofotherpersons,anexternalworld,
or the past. This is the natural human condition it is because of our presently unnatural sinful
conditionthatmanyfindbeliefinGoddifficultorabsurd.Thefactis,Calvinthinks,onewhodoesnot
believeinGodisinanepistemicallysubstandardpositionratherlikeamanwhodoesnotbelievethat
his wife exists, or thinks she is likely a cleverly constructed robot and has no thoughts, feelings, or
consciousness.AlthoughthisbeliefinGodispartiallysuppressed,itisnonethelessuniversallypresent.
(Plantinga1983:66)
From this, Plantinga concludes that there is a kind of faculty or cognitive mechanism, what Calvin calls
sensus divinitatis or a sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs
about God. So in the same way that perceptual beliefs such as I see a table are noninferential and
properly basic, belief in God, when occasioned by the appropriate circumstances (such as one feeling a
sense of guilt, dependence, beauty, and so forth), can also be properly basic because of the cognitive
workingofthesensusdivinitatis.
OnPlantingasreformedaccountthen,beliefinGodcannowbeaddedtothelistofproperlybasicbeliefs:
1. Iseeatree(knownperceptually),
2. Iaminpain(knownintrospectively),
3. Ihadbreakfastthismorning(knownthroughmemory),and
4. Godexists(knownthroughthesensusdivinitatis).

Thisbeliefcanbetakenasproperlybasiciftheagentsbeliefhassufficientwarrant.
There is another important question to be asked, however. Does it follow from this that belief in God is
groundless?IfIcometobelieveinGodonthereformedmodel,canitbesaidthatmybeliefisgroundless?
PlantingaarguesthatinthesamewaythatIseeatreeisproperlybasicbutnotgroundless,beliefinGod
is not groundless. Understanding what Plantinga means by groundless is important in realizing the
distinctionbetweenevidenceandgroundsforbelief.Perceptualexperiences,suchasthosecausedbyvisual
experiences, are not considered to be groundless because of their reliance on the senses. Likewise,
PlantingaclaimsthatbeliefinGodisnotgroundless,becauseitisrootedintheexperienceofthesensus
divinitatis.Theseexperiences,however,donotentailthatthebeliefinquestionisinferential.Thebeliefis
merely occasioned by the circumstance (for example, the circumstance of beholding some majestic
mountainsordesertsunset)whichtriggerstheworkingofthesensusdivinitatis.ThosewhobelieveinGod
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simplyfindthemselveswiththisbelief.
AnotherimportantpointconcernsdefeatersagainstbeliefinGod.PlantingaarguesthatwhilebeliefinGod
isproperlybasic,itisalsoopentodefeat.SupposethatsomeoneoffersadefeaterforthebeliefthatGod
existsthen,claimsPlantinga,thatparticularbeliefwouldhavetobeabandoned.Itispossiblehowever,for
onetoofferadefeaterdefeater,whichwouldobviouslyentailthebeliefbeingjustifiablymaintained.Thisis
an important point in that we can now see that a properly basic belief, for Plantinga, is not some
incorrigible or indubitable belief that one can always believe despite defeating evidence. It is, in other
words,properlybasicbutopentodefeat.

c.WarrantedChristianBelief
Alvin Plantinga has developed an important account of how religious belief could amount to knowledge.
This view is discussed in his trilogy: Warrant: The Current Debate, Warrant and Proper Function, and
finally,WarrantedChristianFaith.InthisWarranttrilogy,PlantingaisinterestedinthequestionWhatis
knowledge?, and more specifically in what it is that makes the difference between mere true belief and
knowledge.Hecallsthis,whateveritis,warrant.
Warrant is just one of a number of epistemic terms that are used in epistemology others include
justification, rationality and evidence. Warrant is of particular importance, however, because if we can
answerthequestionWhatiswarrant?thenwewillhaveananswertothequestionWhatisknowledge?
Plantingaarguesthatwarrantresultsfromtheproperfunctioningofyourcognitivefaculties:
[A] belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been produced in me by cognitive faculties that are
working properly (functioning as they ought to, subject to no cognitive dysfunction) in a cognitive
environmentthatisappropriateformykindsofcognitivefaculties,(2)thesegmentofthedesignplan
governingtheproductionofthatbeliefisaimedattheproductionoftruebeliefs,and(3)thereisahigh
statisticalprobabilitythatabeliefproducedunderthoseconditionswillbetrue.(Plantinga1993:4647)
KeytoPlantingasanalysisofwarrantisthatabeliefcanonlybewarrantedifitisproducedbyacognitive
faculty that is functioning properly, which means that it must not be diseased or broken or hindered. In
order to make sense of what it means for our cognitive faculties to be functioning properly we must
introduce the notion of a design plan, which determines the way our cognitive faculties are supposed to
work.Justasthehumanheartissupposedtobeatat5080beatsperminutewhileatrest,sotoo,thereisa
waythatourcognitivefacultiesaresupposedtofunction.This,claimsPlantinga,shouldnotbethoughtto
necessarilyinvokethenotionofconsciousdesign(byGod,oranyoneelse),ratherhemeanstoinvokethe
commonideasharedbymanytheistsandnontheists,thatpartsofourbodieshaveafunction,suchasone
ofthefunctionsofourlegsbeingtoallowustomovethroughourenvironment.
Aswellashavingcognitivefacultiesthatarefunctioningproperlythosefacultiesmustalsobeoperatingin
the right cognitive environmentthe one for which they are designed. This means that one might have
warrantforaperceptualbeliefthatisformedaboutanearbymediumsizedobjectonaclearday,butnotfor
aperceptualbeliefaboutafarawayobjectinabadlylit,smokefilledroom.Itmustalsobethatthepartof
thedesignplangoverningtheproductionofthebeliefinquestionmustbeaimedattruth.Ourfacultiesare
designed for a number of different purposes, not just the production of true beliefs, which means that it
may be that there are times when our cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the correct
environment,andyetproduceafalsebelief,orabeliefthatisonlyaccidentallytrue.Forexample,itmaybe
thecasethatwhenapersondiscoversthattheyhavealifethreateningillnessthattheyaredesignedinsuch
awaythattheywillcometobelievethattheywillrecover,evenifthisunlikelytobetruethismayperhaps
bethecasebecauseoneismorelikelytorecoverifonebelievesthatthisistrue.Thatwouldbeacaseof
cognitive faculties functioning properly in the correct environment, but not a case of the belief being
warrantedbecausethedesignplan,inthisinstance,doesnotaimattruth.
The final requirement is that there is a high statistical probability that a belief that is produced by the
cognitivefacultyinquestionislikelytobetruewhenitisfunctioningproperlyintheenvironmentforwhich
it was designedwhich is to say that the design must be a good one. Plantinga imagines a situation in
whichourfacultieshavebeendesignedbysomelesserdeity,andthatthisdeityhasdonesuchapoorjob,
that even when our faculties are functioning properly, in the correct environment, according to a design
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planthatisaimedattruth,westillformmostlyfalsebeliefsbecausethedesignissopoor.Ifthiswasthe
case then our beliefs would not have warrant, even in cases where they did turn out to be true. For this
reasonareliabilityconditionisrequiredaswell.
One important point to note is that Plantingas account is an externalist one. This means that, on
Plantingasview,warrantinvolves,notjustfactsthattheagentisawareof,butalsofactsthattheagentmay
notbeawareofsuchas,forexample,whetheronesfacultiesarefunctioningproperlyandfactsaboutthe
environment.ThispointiscrucialtoPlantingasaccountgiventhatwhetherornotatheisthaswarrantfor
herreligiousbeliefsmaydependonfactsthatsheisunawareof.
Plantingaclaimsthatgiventhisviewinepistemologythereisnogoodreasontothinkthatreligiousbeliefis
not warranted. Plantinga claims that, following John Calvin, we may have been created by God with a
faculty called the sensus divinitatis. Any beliefs that result from this faculty will be in a position to be
warranted.SolongasthefacultywasdesignedbyGodforthepurposeofproducingtruebeliefsabouthim
thenthisfacultywillmeettherequirementsdescribedaboveandtheresultingbeliefswillbewarranted.
It is not Plantingas intention to show that this faculty exists or that this really is the way that religious
beliefscomeabout.Insteadhisclaimisthatsincethisistrueforallweknowthenonecannotreasonably
claimthatreligiousbeliefsarenotrationalwithoutfirstshowingthatthisaccountisfalse.

7.ObjectionstoReformedEpistemology
Reformedepistemologyhasreceivedasignificantamountofattentionandattractedmanyobjections.Some
ofthemostsignificantonesaredescribedbelow.

a.GreatPumpkinObjection
ThereisafamilyofobjectionsknownasGreatPumpkinobjections.Theseobjectionsgettheirnamefrom
the Peanuts comic strip. In peanuts the character Linus is a child who believes that each Halloween the
GreatPumpkinwillcometovisithimatthepumpkinpatch.Whattheseobjectionshaveincommonisthat
theyclaimthat,ifreformedepistemologyiscorrect,thenbeliefinGodisnomorerationalthanbeliefinthe
GreatPumpkin.
This kind of objection is first mentioned by Plantinga in Reason and Belief in God (7478). One of the
claimsofreformedepistemologyisthatthereligiousbelieverneednotofferanycriteriafordecidingwhich
beliefsarereasonablestartingpointsforformingfurtherbeliefs.Insteadeachcommunityisresponsiblefor
determining its own starting points and reasoning on that basis. Plantinga supposes that someone might
objecttothisbyclaimingthatthismethodmeansthatthecommunityinquestionwillhavenoreasonto
accept any belief over any other. This community could take belief in God to be properly basic, but they
mightinsteadtakethebeliefthattheearthisflatorthatIcanrunatthespeedoflightifItryreallyhard,or
thebeliefthattheGreatPumpkinwillreturnatHalloweentothemostdeservingpumpkinpatches.Thereis
noreason,sotheobjectiongoes,tochooseonebeliefoveranotherwithoutfirstofferingsomecriteriafor
determiningwhichbeliefsarerationalstartingpointsandwhicharenot.
Plantingapointsoutthatinotherareasweareabletodiscriminatebetweentwothingsevenifwearenot
abletogivecriteriaforhowthatdiscriminationistobedone.Theexamplehegivesisthemeaningfulness
ofsentences.PlantingaobservesthatwecaneasilytellthatthesentenceTwasbrilligandtheslithytoves
did gyre and gymble in the wabe is meaningless even if we cannot appeal to some general criteria of
meaning.Likewise,claimsPlantinga,thereisnoreasontothinkthatsomethingsimilarwillnotbepossible
forbeliefs.Thisexampleshowsthatthereisnothingmysteriousaboutthesuggestionthatwemightbeable
totellwhichcandidatesbelongtoacertainclass,andwhichdonot,withoutalsobeingabletostatecriteria
forinclusion.Forthesereasonsthisobjectionneednottroublethereformedepistemologist.
MichaelMartinoffersamoretroublingversionoftheargument.HedoesnotlabelhisobjectionasaGreat
Pumpkin objection, but Plantinga refers to it as the Son of the Great Pumpkin objection. Here is how
Martinphrasestheobjection:
Although reformed epistemologists would not have to accept voodoo beliefs as rational, voodoo
followers would be able to claim that insofar as they are basic in the voodoo community they are
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rational and, moreover, that reformed thought was irrational in this community. Indeed, Plantingas
proposal would generate many different communities that could legitimately claim that their basic
beliefsarerational.(Martin1990:272)
Thissecondobjectionconcernswhetherornotacommunitycanmakejudgmentsaboutthebasicbeliefsof
other communities in a principled way. They may be able to argue that the believers in some other
community are not justified in holding some of their nonbasic beliefs, because they are not adequately
supportedbytheirbasicbeliefs,butsincethebasicbeliefsarenotsupportedbyotherbeliefs,thereseems
to be no way for those outside the community to criticize them. If this is correct, it is a very strange and
counterintuitiveresult.Therearevariousbeliefsthatwethinkareobjectionable,eveniftheyareheldin
thebasicwayforexample,beliefthattheGreatPumpkinwillreturneveryHalloween,thattheEarthisflat
andtheclaimsofastrologyallseemtobeobjectionablefromtheepistemicpointofview,whetherornot
theyareheldinthebasicway.
Thereformedepistemologistregardstheprocessofassemblingexamplesofproperlybasicbeliefstobethe
responsibilityofeachcommunity,andso,itwouldseem,atleastatfirst,thatsheiscommittedtoasortof
epistemic relativism whereby the most one can do to criticize the beliefs of a person from a different
community is to point out internal inconsistencies. This wouldnt necessarily be a major problem, except
forthefactthatthesortsofcommunitiesthatseemtobeincludedareonesthatholdbizarre,irrationalor
superstitiousbeliefsbeliefslikeastrology,voodooorperhapseventheGreatPumpkinbelief.
The reformed epistemologist can respond to this objection by pointing out that one could challenge the
basic beliefs of another community by finding a defeater. Our basic beliefs are defeasible, and therefore
opentorevisioninlightoffurtherinformation.Thismeansthatjustbecauseyouarepermittedtotreata
beliefasproperlybasicifitseemstoyouthatitis,itdoesnotfollowthatyouwillcontinuetobepermitted
toholdthatbeliefnomatterwhat.Youmaygainadefeaterforthatbeliefandcometobelievethatitisno
longertrue.ApersonmaybejustifiedintakingabeliefsuchastheGreatPumpkinbeliefasbasicifshehas
beenraisedtobelievethattheGreatPumpkinexists,butwhenshecomestolearnmoreabouttheworld
forexample,when,yetagain,theGreatPumpkinfailstoarriveonHalloweenshewillobtainadefeaterfor
thatbelief,anditwillnolongerbereasonableforhertoholdthatbelief.
Thereformedepistemologististhereforenotendorsinganepistemicfreeforall,sincejustbecauseabelief
isbasicdoesnotmeanthatitisimmunetoepistemicappraisal.Itisstillperfectlypossibleforanyoneto
argueagainstthebasicbeliefsofanothercommunity,andtoshowthemthatoneoftheirbeliefsisfalseor
unjustified.
The third, and final, version of this objection claims that reformed epistemology places belief in God
beyondepistemicappraisalandthatitsmethodscouldbeadaptedtoplaceotherbeliefsbeyondepistemic
appraisalbeliefs that are clearly irrational like belief in the Great Pumpkin. If the methods of reformed
epistemology can be used to defend beliefs like these then it cannot be successful in establishing the
rationalityofreligiousbelief.
LindaZagzebskihasofferedanobjectionlikethisone.Sheclaimsthatreformedepistemologyhasfailedto
meettherequirementsofwhatshecallstheRationalRecognitionPrinciple(RRP):Ifabeliefisrational,its
rationalityisrecognizable,inprinciple,byrationalpersonsinothercultures(ZagzebskiinPlantingaetal.
2002:120).ZagzebskidirectsherobjectionagainstPlantingaandwritesthatreformedepistemology
violates the Rational Recognition principle. It does not permit a rational observer outside the
community of believers in the model to distinguish between Plantingas model and the beliefs of any
group, no matter how irrational and bizarresunworshippers, cult followers, devotes of the Greek
gods...,assuming,ofcourse,thattheyarecleverenoughtobuildtheirownepistemicdoctrinesinto
their models in a parallel fashion. But we do think that there are differences in the rationality of the
beliefsofacultandChristianbeliefs,evenifthecultisabletoproduceanexactlyparallelargumentfor
a conditional proposition to the effect that the beliefs of the cult are rational if true. Hence, the
rationalityofsuchbeliefsmustdependuponsomethingotherthantheirtruth.(ZagzebskiinPlantinga
etal.2002:122)
A similar objection is offered by Keith DeRose in his unpublished essay Voodoo Epistemology. DeRose
argues that the real worry for reformed epistemology is that it could be adapted to defend some very
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strange and clearly irrational beliefs. This, claims DeRose, shows that there is something wrong with
reformedepistemologyevenifwecannotsayexactlywhatitis.
Thisobjectionisnotcompletelydevastatingforreformedepistemologybutitdoesmaketheachievements
ofreformedepistemologylookmuchlesssignificant.WorkinthisareabyKyleScott(2014)hassuggested
that we ought to consider the historical and social environments that beliefs occur in, arguing that only
beliefsthatoccurinstableandenduringcommunitiesareviablecandidatesforbeingdefendedintheway
thatreformedepistemologistsdefendreligiousbelief.

b.Disanalogies
An important claim made by reformed epistemology is that religious belief can be rationally held in the
basicway,similartoperceptualbeliefs.Anobjectiontothisisthatitcannotbereasonabletoholdreligious
beliefsinthebasicwaybecauseofsignificantdifferencesbetweenperceptualbeliefsandreligiousbeliefs.
TheobjectionhasbeenmostforcefullyputbyRichardGrigg(1983).Hedoesnotthinkthattheisticbeliefs
will turn out to be basic because of the disanalogies between theistic beliefs and more widely recognized
basicbeliefs.
Grigg interprets reformed epistemology as arguing that the Christian community is within its epistemic
rightsinholdingthatcertaintheisticbeliefsarebasicbecausethesebeliefsareanalogoustootherbeliefs
thataremorewidelyregardedtobebasic.Examplesoftheseinclude:(1)Iseeatree,(2)Ihadbreakfast
this morning, and (3) That person is angry. Grigg identifies three important disanalogies between these
beliefsandtheisticbeliefs.
Firstly, Grigg points out that although beliefs such as (1)(3) will often be basic, they are still constantly
beingconfirmed:
Forexample,whenIreturnhomethisevening,Iwillseesomedirtydishessittinginmysink,oneless
egg in my refrigerator than was there yesterday, etc. This is not to say that (2) is believed because of
evidence. Rather, it is a basic belief grounded immediately by memory. But one of the reasons that I
takesuchmemorybeliefsasproperlybasicisthatmymemoryisalmostalwayssubsequentlyconfirmed
byempiricalevidence.(Grigg1983:126)
This, on the other hand, is not true of theistic belief. Beliefs, such as that God created the world, Grigg
suggests, are not confirmed by observation, and may even be disconfirmed if the problem of evil is a
successfulargument.
Theseconddisanalogyisthatthereisacertainuniversalityenjoyedbybeliefssuchas(1)(3),butnotby
theisticbeliefs.Thatis,whenapersonhasaperceptualexperiencesuchasbeingappearedtotreely,they
willnaturallybelievesomethinglikeIseeatreeandthisisthecase,claimsGrigg,forthevastmajorityof
people.Thesituationisnotthesamefortheisticbeliefstake,forexample,Plantingassuggestionthatone
mighthaveanexperienceofbeingawedbythebeautyoftheuniverseandformthebeliefthatGodcreated
theuniverse.Griggclaimsthatmanypeoplehavethisexperienceyetthereisnouniversallysharedbelief
thattypicallycomeswiththisexperience,unlikeinthecaseofperceptualbeliefs.
Thethird,andfinal,disanalogythatGriggraisesisthatpeoplehaveabiastowardstheisticbeliefs,butnot
usually with less controversial examples of properly basic beliefs. Grigg points out that there is a
psychological benefit to be gained from believing that God exists, whereas, there will not usually be any
obviousbenefitforbeliefslike(1)(3).
Eachofthesedisanalogiescanbechallenged.MarkMacleodpointsoutthatitisnotobviousthattheseare
genuinedisanalogies.Forexample,religiousbeliefsmayreceiveconfirmationfrommultiplesourcessuch
as sacred writings, the testimony of other believers and further religious experiences. Although these
sourcesarenotindependentofeachotheritisnotclearthattheexperiencesinthebreakfastexampleabove
areindependenteithersinceallthesupportingevidencereliesonperceptualexperienceatsomepoint.
Theseconddisanalogyisproblematicaswellbecausewhenapersonhasanexperienceofseeingatreethey
mayformawidevarietyofbeliefsuchasIseeatreeorthattreeisabouttofalloveroritisverywindy
today.ContrarytowhatGriggarguesthebeliefsthatareformedinresponsetoperceptualexperiencesare
notuniform.
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Thethirddisanologyisalsonotclearlyagenuinedisanology.Imayderivepsychologicalbenefitfrommany
ofmyperceptualbeliefssuchasbelievingthatthecomputerscreenisshowingapositivenumbernextto
mybankaccount.
Even if the case for disanalogies between perceptual experiences and religious experience can be proved,
then, this may not be a problem for reformed epistemology. Reformed epistemology should not be
understoodasrelyingontheclaimthatreligiousexperienceisjustlikeperceptualexperience.Ratherwhat
reformedepistemologistshavebeenarguingforisthatweoughttojudgereligiousexperiencebythesame
standardsaswejudgeperceptualexperiences,andthatreligiousexperiencestandsupwellwhenjudgedby
those standards. Given the difference in subject matter and the alleged faculties involved, then, it should
notbesurprisingtofinddisanalogiesbetweenreligiousexperienceandperceptualexperience.Todevelop
anydisanalogiesintoanobjectiontoreformedepistemologyitmustalsobeshownthatthedisanalogiesare
sufficienttoshowthatsuchbeliefsarenotrationalunlesssupportedbyfurtherevidence.

c.ReligiousDiversity
Accordingtoreformedepistemologyreligiousbeliefcanberationalevenifitisnotsupportedbyevidence.
Whatreformedepistemologistsdonotclaimisthatthesebeliefswillbeimmunetodefeat.Itmaybethata
personsreligiousbeliefsareinitiallyirrational,butwhentheydiscoversomenewpieceofinformationthey
cease to be. Some have suggested that, even if reformed epistemology is correct, there is a defeater for
religiousbeliefthatoughttobeapparenttomostcompetentadultsintheworldtoday.Thisdefeatercomes
from considering the facts of religious diversity. In this section we will consider two attempts to advance
thissortofobjection.
i.ReligiousBeliefisEpistemicallyArbitrary
Suppose,forthesakeofargumentatleast,thatallofthemajorreligionsmightbeequallywellsupportedby
arguments and that its adherents might all have the same sort of internally available markers for their
beliefs.Thescenariowouldbeonewherewhateverthetheistcanofferinsupportofherbeliefs,thosewho
disagreecanofferthesameconsiderations.Forexample,supposethatAnnebelievespandBillbelievesp,
and that whatever evidence or arguments Anne can offer in support of p Bill can offer equally good
evidenceandargumentsinsupportofp.Supposefurtherthattheirbeliefsarealikeinallotherrespects,
sothatifAnnefindspintuitive,BillfindspintuitiveorifAnnetakespasfoundationalBilltakespas
foundationalandsoonforanyotherconsiderationsthatmightbeepistemicallyrelevant.JohnHickclaims
thatifthisisthecasethenitisintellectuallyarbitraryforthereligiousbelievertoholdthatherownbeliefs
aretruewhilethoseofotherreligionsarefalsebecauseshehasnoreasontotreatthebeliefsdifferently.
RichardFeldmanalsooffersasimilarobjectionbyarguingforthefollowingprinciple:
If (i) S has some good reasons (internal markers) to believe P, but (ii) also knows that other people
haveequallygoodreasons(internalmarkers)forbelievingthingsincompatiblewithP,and(iii)Shas
noreasontodiscounttheirreasonsandfavorherown,thenSisnotjustifiedinbelievingP.(Feldman
2003:88)
Thisprinciplestatesthatevenifyouhavegoodreasonsforbelievingp,ifyouknowthatothershaveequally
goodreasonsforbelievingsomethingincompatiblewithp,andyouhavenoreasontodiscounttheirreason
thenyouarenotjustifiedinacceptingp.Thisisbecause,claimsFeldman,learningthatothershaveequally
goodreasonsfortheirincompatiblebeliefsundercutsyourjustificationforp.
AlvinPlantingahasrespondedtothisobjectionbytryingtoshowthatthereisnothinginconsistent about
holdingontoyourbeliefsinthefaceofdisagreementeveninthecircumstancesdescribedabove.
Hisfirstpointisthattheinternalsupportthatabeliefenjoysdoesnotexhausteverythingthatcanbesaid
abouttheepistemicstatusofabelief.Twobeliefscanhaveallthesameinternalmarkersandyetstillnot
beequalfromtheepistemicpointofview.Otherrelevantfeaturesincludewhetherornotthefacultythat
producedthebeliefisfunctioningproperly,andwhetherornotthebeliefwasproducedinanenvironment
forwhichthefacultywasdesigned.Furthermore,onedoesnotneedtoendorsePlantingasepistemologyin
order to agree with this point. Others have suggested that external factors are relevant to the epistemic
standingofabeliefsuchasreliabilityofthesourceofthebelief,whetherthebeliefissafeorwhetherthe
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belief is sensitive. What this means is that there is no inconsistency in thinking that two incompatible
beliefs are alike in purely internal support and yet for us to treat them differently. This is a very modest
claim and supplies no reason to think that judging two such beliefs differently in the sorts of cases
describedcanbejustified,onlythatitisnotcontradictorytodoso.Thispointissupposedtolaythebasis
forhisfollowingtwopoints.
Thesecondpointisthatifdisagreementisadefeaterthenitwoulddefeattoomanybeliefs.Plantingalabels
itaphilosophicaltarbaby,claimingthatitwouldbeaproblemnotjustforhim,butforhisobjectorsas
well. This is because whatever position one adopts in this debate there will be others who disagree. The
Christianwillbelievecertainclaimsknowingthatothersinsimilarepistemicsituationsdisagree,aswillthe
HinduortheMuslim.Anatheistorapluralistwillbeinnobetterasituationsinceshewillthinkthatthe
claimsofthesereligionsarefalse,andknowthatthereotherswhodisagree.Plantingadoesnotthinkthat
withholding belief avoids the problem either since if one withholds belief there will still be disagreement
concerning whether or not withholding belief is the correct epistemic attitude to adopt. This worry also
extendstootherareasaswell,suchaspoliticsandphilosophywherethereisalsowidespreaddisagreement.
What this is supposed to show is that claiming that disagreement is a defeater has potentially disastrous
consequences leading to a sort of skepticism. This, of course, does not show that it is wrong that
disagreementdefeatsbelief,itisonlymeanttoshowthatthisproblemisaproblemforeveryone,anditis
notonethatissolelyaproblemforthereligiousbeliever.
Plantingasthirdpointisofferedbywayofathoughtexperiment:
Perhapsyouhavealwaysbelieveditdeeplywrongforacounselortousehispositionoftrusttoseducea
client. Perhaps you discover that others disagree they think it more like a minor peccadillo, like
running a red light when theres no traffic and you realize that possibly these people have the same
internal markers for their beliefs that you have for yours. You think the matter over more fully,
imaginativelyrecreateandrehearsesuchsituations,becomemoreawareofjustwhatisinvolvedinsuch
asituation(thebreachoftrust,thebreakingofimpliedpromises,theinjusticeandunfairness,thenasty
ironyofthesituationinwhichsomeonecomestoacounsellorseekinghelpbutreceivesonlyhurt)and
cometobelieveevenmorefirmlythebeliefthatsuchanactioniswrong...(Plantinga2012:653)
Plantingaclaimsthatinmoralcases,suchasthisone,itisclearthatitisreasonabletocontinuebelievingin
thefaceofdisagreementevenwhenyoubelievethatthosewhodisagreeenjoythesameinternalmarkersas
yourself. If it is reasonable in this case to continue to hold on to your beliefs then it cannot be true in
generalthatoneisrequiredtogiveupbeliefsinthefaceofdisagreement.
Plantinga thinks that these three considerations are sufficient to diffuse the charge of arbitrariness. His
claimisthatifweendorsesomethinglikeFeldmansprincipleabovethenwewillbeforcedtogiveupmany
ofourbeliefs(possiblyincludingbeliefsabouttheprincipleitself)andinparticularthisdoesnotfitwith
our intuitions about what it is rational to do in the case of moral disagreements like the one Plantinga
describesabove.
Theseresponsesdosomethingtohelpneutralizethearbitrarinesschargebuttheydonotadequatelydeal
withit.WhatPlantingahasachievedistoshowthatwecannotalwaysberationallyrequiredtogiveupour
beliefsinthefaceofdisagreement.Butthatisnotsufficienttorespondtotheproblembecausethereare
examples where it does seem to arbitrary to hold on to your belief. An example often discussed in the
literatureistherestaurantcase.
SupposethatAnneandBillareinarestaurantwithfriends.Thetimecomestopaythebillandtheyboth
decide to figure out how much everyone owes. Anne believes that everyone owes $23, but Bill believes
everyone owes $24. Each considers the other to be just as good at mental arithmetic and they have no
reasontosuspectthatoneofthemisimpairedonthisoccasion.Inthisexampleitseemsclearthatitwould
beirrationalforAnnetoholdontoherbeliefthateveryoneowes$23evenifitturnsoutthatsheiscorrect.
Sheseemstohavenogoodreasontopreferherownbeliefotherthanthatitisherown.
Whatthissuggestsisthatitcannotbeeitherthatdisagreementalwaysrequiresustoreviseourbeliefsor
that it never requires us to revise our beliefs. What is needed is a more sophisticated epistemology of
disagreement that lies somewhere between these two extremes. But Plantinga has given us no reason to
think that religious beliefs will remain rational in the face of disagreement under this more reasonable
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epistemologyofdisagreement.Whatisneededhereisabetterunderstandingoftheepistemicimplications
of disagreement and howthatrelates to religious disagreement.Fortunately, there is an activedebateon
thistopicanditislikelythatonesopiniononthatdebatewilldeterminewhetherornotonebelievesthat
thisisasuccessfulobjection.
ii.CompetingBeliefFormingPractices
One of the central claims of reformed epistemology is that what determines whether religious belief is
rationalisnottheevidencethatabelievercanpresent,butfactsaboutthefacultythatproducedthebelief.
Thefactsofreligiousdiversityofferawaytomountanargumentthatconcludesthatwehavegoodreason
tothinkthatthefacultythatproducesreligiousbeliefisunreliable.
Beforelookingataseriousversionofthisargumentitwillbeinstructivetolookatanaveversionofthe
argumentandwhyitfails.Thisversionoftheargumentobservesthewidevarietyofreligiousbeliefsinthe
world and notes that many of them contradict each other. Given this disagreement it seems clear that
religious belief forming methods are unreliable because, even if some of the beliefs are correct, most of
themmustbefalse.Giventhewidediversityofreligiousbeliefs,mostofthesebeliefsmustbefalse.This
objectionisnottootroublingsinceitassumesthatthereisasinglereligiousbeliefformingpractice.Thatis,
however,implausible.Therearesignificantdifferencesinthepracticesofdifferentreligiouspractitioners,
sothediversityofbeliefisnotevidencethatallreligiousbeliefformingpracticesareunreliable.
This objection can be developed further by observing that when it comes to religious matters there are
competing methods. These competing methods frequently produce contradictory beliefs. At most, one of
these methods can be reliable, but if we have no independent (that is, independent of religious belief
forming methods) reason to prefer one over the others then we ought to refrain from engaging in any of
them.
WilliamAlstonraisesthisobjectionagainsthisownview.Hecomparesittothefollowingsituation:
Consider ways of predicting the weather: various 'scientific' meteorological approaches, going by the
state of rheumatism in one's joints, and observing groundhogs. Again, if one employs one of these
methodsbuthasnononquestionbeggingreasonforsupposingthatmethodtobemorereliablethan
theothers,thenonehasnosufficientrationalbasisforreposingconfidenceinitsoutputs.(Alston1991:
271)
It seems clear, when it comes to choosing between methods for predicting the weather, that if we have
severalcompetingmethodsweoughtnotacceptanyofthemuntilwefindsomereasontopreferoneover
theother.
Alstonrespondstothisobjectionbypointingoutthatthereisanimportantdifferencebetweenthereligious
case and the weather prediction case. When it comes to predicting the weather we know what sort of
evidence we would need to choose between these methodswe can observe which one is getting it right.
Thingsaredifferentforthereligiouscasebecausewedonotknowwhatreasonswecouldhaveforchoosing
oneofthesemethodsoveranother.Themethodsinquestioninthereligiouscaseareouronlyaccesstothe
topicindependentlyofthesemethodsitisdifficulttoseewhatreasonswecouldhaveforpreferringone
overanother.Inlightofthis,Alstonsuggeststhatonecannotbefaultedforlackingreasonstopreferones
ownreligiousbeliefformingmethods.

d.SensibleEvidentialism
One of the central claims of reformed epistemology is that evidentialism with respect to belief in God is
misguided. Stephen Wykstra argues that reformed epistemologists (or basicalists, as he calls them) have
poorly framed the debate between themselves and evidentialists. He has sought to relocate the debate
about the proper basicality of belief in God by contrasting reformed epistemology not with what he calls
ExtravagantEvidentialism(EE)butwithSensibleEvidentialism(SE).
EE is the claim that a persons belief is only rational if it is either basic, or that person can present
propositionalevidencefortheirbelief.Ifweusethistodefinebasicandnonbasicbeliefsthenbeliefsthat
arise from testimony or memory will often be basic. Since these beliefs are basic and belief in God often
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derivesfrommemoryortestimony,theninmostcasestheEEObjectiontobeliefinGodwillnotamountto
much.
Wykstra, however, claims that EE is not the best way to understand the notion of needing evidence. He
highlights this by using the example of belief in electrons. Most adults believe in electrons, but very few
holdthisbeliefonthebasisofevidence.Mostofusbelieveinelectronsbecausewehavebeentoldthatthey
exist by scientists, or teachers or some other knowledgeable person. According to the reformed
epistemologistthisbeliefwilloftenbebasic,andsoitwillbeimmunetotheevidentialistobjection.Thisis
only true if we understand evidentialism as a demand that evidence be produced for each belief by the
believer.Thisfailstotakeintoaccountthat,althoughthebelieverinelectronsneednotbeabletoproduce
evidence, the belief is still in some sense in need of evidence. Wykstra asks us to consider the following
possiblesituation:
Supposeweweretodiscoverthatnoevidentialcaseisavailableforelectronssay,thattheentirepresumed
caseforelectronswasafraudpropagatedbycleverconmeninCopenhageninthe1920s.Wouldwe,inthis
event,shrugourshouldersandcontinueunvexedlybelievinginelectrons?Hardly.Wewouldinsteadregard
our electron belief as being in jeopardy, in epistemic hot water, in (let us put it) big doxastic trouble.
(Wykstra1989:485)
Theelectronbeliefmaynotneedevidencetoberationalinanindividualisticsense,butevidencemustbe
availablesomewhereinthecommunity.Thetestimonyisdefectiveifitdoesnotconnectyoutoaperson,or
persons,whodohaveevidencefortheexistenceofelectrons.ThisiswhatWykstrareferstoasamuchmore
sensible way of construing the notion of needing evidence. EE requires that evidence is possessed by the
individual,whereasSErequiresthattheevidenceispossessedbythebelieverscommunity.
SE gives us a much more plausible evidentialist objection to belief in God. The sensible evidentialist
constraintwillbethatbeliefinGodisonlyepistemicallyadequateifthereligiouscommunityhassufficient
evidence for the belief that God exists. The interesting basicalist will then be someone who claims that
belief in God is not in need of evidence even in this sense that belief in God is based upon our native
faculties.WykstraobservesthatevenifbeliefinGodisderivedfromsomeGodgivenfacultyitmaystillbe
the case that belief in God is in need of evidence. Belief in electrons is in need of evidence because our
nativefacultiesdonotgiveusaccesstothem,butbeliefsbaseduponournativefaculties,suchastestimony,
arealsosometimesinneedofevidenceinaratherdifferentway.Wykstradrawsattentiontosomeofthe
insightsofThomasReidconcerningtestimony:
Whenbroughttomaturitybyproperculture[reason]learnstosuspecttestimonyinsomecase,and
to disbelieve it in others But still, to the end of life, she finds a necessity of borrowing light from
testimonyAndas,inmanyinstances,Reasoneveninhermaturity,borrowsaidfromtestimony,soin
othersshemutuallygivesaidtoit,andstrengthensitsauthority.For,aswefindgoodreasontoreject
testimony in some cases, so in others we find good reason to rely upon it with perfect security
(Wykstra1989:489)
AccordingtoReid,weeachhaveanaturaltendencytobelievetestimony,however,overtimewelearnthat
notalltestimonyisreliableandwelearntofindreasonstogivesometestimonygreaterweightandothers
much less. Although inferences are playing a role in forming testimonial belief, it is still testimony that
givessupporttothebeliefinferenceonlyplaysarefiningrole.
Inlightofvariedreligiousbeliefsandexperiences,bothacrossandwithinparticularreligioustraditions,we
must conclude that evidence is needed to discriminate between different religious beliefs. This does not
meanthatreligiousexperiencecannotgroundbeliefinGod.Itmaybethatsomereligiousfacultygrounds
the belief, but that the faculty is in need of refinement, just like testimony can be a basic source of
knowledge, but still in need of refinement. This continues to draw on the teachings of the Christian
traditionbecausealthoughsomeChristiansholdthatwehaveaccesstoGodthroughournativefaculties,
theyhavebeenmarredbysin,soitshouldnotbesurprisingthatwecanerrinourknowledgeofGod,or
thatournativefacultiesalonearenotsufficient.
This sensible evidentialist objection should not really be called an objection perhaps the sensible
evidentialistproblemwouldbebetter.ThatisbecauseWykstraisnoturgingthereadertogiveupbeliefin
God, but rather to properly acknowledge the role that evidence can and does play in knowing God. This
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problem seems to have played some role in motivating the later work of Alvin Plantinga where he is
attempting to set out a positive account of how religious beliefs could amount to knowledge, rather than
simplyrespondingtoanobjection.

8.ReferencesandFurtherReading
Alston,William.ReligiousExperienceandReligiousBelief.InNous16(1982):312.
Anearlyessaybyoneofthecentralproponentsofreformedepistemology.

Alston,William.PerceivingGod.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1991.
Animportantworkontheepistemologyofreligiousexperience.

Baker,DeanePeter.TayloringReformedEpistemology.London:SCMPress,2007.
AnattempttobringtogethertheworkofCharlesTaylorandcertainaspectsofreformedepistemology.Includesahelpfuldescriptionand
critiqueofargumentsforreformedepistemology.

Beilby,James.EpistemologyasTheology.Burlington,VA:AshgatePublishing,2005.
AdetailedaccountofAlvinPlantingasreformedepistemology.

DeRose,Keith.VoodooEpistemologyunpublishedmanuscript.
AwellknownessaydespitebeingunpublishedthatcriticizesAlvinPlantingasreformedepistemology.

Feldman,Richard.PlantingaonExclusivism.InFaithandPhilosophy20(2003):8590.
Apaperarguingthatitcannotberationaltoholdreligiousbeliefswhenoneisawareofthewidespreaddisagreementaboutreligion.

Grigg,Richard.TheismandProperBasicality:AresponsetoPlantinga.InInternationalJournalforPhilosophyif
Religion14(1983):123127.
Anessaychallengingthereformedepistemologistsclaimthatthereisaparitybetweenperceptualbeliefandtheisticbeliefs.

Kenny,Anthony.FaithandReason.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1983.
Muchofthisbookisonreligiousepistemologyanditengageswithreformedepistemology.

Mackie,J.L.TheMiracleofTheism.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1982.
Animportantbookprovidingmanyargumentsagainsttheism.

Martin,Michael.Atheism:APhilosophicalJustification.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1990.
Thisbookpresentsnumerousargumentsinfavourofatheismandagainsttheismincludingagainstreformedepistemology.

Plantinga,Alvin.GodandOtherMinds.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1967.
AnearlyaccountofPlantinga'sparityargumentwhichlaysthefoundationforreformedepistemology.

Plantinga,Alvin.WarrantandProperFunction.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.
AdiscussionofproperfunctionwhichalsolaysthefoundationforPlantingasWarrantedChristianBelief.

Plantinga,Alvin.WarrantedChristianBelief.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000.
Arguablythemostimportantworkinreformedepistemologytodate.Plantingaarticulatesanddefendshisversionoftheviewatgreat
length.ItengageswithmanyimportantdebatesinPhilosophyofReligion.

Plantinga,Alvin.ADefenseofReligiousExclusivisminLouisPojmanandMichaelRae(eds)PhilosophyofReligion:
AnAnthology.Boston:Wadsworth,2012.
Plantingaarguesthatitcanbereasonabletobelievethatyourreligioniscorrectandthatothersarewrong.

Plantinga,AlvinandNicholasWolterstorff.FaithandRationality.NotreDame,Indiana:UniversityofNotreDame
Press,1983.
Containsmanyimportantearlyessaysarticulatinganddefendingreformedepistemology.

Plantinga,A.,Sudduth,M.,Wykstra,S.andZagzebski,L.WarrantedChristianBelief.InPhilosophicalBooks43
(2002):81135.
AcollectionofessayscriticallyengagingwithWarrantedChristianBelief,alongwithareplyfromAlvinPlantinga.

Scott,Kyle.ReturnoftheGreatPumpkin.InReligiousStudies50(2014):297308.
Arecentformulationofanobjectiontoreformedepistemologyalongwithanewresponse.

Sudduth,Michael.TheReformedObjectiontoNaturalTheology.London:Ashgate,2009.
Dealswiththeobjectionstonaturaltheologythataretypicallyposedbythereformedepistemologist.

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Tomberlin,JamesandPetervanInwagen(eds.).AlvinPlantinga.Dordrecht:D.Reidel,1985.
AcollectionofessaysexaminingtheworkofAlvinPlantinga,oneofthecentralfiguresinreformedepistemology.

Wolterstorff,Nicholas.ReasonwithintheBoundsofReligion.GrandRapids,MI:Eerdmans,1976.
AnexplorationofhowhisChristianfaithoughttorelatetohisworkasascholar.

Wolterstorff,Nicholas.LamentforaSon.GrandRapids,MI:Eerdmans,1987.
Thoughnotanacademicbook,someimportantpointsaremadeaboutreformedepistemologyandreligiousepistemologyingeneral.

Wolterstorff,Nicholas.DivineDiscourse.CambridgeUniversityPress,1995.
APhilosophicalexplorationofclaimsthatGodspeaks.

Wolterstorff,Nicholas.Justice:RightsandWrongs.PrincetonUniversityPress,2010.
Offersanaccountofrightsandofjustice.EngagessignificantlywithChristianthought.

Wykstra,Stephen."Towardasensibleevidentialism:onthenotionofneedingevidence."InPhilosophyofReligion,
NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich(1989):426437.
AnanalysisofPlantingascritiqueofevidentialism.

Zagzebski,Linda(ed.).RationalFaith:CatholicResponsestoReformedEpistemology,NotreDame:Universityof
NotreDamePress,1993.
AresponsetoreformedepistemologyfromvariousCatholicphilosophers.

AuthorInformation
AnthonyBolos
Email:[email protected]
VirginiaCommonwealthUniversity
U.S.A.
and
KyleScott
Email:[email protected]
HeythropCollege
UnitedKingdom

ArticleprintedfromInternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy:http://www.iep.utm.edu/refepis/

CopyrightTheInternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Allrightsreserved.

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