Atienza vs.

Board of Medicine
G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011
Justice Nachura
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of
RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent
kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and nonvisualizing.
3. Private respondents husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross negligence
and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of Editha's fully
functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who allegedly participated
in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo
Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request forms where
interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha's formal offer of exhibits, alleging that
said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are hearsay, and
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by the
BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the
ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine
its probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine whether the
evidence is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence.
Held: No. Petition denied.
Ratio:
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe
strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, "it is the safest policy to
be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand,

their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them."
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of the
Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate court,
the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at
any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection with Edithas
medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her "kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it
is covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of
the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys because the position and removal may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable. Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
2. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
3. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
4. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
5. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left nonfunctioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed,
especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building" and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.

Allied Banking v. Cheng Yong

G.R. No. 151040 October 6, 2005
Justice Garcia
Doctrine:
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties
and evidence which shall vary a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document is inadmissible. Simply put, when the parties have reduced their agreement
into writing, they are deemed to have intended such written agreement to be the sole
repository and memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and
contemporaneous agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that,
as between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive
evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or
modify the same is not admissible.

Facts:
1. Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc. (Philippine Pacific), through its then ViceChairman of the Board and concurrent President Marilyn Javier, obtained from Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), a packing credit accommodation amounting to One
Million Seven Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,752,000.00). To secure the
obligation, Marilyn Javier and the spouses Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw (spouses Cheng,
for short), executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety bearing date 27
March 1981.
2. Philippine Pacific, due to business reverses and alleged misuse of corporate funds by its
operating officers, defaulted in the payment of said obligation. An intra-corporate dispute
among its stockholders followed, prompting the filing against Philippine Pacific of a
petition for receivership before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
3. Thereafter, the corporation was reorganized, following which the spouses Cheng Yong
and Lilia Gaw were elected as its president and treasurer, respectively. The spouses
Cheng also hold similar positions in another company, the Glee Chemicals Phils., Inc.
(GCPI), which, incidentally, also had a credit line with Allied Bank. Meanwhile, the parties
agreed to create and constitute a management committee, instead of placing Philippine
Pacific under receivership. Hence, in an order dated 14 August 1981, the SEC formally
created a management committee whose functions, include, among others, the
following: to acquire, lease, sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber such assets with the
prior approval of the Commission.

4. Philippine Pacific executed in favor of Allied Bank a promissory note in the same amount
as the packing credit accommodation. Aside from affixing their signatures on the same
promissory note in their capacity as officers of Philippine Pacific, the spouses Cheng
also signed the note in their personal capacities and as co-makers thereof. However,
Philippine Pacific failed to pay according to the schedule of payments set out in the
promissory note. Later, Allied Bank filed with the sheriff of Navotas an application for
extra-judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted on "Jean III".
5. Pursuant thereto, notices of extra-judicial sale were served on the concerned parties by
the Ex-Officio sheriff of Malabon while the vessel was moored at the Navotas Fishing
Port Complex and under a charter contract with Lig Marine Products, Inc. Spouses
Cheng, to prevent the auction sale of the vessel, filed with the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City an action for declaratory relief with prayer for injunctive remedies. Initially,
that court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the sale but later lifted it upon
dismissal of the main case for declaratory relief.
6. Eventually, in a decision dated 08 February 1989, the trial court declared both the
promissory note dated 12 August 1981 and the deed of chattel mortgage over the vessel
"Jean III" invalid and unenforceable.
7. During its presentation, the Cheng spouses introduced the promissory note as evidence.
Issue: Is the promissory note admissible in evidence?
Held: No, it is not.
Ratio:
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties and
evidence which shall vary a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document is
inadmissible. Simply put, when the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are
deemed to have intended such written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of
everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous agreements are
deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as between them and their successorsin-interest, such writing becomes exclusive evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal
agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is not admissible.
Here, the terms of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are clear and
explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity depends. To be sure, Allied Bank
was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the management committee was ordered created
hence, it would not be correct to presume that it had notice of the existence of the
management committee which, incidentally, was still to be created when the subject promissory
note was executed.

Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042 agreed to form the management committee, it
was only on 14 August 1981 when the committee was actually created and its members
appointed. Clearly then, the subject promissory note was outside the realm of authority of the
management committee. Accordingly, the chattel mortgage accessory to it is likewise valid.
Therefore, the promissory note is not admissible in evidence.