Todd Giffen v. Oregon Habeas Corpus
Todd Giffen v. Oregon Habeas Corpus
Todd Giffen v. Oregon Habeas Corpus
TODD GIFFEN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
CA A157118
v.
STATE OF OREGON, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
OREGON ELLEN ROSENBLUM,
AND ALEX GARDNER, District
Attorney for the State of Oregon,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPELLANTS AMENDED OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Circuit Court
for Lane County
Honorable Charles M. Zennache, Circuit Judge
______________________________________________________Filed 12/14
Table of Contents
APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF ................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................1
Nature of the Proceeding .............................................................................1
Nature of the Judgment................................................................................1
Jurisdiction ...................................................................................................1
Notice of Appeal ..........................................................................................1
Question Presented ......................................................................................1
Summary of Argument ................................................................................2
Summary of Facts ........................................................................................2
I.
Standard of Review.......................................................................2
Argument .....................................................................................................5
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Walker v. State,
26 Or App 697, 302 P3d 469, rev den, 354 Or 62 (2013) .....................................5
White v. Gladden,
209 Or 53, 303 P2d 226 (1956) .............................................................................9
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
US Const Amend VIII..............................................................................................12
US Const Amend XIV .............................................................................................12
US Const Amend IV ......................................................................................... 12, 13
ORCP 21 ....................................................................................................................2
ORS 34.310 ........................................................................................... 7, 8, 9, 10, 12
ORS 34.680 ................................................................................................................2
Standard of Review
This court reviews a trial court ruling granting the states motion to deny
issuance of a writ under ORS 34.680 (1) like a dismissal under ORCP 21 A(8) for
failure to state a claim. Rivas v. Persson, 256 Or App 829, 830, 304 P3d 765
(2013). Under that standard, this court review[s] the allegations in the petition
and related inferences in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff to determine
whether the petition alleges a legally sufficient claim. Id.
II.
plaintiff alleged that he is illegal [sic] detained and held by the Lane County
Circuit Court * * * pre-trial on a charge of assault 4 (under court case number 2213-18198). ER-1. Plaintiff alleged that he is in a custody program of the Lane
County Jail, and am experiencing numerous civil rights violations. ER-1.
Plaintiff also alleged other deprivations of his liberty. Plaintiff alleged that
he has sustained serious fatal physical/brain injury from spy games played by the
law enforcement in the state from the use of directed energy weapons and military
technology on my brain and body[.] ER-1. Plaintiff also alleged as follows:
I allege that at this moment, I am also being stalked and
followed on the streets by undercover agents who work with the state
to coordinate these abuses, and they are using a number of illegal
surveillance tactics on me, trying to harass, and entrap me in the legal
system. This violates my 4th amendment rights under the US
constitution to be free from warrantless surveillance and illegal
searches/seizures by government agents. The abuse I have
experienced constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th
amendment, and it also violates my 14th amendment rights to due
process, including violating the liberty interest of this right. They also
seek to sabotage my legal case, by abusing me and withholding
services another violation of the 14th amendment/due process clause,
which guarantees a fair trial.
ER-1.
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522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred when it denied issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Preservation of Error
After plaintiff filed the petition, and before the court appointed counsel, the
court dismissed the petition on its own motion:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on
February 20, 2014 regarding the terms of his pretrial detention in Lane
County Circuit Court Case Number 22-13-18198.
2. Lane County Circuit Court Case Number 22-13-18198, was
dismissed on the State of Oregons motion on March 5, 2014.
3.
Because the court entered the judgment without prior notice to the parties,
the rules of preservation do not apply to the error. See Walker v. State, 26 Or App
697, 699-700, 302 P3d 469, rev den, 354 Or 62 (2013) (explaining that the
principles of preservation do not apply to an error that appears for the first time in
the judgment). Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error and this court
should exercise its discretion to reverse the error under ORAP 5.45. Ailes v.
Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991).
Standard of Review
This court review[s] the allegations in the petition and related inferences in
the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff to determine whether the petition alleges a
legally sufficient claim. Rivas, 256 Or App at 830. Whether a case is moot
presents a question of law. See Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194
(1993) (applying standard).
Argument
Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek relief from the
pretrial conditions from a criminal case, as well as other alleged acts by state actors
against him. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs petition as moot upon finding that
the underlying criminal case had been dismissed. The trial court erred, however,
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OConnor Weber LLP
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Portland, OR 97204
because the dismissal of the underlying criminal case did not render moot
plaintiffs allegations that the state actors were still restraining plaintiffs
liberty for purposes of habeas corpus. For example, the trial court could grant
plaintiff relief by issuing an order that prohibits state actors from following or
monitoring him, as plaintiff alleged in the petition.
A case presents a justiciable controversy when the courts decision in the
matter will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the
controversy. Brumnett, 315 Or at 405. A case is not moot if a party continues to
suffer collateral consequences from the alleged unlawful restraint of liberty.
Barnes v. Thompson, 159 Or App 383, 386, 977 P2d 431 (1999). See also Jones v.
Thompson, 156 Or App 226, 229, 968 P2d 380 (1998) (noting the general
principle that a case becomes moot when, because of a change in circumstances, a
decision would resolve merely an abstract question without practical effect).
In this case, the trial court dismissed the habeas corpus petition as moot
because plaintiff does not have any charges currently pending against him in this
court. ER-4. The premise of the courts conclusion is that plaintiffs petition for
a writ of habeas corpus addressed only the terms of his pretrial detention in Lane
County Circuit Court Case Number 22-13-18198. ER-4. The premise of the
courts conclusion is flawed, because plaintiff also addressed other deprivations of
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OConnor Weber LLP
522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
Portland, OR 97204
liberty, which, according to the plaintiff, are ongoing and independent of the
criminal case. To determine whether plaintiffs other allegations constitute
deprivations of liberty that fall within the ambit of the habeas corpus statutory
scheme requires this court to interpret that scheme.
ORS 34.310 describes the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus and provides,
in part, Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty * * * may
prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or
restraint, and if illegal, to be delivered therefrom. (Emphasis added.) The issue
in this case is whether plaintiff pleaded facts to support a claim that he is
otherwise restrained of liberty for purposes of ORS 34.310. To interpret a
statute, this court looks to the text and context of the statute, including any helpful
legislative history offered by the parties. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206
P3d 1042 (2009); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12,
859 P2d 1143 (1993).
The plain text of the statute indicates that habeas corpus can address
restraints of liberty outside the context of an ongoing criminal case. Otherwise
can be defined as follows:
1 : in a different way or manner : DIFFERENTLY * * * 2 : in different
circumstances : under other conditions * * * 3 : in other respects * *
*
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OConnor Weber LLP
522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
Portland, OR 97204
Websters Third New Intl Dictionary 1598 (unabridged ed 2002). When read in
context of the habeas corpus statute, ORS 34.310 applies to a person who is
imprisoned or in a different way restrained or liberty, and allows that person
to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.
Plaintiffs plain-text reading is consistent with how the Oregon Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute:
That being restrained of his liberty is not limited to being
imprisoned appears on the face of the statute. Doubtless the term
would include any physical restraint, for instance an allegation that
one is illegally kept chained, or in a straitjacket, or blindfolded,
though not confined in any closed space. One can be no less
restrained by means of the deliberate threat or use of violence to ones
person. Upon such an allegation, the issue is not whether the person
on whose behalf the petition is filed is restrained of his liberty but
whether the restraint is illegal.
Penrod v. Cupp, 283 Or 21, 24, 581 P2d 934 (1978). Similarly, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the phrase to apply to restraint outside the context of an active
criminal case where charges are pending:
The logical inference from the statute is that the kind of restraint to
which reference is made is a physical restraint within the state of
Oregon and within some county or judicial district of the state. A
person may be subject to physical restraint when under arrest by a
police officer or by any other person, without being in prison, but such
restraint differs in kind from that imposed by rule upon a parolee.
White v. Gladden, 209 Or 53, 60, 303 P2d 226 (1956). Therefore, the plain text of
the statute supports plaintiffs argument that habeas corpus applies to restraints of
liberty other than mere confinement pursuant to an ongoing criminal case.
Plaintiffs reading is also consistent with case law that has held that habeas
corpus is available to challenge imprisonment as well as collateral consequences
from a conviction. For instance, in Baty v. Slater, 164 Or App 779, 782, 995 P2d
1176 (2000), this court rejected the states argument that habeas corpus relief is
not available to an offender who has been released from custody, instead
concluding that a habeas corpus petition is not moot if there are collateral
consequences to resolution of the dispute that may result in plaintiff obtaining
relief from a restraint of liberty.
Oregon courts have held that a restraint of liberty for purposes of ORS
34.310 is a state action that violates a persons constitutional rights. See Dunn v.
Hill, 211 Or App 590, 603, 156 P3d 72 (2007) (We conclude that plaintiff has
adequately pleaded facts that, if true, would constitute the deprivation of a
constitutional right requiring immediate judicial scrutiny.). For instance, Oregon
courts have recognized habeas corpus claims that are framed in terms of an
allegation that the state is violating the constitutional right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. Billings v. Gates, 323 Or 167, 180-181, 916 P2d 291
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OConnor Weber LLP
522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
Portland, OR 97204
(1996) (To state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief under Article I,
section 16, a prisoner must allege that the prisoner has a serious medical need that
has not been treated in a timely and proper manner and that prison officials have
been deliberately indifferent to the prisoners serious medical needs.). This court
found that habeas corpus was the proper way to address an alleged violation of the
Article I, section 13, proscription against treating an arrested person with
unnecessary rigor. Schafer v. Maass, 122 Or App 518, 523, 858 P2d 474 (1993)
(In summary, the allegation that petitioner is being subjected to ongoing and
periodical assaults is an allegation that he is being deprived of the constitutional
right to be free from unnecessary physical abuse.). Habeas corpus also is the
proper vehicle to address alleged violations of due process rights. Bekins v. Cupp,
274 Or 115, 117, 545 P2d 861 (1976) (holding that habeas petition was the proper
procedure to challenge the placement of a prisoner in segregation, alleged to be a
violation of due process rights); Dunn, 211 Or App at 598-605 (addressing the
issue of whether the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a deprivation of his due
process right to access to the courts).
Under plaintiffs reading of ORS 34.310, the question in this case is whether
he sufficiently alleged that he was restrained of liberty by the state, meaning the
state is violating his constitutional rights in a way that limits, or restrains, his
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OConnor Weber LLP
522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
Portland, OR 97204
freedom. [P]etitions should be construed liberally and not voided for mere
technical defects. Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or 562, 566, 770 P2d 909 (1989). As
an example of how liberally allegations should be read, this court engaged in the
following analysis in Fox v. Zenon:
Taking as true his allegation that he has made several suicide
attempts, we infer that he cannot control his suicidal impulses and
that, at any time, he is likely to try again. Again taking his allegation
as true that he has requested to see a psychiatrist on 15 to 20 occasions
but that defendant has not provided him with any psychiatric or any
psychological diagnosis or treatment, we infer from his allegations
that defendant will continue to deny his requests to see a psychiatrist
or be diagnosed or treated.
106 Or App 37, 40-41, 806 P2d 166 (1991). In Fox, the court read the allegations
liberally by taking statements of past actions to be read as alleging that the actions
will recur in the future.
When read liberally, plaintiffs petition indicates that the dismissal of the
underlying criminal case has not rendered his case moot. Plaintiff alleged that he
is experiencing numerous civil rights violations. ER-1. Plaintiff has
experienced abuses by the state, retaliations, and covert harassment and
surveillance by state actors. ER-1. Specifically, law enforcement officers have
used directed energy weapons and military technology to cause plaintiff serious
fatal physical/brain injury and chronic traumatic encephalopathy. ER-1.
Under the reading standard applied in Fox, plaintiff is alleging that the state actors
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OConnor Weber LLP
522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
Portland, OR 97204
who have been causing him unwarranted physical harm will continue to do so.
That physical harm would constitute a restraint on plaintiffs liberty cognizable
under ORS 34.310.
Plaintiff also alleged that his liberty was being restrained by violations of his
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ER-1. [U]ndercover agents
who work with the state to coordinate these abuses against plaintiff stalk[] and
follow[] plaintiff and employ a number of illegal surveillance tactics on
[plaintiff]. ER-1. Read liberally, plaintiff alleges that the state actors will
continue to engage in warrantless surveillance and illegal searches/seizures,
violating plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights. ER-1. Further, plaintiff alleges
that [t]he abuse [he] has experienced, which would include the physical injury
caused by the states directed energy weapons and military technology,
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth amendment, and it also
violates my Fourteenth amendment rights to due process, including violating the
liberty interest of this right. ER-1.
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he is unlawfully restrained of liberty.
He has alleged that he is subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, based on the deliberate use of weapons
against him, causing him physical harm. Plaintiff has alleged that his liberty
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OConnor Weber LLP
522 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1125
Portland, OR 97204
against unlawful searches and seizures, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, has been infringed by warrantless surveillance by state actors who
are stalking and following him. Therefore, plaintiffs case is not moot because his
petition contains cognizable claims that have not been resolved by the dismissal of
criminal charges against him. Cf. Anderson v. Britton, 212 Or 1, 5, 318 P2d 291
(1957) ([T]he function of habeas corpus cannot be defeated by a transfer of
custody after a ruling in the trial court and pending appeal to this court. To hold
otherwise would permit the jurisdiction of the court to be thwarted after it has once
attached.).
The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. This court should reverse the decision of the habeas trial court and remand
for further proceedings. See Bedell, 307 Or at 570 (after holding that the trial court
erred in granting the states motion to dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, affording such a remedy).
//
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff asks this court to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and to
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.
ER-1
ER-2
ER-3
ER-4
Brief Length
I certify that (1) this brief complies with the word-count limitation in ORAP
5.05(2)(b) and (2) that the word count of this brief (as described in ORAP
5.05(2)(a)) is 2,910 words.
Type Size
I certify that the size of the type in this brief is not smaller than 14 point font
for both the text of the brief and footnotes as required by ORAP 5.05(4)(f).