StatCon Chap X-1

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994.]

MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago V . Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS; CONSTRUED.
it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
2. ID.; "CHARITABLE"; RELIGIOUS; DISTINCTLY USED IN SEVERAL STATUTES. It will be
observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and
"religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three
descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation."
There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated and
individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28
(8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for
the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and Section 234 (b) (exemptions
from real property tax) of the Local Government Code. That these legislative enactments specifically
spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564
merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in
question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise,
there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
3. ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1564; RELIGIOUS PURPOSE; CONSTRUED. All
contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious
activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not
interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious
purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a
"charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. Although the term
"charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which
are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious
purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has
been done away with by statute. The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable of
different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very
wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a
broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners. To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions
are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there are cases wherein claims for
exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in the law granting
tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of a
statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for
purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious
purposes. A gift for "religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards
exemption from inheritance tax. On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the
solicitation within the concept of "charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree No. 1564
requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development, under pain of penal
liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable"
should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere
to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be
adopted as would favor the accused.
4. ID.; "PENAL LAWS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE AND LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED"; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. it is a well-entrenched rule that
penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are
not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations.
They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful
scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is
ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of
a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves
innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of
the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute
should be regarded as without its intendment. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.
The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving
a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and
circumstances. The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by
circumstances in the abstract. Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes
Statutory Construction Chapter X: Strict and Liberal Construction and Interpretation of Statutes Page 1
mentioned above, the enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious"
make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article
in indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of
either. When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately.
Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive
"or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration
why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; FREEDOM TO ACT; MAY BE
SUBJECTED TO RESTRICTION; CONSTRUED IN CASE AT BAR. The constitutional inhibition of
legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve
the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in
attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Whence, even the
exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect
its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to
establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is
likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety,
peace, comfort, or convenience. It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the
free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a
law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the
"free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents
of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does
not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such
regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or
interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSE; MAY BE SUBJECTED TO PROPER
REGULATIONS THROUGH POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. The State has authority under the
exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of
contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of
common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should
not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the
worthy from the unworthy. The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy
and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the
raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore,
in the public interest. To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation
by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations
intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1564; PURPOSE. The purpose of the
Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and
other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those
belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not
exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic
projects so as to justify state regulation.
2. ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES; DISTINGUISHED FROM CHARITABLE OR
PUBLIC WELFARE PURPOSES. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not
solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose
is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair
of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a
civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the
propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of
charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is
solicited for contribution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR GOVERNMENT PERMIT; RESTRAINT ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed
is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee
before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that
would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious
rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public
parks and streets. To read the Decree, therefor, as including within its reach solicitations for religious
purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote their
remaining years to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for that purpose,
should find themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a community
member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
cdphil
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic
organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the
purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident
of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against
petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information 2
on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential
Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those
made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied 3 by the trial court,
and petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued. LibLex
On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and
petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00.
Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that
they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally
liable were it not for the existence of Presidential Decree No. 1564 which the court opined it had the
duty to apply in the instant case.
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10.
However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with respect
to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of
the lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed which
caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an
increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
court. 6
Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy
eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for
religious purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial
sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is
gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication. prLL
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions
intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes; (2)
penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to
subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of
the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit
Law), provides as follows:
"Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department
of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a
written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social
Services and Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his
discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of the
public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075."
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in
its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 7
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is
only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides
that "charitable institutions, churches and parsonages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated
and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and
28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes
for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and Section 234 (b)
(exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code. prcd
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration,
whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes
to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious
purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious
activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not
interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious
purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a
"charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term
"charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which
are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious
purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has
been done away with by statute. 10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable
of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very
wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a
broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer.
However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been
liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the
term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any property
passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to
succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A gift for "religious purposes" was
considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from inheritance tax. 12
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of
"charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the
Department of Social Services and Development, under pain of penal liability in the absence thereof,
would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to
exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine
underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the
accused. LLphil
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments,
analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new
offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the
tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory
constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred.
The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless
there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not
plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of
description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is
charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate
in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations
therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its
elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article in indicating an alternative. It often
connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various
members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious,"
which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct,
and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of
these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
LexLib
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for,
otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under
the Constitution.
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and,
consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is
not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations
of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause
under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into
the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right
and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one
hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is,
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to
regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the
State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent
solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to
represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a
legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of
religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more
religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any
constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not
constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible
obstacle to its exercise. 21
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by
persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes,
succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent
schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise
of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous
persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the
guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge.
Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but
somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper
charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money
for charity is lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public
interest. 24
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier demonstrated,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor. llcd
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed
by the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's act which thereby caused damage
to the complainant. it must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, even recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused after
finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the solicitation from the complainant, an observation
with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and difficult question of law can be the basis
of good faith, especially for a layman.
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or
otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. this could be reflective
upon her objectivity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial
Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be vigilant
against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist any pressure from whatever source.
26
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner
Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., and Puno, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is
not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable
or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold. cdphil
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or
public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a
charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not
like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the
like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith
or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited
for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not engage
the philanthropic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of
fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are
usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against
fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect
to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation. LLphil
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a
prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify requiring a
permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v.
City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one may
engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose a
condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are
exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public parks and
streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefor, as including within its reach solicitations for religious purposes
would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided. cdphil
For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.
4.Annex G, id., ibid., 40.

5.Annex H, id., ibid., 44.
6.Annex J., id., ibid., 64.
7.Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 48886-88, July 21, 1993, 224
SCRA 665.
8.Scobey vs. Beckman, 41 N.E. 2d 84.
9.See Adye vs. Smith, 26 Am. Rep. 424.
10.See Read vs. McLean, 200 So. 109.
11.In re Seaman's Estate, 139 N.E. 2d 17.
12.In re Clark's Estate, 159 A. 500.
13.Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., 183.
14.Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 69809, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA
112.
15.Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. vs. Board, 402 P. ed 802.
16.Martin, op cit., 81.
17.Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296 (1940).
18.Id., loc. cit.
19.16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 283.
20.Ibid., id., 282.
21.Cantwell vs. Connecticut, supra.
22.Id., loc. cit.
23.City of Seattle vs. Rogers, 106 P. 2d 598.
24.Commonwealth vs. Creighton, et al., 170 A. 720.
25.Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.
26.Rule 1.03. id.
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
1.101 Phil. 386 (1957).
2.B.P. Blg. 880, par 3(a).
||| (Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, [September 1, 1994])
Padilla, J ., concurs.
Footnotes
1.Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.
2.Annex B, id., ibid., 20.
3.Annex D, id., ibid., 34.
No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the words charitable and religious separately
and independently from each other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare
purposes need a permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term charitable should be strictly construed
to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must
be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 48
CASE DIGEST
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092
September 1, 1994
FACTS:
In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose
of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached
Judge Angeles, President of Tikay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made
without a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564,
which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes
shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development.
ISSUE:
W/N the phrase charitable purposes in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes.
HELD:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias
"WARPAN", appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Atty. Jose E. Fernandez for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September 17,
1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty
of three out of the four charges lodged against him. He was found guilty of the crimes of (1) Violation of
Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended; (2) Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294; (3) the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple
Attempted Homicide.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court and found appellant guilty
only of direct assault and multiple attempted homicide and maintaining a drug den. The Court ruled that
that the trial court erred in convicting appellant of illegal possession of firearms. According to the Court,
a simple reading of Section 1 of Republic Act 8294 shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no
longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. The Court also ruled that when the crime was
committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly
superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. In other words, no longer in existence was
the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate
from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866,
contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was committed."
homicide carries the penalty of prison correctional. Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty
for direct assault, which constitute the "most serious crime," should be imposed and applied in its
maximum period.
SYLLABUS
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PD 1866 NO LONGER IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED.
We reject the OSG's contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should
be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language
of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. In
other words, no longer in existence was earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for
illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among
others amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was committed."
DcTAIH
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RA 8294; SECTION 1, SECOND PARAGRAPH THEREOF; PROVISO THAT "NO
OTHER CRIME WAS COMMITTED BY THE PERSON ARRESTED" NOT LIMITED. TO THE CRIMES
OF MURDER AND HOMICIDE. Just an unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find
no justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear:
the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime
was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer
only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily,
where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
7. ID.; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS; REPUBLIC ACT 8294'S PLAIN LANGUAGE IS
MOST FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified for the language of the new law demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since
the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms
cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP; CANNOT

BE GIVEN CREDENCE ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF IMPROPER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE
POLICE OFFICERS COUPLED WITH THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE
SAID OFFICERS. This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak,
since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove. Absent any showing of an improper motive
on the part of the police officers, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty, such defense cannot be given much credence. Indeed, after examining the records of this case,
we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his
Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED; MAINTENANCE OF A
DRUG DEN ESTABLISHED; CASE AT BAR. We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of
maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His
guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who
himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the
time of the raid. The former's testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified
before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to
the prosecution's story.
3. ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONVICTED APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
DIRECT ASSAULT WITH MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE. The trial court was also correct in
convicting appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that "[t]he act
of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a
search warrant . . . " constituted such complex crime. We note that direct assault with the use of a
weapon carries the penalty of prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted
4. ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED);

REPUBLIC ACT 8294; NO SEPARATE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IF AN
UNLICENSED FIREARM IS USED IN THE COMMISSION OF ANY OTHER CRIME. A simple
reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be
no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant
can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
8. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SUPREME COURT; NO DISCRETION TO GIVE

STATUTES NEW MEANING DETACHED FROM THE MANIFEST INTENDMENT AND LANGUAGE OF
THE LEGISLATURE. The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correctional.
Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are
punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA
8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court's review. Any perception that the result reached here
appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has not discretion to give statutes
a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have
done so in this case.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed "no other crime." Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an
accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14
rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have
aggravated the direct assault. CTacSE
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September 17, 1998
Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of
three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations, 2 all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor
Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information 3 was for maintaining a den
for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential
house located at Rio Hondo, 4 this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting . . . his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any
form." 5
The second Information 6 charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We
quote it below:
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the
commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and
under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with
magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty [-one]
(21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolvers with five (5) live ammunition; one
(1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 . . . Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38
Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without
first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant
violation of the aforementioned law." 7
The third Information, 8 for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16
Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting . . . one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1
AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by
then and there firing their M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and
explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well
known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as
such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of
their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally
issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing the commission
of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful
purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary
desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover
during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact
said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil
a.k.a. 'Warpan' and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest;
whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large."
9
In the fourth Information appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. 10
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were
dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of
the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he
entered a plea of not guilty. 11 After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. 'WARPAN'
1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A,
Article 111, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21,
Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
"3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay
a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
"4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault
with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correctional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs."
(emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal. 12

The Facts
Prosecution's Version
In its Brief, 13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
"At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was
issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the AntiVice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search
warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit.
During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo
Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were
assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
"After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Folio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN,
March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellant's house, three (3) persons
sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, '[P]olice, raid, raid' ( Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41,
43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the
house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also
gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16). STIEHc
"SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of
policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired
upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at
the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen
surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
"In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence ( Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59,
73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building.
Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered.
Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground
floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a
young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the
young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
"Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14
rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went
inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a
neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the
raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen
outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar
Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
"At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala
on the second floor (Ibid., p. 2-7). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the
rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the
magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on that sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition
(Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle
magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
"After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant's house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut
followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics
Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched
appellant's room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp.
41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to
J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or 'shabu'.
"Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W;
TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live
[ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
"Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the
morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellant's house to buy
'shabu.' Locson knew appellant as a seller of 'shabu' (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellant's
house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellant's house at 3:20 p.m.
He bought P300.00 worth of 'shabu' from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist
bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6)
persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the
table. They asked Locson to smoke 'shabu' and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of 'shabu'
he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
"While they were smoking 'shabu,' Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant's house. They all stood and
entered appellant's compound, but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at
the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape 'because the police are already here.' They
scampered and 'ran away because there were already shots.' Locson jumped over the fence and ran
towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home
(Ibid., pp. 17-19).
"The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M)
narrating what transpired at appellant's house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
"After the search and before returning to the police station, PO3 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property
Seized' (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea
as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as
witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties
seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
"An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26,
1997 showed that the following firearms 'were fired' (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with
Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2),
a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number
(Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
"With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M.
Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50)
pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426
grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K)
yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
"The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show
that appellant 'had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or . . .
been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence' (Exh. X)" 14
Defense's Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. 15 Hence, we quote the
pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
"Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. 'Warpan', 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as
'smuggling' (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the
Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 4041, id.). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser
Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his 'alias'. However, he admitted that more
people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id.).
He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was
sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandao's house and not
in his house because they ha[d] 'a sort of a conference' as Dandao's daughter was leaving for Saudi
Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard
shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was
arrested ". . . [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping . . . . At the
back of my house' (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him 'considering that the one who
arrested me does not have nameplate.' He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested
him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary
School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He
said the 'policemen' [were] 'the one[s] who fire[d] at us' (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for
sure they [would] die '[b]ecause the door is very near . . . the vicinity of my house'. He does not own the
M14 rifle (Exh. 'B-3') which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to
him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not
know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id.). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. 'B-4'), the three (3) empty M16 rifle
magazines (Exh. 'G'; 'G-1' to 'G-2'), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exhs. 'G-3'; 'G-4'); the
two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. 'B-1'; 'B-2'), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs.
'J-1' to 'J-50') placed inside a pencil case (Exh. 'J', the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. 'W')
and the white crystalline stone (Exh. 'K') all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just produced
those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the policemen
(tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said: 'that is not ours, I
think this (is) theirs, . . . they just brought that as their evidence' (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
"Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that
he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the
husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid
when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino
Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does
not recognize him (tsn, p. 11, id.). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not
selling shabu but he knows 'for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in
that place,' in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp. 11-14, id.).
"After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one
night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath.
He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given
to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was
brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination
(tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
"During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar ( Sikkal)
Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that ' it was the
policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name.' They were killed at the back of his house . He
said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33, May 4, 1998).
"Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he
calls 'Hadji Id' at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was
together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when 'soldiers' entered the house. '(W)hen
they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house' (tsn, p. 5, May 5, 1998). They were
armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they
wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When
Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At
that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search
Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left the
place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that 'it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time
the Search Warrant (was) given to us by . . . Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano' (tsn, pp. 6-8, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived 'already late in the afternoon, almost sundown' (tsn, p. 9, id.). Anilhaw
declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else
that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalam's house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id.).
"Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 o'clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, he was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately
arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He
had 'around P50,000.00' placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie
down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar
wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated.
He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at
the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5,1998).
"Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the
house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her
parents' house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in
Ladjaalam, Walpan's wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her
husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the
policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two
other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp. 2-7, May
5,1998).
"Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was
sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcycle, driven by a person,
stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his
motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her
children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and
'there was a shot.' As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip
Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
"Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o'clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar.
Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw
policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already
handcuffed. Walpan called him that the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was
already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw 'the
things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu' (tsn, p. 17, May 8, 1998). He did not see
the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being
listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. 'Upon seeing the things that were recovered during
the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. "P"; "P-1") of the things . . . taken during the search" (tsn, pp. 1718, May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the
house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id.)." 16
The Trial Court's Ruling
because it had been issued for more than one specific offense, 17 in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court. 18 The court a quo ruled:
"It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally ' null and void' because it was issued
for more than one specific offense . . . contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which
provides that 'A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense . . . .' In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search
warrant for more than one offense a 'scatter shot warrant' violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised
Rules of Court and is 'totally null and void."' 19 (emphasis in the original) aIcDCH
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellant's arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the
officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies
of several police officers, 20 who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on
the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant. 21 Additionally, the judge noted that
Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his
assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid. 22 The trial court
concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellant's narration that he was not
in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
"Under the circumstances, the policemen 'had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and
confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and
confiscation of the firearm.' Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, 'A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person . . . (w)hen in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.' An offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered
the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve
the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and
arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search
Warrant." 23
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle
(with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) 24 used by appellant against the police
elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines. 25 The trial court observed that
these items were in "plain view" of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same
items were "evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to
seizure" 26 since appellant "had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given
authority to carry firearm outside his residence." 27
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellant's claim that the items that were seized by
the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers
wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those
conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence,
when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against
them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak
defense. 28
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
"The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1
Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his
extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where
persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said
regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or
hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be]
proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances,
including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers.
The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ' Warpan' that he did not maintain an
extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu
cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that
he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that
extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a
certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpan's testimony was not elaborated by
evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any
other document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by
accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan' is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve
no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the
negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence." 29
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellant's liability in this manner:

". . . . The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to
serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, not multiple
attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused
and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
"The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan' cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section
16, Article 111, in relation to Sections 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a
total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his
house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search
conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than
one offense, and were not found in 'plain view' of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the
accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with
Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the
policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag
containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan' because
according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted
coins should be turned over to the National Treasury." 30
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I
"The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the
police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire
between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
"The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the
scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located. EaISDC
III
"The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties
[excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu)
were planted by the police." 31
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular
inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame up. In addition, we
shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the
Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court "a better
perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime." 32 We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 33 We note in particular that the defense had even requested
SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of
appellant's house. 34 Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings. 35
Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be
within the discretion of the trial judge. 36 Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that
discretion. 37
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 38 Suffice it to state that
the trial court's assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. 39 After
carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellant's claim, we
cannot exempt this case from the general rule. 40 Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses
positively showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements, and that he had
subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. 41 testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And it's there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? . . . You said you
were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe
Gaganting . . . I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic]
Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw
two old woman.
xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was
concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I,
together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and
immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and
jumped from the window of his house . . . leading to the roof of the neighbor's house.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbor's house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the
raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the
investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan
Ladjaalam." 42
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, 43 as follows:
"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, 'do not fire at
the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.'
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit 'B-3' with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it
over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?

A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put . . . markings.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines? DCAHcT
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxx xxx xxx

Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL." 44
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons
seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had
used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open
court:
"Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder
nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would
be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit 'B-3', which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black
and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness . . .?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue; it could be possible that the gun was fired before the
incident . . . .
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit 'B-3-A'.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor." 45 (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements 46 of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police
officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to
satisfy the second element was the prosecution's Certification 47 stating that he had not filed any
application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any
outside his residence. 48 Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle
were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a
private individual. 49
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he
raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were "planted," and that the entire
Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disproved. 50 Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of
the police officers, 51 coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such
defense cannot be given much credence. 52 Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we
conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his
Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial. 53 He testified thus:
"Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December
1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name.
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: 'that I was
resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed
towards our house.. and I inspected and . . . we were attacked by armed persons. . . and I was
apprehended by the persons who attacked . . . our house'; [the] house you are referring to [in]
this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your
house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: 'that [o]n that afternoon of
September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my
companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo,
Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your
neighbors, house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your]
house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is . . . not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct." 54
Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with
attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for
which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the
testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house
of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The former's testimony
was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not
deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution's story. TIAEac
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault 55 with multiple counts of
attempted homicide. It found that "[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,]
who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant . . ." constituted such complex crime. 56
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional. 57
Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the "most serious
crime," should be imposed and applied in its maximum period. 58
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court
convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have
applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been
PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial court's ruling and the OSG's submission exemplify the legal community's difficulty in grappling
with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to
interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed
as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully
or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms
without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
Citing People v. Jayson, 59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific
facts of this case. Since another crime direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide was
committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second
paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, possession
cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based
on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as
worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is
committed at the same time. 60
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain
its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso 61 in the second
paragraph, it seemed to have construed "no other crime" as referring only to homicide and murder, in
both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime
other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide;
hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute.
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime,
there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case,
appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 62 In this case, the plain meaning
of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. 63
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and
not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSG's contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be
applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of
PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. 64 In
other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for
illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among
other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was committed."
Furthermore, the OSG's reliance on People v. Jayson 65 is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the
conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We
explained however, that "the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration."
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the
proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the
person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and
murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle,
an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the
first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense, 66 like alarm and scandal 67 or slight physical injuries, 68 both of which are punishable by
arresto menor. 69 This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294,
whose wisdom is not subject to the Court's review. Any perception that the result reached here appears
unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence 70 to the proven facts and we have
done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a
weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional and (2)
maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.
Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its
sound discretion, of RA 8294. IESTcD
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Written by Judge Jesus C. Carbon, Jr.
2.Rollo, pp. 10-15.
3.The appellant was charged together with his wife Nur-In Ladjaalam and one Ahmad Sailabbi.
Charges against the latter were later dropped.
4.Also spelled "Riohondo."
5.Rollo, p. 10.
6.Appellant was charged here together with Nur-In Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini. The
charge against the latter two was subsequently dismissed.
7.Rollo, p. 12.
8.In this Information, charged were appellant together with one PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini. Charges against Sailabbi were later dropped; Hadjula still remains at
large.
9.Rollo, pp. 14-15.
10.No copy of the fourth Information was attached to the records. In any event, the trial court
acquitted him of this charge.
11.Assisted by counsel de parte, Atty. Jose E. Fernandez.
12.Notice of Appeal was filed on September 25, 1998. This case was deemed submitted for
resolution after the Court's receipt of the Brief for the Appellee on May 19, 2000. The filing of
a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary period.
13.Signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega and
Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag.
14.Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-16; rollo, pp. 247-254.
15.Appellant's Brief, p. 5; rollo, p. 149. This Brief was signed by Atty. Jose E. Fernandez.
16.Decision, pp. 23-32; rollo, pp. 51-60.
17.These are: 1) violation of 16, Article III of RA 6495, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972; 2) violation of PD 1866 penalizing illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
18.It provides:
"SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized."
20.These are, inter alia, SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr., SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, PO3 Enrique
Rivera and PO3 Renato Dela Pea.
21.Decision, pp. 42-43; rollo, pp. 70-71. Both appellant and the firearms seized tested positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
22.The trial court quoted the same thus:
"[O]n the afternoon of September 24, 1998, I was at home in my house at Aplaya, Rio Hondo,
Barangay Campo Muslim . . . (and) I was resting and sleeping when I heard the sound of
gun reports, which awakened me. Then I noticed that the shots were directed towards our
house, hence I suspected that we were under attack by armed persons. I tried to escape
and jumped outside, but I was apprehended by the persons who attacked our house, before
I learned they were police officers." (Decision p. 35: rollo, p. 63.)
24.Seen by SPO1 Lacastesantos lying on top of a sofa on the second story of appellant's house
when he pursued appellant.
25.Seen at a corner on the same floor.
26.Decision, p. 38; rollo, p. 66.
27.Ibid.
28.Ibid. p. 51; rollo, p. 79.
29.Ibid, pp. 48-50; pp. 76-78.
30.Ibid., pp. 53-54; pp. 81-82.
31.Appellant's Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 145.
32.Appellant's Brief, p. 19; rollo, 163.
33.As shown by the pertinent portions quoted below. See People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472, July 15,
1997.
34.TSN, March 4, 1998, pp. 37-38.
35.See People v. Baniel, supra.
36.Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, 2nd ed., p. 78, citing Graham on Evidence. See also Appellee's
Brief, pp. 21-22.
37.See People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286, April 7, 1949.
38.Appellant's first assignment of error is herein taken up as the second issue.
39.See People v. Elamparo, GR No. 121572, March 31, 2000; People v. Cupino, et al., GR No.
125688, March 31, 2000; People v. Estorco, GR No. 111941, April 27, 2000; People v.
Sultan, GR No. 132470, April 27, 2000; People v. Mendoza, GR No. 128890, May 31, 2000;
People v. Geral, GR No. 122283, June 15, 2000; People v. Rios, GR No. 132632, June 19,
2000; People v Molina, infra.
40.People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, November 16, 1998.
41.The witness is a member of the team that went to Ladjaalam's house on September 24, 1997. He
was tasked to bring the barangay captain to appellant's house to serve as a witness to the
search.
42.TSN, March 4, 1998, pp. 18-23.
43.Also a member or the raiding team. Lacastesantos, together with SPO1 Mirasol, went inside the
house. When appellant tried to escape, Mirasol pursued him; Lacastesantos proceeded to
the second floor.
44.TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-24, 28-29.
45.TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 10-11, 19-20.
46.In the en banc case of People v. Molina (292 SCRA 742, 777, July 22, 1998), we said:
"In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
elements thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused,
who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess or carry the same outside his residence." (footnote omitted)
See also People v. Castillo, GR No. 131592-93, February 15, 2000; People v. Lazaro, GR No.
112090, October 26, 1999; People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, November 16,1998.
47.Signed by Police Senior Inspector Ruperto Rugay Regis, Jr.
48.People v. Lazaro, supra., citing several cases. See also People v. Narvasa, supra.; People v.
Molina, supra.; People v. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489, July 15, 1997.
49.People v. Molina, supra.
50.See People v. Barita et al., GR No. 123541, February 8, 2000; Dizon v. CA, 311 SCRA 1, July 22,
1999.
51.In fact, appellant admits that he did not have any misunderstanding with the arresting officers.
Neither could he think of any reason why they would file false charges against him. (TSN,
May 4, 1998, p. 42)
52.See People v. Dizon, supra.
53.TSN, May 4, 1998, pp. 37-39.
54.Ibid.
55.Article 148 of the RPC reads:
"ART. 148. Direct assaults. Any person or persons who, without public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority. . . . ."
56.Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) reads:
"ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period." (emphasis ours)
57.Article 249; cf. 51, RPC.
58.Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that "the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
"by the Code for the offense." An authority on criminal law writes that when the accused is
guilty of a complex crime, the penalty immediately lower is the next below the penalty
provided for the gravest crime." (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 1981 ed., p.
769.) Since direct assault is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum period, the penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor (maximum) to prision
correctional (minimum). Accordingly, the indeterminate penalty for direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide is 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correctional.
59.282 SCRA 166, 176-177, November 18, 1997.
60.People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996; People v. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601, February 26,
1990.
61."That no other crime was committed by the person arrested."
62.See People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157, February 10, 1998; People v. Deleverio, 289 SCA 547, April
24, 1998.
63.See Tanada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, May 31, 1935; Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173, February 15,
1935.
64.People v. Jayson, supra.
65.Supra at p. 177, per Mendoza, J.
66.Offenses under the Revised Penal Code which carry a penalty lighter than that for illegal
possession of a high-powered firearm include (1) indirect assault (Article 149), (2) tumults
and other disturbances (Article 153), (3) discharge of firearms (Article 254), (4) light threats
(Article 285), and (5) light coercion (Article 287).
67.Article 155 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty of arresto menor or fine not
exceeding 200 pesos upon "[a]ny person who within any town or public place, shall
discharge any firearm, rocket, firecracker or other explosive calculated to cause alarm or
danger."
68.Article 266 (1) imposes the penalty of arresto menor "when an offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attention during the same period." For example, when a person hits the
head of another with the butt of an unlicensed M-14 rifle, thereby incapacitating the latter for
one to nine days, the accused may be charged only with slight physical injuries, not illegal
possession of firearms.
69.Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of arresto menor is one to thirty days.
70.That penal laws should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.
||| (People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, [September 19, 2000], 395 PHIL 1-37)
guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and
sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms after using said
firearm in the commission of another crime.
HELD:
NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only of two
offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and (2)
maintaining a drug den.
RATIO:
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that
no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].
CASE DIGEST
People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam y Milapil
G.R. No. 136149-51
September 19, 2000
FACTS:
The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for which was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Appelants guilt was established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness , who
himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the
time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified
before the court. That appelant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to
the prosecutions story.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle,
an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the
first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto
menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is
not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached
from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The Courts] task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court] have done so in
this case.
The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It
found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen [,] who were about to enter
his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime. Aside from finding appellant
guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by
the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, prejudicial
thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so
and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate. " (Commission of Internal Revenue vs.
Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).
2. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF APPELLATE COURT THAT DEFICIENCY INCOME TAXES WERE PAID
ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT; EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE FINDINGS MAY BE
DISTURBED. The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the
Pastors, and accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are
required by law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and
may not be disturbed except under exceptional circumstances which have already become familiar
(Rule 45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; e.g., where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(7) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence in which they are based; (8)
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent's and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Thelma Fernan vs. CA, et al., 181 SCRA 546,
citing Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), none of which is present
in this case.
3. ID.; TAX STATUTES ARE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. The rule is
that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer, for taxes being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable
statute (in the case P.D. 231) expressly and clearly declares (Commission of Internal Revenue vs. La
Tondea, Inc. and CTA, 5 SCRA 665, citing Manila Railroad Company vs. Collector of Customs, 52 Phil.
950).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 69344. April 26, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR, respondents.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
Roberto L. Bautista for private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. TAXATION; TAX AMNESTY; GOVERNMENT ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN DEFICIENCY TAX ASSESSMENT AND PAYMENT OF AMNESTY TAX. Even assuming
that the deficiency tax assessment of P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since the
latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the Government by way of amnesty taxes
under P.D. No. 213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax
failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax
assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. "A tax amnesty, being a general
pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise
The legal issue presented in this petition for review is whether or not the tax amnesty payments made
by the private respondents on October 23, 1973 bar an action for recovery of deficiency income taxes
under P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.
On April 15, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced
an action in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, Branch XVI, to collect from
the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959
in the amount of P17,117.08 with a 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, and costs.
The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. On August 2, 1975,
they filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them of P17,117.08 for income tax
deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under
P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting to P10,400 or
10% of their reported untaxed income under P.D . 23, P2,951.20 or 20% of the reported untaxed income
under P.D. 213, and a final payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the
Government's Official Receipt No. 1052388. Consequently, the Government is in estopped to demand
and compel further payment of income taxes by them.
The parties agreed that there were no issues of fact to be litigated, hence, the case was submitted for
decision upon the pleadings and memoranda on the lone legal question of: whether or not the payment
of deficiency income tax under the tax amnesty, P.D. 23, and its acceptance by the Government
operated to divest the Government of the right to further recover from the taxpayer, even if there was an
existing assessment against the latter at the time he paid the amnesty tax.
It is not disputed that as a result of an investigation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1963, it
was found that the private respondents owed the Government P1,283,621.63 as income taxes for the
years 1955 to 1959, inclusive of the 50% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. The defendants protested
against the assessment. A reinvestigation was conducted resulting in the drastic reduction of the
assessment to only P17,117.08. LLpr
It appears that on April 27, 1978, the private respondents offered to pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue
the sum of P5,000 by way of compromise settlement of their income tax deficiency for the questioned
years, but Assistant Commissioner Bernardo Carpio, in a letter addressed to the Pastor spouses,
rejected the offer stating that there was no legal or factual justification for accepting it. The Government
filed the action against the spouses in 1980, ten (10) years after the assessment of the income tax
deficiency was made.
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Government, which the spouses did not oppose,
the trial court rendered a decision on February 28, 1980, holding that the defendants spouses had
settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under
P.D. 213, as shown in the Amnesty Income Tax Returns' Summary Statement and the tax Payment
Acceptance Order for P2,951.20 with its corresponding official receipt, which returns also contain the
very assessment for the questioned years. By accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the
Government, therefore, waived its right to further recover deficiency incomes taxes from the defendants
under the existing assessment against them because:
1. the defendants' amnesty income tax returns' Summary Statement included therein the deficiency
assessment for the years 1955 to 1959;
2. tax amnesty payment was made by the defendants under Presidential Decree No. 213, hence, it had the
effect of remission of the income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959;
3. P.D. No. 23 as well as P.D. No. 213 do not make any exceptions nor impose any conditions for their
application, hence, Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 which excludes certain taxpayers from the coverage of
P.D. No. 213 is null and void, and
The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (AC-G.R. CV No. 68371 entitled,
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Antonio Pastor, et al."), alleging that the private respondents were not
qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to
persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 872 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they were
precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.'s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further
argued that "tax exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer."
The respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that P.D. 213 contains no exemptions from its
coverage and that, under Letter of Instruction (LOI) 129 dated September 18, 1973, the immunities
granted by P.D. 213 include: LLjur
"II Immunities Granted.
Upon payment of the amounts specified in the Decree, the following shall be observed:
"1. . . .
"2. The taxpayer shall not be subject to any investigation, whether civil, criminal or administrative, insofar
as his declarations in the income tax returns are concerned nor shall the same be used as evidence
against, or to the prejudice of the declarant in any proceeding before any court of law or body, whether
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative, in which he is a defendant or respondent, and he shall be exempt
from any liability arising from or incident to his failure to file his income tax return and to pay the tax due
thereon, as well as to any liability for any other tax that may be due as a result of business transactions
from which such income, now voluntarily declared may have been derived." (Emphasis supplied; p. 040,
Rollo.)
There is nothing in the LOI which can be construed as authority for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
introduce exceptions and/or conditions to the coverage of the law.
On November 23, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision
dismissing the Government's appeal and holding that the payment of deficiency income taxes by the
Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance thereof by the Government, operated to divest the
latter of its right to further recover deficiency income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the
existing deficiency tax assessment against them. The appellate court held that if Revenue Regulation
No. 7-73 did provide an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, such provision was null and void for
being contrary to, or restrictive of, the clear mandate of P.D. No. 213 which the regulation should
implement. Said revenue regulation may not prevail over the provisions of the decree, for it would then
be an act of administrative legislation, not mere implementation, by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On February 4, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition for
review of the decision dated November 23, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the
dismissal, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, of the Government's complaint against the
respondent spouses.
The petition is devoid of merit.
4. the acceptance of tax amnesty payment by the plaintiff-appellant bars the recovery of deficiency taxes.
(pp. 3-4, IAC Decision, pp. 031-032, Rollo.)
Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment of P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were
correct, since the latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the Government by way of
amnesty taxes under P.D. No. 213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for
their past tax failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency
tax assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. cdphil
A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an
absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and
in this sense, prejudicial thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform
a chance to do so and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate (Commission of Internal
Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).
The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and
accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to
file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be
disturbed except under exceptional circumstances which have already become familiar (Rule 45, Sec.
4, Rules of Court; e.g., where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence in which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9)
when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Thelma Fernan vs. CA, et al., 181 SCRA 546, citing Tolentino
vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), none of which is present in this case.
The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the
applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares (Commission of Internal
Revenue vs. La Tondea, Inc. and CTA, 5 SCRA 665, citing Manila Railroad Company vs. Collector of
Customs, 52 Phil. 950).
CASE DIGEST
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-69344
April 26, 1991
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, [April 26, 1991], 273 PHIL 573-579)
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283, 621.63 for taxes from
the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to
P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even
decreased to about P12,000. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of
such.
The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213
because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had
pending assessments with the BIR. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No.
8-72 was null because P.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to
amnesty.
ISSUE:
Yes, because Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue Regulation No. 8-72
provided an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such provision is null and void for being
contrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a
Presidential Decree.
LATIN MAXIM:
8, 26
W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.

HELD:

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994.]

4.Annex G, id., ibid., 40.

||| (Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, [September 1, 1994])

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP; CANNOT

4. ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED);

8. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SUPREME COURT; NO DISCRETION TO GIVE

Hence, this appeal. 12

The Trial Court's Ruling

In conclusion, the trial court explained appellant's liability in this manner:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Crime and Punishment

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

Roberto L. Bautista for private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied. No costs.

W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.

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