POWERS OF CONGRESS

A. GENERAL PLENARY POWERS (Sec. 1) pass, amend

repeal
LEAGUE OF CITIES VS COMELEC
GR 176951
NOV. 18, 2008
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting
33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from
P20 million to P100 million.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the
Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the
Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
The House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into
law (Cityhood Laws).
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal

Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
ISSUE:
Plenary Powers of Congress
RULING:
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All
Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern
exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of
the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution
is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must
follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found
solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the
P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to
respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were

pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood

Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt
respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid,
such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
LEAGUE OF CITIES RESOLUTION (APRIL 24, 2010)
FACTS: (Same facts above)
RULING: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units
must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one
Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to
stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary
for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in
any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of
cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the
P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to

respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were
pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood
Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt
respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid,
such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code.
Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: Section 450 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Considering the Legislatures primary intent to
curtail the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into
cities, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of
cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.
LEAGUE OF CITIES RESOLUTION (FEB.15, 2011)
FACTS: (Same facts above)
RULING:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress
is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses
plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its lawmaking powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did
when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was
again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When
Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable

indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government

unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to
modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of
municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009,
imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locallygenerated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt
respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified
income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting
flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is
countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for
these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in
effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the
exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly
exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No.
9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and
the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view
that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not
found in the LGC.

DOCTRINE
POWERS

OF

NON-DELEGATION

OF

LEGISLATIVE

PEOPLE VS VERA
65 PHIL 56 NOV. 16, 1937
FACTS:
The criminal case, People v Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) in Manila with HSBC intervening in the case as private
prosecutor. The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu
Unjieng.
Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive
motions for new trial which were all denied on Dec. 17, 1935. Final
judgment was entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filed for certiorari to the
Supreme Court but got denied on Nov. 1936. The SC subsequently
denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial, then remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court,
under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature.

He states he is innocent of the crime; he has no criminal record; and

that he would observe good conduct in the future.
CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on
April 5, 1937. HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such
hearings and assailed the constitutionality of the Probation Act since it
violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful and improper
delegation to provincial boards.
Section 11 of Act 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those
provinces wherein the probationary officer is granted salary not lower
than provincial fiscals by respective provincial boards. The City Fiscal of
Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC,
arguing that probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses
this exclusive power of the Chief Executive. Hence, this petition in the
Supreme Court.
RELATED ISSUES:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power to provincial
boards
RULING:
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent
organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the
Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will.
Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral
National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of
the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest.
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is
not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions
sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body
to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. "It is a cardinal
principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be

managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central

authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the
power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the
municipalities exercising local self-governance has never been held to
trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of
general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to
prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject
of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." On
quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative
power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may
select. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power
to the people at large, though some authorities maintain that this may
not be done. Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by
the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly
may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates,
import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section
16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war
or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy."
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions
hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary
of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of
any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p.
165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this
court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the
legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the GovernorGeneral, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of

rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime.

(See and cf. Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is
limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule,
an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise
of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and
impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use
the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra,
is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature
does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for
the various provincial boards to determine. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for
the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act
is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a
declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but
the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall
take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate."
The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some
other person or body the power to determine when the specified
contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature
has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent
upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire
operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board the
discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A
provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or

await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no

rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the
legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions;
and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It
need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to
appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a
matter which rest entirely at its pleasure.
UNITED STATES VS ANG TANG HO
43 PHIL 1
FEB. 27, 1922
FACTS:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and
authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose."
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of
palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify
the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the
price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang
Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he
appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding
the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the
sentence.
RELATED ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power to the
Governor-General
RULING:
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far
as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.
It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent
of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the

price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms,
the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not
specify or define what an extraordinary rise" is. That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General,
"with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate
"temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is
to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the GovernorGeneral to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state
of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing
the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without
notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such
facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller
commits a crime.

The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.
If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing
more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is
not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the
Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation,
fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation
of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of
the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
EASTERN SHIPPING, INC. VS POEA
166 SCRA 533
OCT. 18, 1988
FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued
for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular
No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that
the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social
Security System and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits
and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular
No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and
domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for
overseas employment.
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2
itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation.
RELATED ISSUE/S:
Whether memorandum circular no. 2 is violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power
RULING:
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative
discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature
to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law

to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and

prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise
a power essentially legislative..
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of
the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a
monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that
she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security
System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a
P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically
reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen
under Memorandum Circular No. 2.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
15 SCRA 569
DEC. 24, 1965
FACTS:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President
of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of
the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by
said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic
Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present
action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the
officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been
impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities
adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because
the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the
new political subdivisions intervened in the case.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act
of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall
come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a
new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may
be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a
resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new
barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred
persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council
of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this
new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
RELATED ISSUES:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
unlawfully delegated legislative power to the President
RULING:
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona
vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has
settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the
creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from
an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer
(See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of
Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing
and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of
two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex
rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and
exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349).
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in

itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these
well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not
overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sente nce
of
Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the
phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses
preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of
the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent
when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act
No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the
Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive
order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68),
including the change of the seat of the government "to such place ...
as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section
1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which, or the
conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be
exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section
referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government
was to be transferred.
As above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an
administrative function, but one which is essentially and
eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact.
It is "purely a legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway
vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a
political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to
whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any
case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re
Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive

departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to
assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include
the authority either to abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged
power of the President to create municipal corporations would
necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President
less power over local governments than that vested in him over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive
departments, bureaus or offices.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
270 SCRA 106
MARCH 19, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for
Reforms Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with the COMELEC a
petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective
officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Art XVII
Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the
people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter
set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interes Law Center,
and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared asintervenorsoppostitors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and
the Delfin petition ring the several arguments, such as the following: 1)
The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; 2) The peoples initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside
the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motion
for Intervention.

RELATED ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power
directly to the people
RULING:
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it
still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation.
R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution.
Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of
the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).

The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed

afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section
is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
The people are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the
system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for
a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than
the initiative on national and local laws.
R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions,
the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the
Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of
initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which
the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements
as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important
or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter
are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of [the] Act

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as

expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section
23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasijudicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance
on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS ERMITA

469 SCRA 1
SEPT. 1, 2005
FACTS:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or
the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the
Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law
in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in
Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate
of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent
(2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President
to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive
power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the
sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation
since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers
to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring
about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding
standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will
make the recommendation.
RELATED ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation by Congress of its
exclusive power to tax to the President
RULING:
The legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power
to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of

contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its

terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe
sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies,
details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such
power may be left to them, including the power to determine the
existence of facts on which its operation depends.
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as
basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative
function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of
correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of
subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its
members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent
legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is
impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the
legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is
proper. The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of
government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact
upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to
application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances
impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the
common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after
any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power.
It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of factsupon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition.

It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon

factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the
absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the
common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory
order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and
courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately
impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be
evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the
word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come
into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the
specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the
12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified
contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions
by a person or body other than the legislature itself.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
562 SCRA 251
AUG. 14, 2008
FACTS:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau
of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system
of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for
the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and
procedures for removing from the service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate
personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4)
prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other
functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6)
submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and

regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient
standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service
if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be
easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
RELATED ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 9335 unduly delegates power to fix revenue
targets to the President.
RULING:
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1)
the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy
and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of
the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above
agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the

delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives
Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be
sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of
their respective revenue targets of the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection of Percent (%) of the Excess
the Excess the Revenue Collection to Accrue to the Fund
Targets
30% or below
15%
More than 30%
15% of the first 30% plus 20%
of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year
immediately following the year when the revenue collection
target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal
year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated
revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures
and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the
President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to
the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue targets as
allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and
the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection
expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does
not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the
DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards
authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least
7.5% may be removed from the service.
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of

tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the

service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due
process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down
a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.
The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience
and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

B. LEGISLATIVE MILL (How a bill becomes a law)

C. LIMITATIONS
C.1 SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
1) Express Limitations
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
148 SCRA 208
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the
"Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this
country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa
representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general
interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers
whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977'
INFRINGES
UPON
THE
FUNDAMENTAL
LAW
BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS
REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO

SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE

PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177
ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS,
FORM
AND
PROCEDURE
PRESCRIBED
BY
THE
CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF
FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER
OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution
dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public
respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there
being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He
further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted
pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that
at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government
to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.
ISSUE:
WON Sec.44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 infringes upon the
fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys
RULING:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commisions may by
law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another
was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to
afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those
of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of
public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of
a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the

government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway

granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds
may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the
purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if
there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President
to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.
GUINGONA VS CARAGUE
196 SCRA 221
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation
(with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations
for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D.
No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of
the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No.
81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks
to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
pursuant to said decrees.
ISSUE:

WON it is inconsistent with Sections 24 and 29(1), Art. VI of the

Constitution
RULING:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
(Emphasis supplied.)
They assert that bills have to be approved by the President, then a law
must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation
and that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated
for the debt service.
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not
meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24
and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among others,
that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt"
must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is
untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere
"bills" that must again go through the legislative million The only
reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which
refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be
passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were
otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or
express manner.
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that
provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals
in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made
impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well
as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied
in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned

decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative

intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In
re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the
present.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No.
81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with
the duty to implement the same.
PCGG VS COCOFED
GR 147062-64 DEC. 14, 2001
FACTS:
Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) Nos. 1, 2 and 14.
On the explicit premise that vast resources of the government have
been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad, the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created by
Executive Order No. 1 to assist the President in the recovery of the illgotten wealth thus accumulated whether located in the Philippines or
abroad.
Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten assets and properties
are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of
stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions,
residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in
the Philippines and in various countries of the world.
Executive Order No. 14, on the other hand, empowered the PCGG, with
the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other
government agencies, inter alia, to file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it under EO Nos. 1 and 2.
Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG issued and implemented numerous
sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of allegedly illgotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal.
Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of
stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the
names of the alleged one million coconut farmers, the so-called
Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and
Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. (hereinafter Cojuangco).
In connection with the sequestration of the said UCPB shares, the
PCGG, on July 31, 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

Upon Motion of Private Respondent COCOFED, the Sandiganbayan

issued a Resolution lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares
on the ground that herein private respondents -- in particular,
COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies had not been impleaded by
the PCGG as parties-defendants in its July 31, 1987 Complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that the Writ of Sequestration issued by the
Commission was automatically lifted for PCGGs failure to commence
the corresponding judicial action within the six-month period ending on
August 2, 1987 provided under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. The anti-graft court noted that though these entities were
listed in an annex appended to the Complaint, they had not been
named as parties-respondents.
This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a
Petition for Certiorari. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the antigraft court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of Directors of
UCPB. However, the PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a
Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the election. Subsequently,
the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to proceed
with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the
sequestered shares to be voted by their registered owners.
the
Court,
acting
on
the
solicitor
generals
Motion
for
Clarification/Manifestation, issued a Resolution on February 16, 1993,
declaring that the right of petitioners [herein private respondents] to
vote stock in their names at the meetings of the UCPB cannot be
conceded at this time. That right still has to be established by them
before the Sandiganbayan. Until that is done, they cannot be deemed
legitimate owners of UCPB stock and cannot be accorded the right to
vote them.
On January 23, 1995, the Court rendered its final Decision in GR No.
96073, nullifying and setting aside the November 15, 1990 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan which, as earlier stated, lifted the sequestration
of the subject UCPB shares. The express impleading of herein
Respondents COCOFED et al. was deemed unnecessary because the
judgment may simply be directed against the shares of stock shown to
have been issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth. Furthermore, the
companies are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally
acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against
them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said case.
Six years later, on February 13, 2001, the Board of Directors of UCPB
received from the ACCRA Law Office a letter written on behalf of the
COCOFED and the alleged nameless one million coconut farmers,
demanding the holding of a stockholders meeting for the purpose of,
among others, electing the board of directors. In response, the board

approved a Resolution calling for a stockholders meeting on March 6,

2001 at three oclock in the afternoon.
ISSUE:
Express Limitation on Taxation
RULING:
Coconut Funds Are Levied for the Benefit of the Coconut
Industry and Its Farmers.
Just like the sugar levy funds, the coconut levy funds constitute state
funds even though they may be held for a special public purpose.
In fact, Executive Order No. 481 dated May 1, 1998 specifically likens
the coconut levy funds to the sugar levy funds, both being special
public funds acquired through the taxing and police powers of
the State. The sugar levy funds, which are strikingly similar to the
coconut levies in their imposition and purpose, were declared public
funds by this Court in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, from which we
quote:
The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax which is
within the power of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar
industry (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). They constitute sugar liens
(Sec. 7[b], P.D. No. 388). The collections made accrue to a Special
Fund, a Development and Stabilization Fund, almost identical to the
Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund created under Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act 567. The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of
the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide
means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily
in the exercise of the police power of the State. (Lutz vs. Araneta,
supra.).
The Court further explained:
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar
millers, planters and producers for a special purpose that of financing
the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its
components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign
market. The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys
pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as state funds, even
though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v. American
Surety Co., 263 Mich 586. 294 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am. Jur., Sec. 2., p.
718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues
collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the
language of the statute, administered in trust for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of
the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (see

1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 29[3], lifted from the 1935
Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23[1].
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special fund is emphasized
by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank
and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out
only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Sec. 29[1], 1973 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 18[1]).
That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and
millers, and that the funds were channeled to the purchase of shares of
stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fund for
their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so
purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since
it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the
funds derived from it. The investment in shares of respondent Bank is
not alien to the purpose intended because of the Banks character as a
commodity bank for sugar conceived for the industrys growth and
development. Furthermore, of note is the fact that one-half (1/2) or
P0.50 per picul, of the amount levied under P.D. No. 388 is to be
utilized for the payment of salaries and wages of personnel, fringe
benefits and allowances of officers and employees of PHILSUCOM
thereby immediately negating the claim that the entire amount levied
is in trust for sugar, producers, planters and millers.
To rule in petitioners favor would contravene the general principle that
revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private
purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The
Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar
industry, and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market
including the foreign market, the industry being of vital importance to
the countrys economy and to national interest.
Thus, the coconut levy funds -- like the sugar levy and the oil
stabilization funds, as well as the monies generated by the On-line
Lottery System -- are funds exacted by the State. Being enforced
contributions, they are prima facie public funds.
PASCUAL VS SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS
FACTS:
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial
Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act
Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for
the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement"
of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas Gen. Araneta Gen.
Lucban Gen. Capinpin Gen. Segundo Gen. Delgado Gen.

Malvar Gen. Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of
said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected
and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the
Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal", which projected
feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any
important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned
Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads
were to be construed) were private properties of respondent Jose C.
Zulueta, who was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on
May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal
Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to
the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was
accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two
of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig
was, however, executed;.; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was
made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the
projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private
streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a semblance of
legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953,
while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged
deed of donation of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said
projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same
date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to
an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract.
The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because
people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the
construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the
donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by
its owner to the government.
ISSUE:
WON the appropriation is valid.
RULING:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential
character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to
be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited
by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of

private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use
public money.
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used only for public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and
the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than for a public purpose.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest,
as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the
public.

2) Implied Limitations
a. Non-Delegation of Powers
b. Prohibition against irrepealable laws
3) Procedural Limitations
a. One Subject and Title
CRUZ VS PARAS
123 SCRA 569
FACTS:
The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as
amended. It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN
ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' Its first section insofar as
pertinent reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets,
dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction: ... " Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was
amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded
exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus
amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a
municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night
clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of
support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way

altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed.
The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
ISSUE:
One Subject One Title Limitation
RULING:
There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to
construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof. " Since there is no dispute
as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would
result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide
gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, in the
language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all
"the great public needs, to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any
calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional
infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to
be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done
so before We do so again.
TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
GR 75697
JUNE 18, 1987
FACTS:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own
behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators
adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree
No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board"
with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry
(hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD).
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,
That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes
shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association,

Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of
the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted
by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon
the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The
Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in
Intervention.
ISSUE:
WON Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross
receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER
RULING:
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently
complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary
that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the
title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject and title. An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement
as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
or impede the power of legislation. It should be given practical rather
than technical construction.
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax
provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads,
inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall
collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental
rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%)
shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED,
That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the
DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision
is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As
a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of
the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those
preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the
Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title
or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
GR L-114783
FACTS:
Herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held
on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether
they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.
Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue
of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the
former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the
new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be
elected at the same election.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the

subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,

namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized

city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts, in violation of the one
subject- one bill rule.
ISSUE:
WON the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law makes
it a violation of the one subject-one bill rule
RULING:
The contentions are devoid of merit.
the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate

that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject
treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has
been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we
ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article
VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement
if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been
further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of

the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the

persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation"

b. 3-Reading Rule
4) Presidential Veto
BOLINAO ELECTRIC CORP. VS VALENCIA
11 SCRA 486
FACTS:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary
injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of
radio and television stations enumerated therein, against respondents Secretary
of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control
Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine
Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said
intervenor having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a
television station in Manila.
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They
operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for
operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of
CBNs continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had
caused damages to his department.

ISSUE:
WON the President may legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill
RULING:
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any
particular item or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a
provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the
same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same
time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI,
Sec. 20.)
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that
the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine
Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same
shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in
Luzon, where there are already existing commercial television stations.
This gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally
veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to

research on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide

action on the matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was
already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal.
This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the
same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by
the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television
station in Manila, where there are already television stations in
operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release
of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult
to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel
9, said intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its
illegal expenditures.
GONZALES VS MACARAIG
191 SCRA 452
FACTS:
Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations
Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the
President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills,
Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and
approval.
The President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions
and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381
mentioned at the outset, further expressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved, That the Senate
express its sense that the veto by the President of Section 55 of the
GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B.
No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any
force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains;
"x

x"

Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus

was filed, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality
or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin
respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restraining
Order was issued by the Court.

The petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit

Supplemental Petition, which was granted, basically raising the same
issue as in the original Petition, this time questioning the Presidents
veto of certain provisions, particularly Section 16, of House Bill 26934,
or the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1990, which the
President declared to have become Rep. Act No. 6831.
Petitioners cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90)
which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision of
an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with
it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)
the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is
also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise
of that power.
ISSUE:
WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto
"provisions" of an Appropriations Bill.
RULING:
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are
provisions and not items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the
item-veto power of the President.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of
the 1987 Constitution reading, in full, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections
at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President

shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where

it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object."
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President
and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a
general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto
power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto
over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than
all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words,
the power given the executive to disapprove any item or
items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of
appropriation bills and first came into being in the former
Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. This was
followed by the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar
provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto
power was made more expansive by the inclusion of this
sentence:
". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one
or more items of the same, the President can not veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular
item or items to which it relates . . ."
The 1935 Constitution further broadened the Presidents veto
power to include the veto of item or items of revenue and tariff
bills.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a
more simple and compact form, thus:
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto
any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object."

It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987

Constitution (Article VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim
reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other
words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a
provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be
interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a
provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and
practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of
the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson,
11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
(299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an
item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in
itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation
bill."
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination
in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any
reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents
veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has
not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely
pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part
of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that
the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject
of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional
mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill
shall
relate
specifically
to
some
particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations
Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to
the entire bill. library
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the
executive power to veto, we are of the opinion that Section 55
(FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the

budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the

1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically
to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates."

Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations

Bill should relate specifically to some" particular appropriation"
therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all
items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations
Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to
be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have
to be made to the original recommendations made by the
President and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves,
i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office"
(Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are
more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16
(FY 90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the Presidents veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977]
346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
GR 113105 AUG. 19, 1994
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of
1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations
on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and
to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as
prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and
declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER

THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he
vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, to wit:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that
appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under
Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the
creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the
appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in
compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for
the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the
Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for
the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the
entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which
states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer
planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

the

Supreme

Court,

The GAA contains a special provision applicable to Congress. It allowed

any member of congress the REALIGNMENT OF ALLOCATION FOR
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES, provided that the total of said allocation is
not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker are
the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the
individual members of Congress themselves.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art 6. Whether the
enumeration is exclusive

RULING:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part
of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in
the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No.
292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law,
not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have
been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g.,
R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the
Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department
of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item
for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is
not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by
the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the
National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate
provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the
said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the
AFP modernization program that the President must submit all
purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at
bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of
the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2
and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the

Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored
personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that
impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the
language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply
that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members
all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be
embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on
the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions
relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional
commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. These
steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

5) Three Ways by which a bill becomes a law

- by signature of the Pres.
- by overriding the veto
- by inaction for 30days

6) Effectivity of Laws

TAADA VS TUVERA
136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the

publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,

letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted
that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
ISSUE:
WON there is still a need to publish the law even if the law itself
provided for its effectivity
RULING:
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, ...
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered
in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette
[1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, except such
as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts
of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to
time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which
he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or

otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he

had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic
has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES VS JUDGE VERA
GR 105364 JUNE 2001
FACTS:
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for
assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB Employees Union
filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) was
signed into law by then Pres. Corazon Aquino and was published in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This law sought the
rehabilitation of the PVB which means that Congress mandated that
the PVB be not dissolved.
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of
PVB, respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of
the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to
order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of
another lawyer, while petitioners claims have been frozen to their
prejudice.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation
court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to
continue with liquidation proceedings.
ISSUE:
RULING:

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169
became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, the Court is of the view that the contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless
otherwise provided."
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law
effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No.
7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2,
1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on
February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the
Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by
respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

D.INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

GARCIA VS COMELEC
GR 111230 SEPT. 30, 1994
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic
Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days
after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under
the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required
number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding
Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June
11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative
because its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the
proper subject of an initiative?

2. WON the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set

aside
RULING:
Respondents contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991
only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section
120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991
which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal
process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."
[The Court] reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above
provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the
intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI
provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed
by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a
resolution.
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as
appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System
of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus,
its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives
on local legislations.
Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent
enactment of the local Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with
local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More
specifically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to
ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code
cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as
the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government
unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not,
however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a
local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:
Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within
the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.

This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives
to ordinances, but to all "subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes
resolutions.

E. AIDS IN LEGISLATION
E.1 QUESTION
INQUIRY (Sec.21)

HOUR

(Sec.22)

vs

LEGISLATIVE

Question hour applies to Cabinet; appearance needs prior

consent of the President; informing power of the President so
Congress will know what the Executive is doing.
Legislative Inquiry applies to anyone; appearance of Cabinet
does not need prior consent by the President unless the latter
invokes that the matters inquired are covered within executive
privilege which shall be specified; information to be obtained
relates to a pending bill or will result in proposed legislation;
different from preliminary investigation or criminal prosecution.

SENATE VS ERMITA
GR 169777 APRIL 20, 2006
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North
Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating
Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot
attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate
attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent
belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads
are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security

Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by
the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves.
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without
her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes
on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
ISSUE:
WON EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish
Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power
is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned
and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A

distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and

the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in
the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a
valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as
that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a
matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with
the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.

BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

GR L-89914 NOV.20, 1991
FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together
with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the
expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the
Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among
others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the
country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech
alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations
which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa
refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his
right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically
denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and
malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour
upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The
SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et
al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,

particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of
legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction
of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or
not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than
of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOP VS SANGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD
155 SCRA 421
FACTS:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to
conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related
to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the
heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.)
Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to
appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate,
and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City
of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the
legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to
punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD:
No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in
the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of
these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a
subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They

cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they

exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To
allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC
explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue
compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and
Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body
has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even
assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to
issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would
still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where
the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body.
ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
87 PHIL 29
FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault,
a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault
refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate
adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of
Habeas Corpus
ISSUE:
Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out
their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness right to due process of law.

GUDANI VS SENGA
GR 170165 AUG.15, 2006
FACTS:
Gudani and Balutan are high ranking officials of the Philippine Marines
who, at the time of the incidents in this case, were assigned at the
Philippine Military Academy in Baguio.
Senator Biazon invited several junior officers of the AFP including Chief
of Staff Senga to appear before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security on Sept. 28, 2005, in light of the electoral fraud
in the 2004 elections. (Gudani and Balutan were assigned to maintain
peace and order in Lanao del Norte and Sur during the 04 elections).
Gen. Senga informed Senator Biazon that he could not attend due to
prior commitments but he would ask the other officers to attend so the
PMA superintendent was informed that Gudani and Senga were invited
to appear before the Senate hearing.
On the evening of Sept. 27, a message was transmitted to the PMA
superintendent that as per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, no AFP
personnel shall appear before any congressional hearing without the
approval of the Pres. HOWEVER, by that time Gudani and Senga
already left Baguio for Manila.
The following day, Gen. Senga informed Sen. Biazon that no approval
has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before
the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both
testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections
(Note: EO 464 was also issued on Sept 28.)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifests that shortly before
the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Sengas letter to Sen. Biazon
sent earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore
Tolentino to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy.
Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell
phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In
response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen.
Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take
Gen. Sengas call.
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their
testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted
that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Artcles of
War 65(Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be
subjected to General Court Martial proceedings. Both Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

Petitioners were separately served with Orders directing them to

appear in person at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Charges for
violation of Articles 66 and 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 and to
submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office
of the Judge Advocate General. The Orders were accompanied by
respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them of
violating Articles of War 65 and 97.
It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President
Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from
testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
WON the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before legislative inquiry?
HELD:
The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance
before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military
official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled
to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of
the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.
The ability of the President to prevent military officers from
testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-inchief to control the actions and speech of members of the
armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-inchief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on
the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-inchief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the

position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of

command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where
a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying
the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has
to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is
the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces.
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATION
GR 180643 MARCH 25, 2008
FACTS:
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The
Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the
other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated
for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried
to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent
a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered
falls under executive privilege.
HELD:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by

the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.