Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141528

October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,

vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity
bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?

without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer
with a motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal
of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion
to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The facts are not disputed:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as
the Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the
merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision2 dated November 11,
1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking."3 The appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a
resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner
filed on July 12, 1999 another petition5for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order 9 dated
January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE
BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE
ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE

TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE

WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN
DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS
COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW.
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK
OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT
HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA,
SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM
SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the
same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the
cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the
cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon
which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either
were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action,
petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second
petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no
violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the
splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000,
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it
still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is,
the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the
same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum
shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule
on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have
been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter
of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite
prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a
partys psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage
license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not
fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor
would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to
the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former
suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of
the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on
the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47
(b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or
in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the
probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect
to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; and,

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought
by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on
separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first
petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the
present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a
marriage license.

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their

successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds

for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another.17 In both petitions,
petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action
is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the
various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of
this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents
marriage.

The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47
(b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by
verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On
the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains tores judicata in its concept as
"conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter
action pendantwhich ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in
a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its
concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an orderon the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first
and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites.
What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the
test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of
the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two
actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action.16

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage
is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due
to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been
solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license
which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the
earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards
every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or
demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been
adjudged in that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application
of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v.
Court of Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different
cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or
act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not
necessarily for different causes of action simply because the
theory of the second would not have been open under the
pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a
second action after the loss of the first merely by having

circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the

pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A
lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to
set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be
permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive
action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must
present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or
both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his
favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and
prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the
grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the
rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to
take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and
a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant

issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the
same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and
financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same
controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any
defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch
29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia,

JJ., concur.