Sino-India Relations

IDSA Monograph Series
No. 46 October 2015
THE US FACTOR IN
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
INDIA'S FINE BALANCING
Rup Narayan Das
THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 1
IDSA Monograph Series

No. 46 October 2015
THE US FACTOR IN SINOINDIAN RELATIONS

INDIA'S FINE BALANCING
Rup Narayan Das
2 | RUP NARAYAN DAS
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

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Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE KOREAN WAR
10
3. 1962 WAR: THE TURNING POINT
15
3.1. NEHRU'S LETTERS TO KENNEDY
17
3.2. THE 'AIR UMBRELLA' CONTROVERSY
22
3.3. INTENSIFIED COOPERATION BETWEEN

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
24
3.3. THE U-2 INCIDENT
26
3.4 DID KENNEDY CONTEMPLATE NUKING

CHINA AFTER 1962 WAR?
27
4. POST 1962 DEVELOPMENTS

4.1. MOVE TOWARDS CLOSER COOPERATION WITH U.S.A.
29
29
5. 1971-1991: SINO-US CONVERGENCE, AND INDO-US

ESTRANGEMENT
32
5.1. THE END OF COLD WAR, 1991: SINO-INDIAN

ENGAGEMENT
33
5.2. POKHRAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, 1998 AND

INDO-US ESTRANGEMENT
35
5.3. CLINTON'S VISIT TO CHINA
36
6. INDO-US STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE AND THE

SINO-INDIAN TRUST DEFICIT
39
6.1. INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL
40
6.2. SINO-INDIAN TRUST DEFICIT
42
4 | RUP NARAYAN DAS
6.3. THE US RETURN TO THE ASIA PACIFIC AND

ITS OVERTURES TO CO-OPT INDIA
44
6.4. CONDOLEEZZA RICE STATEMENT, 2005
45
6.5. ASIA-PACIFIC: INDIA'S NUANCED APPROACH
46
6.5. BEIJING'S SUSPICION: A RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT
53
6.6. THE SALIENCE OF THE TRIANGULAR

RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN
7. INDIA'S CALIBRATED APPROACH

7.1. INDO-US DEFENCE COOPERATION
8. THE ELECTORAL VICTORY OF BJP AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONS
56
58
65
68
8.1. THE CHINESE RESPONSE
68
8.2. THE US RESPONSE
69
9. CONCLUSION
77
RECOMMENDATIONS
80
ANNEXURE I
81
ANNEXUREII
82
BIBLIOGRAPHY
83
I.
83
PRIMARY SOURCE :
II. SECONDARY SOURCE:
84
A BOOKS
84
B. ARTICLES
86
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I acknowledge with sincere gratitude the help, support, inspiration and
encouragement of a number of individuals in the fruition of this humble
contribution in the form of this monograph. I am indeed grateful to
Dr. Arvind Gupta, former Director-General of the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, and Deputy National Security Advisor,
for his inspiration and encouragement in the writing of the monograph.
I am equally grateful to Brig. Rumel Dahiya, Deputy Director- General
for his patience and support all through my stint at IDSA.
Incisive and insightful comments offered by Prof. Christopher S. Raj,
Prof. Chintamni Mahapatra of the Jawaharlal Nehru University and
Prof Sreeram Sunder Chaulia of O.P. Jindal University during the
presentation of the fellow paper in the fellow seminar at IDSA were
very helpful in embellishing the draft of the monograph. I am also
thankful to Shri H.K. Dua, Member of Rajya Sabha, Shri Sanjay Singh,
former secretary (East) of the Ministry of External Affairs, and Gen.
Y. M Bammy for going through the draft and offering valuable
suggestions.
I thank Dr. Jaydev Sahu, Additional Director in the Lok Sabha
Secretariat, my wife Sanjukta, daughters Swayamsiddha and Punya
Prabha for reading the proof and in editing the manuscript. Finally, I
am also thankful to Vivek Kaushik and Geeta Kumari for publishing
the monograph.
Rup Narayan Das
6 | RUP NARAYAN DAS
1
INTRODUCTION
In the narrative of the triangular India-China-US relations, United States
occupies some degree of strategic space in India-China relations,
notwithstanding the fact that Sino-Indian relations, like Sino-US
relations, or for that matter, Indo-US relations have their own dynamics
and imperatives. India and China are worlds two most populated
countries occupying vast swathe of territories. Both boast of rich
civilizational heritage. Similarities may end here. On the difference, most
significant is that India is a vibrant democracy, which achieved
independence through predominantly non-violent means, whereas
China is a communist country born out of a protracted armed struggle.
The two countries were, however, born contemporaneously. India
liberated from the British rule on August 15, 1947 and the Peoples
Republic of China came into being as a Communist nation on October
1, 1949. The nuances and ethos of western liberalism had impacted
the thought processes to a great deal on the minds of Indian leaders.
In the narrative of democratic peace theory, Indias credentials and
commitments to democracy, independence of judiciary and freedom
of press as contrasted with China play out in the triangular IndiaChina-US relations. In recent years, there has been a renewed recognition
and emphasis on shared values between the two countries.
The dynamics of the global and regional geo-politics have also found
their resonance in the triangular relationship among the three counties.
For example; it was the cold war geo-politics that greatly impacted the
relationship among the three countries during the Korean crisis in 1950s.
As far as the regional geo-politics is concerned, the Kashmir issue and
the US support to Pakistan, at times, found their resonance in the
triangular relations. The end of cold war, the seismic shift of geopolitics from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, the rise of India and
China, globalization and emergence of mutual economic
interdependence have also impacted the triangular relations. Thus the
triangular relations need to be seen through the prism of all these
complex issues.
8 | RUP NARAYAN DAS
While the perceived trust deficit and security dilemma, both real and
imagined, between India and China, particularly after 1962 war, have
been one of the factors for Indo-US strategic and security cooperation,
it is seldom remembered that India and China enjoyed a degree of
camaraderie and strategic trust, though the term had not acquired the
salience then, in early 1950s, which enabled India to be a channel of
communication between China and USA. The war of 1962, however,
obliterated the mutual trust between the two countries. The adoption
of two competitive political systems and attendant economic
development model; and the emergence of the two Asian giants as
major powers in spite of the asymmetry between the two have provided
resonance to the persistent security dilemma and trust deficit between
India and China.
Realising the potential and possibilities of India to forge closer strategic
and security partnership with the USA, China extends overtures to
India to court New Delhi away from the US embrace. Similarly, India
occupies some strategic significance in the US strategy to hedge China
in its much touted Rebalancing or Pivot to Asia in the theatre of
Asia-Pacific, although India would like to assert that there is no such
element in Indias foreign policy. The China threat or Chinas assetive
behaviour not only provides a rationale for the Indo-US strategic
partnership, but also gives succor to the military-industrial complex of
the US, and to resurrect its economy. If Indo-US strategic relations
can cause consternation to China, Sino-Indian rapport may also cause
discomfort to USA. A G-2 between USA and China will also be an
issue of anxiety to India.
The monograph aims to determine the extent to which the US is a
factor as an intervening variable in the complex India-China relations.
The intervening variable works both as determinant and consequent
of the triangular relations. The study attempts to probe the research
question as to how China perceives U.S. policy towards India in
particular, and whether growing Indo-US ties can affect Chinas security
interest negatively. Related to this research question is how India is
trying to calibrate its relationship with both USA and China, and how
far India has been successful in this endeavour in the context of strategic
distrust and security dilemma. It endorses the assertion that skillful
maneuvering and manipulating of great power alignment can add to a
countrys existing diplomatic capital in more practical terms.1As the

full import of the US factor in Sino-Indian relations can only be grasped
in the context of Indo-US relations and Sino-Indian relations, it is
imperative that these two aspects are put in perspective, while elucidating
the US factor in India-China relations.
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict, India
Research Press, New Delhi, 2003, p. 78.
10 | RUP NARAYAN DAS
2
THE KOREAN WAR
The Korean War broke out six months after the Communist assumed
power in China in 1949. The triangular relationship among India, China
and the USA was played out for the first time in the Korean Peninsula,
when North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950.
Indias actions at the UN were complex. While the crisis in the Korean
Peninsula found its echoes in the Indian Parliament, Indias proactive
role was played out in Beijing, the Korean Peninsula and at the UN
General Assembly at New York.2
At a time when the nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula hardly finds
echo in the Indian Parliament in recent times, it is worth a while to
recall that Lok Sabha, the popular chamber of Indias bicameral
Parliament, was convened on July 31, 1950 to discuss the Korean crisis.
Addressing the members of Parliament, President Rajendra Prasad
said that Prime Minister Nehru had appealed to the Russian Premier,
Joseph Stalin and the Secretary of the United States of America, Dean
Acheson to exert their authority and power to localize the armed
struggle in Korea. He further said that India wanted to break the
deadlock in the Security Council of the United Nations over the
admission of the Peoples Republic of China, so that the international
tension might be eased and the way opened to a solution of the Korean
problem by discussion in the Security Council3. With his principle belief
in a peaceful settlement of disputes, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
at his own initiative, earlier on July 13, 1950 wrote to Dean Acheson
and Joseph Stalin, suggesting a broader approach arguing for admission
Shiv Dayal , Settlement of International Disputes Under United Nations ( S. Chand & Co.,Delhi,
1959); Robert Barnes, Branding an Aggressor: The Commonwealth, the United Nations
and Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, November 1950-January 1951, Journal of
Strategic Studies, vol.33, No.2, April 2010. pp.231-253.
LS Deb.cc9-10, July 31, 1950.
of the Peoples Republic of China into UNSC, which in turn would

have facilitated the return of the Soviet representative to the Security
Council.4
Although Stalin was favourably inclined towards Indias stance, Dean
Acheson was not quite convinced. Acheson explained in some detail in
private correspondence with Nehru as to why the United States
disagreed with the Indian approach. The exchange of correspondence
indicated American interest in using the Indian Ambassador in Beijing
K.M. Panikkar, as a channel to the Chinese Communists. Although
Washington regarded Panikkar with suspicion, he was the only nonCommunist envoy with good access to the Chinese leadership.5
The refusal of the Security Council, under US pressure, to admit Peoples
Republic of China to UN, led to the Soviet Union walking out of the
Council. This further precipitated the Korean crisis. In the wake of
North Koreas sudden and brazen invasion, all the Commonwealth
members including India endorsed a US-sponsored resolution
condemning North Korea and calling for the withdrawal of its forces
from north of 38th Parallel. At the same time, India made it clear that
it would not send troops to fight in Korea, thus distanshed herself
from the Western bloc. In the Security Council, India, the only
Commonwealth country represented except Britain, which refused to
vote on the second US-sponsored resolution, calling for the members
of the UN to furnish such assistance to South Korea necessary to repel
the North Korean armed attack and restore international peace and
security. It was only after intense British pressure that Prime Minister
Nehru agreed to accept the resolution as a natural progression of the
UN action. Still Prime Minister Nehru refused to sanction the Britishsponsored, but American-authored third resolution that placed the US
government in control of the Unified Command- a resolution that
Skand R. Tayal, India and the Republic of Korea: Engaged Democracies, Routledge, New Delhi,
2014, p. 28.
Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, National Defence University
Press, 1992, Washington, pp.73-74.
transferred the Security Councils powers of military coordination to

Washington.6
While there was a great degree of convergence of approach between
India and China, though differed on nuances, there was some degree
of divergence of views between India and the US with regard to the
unfolding security scenario in the Korean Peninsula. For USA, it was a
challenge to prevent the spread of communism and rein in China.
India, a nascent democracy, confronted with its own developmental
imperatives, cherished peace and stability in the region. USA perceived
that Nehru saw the US policy as threatening to enlarge the war in
defence of Western interests. Favouring Chinese incorporation of
Formosa (Taiwan), and withdrawal of the French from Indo-China,
Nehru saw both issues in terms of Asian nationalism, as part of the
struggle to free the region from Western domination, rather than as a
contest between pro- and anti-communist forces7.
In September 1950, MacArthurs forces crossed the 38th parallel. That
evening Zhou Enlai invited Indian Ambassador to China K.M. Panikkar,
to his home in Zhoongnanhai. Through Panikkar, Zhou issued the first
of many warnings. China cannot remain passive while our neighbour
is being invaded. We need peace, we want peace, and we do not
want war for a single day. War would slow down our reconstruction.
But we cannot be bullied. We are not afraid to resist invasion. This
must be understood.8 Pannikar passed on Zhous warning to the US
interlocutors. President Truman declared that he did not take Panikkars
report as that of an impartial observer, believing that the Indian
envoy played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly.9
Robert Barnes, Branding Aggressor: The Commonwealth, the United Nations and
the Chinese Intervention in the Korean Was, November 1950-January 1951, Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol.33,No.2,April 2010, p.235.
Kux N.3, p.73.
Han Suyin, Eldest Son, Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976, Jonathan
Cape, London,1994, p.225.
Harry S. Truman, Memories, Years of Trial and Hope, Garden City; Doubleday&
Company,Inc;1956, pp.361-62.
In December 1950, just after the Chinese routed UN forces in North

Korea, a State Department policy review of South Asia made it clear
that Washingtons main concern about India was that the country not
to be lost the way China was. With China under Communist
domination, Soviet powers now encroach along the perimeter of
the Indian sub-continent. India has become the pivotal state in nonCommunist Asia by virtue of its relative power, stability and
influence.10
The estrangement in Indo-US relationship in terms of the US military
assistance to Pakistan, the US interference on Kashmir issue much to
the chagrin of India and its nudging to join in military pacts with the
US such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact to contain China, which
had military implications for India, was also played out in the triangular
relation. The Korean crisis witnessed arguably the best period of SinoIndian relations, which reached its pinnacle in the signing of the
Panchsheel in 1954. This period was also one of the most difficult
phases of Indo-US relations. The estrangement of Indo-US relations
was partly due to Sino-Indian cooperation in both the Korean crisis
and the crisis in Indo-China and Indias intransient attitude towards the
USA in its containment strategy. This period also witnessed efforts of
the US to prevent India from moving closer to China.The US, however,
didnt succeed in its endeavour, which impelled it to court Indias
adversary, Pakistan.
During the next two years after the cease-fire, India participated actively
in the arrangements to supervise the repatriation of prisoners of war.
India was not directly represented at the Political Conference because
of the opposition of the Western countries, particularly the United
States and the Great Britain; later, however India took a leading role in
the momentous negotiation in which decisive personal role was played
by Krishna Menon. Indias pivotal role as the Chairman of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission was acknowledged internationally.
Indias role in Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, however,
was not liked very much by the USA. While Washington was annoyed
10
Kux N.3, p.87, quoting Foreign Relations of The United States (FRUS), Vol. V, p. 1478.
with India for not appreciating the danger of communism, Nehru

was not happy about strident anti-communism of President Eisenhower
and Dulles.
Indias role in the Korean crisis and also, in the Indo-China imbroglio,
in spite of minor hiccups here and there endeared India to China and
created a sort of bonhomie and camaraderie between the two emerging
Asian powers that reached its climax in the signing of the lofty
Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 and continued till the Bandung
Conference a year later in 1955. Thereafter, fissures developed casting
shadows on the relationship between the two countries. As far as the
triangular relation was concerned, India and USA continued to differ
on Communist China. Nehru argued for Beijings acceptance into the
UN system. He thought it only a matter of time until Formosa (Taiwan)
fell. During the period in which Eisenhower was the President of
USA, he believed that the Chinese needed to follow basic norms of
international conduct before they joined the United Nations. Regarding
Indias non-alignment, Nehru emphasized that this approach helped
keep defence expenditures down since the policy minimized the chances
of conflict on the Himalayan borders, the only logical security threat to
India. In an argument that impressed President Eisenhower, Nehru
asserted that, given Indias extant economic weakness, having India as
an ally would serve to weaken rather than strengthen the western
bloc.11
11
Kux, N.3, p.142.
3
1962
WAR:
THE
TURNING POINT
Sino-India relations started deteriorating in the middle of 1959.

Hostilities broke out between Tibetan and Chinese forces and Dalai
Lama left Lhasa on March17, 1959 with the intention of seeking
asylum in India. The news of the uprising led to a spontaneous outburst
of sympathy with the Tibetan people in India. There were demands
for an interventionist policy by those political parties that had, throughout
the fifties never been reconciled to Chinas occupation of Tibet. While
there was internal outrage in India with regard to development in Tibet,
most Western countries, the United States, in particular, saw in this
development an excellent opportunity to wean India away from her
policy of neutrality and enter into anti-China, anti-Soviet and antiCommunist positions.12
The Chinese attack on India coincided with yet another major
international development of the Cuban missile crisis. It is debatable if
the Chinese attack on India was premeditated or the Cuban missile
crisis was just a coincidence. Hindsight tends to suggest that it was by
conscious deliberation and design.
According to Rama Chandra Guha, The border war provoked a
reluctant tilt towards the United States, who had come forth with arms
while Soviet Russia stayed neutral13. J.K. Gailbraith, the US ambassador
to India, the Harvard University economics professor was quite
appreciative of Nehrus ideology of a calibrated economy. He was
enthusiastic to extend American support to Indias crisis at the IndiaChina border.
12
A.K. Damodaran, Foreign Policy in Action, in A Century History of the Indian National
Congress (1885-1985), vol.Four, Vikash Publishing House Private Limited, New Delhi,
1990, p.476.
When the Sino-Indian war was at its peak, Gailbraith met Prime Minister
Nehru on October 23, 1962 and strongly urged him to see how sensitive
the issue (Cuban missile crisis) was for the USA and to support the US
efforts in the U.N. to have U.N. inspectors go to the Cuban missile
sites.14
R.D. Pradhan, the Private Secretary to the late former Defence Minister
Y.V.Chavan, recalls in his book Debacle to the Revival that the request
unambiguously asked that the United States should also send planes
flown by American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in any
battles with the Chinese in Indian air space and also two B-47 bomber
squadrons to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields.
Making a plea for Nehrus request, Galbraith wrote to President
Kennedy, all his life Nehru had sought to avoid being dependent
upon the United States and the United Kingdom, most of his personal
reluctance to ask (or thank) for aid has been based on this prideNow
nothing is important to him, more personally than politically, than to
maintain the semblance of this independence. His age no longer allows
of readjustment. To a point we can, I feel, be generous on this15.
On October 26, 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made an appeal
to major world leaders for support and assistance against Chinese attack.
The letter said:
The issue involved is not one of small territorial gains, one
way or other, but standards of international behaviour between
neighbouring countries and whether the world will allow the
principles of Might is Right to prevail in international relations.
Finally he asserted:
In this hour of crisis, when we are engaged in resisting this
aggression, we are confident that we shall have your sympathy
13
Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the Worlds Largest Democracy, Picador,
New Delhi, 2007, p. 339.
14
J.K. Gailbraith, Ambassadors Journal, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1969, p. 430.
15
Ibid.
and the support of all countries, not only because of their friendly
relations with us, but also because our struggle is in the interests
of the world peace and is directed to the elimination of deceit,
dissimulation and force in international relations.16
Nehru wrote a letter to President John F. Kennedy, soliciting American

support and assistance. Gailbraith also met the beleaguered Defence
Minister Krishna Menon, who later demitted his office to Y. V. Chavan.
President Kennedys response was immediate. Assuring Nehru of his
support and sympathy, he suggested, This is a practical matter and, if
you wish, my Ambassador in New Delhi can discuss with you and the
officials of your government; what we can do to translate our support
into terms which are practically more useful to you as soon as possible.
3.1. Nehrus letters to Kennedy

On November 19, 1962, in the wake of the debacle and when the
Chinese troops were almost poised to reach the foot hills, Nehru wrote
two letters in quick succession on the same day to President John F.
Kennedy, requesting the immediate dispatch of a minimum of twelve
squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighter aircrafts and setting up of
radar communications to defend Indian cities against anticipated attack
by the Chinese air force.
Now that the said two letters have been declassified and are available
in some sections of the public domain, the controversy with regard to
the contents of the letters particularly regarding the American aircraft
carrier can be set to rest. The credit for publishing these two letters in
the Indian media goes to the veteran editor, Inder Malhotra.17 In his
first letter of November 19, 1962, Nehru acknowledged his gratitude
16
R.D Pradhan, Debacle to Revival: Y B Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-1965, Orient Longman,
1999, pp., 35-36.
17
Inder Malhotra, J.N. To JFK, Eyes only, The Indian Express, November 15, 2010; also
Letters from the darkest hour, The Indian Express, November 17, 2010. The Internet
editions, however, do not show Nehrus letters. Pl. see the hard copy of November 17
edition to view Nehrus two letters. Pl. see Annexure 1 and 2.
to President Kennedy and the Government of US, for speedily

providing small arms and ammunitions to India. He then apprised
President Kennedy that the Chinese were, by and large, in possession
of the greater portion of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
and were poised to over-run Chushul in Ladakh. He further said that
there was nothing to stop them after Chushul till they reached Leh. He
also informed him that he was separately writing to Prime Minister
Macmillan to keep him informed of these developments.
In the second letter that Nehru wrote to President Kennedy, within a
few hours of the first, he said, The situation in NEFA Command
has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces
from Sela have been trapped between the Sela Ridge and Bomdila. A
serious threat has developed to our Digboi oilfields in Assam. With
the advance of Chinese massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley
is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to
stem the tide, the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland
would also pass into Chinese hands. He further said, The Chinese
have poised massive forces in Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and
Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent
In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is
under heavy attack. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the
Chinese air force After pointing out that hitherto, he had restricted
our request to essential equipment and thanking the US for assistance
so readily given, he went on, We did not ask for more
comprehensive assistance, particularly air assistance, because of wider
implicationsin the global context and we did not want to embarrass
our friends. Having said this, he hastened to emphasize, The situation
that has developed is, however, desperate. We have to have more
comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from
taking over the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance
reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country.
Nehru was rather categorical about Indias wish list at that critical
juncture, when there was grave security threat to Indias territorial
integrity and sovereignty. Not surprisingly, therefore, Nehrus request
for comprehensive aid goes into minute details, and is prefaced by the
statement, We have repeatedly felt the need to use our air arm in
support of our land forces but have been unable to do so because in
the present statewe have no defence against retaliatory action by the

Chinese. In this context, his specific demands were for minimum of
12 squadrons of supersonic all weather fighters and a modern radar
cover (which) we dont have. Nehru added that the US air force
personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while
our personnel are being trained. More significantly, he spelt out that
US fighter transport aircraft manned by the US personnel will be
used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese
attacks and maintain our communications and if possible to assist
the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian
areas where air action by the IAF against Chinese communication lines,
supplies and troop concentrations may lead to counter air action by
the Chinese. Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the
limits of our country, e.g. in Tibet, will be taken by the IAF planes
manned by Indian personnel. 18
It was indeed a very agonizing and excruciating experience for Prime
Minister Nehru who all his life had tried his best to maintain Indias
self-esteem and independence against all odds. Indias Ambassador in
USA, B.K. Nehru was also pained and anguished at the trauma of
Prime Minister Nehru. Capturing the despondency, he very poignantly
wrote in his biography, the morale of our leadership had collapsed
and the unconquerable spirit of that valiant, fearless, unbending leader
who had led India to Independence and also maintained that
independence under great pressure from both the Western powers
and the communist bloc was broken, He further wrote, the tone of
the telegrams I got conveying the message to the President for help
was not the tone that I had been used to in all my dealings with
Jawaharlal Nehru from childhood on. Nor were the words used his
words. His only contribution to these messages seemed to have been
his signature; he seemed to have been in a state of mind where he did
not quite know what he was signing.19
18
Ibid.
19
B.K.Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, Penguin India, New Delhi, 1997, p.404.
The USA, the UK and the Commonwealth countries promptly

responded to Nehrus request for military aid. There was, however, a
logistic problem. Since the Indian armed forces did not have American
weapons, the emergency aid had to be only in respect of those
equipments which were common to the American and the
Commonwealth countries or which the American could spare in
adequate quantities to cover Indias requirement. India received selfloading rifles from the UK and Australia and ammunitions for its own
weapons from the Commonwealth countries. USA provided some
ammunition of the World War II; weapons like 4.2 mortars and 3.7
howitzers. USA also supplied 0.30 Browning machine guns, which
were subsequently replaced. Considerable quantities of wireless
equipment (models which were obsolescent in the US forces), spares
for Dakota and Fairchild Packet aircraft, snow clearing equipment,
winter clothing etc., were also received from the USA. In December
1962, at Nassau, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan,
agreed to provide military aid to India to the extent of $ 120 million
of which 60 million would be from USA and the balance from the
Commonwealth countries. After setting off the above mentioned
emergency supplies, twenty four more Fairchild Packet supply dropping
aircraft from USA were received by India, besides similar military
assistance from the UK and Canada20.
In the first eight months of 1963, a squadron of C-130 (also called
Hercules) aircraft was deployed by the US Air Force to drop supplies
to the Indian troops in Ladakh. But at the end of the period the aircrafts
were withdrawn. An Indian request for this transport aircraft was not
acceeded to.21 The fact remains that the fleet of C-130 aircrafts was
found immensely useful during those critical times. During those days,
the mainstay of the Indian Air Forces transport fleet was the Russian
AN12 four-engine aircraft, a sturdier and faster aircraft than the C130. But the Indian Air Force was finding it difficult to transport heavy
loads and personnel to the short Leh airfield located at an altitude of
20
K. Subramanyam, U.S. Policy towards India, China Report, January-April 1972, p. 44.
21
ibid, p. 45.
10,500 feet. The unpressurised AN 12 was also unsuitable to fly troops

to the high-altitude airbase. Over a nine-month period, the 12 C-130
detachment brought in thousands of troops to the Chinese frontier,
flying regular missions to Ladakh as well as airstrips in the North-East
on the Arunachal Pradesh border. In one mission, an aircraft flew out
104 Tibetan orphans whose parents had been killed during the border
clash from Leh to South India.22
In 1964, there was another agreement between President Kennedy
and Prime Minister Macmillan, at Birchgrove where they agreed on a
programme of military assistance to India under which the United
States and the Commonwealth would contribute $50 million each.
During this period, it was found that the United States was unwilling
to provide lethal military items to India fearing that it would offend
Pakistan. At the same time, a large body of American personnel
(around120) was stationed in New Delhi to supervise that the
equipment, provided by USA, was solely used by troops deployed on
the northern borders.
The year also witnessed heightened defence contact and engagement
between India and the USA. Y. V. Chavan, who replaced the
beleaguered Krishna Menon as Indias Defence Minister visited USA
in April 1964. Chavan held discussions with the US Secretary of Defense,
Robert S. McNamara. McNamara described the US perception of
the Chinese threat and also outlined the parameters within which the
United State could help with Indias defence requirements. McNamara
came down harshly on the state of Indias defence preparedness,
especially Indias inferior quality of weaponary. This was largely true as
Indian soldiers were still armed with 303 Enfield rifles of the nineteenth
century vintage with which they had faced Chinese troops armed with
semi-automatic rifles.23
22
Manu Puby, 1962 war hero Hercules to make a comeback, The Indian Express, July 5,
2010, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/
2547147/posts
23
Pradhan, n. 16, p.185.
The motivation behind the American military assistance was clearly

articulated by Gailbraith in a letter to President Kennedy. He wrote,
The Chinese are not quarrelling with the Soviets over some academic
points of doctrine. They are, one must assume, serious about their
revolution. The natural area of expansion is in their part of the world.
The only Asian country that really stands in there are India and paripasu
the only Western country that is assuming responsibility is the United
States. It seems obvious to me [that] there should be some understanding
between the two countries. We should expect to make use of Indias
political and geographical position; political power and manpower or
any how ask.24
3.2. The Air Umbrella Controversy

Considering Indias reputation to its avowed commitment to the
principles and policies of Non-Alignment, and Nehrus sensitivity to it,
the nature and extent of USAs military engagement with India sparked
off a lot of controversy, which dominated the debate both in Parliament
and outside. Questions were raised about India seeking an air
umbrella from the United States. Official agencies denied that any
such request was made. Nehru openly rejected the concept of the air
umbrella. There were also reports about whether India and the US
had entered into a joint defence agreement. As a consequence, when in
mid-November US supersonic planes, flying over 10,000 miles landed
in New Delhi, they were given a cool reception. From the Indian side
Air Marshall A.M. Engineer was present to welcome the American
crew, while the US ambassador Chester Bowles was keen that the
Defense Minister should do so. Nehrus efforts to down-play the US
assistance were not helpful when the Peoples Daily described the joint
air exercise as a threat to the security of Asian countries. It added the
(joint air) maneuvers were proof that the Indian government was
deliberately creating tension on the Sino-Indian border under its own
fabricated pretext of Chinese aggression. In order to malign Indias
24
Guha, n. 13, quoting from Galbraith to Kennedy, January 29,1963, copy in Dean Rusk
Papers, University of Georgia.
credibility as the leader of the Non-aligned, the Peoples Daily further

said, The description of India as Non-aligned was sheer mockery to
countries which really pursued the policy of non-alignment.25
In the absence of a copy of the letter, the air umbrella controversy
created quite a furor in Indian Parliament on March 15, 1965, when
Sudhir Ghosh, a member of the Rajya Sabha, raised the issue in the
Rajya Sabha on that day. Angry demands for his expulsion were made
for daring to speak in Parliament the truth about the desperate appeal
for help made by Nehru to President Kennedy when India lay open to
a serious invasion by the Chinese. Explaining his position Mr. Ghosh
said in the Rajya Sabha on March 15, 1965, it is not widely known
that in those dark days of Indias peril, there was standing just outside
Calcutta, near the mouth of Hoogly river, about a couple of miles
outside the territorial waters, one of the largest and newest aircraft
carriers of the United States navy, fitted with a full complement of
supersonic aircraft and all the latest gadgets of destructions, sufficient
to pulverize an advancing Chinese army, however large. One great
power knows how to give signal to another great power, and it is not
widely known that a signal was given by one side to the other that if
they advanced any further, they would be forcing the hands of the
President of the United States. He further asserted that the American
aircraft carrier with all its means of destruction was there, not on the
initiative of American President; it was there at the request of Prime
Minister of India, Jawahar Lal Nehru, who had asked for American
air protection, which was provided by President Kennedy. In the hour
of our danger, so proud a man as our former Prime Minister, realized
that, in the last analysis, it was not a practical proposition to defend
India from the military might of communist China without using the
military might of the United States26
Nehrus letter of November 19, which is now available, makes it clear
that he didnt ask for the deployment of the aircraft carrier. Ambassador
Gailbraith, however, wrote in his memoir, I also proposed that
25
Pradhan , n.16, p. 104.
26
RajyaSabha Deb. March 15, 1965, cc.3466.
we ask that the elements of the Seventh Fleet be sent into the Bay of
Bengal, although this violated my rule that we do nothing that Indians
did not request27 Is there any causal connection between the
deployment of the Seventh Fleet and Chinas unilateral offer of cease
fire on November 20, 1962? According to K. Subramanyam, the
Chinese had offered unilateral cease fire on November 20. Enterprise,
the nuclear powered aircraft carrier that USA deployed in the Bay of
Bengal during the 1971 Bangladesh War took three days from Tonkin
Gulf to Singapore, one day to move up the Malacca Straits. Enterprise
is a much faster vehicle than the carriers deployed by the Seventh Fleet in
1962. Before one links up the Chinese offer of cease fire with any US
moves, some of these facts must be taken into account. On the other
hand, the Chinese had reasons to worry that their logistics were getting
over-extended and consequently their offer of unilateral cease fire was
a brilliant diplomatic move to cover up their military limitations.28
3.3. Intensified Cooperation between Intelligence

Agencies
Yet another major offshoot of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in the
triangular relations was the intensification of cooperation and
confidentiality of the intelligence agencies of the two countries between
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA and Intelligence Bureau
(IB) of India. The CIA, however, had been active in Tibet, at least
during the uprising there and the flight of Dalai Lama to India in 1959,
the CIA had been air-dropping a limited amount of supplies to the
Tibetan resistance. These flights first staged from erstwhile East Pakistan
and later from Thailand, briefly crossed Indian Territory on their way
to Tibet. Publicly India feigned ignorance, but the CIA on the flights
had unofficially briefed Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director B.N. Mullick.
Mullick, who had long harboured concerns about a Chinese military
threat, privately assured the CIA that he supported these efforts; he
27
Galbraith, n. 14, p. 487.
28
K. Subramanyam, U.S. policy towards India, The China Report, January- April,1972,
p. 47.
also claimed that Nehru, who sympathized with the Tibetans and had
been soured by Beijings heavy-handed tactics, did not oppose overt
American aid. However, since Nehru was still committed to maintaining
cordial ties with China, the best Mullik could offer was a wink and a
nod.29
Immediately after the 1962 war, USA assisted India in raising certain
paramilitary formations in the India-China border. The creation of
Tibet Force was one such instance, which was conceptualized to harness
the unconventional mind of the Tibetan refugees and convert them
into warriors. With the help of American financial aid and a CIA
instructor, General Sujan Singh Uban set up the camp in the tranquil
hill village of Chakrata. In the end, the Tibetan unit exceeded all
expectations. The Tibetans particularly excelled as parachutists and had
the distinction of conducting jumps at the altitude up to 15, 400 feet
using chutes specially procured by the CIA. A second joint CIA-IB
project involved raising a cadre of long-term Tibetan Agents that could
establish a resistance network inside their homeland. The agents would
receive extensive tradecraft training at a CIA base in Colorado. As the
project was originally conceived, India would provide limited assistance
during their infiltration back into Tibet.30
A third joint programme with the objective to lend air support to the
Tibetan commandos and agents was the Aviation Research Center
(ARC), a covert aviation outfit for use along the India-China border. It
was actually a subsection of the IB and was staffed by IB officers and
aircrews from the Indian Air Force. Its aircrafts consisted of transport
and light planes mostly from USA, courtesy the CIA. Mr. BijuPatnaik,
the then Chief Minister of Odisha and a veteran Parliamentarian, was
instrumental in setting up the project. Patnaik visited USA to work out
the concept with the CIA. The American saw merit in the plan and
dispatched two officers to India for initial fact finding tour. Rameshwar
Nath Kao was its first Director. Patnaik had also provided land for the
air base at Charbatia in Odisha for the use of ARC31.
29
M.S. Kohli and Kenneth Conboy, Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Mission and Perilous Climbs,
Harper Collins , New Delhi, 2003, p.15.
30
Ibid, p, 16.
31
Ibid.
3.3. The U-2 Incident

As USA was deeply concerned about Chinas nuclear programme, it
wanted to keep a tab on the development of nuclear weapons by
China. Not many options were available to monitor Chinas nuclear
programme. One option available to the USA was satellite imagery,
which was not very developed then and the resolution of the imagery
was not of very high quality. Another U.S. option, the U-2 spy plane,
had its own set of problems. As Chinas test sites were believed to be
concentrated in distant Xinjiang, spy planes launched from airstrips on
Taiwan did not have the range to make the round trip. The CIA had
earlier made discreet use of an airfield at Peshawar, Pakistan, which
put Xinjiang within the range. But that had ended after the diplomatic
furor following the 1960 shoot-down over the Soviet Union of a U2 launched from Peshawar. It was against this backdrop that the ARC
airbase at Charbatia configured between USA and India. When the
agency appealed for use of Charbatia as a U-2 staging facility, India
agreed32.
In May 1964, a small CIA team arrived at Charbatia with an unmarked
spy plane. As planned, the plane performed a single mission over
Xinjiang and headed back to Charbatia. As it touched down, its brake
failed, and the U-2 rolled off the end of the runway. Wary of the
media exposure, ARC personnel put the aircraft into the hanger and
waited for the CIA technicians to make the necessary repairs. Once
they were completed, the plane was discretely flown out without
attempting further over-flights from Indian soil. Later in December
1964, India reconsidered its ban and it allowed a single CIA-piloted
U-2 to briefly stage from Charbatia.33
Years after, Kohli and Conboy wrote about the U-2 incident, in a
report based on the latest set of declassified documents obtained from
the CIA under the freedom of Information Act in August 1963 whereas
the independent National Security Archive (NSA) shed more light on
32
Ibid, p.23.
33
Ibid, p.24.
the incident. According to this report, the use of Charbatia, was agreed
during a meeting between President Kennedy and the visiting Indian
President S. Radhakrishnan on June 3, 1963, but Indian work to improve
it took longer than expected, so the missions presumed from Thailands
Takhili. The report further said that the first mission out of Charbatia
did not take place until May 1964. The operation ceased consequent
upon the death of Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru. The US
detachment stayed on at Charbatia till 1967 and served as an adjunct
to the main operational base in Thailand.
The report further said, the pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but others
remained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when SinoIndian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G returned to
Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions, satisfying all
requirements for the Sino-Indian border region. By this time, however,
Takhli had become the main base for Detachment Gs Asian operations,
and Charbatia served merely as a forward staging base. The information
gathered from aerial surveillance was yet another aspect of the close
Indo-US cooperation in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Indian
war of 1962.
3.4 Did Kennedy contemplate nuking China after 1962

war?
A book entitled Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings of John F.
Kennedy34, co-authored by Ted Widmar and Caroline Kennedy published
in 2012 claimed that six months after 1962 India-China border war,
the US had contemplated using nuclear weapons in the event of another
attack from Beijing as it was determined to prevent an Indian defeat at
the hands of the Communists. The then president John F. Kennedy at
a meeting with his top military aide on May 9, 1963, had expressed
clear determination not to let Beijing defeat New Delhi, with his defense
secretary even talking about using nuclear weapons against China if it
34
Ted Widmar and Caroline Kennedy, Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings of John
F. Kennedy, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434/docs/U2%20%20Chapter%205.pdf
launched another attack against India. It quoted Kennedy saying in an

inaudible voice, I gather were coming to the defense of Israel and
Saudi Arabia. What I think we ought to think about is, (unclear its
desirable (?) for us, to give India a guarantee, which actually we would
carry out. I dont think theres any doubt that this country is determined
that we couldnt permit the Chinese to defeat the Indians. Kennedy
was quoted by the book as making these remarks in the White House
meeting with his defense secretary Robert McNamara and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Davenport Max
Taylor.
This claim can be taken with a pinch of salt. In yet another place
Strobe Talbott, the then secretary of state of US writes, In 1964, the
year that Nehru died, China conducted its first test of a nuclear weapon.
India sought security guarantees from the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. That idea went nowhere. Washington
regarded India as a country that was, if not playing for the Soviet side,
then at least rooting for Moscow from the sidelines. In any event, the
United States was not about to commit itself to going to war with China if there
was another Sino-Indian conflict (emphasis added).35
35
Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, Penguin Viking, New
Delhi, 2004, p.11.
4
POST 1962 DEVELOPMENTS
After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Indias policy of non-alignment
was questioned both inside as well as outside the Parliament. There
was also demand that India must align with the West, particularly the
USA. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru initiating the resolution on the
proclamation of emergency and aggression by China on November
8, 1962 in Lok Sabha acknowledged the swift help extended by western
democracies like the USA and the UK, France and friendly countries
like the Soviet Union. There were demands from the member(s) to
acknowledge this in the resolution.36
4.1. Move towards closer cooperation with U.S.A.

It is worthwhile to recall the initiative and efforts of a very prominent
Member of Parliament and a close confidant of Prime Minister Nehru,
Sudhir Ghosh, who pleaded with Nehru to forge strategic cooperation
with the USA. In a written memorandum submitted to the Prime
Minister Nehru on January 2, 1963, Mr. Ghosh proposed for a
diplomatic arrangement between India on the one hand and a group
of Parliamentary democracies including the USA, Canada, Britain,
Australia, and New Zealand on the other side. His proposal was to
supply military equipment necessary for enlarging Indian Army and
Air Force so as to effectively deal with threat to Indias territorial integrity,
freedom and democracy. Ghosh asserted that the proposed
arrangement was to be directed only against China and not any other
communist country of the world. Ghosh further pointed out that he
was not envisaging the kind of military involvement that existed between
Pakistan and the USA, with American military installations located in
Pakistan territory nor was he proposing military pacts like SEATO or
CENTO. What he suggested was that simple letters were exchanged
36
LS Deb., November 8, 1962.
between the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Ministers of Britain,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the President of the U.S.A to
the effect that India requested and these countries agreed that if at any
time during the next ten years, if China threatened to violate the territorial
integrity and the independence of India, these countries would
automatically come to the defence of India.37
Nehru in his reply to Ghosh said that the proposal was tantamount to
a military alliance and that it would be bad for India as well as from
the point of view of world peace. Nehru, however, allowed him to
visit USSR and USA to canvass support for India. Ghosh, thus, visited
Washington in March 1963 and interacted with the key men in the US
Senate, the House of Representatives and the American Administration,
and rounded it off with a talk with President Kennedy himself. Ghosh
found the response of the US Senators extremely supportive and
sensitive to the Indian cause. He was given a seat on the Senate floor to
sit with the Senators to watch the proceedings. He felt that there was
no lack of feeling for India and they were eager to hear all that he had
to say as Mr. Nehrus unofficial emissary. The forty odd leading men
with whom he discussed the India-China situation included most of
the leading members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and their counterparts in the
House as well as leading men in the Administration like Secretary Rusk,
Secretary McNamara and Mr. Harriman. He also met Mr. McGeorge
Bundy, the National Security Adviser to President Kennedy.
Thus, the post 1962 witnessed arguably the high point of India-US
security ties, which coincided with the Cuban missile crisis, and
Washingtons relief programme, which began in the early 1950s and
extended into the next decade. According to a Canadian scholar, who
had worked on India, In the late 1950s and early 1960s, both
humanitarian and security concerns worked to Indias advantage in the
containment of China. In the view of the State Department, South
Asia became a testing ground for the free world. In this area, it was
37
Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhis Emissary, Routledge, New Delhi, 2008, pp.267-68.
determined whether nations could surmount tremendous economic

and social problems, and achieve far-reaching changes in their entire
pattern of life without resorting to the totalitarian system of
communism.38
38
Arthur G. Rubinoff, Missed Opportunities and Contradictory Policies: Indo-American

Relations in the Clinton-Rao Years, Pacific Affairs, September 1996, pp. 499-515
5
1971-1991: SINO-US CONVERGENCE,
INDO-US ESTRANGEMENT
AND
The two decades 1971-1991 occupies a very significant period not

only in the context of international relations, but also in the triangular
relationship among the three countries. In the Indian sub-continent, it
witnessed the victory of India defeating Pakistan and the birth of a
new nation, Bangladesh. This had a salutary effect on the regional geopolitics and power configuration. Earlier, India had signed the Friendship
Treaty with the USSR in 1971. Internally China recuperated from the
internal convulsion of the tumultous Cultural Revolution (1966-69)
and set on the process of reapprochement with the USA, which started
with the secret visit of President Nixons national security advisor Henry
Kissinger, to China in 1971. Pakistan played a very critical role in the
reapprochement between the USA and China. Indo-US security
relationship, which the Chinese attack of India had impelled, however,
didnt continue for long. The reason for this was not difficult to fathom.
The cold war and Indias security pact with the erstwhile USSR and
finally the 1971 war in which USA tilted in favour of Pakistan, more
accurately a tilt towards China, and the sending of the US carrier
Enterprise soured the Indo-US relations. This period further witnessed
the convergence and synchronization of the foreign policy goals of
USA, China and Pakistan in the subcontinent. Pakistan played a catalytic
role in bringing the reapprochement between USA and China.
President Nixon in his Foreign Policy Report to the US Congress on
February 9, 1972 declared, It makes no sense to assume that a
countrys democratic and political system or its size requires our
automatic agreement with every aspect of its foreign policy39. The
39
Subramayam, n. 28, p. 36.
historic Shanghai Communiqu, which President Nixon signed with

Premier Zhou Enlai on February 28, 1972, facilitating the diplomatic
relations between the two countries clearly and unambiguously reflected
the US tilt in favour of a Sino-Pak nexus. The Communiqu much to
the annoyance of India said, It firmly maintains that India and
Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolution on
Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their
respective territories and to their own side of the ceasefire line in Jammu
and Kashmir and firmly support the Pakistan Government and people
in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and
the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for right of selfdetermination40
In the wake of the emerging Sino-US reapprochement and
Washingtons tilt towards Pakistan, New Delhi was worried that a USChina alliance was planning to open a third front during the Bangladesh
war in 1971. However, apart from accusing India of infringing on the
territory of Tibet along the Sikkim border and mobilizing some troops
locally, China made no military intervention during the war41.
5.1 THE END OF COLD WAR, 1991: SINO-INDIAN

ENGAGEMENT
The disintegration of the erstwhile USSR and the end of cold war in
1991, not only transformed the geo-political spectrum, but also had
their bearing on the US factor in Sino-Indian relations. India restored
diplomatic relationship with China in 1976 with the appointment of
Mr. K.R. Narayanan as its ambassador to Beijing. The end of Cold
War removed the major obstacle in the Sino-Indian relations, which in
turn gave fillip to strategic trust to Sino-Indian relations. In India also,
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, initiated bold economic reforms and
unveiled look east policy in the sphere of foreign policy. The
Tiananmen Squire incident of 1989 had also strained the relationship
40
Joint Communiqu of the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of
China, February 28, 1972, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v17/d203
41
Sidhu, n.1, p. 20
between the USA and China. The disintegration of the erstwhile USSR
and the end of cold war also resonated in the triangular relationship
among the three countries. It paved the way for engagement between
India and China. US didnt construe Sino-Indian engagement detrimental
to its interest. USAs strategy, on the contrary, was to checkmate India
by empowering Pakistan. This was also the period during which the
Indo-US strategic partnership was yet to start. All these factors put
together provided a very conducive geo-strategic environment for a
heightened engagement between India and China.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988, during which the
Joint Working Group (JWG) for settlement of the border dispute
was established. The visit created a very conducive pitch for SinoIndian engagement. Rajiv Gandhi, however, didnt live long to carry
forward Sino-Indian engagement to greater heights. The responsibility
fell on the succeeding government headed by Narasimha Rao. It was
against this backdrop that the visit of then Defence Minister Sharad
Pawar to China took place in July 1993. Pawars was the first ever visit
by a Defence Minister of India to China. During Pawars visit, the
Chinese military leadership emphasized the importance of troop
reduction in the border region as a result of prohibitive costs.
The visit of Defence Minister Pawar was followed by the visit of
Prime Minister, P.V. Narashimha Rao in September 1993, during which
an important Confidence Building Measure (CMB), the Agreement on
the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the
India-China Border Area, was signed. The Agreement was indeed a
breakthrough. It affirmed that the India-China boundary question shall
be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations and that neither
side shall use or threaten to use force against the other. It also stipulated
that pending an ultimate solution of the boundary question between
the two countries, the two sides shall strictly observe the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) and that no activities of either side shall overstep the
LAC.
The Agreement further envisaged that: (1) each government will keep
its military forces in the area along the LAC to a minimum level
compatible with the friendly neighbourly relations between the two
countries, (2) that the two sides agree to reduce their military forces
along the LAC in conformity with the requirement of the principle of
mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon, and

(3) that the reduction of military forces shall be carried out by stages
and sector-wise in mutually agreed upon geographical locations in the
areas along the LAC.
Three years later, this CBM was followed by Confidence Building Measures
in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border
Areas during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India in
November 1996. The Agreement, while reiterating and reaffirming
the intent and spirit of the 1993 CBM, among other things, stipulated
that the major categories of armament to be reduced or limited include
combat tanks; infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with
75 mm or bigger caliber, mortars with 120 mm or bigger caliber,
surface-to-surface missiles, and any other weapon systems.
5.2. Pokhran Nuclear Explosion, 1998 and Indo-US

Estrangement
While during this period Sino-Indian relations witnessed substantial
progress in terms of mutual trust and Confidence Building Measures,
Indias second nuclear explosion on May 11, 1998, carried out by the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government led by Atal Bihari
Vajpayee of the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) played out in the triangular
relations among the three countries. In a letter to the US President Bill
Clinton, which was published by the New York Times, Vajpayee sought
to explain the rationale for the underground nuclear test. He wrote,
We have an overt nuclear state on our borders, a state which committed
armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with
that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of
distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add
to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbour of
ours to become a covert nuclear state. He, however, assured Clinton
that India would continue to work with USA in a multilateral or bilateral
framework to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament.42
42
Nuclear Anxiety; Indians letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing, The New York
Times, May 13, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxietyindian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html
Indo-US relations hit rock bottom in June 1998. While Bill Clinton
was upset with India immediately after Pokhran, his anger only seemed
to increase in the following weeks.43Clinton called the tests selfdefeating, wasteful and dangerous and said they would make the
people of India and Pakistan poorer and less secure. He bore down
harder on India than Pakistan, accusing the BJP government of betraying
the ideals of non-violent democratic freedom and independence at
the heart of Gandhis freedom struggle to end colonialism on the
Indian subcontinent. He applauded Chinas willingness to chair the
Geneva meeting of the P-5, citing it as further evidence of the
important role China can play in meeting the challenges of the twenty
first century and constructive Chinese leadership that will be essential
to the long-term resolution of issues involving South Asia.44
5.3. Clintons visit to China

It was against this backdrop that Clinton visited China in June 1998.
The Sino-US Joint Statement issued by the two sides criticized the
nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan. The Statement said that the
two countries had agreed to work closely together, within the P-5, the
Security Council and with others, to prevent an accelerating nuclear
and missile arms race in South Asia, strengthening international nonproliferation efforts, and promoting reconciliation and the peaceful
resolution of differences between India and Pakistan45. Strongly rejecting
the Sino-US Joint Statement, India said, it categorically rejects the
notion of these countries arrogating to themselves; joint or individual
responsibility for the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the
region. This approach reflects the hegemonistic mentality of a bygone
era in international relations and is completely unacceptable and out of
place in the present day world.
43
William H. Avery, Chinas Nightmare, Americas Dream: India as the next global power, Amaryllis,
New Delhi, 2012, p. 46.
44
Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, Penguin Viking, New
Delhi, 2004, p.74.
45
US-China Joint Statement on South Asia, June, 1998, http://www.acronym.org.uk/

proliferation-challenges/nuclear-weapons-possessors/china/us-china-joint-statementsouth-asia-june-1998,
Without mincing words, it further said, The statement contains a

number of references to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
It is almost ironical that the two countries that have directly and indirectly
contributed to the unabated proliferation of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems in our neighbourhood, are now presuming to prescribe
norms for non-proliferation We would also like to make it clear
that India cannot consider the suggestion contained in the statement
for curtailing our nuclear weapons or missile development programs.
India will continue to take decisions in this regard on the basis of its
own national security requirements.46
Indias underground nuclear test initially evoked a studied and measured
response from Beijing. When India conducted the second round of
tests and Vajpayees letter to President Clinton was published in the
New York Times, in a statement by the foreign affairs ministry, China
condemned the tests. It said:
In disregard of the strong opposition of the international
community, the Indian government conducted two more
nuclear tests on May 13 following the May 11 tests. The Chinese
government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its
strong condemnation. This act of Indias is nothing but an
outrageous contempt for the common will of international
community for the comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon
proliferation. It will entail serious consequences to the peace
and stability in South Asia and the world at large.47
The Kargil war of 1999, however, gave a twist to the triangular relations
between India and USA. USAs positive and proactive role averted a
major war between India and Pakistan. China also remained neutral in
the Kargil war. The post Kargil years witnessed some degree of
convergence of approach between the US and China with regard to
India although the tilt of USA towards India was discernible. This tilt
was distinctly manifested when President Bill Clinton visited India in
2000. President Clintons visit to India, the first by a United States
46
Statement of Official Spokesman, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, June 27,
1998, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://fas.org/news/india/1998/06/980629-goi.htm
47
Chinas Statement on Indias Nuclear Tests, Beijing Review, June 1-7,1998, p.7
President since Jimmy Carter visited the country in 1978, marked a

further shift in Washingtons orientation in the region away from its
previous Cold War alliance with Pakistan and towards a new, as yet
tentative, strategic and economic relationship with India.48 President
Clinton signed a joint vision statement with Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee, which was effusive and pledged to create a close and
qualitatively new relationship between two of the worlds largest
democracies. In many ways, the document claimed, the character
of the 21st century world will depend on the success of our cooperation
for peace, prosperity, democracy and freedom.49
Political trust between the India and China was also strengthened during
the visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China in June 2003,
during which the two countries signed the Memorandum on expanding
border trade between the two countries. According to this memorandum,
India agreed to designate Changgu in Sikkim state as the venue for
border trade, and the Chinese agreed to designate Renqinggang of the
Tibet Autonomous Region as their venue for border trade. The political
and strategic significance of this agreement was that, for the first time,
China recognized Sikkim as an integral part of India.
The upward swing of strategic trust and defence and military
engagement between the two countries was given a further boost when
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005. The two
countries signed two important agreements during the visit, the first
being the Protocol on Modalities for the implementation of the CBMS
in the military fields along the LAC, and the second, politically more
significant, being on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the
Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. Article VII of the Agreement
provided that in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall
safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas,
indeed a breakthrough in a contentious border dispute between the
two countries as it was interpreted that China would eventually accept
a swap deal, agreeing to recognize Indias sovereignty over Arunachal
Pradesh with some adjustment, considering Indias acceptance of
Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin in the Western Sector.
49
The Clinton-Vajpayee joint statement: The full text, accessed on February 1, 2015,
http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/sep/16pmus2.htm
6
INDO-US STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE AND
THE SINO-INDIAN TRUST DEFICIT
It is an irony of history that two of worlds largest and most vibrant
democracies couldnt maintain the best of relations in the post-war
years. What prevented the two democracies from coming together?
Perhaps the most plausible reason for this yawning gap was Indias
decision to aim for a socialist pattern of regime, giving primacy to the
state sector of the economy, and not the corporate sector as in the
USA. Indias Non-Aligned policy, which regarded Soviet Union as a
natural ally of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its leading role there
further, divided the two countries; Indias friendship treaty with the
Soviet Union in 1971 had the same effect. Indias victory in the
Bangladesh War of 1971 with Pakistan, then a close ally of the USA,
established Indias pre-eminent position in South Asia and further
heightened the hiatus of close cooperation between the two countries.
The prejudiced mind of the legislature (Congress) and the executive
bureaucracy in the USA also did not help the relationship to improve,
and there were no serious efforts on part of the intelligentsia, academia,
or media to correct popular perceptions and predilections.50
What changed the situation, as mentioned earlier, was the disintegration
of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War. Yet another aspect of
the contour and contents of geopolitics has been the tectonic shift
from the West to the Asia-Pacific. What provided resonance to all
these changes and transformations in Indo-US relations was Indias
own economic reform and liberalization, which India initiated during
the same period.
50
See Arthur G. Rubinoff, Legislative Perceptions of Indo-American Relations in

Ashok Kapur, Y.K. Malik, Harold A. Gould and Arthur G. Rubinoff (edited), India and
the United States in a changing world,(Sage,New Delhi, 2002), pp. 412-457.
It was against this background of the changing profile of India and

the unfolding geopolitical scenario that the US began shifting its attention
to India. The unqualified American support to India in the Kargil War
of 1999 was just a precursor to the changing US attitude towards
India. President Bill Clinton visited India and opened a new chapter in
Indo-US relations. In November 2001, President George W. Bush and
Prime Minister Vajpayee affirmed their commitments to transforming
the bilateral relationship and agreed that the two countries should try
to give this partnership the inherent strength to survive all future political
changes in the two democracies. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
at the helm of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government,
and President Bill Clinton agreed that India and the US would be
partners in peace in the new century and share common responsibilities
for ensuring regional and international security. History took its full
circle when Atal Bihari Vajpayee, while speaking at the Asia Society in
New York in September 2003, described the US as a natural ally of
India. 51 A landmark event in the bilateral relations was the
announcement of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in
January 2004 after a protracted negotiation. Tellis argues that the NSSP
heralded a breakthrough in US-Indian strategic collaboration because
despite continued disagreements on other issues such as trade, Iraq,
and the United Nations, it committed both countries to work together
in four difficult arenas civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programs,
high technology trade, and missile defence.52
6.1. Indo-US Nuclear Deal

The high point of this comprehensive engagement was the Indo-US
nuclear deal. On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced that he would
work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India and
would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust US policy in the
context of a broader, global partnership with India in order to promote
stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace. India and the US subsequently
51
Address by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Asia Society, accessed on July 16, 2012, http://
www.asiasociety.org/policy/address-shri-atal-bihari-vajpayee
52
Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power( India Research Press,New Delhi, 2005), p.2.
announced on July 27, 2007 that they had reached agreement on the
text of a nuclear cooperation agreement.
In terms of the bilateral relationship between the two countries, the
Indo-US nuclear deal is unprecedented. Indias nuclear explosion in
1974 had soured the relationship between the two countries and the
US Congress retaliated by passing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978, imposing tough new requirements for US nuclear exports to
non-nuclear weapon states-full scope safeguards and termination of
exports if such a state detonates a nuclear explosive device or engage
in activities related to acquiring or manufacturing of nuclear weapons,
among other things. Internationally, the United States created the Nuclear
Supplier Group (NSG) in 1975 for nuclear transfers for peaceful
purposes, to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to
unguarded nuclear fuel cycles or nuclear explosive activities.
History was rewritten when the same USA put all its influence at the
same NSG to get a nod for the Indo-US nuclear deal, and President
George Bush put his best into facilitating a smooth passage of the
Indo-US nuclear deal for the approval of Congress. The nuclear deal
ended what is called Indias decades-long apartheid and paved the way
for India to sign similar deals with other countries, reflecting the deals
global implications beyond bilateral relations between India and the
US.
Never before in the history of the US Congress has such an issue
related to Indo-US relations been as intensely debated as the Indo-US
nuclear deal. Unlike in a parliamentary forum of government, in which
foreign policy issues are dealt with primarily by the executive, the
legislature in a presidential form of government such as the US wields
ultimate authority and grants its seal of approval to foreign policy
postulates and pronouncements. The passage of the US-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, also known as the 123 Agreement,
in the House of Representatives and earlier in the all-powerful Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, was unprecedented, demonstrating
bipartisan support in the House of Representatives and ultimately
garnering a 298-117 backing.
The Bill received overwhelming support in the House because of
sustained canvassing and campaigning by the Congressmen sympathetic
to India, as well as the proactive role of the Indian-American

community. Five leading US Congressmen wrote to their colleagues in
the House of Representatives urging them to expedite the passage of
the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal. Dear Colleagues, a letter dated
September 16th said, We refer you to the September 12, 2008
Washington Post editorial written in support of the US-India Civilian
Nuclear Agreement. As past and present co-chairs of the Congressional
Caucus on India and Indian-Americans, we are asking you to support
this agreement, which provides for peaceful nuclear cooperation
between the two democracies. Passage of this measure in an expedient
manner will be beneficial to both of our countries. 53
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington from November
22-26, 2009 at the invitation of President Obama as his first state guest.
The visit focused on the common interests and shared values in a
strategic partnership of global relevance and reflected the vision and
resolve of the two leaders to embark upon a new phase in their bilateral
partnership. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conveyed to the President
that the rapid socio economic transformation underway in India holds
several opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the
two countries.
6.2. Sino-Indian Trust Deficit

It was at this juncture that growing strategic proximity between India
and the US was a dampener on the relationship between India and
China. In trying to find out reasons for Chinas hardening attitude
towards India, Chellaney argues, The only major development in that
period was the new Indo-US strategic tie-up, as defined by the defence
framework accord and nuclear deal, but the US-India military alliance
has always been a strategic nightmare for the Chinese and apparently,
Chinese policy makers began to believe that India was being groomed
as a new Australia to America.54 In fact, in some quarter the historic
53
Aziz Hanifa, US law makers urged to support Nuclear Deal in Congress, Rediff
news, September 17, 2008.
54
Brahma Chellaney, Threes a Crowd in the India-China Theater,Far Eastern Economic

Review (2009), p 17.
Indo-US civil nuclear initiative of 2005 was perceived as a part of a

strategic effort to boost India as potential counterweight to China.55
Beijing, which suspected that India is being drafted into US, led
containment right against China, attempted to block the approval of
the civil nuclear liability in the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the autumn
of 2008. When it could not, Beijing announced a nuclear deal with
Pakistan that was similar to the one between Delhi and Washington.56
The Chinese, in an article in Renmin Ribao, accused the US of double
standards saying that the Indian exception could be used by other
nations to give nuclear advantages to their friends and thus weaken the
international non-proliferation regime. A domino effect of nuclear
proliferation, once turned into reality, will definitely lead to global nuclear
proliferation and competition, said the paper. It added, U.S. acts leave
people more and more dubious: is it striving to prevent nuclear
proliferation or actively pushing in the opposite direction?57
Commenting on the salutary impact of the Indo-US nuclear deal on
Sino-Indian relations, Chinese scholars wrote, The formal signature
of the civilian nuclear deal in 2008 was a milestone in an enhanced
Indo-US partnership, convincingly marking the depth of the strategic
engagement. The Bush administration promised to help India to be
global power in the 21st century and appeared as having a strategic
allusion to Chinas rise.58 Yet another eminent Chinese scholar Zhang
Li wrote, Washingtons rhetoric on the bond of the oldest
democracy and the largest democracy and its initiative to forge an
Asian alliance of democracies has made Beijing more vigilant about
any undermining changes of its strategic environment59.
55
C. Raja Mohan, Sleeping in New Delhi, The Indian Express, January 10, 2012, accessed
on February 1, 2015, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/sleeping-in-new-delhi/
897876/
56
ibid
57
David Watts, Blunting the NPT Regime, Asian Affairs, May 2006, pp. 4-5
58
Zhanh Yyan and Zhang Jingchun, China-India Relations in Asian Economic

integration, Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, Beijing, Issue 2, 2006
59
Zhang Li, China-India Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges, Asie.visions34,

September 2010, P. 27.
Chinas hardening attitude was reflected in various stances, such as in

describing Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet. China also retracted
from Article VII of the 2005 Agreement that had said that in reaching
a settlement, the two sides would only safeguard the interests of their
settled populations. The Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi later
told Indias external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee on the sidelines
of a meeting in Hamburg that according to China, the settled population
did not mean that it had given up its claim over Arunachal Pradesh60.
There was discernable shift in Chinas stance towards Indo-US nuclear
deal towards the end of 2006, when Beijing realized that the Indo-US
nuclear deal was a fait- accompli, and tried to make virtue out of
necessity. This was evident during the Chinese President Hu Jintaos
visit to India in 2006. The Joint Decleration issued on November 21,
during the visit of the Chinese President said, Considering that for
both China and India, expansion of civil nuclear energy programme is
an essential and important component for their national energy plans
to ensure energy security, the two sides agree to promote in the field
of energy, consistent with their respective international commitments.
The change in Chinese stance came only few days after US Congress
overwhelming approval of the Indo-US nuclear deal in first week of
December 2006. Responding to comment on Indo-US nuclear deal,
the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang said, We consider
the co-operation between countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purpose as it will be beneficial to maintain the principles and effectiveness
of international nuclear proliferation.61
6.3. The US Return to the Asia Pacific and its Overtures

to Co-opt India
The US efforts to mentor India to soft-balance China in the AsiaPacific gave a new dimension to the triangular relationship. While
economic engagement with China has brought economic benefits for
60
P. Stobdan, India-China Relations, Think India Quarterly 13.2 (2010), p. 132.
61
China backs Indo-US nuclear deal, Rediffnews, accessed on February 1, 2015, http:/
/www.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/13ndeal.htm
countries in the region, Chinas military rise has given rise to

consternation, if not outright fear, in the minds of the leaders of these
countries. The United States, which has been the resident power in the
region, reinvigorated its strategic engagement there. Many countries in
the region are now looking towards India not only for economic
engagement, but also for strategic reassurance to soft-balance China.
6.4. Condoleezza Rice Statement, 2005

The US motives and interest can be gauged from a statement by former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her 2005 visit to Tokyo.
Asked whether she viewed China as a strategic partner or competitor,
Rice replied:
When I look at Chinas role in this region, I think its a very
important thing that China plays an increasing role. It is nonetheless
a good thing that China plays that role in the context of democratic
alliances like the United States and Japan. I really do believe that
the US-Japan relationship, the US-South Korean relationship, the
US-Indian relationship are all important in creating an environment
in which China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative
role. These alliances are not against China; they are alliances that
are devoted to a stable security and the political and economic,
and indeed, values-based relationships that put China in the context
of those relationships, and a different path to development than
if China were simply untethered, simply operating without that
strategic context.62
The National Security Strategy of the USA, unveiled in May 2010, also
saw India, China, and Russia as the key centers of influence in the
contemporary world countries with whom Washington would like
to deepen its partnership. Certain bilateral relationships such as US
relations with China, India, and Russia will be critical in building
broader cooperation in areas of mutual interest, the fifty-two-page
62
Condoleeza Rice address at Sofia University, Tokyo, Japan, March 19, 2005, accessed on
February 1, 2015, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0501qus_china.pdf
document stated. Noting that Asias dramatic economic growth has

increased its connection to Americas future prosperity and
acknowledging Indias responsible advancement, the report asserted
that the US and India are building a strategic partnership that is
underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the worlds
two largest democracies, and close connections among our people.
The report further added, We value Indias growing leadership on a
wide array of global issues, through groups like G-20, and will seek to
work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in
the world.63 US National Security Adviser James Jones, in his
comments during a media briefing, said: India, with our growing
relationship, is one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century.64
6.5. Asia-Pacific: Indias Nuanced Approach

Interestingly, Indo-US strategic partnership was further strengthened
in the backdrop of Chinas assertiveness in the South China Sea. The
coming into being of the India-US Strategic Dialogue in June 2010
was the clear indication of the strategic convergence between the two
countries. Inaugurating the Dialogue, Ms. Hillary Clinton, the then US
Secretary of State referred to their joint responsibility to determine
the course of the world. Commenting on this later Jayant Prasad a
distinguished Indian diplomat wrote, Given their different histories
and distant geographies, Indian and U.S. geo-strategic interests can never
completely converge. Yet, there is consonance in their concern about
the consequence of the rise of China. China and the United States
have adversarial relations with each other. So do China and India.65
63
National Security Strategy, May 2010, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
64
India among key centers of influence in Obama security strategy, Hindustan Times,
May 28, 2010, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/worldnews/Americas/India-among-key-centres-of-influence-in-Obama-security-strategy/
Article1-549620.aspx
65
Jayant Prasad, Estrangement and Engagement, The Hindu, January 16, 2014, accessed
on February 1, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/
estrangement-and-engagement/article5580472.ece
The nature of adversarial relationship that the US shares with China is

not same as that India shares with its northern neighbour. First of all,
India and China are two great neighbours and are Asian countries,
who suffered colonialism and imperialism. Secondly, the US fought
against China both in Formosa (Taiwan) and also in Korea, where
India, as elucidated earlier, played proactive role. In the present context
also, US and China are locked in the Asia-Pacific. India and China
fought a war in 1962. But China predominantly puts the blame of the
border dispute on the colonial historic legacy of the Macmohan Line
of 1914. Secondly, India and USA, both being vibrant democracies,
didnt share a very comfortable relationship for a better part of history
at least prior to the end of cold war. This explains Indias nuanced
approach to US overtures to India to contain China.
Be that as it may, the call to engage India in the Asia-Pacific was renewed
by the US when President Obama visited India in November 2010.
Addressing members of Parliament, a rare honour extended to very
select Heads of State or the Government, President Obama said,
more broadly, India and the United States can partner in Asia.
Today the United States is once again playing a leadership role in
Asia strengthening old alliances, deepening relationships, as we
are doing with China, and were reengaging with regional
organizations like the ASEAN and joining the East Asia Summit
organizations in which India is also a partner. Like your neighbours
in Southeast Asia, we want India not only to Look East, we
want India to engage East because it will increase the security
and prosperity of all our nations.66
A close analysis of President Obamas exhortation to India suggests

that US expects New Delhi to be more active in the Asia-Pacific to
hedge China through deepening security and strategic relations with
66
Lynn Sweet, Obama speech to India Parliament. Transcript, Chicago Sun-Times,

November 9, 2010, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/
2010/11/obama_speech_to_india_parliame.html
the countries in the region, particularly American allies like Japan and
South Korea, and other countries like Vietnam, which has adversarial
relationship with China. Chinas assertiveness in the South China Sea
and Americas strong advocacy for freedom of navigation and the Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOCS) have offered challenges to India
to calibrate a nuanced approach to the Asia-Pacific, which can be
discerned from Indias foray into the South China Sea. India has
maintained that its engagement in the South China Sea is purely for
commercial purposes to explore hydrocarbon. Secondly, India is not a
party to South China Sea and that the dispute in the South China Sea
should be resolved by the concerned countries in accordance with
international law. Thirdly, what riles China, and which supports US
position is Indias articulation of freedom of navigation. Indias strategic
autonomy on various issues on Sino-Indian relations and Indo-US
relations have been reiterated by India from time to time including
during President Obamas address to the members of Indian
Parliament. While media paid attention to Obamas speech, little attention
was paid to the opening remark by the Vice-President of India, Hamid
Ansari, who is the Chairman of the Upper House of Indian Parliament.
In his opening remark he very thoughtfully said, As vibrant
democracies, we cherish the right to disagree within a framework of
our endeavour for the common good67
The appeal to exhort India was reiterated when US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton visited India, on July 2011. Speaking in Chennai she
said, Much of the history of the 21st Century will be written in Asia
which, in turn, will be influenced by the partnership between the US
and India and its relationship with neighbours.68 She said that India
could build a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific in forums like the East
Asia Summit and the Asian Regional Forum, contribute more to
67
Address by the Vice-President of India and Chairman, Rajya Sabha, Shri Mohammad
Ansari, The Journal of Parliamentary Information, Vol. Lvii, No 1, March 2011.
68
As China looms, US tells India to lead Asia, Hindustan Times, July 21, 2011, accessed on
February 1, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Chennai/As-Chinalooms-US-tells-India-to-lead-Asia/Article1-723313.aspx
maritime security, democracy promotion, explore a new Silk Route

into Central Asia, support rebuilding Afghanistan and even help stabilize
Pakistan. The US renewed its appeal to India to reinvigorate its
engagement in the Asia Pacific when President Barack Obama addressed
Australian Parliament in November 2011.69
The US reiterated its stand to India in its Pentagon report titled
Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 Century Defense
in January 2012. The new strategy, envisaged in the report, is aimed at
tackling the emerging threat from Chinas military build-up. It takes
forward the process of reorienting American military might from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. At the strategys core, US forces would fight
fewer counter-terror campaigns in far-flung areas, but will focus on its
air and naval forces to balance China or face down Iran. Turning to
India, the report stated that the US is geared to investing in a long
term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a
regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader
Indian Ocean region.70
Such exhortation to co-opt India was reinforced in February 2011 in
Singapore, when US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asian Affairs, Geofrey Pyatt, suggested that New
Delhi adopt a Be East policy. The objective was to encourage India
to expand (its) market and security integration across the Asian region.
He was equally candid about the US wanting to revolutionize its military
relationship with India. According to one opinion, acquiring unexplored
meaning in such an evolving ambience reflects Mr. Pyatts view that
one of the areas in which we see great potential for the US and India
is indeed in East Asia. Such a potential partnership in East Asia can be
viewed as part of US support for Indias expanding global reach.71
69
US President Barack Obamas speech to parliament, The Australian, November 17, 2011,
accessed on February 1, 2015, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obamain-australia/obamas-speech-to-parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237
70
Harsh V. Pant, Tectonic rumblings in the region, Indian Express, January 11, 2012.accessed
on February 1, 2015, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/tectonic-rumblings-inthe-region/898178/
71
P.S. Suryanarayan ,U.S. move tormentor India in new East Asia, The Hindu, February
22, 2011.
There seemed to be slight moderation in US strategy towards AsiaPacific with the exit of Ms. Hillary Clinton and the assumption of the
position of the secretary of state by John Kerry, presumably soft
towards China. But when Tom Donilon, the US National Security
Advisor, while speaking at the Asia Forum, said, US and Indian interests
powerfully converge in the Asia-Pacific, where India has much to give
and much to gain. South East Asia begins in Northeast India, and we
welcome Indias efforts to look East, from supporting reforms in
Burma to trilateral cooperation with Japan to promoting maritime
security72.It clearly conveyed the message that there would be change
with continuity as regards USAs engagement with India as far as Asia
Pacific is concerned.
This stance of USA was further reiterated by the Secretary of Defence
Chuck Hagel in his speech at the Shangri-la dialogue in Singapore in
June, 2013. Essentially, he was elucidating on the USAs strategy of
rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. After mentioning the security
cooperation with treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Philippines, and Thailand, he alluded to such cooperation with other
allies like Singapore, New Zealand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Mynamar.
Referring to India, he first of all alluded to the US-Japan-India trilateral
cooperation. Articulating on India, he said that an important example
of this security cooperation was with India, one of the leaders in the
broader Asian region, where US is moving beyond purely defense
trade towards technology sharing, technology trade and co-production.
He further said, As the worlds largest democracy, Indias role as a
stabilizing power is of growing importance with the increase of trade
and transit between the India and the Pacific Oceans. The United Stated
considers Indias efforts to enhance its military capabilities as a welcome
contribution to security in the region. Elaborating further, he said,
Our vision for Asia-Pacific region is an open and inclusive one. Along
with India, other rising powers also have a special role to play in a
72
Indo-US ties one of the defining 21st century partnerships: US security adviser Tom
Donilon, The Economic Times, March 12, 2013, accessed on February 1, 2015, http:/
/articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-03-12/news/37651075_1_adviser-tomdonilon-northeast-india-asia-society
future security order as they assume the responsibilities that come with
growing stakes in regional stability. To that end, a critical element of
our long term strategy in Asia is to seek to build strong relationships
with rising powers-including India, Indonesia and China. The priorities
of the countries in the pecking order are quite clear. With regard to
China, he said, Building a positive and constructive relationship with
China is also an essential part of Americas rebalance to Asia. The
United States welcomes and supports a prosperous and successful
China that contributes to regional and global problem solving. To this
end, the United States has consistently supported a role for China in
regional and global economic and security institutions, such as the G20,
We encourage our allies and partners to do the same.73 The expectation
from India as compared with China is loud and clear.
If these statements of US officials are deconstructed, it clearly suggests
the hedging strategy of USA towards China and expected role of
India in this exercise. Considering Chinas military rise and the mutual
economic interdependence between USA and China, and Indias
compulsions to manage its tenuous relations with China, USA adopts
a hedging strategy .According to George J.Gilboy and Eric
Higginbotham, over the last decade, US. policies towards China
and India appear increasingly to reflect an underlying assumption that
India, a democracy, is more likely to foreign policies commensurate
with US interests than China, an authoritarian system with roots in
both imperial traditions and communism. Extrapolating from
democratic peace theory, he further writes that lack of common values
and institutions is said to make international conflict with China more
likely than with India In support of the assertion, the authors quote
US Senator John McCain who opines, Until China moves towards
political liberalization, our relationship will be based on periodically
shared interest rather than the bedrock of shared values. They further
quote Winston Lord, US ambassador to China during the Clinton
73
Speech delivered by US Secretary of Defence Chuk Hagel at Shangri-La Dialogue,

accessed on February 1, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1785
administration and Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs

under Clinton that there is a limit to our relations with China because
we share only interests, not values. The fundamental reason for India
and the US coming together is our shared value74.
The basic idea is not to confront China, but check its growing
assertiveness through deterrence by empowering its allies and strategic
partners, which is evident from the growing defence cooperation
between India and USA. The real strategic intents of the USAs hedging
strategy and Indias expected role are couched in subterfuge in official
pronouncements; they are more explicit in private writings by US
scholars and liberated diplomats. In a very provocatively titled book
Chinas Nightmare, Americas Dream, Wiliiam H. Avery, an American
diplomat earlier posted in India writes,China is well on its way to
building the economic and military strength required to become a great
power. Its leaders may be hoping that, having achieved this level of
power, it will be able to dominate Asia. India is the only Asian nation
standing on its way. An India that pursues and achieves great power
status is Chinas worst geopolitical nightmare.75 He compares Indias
expected role in this joint venture with that of the United Kingdom
during the haloed years of its power. To put in his words, An India
that amasses the power needed to fill the void left by the United
Kingdom would be an American dream comes true.
This trend of thinking in the US strategic circle was yet in another
occasion articulated by former US under secretary of state for political
affairs Nicholas Burns in December 2013, while speaking at the
Hindustan Times Summit. Mr. Burns made a case for building bridges
with an aggressive China, but called for revitalizing Indo-US ties to
manage the rise of Beijing. Articulating the triangular relationship, he
said, China will be most important relationship for the US in the next
half-a-century and so would be for India. While we are partners with
74
George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behaviour,: Growing
Power and Alarm, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 53-55.
75
William H. Avery, Chinas Nightmare, Americas Dream: India as the Next Global Power,
Amaryllis, New Delhi, 2012,p.xvi.
China, we are also strategic competitors. The former US official

emphasized that while China has been growing its military and economic
powers, both India and China should have dialogue on issues such as
climate change, terrorism, non-proliferation and crime cartels. At the
same time, both India and the US should be strong enough, politically
and militarily to disagree with the Asian giant. Turning to South China
Sea issue, he further said, China has over played their hands in
South China Sea. As a private citizen, I can say that the US is going to
stay in the region. We will build up our security cooperation in the
region and most definitely with India.76
6.5. Beijings Suspicion: A Ring of Encirclement

American efforts to court India to soft-balance China have evoked
mixed reaction in China. Commenting on Ms. Clintons visit to India in
2011, an opinion piece article in China Daily stated, In the current
Obama administration, Clinton has emerged as one of the most vocal
proponent of the China balancing theory.77 In her official press
conference in India, Clinton urged India to play a leading role in AsiaPacific, which either directly or indirectly hints at the balancing of Chinas
influence in the region. Her speeches in Africa, and now in Asia, clearly
hint at the US concern about its receding influence in the Asia-Pacific
region. Referring to Indo-US relations, the article said:
Overall, Indo-US relations have improved over the last decade,
but it will be an exaggeration to say that India is a US ally in the
region. A 2005 Indo-US civil nuclear deal did not change the
status of the Indo-US strategic relationship in a large way. The
emerging new relationship between the two democracies is only a
late recognition of their converging interest in combating global
terrorism sponsored by state and non-state actors. There is a long
76
Be Strong Enough to Disagree with China: Ex-US official, Economic Times, December
7, 2013, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
2013-12-07/news/44909530_1_south-china-shyam-saran-east-asia
77
Binod Singh, Clintons India visit reached no consensus on fighting terrorism, China
Daily, July 27, 2011, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
opinion/2011-07/26/content_12985144.htm
way to go for before an Indo-US strategic relationship, and it will

be immature at this stage.
Beijing is critical of the efforts of the US to cultivate countries in the

region, including Japan and India, to hedge against China in the region.
This concern can be gauged from writings and views in Chinese
authoritative journals and commentaries in the newspapers. As written
in the China Daily in February 2010, China is in a crescent-shaped ring
of encirclement. The ring brings in Japan, stretches through nations in
the South-China Sea to India, and ends in Afghanistan.78 In an article
by Garver and Wang, the authors quote a PLA Colonel that the United
States is constructing a ring of encirclement, stretching from Japan,
South Korea, and Mongolia in the North through the South China Sea
and India in the South, as steps towards the final carving up and
destruction of China.79
Chinas unease and discomfort at US efforts to put in place an antiChina alliance aimed at containing China was also reflected a year later
in an article published by Chinese Communist Party Journal Qiushi.
The article asserts, The US seems highly interested in forming a very
strong anti-China alliance. It not only made a high profile announcement
of its return to East Asia but also claimed to lead in Asia80. The article
further elaborates, What is particularly unbearable is how the US
blatantly encourages Chinas neighbouring countries to go against China.
It added, Countries like Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Korea are trying to join the anti-China group because
they either had a war or another conflict of interest with China. Turning
to India it said, The probability for India to cooperate with China is
also not great and India has stayed closely allied with the US. In
recent years, US President Barack Obama proposed to support India
for a permanent membership in the UNSC (United Nations Security
Council).
78
Qin Jize and Li Xiaokun, China circled by chain of US anti-missile systems, China
Daily, accessed on February 1, 2015,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-02/
22/content_9481548.htm
79
John W. Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, Chinas Anti-encirclement Struggle, Asian Security,
6.3(2010), pp. 238-261.
Ma Jiali, author of Rising India in a Global Times interview in response to

a question as to whether the US is shifting its strategic focus to Asia
and whether it supports India in containing China in Asia stated, The
US does have the strategic intent to use India to contain China, as we
can learn from some US official documents. But we should see that
India is independent in its foreign policy .There are voices against the
US in India, and some Indian intellectuals know clearly that the US
kindness to India has a strategic intent.81 Replying to another question
as to if there is a zero-sum game between the two Asia giants and
recalling former Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs oft-quoted assertion
that Asia has enough room to accommodate the development of both
China and India, he further asserts, The development of China and
India is not a zero-sum game, but could be a win-win situation.
It seems that in China there are also scholars who argue for better
India-China cooperation to counter the US policy of expanding
influence in Asia. An opinion piece in the Peoples Daily in February,
2012, commented, The development of the China-India relationship
is being tested by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, which
will have complicated and in-depth influence on the future of IndiaChina relations. Referring to the US-Japan-India Trilateral meeting,
the article said that the effort was to beseech China instead of getting
into an apparent anti-China effort, and that India should enter into a
strategic partnership with China that will create mutual trust and
benefit.82
80
Ananth Krishnan, Chinas Communist Party sees India as part of U.S. containment
strategy, The Hindu, February 12, 2011, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://
www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/chinas-communist-party-sees-india-aspart-of-us-containment-strategy/article1415091.ece
81
http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2011-03/634998_3.html
82
Sutirtho Patranobis, Paper calls for China-India alliance against US, Hindustan Times,
February 21, 2012, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/
world-news/China/Paper-calls-for-China-India-alliance-against-US/Article1-814493.aspx
6.6. The Salience of the triangular relations in the

maritime domain
At a time when seas and oceans are poised to occupy considerable
significance in the strategic calculus of contemporary geo-politics, it is
interesting to analyze as to how the triangular relations among the three
countries are playing out in the maritime domain. The jostling for
influence and strategic control is being played out in two theatres. Firstly,
it is Pacific, where the two dominant players are the USA, which consider
it to be the resident power, and China, which has made a foray into the
Pacific. The US and most countries in the region including Japan and
countries belonging to the ASEAN expect India to soft balance China
to check its assertiveness in the region. India has its own inherent
limitations in terms of both its capability and inclination. In line with its
policy of strategic autonomy, it prudently adopts a nuanced approach.
While India has been reasonably successful in managing its delicate and
sensitive relations with China as far as Asia-Pacific is concerned, Indias
articulation and posturing falls short of the expectations of the key
strategic players in the region- the US, Japan and the ASEAN.
Indias nuanced approach to the triangular relationship in the theatre
of Indian Ocean, for example, can be gauged from its Malabar series
of naval exercise, which India has been conducting in last few years.
Earlier in 2007, the Indo-US Malabar exercise was held in the eastern
theatre of Bay of Bengal. It was expanded to include Australian,
Japanese and Singaporean navies as well. Viewing it as an axis of
democracy designed to contain it, China had let loose diplomatic
protests. Since then India has largely restricted the annual Malabar exercise
to a bilateral one and holds it in the Western theatre of Arabian Sea to
avoid ruffling China. But this has not stopped the US for describing
India as a linchpin in its new strategy to re-balance forces towards
the Asia-Pacific, even though it has its own security concerns vis-vis an assertive China. India is keen to be seen as neutral player in
the unfolding great game.83 The Malabar 2013, though smaller in size,
83
Rajat Pandit, India strikes a fine balance with combat exercises with US, China, The
Times of India, November 5, 2013, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-strikes-a-balance-with-combat-exercises-withUS-China/articleshow/25226511.cms
represented the high-end of the expansive military-to-military

engagement between the two countries. The US Navy deployed the
Arieigh Burke class guided missiles destroyer USS McCambell and
P3C patrol aircraft for the Malabar exercise held in November 2013.
India fielded stealth frigate INS Shivalik missile destroyer, INS Ranvijay
and TU-142M maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Malabar is designed
to advance military-to-military coordination as well as the capacity to
plan and execute tactical operations in a multilateral environment.
While India has been active in the Southeast Asia historically, traditionally,
and politically, the dispute over South China Sea issue, particularly
between China and Vietnam, and USs strong advocacy of freedom
of navigation and sea lanes of communication has riled China. The
metaphor Indo-Pacific has been coined by the US and other Pacific
countries, more particularly, Japan to enlist India in this seamless maritime
dimension linking Pacific with the Indian Ocean. In its economic
dimension the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been embedded to
the Indo-Pacific architecture. Chinas counter to TPP has been the
advocacy for RCEP. India navigates between the two. India sulks
because its economy is not yet prepared to respond to these initiatives
lest its own economy gets swamped.
Chinas foray into Indian Ocean in response to Indias presence in the
South China Sea, where its OVL is engaged in off-shore oil drilling,
adds interesting dimension to the maritime rivalry between the two.
China has floated the concept of Maritime Silk Route. and has asked
India to join the Maritime Silk Route initiative. Chinas offer has put
India into a dilemma.
7
INDIAS CALIBRATED APPROACH
Despite the US attempts to mentor India to balance China in the AsiaPacific, New Delhi has calibrated its approach to the region and China
with a great degree of finesse. The reality has been that this strategy is
easier said than done, but such is the challenge before diplomacy. Indias
approach has been to prod China to be a responsible stakeholder to
ensure and facilitate peace and stability in the region through institutional
mechanism like the East Asia Forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum,
and ADMM Plus. US Secretary of Defense Leone Panetta, during his
visit to India in June 2012 articulated the same sentiments in his address
at Indias Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) when he
said, The United States supports South-east Asias multilateral forums
such as ADMM Plus. These mechanisms will prevent and manage
regional tensions Indias voice and involvement in these international
forums will be critical. Panetta said that defense cooperation with
India is the linchpin in the American rebalancing strategy, and that
India is one of the countries whom US would help develop the
capabilities to share common values. Turning to China, he hastened to
add, As the United States and India deepen our defense partnership
with each other, and both of us will also seek to strengthen our relations
with China. He further asserted that the US recognizes that China has
a critical role to play in the security and prosperity in the region The
United States welcome the rise of a strong, prosperous, and a successful
China that plays a greater role in global affairs and respects and
enforces the international norms that have governed this region for six
decades.84
84
http://idsa.in/keyspeeches/LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury, accessed on
February 1, 2015.
It seems both Washington and Beijing have noted Indias strategic

autonomy in its relationship with both of them; they have also been
reconciled to Indias stance. The Chinese media have been very
circumspect to convey the message to USA. It may be mentioned in
this connection that when the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
met his former Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao on the margins of the
UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in June
2012, China Daily quoted Prime Minister Manmohan Sing saying,
India will not tolerate anybody conducting anti-China activities on Indian
Territory and will not join any action aimed at containing and encircling
China.85 It is clear that while the former refers to the activities of
Tibetan refugees in India, the latter is an allusion to the USA.
Indias stance on Asia-Pacific in relation to China can best be explained
in the words of the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his
address at the Central Party School in Beijing on October 24, 2013,
where he said, Above all, India and China need a stable, secure and
prosperous Asia Pacific region. The center of gravity of global
opportunities and challenges are shifting to this region. In the coming
decades, China and India, together with the United States, Japan, Korea
and the ASEAN community will be among the largest economies in
the world. While this region embodies unparalleled dynamism and
hope, it is also one with unsettled questions and unresolved disputes. It
will be in our mutual interest to work for a co-operative, inclusive and
rule based security architecture that enhances our collective security
and regional and global stability. Debunking the theories of alliances
and containment he asserted that old theories of alliances are no longer
relevant. India and China cannot be contained and our recent history is
testimony to this. Nor should we seek to contain others. Alluding to
Indias strategic relationship with other countries and setting to rest all
speculation, he further said, Our strategic partnerships with other
countries are defined by our own economic interests, needs and
85
Lan Lan and Qin Jize, Rio reflects efforts of developing nations, China Daily, June
22, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/22/content_15517845.htm,
accessed on February 1 , 2015.
aspirations. They are not directed against China or anyone else. We

expect a similar approach from China86.
The Depsang incident of April 15,2013 in which Chinese troops
intruded into the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and
remained in occupation of the territory for about three weeks not
only exacerbated the security dilemma between the two countries, but
also inflicted a serious jolt to the strategic trust between the two countries.
It was a different matter that the two sides could resolve the stand off
through discussions. It was in this back drop that Prime Minister
Manmohan Singhs visit to both Japan and USA preceded to that of
China. Although the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs visit to
USA in September 2013 to participate in the UN General Assembly
was scheduled earlier, a meeting with US President was quickly arranged
on the occasion of his visit to USA to participate in the UN General
Assembly. It is not customary for Prime Minister to participate every
time in the UN General Assembly. In the past the Prime Minister on
some occasions had skipped the UN General Assembly and had
deputed a senior cabinet colleague to represent him. Further, it is not
every time that Prime Minister meets the President of USA during his
visit to USA to participate in the UN General Assembly. The fact that
security and defence cooperation between the two sides occupied a
significant space in the deliberations between the two leaders echoed
the security dilemma of the Depsang incident.
Significantly, the Joint Statement issued by the two sides affirmed that
the partnership between the two democratic nations is stronger today
than at any point in their 67-year history. The statement added, rooted
in common democratic values and strong people to people ties, the
United States and India have developed a comprehensive and global
strategic partnership, both in name and in substance that has made
their citizens safer and more prosperous. The statement further said
86
Manmohan Singhs speech on India-China relations at the Central Party School, Beijing,
The Hindu, October 24, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/manmohansinghs-speech-on-indiachina-relations-at-the-central-party-school-beijing/
article5268097.ece, accessed on February 1, 2015.
that President Obama and Prime Minister Singh pledged to make the
next decade equally as transformative, challenging their governments
to reach the full potential of this partnership, particularly in the areas of
security cooperation, (emphasis added) bilateral trade and investment, energy
and environment, higher education, and global architecture. Applauding
bilateral defense cooperation, including trade and military exercises;
both sides expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved so far in
defence relations. They emphasized the need for more intensive defence
cooperation. The leaders reiterated their desire to further strengthen
defense trade cooperation endorsing a Joint Declaration on Defence
Cooperation as a means of enhancing their partnership in defence
technology transfer, joint research, co-development and co-production.
President Obama encouraged the further participation of US firms in
partnering Indias efforts to enhance defence capabilities.87
During the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to USA, a Joint
Declaration on Defence Cooperation between the two countries was
signed. The Joint Declaration proclaimed that the USA and India shares
common security interest and place each other as their closest partners.
Spelling out further details of the defence cooperation, it said that it
includes defence technology transfer, trade, research, co-development,
and co-production of for defence article and services including the
most advanced and sophisticated technology. It further said that the
United States and India are also committed to protecting each others
sensitive technology and information. It also said that the US will
continue to support Indias full membership in four international export
control regimes which would further facilitate technology sharing.88
87
Joint Statement on Prime Ministers Summit Meeting with President Barack Obama in
Washington D.C (September 27, 2013), http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/22265/Joint+Statement+on+Prime+
Ministers+Summit+Meeting+with+President+Barack+
Obama+in+Washington+DC+September+27+2013ar ticle.htm?22265/
Joint+Statement+on+Prime+Ministers+Summit+Meeting+with+
President+Barack+Obama+in+Washington+DC+September+27+2013, accessed on
February 1, 2015.
88
India-US Defence Relations, https://www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=53,

accessed on February 1, 2015.
There has been a slew of defence related exchanges of visits in recent

times after the signing of the Indo-US Joint Declaration. Chairman,
Chief of Staff and Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall A.K. Browne,
paid a goodwill visit to US during July, 2013. From US side, General
Raymond T Odierno, Chief of Staff of US Army visited India in July
2013. Significantly General Odierno in an interview denied that growing
military ties and joint exercises between Washington and New Delhi
were attempts by the US to co-opt India to triangulate or contain
China. In an interaction at the neo-conservative American Enterprise
Institute, the US Chief of Army Staff said, One of the things we
have to remember is that they (India) maintain their strategic
autonomy89
Elucidating further he added, Where you get into a policy of
containment is when you start having land forces forward stationed in
countries and thats not our plan. Without mincing words he said,
So ours is not to contain China, ours is to build relationship to build
better support for the United States Pacific Command and to see it
tends to ensure that we dont get into conflict, we dont build animosity
between all the major powers in Asia-Pacific. Shedding more light,
he added, As you look to Asia-Pacific, its about competition for
limited resources, its about making sure that everyone is able to sustain
their sovereignty and meet their own interests. Disclosing his discussions
with his Indian counterpart, he said, the discussions we had were
really about where we can help each other and look ahead on how we
try to ensure that some of these issues dont get blown out to something
much bigger thanneeded90. This indicates that perhaps US has
reconciled Indias stance with regard to China and Indias strategic
autonomy in its foreign policy.
89
Aziz Haniffa, US army chief: Growing ties with India not to contain China, Rediff,
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-us-army-chief-growing-tieswith-india-not-to-contain-china/20130805.htm, accessed on February 1, 2015.
90
Ibid.
Later, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, who has

since been elevated to the position of Defence Secretary, visited India
during September 2013 and met senior Indian officials and defence
industry leaders. In his meetings, Deputy Secretary Carter reiterated
that United States and India are destined to be partner on the world
stage due to their shared common values and outlook on a wide range
of issues. General Odiernos visit was reciprocated by the visit of Chief
of Army Staff of India, General Bikram Singh to USA in December,
2013. General Singh utilized the opportunity to carry forward the
growing understanding and relationship with senior US Army leadership,
and sought to sensitize them the emerging security dynamics from
Indias perspective. He also appraised the US side for the latest
modernization plan being implemented in India, and sought to
understand the challenges faced by the US Army in their ongoing
transformation after their experience in US and Afghanistan.
The Indo-US relationship, however, suffered a major setback with the
Devyani Khobrgade episode. Interestingly, the Chinese media reported
the Devyani Khobragade incident in detail and had a measured reaction
to it. The Chinese communist party controlled Global Times published
an article written by a scholar at the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies. In a very carefully worded article, the author said that the US
and India had been caught up in a diplomatic row in recent days over
the arrest of Ms. Devyani Khobragade in US, who was accused of
visa fraud and abusing her Indian maid. The article further said that
Ms. Khobragade claimed that she was mistreated, which aroused a
storm of public outcry in India over the humiliation by the US. Indignant
groups staged protests in front of the US Embassy in India and burned
effigies of the US president, Barack Obama. Having reported the
incident comprehensively, it commented that the occurrence and progress
of the Khabragade case unveiled the complicated nature of US-India relations and
different expectations on bilateral ties of both sides. Claiming the independence
of Indias foreign policy, the article further said, There are already risks
that may explode at any moment in the US-India relations. The two have different
expectations of bilateral ties: India hopes to rely on the US to improve international
position, strengthen strategic advantage and boost economy; but it is unwilling to be
a tool of the US in containing China, while the US aims at making use of India
to balance China and wants a more open Indian market. These mismatching goals
offer the potential of conflict. Ever since then, both India and USA are
trying their best to repair the damage and put the relationship back on
the track. It was in this backdrop that Dr. S. Jaishankar, who demitted
office as Indias ambassador to China, took over the charge as Indias
ambassador to the US from Ms. Nirupama Rao, consequent upon the
end of her tenure. In an address at the Carnegie Endowment, identifying
the key drivers of Indo-US relationship, he said that first and foremost
was the geo-strategic and political convergence, something that could
manifest itself after the Cold War91. Quite significantly, he said that the
new level of the relationship between the two countries was animated
by the strategic vision in both the nations. Without mentioning China,
he said that the fact that the two countries discuss East Asia regularly
reflected the confidence levels of the two countries. East Asia in Indias
diplomatic parlance subsumes China. He also alluded to the US-JapanIndia trilateral relations.
What further exacerbated Indo-US relations, besides the diplomatic
row over the alleged ill treatment meted out to Devyani Khobragade,
were the slew of unhelpful measures by the US like the blockage of
Indian generic drugs allegedly on the grounds of non-compliance to
its domestic standards. Also, the US International Trade Commission
(USITC) and the US Trade Representative (USTR) threatened to take
New Delhi to WTO on trade and investment policies like solar energy
and IPR regime. It was against this backdrop that the visit of Nisha D
Biswal, US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, to
India took place in the first week of March, 2014. In an article in a
leading English daily ahead of her visit to Delhi, Ms. Biswal wrote, It
is becoming widely accepted that our converging interests will shape
Indo -Pacific strategic and economic geography and with it the future
of the 21st century and half of the worlds population that call this
region homeour diplomatic and service-to-service partnership in
the Indian Ocean will keep vital sea lanes free for navigation and
commerce, and co-development: and co-production of defense
91
Speech by Ambassador S. Jaishankar on US-India Relations, https://

www.indianembassy.org/press_detail.php?nid=1998, accessed on February 1, 2015.
platforms will enhance the security of both our nations for generations
to come92
Elucidating further, she wrote, In a globalized world, a relationship
like ours cant be focused on development in Delhi and Washington
only, nor can it be limited to our bilateral interests. India is an essential
partner in Americas broader engagement with Asia, where our interests
naturally converge. Reference to Chinas assertiveness was unmistakable,
although China was never mentioned by name, where she said, Over
the course of this century, our government need to work with partners
across the Indo-Pacific region to ensure that all countries can enjoy the
benefits of peace, stability and freedom that come with open societies
and open markets. To that purpose, we should seize the historic
opportunity afforded by Myanmars opening to connect South and
Southeast Asia into an integrated economic landscape. Through our
trilateral dialogue with India and Japan, we are doing just that
In her interaction with Indias Foreign Secretary Ms. Sujatha Singh, the
latter underlined the need for officials on both sides to expeditiously
resolve outstanding issues, to enable both sides to focus their energies
on the substantive and strategic issues that underpin this vital partnership.
Both sides reaffirmed the priority attached to India-US strategic
partnership, and discussed ways in which existing dialogue mechanisms
could be energized to generate fresh momentum.93
7.1. Indo-US Defence Cooperation

In spite of the spat over Devyani Khobragade incident, defence
cooperation between India and the USA continued as per schedule.
92
Nisha D. Biswal, Special, Strategic Relationship, The Times of India, March 4, 2014,
http://lite.epaper.timesofindia.com/getpage.aspx?articles=yes&pageid=
14&max=true&articleid=Ar01400&sectid=5edid=&edlabel=TOICH&mydateHid=0 403-2014&pubname=Times+of+India+-+Chennai++Editorial&title=Special%2C+Strategic+Relationship&edname=&publabel=TOI,
93
Elizabeth Roche, US disputes: India for early resolution, The Mint, March, 2014,
http://www.livemint.com/Home-Page/xd1LAv3rOzd3rVQ1eJd0AO/US-disputesIndia-seeks-early-resolution.html, accessed on February 1, 2015.
India and USA signed the second contract worth $1.01 billion for
purchase of six additional C-130J Super Hercules aircraft in
December 2013 under foreign military sales (FMS) programme.
Indian Air Force earlier had acquired the first batch of six C-130Js
tactical airlift aircraft ordered for $962 million in 2007, which are based
at the Hindon airbase at the outskirts of Delhi. The six new C-130Js,
also meant for special operations as the first six are slated to be
based at Panagarh in West Bengal.94 Panagarh will also house the
headquarters of the mountain strike corpse with a total of 80,000
soldiers, being raised by the Army in a project worth around Rs. 90,000
crore. The proposal to form the mountain strike corpse was initiated
by the Indian Army some time in 2010. The Cabinet Committee on
Security, however, asked the services chief to redraw the plan with
components from each service to avoid chances of any repetition in
future. Subsequently, the plan was reviewed by the Chief of Staff
Committee, which had since been cleared by the defence ministry.
The C-130J had already landed at the Daulat Beg Oldie airstrip in the
eastern Ladakh at an altitude of 16,614-feet just 7 kilometers from
Line of Actual Control on the India-China border. Besides, the C130J, India also signed with USA in June 2011, to acquire ten C-17
Globmaster III airlifters, making India the largest C-17 customer outside
the U.S. C-17 is bigger than C-130-J, but C-130J can land at small
forward base on a semi-prepared runway. Capable of carrying Indias
T-72 tanks closer to the China border, C-17 Globmaster III can take
off or land on a small runway. Under normal operation, a C-17
Globmaster III airlifter can carry a T-72 or T-90 into, or out of, a high
altitude air field. It can carry armoured vehicles as well as the tanks.
During the field trials in India, the C-17 Globmaster III demonstrated
ability to fly at high altitudes, take off and land on short and unprepared
runways and carry heavy loads. Both the C-130-J and C-17 Globmaster
94
Rajat Pandit, India, US ink $1 billion deal for 6 more Super Hercules, The Times of
India, December 28, 2013, accessed on February 1, 2015, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-US-ink-1billion-deal-for-six-Super-Herculesaircraft/movie-review/28025763.cms, accessed on February 1, 2015.
III are stationed at Panagarh, as an air arm to the mountain strike

corpse. The Defence Ministry also negotiated with the USA to buy
145 ultralight-weight howitzers for operational use in the hilly terrains.
All these acquisitions of advance aircraft and their positioning in strategic
locations are suggestive of Indias threat perception emanating from
China.
Interestingly enough, Indias acquisition of these heavy lifter aircrafts
and weapons picked up the momentum when Indias threat perception
of China registered a high degree of salience. The Annual Report of
the Ministry of Defence for the year 2010-11 observed, India is
conscious and watchful of the implications of Chinas evolving military
profile in the immediate and extended neighbourhood. Indias policy
is to engage with China on the principles of mutual trust and respect
and sensitivity for each others concerns The Annual Report of the
Ministry of Defense for the year 2014-2015 reiterated that India
remains conscious and watchful of the implications of Chinas increasing
military profile in our immediate naighbourhood as well as the
development of strategic infrastructure by China in the border areas.
It further said, India is also taking necessary measures to develop the
requisite capability to counter any adverse impact on our own society.
Yet in another place, the report mentiond that China is engaged in
creating a favourable environment aimed at achieving its core objective.
Chinas is extending its lines of access towards the India Ocean through
Myanmar and Pakistan. Its footprints in Indias immediate
neigbourhood has also been increasing as a result of its proactive
diplomacy through political, military and economic engagement. Thus,
it is Indias threat perception as emanating from China that impels
India to forge and deepen defence cooperation with the USA, which
in turns riles China creating a vicious circle.
8
THE ELECTORAL VICTORY OF BJP AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE TRIANGULAR
RELATIONS
8.1. The Chinese Response
While the sixteenth general elections to the Lok Sabha will be
remembered as water shed for many reasons, it is interesting to analyze
how both China and USA tried to reach out to its Prime Ministerial
candidate Narendra Modi, in the run up to the elections and after the
election results were declared. While Indo-US relations remained on
the plateau without any major initiative to repair the damage caused by
the Devyani episode, Beijing continued its charm offensive and even
extended overtures to the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) and
NarendraModi. Beijing hosted him in November 2011 and facilitated
a meeting for him with Wang Gang, member of the CPC Central
Committee. Chinese media showed a lot of interest on the long drawn
national elections in India that started on April 7 and ended on May 12.
Positive vibes were exuded towards BJPs prime ministerial candidate,
while acknowledging the contributions of the outgoing regime under
the leadership of the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
pointing out the continuity and stability of Sino-Indian relations. Beijing
based correspondent of major English daily extensively quoted a
Chinese scholar Lan Jianxue from the China Institute of International
Studies saying, Unlike some western countries, China doesnt feel
uncomfortable with any Indian parties or candidates. When he first
became chief minister in Gujarat, he had been studied by Chinese
scholars. A large amount of Chinese investment has been putting in
Gujarat. Some believe he is very pragmatic and has some Chinese
way. In 2011, he was invited to visit China. The visit was very successful
and good to build some personal linkage and working relationship.95
95
Sutirtho Patronobis, Shakti or Shanti, Chinese experts analyse Modis plan, The
Hindustan Times, April 6, 2014.
In the same news story, the former Consul General of China in Kolkata,
Mao Siwei had a similar view on Modis business policies. Mao was
quoted saying, There is a saying in India that Gujarat is Indias
Guangdong. This reflects a trend that Indians are recognizing the
importance of manufacturing to the economyIf Mr. Modi becomes
the next Prime Minister of India, I believe the Chinese government
would say that We respect the decision made by the Indian people.
The news report further quoted another Chinese scholar, who is known
for his favourable disposition towards India, as saying, No matter
which party comes to power, the current momentum of Sino-India
relations will be maintained. The aforesaid narrative suggests how
deterioration in Indo-US relations encourages China to extend overtures
of goodwill and strategic gestures towards India.
8.2. The US Response

Unsure of his electoral victory, the US administration reached out to
Modi late, only when exit polls suggested his impending victory with
thumping majority in the second week of May 2014. The U.S. State
Department described the Indian elections, as an inspiring example
of the democratic process in action. Its spokesman Jen Psaki said,
We view our relationship with India as one thats vitally important for
economic and strategic reasons. We look forward to work with the
leaders chosen by the Indian people to advance this important
partnership and to set an ambitious agenda. Ashley Tellis, a South
Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said
that if Modi were elected, Secretary John Kerry should visit India as
soon as possible and Modi should be invited to the United States.96
In a statement, Obama said, The United States and India have
developed a strong friendship and comprehensive partnership over
the last two decades, which has made our citizens safer and more
prosperous and which has enhanced our ability to work together to
96
U.S. would welcome Modi as PM despite past visa ban, Reuters, http://in.reuters.com/
article/2014/05/12/modi-pm-usa-visa-idINKBN0DS1M120140512, accessed on
February 1, 2015.
solve global challenges.97 The US factor in Sino-Indian relations was

very much evident in an article by Ashley Tellis in the website of Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace carried just a few days before the
election results were declared on May 16, 2014. In the article, Tellis
argued that Washington should remember that a strong India is in
Americas strategic interest on its own merits. Especially in the face of
an increasingly assertive China, the United States benefits from the
presence of a robust democratic power that is willing to and capable
of independently balancing Beijings rising influence in Asia.98 Without
mentioning the Pivot to Asia, he, however, extrapolated it in his
assertion that a deeper Indian relationship with Japan, Singapore,
and other trading states of East Asia will bind New Delhi closer to
countries that are otherwise American allies and partners. These states
will profit from any renewed Indian engagement in their region, in the
process of advancing U.S. interests even if doing so was not Indias
primary intention. Even an effort by Modi to improve Sino-Indian
ties would not necessarily undermine American aims in Asia. Modi is
astute enough to recognize the nature of threats posed by rising Chinese
power to Indian security, so it is unlikely that improved relations between
Beijing and New Delhi would ever come to constitute strategic
bandwagoning against Washington.
Sensing the electoral victory, Modi had a studied response to a tricky
question raised by a correspondent of a leading newspaper as to
whether he would build upon better relationship with China than with
the USA, he avoided a direct answer and said that relations between
India and USA cannot be determined or be remotely influenced by
incidents related to individuals The oldest democracy in the world
and the largest democracy in the world are natural allies and we must
work together towards global peace and prosperity. Regarding China,
97
Exit poll effect: Obama to work closely with NDA, The Pioneer, May 14, 2014, http://
www.dailypioneer.com/world/exit-poll-effect-obama-to-work-closely-with-nda.html,
98
Ashley Tellis, Productive but Joyless? NarendraModi and U.S.-India Relations, May
12 ,2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/12/productive-but-joyless-narendramodi-and-u.s.-india-relations/han1?reloadFlag=1, accessed on February 1, 2015.
he said that it was possible to solve the problems with China and take
the relationship with it to another level. If India and China want to
work together towards improving our relationship and resolve our
differences, it would be helpful to both the nations. The 21st century
belongs to Asia. More than 60% of the worlds population resides in
Asia. It would be thus in the interests of the world that Asia develops
and concentrates on improving the standard of living of its people.99
The reset in ties between the two countries started with a congratulatory
telephone call from President Obama to Prime Minister elect Modi on
May 16, 2014 that was also accompanied by an invitation to visit
Washington. It was on the same day that that the White House announced
the lifting of the visa ban on Modi.100 Few days later, US secretary of
state John Kerry called up foreign minister Sushma Swaraj on May 29,
2014 and followed it up with a visit to New Delhi on July 31 for the
fifth India-US strategic dialogue. Another high profile visitor from the
US administration was Secretary of Defence Chuk Hagel, who visited
New Delhi in August 2014.
China also tried to reach out to India with equal alacrity. Its foreign
minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi as a special envoy of the Chinese
government on February 11, 2014. After the formation of the new
government under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi
in May 2014, Beijing wanted to invite him to visit China. Sensing that a
visit by Prime Minister Modi might not be possible immediately, Beijing
invited Vice-President Hamid Ansari to participate in the celebration
of the sixtieth anniversary of Panchsheel held in Beijing on June 28-29,
99
NarendraModi interview: Only constitutional authorities should be trusted on Gujarat

riots, The Times Of India, May 8, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/loksabha-elections-2014/news/Narendra-Modi-interview-Only-constitutional-authoritiesshould-be-trusted-on-Gujarat-riots/articleshow/34843479.cms, accessed on February
1, 2015.
100
Elizabeth Roche, Advent of new govt. opportunity to renew ties: Obama, Modi, The
Mint, October 1, 2014, http://origin-www.livemint.com/Politics/
ZzaBkISPeY1MBBJ5R2npuL/Advent-of-new-govt-opportunity-to-renew-ties-ObamaModi.html, accessed on February 1, 2015.
2014. Jansangh, the precursor of the nationalist BJP was critical of the
Panchsheel agreement in the Indian Parliament in the 1960s. Prime Minister
Modi, however, sprang a surprise by deciding to visit Bhutan as his
first port of call after assuming power. Priorities of the countries,
which Prime Minister Modi decided to visit, certainly reflected his foreign
policy priorities. Be that as it may, Prime Minister Modi met Chinese
President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the sixth BRICS summit held
at Fortaleza (Brazil) on July 15, 2014. Interestingly while alluding to
India-China relations President Xi Jinping remarked that when India
and China meet, the whole world watches, Prime Minister Modi said,
If India and China amicably resolve the boundary question, it would
be an example for the entire world on peaceful conflict resolution.
The difference of emphasis is quite clear. President Xi tried to exhibit
the strategic solidarity between the two countries; Modi drew attention
to the contentious border dispute. Prime Minister Modi visited Japan,
a close ally of the USA in September 2014, ahead of the visit of
Chinese president Xi Jinping to India, which took place from September
17, 2014.
It was against this backdrop that foreign policy orientation of India
witnessed certain discernible shift towards the USA and its strategic
allies like Japan, a process which earlier started with the Congress led
UPA government under Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. The subtle
tilt of the Modi government towards the USA manifested when he
visited USA towards the end of September within few months of the
formation of his government. The Joint Statement issued on September
30, 2014 said that President Obama recognized that Indias rise as a
friend and partner is in the United States interest. Noting that the two
way trade between the two countries had increased fivefold since 2001
nearly to $ 100 billion, the two sides pledged to facilitate the actions
necessary to increase bilateral trade to five fold. Significantly, the issue
that rattled Beijing was the reference to South China Sea. The Statement
asserted that the two leaders agreed to intensify cooperation in maritime
security to ensure freedom of navigation and unimpeded movement
of lawful shipping and commercial activity, in accordance with accepted
principles of international law. To achieve this objective, the two sides
considered enhancing technology partnerships for Indias navy including
assessing possible areas of technology cooperation. They also agreed
to upgrade their existing bilateral exercise MALABAR. The Statement
also contained convergence of approach with regard to Asia-Pacific

and South China Sea articulating that Indias Act East policy and the
United States rebalancing to Asia, the leaders committed to work more
closely with other Asia-Pacific countries through consultations, dialogues,
and exercises. They underlined the importance of their trilateral dialogue
with Japan and decided to explore holding this dialogue among their
Foreign Ministers. The Joint Statement for the first time perhaps
expressed concerns about rising tensions over maritime territorial
disputes, and affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime
security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout
the region, especially South China Sea. The Joint statement further said
both sides called on all parties to avoid the use, or the threat of use, of
force in advancing their claims and urged the concerned parties to
pursue resolution of their territorial disputes through all peaceful means
in accordance with universally recognized principles of international
law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Although this stance was in line with Indias stated position on the
issue, its articulation in a Joint Statement rattled China. Referring to the
statement, Beijing reacted that Chinas position was that the dispute in
the South China Sea should be resolved by countries; directly concerned
through negotiation and consultation, and any third party should not
be involved.101
Barely two weeks after Prime Minister Modis visit to the USA, President
Pranab Mukherjee, ahead of the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping
to India, visited Vietnam, a close strategic country for the USA, from
September 14 - 17, 2014. The Joint Communiqu between the two
countries reiterated that freedom of navigation in the East Sea/ South
China Sea should not be impeded and called the parties concerned to
abide by and implement the 2002 law, including the UNLOS-1982.
The two countries also welcomed the collective commitment of the
concerned parties to abide by and implement the 2002 Declaration of
101
Third party should keep off South China Sea: Beijing to India ,US, The Hindustan
Times, October 9, 2014, http://www.htsyndication.com/htsportal/article/Third-partyshould-keep-off-South-China-Sea%3A-Beijing-to-India,-US/5707737, accessed on
February 1, 2015.
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea on the basis of consensus
and called for cooperation in ensuring security of sea-lanes, maritime
security, combating piracy and conducting search and rescue
operations.102 The three day visit of President Xi Jinping to India which
concluded on September 19, 2014, was an important event in the
narrative of complex relationship between the two countries. The visit,
however, didnt result in any major breakthrough. The Joint Statement
between the two countries largely reiterated earlier stated positions on
different issues. Sixteen agreements were signed between the two
countries during the visit. A tangible out of the visit was the agreement
to establish two industrial parks in India. The border transgression by
the Peoples Liberation Army of China along the Indian side of the
Line of Actual Control (LAC), on April 10, 2015, however, exacerbated
the security dilemma between the two countries. This impelled Prime
Minister Narendra Modi to assert: Respect for each others sensitivities
and concerns, and peace and stability in our relations and along our
border, are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our
relations.
While persistent security dilemma and increasing Chinese footprints in
Indias neighborhood stymied strategic partnership between India and
China, the same factor and the Chinese assertiveness forged Indo-US
relations to greater heights. Prime Minister Modi created a history of
sort when he invited President Barack Obama in November 2014 to
be the Chief Guest at Indias Republic Day celebrations on January 26,
2015. White House accepted the invitation swiftly. It was against this
backdrop of heightened bonhomie that President Barack Obamas
three day visit to India took place from January 25-27, 2015. It was
for the first time that a President of USA was the Chief Guest at the
ceremonial Republic Day parade. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision
for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region evoked a studied response
from China. The Vision document reiterated the importance of
102
Joint Communiqu between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of
India, Hanoi, Vietnam, September 15, 2014, http://www.presidentofindia.nic.in/pressrelease-detail.htm?1105, accessed on February 1, 2015.
safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation

and over flights throughout the region, especially in the South China
Sea. It further called on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force
and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all
peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognized principles
of international law, including the United Nation Convention on the
Law of the Sea.103 The document also sought to strengthen the East
Asia Summit on its tenth anniversary to promote regional dialogue on
key political and security issues, and to work together to strengthen it.
All these affirmations and articulations clearly suggests US efforts to
mentor India to be a stake holder in the maritime security in the AsiaPacific in the backdrop of Chinas growing assertiveness in the region
with the strategic objective of creating the regional equilibrium or a
new Asian balance of power. This was very much evident in the Joint
Statement released on January 25. It recognized the important role
that both countries play in promoting peace, prosperity, stability and
security in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region and noted that
Indias Act East Policy and the United States rebalancing to Asia
provide opportunities for India, the United States, and other AsiaPacific countries to work closely to strengthen regional ties.104 The
defence and military dimensions of the growing strategic convergence
were manifested in the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI)
in developing new areas of technology cooperation in the defence
sector through co-development and co-production. The Joint Statement
further committed to continue to work towards Indias phased entry
into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia
103
US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, January
25, 2015, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/24728/USIndia+Joint+Strategic+Vision+for+the
+AsiaPacific+and+Indian+Ocean+Region, accessed on February 1, 2015.
104
Joint Statement during the visit of President of USA to India-Shared Effort; Progress
for All, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 25, 2015, http://
m e a . g o v. i n / b i l a t e r a l - d o c u m e n t s. h t m ? d t l / 2 4 7 2 6 / Jo i n t _ S t a t e m e n t _
during_the_visit_of_President_of_USA_to_India_Shared_Effort_Progress_for_All,
Group. President Barack Obama affirmed that the United States and
India meets MTCR requirements and is ready for NSG membership
and that it supports Indias early application and eventual membership
in all four regimes. Speaking before a select gathering on January 27,
President Obama reiterated the support of USA for Indias candidature
for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.105
Beijing keenly watched the visit and reacted very cautiously. Reporting
the development, China Daily quoted Foreign Ministry spokeswomen
Hua Chunying, China hopes that the development of US-India
relations will help promote mutual trust and cooperation among
countries in the region, and safeguard peace, stability and prosperity
of the region as well. The report also quoted the congratulatory
messages of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang to President
Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Modi on the occasion of the
66th anniversary of Indian Republic pledging that China was willing to
work with India to deepen their mutually beneficial cooperation, build
close partnership in development and elevate the bilateral strategic
cooperation partnership to a higher level.106 Quoting the article of an
Indian professor carried in its own columns the previous day, it said,
Modi must realize that since the Chinese economy has increased from
2.5 times that of India in 2000 to five times today, he has to focus on
economic diplomacy and build partnerships with one and all to replicate
Chinas policies.
While China Daily was conciliatory in its comments, the ultra nationalist
Party controlled Global Times was more critical of the President Obamas
India visit. It criticized western media for pitting India against China. It
described American strategic outreach to India as a craftily set trap,
which will be revealed eventually.
105
Want India as permanent member of UNSC: President Obama, Yahoo News India,
January 27, 2015, https://in.news.yahoo.com/want-india-permanent-member-unscpresident-obama-065302481.html, accessed on February 1, 2015.
106
Chen Weihua, Obamas India trip triggers triangular concern, China Daily, January 27,
2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-01/27/content_19415778.htm, accessed
on February 1, 2015.
9
CONCLUSION
Unsure of Chinas strategic intention and the persistent security dilemma
existing between the two countries and given the asymmetry in the
military strength between India and China, New Delhi beefs up security
relations with the USA so as to create deterrence. Thus the 2005 New
Framework Agreement laid strong foundation leading to mutually
beneficial defence cooperation activities through security dialogue, service
level exchanges, defence exercises and defence and technology
collaboration. The new US Strategic Military Guidance announced in
January 2012 by President Obama puts greater emphasis on the Pacific
region and refers to India as a Strategic Partner. The common strategic
and security interests are , however, couched in subterfuge like
maintaining security and stability, defeating violent religious extremism
and terrorism, disaster relief, preventing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and associated materials, data and techniques,
protecting the free flow of commerce and resources through the vital
sea lanes of Indian Ocean.
In the triangular relations, the US attitude towards India has been to
mentor it to play a pivotal role in the Asian balance of power to create
equilibrium to deter Chinese assertiveness. Sino-Indian relations on the
contrary have been resilient, but the undercurrent of strategic distrust
and security dilemma persists. Border incursions take place and security
dilemma persists. Although government avoids articulating them in so
many words, certain military defence and strategic measures do indicate
them. Moreover Chinas charm offensives and overtures do not match
with its infrastructural developments in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(PoK), which exacerbates Indias security concerns. China is yet to extend
support to Indias candidature for the UNSC, while India had done so
even at the height of border war in 1962. This is because the nature of
relationship between the two countries continues to be adversarial in
spite of the claims of both the countries that there is enough space for
both to cooperate and compete. But there is a qualitative difference in
the nature of relationship that India shares with USA and China. One
fundamental difference in the nature of relationship that India shares
with US and China is that India-China relations even if they are resilient
continues to be competitive, if not adversarial, which is not the case
with the USA. So far as Chinas claim of Asian identity of India and
China; and the US claims of shared values of democracy are concerned,
it may be asserted that to a large extent they are both symbolic and
rhetoric. It is the national interest that drives the foreign policy postulates
of the three countries. Indo-US difference can be attributed to the
vibrant nature of the democratic polity of the two countries with
robust judicial system and also a fiercely independent media. The
differences in Indo-US relations at different levels are articulated freely;
whereas Sino-Indian relations, at times, are concealed or muted.
Can India trust USA? The answer is complex. Before an answer can
be drawn, USAs past attitude and behaviour will help us to formulate
answer. As discussed in the preceding sections, US in the past had
supported Pakistan on Kashmir issue much to the chagrin of India. It
had supplied arms and ammunitions to Pakistan targeted against India.
It sided with Pakistan in 1971 war and sent the USS Enterprise to deter
India. USA had imposed sanction against India for Indias nuclear
explosion in 1998. It didnt pay heed to India, when it suffered to
terrorism until the twin tower attack. Although in the past, in 1962
war, USA extended all material and political support to India, to the
extent as the economies of the USA and China are intertwined like the
con-joined Siamese twins, it is only a hazardous guess if US would
support India in the event of a conflict situation like 1962.
How is Indias experience with China? At the level of rhetoric, the two
countries claim cultural intercourse for about 2000 years; both suffered
colonialism and imperialism, and fought against them. Both championed
the cause of the Afro-Asian countries. Both argue that current world
governance structure should reflect the tectonic shift from Atlantic to
the Asia-Pacific. The similarities end here. The divergences are quite
enormous. The two have different and yet competitive political
systems-India, a boisterous democracy; and China, a totalitarian system.
Both are two of worlds largest economies competing for strategic
resources, and markets; and for global clout and influence. Will they
have to inevitably come to a conflict of war like situation to resolve
their claim and counter claim? Not necessarily; because, the nature of
geo-politics has changed. Not only that the theatre of geo-politics has
shifted from Atlantic to Asia-Pacific, but also the nature of geo-politics

has changed after the end of cold war-from politics in command to
economy in command. Globalization and mutual economic
interdependence has added new dimension to contemporary geopolitics. The intense negotiations for Free Trade Agreement of different
hues, both at bilateral and multilateral level have the potential to convert
challenges into opportunity. Yet another highlight of contemporary
international politics is the slew of Confidence Building Measures
(CBMs) between and among nation states and multilateral architectures,
which have been found useful to diffuse acrimonious situations. Secondly,
todays China is not the China of 1950s or 1960s. It has long shed its
isolationism and is an important stakeholder in global governance. Thus
the triangular relations need to be seen in these perspectives.
It is in Indias interest that there is effective strategic communication
between USA and China particularly with regard to Asia-Pacific.
Similarly, a robust engagement between India and China is in the interest
of USA. It augurs well that such an understanding exists between and
among the three countries. The assertiveness of China will continue to
be a challenge. This, however, needs to be managed thoughtfully, both
through engagement and hedging strategy. Strategic equilibrium in the
Asia-Pacific is the need of the hour. All the stakeholders in the regionUS, China, Japan and India should collectively endeavour for architecture
in the nature of what Japans former defence minister and national
security adviser Yuriko Kolke calls a concert system that gave Europe
a century of almost complete peace in the 19th century. Kolke further
writes, Such a system requires China to set aside its goal of regional
hegemony. Clear-sighted Chinese must already see that, short of a
victorious war, such dominance is impossible. Now is the moment
for China to anchor its rise in a stable and mutually acceptable Asian
regional order. For China, this may be the ultimate tipping point in its
modernization.107
107
Yuriko Kolke, Tipping points to Asias future, The Mint, May 27, 2014, http://
www.livemint.com/Opinion/NZoT1x9xpF8whiXVOEOdEJ/Yuriko-Koike
Tipping-points-to-Asias-future.html, accessed on February 1, 2015.
Recommendations
l
India should continue and strengthen the engagement with

China, and should articulate its concerns boldly. The CBMs
and the dialogue mechanisms between the two countries have
been to a large extent satisfactory. The hot-line telecom
between the two Prime Ministers and the military establishments
should remain active to diffuse any kind of strategic
miscalculation or misperception.
The military-to- military and defence dialogue should be made

more robust. New posts for border personnel and flag
meetings should be opened. Joint military exercises and the
naval exchanges should be more regular.
In the strategic and security dialogue with China, India should

appraise China of similar dialogue with USA and make it
clear that the security cooperation with USA is not targeted
against it.
India should further strengthen its infrastructure in the IndiaChina border. The border roads should be strengthened.
Defence is the best way to deter offence.
Indias defence budget should be further increased and to

supplement the governmental budget, Foreign Direct
Investment in select sectors and private participations should
be encouraged.
As far as the US is concerned, it must provide India advanced

defence technology and support co-production of advanced
defence equipment and help India indigenization of its defence
production and industry.
ANNEXURE I
ANNEXURE II
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environment and Indias response, in Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges
and Opportunities, Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi, 2007
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Gangulyopcit
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of Power System in the Making, Centre for Strategic and
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Contemporary International Relations, Vo. 21 No. 4, , China Institute
of Contemporary International Relations,July-August 2011
In the narrative of India-China-US triangular relations, the United States

occupies some degree of strategic space notwithstanding the fact that
Sino-Indian relations, like Sino-US relations, or for that matter, Indo-US
relations have their own dynamics and imperatives. The monograph
seeks to determine the extent to which the US is a factor as an intervening
variable in the complex relationship between the two countries. The study
attempts to probe the research question as to how China perceives U.S
policy towards India in particular, and whether growing Indo-US ties can
affect China's security interest negatively. Related to this research
question is how India is trying to calibrate its relationship with both USA
and China, and how far India has been successful in this endeavour in the
context of strategic distrust and security dilemma between both the
countries.
Rup Narayan Das was a Senior Fellow with the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses for little over four years from
June, 2010 to 31 August, 2014 on deputation from the Lok
Sabha Secretariat, where currently he is a Director in the
Research and Information Division of the legislature's
secretariat. He holds Ph.D in Chinese studies from the
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His
research papers, book reviews and articles have appeared, among
others, in Harvard Asia Quarterly, China Report, International Studies,
Strategic Analyses, Journal of Defence Studies, China Brief, Asia Times,
Diplomat, besides most English dailies of India. His monograph on SinoIndian Relations: A New Paradigm was earlier published by IDSA.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,
Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010
Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191
E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in

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IDSA Monograph Series

No. 46 October 2015

Rup Narayan Das

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 1

IDSA Monograph Series

THE US FACTOR IN SINOINDIAN RELATIONS

Rup Narayan Das

2 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Disclaimer: It is certified that views expressed and suggestions made in this

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 3

2. THE KOREAN WAR

3. 1962 WAR: THE TURNING POINT

3.1. NEHRU'S LETTERS TO KENNEDY

3.2. THE 'AIR UMBRELLA' CONTROVERSY

3.3. INTENSIFIED COOPERATION BETWEEN

3.3. THE U-2 INCIDENT

3.4 DID KENNEDY CONTEMPLATE NUKING

4. POST 1962 DEVELOPMENTS

5. 1971-1991: SINO-US CONVERGENCE, AND INDO-US

5.1. THE END OF COLD WAR, 1991: SINO-INDIAN

5.2. POKHRAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, 1998 AND

5.3. CLINTON'S VISIT TO CHINA

6. INDO-US STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE AND THE

6.1. INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL

6.2. SINO-INDIAN TRUST DEFICIT

4 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

6.3. THE US RETURN TO THE ASIA PACIFIC AND

6.4. CONDOLEEZZA RICE STATEMENT, 2005

6.5. ASIA-PACIFIC: INDIA'S NUANCED APPROACH

6.5. BEIJING'S SUSPICION: A RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT

6.6. THE SALIENCE OF THE TRIANGULAR

7. INDIA'S CALIBRATED APPROACH

8.1. THE CHINESE RESPONSE

8.2. THE US RESPONSE

II. SECONDARY SOURCE:

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 5

6 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 7

8 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 9

countrys existing diplomatic capital in more practical terms.1As the

10 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

LS Deb.cc9-10, July 31, 1950.

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 11

of the Peoples Republic of China into UNSC, which in turn would

12 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

transferred the Security Councils powers of military coordination to

Kux N.3, p.73.

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 13

In December 1950, just after the Chinese routed UN forces in North

14 | RUP NARAYAN DAS

with India for not appreciating the danger of communism, Nehru

Kux, N.3, p.142.

THE US FACTOR IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS...| 15

Sino-India relations started deteriorating in the middle of 1959.

16 | RUP NARAYAN DAS