Alog Julaug09

40 YEARS 19692009
Julyaugust 2009
Modular
Sustainment
in Iraq
Contracting Agility in LOGCAP-Kuwait
Sustainment-Centric Intelligence
Joint Logistics Analysis Tool
PB 7000904 Headquarters, Department of the Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

3

9
From CASCOM: Personnel Services Delivery Redesign

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B. Nichols
Contracting Agility in LOGCAP-KuwaitColonel Scott S. Haraburda,
Lieutenant Colonel Frances A. Bloom, and Major Robert T. Keck
Planning Initial Reset for Brigade Combat TeamsMajor Jason Tomasetti
PB 7000904
VOLUME 41, ISSUE 4
JULYAUGUST 2009
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Chairman
Major General James E. Chambers
Commander
Army Combined Arms Support Command
Members
The Honorable Dean G. Popps
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
10
Pit Crew Maintenance in the Brigade Support BattalionMajor Troy K. King
13
Sustainment-Centric IntelligenceCaptain Gregory Larkin
18

Commentary: Logisticians Are Sustainers, Not Targeters

Major Donald A. MacCuish
20

Over There: Army Expeditionary Forces Logistics in World War I

Alexander F. Barnes

24
The 1st Sustainment Brigade in Iraq

Executing Offensive LogisticsLieutenant Colonel Todd A. Heussner
27

Transformation of Finance OperationsMajor Thomas A. Buchholz,

Captain Nicole M. Ward, and Staff Sergeant James R. Bakie
Colonel Shelley A. Richardson

Commandant
32

The Critical Role of Shower, Laundry, and Clothing Repair Teams

Captain James C. Machado
Barbara G. Mroczkowski
Assistant Commandant
36

Technology and Daily Management Help CRSPs Move Cargo

Chief Warrant Officer (W2) Nadine S. Johnson
38

The 1st Sustainment Brigades Contract Coordination Cell

Major John R. Caudill
42
Human Resources Modularity Tested in IraqCaptain Xarhya Wulf
47
The Joint Logistics Analysis ToolPeter J. Cloutier and Brian K. Frank
50

Lightweight Modular Causeway System: Logistics Advanced Concept

Technology DemonstrationMargaret A. Deming
52

Earning a Graduate Degree at ILEWillis F. Jackson, Jr., Gerald J. Leonard,

and Gina Smith
54

Spectrum
No Belts Required: The Advantages and Limitations of Statistical
Quality ControlMajor Donovan O. Fuqua
58
Log Notes
59
R & R: Reading and Reviews
61
News
Cover: A shower, laundry, and clothing repair (SCLR) specialist with the 549th
Quartermaster Company, 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, from Fort
Carson, Colorado, folds clothes at Patrol Base Murray, Iraq. Before a SLCR team
arrived at the patrol base, Soldiers had to wash their laundry by hand or send it
on a convoy to Forward Operating Base Falcon and then wait 3 to 4 days to get it
back. With the SCLR team deployed, Soldiers had to wait only 24 hours to get their
laundry back. The article beginning on page 32 describes how SCLR teams provided
clean clothes, hot showers, and textile repairs to Soldiers in the field. Articles
beginning on pages 24, 27, 36, 38, and 42 discuss other support provided by units
under the 1st Sustainment Brigade in Iraq. (Photo by SPC Andrea Merritt)
Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

Deputy Chief of Staff, G4
Department of the Army
General Ann E. Dunwoody
Commander
Army Materiel Command
ARMY LOGISTICS
MANAGEMENT COLLEGE
STAFF
Robert D. Paulus, Editor
Kari J. Chenault, Associate Editor
April K. Morgan, Assistant Editor
Julianne E. Cochran, Assistant Editor
Louanne E. Birkner, Administrative Assistant
Graphic arts and layout by
RCW Communication Design Inc.
This medium is approved for the official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals
within the Army knowledgeable of current and
emerging developments within their areas of
expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0913114
World Wide Web address:

www.almc.army.mil/alog
From CASCOM
Personnel Services Delivery Redesign

by
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B. Nichols
ne of the many questions I come across in my

and HR planning and operations customer service. The
travels is this: Why did the Adjutant General
brigade S1s also provide policy, procedures, and training
Corps give up its personnel support battalions?
information and oversight to the battalion S1 sections
The answer is rather simple, but the effects of that deciwithin the brigade as directed by the brigade commander
sion are still being discovered by sustainment units
and defined by the division, corps, and Army service
today.
component command (ASCC) G1s and Army policy.
The simple answer is that the Army has transformed
Providing the brigade S1 section with all of the
into a brigade combat team/brigade-centric force, restrucsystem accesses and permissions needed to enter data
turing brigades to have the organic capabilities they
into or receive data from the top of the HR system (the
need to accomplish assigned tasks. The long answer is
Army Human Resources Command and the Defense
that the human resources (HR) community was told to
Finance and Accounting Service), without having to go
reduce its support command and control footprint on the
through intermediate steps at the division, corps, and
battlefield, and the Army's transformation to brigadeASCC G1s.
centric operations allowed for the transfer of the func Providing the capability to communicate digitally via
tions of the personnel service battalion to the brigade
NIPR (Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router),
S1. The HR communitys restructuring,
called personnel services delivery redeHR Tasks and Functions
sign (PSDR), has affected all echelons
of the Army structure, from battalion to
X
XX
theater levels.
S1
G1
The fundamental characteristics of
Plans, coordinates, integrates, and
Human resources (HR) plans and
executes HR support.
operations
PSDR are
Provides technical support to sub Personnel accountability and strength
Traditional
1
Empowering commanders to proordinate HR branches and HR companies.
reporting (PASR)
Reporting
Executes personnel accountability,
Personnel readiness management (PRM)
vide HR support to Soldiers with organic
Chain
casualty, postal, and R5 operations.
Brigade combat team (BCT) reception,
HR assets, thereby furnishing Soldiers
Establishes the theater casualty
replacement, return to duty, rest and
assistance center.
with specific support at brigade and batrecuperation, and redeployment (R5)
Establishes linkages to Military Postal
Personnel information management
talion S1 sections.
Service Agency and Joint Military Postal
Casualty reporting and management
Activity.
Eliminating the requirement to pull
Awards and decorations
Evaluations
personnel service capabilities from an
Utilization and assignments
external structure (the old personnel
Uniform Code of Military Justice actions
support battalions) to support brigade
Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR)
X
program
deployments; this was accomplished by
Sustainment
Soldier readiness
Sustainment
creating robust brigade and battalion S1
SPO HR plans and operations branch
Soldier actions and applications
requirements
Plan, integrate, and synchronize HR
Semicentralized promotions
sections.
and command
units in area of responsibility
Organization inspection program
and
control
Maximizing the use of web-based
Resource, position, and align HR units
Congressional inquiries
of
HR
units
(HR company, platoons, and teams)
systems, communications infrastructure,
Leave/pass processing
Direct postal, R5, and casualty
Rear detachment
and bandwidth to minimize the HR foot(medical treatment facilities)
Outside CONUS postal
print as well as layers of hierarchy; these
The Army Installation Management Command provides continental United States (CONUS) casualty and memorial
systems are brigade S1 enablers.
affairs, transition/retirement services, Soldier Readiness Program site management, reassignment processing,
Addressing
battlefield
deficiencies
deployment-cycle support, passports and birth registration, Army Career and Alumni Program, family travel, temporary
change of station orders, and identification cards and Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS)/Realinvolving casualty, postal, and personTime Automated Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS) support for retirees and family members.
nel accounting and strength reporting
(PASR) operations in deployed theaters, using modular,
The tasks and functions of the brigade S1
scalable, and flexible HR organizations that are com(listed on the left) and how they relate to the
manded and controlled by the sustainment community.
higher G1 (division in this case) and interact
Using brigade S1s to provide essential personnel
with the sustainment brigade, specifically the
services, PASR, personnel readiness management, perhuman resources (HR) operations branch within
the brigade support operations (SPO) section.
sonnel information management, casualty management,
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Casualty Reporting
Develop/refine and rehearse the brigade and battalion
casualty tactics, techniques, and procedures (for killed
in action [KIA] and wounded in action [WIA], duty
status-whereabouts unknown [DUSTWUN], hostile and
nonhostile casualties) to
Establish commanders critical information
requirements. Consider all KIA, all or some WIA, all
died of wounds, and key events (such as notification,
movement of KIA/WIA, funeral, etc.)
Internal and external brigade and battalion casualty reporting process and chain.
Field-grade release authority.
Rules for communication and notification within
the brigade/brigade combat team (BCT).
Evacuation of remains and wounded (process,
tracking, and reporting).
Letters of condolence and sympathy.
Summary courts-martial officer, line of duty, and
Army Regulation (AR) 156, Investigating Officers
Guide, investigations.
Brigade and battalion S1 daily update/report
with division G1, medical treatment facilities, mortuary affairs company, BCT surgeon.
Rear detachment casualty missions.
Memorial services.
Mass casualty events.
Counseling.
Field-grade review
Required for all deaths, DUSTWUN, and missing
per AR 60081, Army Casualty Program.
Field-grade reviewer is the battalion commander
or designated field-grade representative.
Authenticate casualty information for accuracy
and thoroughness.
Verify that data in lines 13, 79, 1214, 36, 37,
39, 40, and 61 are complete and detailed.
Ensure the CIRCUMSTANCES (line 39) are
properly written, error free, and answerthe 5 Ws:
WHO: (was involved?)
WHAT: (happened?)
WHEN: (did the incident occur?)
WHERE: (city, state, country, location, grid, etc.)
WHY (HOW): (What were the casualties doing at
the time of the incident?)
State the facts with respect and without speculation or embellishment. Remember, this information is
for the next of kin/family.
AR 156 Investigations
All hostile deaths and friendly fire and suspected
friendly fire incidents that result in death or wounding
of a Soldier require a 156 investigation.
Submit Supplemental Defense Casualty Information Processing System Report (Remarks: Investigating
officer name, start/end date).
Not later than 60 days after start, forward completed 156 reports to: [email protected].
(References: MILPER Messages 07233, 07236)
HR Tasks and Functions

Human Resources Operations Branch
Develop and execute human resources
(HR) plans and operations.
Synchronize HR support with other
sustainment elements and operations.
Project and recommend HR support
requirements.
Provide technical guidance to
supported S1/G1s and supporting HR
organizations.
Collect, analyze, and report HR
support information to sustainment
brigade and expeditionary sustainment
command commanders.
Prepare and maintain the personnel
estimate.
Establish and submit commanders
critical information requirements for HR
support operations.
Coordinate with other support
operations (SPO) branches to establish
and execute recurring transportation
requirements for postal and R5 units.
Coordinate with other SPO branches
and sustainment units for the execution
of life support for transiting personnel
during R5 operations.
Receive support requests from
supported S1/G1s.
TSC HRSC
Plans, coordinates, integrates, and
executes HR support.
Provides technical support to subordinate HR branches and HR companies.
Executes personnel accountability,
casualty, postal, and R5 operations.
Establishes the theater casualty
assistance center.
Establishes linkages to Military Postal
Service Agency and Joint Military Postal
Activity.
Technical
Guidance
Technical
Guidance
and
Resources
MMT
TG R5
Conducts R5 personnel processing

center operations.
Conducts MMT and postal operations.
Conducts casualty operations.
Conducts any combination of R5,
postal, or casualty operations depending
on make-up.
TSC HRSC = Theater Sustainment Command Human Resources

Sustainment Center
MMT
= Military Mail Terminal
R5
= Reception, replacement, return-to-duty, rest
and recuperation, and redeployment
TG R5
= Theater Gateway Personnel Processing Center
The various levels of the sustainment command

interact as they relate to additional human
resources (HR) areas of responsibility.
I
HR
SIPR (Secure Internet Protocol Router),

and voice networks to subordinate S1 sections, sustainment brigades, HR operations
branches, HR companies, casualty liaison
teams, continental United States personnel,
and division, corps, and ASCC G1s.
During a time of war, casualties are a
major concern of the HR community. No
matter what portion of the Army Force
Generation cycle your unit is in currently,
you should take time to review some of
the points in the chart above. It will be too
late to work through this process during an
actual crisis.
Through PSDR, the HR community has
transformed to support the modular, brigadecentric Army and the sustainment community. The result is improved HR support to the
warfighter that is more effective, more efficient, and more responsive.
ALOG
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B.

Nichols is the director of the Human
Resource Management Qualification Course at the
Army Adjutant General School at Fort Jackson,
South Carolina.
julyaugust 2009
Contracting Agility in LOGCAP-Kuwait

by
Colonel Scott S. Haraburda, Lieutenant Colonel Frances A. Bloom,
and
Major Robert T. Keck
To end fraud and waste in contracting and improve support to Soldiers,

the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program in Kuwait has expanded
its responsibilities beyond supporting the LOGCAP contract.
uring the monthly U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) class for contracting officers representatives in Kuwait, the briefer from
the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
would ask, Does anyone here know what LOGCAP
means in Kuwait? In response, most of the students
would answer KBR, meaning the company supporting the LOGCAP III contract. However, in Kuwait,
LOGCAP now means more than the LOGCAP contract. It also refers to the team of logistics support
officers (LSOs) and logistics management specialists
(LMSs) who support all contracts in the Kuwait area of
operations. So, what caused this change?
Traditional LOGCAP
LOGCAP provides contingency support to augment
the Army force structure. With large global commitments, the Army must use contractors to provide logistics support in theaters of operations so that military
units can be released for other missions. In essence,
contractors provide the Army with additional means to
adequately support its forces. This is not a new concept
for the Army, which has used contractors to provide
supplies and services since the Revolutionary War.
LOGCAP was established in 1985 to plan for contingencies and leverage existing civilian resources.
When the initial LOGCAP contract expired, it was
competed again, with DynCorp International LLC
winning the second contract in January 1997. In 2001,
the Army Materiel Command awarded the third contract, LOGCAP III, to KBR. Since then, it has been
the primary support contract of the Global War on
Terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, and
Georgia. The benefits of the LOGCAP contract to
warfighters include offsetting the Soldiers operating
tempo, maintaining high-technology and low-density
skills, allowing the transfer of Soldiers from combat
support and sustainment units to combat units, and
providing capabilities that the Army does not possess.
According to 2008 reports, over 160,000 contractor personnel were employed in Kuwait, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. The contracts they administered involved
most services and supplies. It was estimated that the
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Contractors from CSA, Ltd., discuss training

equipment in northern Kuwait with LOGCAP
and Defense Contract Management Agency
personnel. (Photo by COL Scott S. Haraburda)
military had spent in excess of $19 billion for the
logistics support of operations. As an integral part of
the LOGCAP team, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) administers the LOGCAP
contract in theater and provides quality oversight of
the contracts execution. DCMA develops, trains, and
manages contracting officers representatives (CORs)
in supported units and evaluates contractor performance, ensuring that Federal acquisition programs,
supplies, and services meet all requirements.
The Requirements Generation Process
The contracting process begins with a unit that has
a task that requires contracting support. The unit contacts the LOGCAP-Kuwait office and communicates
the required task to an LSO or LMS. The LSO helps
the unit generate a requirements memorandum, which
Requirements
Cost Estimate
Supported unit generates requirement memorandum with

unit lieutenant colonel/colonel commander approval.
LOGCAPs cost analyst generates independent Government

cost estimate (IGCE)
Acquisition Approval
Contract Award
Contracting officer issues contract to contractor
to begin executing contract requirements.
Contractor Executes
Contractor executes the contract and provides
the Government with its requirements.
Contractor Proposal
Contracting officer submits a request for proposal
from contractor for its proposal of the requirements.
LOGCAP assists in developing and submitting packet

for acquisition review board or purchase request
and commitment approval.
Scope
LOGCAP helps supported unit develop requirementsbased scope (i.e., performance work statement).
Funding Approval
Unit S8 or G8 (resource manager) takes approved
packet and approves funding and places in spend plan.
10
Negotiation
Contracting officer negotiates terms and conditions
of contract with contractor.
Contract Oversight
Contracting officer and contracting officers
representatives conduct oversight of contractors
to ensure compliance.
LOGCAP requirements generation process.

is signed by the first lieutenant colonel or colonel
in the chain of command. That officer validates the
requirement and certifies that the unit has exhausted
all organic resources capable of providing the needed
support. After validating the requirement, the LSO
helps the unit develop the requirements-based scope
that defines the exact need. The new requirement is
then written in performance-based language as a performance work statement (PWS).
While developing this PWS, the unit provides estimated cost-generating requirements to the LOGCAP
offices cost analyst, who then develops an independent Government cost estimate (IGCE). As this estimate is being developed, the contracting officer issues
a request for proposal to a contractor to use for its
formal proposal to meet the requirements of the PWS.
After receiving the contractors ceiling price proposal
or the IGCE, the LSO assists the unit in developing
and submitting a packet for acquisition approval. This
approval can be obtained from either an acquisition
review board or by completing a purchase request and

commitment form.
Once the acquisition is approved, the unit resource
manager, such as the S8 or G8, approves the funding
and places the budget into the spend plan. The contracting officer then issues a contract to the contractor
so it can begin execution of the contract. At the same
time, the contracting officer conducts negotiations
with the contractor to finalize the specific requirements and costs of the contract. The last step in this
process is oversight of the contractor, which is conducted through the administrative contracting officer
and his appointed CORs.
Flexibility is essential for effective logistics performance; logistics structures and procedures must be
adapted to changing situations, missions, and concepts.
Contract support is guided by a legal document (the
contract) outlining a PWS for both parties intent and
expectations. Unfortunately, if mission requirements
change, the PWS may require modifications if it is
julyaugust 2009
not written in sufficiently broad terms. If the PWS is

changed, the contract may require modification, which
many times results in cost changes.
The key areas addressed in contract planning
are contractor legal status; planning requirements;
mission-essential services; visibility; deployment, theater reception, and in-theater management processes;
force protection and security; and medical care. Obtaining optimal capabilities involves integrating military
and contractor planning, which is effectively accomplished by including LSOs in the planning process.
In planning for LOGCAP support, the art and science of writing contracts is critical to ensuring flexibility, sustainability, and survivability on the battlefield.
Every commander and logistician, from the field
commander down, must be knowledgeable about the
contract process, and the COR must be able to adapt
to the constantly changing environment.
Contracting Crisis
During a probe of contingency contracting in 2007,
it became clear that a serious problem involving fraud,
waste, and abuse existed in Southwest Asia. By that
summer, the situation had become so alarming that
the Secretary of the Army, Pete Geren, established the
independent Commission on Army Acquisition and
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations
to review recent operations and provide recommendations for improving the effectiveness and efficiency
of future operations. This commission released what
became known as the Gansler Report in October 2007.
The report identified two significant logistics issues:
Although the number of contractor personnel in
the Kuwait-Iraq-Afghanistan theater almost equals the
number of U.S. military personnel deployed there, the
operational Army does not yet recognize the impact of
contracting and contractors on expeditionary operations and mission success.
What should be a core competencecontracting
(from requirements definition, through contract management, to contract closeout)is treated as an operational and institutional side issue.
When the Gansler Report was issued, over 70 fraud
cases were open for investigation, involving about 100
personnel. Confirmed bribes totaled an excess of $15
million. People with relatively little training or background in Government contracting had committed the
significant majority of fraudulent actions. They were
either CORs or had other duties related to the contracting process. Many of the investigations involved
Soldiers who did not really understand contract law.
When Secretary Geren visited the Kuwait contracting office in September 2007, he was so impressed with
the requirements generation process of the LOGCAPKuwait office that he directed that it be used for all
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
requirements within Kuwait. In essence, the LOGCAP

process was identified and directed as a management
control in the contracting process. Since then, the
LOGCAP office has been leaning forward to support
the warfighter while the decisionmakers in the United
States determine the best way to support them.
Major Types of Services

Provided by the LOGCAP III Contract
Airfield operations
Ammunition storage and supply
Base camp operations:
- Construction and maintenance

- Electric power generation
- Food service and dining facilities
- Hazardous materials management
- Laundry services
- Operations and maintenance
- Water and ice distribution
Communications and
information technology
Equipment maintenance
Firefighting services
Fuel distribution
Morale, welfare, and recreation
Transportation
CORs are an essential part of managing contracts.
However, the Gansler Report found that they were
typically assigned their COR responsibilities as an
extra duty and possessed no COR-related experience. The result was that CORs were often inexperienced Soldiers who were assigned as CORs because
they had the available time. They also received little, if
any, training. The report concluded that the number of
CORs was insufficient and that they had a high turnover rate, which frequently left many gaps in contract
oversight. The Gansler Report recommended that all
logistics officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] should be earmarked as potential CORs.
To ensure that CORs had sufficient operational
knowledge of contracting, they were provided with
theater-specific COR training. The Army Contracting
Command-Kuwait developed a 3-day supplemental
COR course that augmented the COR course taught
by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and
the Army Logistics Management College (ALMC).
As part of this supplemental course, the students
learned about each agency involved in the contract.
The LOGCAP office has a 1-hour block that provides

necessary information about its requirements generation process.
LOGCAP Reachback
The Army Sustainment Command (ASC) established a robust contracting and logistics reachback
capability to pass the management and execution of
specific contracts and acquisition requirements back
to the United States. This change was designed to
strengthen the management of the Kuwait contracting
and logistics operations. The LOGCAP-Kuwait office
would provide management and oversight in support
of all contracts that were passed back to the ASC
offices in the continental United States.
This sounded simple enough when it started in
October 2007, but it posed challenges. The LOGCAPKuwait office had to overcome the inevitable not done
that way before obstacle when it took on the reachback
effort. For the first time, the LSOs assisted all of the
units in Kuwait with developing their requirements, no
matter which contract vehicle would be used to provide
the capabilities. Of course, it took some education and
As darkness falls, Army contract employees install

a fabric end section on a new maintenance tent
at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The tents are one way
to protect Soldiers, civilians, and equipment
from the sun, wind, dust, and high temperatures
of the Arabian Peninsula. (Photo by Jim Hinnant,
401st Army Field Support Brigade)
marketing to get the word out, but now the LOGCAP

office is the first stop for customers trying to get contract services in place in a timely and efficient manner.
In a matter of days after the reachback effort started,
the LOGCAP office took on over $1 billion in annual
requirements. For Kuwait, these included supply,
maintenance, transportation, public works, information management, training, and services. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
(SDDC) also gave the LOGCAP office requirements
for stevedoring and related terminal services for Umm
Qasr, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
The LOGCAP office used its effective program
management processes to support this reachback
effort. The processes included the requirements generation process as well as schedule, risk, and change
management processes.
Schedule management. The schedule was the center
of the contracting process and logistics plans. This was
the foundation on which resource estimation was based,
execution of task elements was monitored, and progress
toward success was measured. The LOGCAP team
frequently used milestones, timelines, and other schedules to assist
supported units in obtaining their
contracted services and supplies.
Risk management. Risk management does not mean avoiding
chances. The LOGCAP office
used this process to assess the
benefit-to-risk ratio and then
developed plans to manage the
risks or uncertainties involved in
each logistics effort. If the supported units failed to consider
risk, the result could be substantial loss for the unit, including
the possibility that the logistics
program would fail. In assisting
units, the LOGCAP office was
proactive in obtaining requirements early in the decisionmaking process and in developing
contingency plans in case of sudden changes in requirements.
Change management. Change
management was critical to
ensuring the success of supported units. In Kuwait, changes came from all directions:
from supported units, from other logistics units, and
from errors introduced into the requirements process, to
name a few. The LOGCAP office developed a flexible
response capability that assisted in managing the frequent changes in logistics requirements. The biggest
julyaugust 2009
change for the office was the internal change from

supporting just one contract under LOGCAP to supporting hundreds of contracts under the reachback
effort. It did this by becoming aware of the rationale
behind each change, acquiring the abilities to implement the changes, and institutionalizing procedures to
sustain the changes.
In addition to moving large and bulky contracts
back to ASC, the reachback effort required the accomplishment of more daunting tasks. Since each of the
base camps in Kuwait required similar services, such
as tents, electric power, latrines, water provision and
removal, copiers, cable and telephone services, and
facility operations and maintenance, it made sense to
consolidate hundreds of individual yet similar contracts into a handful of larger, more robust contracts.
The LSOs, as the interface between the supported unit
and contracting, constantly monitored expiring contracts and communicated with everyone to ensure that
no requirement fell through the cracks.
This logistics effort took a great deal of synchronization of all the required timelines, which normally
meant bridging or extending contracts to prevent lapses
in service. Obviously, the transitions were of the utmost
importance to maintain the continuity of services and
were monitored by the contracting officers, LSOs, and
supported units. Consolidating contracts reduced costs
to the Government by decreasing management fees
and increasing efficiencies in performance. In the end,
the reachback effort with ASC successfully corrected
the fraud, waste, and abuse found in Kuwait in 2006
and 2007.
Transition to LOGCAP IV
LOGCAP IV is the next iteration of the LOGCAP
contingency contracting plan. From 2001 to 2008,
KBR was the sole contractor supporting the LOGCAP
III contract. The follow-on contingency performance
contracts have been awarded to three separate companies as indefinite quantity/indefinite delivery
contracts with 1 base year and 9 option years. Each
contract has a maximum value of $5 billion per year,
which means a total annual maximum value of $15 billion and a lifetime maximum value of $150 billion.
The use of multiple LOGCAP contractors is
designed to reduce risk to the Government, which no
longer needs to rely on a single company to execute the
entire LOGCAP contract at a time of very high demand
for military logistics and support services. Under this
new strategy, the three performance contractors may
compete for individual LOGCAP task orders, creating
a competitive environment intended to control costs
and enhance quality. The three companies awarded
the LOGCAP IV contract were DynCorp International
LLC of Fort Worth, Texas; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc.,
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
An employee of ITT Corporation creates sparks

as he grinds away rough metal from the body of a
Caterpillar 621B scraper at the 1st Battalion, 401st
Army Field Support Brigade, auto body repair
facility at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar. (Photo by
Jim Hinnant, 401st Army Field Support Brigade)
of Greenville, South Carolina; and KBR, which is
based in Houston, Texas.
The transition from a single company to three
companies entails a great deal of planning and coordination to effect change while continuing to provide
service to the warfighter. The incumbent contractor,
KBR, will continue services until the transition is
complete. The most daunting challenge is the transfer
of Government-furnished property, which has to be
inventoried, technically inspected, and repaired before
it can be transferred. The transfer has to occur from
KBR to the Government and then from the Government to the new companies. Extreme diligence is
always a must in such situations to ensure that all
equipment is accounted for properly.
The LOGCAP IV transition is occurring in three
phases. The first phase is transition of services in the
Kuwait area of responsibility (AOR), which is the
Major Documents on Contractor Use
Joint Publication 40, Joint Logis-
tics. Chapter II describes key areas

involved in planning for the use
of contractors.
Army Regulation 7159, Contractors Accompanying the Force.
Provides the policies, procedures,
and responsibilities for using
deployed contractors.
Department of the Army Pamphlet 71516, Contractor Deployment Guide. Describes current
policies and procedures affecting
deployed contractors.
Field Manual 3100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield. Provides
guidance in developing plans for
managing and supporting contractors on the battlefield.
smallest of the three AORs that will be transitioning.
The second phase will be transition of the Afghanistan
AOR, with the Iraq AOR transition following shortly
thereafter as the third phase. The actual transition
started in July 2008 with site visits throughout Kuwait
by several representatives from each of the three contractors. The Kuwait transition has become a test bed
for developing lessons learned to ensure smooth transitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shortly after the initial
visits, the contracting officer sent a solicitation for
existing requirements to the three companies. Following award of contracts for these requirements later in
2008, they were transferred to the winning company in
the spring of 2009. The current plan is to complete the
transition of all existing requirements to the LOGCAP
IV contracts by the end of 2010.
The initial success of the LOGCAP reachback
and transition efforts can be traced to the LOGCAPKuwait offices ability to change its processes quickly
as mission requirements shift. As a pioneer in creating
logistics doctrine on the battlefield, the LOGCAP program in Kuwait has proven itself to be a value-added
force multiplier in ARCENTs full-spectrum logistics
effort. It has the potential of doing the same for other
global locations. In the meantime, LOGCAP-Kuwait
remains focused on customer support and providing
full-spectrum logistics support.
According to the Gansler Report, all logisticians

should understand the importance of contracting:
Over half of the personnel currently in Iraq and
Afghanistan are contract employees. This puts
Army contracting (writing, negotiating, monitoring, and achieving accountability and enforcement
of the contracts), along with modern (informationbased) logistics support, squarely at the forefront
of our challenges in supporting expeditionary
operations. It also invokes command-level issues:
Commanders must have timely situational awareness of contracts and contractor personnel and
assets on the battlefield, to properly plan, synchronize operations, and manage the supply chain.
To meet this goal, logisticians should accomplish
the following to effectively support the warfighter:
Understand the processes involved in using contractors on the battlefield.
Complete the ALMCDAU COR course.
Include the effective use of contractors in logistics
annexes to operation plans.
Be flexible in a rapidly changing logistics environment, by doing such things as leveraging and
synchronizing both organic and contracted sources
of supplies.
In 2003, no one imagined the scope, scale, operating
tempo, and duration of this war. Preparations to manage the logistics efforts in future contingencies must
leave sufficient degrees of freedom for the unforeseen
circumstances of the modern irregular warfare. The
bottom line in preparing to employ contractors on
the battlefield is that there is no going back. Contractors are now part of force deployment, and as such,
they must be included at all levels of logistics planning
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and training.
Colonel Scott S. Haraburda is the lead logistics support officer in the LOGCAP-Kuwait office.
He has a doctoral degree in chemical engineering
from Michigan State University and is a graduate
of the Army War College. He is a registered professional engineer in the state of Indiana.
Lieutenant Colonel Frances A. Bloom is a
logistics support officer in the LOGCAP-Kuwait
office. She has a B.S. degree in life science/medical
technology from Indiana State University and an
M.B.A. degree from American Intercontinental
University. She is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College.
Major Robert T. Keck is a logistics support officer
in the LOGCAP-Kuwait office. He has a B.S. degree
in animal science from Texas A&M University. He
is a graduate of the Transportation Officer Advanced
Course and the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School.
julyaugust 2009
Planning Initial Reset for Brigade

Combat Teams
by
onducting initial reset of a brigade combat team

(BCT) within 6 to 8 weeks of returning from
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring
Freedom can be critical to the rest of the brigades reset
and reconstitution. By targeting initial capabilities for
reset during the brigades block leave, the BCT can start
unit equipment reset (including new equipment issue) and
individual training relatively quickly.
Planning for the initial reset is necessary, and roles and
responsibilities should be determined 4 to 6 months out
so that coordination can start with rear detachments and
home-station organizations. The BCT support operations
office (SPO) or BCT S4 will likely be the starting point
for reset operations planning. The BCT must coordinate
with its rear detachment, Army field support battalion
(AFSBn), directorate of logistics (DOL), and division or
post G4 to determine how, where, and when equipment
will be reset and what the brigades priorities are (specifically, in what order units and systems will be reset). Army
Materiel Command brigade logistics support teams can
aid this coordination if they are deployed with the BCT.
The target of the initial reset is debatable, but should
include Standard Army Management Information Systems
(STAMISs), individual night vision devices (NVDs), and
individual weapons (to include M240 machineguns).
STAMISs include the Standard Army Maintenance
System (SAMS), Standard Army Retail Supply System
(SARSS), and Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced
(PBUSE) and are supported by the very small aperture terminal (VSAT), and Combat Service Support Automated
Information Systems Interface (CAISI).
STAMIS reset allows units to reset unit-level equipment,
order requirements to fill shortfalls, and track items sent for
sustainment-level reset.
At a minimum, resetting STAMISs should include
Cleaning computer hardware internally and externally.
Wiping hard drives and reimaging them with software and all updates.
Loading home-station unit information, including
unit identification codes and Department of Defense
activity address codes.
Inspecting and repairing VSATs and CAISIs.
Conducting a STAMIS communication gunnery by
setting up the satellite dishes and computers and ensuring
all systems (including VSAT, CAISI, SAMS, SARSS,
and PBUSE) can communicate with one another.
By resetting individual weapons and NVDs, units
should be able to start individual training shortly after
block leave while the unit equipment needed for unit- and
collective-level training is being reset.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Major Jason Tomasetti
Reset for weapons and NVDs consists of conducting

technical inspections, bringing equipment back to the
10 and 20 level, and turning in items that are deemed
nonreparable.
When redeploying, units must carry back initial reset
items as baggage to accompany troops. While individual
weapons are easy to carry back, units might be inclined
to ship back NVDs and STAMISs in unit containers,
which can result in a 6-to-8-week wait. This will hinder
the BCTs initial reset operations. STAMIS laptops are
easy to carry back, but strategic air support may be necessary to move the VSAT systems. Submitting this strategic
air request early in the redeployment planning process
is important.
Having the right people in place to facilitate the initial
reset is crucial, too. Battalions must appoint competent
people to oversee reset while the rest of the battalion is on
block leave. Key personnel include unit armorers to allow
technical inspectors into arms rooms, a supply person
to code out weapons or NVDs as needed, and STAMIS
maintainers and operators to oversee the STAMIS reset.
These people might not be readily available within the
rear detachment, so rear-detachment commanders must
identify candidates early on and send them to the proper
training, such as the Army Armorer School, before units
start to redeploy. For units still lacking the right expertise
in certain areas, these initial reset facilitators are good
candidates to include in the advanced redeployment party.
Tracking the progress of reset falls on the shoulders of
the BCT SPO and S4 and the AFSBn. Tracking mechanisms must be in place to ensure that all the equipment is
reset but is not inspected more times than necessary. These
mechanisms must be established early in the planning process to ensure that the proper data are collected and used
to keep the battalion- and brigade-level leaders informed
of reset progress. Adequately showing this progress to the
brigades leaders will instill confidence in the reset process, making reset easier once all the deployed equipment
returns to home station.
ALOG
Major Jason Tomasetti is the support operations
chief for the Logistics Management Branch of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Communication
and Information Systems Services Agency, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Belgium. He
served as the support operations officer for the 2d
Brigade Support Battalion, 2d Infantry Brigade
Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, during Operation
Iraqi Freedom 0608. He holds a master s degree in
military arts and sciences from the Army Command
and General Staff College.
Pit Crew Maintenance in the

Brigade Support Battalion
by
Major Troy K. King
n the operational environment of Iraq, equipment

takes a beating under the strain of harsh heat and
dust, generating challenges to maintaining combat
readiness. While deployed, the field maintenance company (FMC) of the 626th Brigade Support Battalion
(BSB), 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), knew it would take outside-thebox thinking and inventive strategies to combat the elements and the strain on equipment.
So, Soldiers implemented pit crew maintenance,
which is similar to how National Association for Stock
Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) mechanics keep their drivers vehicles in top condition. The distribution company
relied on the FMC to keep its vehicles moving on the
roads of Iraq, and the FMC took it personally when missions failed because of vehicle maintenance problems.
Like a NASCAR Pit Crew
Soldiers may say, What is pit crew maintenance in
the BSB? This is not NASCAR; we are in combat.
Where is this written in our doctrine? Where is this
found in the Army regulations? Pit crew maintenance is

nothing more than what maintenance Soldiers have been
practicing since the early days of the Global War on Terrorism: replace the part and continue on with the mission, ship the not mission capable (NMC) part back, and
let the sustainment maintenance team rebuild the part.
Pit crew maintenance best describes the method that
Soldiers adopted to maintain a fleet with a high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and allow them to deliver supplies to the forward support companies (FSCs).
In the pits of NASCAR races, crews focus on component replacements in the hours before the race. With no
time to rebuild an engine right before a race, the crew
replaces the engine. The time spent in the pit area often
determines the outcome of the race. In a BCT, a vehicles
time spent in the bay drives down the BSBs ability to
support the BCT. Fixing the vehicle and getting it back
on the road is the FMC mechanics objective.
Now that the Army has moved from a four-tier maintenance system to a two-tier system (field and sustainment), maintenance Soldiers are consolidated in one
A 626th Brigade Support Battalion Soldier rotates the tires of a vehicle belonging to the 3d Brigade
Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
10
julyaugust 2009
location to perform maintenance in a battalion. Transformation consolidated a brigades maintenance Soldiers into the FMC and the maintenance platoons
belonging to each FSC. Units do not have the time to
diagnose and rebuild components at the field maintenance level. In a NASCAR race, the pit crew changes
the engine or major subcomponent and gets the vehicle
back on the track. Our FMC did the same thing in Iraq,
but in our case, we got the vehicle back in the convoy.
NASCAR pit crew maintenance is a team effort. The
car will not operate efficiently if it is not in top condition before the race. Before the race begins, the car is
checked from bumper to bumper for flaws in the frame,
engine, and transmission. Military vehicles require the
same treatment. Pre-mission readiness is the FMCs
greatest concern since its goal is to ensure that vehicles
do not break down on the road. All military vehicles
require regular services, and post-mission checks normally involve preventive maintenance services.
The Effect of High OPTEMPO on Equipment
The Armys OPTEMPO has been high over the past
6 years, so its equipment has continually received
upgrades and overhauls. In the early years of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Soldiers placed armor plates on vehicles to protect themselves and complete their missions.
The increased and excessive weight pushed the vehicles past their physical limits.
The palletized load system and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) have been through
various rebuild programs that have only addressed the
components of the vehicle and not the frame. The
HMMWV was upgraded from the M1114 to the
M1151 and is now being replaced by the mine-resistant
ambush-protected vehicle to address the weight issues.
But because of the constant upgrades and limited production of armored vehicles, units still use the M1114s
to accomplish their missions.
In NASCAR, stress on the frame means reduced
performance on the track, which drastically affects the
outcome of the race. The same is true for Army vehicles. A prime example is the increased weight of the
front cab of the family of medium tactical vehicles.
When the engine compartment is opened for repairs,
the excessive weight causes fractures at the pivot
points. Currently, it takes the crane of an M984 heavy
expanded-mobility tactical truck wrecker to open and
hold the weight of the cab to prevent it from snapping
off the frame.
The Army tends to react to the effects of problems
instead of just fixing the problems. For instance, the
Army will replace components with rebuilt parts instead
of installing new engines or transmissions. Constant care
is required to maintain and increase the lifespan of the
vehicles in Iraq that do not receive new parts.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Soldiers of the 626th Brigade Support Battalions

field maintenance company change a vehicles
motor oil. Preventive maintenance is very important
in the high operating tempo environment of Iraq.
With the increased OPTEMPO and constant demand
on convoy vehicles, an FMC must embrace the two
levels of maintenance. Although the mechanics are
fully capable and equipped to rebuild the parts they are
replacing, an FMC cannot allow a piece of missionessential equipment to be out of commission while it
waits on repairs. A fast equipment repair time is critical
to meeting the requirements of the BCTs missions.
Annual Services Conducted Semiannually
The 626th BSBs FMC identified the need for a more
comprehensive plan to maintain an increased vehicle
readiness rate in combat. During a year-long deployment,
the BSBs vehicles experienced summer temperatures of
130 degrees and a winter that produced snow in Baghdad
for the first time in 20 years, which put additional stress
on vehicles and their components. Regular services were
important to keeping the vehicles on the road.
The Army suggests maintaining vehicles on annual,
semiannual, and quarterly schedules, with a different set
of services prescribed for each schedule. Instead of performing the semiannual and quarterly sets of services,
our battalion performed the annual set of services on
each vehicle every 6 months.
The warrant officers and senior noncommissioned
officers found that the quarterly and semiannual services
increase the downtime of mission-essential vehicles and
do not address every area that is necessary to maintain
the vehicle in top condition. The annual service is a more
comprehensive check that is needed to maintain vehicles
in a high state of readiness and has been shown to
decrease breakdowns on the road. The prescribed services schedule consumes considerable time, and our
FMC found that performing the annual services twice as
11
often was more efficient and effective than the traditional schedule.
Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
Vehicles are selected for missions based on the
requirements to support the BCT. If a distribution company vehicle broke down just 5 hours before a mission,
the company would not have time to find another
vehicle and prepare it for dispatch. But since the FMC
made sure that each vehicle regularly went through a
series of preventive maintenance checks and services,
one would already be mission ready and prepared to go
at a moments notice.
The BSB dispatched vehicles every 7 days (instead
of daily) to ensure that each vehicle received proper
maintenance attention. Each platoon in the distribution
company dispatched vehicles on different days to
increase the number of mechanics available to surge on
maintenance issues. All vehicles that went through the
inspection section received a bumper-to-bumper certified check. Each vehicle was checked for leaks and
stress fractures and insufficient tire pressure, fluids,
and tire condition. This process made up the principal
operator preventive maintenance checks and services
before the vehicle was inspected by the mechanics.
Next, the vehicle moved to the ground support equipment (GSE) section for a thorough air-conditioning
check. No vehicle is fully mission capable unless the airconditioning functions at full capacity. The GSE section
inspects all the components of the air-conditioning system and completes the check by blowing air through the
system with an air compressor to ensure free movement
of air in the vehicle. If the vehicle fails any part of the
inspection process, it is NMC and the operator takes it to
the motor sergeant to be repaired immediately.
The Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988E,
Equipment, Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet, is
initialed off at the inspection by the GSE and automotive sections before any mission-essential vehicle
receives approval to be used in a convoy. This process
decreases the requirement to dispatch each vehicle
daily and ensures each vehicle receives the highest
level of maintenance attention before each mission.
During-Mission Maintenance
The driver and vehicle commander play a vital role
in equipment readiness. During convoys, they see, hear,
and feel what the vehicle is doing. Like the NASCAR
driver who radios in and reports the slightest shaking or
vibration to the crew chief, the driver and vehicle commander report the slightest changes in the performance
of the vehicle to the inspection section.
What might be just squeaking or shaking to a driver
means much more to a mechanic, and a drivers input
will help the inspection team find problems. During the
12
inspection process, the mechanics can only visually

examine the vehicle and may not hear the vibrations or
squeaks that could lead to equipment failure on the
missions.
Post-Mission Checks
Like a NASCAR pit crew, the inspection sections
mission included a final step to ensure all missionessential equipment remained in the highest state of
readiness. After returning from a mission, all missionessential vehicles passed through the inspection section
to be checked bumper-to-bumper, just like during the
pre-mission checks, before being placed back on the
line. The faults were captured on the DA Form 5988E
and, if at all possible, fixed on the spot. Vehicles that
failed the inspection proceeded to the maintenance bay
for repair. The maintenance section indentified which
parts were required to repair the vehicle and placed the
parts on order before moving on to a new job. No job
was complete until the parts were replaced or on order.
The 626th BSB took the fight to the enemy. For the
FMC, the enemy was 5 years of wear and tear on critical, mission-essential equipment. Conducting the
annual services set every 6 months kept all but two
M931 5-ton tractors from breaking down on the roads.
Preparing a racecar for a big NASCAR race is a
7-day process. After a race on Sunday, the car receives
a post-race check to identify imperfections and look for
areas to improve performance. Then, a total overhaul of
the vehicle begins on Monday to prepare for the next
race. Throughout the week, parts are stripped, cleaned,
and replaced. For the BSB, this process started when
the vehicle returned from the mission and entered the
inspection bay for a post-mission maintenance check.
The creation of the pit crew maintenance plan addressed
a comprehensive dispatch plan with a strict checklist for
all vehicles. The inspector certified the mission readiness
of all vehicles before approving them for future combat
missions. The goal of this procedure was a 24-hour turnaround on all NMC equipment. The aggressive plan
allowed the BSB to enjoy a readiness rate of 96 percent
in the first 6 months of the deployment.
Mark Martin, NASCAR driver for the number 8 car
while it was on the U.S. Army Team, stated that after a bad
day on the track, Were like our Soldiers; we dont quit,
ALOG
we just fight harder to complete the mission.
Major Troy K. King is the executive officer of the
626th Brigade Support Battalion, 3d Brigade
Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
He has a B.S. degree in education from East Tennessee State University and an M.S. degree in education from the University of Tennessee.
The author would like to thank Captain Tammy
Bogart for her contribution to this article.
julyaugust 2009
Sustainment-Centric Intelligence
by
Captain Gregory Larkin
he art of being wise, psychologist William

James once wrote, is the art of knowing
what to overlook. The intelligence requirements of a sustainment command demand that more be
done with less. The far reach of convoy missions passing through multiple and diverse battlespaces, a lack of
organic intelligence collection assets, and the absence
of a reliable theater-wide attack reporting system all
converge to make intelligence seem like an impossible
task for the frequently undermanned and untrained
intelligence sections of sustainment commands. However, if a sustainment command intelligence section
can develop tools that focus only on the trafficked
main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes
(ASRs) and depend on the battlespace owners intelligence sections for area analysis, it can not only meet
its own unique requirements but also afford to function
as a regional route analysis provider for all patrols and
convoys passing through its linear-route battlespace.
Limited Resources and Unique Needs
Sustainment command intelligence sections are
often overworked and undermanned. This comes
as no surprise because sustainment commands are
often considered the handle of the warfighters spear.
Although maneuver commands enjoy intelligence
sections staffed with analystsenlisted Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers from a variety
of intelligence backgroundssustainment command
Convoys traveling along a main supply route

(MSR) may travel through several different
enemy situations
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
intelligence sections are generally staffed by one or

two Soldiers who focus solely on intelligence analysis.
Often these Soldiers are pulled from other sections,
such as the S6 or the motor pool. Only occasionally are these analysts trained at the Army Intelligence
School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In the course of
my 15-month deployment experience in Iraq, only
one of five adjacent combat sustainment support battalions (CSSBs) had Army Intelligence School-trained
personnel and some fell drastically short, with no formally trained intelligence personnel at all.
The 264th CSSB intelligence section was lucky
to deploy with one functional area 35D (all-source
intelligence officer) lieutenant and two military occupational specialty 35F (intelligence analyst) E3s. All
three of us were doctrinally trained at the Army Intelligence School, but we faced other limitations inherent
in providing intelligence support to the distribution
fight. So during our 15-month deployment, we honed
our sections role down to just a few key tasks. What
follows is a guide for what to focus on and what to
overlook when providing for the unique intelligence
needs of a sustainment command.
The distribution mission requires unique intelligence support, which is dictated by unique mission
characteristics. The logistics convoy mission is fundamentally different from all other combat missions.
Some convoy mission characteristics, such as geographic span, multiply and complicate intelligence
requirements. Other characteristics, such as the fundamentally defensive nature of the logistics convoy
and the linear nature of its area of operations, greatly
simplify intelligence requirements.
Geographic Span
Sustainment commands sustain the hubs that supply
the warfighters. Sustainment convoys move supplies
between distant logistics bases, which are connected
by MSRs and ASRs. These routes pass through many
battlespaces occupied by diverse land-owning commands with varied enemy situations. The far reach
of each logistics convoy mission requires intelligence
analysts to track multiple evolving threats.
The intelligence analysts of conventional combat
power battalions focus on their locality while higher
commands are tasked with the regional picture. However, the analysts who support any sized command
tasked with logistics convoy missions must track the
many diverse localities that their logistics convoys
pass through (see chart at left). This requirement is
13
compounded by the facts that each battlespace owner has

its own way of doing things and that shared intelligence
products vary in quality and format. For example, some
battlespace owners maintain online archives of route
assessments, while others may only provide area assessments with no specific analysis of the MSRs and ASRs
running through their areas. Still others provide nothing
at all. Therefore, a passive SIPRNet-browsing analysis of
shared intelligence products will leave a logistics convoy
mission intelligence brief riddled with gaps. (SIPRNet is
the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network.)
For these reasons, sustainment command intelligence analysts must become masters of networking
with fellow analysts. Face-to-face meetings with all
pertinent intelligence analysts of battlespace-owning
commands are preferred because the sustainment command intelligence analysts will be asking them for
assistance frequently. This is the perfect opportunity
The 264th CSSB intelligence section

was lucky to deploy with one functional
area 35D (all-source intelligence officer)
lieutenant and two military occupational
specialty 35F (intelligence analyst) E3s.
for the analysts to get on the road, participate in a logistics convoy mission, and visit the intelligence analysts
of battlespace-owning commands at each stop along
the way. It is also the perfect opportunity for the analyst
to serve as the bridge between the commanders staff
and the Soldiers on the road in order to build firsthand
situational awareness.
Sustainment command intelligence analysts should
rely on their battlespace-owner counterparts to be the
subject-matter experts on the status of the threat in
their area. Convoys rarely, if ever, deviate from the
MSRs and ASRs, so sustainment command intelligence analysts can remain focused on the routes themselves. Only by maintaining this focus can an analysis
complicated by the logistics convoy missions span of
many diverse battlespaces be made a manageable task.
Offensive Posture but Defensive Nature
One unique characteristic that differentiates the sustainment missions intelligence requirements from those
of all other combat missions is the defensive nature of
logistics convoys. Although Soldiers on logistics convoys are trained to maintain an offensive posture, the
convoys do not seek out and destroy threats. On the contrary, logistics convoys aim to avoid threats. This led to
the eventual development of the tactical mantra, Avoid
them and see them, referring to how our logistics
14
convoys counter the primary threat on MSRs and

ASRsthe improvised explosive device (IED).
The defensive nature of the logistics convoy mission simplifies the commanders decision requirements. Although logistics convoys are escorted by
gun trucks tasked with providing security, the convoys
avoid the enemy at all costs, unlike patrols that seek
out and destroy the enemy. For example, a logistics
convoy will be planned to travel the route with the
lowest threat at a time of day when the threat is historically at its lowest. So while intelligence analysts of
battlespace-owning commands are assembling targeting packages or leafing through pages of interrogation
reports, sustainment command intelligence analysts
are simply figuring when and where threats are likely
to occur on the routes in order to develop a plan to
avoid engagements altogether.
Linear Area of Operations
Perhaps the best thing sustainment command intelligence analysts have going for them is that their areas
of operations are strictly linear. Except for the rare case
when a logistics convoy zigzags through the streets
and alleys of a major city, a sustainment commands
battlefield consists of a straight line drawn through
vast expanses of battlespace-owner territory. Like
the defensive nature of logistics convoys, this unique
characteristic greatly simplifies the demands on their
under-resourced intelligence sections. With a purview
limited to enemy activity on the routes, the sections
primary task becomes identifying attack trends along
the linear spans of MSRs and ASRs in order to support
plans to circumvent and counter attacks.
Sustainment-Centric Intelligence Products
According to the sustainment-centric concept of
intelligence operations, analysts should focus on creating intelligence products that enable the commander
and Soldiers on the road to prevent and avoid threats
while depending on battlespace owners intelligence
analysts to provide all other intelligence support. This
makes the demands on the frequently under-resourced
sustainment command intelligence sections manageable. However, customized tools are necessary for
analysis focused strictly on the vast, linear expanses
of logistics convoy areas of operations. Like all good
intelligence analysis, sustainment-centric products
must begin with good reporting.
The biggest obstacle to meeting a sustainment commands unique intelligence requirements is the absence
of a uniform, theater-wide enemy-activity reporting
system that can provide the data needed to form a
thorough route threat assessment. A few centralized
databases collect enemy-activity reports, but none of
the databases are uniform and theater wide, and none
julyaugust 2009
allow for the entry of the key pieces of data needed by

sustainment command intelligence analysts.
The databases currently available include the who,
what, when, and where, but they do not provide enough
detail to support useful trend analysis. Moreover,
reports are actually keyed into the system by personnel
at levels of command that are too far removed from the
incidents to provide accurate details. Fundamentally,
the status quo for incident reporting is flawed: It is
not uniform, it is not theaterwide, it does not allow for
the entry of details needed for route analysis, and data
are entered too many echelons above the actual unit
involved in the incidents.
Ideally, a uniform, theater-wide standard would cater
to the needs of sustainment command intelligence analysts conducting route threat analysis. Each entry in a
database of attacks would include data fields such as
Whether or not the attack occurred on a route
of any kind.
The name of the route on which the attack
occurred.
If the targeted unit was a logistics convoy or
a patrol.
The specific initiator type of an IED (for example,
hacksaw-blade pressure plate, Christmas tree lights,
victim-operated push-button, or command wire).
The specific munitions or explosives type used
(such as 120-millimeter artillery rounds or homemade
explosives).
The location of an IED emplacement in the road
(such as shoulder, median, or lane).
The order of march of the attacked vehicle.
This is not an exhaustive list of the layers of description needed for each incident, but it is a good start.
A complete and exhaustive set of data fields should
include mutually exclusive options for each data field so

that no incident details are left open for interpretation.
The enemy-activity reporting system needs to be
transformed. More data are needed in addition to the
minimal who, what, when, and where in order to
create sustainment-centric intelligence. Such a transformation would certainly consume resources, but
intelligence is incredibly important to our asymmetric
warfighters. Leaders should institute a reporting system that emphasizes attack-trend analysis. A reporting
system and incident database as described here would
greatly simplify the route threat analysis process.
Developing Our Own Warning System

In the absence of this ideal incident database, the
13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) G2 section maintained its own intelligence database and provided it to analysts studying attack trends along their
routes. On a daily basis, the G2 analysts manually
sorted through the previous 24 hours of enemy activity
reports provided by the Combined Information Network Data Exchange (CIDNE). The analysts read each
report and copied into a Microsoft Excel worksheet
only those reports with narratives that explicitly identified an MSR or ASR as the location of the attack. Then
they manually added many useful layers of information
to the worksheet for each of the selected entries.
Essentially, the 13th Sustainment Command G2
section manually created its own sustainment-centric
database from which sustainment-centric intelligence
could be derived by subordinate command intelligence
analysts. This investment of considerable manpower
proved extremely valuable to intelligence analysts studying attack trends on routes. Intelligence analysts used
this sustainment-centric database to empirically calculate which lengths of their routes
represented zones of statistically
high historical enemy activity.
The process was not as complex as it sounds and represents a
more accurate and evidence-based
method than the classic circling of
dots on a map to determine highthreat zones. As shown at left, if
the rate of attacks between any two
grid lines (east-west grid lines for
generally north-south routes and
north-south grid lines for generally east-west routes) exceeded a
threshold representing a level of
risk accepted by the commander,
the analysts designated those grid
lines as the boundaries of a threat
Intelligence analysts monitor enemy activity and identify elevated
zone. For example, the 264th CSSB
threat zones (ETZs) as those with activity in excess of a level set
by the commander.
commander set a threshold of two
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
15
attacks per kilometer over a period of 8 weeks. The

product consisted of a set of threat zones with boundaries falling on north-south grid lines for generally
east-west routes or east-west grid lines for north-south
routes, as illustrated below.
The decision to round the boundaries of the threat
zones to kilometer grid lines made the intelligence
products useful to the multitasking logistics convoy
commanders, who were already busy tracking all the
vehicles in their logistics convoys, communicating with
higher headquarters, and scanning the road for IEDs.
Having memorized just a few 2-digit eastings (eastbound route coordinates) and northings (north-bound
route coordinates), the logistics convoy commanders
knew exactly where to adjust their tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTP) simply by monitoring the military grid reference system (MGRS) output on their
global positioning system (GPS) devices.
Elevated Threat Zones
The first inclination was to call these threat zones
named areas of interest (NAIs), but it was later
determined that the doctrinal definition of an NAI was
essentially different than what had been created. Without
a doctrinal term, the commander dubbed these sections
of route elevated threat zones, or ETZs. This term had
been coined by another unit to describe their dots on a
map method, but it described our creation perfectly.
Northings (Kilometers)
Eastings (Kilometers)
This chart shows the locations of the elevated

threat zones (ETZs)as identified by graphs
like the one on page 15along the main supply
route (MSR) and alternate supply route (ASR).
16
The analysts then zoomed in on each ETZ by filtering the entries of the sustainment-centric database
for those attacks that occurred between the defining
boundaries on the route of interest. What remained
after the filter was a list of attacks that had occurred
only in the defined zone of the route.
The analysts could then pursue trends through the
layers of data for each entry provided by the 13th
Sustainment Commands G2 analysts. For example,
some ETZs exhibited day-of-week trends while some
exhibited trends in IED initiator types. These trends
changed over time, and of course, they changed from
location to location as the routes cut through many
diverse battlespaceseach with a unique enemy situation. Most ETZs exhibited a low variation in attack
times, meaning that they had discernable hot times,
although a few did not.
With these products, the 264th CSSB commander
exercised his tactical counter-IED philosophy: Avoid
them and see them. The commanders staff planned
convoy times around the hot times to avoid them. The
next step was to see them.
The 264th CSSB fusion cell developed a threepronged approach to the see them counter-IED philosophy. First, we ensured maximum vehicle lighting
for night missions. Second, the fusion cell recommended slowing vehicular speed to aid in spotting IED indicators when passing through ETZs. Logistics convoys
were monitored on the Blue Force Tracker to track their
compliance with the mandated speed limits. Third, the
intelligence analysts identified trends in IED indicators
in each ETZ and developed appropriate counter-IED
TTP with the operations section. Intelligence analysts
dissemintated trend analyses of all IED indicators. The
location of the ETZs would be presented to the Soldiers during mission preparation and during missions.
To make the statistics meaningful for the Soldiers, the
analysts searched the battlespace owners explosive
ordnance disposal report archives for pictures of typical IED attacks for each ETZ. This showed the Soldiers
exactly what IED indicators to watch for, thus arming
the Soldiers with the knowledge they needed to see
them before they encountered them.
The result was a set of PowerPoint slides depicting
a map of routes, overlaid with the ETZs represented as
boxes and with boundaries falling on rounded kilometer
grid lines. (See figure at left.) Subsequent slides showed
each ETZ individually on a larger scale. Each ETZ
slide presented graphs of the hourly attack frequency
and attack type frequency as well as a verbal analysis
of common attack trends not captured in the graphs, for
example, IEDs wrapped in black plastic bags. (See figure above.) These slides were bound in trail books, which
logistics convoy commanders signed out to study during
the mission planning phase of their convoys. To make
julyaugust 2009
Eastings (Kilometers)
Northings (Kilometers)
Legend
ASR = Alternate supply route
CWIED = Command-wire IED
EFP = Explosively formed charge
ETZ = Elevated threat zone
IED = Improvised explosive device
SAF = Small-arms fire
VBIED = Vehicle borne improvised
explosive device
VOIED = Victim operated IED
This chart gives specific

information about the attacks
in ETZ 2 shown on the chart
on page 16.
the information even easier for the Soldiers to access

during the mission, the ETZ overlays were transferred to
Blue Force Tracker overlays and electronically pushed to
each vehicle before the mission. This final stage of dissemination provided real-time access to the intelligence
analysts empirical analyses of historical attack trends.
Regional Intelligence Provider
By staying focused on the routes and leaving the
rest to the battlespace-owners intelligence analysts,
sustainment command intelligence analysts become
the wise men of the roads. The intelligence section
of any given sustainment command can use symbiotic
relationships with its battlespace-owner counterparts as
leverage points to transform from an under-resourced
and over-tasked intelligence section to a regional routeintelligence provider.
This transformation requires the development of
customized tools and a disciplined focus on the routes.
The sustainment command intelligence analysts must
resist pursuing other intelligence endeavors. Instead,
they must rely on their battlespace-owner partners for
other area analyses. In return, their partners can afford
to focus on the intelligence requirements of maneuver missions and get their route intelligence from the
regional route intelligence providers in sustainment
commands. That is the art of being wise.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
This article provides a general outline for doing more

with less. The project here is to focus sustainment command intelligence analysts on what matters to logistics
convoys and encourage a sharing relationship among all
analysts in the intelligence community. The tools developed by the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) G2 section were time consuming and were only
temporary fixes. There remains a long-term need for
top-down support for a theater-wide reporting system
that meets the needs of both maneuver command intelligence analysts and sustainment command intelligence
analysts. This would require a serious overhaul of the
reporting system and an in-depth expert study that is
far beyond the scope of this article. Such a transformation would certainly eliminate some of the many enemy
activity reporting systems currently in use and pay huge
ALOG
dividends to the intelligence community.
Captain Gregory Nick Larkin is the assistant staff

intelligence officer of the 82d Sustainment Brigade at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds a B.S. degree
in psychology from Purdue Universtiy and a B.S.
degree in international relations from the United
States Naval Academy. An interservice transfer, he is
a graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Basic
Course, Airborne School, and Ranger School.
17
Commentary
Logisticians Are Sustainers, Not Targeters

by
Major Donald A. MacCuish
t is amazing how much terminology is appropriately

and inappropriately used by Army personnel. This
is particularly true for the sustainment community.
Take convoys, for instance. While in Iraq, we called
sustainment convoys combat logistics patrols, or
CLPs. The Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, likes to use the term combat logistics convoys, or CLCs. (See Center for Army Lessons Learned
[Call] Handbook 0823.) But wait. I find that neither
of these terms is used in doctrine and that the term
logistics package (LOGPAC) is the preferred term at
the Battle Command Training Program.
The Army has always had situations like this. For
instance, a few years ago maneuver units called logistics
functions man, arm, fix, and fuel. At the same time,
the sustainment community called the same functions
supply, field services, maintenance, transportation.
The Sustainment Targeting Process
In May 2008, CALL published the Brigade Support
Battalion Battle Staff TTP [tactics, techniques, and
procedures] Handbook. Chapter 6 of that handbook is
titled The Sustainment Targeting Process. The handbook makes some very good points that are highlighted
time-and-again in CALLs trend analyses. Sustainment
units have a tough time synchronizing logistics across
the brigade combat team (BCT) area of operations. This
is a valid observation and should be a focus of collective
training events. Where I take issue with the handbook
is in the development of new terminology: sustainment
targeting, sustainment targeting matrices, and sustainment targeting meeting. The underlying problem with
creating this new terminology is that it misrepresents
current Army terminology related to targeting.
Doctrinal Definitions of Targeting
Joint Publication 360, Joint Targeting, defines a
target as an entity or object considered for possible
engagement or action. Field Manual (FM) 62010,
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting
Process, describes targets as geographical areas, complexes, or installations planned for capture or destruction by military forces.
Doctrine goes on to describe the process of targeting. FM 62010 describes the emphasis of targeting
as identifying resources the enemy can least afford to
lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage.
Targeting focuses on attacking an enemys capability.
Joint Publication 360 describes targeting as a method
18
of selecting and prioritizing targets, matching the

appropriate response to them, integrating fires into the
operations process, and creating desired effects necessary to achieve objectives.
The process of targeting helps integrate and synchronize fires with the other warfighting functions (including sustainment). However, synchronizing sustainment
in the targeting process and describing the sustainment
process as targeting are distinctly different.
Pitfalls of Using Targeting With Sustainment
Sustainment synchronization, unlike targeting, is
designed to support friendly forces, not attack enemy
capability. Both targeting and sustainment are part of
the operations process, but they link into the operations
process quite differently. For this reason, we should
stick to existing sustainment terminology rather than
misuse the doctrinal terms target and targeting.
Likewise, we do not need to invent a new term by
calling a synchronization meeting a sustainment targeting meeting.
I see three consequences of using the term targeting in the sustainment planning and synchronization
process. First, sustainment targeting misuses the
current doctrinal definition of targeting. If we misuse
the terms associated with targeting to fit sustainment,
we run the risk of misusing the original term when it
is used in the context of lethal and nonlethal targeting.
We also confuse other warfighting functions and joint
and multinational partners by taking a task specifically
designated in doctrine as a fires function and using
it to describe how the sustainment function operates.
Further, a doctrinal process already exists that does not
take the current terminology out of context. As stated
earlier, CALL trends show that the BCTs have a tough
time synchronizing sustainment operations across their
areas of operations. When sustainment organizations
misuse a doctrinal term, it confuses a process that they
already do not practice enough.
Second, by using the terms target and targeting
beyond their intended use, we actually change the
meanings of the words and weaken the understanding of their purpose. Two examples of the cause-andeffect of misunderstanding terms are center of gravity
analysis and the prohibited term effect-based operations. Marines will use centers of gravity analysis at
the tactical level; Army forces do not. When you put
a Soldier and a Marine together, you get conflicting
understanding of terms. The effect-based approach had
julyaugust 2009
great application, but as the term became a catchall for Army operations, the original concept lost its
intended purpose. We no longer use the term because
of its misuse. The same can be said for sustainment
targeting. The sustainment synchronization process is
tough, and we do not execute it with ease. We should
work within the existing model of executing sustainment operations, rather than adapt the targeting model
simply because it is the flavor of the day.
Over the past couple of years, we have seen increased
efforts to define functions as targeting. Targeting should
be left as targeting. If we define too many things as
targeting, we run the danger of overusing the term and
weakening its value inside the military decisionmaking and operations processes. We must keep the term
target focused on the enemy. If sustainers start using
targeting to describe the operations process, should
the Army also use targeting to describe how it employs
and synchronizes maneuver forces to accomplish a mission? For instance, in air assault operations, it would be a
Rather than change terminology, the

sustainment community needs to focus
on improving the process of logistics
synchronization.
misuse of terminology to use "target" when planning an
air movement plan or movement to the pickup zone. Do
we allow the medical community to develop a targeting
matrix for patient evacuation and medical care?
The third consequence is that by developing a sustainment targeting process, we run the inevitable risk
of creating more of the same problem that we tried
to solve by creating the term in the first place. The
sustainment function is an essential element of the
existing targeting process. The trend to separate lethal
and nonlethal targeting runs contrary to the intent of
targeting. The intent of targeting is to synchronize
across functions, so developing a sustainment targeting process exacerbates the problem of synchronizing
sustainment with traditional targeting.
Targeting Versus Sustainment
The decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting process is designed to match the friendly force
capabilities against enemy targets. Take, for instance,
the decide function. In targeting, the first step is to provide the overall focus and set priorities for intelligence
collection and attack planning. Unfortunately, we cannot
engage every target on the battlefield. The many different
types of targets exceed our capabilities to acquire and
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
attack them. We must determine which targets are most

important to the enemy and which of those targets we
must acquire and attack to accomplish our mission.
Sustainment personnel should not take this tactic
because they cannot choose which of their units to
support and which ones not to focus on. The focus of
the sustainment planners during this time is to develop
priorities of support to the BCT. The sustainment planner should focus on providing the commander a clear
picture of priorities applied to selecting a friendly
course of action. The intent of the decide function in
targeting is to provide the commander with a clear picture of priorities applied to how to attack or with what
capabilities to attack.
Let us consider detect. FM 50, Army Planning
and Orders Production, describes the detect function
as locating high-payoff targets for engagement. It is
designed to acquire the targets selected in the decide
phase. Detecting infers looking for something and
finding it. Sustainment status is not something we are
attempting to acquire or discover. We may need to identify, prepare, track, or determine shortfalls, but detect
is a misrepresentation of the sustainment process.
Rather than using a model of targeting, I suggest
we use models already in existence. We can modify
these models to give them the flavor and pizzazz we
want. For example, doctrine discusses four continuous,
overlapping activities that occur throughout a military
operation: plan, prepare, execute, and assess. Targeting
fits under what doctrine calls integrating processes,
and it is a critical component of the overall operations
process. Using the targeting process for sustainment
would be like using the risk management process to
define sustainment operations.
As sustainers, we must be fully involved in the targeting processthe doctrinal targeting process. By incorporating the word targeting into a process to which
it does not apply, we misuse current doctrinal terms,
water down the understanding of what targeting is, and
we run the risk of making targeting a catch-all phrase
to the detriment of its original purpose in Army planning and operations. Rather than change terminology,
the sustainment community needs to focus on improving the process of logistics synchronization. ALOG
Major Donald A. MacCuish is an observer-trainer
at the Battle Command Training Program at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a bachelors degree
from the University of Tampa and a masters degree
in logistics management from Florida Institute of
Technology. He is a graduate of the Logistics Executive Development Course and the Army Command
and General Staff College. He is working on his
doctorate in organizational leadership.
19
Over There: Army Expeditionary

Forces Logistics in World War I
by Alexander
F. Barnes
n the weeks that followed the Allies victory in

World War I on 11 November 1918, a U.S. Army
quartermaster officer of the Services of Supply
(SOS) sat down to write his portion of the after-action
report. The report was neatly typed, thorough, and
impressively honest. It outlined how, almost out of
nothing, the Army had forged the SOS, the logistics
organization that supported the 3 million Soldiers
deployed over there to Europe as the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).
Joining the Fight
In 1917, when the United States entered the war,
the force structure for each infantry division included
4 infantry regiments, 3 artillery regiments, 4 machinegun battalions, an engineer regiment, a signal battalion, and a number of other supporting units for a total
of 25,484 Soldiers. (Serving in these divisions, either
as volunteers or draftees, were such notable men as
Buster Keaton, Walter Brennan, Conrad Hilton, Ty
Cobb, future Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black,
future President Harry Truman, boxer Gene Tunney,
and future World War II leaders Douglas MacArthur,
George Patton, Joseph Stillwell, George Marshall,
Clifton Cates, and James Van Fleet.)
Joining the war involved intense logistics planning and execution. Just getting the units to France
was a major accomplishment. German surface raider
warships and U-boats were patrolling the Atlantic
and had been devastating the shipping capabilities of
England and France since 1914.
After arriving in France in 1917 with
a small headquarters contingent, the AEF
commander, General John J. Pershing,
waged a continuous struggle against his
French, British, and Italian counterparts
who wanted to use the U.S. doughboys
as replacements in their decimated armies.
Mindful of the terrible casualty rates of the European

allies in their trench warfare, Pershing insisted that
the U.S. Soldiers would serve and fight as an independent American force.
The constant negotiation with the British for shipping space led Pershing to compromise to the degree
that he later assigned some doughboys to train and
serve with the British Army, but always as complete
infantry brigades. The urgency of getting troops to
France and into the combat zone increased when Russia, undergoing the Communist Revolution, dropped
out of the war, thereby freeing many German divisions to join their comrades in France and fight on the
Western Front in the spring of 1918.
During the peak days of fighting for the AEF in the
autumn of 1918, the SOS operated water ports, ran
combat convoys, regulated rail lines, fed the force,
fixed automotive and horse-drawn vehicles, maintained hospitals with 190,000 patients, and milled the
lumber required to build the transient camps to house
Soldiers, who were arriving from the United States
at the rate of 10,000 a day. The SOS worked around
the clock to provide support to 43 Army infantry
divisions, a Marine Corps brigade that had been integrated directly into the Armys 2d Infantry Division,
some other separate Army units equipped mainly with
French weapons, some Army units equipped partially
with British weapons, and a rapidly growing Army
Air Service equipped with borrowed French and British airplanes.
Services of Supply doughboys stand

in a Luxembourg street during
the road march to Germany in 1918.
After the armistice, Allied forces occupied Germany in a formal state of war
until the Treaty of Versailles was signed
on 28 June 1919.
20
julyaugust 2009
Logistics Problems
In spite of all the great combat support and logistics
feats they had accomplished, AEF logistics operations
still had some dismal aspects. Early operations were
plagued with shipping mistakes and confusion over
cargo destination and delivery priority. Discussing the
early operations, the after-action report said, The most
serious delays experienced were in the case of articles
which would be classified as initial equipment, requisitions for which were submitted to G1, Second Corps.
In no case were these supplies ever received.
The problems did not end with the AEFs arrival in
Europe. Of the Allied countries, France in particular
was drained by 3 years of constant warfare, and a large
portion of the country was either occupied by the German Army or devastated by the fighting in the trenches
that stretched from the English Channel to Switzerland.
With the largest portion of their workforce in military
service, the French were struggling to provide food and
shelter for their own soldiers, and although they were
enthusiastic supporters of the AEF, they had little left
to offer the Americans. Max Brakebill, a former Hollywood motion picture studio employee and California
National Guardsman in the 144th Artillery Regiment,
wrote home, The women of France deserve a lot of
credit. They work like men . . . If people in the States
could see what France has put up with in the last 4
years they would know what war means.
The line of communication (LOC), while formed
with good intentions, was the subject of some embarrassing episodes. In a memorandum to General Pershings chief of staff dated 15 November 1917, Colonel
Johnson Hagood reported
I am informed a ship lay at one of our base ports
in France for forty-two days waiting to be unloaded and costing the government in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars a day . . . at one
time ninety percent of all of the transportation of
one American division had been borrowed from a
French captain . . . Not only has the [LOC] failed,
so far, to function properly in the supply of our
own men but it has so clogged the French railway
yards, storehouse and quays, in this section as to
cause an official complaint to be made.
Equally embarrassing was the situation in one of
the earliest units to deploy, the 42d Infantry Division,
whose supplies were scattered across a 10-acre field,
rendering much of it unserviceable or lost. Uniforms
were in such short supply that some American Soldiers,
particularly II Corps troops attached to the British
Expeditionary Force, had to be issued British Army
tunics complete with Kings Crown brass buttons.
Not all of the AEFs problems concerned logistics or
even the eastern side of the Atlantic. Colonel Hagood
also reported on the Soldiers lack of basic skills
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
training, saying that there were men who had been in

the Army four months and had never fired a rifle, had
any gas instruction, or marched a mile with a pack;
that many of them had spent their time on setting up
exercises, learning the customs and courtesies of the
service, singing and acquiring a knowledge of the court
martial procedure.
Problems with transportation and vehicles continued
to be a major concern. A brigade commander in the
26th Infantry Division reported, With traffic cops on
every corner of the training camps at home and thousands of cars and trucks in reserve, we were put to the
mortification of having to borrow transportation from
the British and the French to keep men from starving
to death. The 33d Infantry Division commander noted
sarcastically that while the streets of Washington, D.C.,
were filled with Army and civilian cars, his division
did not have a single vehicle capable of driving more
than 20 miles without breaking down. Some motorized
divisional supply-train units were among the laterdeployed units so that infantry battalions would have
more shipping space.
Building the SOS
Realizing that the LOC was not working, Pershing decided he needed a take charge type of officer
to reorganize the AEFs logistics support. Pershing
handed over control to General James G. Harbord, his
former chief of staff, who was serving as the commander of the 2d Infantry Division. Working on the
framework of a six-infantry-division corps, with four
fighting divisions and two divisions designated as base
or depot divisions, Harbord set about creating the SOS
to support it.
Infantry divisions arriving in France were stripped
of Soldiers with backgrounds as plumbers, pipefitters,
masons, carpenters, bricklayers, millwrights, wranglers, electricians, blacksmiths, and glaziers. Those
Soldiers were sent to build and maintain the logistics
bases. Robert Koehn, an Ohio doughboy in the 83d
Infantry Division, wrote to his mother, Working on a
building for a barracks and office room . . . it is 100
ft wide and 400 ft long. And a few months later he
wrote, Dear Mother . . . this is Sunday an[d] a day
off first day for 6 weeks . . . So we all went uptown to
take a bath . . . first time I been to town for 2 months .
. . got a big bunch of American tools in last week . . .
Seems good to get hold of them kind of tools . . . Still
making windows . . . Thats all I have been doing since
we came to this camp.
Similarly, because of his previous civilian railroad
experience, Charles Etzweiler, a young doughboy from
Red Lion, Pennsylvania, spent the war in a railroad
regulating company despite his many attempts to get a
transfer to the Tank Corps.
21
Becoming Effective and Efficient

Harbord set the pace by frequently traveling throughout the theater. He traveled by train and, for his personal
transportation, always brought with him an automobile
on a flatcar. He and his staff divided the AEF sector of
France into base sections that each had a water port,
intermediate sections for the storage of supplies and
materiel, and an advanced section responsible for
distributing supplies and parts directly to the combat
divisions. As AEF infantry divisions went to the line, the
supporting depots in the advanced section were responsible for documenting and loading the railcars that went
to the divisions assigned railheads. From the railheads
forward, each division was responsible for picking up
the supplies and getting them to the appropriate units.
The statistics of the SOSs work are impressive. The
forestry units milled 200 million feet of lumber and cut
4 million railroad ties. One bakery produced 800,000
pounds of bread each day, SOS mechanics repaired
30,000 vehicles, and the advanced section depots maintained over 2 million square feet of covered storage
space. By the time the armistice was signed in November 1918, there were 2,084,000 doughboys in France
and 650,000 of them were assigned to the SOS.
In the meantime, Pershing was able to secure the
services of a number of professional businessmen to
assist in the acquisition, production, and distribution of
badly needed resources. Everything the Army needed,
from lumber to medicine, fresh vegetables, boots, and
draft animals, was purchased and turned over to the
SOS for distribution and management.
Lieutenant Jay Hormel used his background in the
family meatpacking business to figure out that deboned
frozen meats took up 40-percent less cargo space than
very large cuts of meat still on the bone, which would
free up valuable cargo space for other commodities.
Hormels later development of Spam canned meat
would have an equally significant effect on the American Soldiers of World War II.
Working with the British supply system proved to
be an enlightening experience. While the American
Soldiers did not care much for British food rations, an
Army quartermaster reported
We found that if we followed instructions, supplies were forthcoming. Not a requisition was
sent to the base that was not properly acknowledged, with a statement as to the probability of
supply. A wire was always received the day before
the [rail] car so that preparations could be made
to receive it. Carefully checked lists were always
found in the cars, showing exactly what they contained, and shortages almost never occurred.
Post-Armistice Logistics
By the time the armistice ended the hostilities, 29
AEF infantry divisions were either in combat or moving
22
into the combat zone. In order to take over the AEFs

assigned 2,500-square-mile occupation zone in Germany, Pershing selected eight of his best divisions (four
Regular Army, two Army National Guard, and two
National Army), assigned them to the Third Army, and
sent them through France and Luxembourg on a road
march to their assigned sites in Germany. The movement
of 250,000 doughboys into potentially hostile territory
caused a wave of new problems for the SOS because
these units quickly had to be brought up to a full complement of equipment, vehicles, and even horses.
Among the units now belonging to the Army of
Occupation (which, through the Third Armys lineage,
is now the U.S. Army Central Command) were several
of the divisions that had seen some of the hardest fighting in the final days of the war. Their pack and draft
animals were in deplorable condition, so to make the
move to their occupation zones, these units were given
permission to draw animals from other divisions not
making the move.
Soon most of the divisions were able to reach their
assigned strength of 6,100 animals each, although the
condition of many of the borrowed horses was not
much of an improvement. One example of the perseverance and ingenuity of the American Soldiers occurred
shortly after all the occupation forces were in place
in December 1918. The Army Remount Service set
up shop in Germany and did such a good job nursing
the horses back to health that they actually created a
surplus and ended up selling the excess animals to the
local population.
A bigger problem troubling the AEF logisticians
was how to support and maintain the forces once they
arrived at their assigned occupation zone. Germany had
been at war since 1914 and under blockade for much of
that time. The German countryside had been stripped
of anything that could produce food or be eaten, and
the local population was close to starvation. Along
with food, the occupying forces also required massive
amounts of replacement boots, overcoats, blankets,
linen, and other cold-weather gear to help them through
the winter. Working with German officials and the
owners of a local shoe factory, uniform factory, and
steam laundry in the Coblenz-Lutzel area, the Third
Army began operating a system of repairing salvaged
clothing, shoes, boots, and equipment for reissue. Their
output soon reached between 800 and 1,000 pairs of
repaired shoes and boots a day.
In addition to supporting the occupation units
deployed to Germany, the SOS was responsible for
sending back home the other infantry divisions that
were not going to remain in Europe. At the same time,
the Spanish influenza epidemic was sweeping Europe.
Sixty-two thousand doughboys died, while thousands
of others were hospitalized in France undergoing
julyaugust 2009
Two doughboys assigned to a Services of Supply

transportation unit pose for a photograph.
convalescent treatment. Koehn reported to his mother
in October 1918, That Spanish Influenzia has killed
many of the boys an[d] a lot of the people over hear
[sic] . . . quite a few died on the boat. In the port of
Brest, between September and November 1918, there
were 1,817 burials of doughboys, many of whom died
of influenza on the boat en route to France.
Yet, by mid-1919, the occupation of Germany was
logistically sound, most of the AEFs other doughboys
were demobilizing back in the United States, and the
SOS was able to close down many of its operations.
Lessons Learned
So, 90 years later, here are some lessons for todays
logisticians.
A bad beginning doesnt mean a bad ending. The
explosive growth from a 200,000-man army to a 3-million
-man army in 2 years magnified the results of every
bad decision and mistake. Deploying a force of that size
across the Atlantic Ocean to a country that had been
under constant attack for 3 years was a complex operation that no U.S. Army logistician had ever attempted. In
the end, with adaptive, creative leadership and plain hard
work, the AEF grew into a combat-effective army and
prevailed against a skilled veteran enemy.
Nothing happens until something moves, but it
still takes planning and human effort to make things
move. The AEFs recovery of materiel from the battlefield exemplifies the importance of planning and
human effort. Salvage recovery became a watchword
in the AEF during the Argonne campaign. Instructions
were given that, unless wounded, each Soldier returning from the front would bring back some salvaged
item. The division quartermaster of the 79th Infantry
Division instructed that it might be an empty cartridge
case, or a pair of shoes, but no one was to return empty
handed. In effect, each Soldier became part of the
solution. Similarly, all trucks and vehicles, including
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
kitchen carts, were used to carry salvage back from

the front to preassigned salvage dumps, where it was
sorted by salvage platoons and reissued if possible.
Knowing where things are is critical in getting
them to the right location. In 1918, as in 2009, getting
advance notice of what was in storage or en route gave
logisticians the luxury of planning how to support the
combat troops instead of scrambling to catch up to their
needs. Without accurate inventory records and detailed
packing lists, the materiel might as well have been on
the moon for all the good it did the Soldier.
A well-organized, innovative, and responsive distribution system is a combat multiplier whose value
cannot be over-estimated. There is no substitute for
Soldiers who understand their jobs and perform them
at a high level. Find your experts and use them without
waiting for enablers to provide a magic bullet. The
SOS spent a seemingly inordinate amount of time and
effort in keeping the frontline troops supplied with
footwear to protect them from exposure to the continuously cold and wet conditions in the trenches. It
worked. As a result, the AEF suffered a lower percentage of trench foot than the U.S. Army did under similar
conditions 25 years later in World War II and in the
1950s in Korea.
There will always be critics, but nothing succeeds like success. When asked to defend some of the
extravagant spending practices of the AEF to a congressional committee in 1921, General Charles Dawes,
later the 30th Vice President of the United States,
replied in no uncertain terms, Its all right to say we
bought too much . . . but we saved the civilizations of
the World . . . we werent trying to keep a set of books.
We were trying to win a war.
When the division quartermaster for the 29th Infantry Division wrote his after-action report for the Battle
of Saint Mihiel, he described in detail the struggles and
ultimate success of one specific night convoy in which
he traveled nearly impassible muddy roads under artillery and gas attack and endured miles-long traffic jams
to get the required supplies to his units. He concluded
with a simple statement and perhaps fitting tribute
to all the doughboys of the SOS: Where would the
fighter be if not for the machinery that permitted him
ALOG
to keep fighting?
Alexander F. Barnes is a logistics management
supervisor for the Enterprise Systems Directorate
of the Army Combined Arms Support Command at
Fort Lee, Virginia. A former Marine Corps corporal and Army warrant officer, he has a bachelors
degree in anthropology from the State University
of New York at Cortland and a masters degree in
archeology from the State University of New York
at Binghamton.
23
Executing Offensive Logistics

by
Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Heussner
The 168th Brigade Support Battalion trained its Soldiers to anticipate requirements,
solve problems, take the initiative, and aggressively support the warfighter.
n the realm of military tactics, there

really are only two options: offense
and defense. It has been said many
times that you cant win a defensive war
and that defense should be used only
until a force can resume offensive operations. In the logistics world, we often are
guilty of not using tactical terms to
define our operations. We should not
only adopt tactical terms like the
offense to describe our operations, but
in executing those operations, we should
go on the offensive.
Websters Dictionary defines offense
as an attack or assault. As logisticians,
we must be assaulting our supported
units with every bit of capability that we
have, leaving no Soldiers or equipment
idle. We must employ all that we have to
enable our maneuver teammates to pursue the enemy with success.
In the 168th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), we developed a concept of
offense as applied to logistics operations. Here is our definition of offensive logistics: A
fully integrated, aggressive, and proactive system of
logistics support that anticipates requirements, synchronizes support, integrates deliberate logistics convoys
with mission requirements, and improvises when standard support does not meet requirements.
Soldiers of the 168th Brigade Support Battalion

perform precombat inspections before a logistics
convoy. The battalion functioned as a combat
sustainment support battalion, supporting more
than 80,000 Soldiers in Multi-National DivisionBaghdad.
The Offensive Logistics Mindset

Executing offensive logistics is as much a state of
mind as a physical manifestation of logistics support.
The offensive logistics mindset facilitates aggressive
action by every member of the team, thereby eliminating
reactive support and allowing logisticians to provide
support more deliberately. By contrast, reactive support
places our Soldiers at risk by reducing the time they can
spend planning, preparing, and rehearsing before they
execute an operation. In the absence of specific guidance, Soldiers trained in offensive logistics have a very
clear understanding of what is expected of them and how
they are to execute operations. Offensive logistics is the
commanders guidance captured in two words.

Executing offensive support allows the units we support to focus on the fight in front of them without being
burdened by logistics concerns. All logisticians must
work to push supplies, services, and support as far forward as possible to enable maneuver operations. Forcing
a supported unit to come back to the supporting units
location reduces forward momentum and slows offensive operations; this is because the supported units
attention is divided between pursuing the enemy and
seeking supply, maintenance, and distribution support,
which typically is positioned away from the main effort
of maneuver forces. Providing aggressive support means
24
julyaugust 2009
effectively eliminating supply point distribution and providing services forward on the battlefield. Anticipating
requirements and pushing assets forward maintains
momentum, reduces supply and repair cycle time, and
allows our teammates to pursue the enemy. An enemy
who cannot rest will not last long on the battlefield.
To ensure that the 168th BSB continually executed
offensively while deployed to Iraq, commanders and staff
routinely provided examples of how their companies were
executing offensive logistics. We focused on identifying
what capabilities existed and how we were employing
them and determining ways to move support closer to the
supported units. Soldiers and leaders routinely discovered
new ways to push support forward or employ resources
more effectively. Finding new methods of employing
assets and capabilities became an obsession that paid off
in a number of exciting ways across the battlefield.
A BSB Acting as a CSSB
While the 168th is a BSBorganized, manned, and
equipped to provide support to the 214th Fires Brigade
we were deployed to Iraq on an in lieu of mission as a
combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB). While
under the 1st Sustainment Brigade, our mission was to
support the 80,000 Soldiers of Multi-National DivisionBaghdad. As a CSSB, our battalion grew from a modification table of organization and equipment strength of
350 to nearly 1,000 Soldiers, organized into headquarters, supply and distribution, maintenance, transportation, convoy security, and force protection companies.
Each company executed offensive support in inno
vative ways. Soldiers seized upon the idea and dis
covered new and improved ways to execute their
individual tasks at the locations of supported units. The
results were inspirational and motivational, and the battalion quickly developed an offensive and aggressive
culture that produced amazing results that were routinely recognized by senior leaders in theater.
Operations S2 and S3
Intelligence drives logistics operations, so an intimate
knowledge of enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures,
patterns, and engagement areas is absolutely critical to
successfully accomplishing logistics missions and maintaining the safety and security of Soldiers. The BSBs
S2 recognized her critical function and went on the
offense to gather, produce, analyze, and distribute intelligence products throughout the battlespace. Her aggressive collection and amazing ability to determine where
the enemy would engage and by what means was quickly
recognized by the intelligence community all the way up
to the corps level. The S2s offensive pursuit of intelligence routinely kept the battalions logistics convoys out
of enemy engagement areas during peak activity periods. Without a doubt, the S2s work saved lives and
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
The noncommissioned officer-in-charge of the

stock control section of A Company, 168th Brigade Support Battalion, performs location maintenance at the 168th Supply Support Activity.
The battalion worked to ensure that inventory
accuracy was maintained above Department of
the Army standards.
helped maintain an uninterrupted flow of supplies to
supported units.
The S3 was responsible for executing distribution
operations when planned missions entered the 48-hour
lock-in window. In keeping with the battalions offensive
focus, the S3 worked very hard to identify, coordinate,
and synchronize external assets that could ensure the
effective delivery of supplies and services throughout
Baghdad. The S3 synchronized our convoys to pass
through engagement areas immediately after explosive
ordnance disposal or route clearance assets cleared the
area of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). He also
worked very closely to tie our logistics operations to the
operations of the battlespace owners to ensure that we
traversed their terrain while they were executing patrols.
Simultaneously, the S3 worked with the electronic warfare officer to employ Air Force assets to jam frequencies
and predetonate any IEDS along our routes.
The battalion staff executed logistics offensively to
bring every available asset into the fight at a precise
point on the ground at a specific time. The coordinated
and synchronized effort of assets from several Army
branches as well as the Air Force resulted in the completion of more than 3,500 logistics convoys covering
more than 2.2 million miles with no effective enemy
attacks, zero injuries, and no deaths. The entire battalion
staff was committed to executing offensive logistics
operations to ensure that our mission was accomplished
while ensuring that our Soldiers were safe.
Support Operations
Support operations is the center of gravity for any
logistics unit. While supporting combat operations, the
25
support operations (SPO) section executed offensive

logistics in a number of innovative ways. However, the
offensive nature of the battalion manifested itself in
every section and touched every facet of our operations.
When we arrived in Iraq, the distribution management system consisted of paper copies of movement
releases placed in binders and highlighted with different colors to differentiate movement priorities. The
system was cumbersome and slow and required daily
synchronization meetings with distribution managers
across Iraq. To improve the system, our distribution
section designed, developed, and implemented a transportation movement release (TMR) database that revolutionized distribution management at the brigade
level. The database was shared across the brigade, giving every member of the distribution team, from company to brigade levels, perfect situational understanding of required movements, priorities, and backlogs.
The TMR management system improved support,
reduced transit times, and freed leaders to focus on less
routine and more urgent requirements.
The supply management team in the SPO section executed offensive logistics by improving authorized stockage list management. Their relentless pursuit of repair
parts and supplies reduced the requisition wait time from
19 days to 11 days, reduced zero balances from 12 percent
to 3 percent, and improved the fill rate to 86 percent. The
168th Supply Support Activity (SSA) led the theater in
nearly every supply performance metric as a result of the
offensive execution of supply management functions.
Improvements in maintenance operations were
equally as impressive as the gains made in the supply
performance and distribution arenas. The maintenance
managers executed offensively by identifying parts
with long leadtimes, prioritizing difficult jobs, working
with item managers and parts manufacturers to procure
parts, and fabricating parts when required. They routinely managed nearly 2,000 jobs per month, with each
job requiring less than 30 days to complete.
Working in concert, the distribution, supply, and maintenance managers executed offensive logistics that
resulted in increased velocity, improved availability, and
reduced cycle times, yielding world-class support for
Soldiers in contact with the enemy. The brigade combat
teams (BCTs) that we supported were the beneficiaries of
our offensive logistics, receiving their supplies an average of 40-percent faster than before we began our efforts.
The increased velocity improved supply availability,
decreased repair cycle times, and allowed the BCTs to
continue to pursue the enemy without interruption.
Company Execution of Offensive Logistics
Offensive logistics manifested itself in a number of
ways at the company level as well. Soldiers transformed the SSA inside and out by reorganizing,
26
rebuilding, and providing first-class support to our sup

ported units. On a near-daily basis, we received com
ments from our teammates about the responsive and
professional attitudes of our Soldiers. Since they
worked at one of the busiest warehouses in Iraq, it
would be expected that our Soldiers would be tired and
dispirited, but they were constantly motivated by the
continuous improvement and fueled by the laudatory
comments that they routinely received.
Our maintenance Soldiers developed a number of
offensive programs that provided outstanding support to
units. All of the sections in the maintenance company
communications and electronics equipment, small arms,
air-conditioning and generator repairdeveloped
mobile teams to assess and repair at unit locations
equipment that normally does not receive the care and
attention it deserves. If the equipment could not be
repaired immediately, our Soldiers assisted the supported unit in submitting a work order for the equipment and moving it to our location for repair. In many
cases, the owning unit or Soldiers didnt even know that
their equipment required maintenance.
The distribution company started delivering supplies
received at the SSA to supported units, eliminating
supply point distribution for those who did not have the
time, resources, or desire to pick them up. Many of
these programs were started by Soldiers who understood what offensive logistics means: pushing support
as far forward as possible, anticipating requirements,
and reducing reactive support.
The impact of executing offensive logistics cannot be
overstated. It is a concept that manifests itself physically
and culturally, transforming logistics support across the
organization. Offensive logistics permeated every section, platoon, company, and function of the 168th BSB.
Soldiers knew intuitively to provide support aggressively
without being told what to do or how to do it.
The power of nearly 1,000 Soldiers working in concert to accomplish a goal is truly inspiring. Once Soldiers understand that they are to solve problems, provide support, and continuously improve and innovate,
what they can accomplish has no limit. The results of
executing offensively speak volumes about the motivation, dedication, and professionalism of our Soldiers.
The 168th Brigade Support Battalion knows how to
ALOG
Make It Happen!
Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Heussner is a student at the Army War College. At the time he
wrote this article, he was the commander of the
168th Brigade Support Battalion. He holds a B.S.
degree in political science from Stetson University
and an M.S. degree in logistics management from
Florida Institute of Technology and is a graduate
of the Army Command and General Staff College.
julyaugust 2009
Transformation of Finance Operations

by
Major Thomas A. Buchholz, Captain Nicole M. Ward,
and
Staff Sergeant James R. Bakie
With Army transformation, finance operations have become a sustainment function.

When the 1st Sustainment Brigade deployed to Iraq in 2007, it was in the process
of learning how best to provide financial support in a modular organization.
aced with the challenge of transforming into

an expeditionary, campaign-quality force, the
Army replaced division support commands and
other support brigades with sustainment brigades. For
the logistician, this involved not only streamlining
traditional systems for command and control, theater
opening, and theater distribution but also integrating
financial management operations as a new sustainment
function. Within the sustainment brigade, a financial
management support operations (FM SPO) section was
added to the table of organization and equipment. This
section was created to help the sustainment brigade
command and control a financial management company (FMCO).
Finance Modularity
The financial management community transformed
in order to adapt to Army modularity. Finance transformation was designed to help support and serve the
Army and the Nation, provide modular, capabilitiesbased organizations, and increase the relevance and
responsiveness of finance units to commanders. Financial management transformation eliminated finance
commands, finance groups, and finance battalions. In
their place, the Army created financial management
centers (FMCs) that provide financial operations, theater policy, and technical oversight. The FMC is the
theater link to financial management national providers
such as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
(DFAS) and the Department of the Treasury.
The elimination of finance battalions resourced
a total of 23 FMCOs (12 in the Active component)
and 90 financial management detachments (33 in the
Active component). FMCOs and financial management detachments have the same missions as the legacy
finance structures, but provide greater disbursing capability at the detachment level and only limited military
pay support because of the fielding of the Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Predeployment Developments
The 1st Sustainment Brigade, formerly the 1st
Infantry Division Support Command, was activated on
15 February 2007. Soon after the activation, we were
notified of our deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 0709 to support Multi-National DivisionBaghdad (MNDB). The 1st Sustainment Brigade was
the second sustainment brigade to employ finance formations in combat operations.
The brigade commander decided to reorganize key
staff positions for OIF 0709. This decision was based
on an earlier action that attached the 24th FMCO to
the special troops battalion (STB) during its deployment. The logic was to give the STB commander the
tools and resources needed to successfully provide
command and control and technical oversight for
financial management operations in his area of operations. Because of this reorganization, the FM SPO
section was shifted from the brigade SPO section to
the STBs as primary staff.
Planning and Preparation
Before deploying, the FM SPO established communication with several financial management unitsthe
24th FMCO at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the 13th Finance
Group (deployed to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait), and the
336th FMC from Lake Charles, Louisianawith the
intent of building relationships with nonaligned units
before the deployment. Relationship building was key
to our successful integration in theater.
Our initial contact with a unit that was in theater was
with the 13th Finance Group. We contacted the group
to gather information, theater policies, and the finance
support matrix for the theater of operations. We sought
to develop a better understanding of the working relationship between FM SPO and the finance group. We
also gleaned this type of information from the 336th
FMC, which visited us at Fort Riley, Kansas, and
briefed the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Sustainment
27
Brigade leaders on the financial management concept

of support and modularity.
The 24th FMCO was task-organized under the 1st
Sustainment Brigade for OIF 0709. The FM SPO and
the 24th FMCO discussed personnel and equipment
issues and the companys predeployment training. The
FM SPO began to integrate this information into STB
training meetings, and a video teleconference was conducted to discuss current and future issues, working
relationships between the FMCO and FM SPO, finance
support in Iraq, and individual detachment strengths
and locations.
The battalion commander, the FM SPO section, and
the 24th FMCO commander and sergeant major went
to Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, to observe Army Reserve
finance predeployment training and to meet two
Army Reserve detachments that would deploy with
Finance transformation was designed

to help support and serve the Army
and the Nation, provide modular,
capabilities-based organizations, and
increase relevance and responsiveness
to commanders.
the 24th FMCO. The 336th FMC was still training at
Fort McCoy, allowing the FM SPO section to meet
its leaders and discuss theater finance policies, roles,
responsibilities, and relationships. We also met the
officer-in-charge of the Army Reserve finance training at Fort McCoy and his staff to discuss the training
and tasks that all Reserve finance units must conduct
before deploying. The visit also allowed us to meet the
two detachment commanders who would be attached
to the 24th FMCO in Iraq. We based our discussions
on their training, Soldier and equipment strength, and
the future concept of support to operations in Iraq.
The FM SPO section also initiated communication
with the 15th Finance Battalion in Iraq to learn about
reporting procedures and requirements, customer service workload, locations of detachments and their
finance support teams missions, the financial impact
of the surge, guidance for the FM SPO section, and the
transition process between the 15th Finance Battalion
and the 24th FMCO.
Understanding Roles and Responsibilities
The 1st Sustainment Brigade deployed to Iraq with a
finance battalion instead of a FMCO. This allowed the
FM SPO within the STB to develop its internal standing operating procedures (SOPs), identify its roles and
responsibilities, and learn everything it could from the
28
finance battalion before the FMCO arrived. The FM

SPO section quickly learned and understood the unique
finance focuses, such as the merged accountability
funds report, analysis of unmatched transactions, and
assignment incentive pay. We also began to learn how
finance operations work in a deployed environment.
Functions of the FM SPO Section
By the time the FMCO arrived, the FM SPO section
was operational and understood its tasks, roles, and
responsibilities. We took the functions of an FM SPO
found in Field Manual 106, Financial Management
Operations, and used them as a guide to create the specific tasks the section would conduct. We noted that,
in the sustainment community, receiving timely and
relevant data is important. In the finance community,
that translates to tracking all Soldier and commander
support statistics, including casual pay, check cashing,
EagleCash card activity, paying-agent funding, and
commercial vendor service payments.
These statistics quickly turned into tasks. The FM
SPO section had to
Monitor and compile finance data through Diamond 2 reports.
Develop trend and review-and-analysis briefs
monthly.
Monitor software and equipmentkiosks, the
deployable disbursing system, paperless check conversion, point-of-sale devices, vaults, and cash counters.
Plan finance support to respond to changes in the
theater. As maneuver brigades shift throughout the
battlefield, they can request finance support at remote
combat outposts.
Ensure that the brigade plans and coordinates with
the brigade SPO and S3.
Resolve FMCO issues. This task became necessary
when the FM SPO section began supporting the FMCO.
Each task had associated subtasks, and over time, we
saw them changing as other priorities changed. These
tasks were merely what we identified as our priorities
during the first 5 months in Iraq.
Relationships
When we arrived in theater, the FM SPO quickly
coordinated with outside agencies and units. These
included the 316th FM SPO section (the 1st Sustainment Brigade FM SPOs higher headquarters); 336th
FMC; 3d, 7th, and 640th Sustainment Brigade FM
SPOs; 1st Sustainment Brigade staff (specifically the
brigade SPO section); and 24th FMCO.
The FM SPO section communicated daily with
the 336th FMC for policy and technical guidance.
The 336th FMC served as the higher finance unit.
Although it was not a command, the 336th FMC served
as the financial management adviser for the theater.
julyaugust 2009
It provided technical oversight and coordinated with

national providers, such as DFAS, the Department of
the Treasury, and the U.S. Army Finance Command
(USAFINCOM). The 336th FMC was responsible
for sending daily technical finance reports, chairing
weekly technical update meetings, and publishing
finance directives and policies to FM SPOs. The 336th
FMC also served as the theater program manager for
Federal Reserve System programs, EagleCash cards,
and paperless check conversion.
DFAS, USAFINCOM, the Federal Reserve System,
and the Department of the Treasury were important
assets and force multipliers for us. They served as our

technical experts and program managers and were a
source for historical information. They were always
responsive to our questions and concerns about operations and procedures. We communicated with all of
the agencies regularly in either monthly or bimonthly
teleconferences that served as a forum for us to convey
our concerns.
In addition to our teleconferences with outside
agencies, representatives from DFAS and the Treasury
Department visited Iraq to provide assistance and implement new software. DFAS sent a Corporate Electronic
FM
FM SPOs
SPOs
MNDB
MND-B
MNDC
MND-C
316th
316th ESC
ESC
STB
FM SPO
DFAS
DFAS
BSB
BSB SPOs
SPOs
24th
24th FM
FMCO
CO
FRB
FRB
(Federal
(Federal Reserve
Reserve Bank
Bank))
336th
336th FMC
FMC
Legend
BSB
=
DFAS =
ESC
=
FM
=
FMC
=
FMCO =
MNDB =
MNDC =
SPO
=
STB
=
Brigade support battalion

Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Expeditionary sustainment command
Financial management
Financial management center
Financial management company
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Multi-National Division-Central
Support operations office
Sustainment brigade
This diagram shows all of the agencies that the financial management support operations section works
with or coordinates with on a regular basis.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
29
Functions of a Financial Management

Support Operations Section
Integrate all financial management (FM) within the
area of operations.
Plan employment of FM units.
Synchronize division of FM networks.
Manage all FM systems.
Coordinate FM requirements.
Coordinate operations and strategic FM support.
and integrated our plans with

the brigade SPO plans section,
and participated in brigade
operational planning groups.
The brigade served as our link
to future support requirements
and operational plans for Iraq.
Rules, Tools, and Procedures

The FM SPO section
improved the reporting system
by implementing the Diamond
2 report from the 336th FMC.
This report was a consolidation
Field Manual 106,
of all finance data from the
Financial Management Operations
detachments and the FMCO.
The type of data collected
included customers served,
Document Management System (CEDMS) team to set
casual pay, checks cashed, EagleCash card activup a web-based CEDMS application and a central reposity, paying agent activity, Commanders Emergency
itory for permanent storage of documents. CEDMS
Response Program payment, and commercial vendor
provides online access to disbursing vouchers and supservice activity. With these data, we were able to brief
porting documents to reduce the risk of lost documents
accurate review-and-analysis and trend information to
and the time needed to access supporting documents for
the 1st Sustainment Brigade commander. Some key
research and audits and work problem disbursements.
information collected included customer numbers for
Another helpful visit was conducted by the Eagledisbursing, paying agents, commercial vendor serCash card team, which provided retraining to finance,
vices, and military pay.
postal, and exchange workers on end-user equipment
The automation tracker was used by tracking autorelating to the EagleCash program.
mation that belonged to the Federal Reserve SysThe FM SPO section collaborated with other FM
tem. The type of equipment tracked included kiosks,
SPOs from the 3d, 7th, and 640th Sustainment Bripoint-of-sale devices, paperless check conversion, and
gades. We shared ideas and SOPs and worked together
EagleCash cards. This ensured that the automation
to resolve finance issues as a group. We resolved
equipment was repaired or replaced as needed. Ensurcross-boundary finance support concerns before they
ing that the right equipment was at the right location
became 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command
was mission essential.
(ESC) issues. An example of coordination among all
In an effort to track the more than 700 paying agents
the FM SPOs occurred in December 2007, when the
that supported the commanders on the battlefield, the
336th FMC hosted a planning conference to realign
FM SPO developed a paying-agent tracker. The system
finance support boundaries and missions throughout
tracked paying agents by unit, assigned location, and
Iraq. After the 2-day planning conference, the FM
fund-clearing status. This helped ensure that we knew
SPOs briefed their FMCO, battalion, and brigade
who our customers were and how we could help them.
commanders on the draft courses of action (COAs).
It also helped us plan for future missions and the placeEach commander provided his input to his FM SPO,
ment of financial management support.
and the finance community reconvened via Breeze
We tracked our forward operating bases, combat
(Adobe Acrobat Connect Pro Web-conferencing softoutposts, joint security stations, and patrol bases by
ware). The changes were briefed, agreed on, and
which financial management detachments directly
merged, resulting in an approved COA. The 316th
supported them, what units were being supported,
ESC published a fragmentary order directing the susand population size. As the number of units in theater
tainment brigades to execute the boundary shifts and
increased, we used this information to adjust where
mission changes.
support was needed.
Although the FM SPO section was located at the
battalion level, we were closely linked with the briFinancial Management Briefings
gade SPO. We participated in the brigade SPO weekly
The development of our trackers and consistent
collaborative sessions (a forum with all of the subormonitoring of financial data evolved into the develdinate brigade support battalion SPOs), coordinated
opment of numerous finance briefs. The FM SPO
30
julyaugust 2009
The FM SPO section also initiated communication with the 15th Finance
Battalion in Iraq to learn about reporting procedures and requirements, customer
service workload, locations of detachments and their finance support teams missions,
the financial impact of the surge, guidance for the FM SPO section, and the transition
process between the 15th Finance Battalion and the 24th FMCO.
prepared many financial management information

papers for higher-level discussions and meetings. The
FM SPO section attended monthly collaborative G1
meetings for MNDB and Multi-National DivisionCentral (MNDC) and completed mission analyses
and COA analyses for both MNDB and MNDC.
We developed monthly trends briefings that were
shared among the brigade leaders to identify how to
sustain and improve finance operations. The trends
briefings covered vendor payments, EagleCash card
loads versus cashier disbursements, paying agent support, and Soldier support disbursement.
In synchronization with the brigade SPO, we also
developed a review-and-analysis briefing that showed
all of the FMCOs technical statistics. The briefing
covered the case management system, merged accountability funds report, analysis of unmatched transactions, the military pay accuracy rate, and Soldier
support disbursements. This allowed the 1st Sustainment Brigade, STB, and FMCO commanders to see the
macro-to-micro view of financial management support
in our area of operations.
Challenges of Modularity
The financial management community has faced
some challenges during the modularity conversion,
the biggest being the transformation of financial
management battalions to companies. This shift put
FMCOs under the command and control of STBs.
Reorganizing the financial management unit into
a company has had some negative impacts on how
the company is perceived and how assets, such as
housing and workspace, are allocated. The STB has
been very careful not to remove power from the
detachment commanders and has even aligned their
rating scheme with that of all other company-level
commanders, having the FMCO commander as their
rater, the battalion commander as their intermediate
rater, and the 1st Sustainment Brigade commander as
their senior rater.
It was an educational process for both the sustainment community and the financial management community to understand each others
technical requirements and methods of thinking. The
sustainment community did not understand financial
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
management processes, regulations, and business

rules, and the financial management units learned
how the logistics community is a numbers-based organization that uses statistical data to analyze workflow,
workload capacity, customer service satisfaction, and
proficiency. The FM SPO and the subordinate financial management units learned to analyze the data and
use them to improve processes and procedures.
The 1st Sustainment Brigades STB and FM SPO
have embraced financial management modularity. We
see the potential in applying modularity to the financial management structure throughout Iraq. Finance
Soldiers are no longer administrative overhead; they
are now increasingly critical warfighting enablers and
should be considered as such by all. Finance functions
are now in the fight, with a tighter link to operational
and support planning in conjunction with the battlespace management that the sustainment brigade
provides. The sustainment brigade and the FM SPO
have only begun to scratch the surface on exploiting
the opportunities for the positive synergy that merging
financial management into the sustainment community
ALOG
provides.
Major Thomas A. Buchholz is the executive officer

of the 1st Sustainment Brigade Special Troops Battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas. He holds a B.A. degree
from the Citadel and is a graduate of the Infantry
Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Comptroller Intermediate Level Education Phase II.
Captain Nicole M. Ward is the financial management support operations officer for the 1st
Sustainment Brigade Special Troops Battalion. She
holds a bachelors degree from Xavier University
and is a graduate of the Finance Officer Basic
Course and Finance Captains Career Course.
Staff Sergeant James R. Bakie is the noncommissioned officer-in-charge of the Financial Management Support Operations Section, 1st Sustainment
Brigade, at Fort Riley, Kansas. He is a graduate of
the Warrior Leader Course and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course.
31
The Critical Role of Shower,

Laundry, and Clothing Repair Teams
by
Captain James C. Machado
s missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

have changed over the past 6 years, so have the
logistics requirements. During the initial entry
phase and the first 2 years of the war, shower, laundry, and clothing repair (SLCR) teams were the only
means of providing Soldiers with adequately cleaned
laundry and a respectable shower. If they were not fortunate enough to receive the field services that SLCR
(pronounced slicker) teams provide, Soldiers were

forced to fabricate their own showers and wash their
clothing by hand.
SLCR Teams in OIF
By the summer of 2005, the OIF theater of operations had matured, and most Soldiers resided on
large bases like Logistics Support Area Anaconda and
julyaugust 2009
Victory Base Complex (VBC) or substantial forward

operating bases (FOBs) that contracted laundry and
shower services to support their populations. By the
end of 2005, most SLCR teams found themselves without purpose because of the abundance of contractors.
SLCR team members took on in lieu of missions,
including convoy security and escort duties and base
force-protection missions.
But in late 2006, the lack of security in Iraq became
intolerable. Escalating violence was threatening the longterm success of democracy in the country. So President
George W. Bush appointed leaders with fresh ideas and
a comprehensive understanding of counterinsurgency
operations. Those new leaders decided to use a new
tactic: placing Soldiers in patrol bases (PBs) and combat
A laundry advanced system is unveiled and

prepared for operation at Combat Outpost
War Eagle in support of the 64th Special
Troops Battalion. Shower and laundry
operations were functioning within
48 hours of the teams arrival.
outposts that were embedded in communities throughout

Iraq, far from the comforts of well-established bases.
Shower and laundry services were once again in high
demand to support these remote PBs and combat outposts, and SLCR Soldiers began using their military
occupational specialty again.
When outposts are fortunate enough to have a SLCR
team, the units enjoy a significant combat multiplier.
The teams provide a service that gives Soldiers not
only clean clothes to wear, but also a way to wash off
sweat and dirt at the end of a hard day of patrolling.
This capability enables Soldiers to enjoy their free
time, not spend it washing clothes by hand or carrying clothes to the nearest FOB for contracted laundry
support. SLCR teams allow combat units to focus on
combat missions rather than trying to solve simple
logistics problems. Another benefit of a SLCR team
is their ability to repair ripped and torn uniforms.
Patrolling Soldiers often damage their uniforms while
executing their duties, but with a SLCR team on site
to mend these deficiencies, they should always have
usable uniforms available.
In late July 2007, in the midst of new and improved
counterinsurgency operations, the 1st Platoon, 549th
Quartermaster Company, 68th Combat Sustainment
Support Battalion (which was under the administrative
control of the 1st Sustainment Brigade), deployed with
over 40 Soldiers who were eager to begin their mission of providing field services for forward-deployed
outposts and bases in Iraq. The platoons SLCR teams
met the laundry needs of one FOB, one PB, and one
combat outpost with over 1,900 Soldiers. The platoon
also operated the only Soldier-run renovation shop in
Iraq at VBC.
Team 1
When the 1st Platoon arrived in Iraq, it immediately
sent a SLCR team to FOB Iskandariyah to support the
3d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment. That SLCR team,
Team 1, provided laundry and minor clothing repair
services to over 750 Soldiers, civilians, and some thirdcountry nationals who worked on the FOB. Soldiers
enjoyed a less than 24-hour turnaround on their laundry
during regular operations, but the laundry advanced
system (LADS) facility personnel also accommodated
Soldiers if they returned from patrols or convoys during
off-hours and needed immediate laundry service. This
practice gave Soldiers who spent only one night a week
on the FOB the ability to leave the FOB and continue on
their missions with clean clothes in hand. Team 1 processed an average of 300 bundles of clothing each day
for the 3d Battalion and regularly repaired torn uniforms
for the Soldiers at FOB Iskandariyah.
33
A Soldier repairs a
uniform to return it
to service. Renovation
services were free of
charge for any Soldier
and usually were
completed in less than
24 hours.
team established operating
hours to coincide with returning patrols so troops could
clean off the sweat and dirt
of the mission immediately.
Team 2 provided services that
not only kept Soldiers off the
roads but also improved their
morale with freshly laundered
clothes and daily showers.
Team 2
Beginning in November 2007, another group of
1st Platoon Soldiers, Team 2, was tasked to provide
shower and laundry support to the 1st Battalion, 30th
Infantry Regiment, at PB Murray and also to some units
at the surrounding PBs. Before Team 2s arrival at PB
Murray, the infantry Soldiers had to take their clothes
to FOB Falcon, which was 30 to 45 minutes away. The
Soldiers sometimes waited 2 or 3 weeks before they
could get to Falcon to have their clothes laundered,
and they also had to return to pick up their completed
laundry a few days later. This risked Soldiers lives by
forcing them to be on the roads unnecessarily.
Before the 1st Platoons arrival, the units at PB Murray and the other surrounding PBs took cold showers
with bottles of water or engineered makeshift shower
sites with privately owned Sun Shower bags. PB Murray
had established gravity flow showers, but the water was
heated by sunlight, so the Soldiers took cold showers in
the winter months.
To make life easier on the 1st Battalion, Team 2
arrived at PB Murray with 2 shower tents that provided
an average of 150 showers per day and a LADS, which
allowed the team to complete laundry in less than 24
hours. Such turnaround times were ideal because the
Soldiers sometimes spent more than 16 hours on convoys and patrols and often returned to the PB for less
than 24 hours.
To the Soldiers delight, the water in the field showers was heated to the perfect temperature, and the SLCR
34
Other 1st Platoon Missions

A few Soldiers from the
1st Platoon remained at VBC
and operated the Stagecoach
Renovation Shop, where they
repaired clothing and sewed
patches onto the uniforms of not only Soldiers but also
Marines, Sailors, and Airmen. Within the limitations
of their sewing machines, shop personnel fabricated
simple textile items like rifle covers, weapon slings,
modified reflective belts, and makeshift harnesses. The
Stagecoach Renovation Shop repaired or patched the
uniforms of several high-profile Soldiers, including
General David Petraeus and Sergeant Major Marvin
Hill, who were the Multi-National Forces-Iraq commanding general and command sergeant major.
The 1st Platoon maintained a command and control
element at VBC, but the platoon leader and platoon
sergeant spent much of their time traveling to each
SLCR site to check on their troops and ensure their
equipment readiness remained at the highest level
possible. The 1st Platoon also had two mechanics who
remained at VBC to repair broken equipment that came
back from the outlying sites for direct-support repairs.
They often caught flights to outlying sites to take highpriority parts to the teams and conduct organizational
maintenance, which reduced maintenance problems
and long-term deadlines on the LADS, generators, and
water boilers.
The 1st Platoon took on one last mission to support
about 800 Soldiers in the Multi-National DivisionBaghdad area of operations in March 2008. Team 3
established the third SLCR site of their tour at Combat
Outpost War Eagle. The site was built from excess plywood on the post, and the Soldiers erected the building
within 48 hours of arrival.
julyaugust 2009
Soldiers from Team 3 at Combat Outpost War Eagle begin operations in the partially constructed
building during the first 24 hours in theater.
Equipment
Many SLCR customers wanted to know what a
LADS is and how it works. A LADS is a 40-footlong mobile laundry trailer that is easily hauled by an
M1088 tractor and M871 trailer from location to location. The system can be set up and operational within
hours. LADS is now completely computerized, making
it easier to operate for even the most inexperienced
SLCR Soldiers.
While many household detergents contaminate water
and produce what is commonly known as gray water,
LADS uses only environmentally friendly cleaning
agents. Generally, the clothes put into the LADS are
washed in a mild detergent solution (procured from the
Army supply system) with an added antifoam chemical. The components of the detergent break apart and
disintegrate into the environment without causing
chemical damage to soil, so the laundry water does not
require waste-water disposal. By using these nonhazardous chemicals, LADS can be set up anywhere clean
(not necessarily potable) water is readily available,
allowing SLCR teams to deploy with any unit.
Shower equipment in a SLCR operation normally
includes one tent with a 12-head private shower stall
setup. On camps or outposts with both men and women,
hours of operation are gender-specific to ensure adequate privacy, but the hours always accommodate the
operating tempo of each specific customer unit. A
shower tent has one small generator to power the boilers
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
that heat the water and to pump water to and from the
tent. SLCR Soldiers are responsible for ensuring that
the water is the proper temperature and that the showers
are kept clean and sanitary. They also take special care
to maintain the often overworked equipment, making
certain it is kept in proper working order and supplied
with fuel and water as needed.
Soldiers of the 1st Platoon received several certificates of achievement, Army Achievement Medals, and
coins from their supported units in appreciation for
their hard work and dedication to their fellow Soldiers
deployed in support of OIF. The 1st Platoon successfully redeployed from Iraq in October 2008 and rejoined
the 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion at Fort
Carson, Colorado, where they currently continue to
ALOG
train for future SLCR operations.
Captain James C. Machado is the aide-de-camp for

the Multi-National Forces-Iraq deputy commanding general in Baghdad. He was the commander of
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 68th
Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 43rd Area
Support Group, from January 2007 to June 2008.
He was commissioned at Arizona State University
through the Armys Green to Gold program and is
a graduate of the Airborne School and the Signal
Officer Basic Course.
35
Technology and Daily Management

Help CRSPs Move Cargo
by
Chief Warrant Officer (W2) Nadine S. Johnson
The author lays out the tools used by the 1st Sustainment Brigade central receiving
and shipping point to manage and move cargo throughout Iraq.
entral receiving and shipping point (CRSP)

operations provide checks and balances for
managing mass cargo flowing into the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) theater. On a daily basis,
the 1st Sustainment Brigade CRSPs managed these
operations for the brigade during its OIF 0709
deployment.
Cargo has been moving faster and more efficiently
into the Iraqi theater of operations since the brigade
implemented a new Microsoft Access database that
links the Victory Base Complex and Camp Taji CRSP
databases with battalion- and brigade-level transportation movement release (TMR) databases. This
integrated database, developed by personnel from
the 168th Brigade Support Battalion and the 192d
Quartermaster Company, laid the groundwork for
improvements in the daily transportation management
of the CRSPs.
TMR Database Management

Daily operations included a battalion-level review
of all cargo in the CRSPs against the TMRs assigned
to it. The brigade TMR manager imported all assigned
battalion-level TMRs into the CRSP database. He
ensured that the TMRs were assigned to the correct
mode operator. (The mode operator is the battalion
assigned to move the equipment.) The TMR manager
then monitored the daily status for completion to ensure
delivery of the cargo by the required delivery date (RDD)
or no later than 9 days after the RDD.
The TMR database was implemented in October
2007, and by Februrary 2008, the 1 to 9 day past RDD
rate had been reduced from 21 percent to 5 percent.
Movement Planning
Since most of the cargo that the brigade transported
transited the CRSPs, managing the CRSPs was imperative to cargo visibility.
Daily checks of assigned
Daily Cargo Screening Checklist
TMRs against the cargo
in the CRSPs facilitated
Ensure cargo entries are correct and standardized in the database.
movement
planning.
Check for cargo on hand for over 10 days.
Accurate entries in the
Separate 1st Sustainment Brigade cargo from other cargo.
CRSP databases ensured
that the correct number
Check for discrepancies in numbers or odd TMRs.
of trucks was allocated
Communicate with CRSPs and battalions regarding shipping dates.
to move cargo to its final
Communicate with MCTs on local discrepancies.
destination. The CRSP
Communicate with MCTs on theater cargo discrepancies.
personnel and mode operPay special attention to deployment and redeployment cargo.
ators doublechecked the
items listed on a TMR
Legend
against the cargo actually
CRSP = Central receiving and shipping point
in the CRSPs. If discrepMCT = Movement control team
ancies were found, they
TMR = Transportation movement release
were fixed with the help
of the 199th Movement
Control Team (MCT) at
This checklist was used by managers of 1st Sustainment Brigade
Victory Base Complex or
central receiving and shipping points to measure the progress of
cargo being moved.
the 528th MCT at Camp
36
julyaugust 2009
Taji, which were colocated with the brigade

and the CRSPs. The initiative to colocate the
MCTs improved the flow
of cargo. The MCTs were
the honest brokers used to
enforce load lists, fix TMR
discrepancies, and provide
visibility of incoming and
outgoing cargo.
8
6
4
2
0
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
CRSP 1
7.5
6.7
3.3
3.4
2.6
CRSP 2
6.8
7.1
2.8
2.3
2.1
Daily Cargo Screening

The checklist at left
The number of days cargo spent in transit through the 1st Sustainment
was a guide that the man- Brigade CRSPs dropped significantly from November 2007 to March
agers of the 1st Sustain- 2008 because of improved management practices and success metrics.
ment Brigade CRSPs used
to accomplish the daily
cargo spent at the CRSPs was also reduced. (See chart
screening of the cargo. This checklist was essential in
above.) In November 2007, the average time a piece
finding discrepancies and providing the brigade with
of cargo assigned to the 1st Sustainment Brigade was
a good snapshot of how the CRSPs and the battalion
in transit in the CRSP was more than 7 days by March
mode operators performed. The battalion mode opera2008, the average time was only 2.4 days.
tors had to meet two challenges: They had to deliver
cargo before the RDD, and they had to keep the time a
The CRSP should be recognized as an important
piece of cargo spent in the CRSPs as short as possible.
node in the transportation system, one that requires
Balancing these requirements was an art that ensured
daily supervision and implementation of managethe earliest possible delivery time to the customer. Over
ment tools. Both 1st Sustainment Brigade CRSPs
the last months of their deployment, the 1st Sustainprocessed over 49,000 pieces of cargo over a 5-month
ment Brigade and its battalions perfected this art.
period. Human error is found in any organization,
and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to
The CRSP Scrub
counteract this tendency helped greatly in daily transThe brigade CRSP manager ensured that entries in
portation management and made a positive impact on
the CRSP databases were standardized for export and
the support the 1st Sustainment Brigade provided to
import to the TMR databases used by the battalions and
the warfighter.
the brigade. The 1st Sustainment Brigade conducted
Daily management also revealed negative trends,
CRSP scrubs at least twice a week to doublecheck
such as incorrect labeling of cargo and generic destithe accuracy of current onhand cargo, destinations,
nation points of contact on TMRs. Recognizing these
mode managers, and estimated ship dates (ESDs).
trends and addressing them to the correct agency was
The meeting also provided a forum for the brigade
extremely importantespecially at the VBC CRSP,
CRSP manager, the battalion transportation section,
which was often used as the dividing point for TMRs
the MCTs, and the CRSPs staffs to discuss any new
for cargo within the Iraqi theater of operations. Proper
trends and developments. The brigade CRSP manager
action taken on those negative trends set up the entire
facilitated external coordination with the other brigadetheater for success and reduced doublehandling of
level mode managers in Iraq.
cargo and customer wait time for all supported units
ALOG
Improved Practices, Improved Service
in Iraq.
Knowing which piece of cargo was assigned to each
mode manager helped to coordinate the movement of
any cargo left at the CRSPs for over 10 days. After the
implementation of the above management practices
Chief Warrant Officer (W2) Nadine S. Johnand the establishment of success metrics in December
son is the mobility officer and central receiving and
2007, the CRSPs were able to reduce the percentage
shipping point manager for the 1st Sustainment
of 1st Sustainment Brigade cargo on hand longer than
Brigade. She holds an associates degree in general
10 days from over 10 percent to 1 percent. Not only
studies from Campbell University and is a graduate
of the Warrant Officer Basic Course.
was the backlog cleared, but the time that pieces of
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
37
The 1st Sustainment Brigades

Contract Coordination Cell
by
Major John R. Caudill
Contracting for support has become a fact of life on the battlefield. But many
Soldiers and leaders do not have their first experience with contracting until they
arrive in theater. The 1st Sustainment Brigade found that changes in organization
and training are needed to meet the challenges of contracting.
raq has matured into a complex theater for support

operations. Most operations involve some level of
contracted support, whether for maintenance services, line-haul of critical classes of supply, force protection
services, bottled water production, or warehouse management. The operational environment changes rapidly,
and combat operations are planned and executed in more
flexible and rapid processes than in the past. The planning
and execution of support operations, including contracted
support, must also be flexible and responsive.
Contract processes are complex, not uniform, and
the personnel involved are constantly rotating in and
out of theater. In the contemporary operational environment, many contracting mechanisms, multiple contracting officers, varying degrees of contract oversight,
and numerous commercial companies are involved in
supporting our forces.
The experience of the 1st Sustainment Brigade in
Iraq demonstrates that the complexity of contracting in
the contemporary operational environment and under
the modular force structure requires modifications to
the sustainment brigades organization and to Army
institutional leader development. I believe the contract
coordination cell established by the 1st Sustainment
Brigade to mitigate the risks associated with the complex contracting environment in Iraq should be considered for Army-wide adoption.
The Contracting Environment in Iraq
Army logisticians must have synthesized contract
planning, administration, change, and implementation
mechanisms and processes. Their contracts can range
from Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts to Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/
Afghanistan contracts (whether theater-wide indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts or local contracts
administered by regional contracting centers) to continental United States (CONUS) program manager support contracts. Each of these contract vehicles can have
38
multiple contracting officers (KOs) or, in the case of

LOGCAP, administrative contracting officers (ACOs).
Each contracting mechanism has different levels of
involvement by the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) in contract oversight and auditing.
In the case of LOGCAP, an Army Materiel Command (AMC) LOGCAP support unit (an Army Reserve
unit) assigns regional specialists to assist in crafting
and processing changes to contracts. The companies
involved in support operations range from international
giants to regional companies to local vendors. Each of
these companies has its own list of managers, deputies,
analysts, and supervisors, who rotate just like their
military counterparts and make it difficult to keep contactor rosters current.
Each contracted effort involved in support operations must have a contracting officers representative
(COR) from the military unit responsible for the contracted function. The COR evaluates the contractors
performance, ensures that the contractor is in compliance with the requirements of the contract, and serves
as a technical representative and liaison among the customer unit, the contractor, and the KO to communicate
changes or the need for changes in the contract. In Iraq
today, it is not uncommon for a sustainment brigade to
have as many as 40 to 50 CORs.
Adapting to the Challenges of Contracting
Contracted support must be planned, just like military support, to ensure timely and effective support to
operations. Guidance must be given to, and feedback
received from, contractors, just as Army commanders
give guidance to and expect feedback (in the form of
reports) from units. The major challenge of contract
support planning and execution is the training (or lack
of training) of military planners at all levels and their
experience (or lack of experience) with the planning
and execution processes and the channels for implementing contractual changes.
julyaugust 2009
Many Soldiers and leaders encounter contract planning and administration for the first time in Iraq,
and they must adapt their organizations to deal with
contracts. Military planners are familiar with military
terms, such as staff principals, course of action, concept of operations, and fragmentary order (FRAGO).
But they struggle with contracting terms such as COR,
performance work statement (PWS), project planning
requests (PPRs), letter of technical direction (LOTD),
change order, notice to proceed, and spend plan. Military planners have realistic, experience-based expectations about the timelines associated with the military
decision making process and orders processes. However, most do not understand the timelines associated
with the contractual equivalents required to go from
concept to execution.
One Units Experience
The 1st Sustainment Brigade entered the Iraq theater
in September 2007, and by November two problems
had become obvious: Organizationally, we did not
have a single belly button to manage all contracting matters; individually, our Soldiers did not have the
knowledge of contracting processes they needed to
ensure that contractors provided timely and effective
support to ongoing operations. The result was that the
brigade operated through a series of crisis reaction
drills because we lacked the organizational capability
to plan and contract for changes. Both the brigade and
the contractors realized that some action was needed to
make changes in our contracting efforts, but no understanding of exactly how to accomplish that existed. The
lack of understanding of the contracting process, compounded by the slow response times in contract change
processes, led to shortfalls in support operations that
had a direct impact on the mission.
When a military operation requires a surge in capability, the natural response is to cut a FRAGO to direct
military resources to fill the capability gap. In a contracted effort, where the contractor has operational control of the activity, it is a violation of the PWS to insert
military capability without going through the change
order process. This is critical for military logisticians to
understand when they plan support operations or consider contracting operational control of critical support
operations (such as a supply support activity).
A gap existed between evaluations of the contractors
performance and the chain of commands perception of
the contractors performance. Commanders at all levels
were not receiving the contracted support they needed
in a timely manner, but the contractors were receiving
excellent ratings on the work they were contracted to
perform. This occurred because the military did not
fully understanding the contracts and because evaluations were nonexistent or poorly reported.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
The brigade commander and staff recognized that a

disconnect existed between the contractors and those
being supported and took immediate action to define
and analyze the problem, implement corrective actions
for the immediate deficiencies, and establish recurring
controls so that the problem would not continue. The
brigade established a small team of two officers to
work specifically on the issue.
What Are We Contracting?
The teams first task was to define all of the brigades contracted efforts. We began by scouring the
brigade staff to find out where the service contracts
were used in the brigade. This produced the obvious
list of LOGCAP contractors. Then we queried the subordinate battalions to find out what contractors they
had in their areas. This produced a significant list of
contracts that were in place by units that had submitted
purchase request and commitment actions through the
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan; these
contracts ranged from Iraqi truck drivers to warehouse
employees augmenting the military.
Finally, we physically visited all of the brigade areas
and identified contractors that were working in our
area but did not have a direct relationship with any of
our Soldiers. This produced a list of contracts that we
categorized as contracts found on installation. These
were low-density contracts that ranged from foreignlanguage interpreters to technical support for Standard
Army Management Information Systems contracted by
CONUS program managers. Each contract performed
critical, integral services in support of the military mission but was not fully integrated into the planning and
execution functions of the brigade.
What Are the Contractors Supposed to Be Doing?
Unlike military units, where the phrase and all
other duties as assigned is understood, contractors
are paid to deliver the services defined in their PWS.
Once the list of contracts was defined, the team started
acquiring copies of all contractual documents. These
documents included copies of contracts, task orders
against contracts, change orders and administrative
change letters to task orders and contracts, and LOTDs
from the KO to the contractor.
To relate these documents to military terminology,
contracts and task orders can be roughly equated to
operation orders. They are the base documents that
establish services, schedules, manning levels or levels of effort, and reporting relationships. The change
orders, administrative change letters, and LOTDs are
roughly equivalent to FRAGOs; they communicate to
the contractor changes to the original contract and provide direction to clarify or change details in previous
contract documents.
39
Who Is Involved With Contracts?

1st Sustainment Brigade Contract Coordination Cell
One critical outcome of these initial
steps was a better understanding of all
(SPO CCC)
the key players involved in each contract. Each contracted effort has sevContract Coordination
eral critical points of contact (POCs)
Cell Officer in Charge
involved in ensuring successful planning and execution. They include the
Plans and Programs
Quality Assurance
Purchasing Branch
contractor POC, the military contractBranch
Branch
ing and support operations POCs, the
COTR tracking and RIP
Brigade purchase request
Help desk operation
military subject-matter expert at the
COTR training
and commitment processing
Administrative contracting officer
point of delivery for the service (who
COTR support
and tracking
and LSO liaison
Defense Contract
Subordinate S-4 support
Project planning request and letter
will end up being the COR), the KO
Management Agency quality
of technical direction request
or ACO who directs the contractor,
assurance representative liaison
production, processing, and tracking
Audit reporting
and the DCMA quality assurance rep Customer and contractor issue
Audit review and analysis
communication and resolution
resentative (QAR) who is responsible
Performance Evaluation
Mission analysis and support
for auditing the contractors perforBoard scheduling and support
Brigade custodian of contractual
Brigade custodian of audit
documents
mance and compliance and supporting
reports
the CORs with training and advice.
The CORs are the day-to-day
Sustain to Victory
auditors and Government representatives at the point of service, who are
Legend
responsible for evaluating the perforCOTR = Contracting officers technical representative
mance of the contractor and facilitatLSO = Logistics support officer
ing the flow of information between
RIP = Relief in place
the contractor and the Government.
SPO = Support operations
Government support agencies and
overwhelming, especially in Iraq. The normal military
personnel are available to help logisticians plan and
planning process for operations is well understood by
execute contracted support operations, but the bulk of
military logisticians; the planning process to conduct
the effort falls back on the customer logistician who
contract support to operations is not. The battle drill
desires the support.
for processing a change order or LOTD to a contractor
in order to facilitate timely and effective support must
What Are Unit Responsibilities?
be a core competence for all Army logisticians in the
The military customer is responsible for planning
contemporary operational environment.
and preparing the documentation associated with a conThe process varies for each contract vehicle. As a
tracted effort; justifying and obtaining funding for the
logistician, once you understand the existing contracts
proposed contract; and monitoring quality assurance and
and POCs, your unit must define the process to change
evaluating performance evaluation of contract support.
those contracts. The place to start is with the KO,
The mission analysis for an upcoming operation
who can provide you with the process for changing
must be conducted with each contract in mind. As
contracts for your organization. The military comptrolimpacts or new requirements are identified, the brigade
ler community can outline the process for obtaining
must create or modify PWSs and letters of justification,
funding approval for the contract. If you do not have
review planning project estimates and schedules, negothe funds to obligate, you cannot get the contract suptiate with contractors and KOs, and move contracting
port you desire. Once you know the process, timeline,
document packages through the funding review and
and documents required to change a contract, you can
approval levels, from the brigade headquarters to the
adequately plan contracted support operations.
corps or division headquarters. Friction is inherent in
operating under the constraints of the Armys existing
1st Sustainment Brigades Mitigation Approach
contract procedures, which were written with assumpRecognizing that action needed to be taken immetions that are now dated in the reality of todays operadiately to address the challenges posed by large-scale
tional environment.
contracting, the 1st Sustainment Brigade established
a contract coordination cell (CCC) under the support
What Is Required to Change a Contract?
operations officer (SPO). The CCC served as the single
The procedures, timelines, and documents that
belly-button for all contract matters in the brigade.
must be used to change or establish contracts can be
40
julyaugust 2009
Instead of forcing all the players throughout the chain

of command to develop the same understanding of contracting procedures and personnel and the same level of
proficiency, we opted to create a core team of personnel
to serve as a contracting helpdesk. The CCC owned
contract-related issues and processes for the brigade.
The CCC comprised an officer-in-charge and three
branches: quality assurance, purchasing, and plans and
programs. The CCCs personnel were a mix of military
logisticians taken out of other shops in the SPO, representatives from national-level agencies and commands
(DCMA and AMC), and a LOGCAP contractor representative that the contractor agreed to assign to our
organization. (See chart at left.)
The quality assurance (QA) branch was responsible
for
Identifying CORs and tracking unit transitions that
require COR nominations, appointments, and training.
During unit transitions, the QA branch is responsible
for ensuring that right-seat, left-seat ride training is
adequate to meet the incoming CORs requirements.
Coordinating letters of appointment and initial and
sustainment training for brigade CORs.
Supporting COR requests for assistance, documentation, and training.
Maintaining liaison with DCMA QARs for corrective action requests.
Receiving, reviewing, and processing COR daily
and weekly audit reports.
Receiving, reviewing, and processing monthly
performance evaluation reports.
The purchasing branch was responsible for
Reviewing, consolidating, processing, and tracking all purchase request and commitment (Department
of the Army Form 3953) actions for the brigade.
Assisting subordinate units with purchasing
requirements.
The plans and programs branch was responsible
for
Assisting all brigade subordinate and supported
units with contracting questions (the helpdesk function).
Maintaining liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent contracting POCs to resolve contract issues.
Preparing, processing, and tracking the completion of all documents and processes related to ongoing
contracted activities. These documents include but
are not limited to PWSs, letters of justification, PPRs,
and LOTDs.
Supporting operations mission analysis for contract impacts.
Maintaining a central database of all brigade contractual documents.
The CCC was essential to the success of the brigade
in effectively planning and administering the brigades
contracted efforts.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Improving Contracting
I believe the experience of the 1st Sustainment Brigade in contracting for sustainment operations in Iraq
leads to four major conclusions:
Contracted support will continue to be integral to
the contemporary operational environment. Multiple
deployments have strained all sectors of the Armys
sustainment formations. Contracting certain sustainment functions allows us to devote critical military
resources to higher priority requirements. The strain
on the military is not going to be reduced significantly
in the foreseeable future, so all military logisticians
should become comfortable with and proficient at
planning for and executing contracted support.
Support operations activities should be retained
under the command and control of the military chain
of command and augmented by contractors. Contracting operational control of support operations does not
allow for the flexibility required in the contemporary
operational environment. Contract change processes
and timelines do not lend themselves to flexibility and
timely, effective support.
Sustainment brigade modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) must be modified
to add a contract coordination cell in the SPO section.
The current sustainment brigade MTOE does not have
an organic CCC. It is imperative that the sustainment
brigade MTOE be modified immediately to ensure that
it is organized and trained for the current mission.
Institutional training at all levels for tactical
contracting is a must. Todays Army leaders must
possess a general knowledge of contracting as a core
competence. All Soldiers on the battlefield will interface with contractors, either in their organization or
in the course of their duties. Planning, administering,
and executing contract support operations must be
integrated into Army institutional leader development
as a core competence so that our Soldiers possess the
baseline knowledge required to function as logisticians
in todays environment.
The contemporary operational environment is volatile, chaotic, and uncertain, and the contracting aspect
of this environment is no different. Our Soldiers and
formations must be comfortable and prepared for sucALOG
cess in this environment.
Major John R. Caudill is the S4 of the 214th

Fires Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He served as
the branch chief of the contract coordination
cell in the 1st Sustainment Brigade in Iraq. He
holds a bachelors degree in animal science from
Kansas State University.
41
Human Resources Modularity

Tested in Iraq
by
Captain Xarhya Wulf
he Armys most recent transformation began in

October 1999 when Chief of Staff of the Army
General Eric K. Shinseki announced that the
Army was developing plans to transform its Cold
War organizations and equipment into a lighter, more
responsive force to fill what was seen as a strategic
gap in warfighting capabilities. However, it was not
until 2003 that the adjutant general community offered
Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) as a
solution to support the human resources (HR) area of
the Armys transformation effort.
When PSDR was implemented in 2006, the Army
G1, Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle, said
that PSDR impacts how we support our Soldiers in the
operational force. It is a revolution in how we deliver
support. It is the most significant change in our business we have seen in our careers.
PSDR replaced the legacy structure that used multiple layers of paperwork that made personnel processing
tedious, time-consuming, and slow. With PSDR, the
personnel services battalions (PSBs) started to dissolve
and were replaced by brigade S1s with the capability
of providing essential personnel services and personnel
strength accounting.
Of particular note was the creation of HR companies
that formed the foundation of the new standard requirements code (SRC) 12 (Adjutant Generals Corps)
structure. Under the SRC 12 structure, HR elements
deploy to theater and provide nonessential personnel
services, including postal, casualty, and R5 (reception,
replacement, return-to-duty, rest and recuperation, and
redeployment). Multiple levels within the HR hierarchy provide technical oversight and guidance to SRC
12 units. The highest level in this hierarchy is at the
human resources sustainment center (HRSC). Under
the HRSC, embedded within the theater sustainment
command, is the HR operations cell, which provides
technical oversight to the HR support operations cells
(HR SPOs) of the sustainment brigades.
In fiscal year 2006, the 15th PSB deployed to Iraq
under the 15th Sustainment Brigade. Consequently, the
new structures could not be tested until the 1st, 3d, and
7th Sustainment Brigades arrived in theater in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, beginning in fiscal year
2007. As suggested in Field Manual Interim (FMI)
493.2, The Sustainment Brigade, each of those bri-
42
gades has attached its HR company to its special troops

battalion. The 1st Sustainment Brigade has found this
command relationship to be very effective.
Predeployment Coordination
The 1st Sustainment Brigade was activated on 15
February 2007, but the HR SPO did not become fully
activated and staffed with its eight personnel until May.
Originally, doctrine stated that 12 Soldiers would be
in the HR SPO. However, the doctrine has since been
modified, and the following eight positions remain:
Operations officer (O4).
Plans and operations officer (O3).
R5 and postal officer (O3).
HR technician (W2) (military occupational specialty [MOS] 420A).
Senior HR operations noncommissioned officer
(NCO) (MOS 42A50).
R5 operations NCO (MOS 42A40).
Postal operations NCO (MOS 42A30).
Information systems NCO (MOS 42A30).
With key personnel in place, the first task in the predeployment planning process was to define the roles and
responsibilities at each level, from the plans and operations cell to the HR company and its postal platoons, R5
teams, and casualty liaison teams. Unfortunately, being
the first iteration of new modular HR doctrine, Field
Manual (FM) 10, Human Resources Support, was painfully devoid of detailed data. The only thing that the HR
SPO cell knew with any clarity was the basic structure.
Therefore, the HR SPO staffall newly assigned to
the brigaderead postal, casualty, and R5 regulations
as they sought to understand their roles in relation to
the bigger picture, the scope of support, and the units
to be supported. Each section NCO cross-trained all of
the other team members in his area of expertise. Everyone took both the casualty and mortuary affairs operations center training offered online. They also became
familiar with Defense Casualty Information Processing
System reports, postal regulatory guidelines, and ongoing theater R5 policies and procedures. The casualty
and mortuary affairs training was one of the most beneficial because, as the 1st Sustainment Brigade deployed
into theater, a member of the HR SPO was lost from
the cell. However, because of the cross-training and
information sharing, the HR SPO was able to continue
julyaugust 2009
1st Sustainment Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1st Sustainment
Brigade
S1
STB
Headquarters
S1
S3/2
S4
HHC
Legend
FMCO =
HRCO =
HHC =
NCO =
STB =
S6
Signal
Financial management company

Human resources company
Headquarters and headquarters company
Noncommissioned officer
Special troops battalion
its mission without a moments hesitation.

The special troops battalion (STB) commander and
HR SPO representatives attended a mission readiness
exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and an HR
conference at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The 510th
HR Company commander and first sergeant visited
the STB at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the HR SPO and
the STB command team returned the favor by visiting Soldiers of some of the postal platoons attending
training at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Initial contact was
also made with the 15th PSB in Iraq, the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), and the 8th
HRSC. Through these meetings and contacts, the HR
SPO established the foundation for a good working
relationship with elements at every level of the HR
hierarchy. From these early engagements, we created a
staff mission statement and an initial HR SPO standing
operating procedure, along with all the point-of-contact
information needed to get up and running quickly.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
Chaplain
FMCO
HR SPO
FM SPO
Retention
NCO
HRCO
Deployment
On 19 September 2007, the 1st Sustainment Brigade deployed to Iraq. One of the HR SPO cells
first accomplishments after getting connectivity was
attending an HR conference that occurred during our
relief in place and transfer of authority (RIP/TOA).
The conference was attended by members from various divisions of the 8th HRSC (postal operations, R5,
casualty liaison team, and plans and operations), the
316th ESC HR SPO, and the 1st and 3d Sustainment
Brigades HR SPOs.
At this conference, we were able to solidify the
relationships that had begun in the continental United
States. The event was necessary and proved to be a
good beginning for the following reasons:
It allowed members of the deployed HR community to meet their counterparts and foster working
relationships.
It afforded the members an opportunity to voice
their concerns, issues, and questions and then allowed
leaders to discuss it in an open forum.
Most importantly, it provided a common HR
vision to all attendees.
Other outcomes of the conference included guidance
from the 8th HRSC on the way ahead and a standardization of reports to be used by all sustainment brigades.
43
Modular Structure
++
TSC
++
++
ESC
ESC
DMC
HR OPS
X
SUST
+
Legend
DMC
ESC
HR OPS
HRSC
SUST
TSC
= Distribution management center

= Expeditionary sustainment command
= Human resources operations
= Human resources sustainment center
= Sustainment brigade
= Theater sustainment command
control over the mission planning and

execution of the HR company. The 1st
Sustainment Brigade also retained its HR
SPO under the STB because it provided
the STB commander with the capabilities
and expertise needed to more effectively
employ his HR company.
After attending the conference, the
1st Sustainment Brigade HR SPO better understood the challenges it would
face in the deployment. The biggest of
HRSC
these challenges arose from the fact that
approximately 90 percent of the 510th HR
Company elements had been deployed
months before the arrival of the HR company headquarters. Since the 510th had
to fall under the command and control
of someone, it had been placed under the
command and control of the 15th PSB.
When the 1st Sustainment Brigade HR
SPO arrived in theater, its leaders thought
that they would conduct a RIP/TOA with
the PSB. However, the PSB was waiting
for the 510th HR Company headquarters,
which was not scheduled to arrive in
theater until the end of December 2007.
This added layers of command and control that made the flow of information
excruciatingly slow. The RIP/TOA process is designed for like units, which made the mixing
of legacy and modular formations during the first few
months particularly challenging for all.
As discussions proceded, we soon realized that the

makeup of the HR SPO had a couple of noticeable
shortfalls and that each HR SPO had been embedded
differently within its sustainment brigade or STB. The
1st Sustainment Brigade HR SPO was located in the
STB and placed under the supervision of the STB commander, who was dual-hatted as the HR and financial
management SPO. The 3d SB had placed most of its HR
team members at the brigade SPO and one technician at
the STB. Although the 7th Sustainment Brigade was not
in theater at the time, we discovered that it was planning
to leave its entire HR SPO at the brigade SPO.
The 1st Sustainment Brigade attached its HR company to the STB for command and control, although at
the time doctrine stated that the STB should provide
only administrative control for the HR company with
retention of mission responsibilities and authority at
the brigade level. This command relationship worked
because it allowed the STB commander to have full
44
Postal Operations
From the beginning, the biggest part of the 1st Sustainment Brigade HR mission was postal operations.
Concurrent with the RIP/TOA challenges, all Army
post offices (APOs) within the 1st Sustainment Brigade footprint were in the process of transferring their
missions to KBR in the midst of the Christmas surge.
The primary glitch in contracting postal services was
that KBR arrived understaffed and largely undertrained
to fulfill their postal mission. As if that wasnt enough,
the 1st Sustainment Brigade area of operations experienced a loss of air assets that had been used to deliver
a significant portion of Soldiers mail.
Despite these challenges early on, the postal mission during the Christmas surge was executed with
unprecedented success. Two key factors contributed.
First, quick changes to the distribution plan provided
increased frequency and capacity of ground logistics
convoys throughout the various destinations. Second,
the HR SPO decided to keep some postal platoons
working in the contracted APOs to assist the contractors with the mission.
julyaugust 2009
These measures prevented any mail delays in theater and significantly decreased the average time of
receipt of mail from the continental United States from
what was already a good 10 to 12 days (the military
postal standard is 12 to 18 days) to consistently under
8 days. Even during the peak of the holiday surge and
on Christmas Day, many Soldiers received packages in
only 5 to 6 days. In addition to providing regular APO
services, the 1st Sustainment Brigade also executed an
average of 21 mobile postal missions a week to units
dispersed to locations where a regular APO could not
be established.
One of the nondoctrinal positions that the HRSC
created to assist the sustainment brigades is the regional director. Regional directors are postal experts who
assist the HR companies and postal platoons with resolution of issues and provide postal advice and technical
guidance as needed. The regional directors are instrumental in the success of APO inspections because they
go out on staff assistance visits and ensure that the
APOs comply with the regulations. This needs to be an
actual authorized position for the HRSC.
R5
Personnel accountability is the most critical R5 task. The constant
updating of the Deployed
Theater Accountability
System (DTAS) database as Soldiers move
through the R5 process
is supposed to allow
near-real-time visibility
of Soldier movement.
The intent is to provide
visibility of Soldiers as
they move within the
theater and record when
they leave. In concept,
this is a great idea. However, this process is not
as well synchronized as
intended.
The R5 teams were
often
undermanned
when they arrived in theater and may not have
operated at every key
intratheater in-transit
node. Even areas with
an R5 team were not
always able to capture
all passengers going in
and out of a particular
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
aerial port of debarkation. FMI 10.02, Theater-Level

Human Resources Support, says that R5 teams will coordinate lodging or transportation of Soldiers delayed while
transiting. However, most units at division and brigade
level felt the need to put liaison teams at the R5 nodes
to manage R5 functions for their Soldiers. This begs the
question: Are R5 teams fulfilling their intended roles?
To ensure that the R5 teams are properly structured,
resourced, and employed to their fullest potential, FMI
10.02 should provide clearer, more concise R5 team
roles and responsibilities.
Casualty Liaison Team
The 1st Sustainment Brigade was originally sourced
with five casualty liaison teams (CLTs), but three
were attached to Multi-National Division-Baghdad,
Multi-National Division-Central, and Multi-National
Corps-Iraq. The fourth CLT was reassigned to fulfill a
different HR function outside the brigade. The remaining 1st Sustainment Brigade CLT consisted of five
Soldiers who did much more than their doctrinal role.
Once a casualty arrived at the combat support hospital,
Legacy Structure
++
PERSCOM
PER
PSA
HHD
PD
PSTL
PSB
HHD
Legend
HHD =
PD =
PER =
PSA =
PSB =
PSTL =
PD
PD
PD
PD
PSTL
Headquarters and headquarters detachment

Postal division
Personnel company
Personnel services activity
Personnel services battalion
Postal operations
45
a CLT member interviewed the patient to get his vital

information. This information was then entered into the
Defense Casualty Information Processing System and
sent to the necessary agencies within 3 hours.
While the patient was at the hospital, a CLT member
entered a progress report every 2 hours. Once a determination was made as to whether the casualty would be
medically evaluated or returned to duty, the CLT member
submitted an additional report and contacted the Soldiers
unit to coordinate pickup of the Soldier. The biggest issue
in the CLT realm is the inability to rotate the teams with
those in the division casualty cell to prevent combat stress
that often affects Soldiers in these roles.
Recommended Changes
The HR SPO, the R5, and the CLT need defined
missions. The HR SPO needs a better defined role at
each level to preclude the duplication of duties that is
currently happening in theater. The R5 and CLT plans
and operations sections should be combined at the company level, and the sustainment brigade HR operations
cell should be renamed as the HR SPO, with specific
roles and responsibilities defined for each element.
The existing command and control relationship does
not follow doctrine. In the 1st Sustainment Brigade,
the HR company is placed under the STB for command and control because the STB commander has
the authority and ability to provide more command
emphasis and mission focus to the HR company. Doctrine should be changed to reflect this command and
control relationship.
The casualty platoon consists of a platoon headquarters (with just a platoon leader and platoon sergeant)
and one or more plug-and-play CLTs. In practice,
this means that the platoon leader and platoon sergeant
may not have a home-station platoon to lead or train
every day and, if they do, likely will not deploy with
it. The1st Sustainment Brigade had a casualty platoon
that was from one Active component unit while its 5
subordinate teams were from 4 different Reserve component units. That required 6 separate unit requirement
forms with 6 separate unit identification codes deploying at different times from 5 different locations to build
1 platoon of 27 Soldiers.
The HR company has no subordinate detachment
command structure and, therefore, no reduction in the
span of control for the HR company commander. This
lack of detachment makes it difficult for the HR company to account for property, provide Uniform Code
of Military Justice authority, or groom junior adjutant
general captains to keep them competitive with their
peers in other branches. A captain subordinate command should be established under the HR company.
Similarly, since the CLT and R5 missions employ the
same MOS (without the F4 and F5 postal additional
46
skill identifiers), a single, larger, multifunctional, and

multicapable HR operations platoon would further
reduce span of control, simplify force structure, and
increase mission flexibility.
The primary missions of the HR operations cells R5,
CLT, and postal sections are executed during deployment. The HR SPO garrison mission is to train and
prepare for upcoming deployments. The CLT, R5, and
postal sections have no mission in garrison. All other
garrison functions are executed by the Army Installation Management Command and the brigade or battalion S1s. This lack of garrison mission causes great
angst among adjutant general professionals. What kind
of deployment training should be conducted? If stabilization of units is 12 to 24 months before redeployment,
is the garrison mission of training and preparing for
deployment sufficient for an HR SPO?
Eight Soldiers are authorized for the HR SPO. The
requirement should be changed to five Soldiers:
One O3 or O4 to serve as the officer in charge.
One W2 to serve as the plans and operations officer or technician.
One E7 or E8 to serve as the overall NCO in
charge and casualty NCO.
Two E5s or E6s to serve as the R5 and postal
NCOs.
The 1st Sustainment Brigade leaders firmly believe
that the success of the HR mission can be attributed
to the fact that the HR SPO was placed under the
STB. The STB is indeed organic to the brigade, and
the brigade staff is assigned to the STB through the
headquarters and headquarters company. The two are
neither organizationally nor physically separated as
they are in a combat sustainment support battalion.
Therefore, the STB commander can operate (along
with the HR SPO) as the brigade staff officer when
collaborating with adjacent and higher organizations, while concurrently serving as the commander
responsible for the HR mission. This arrangement has
provided more synergy and an enhanced unity of effort
than could be attained if the STB merely had adminisALOG
trative control.
Captain Xarhya Wulf is the battalion adjutant
for the 1st Sustainment Brigade Special Troops
Battalion. She was the human resources operations cell plans and operations and postal operations officer-in-charge and the casualty and R5
officer-in-charge for the 1st Sustainment Brigade
when she wrote this article. She holds an M.A.
degree in human resource management from Webster University. She is graduate of the Adjutant
General Officer Basic Course, Adjutant General
Captains Career Course, and the Human Resources
Management Course.
julyaugust 2009
The Joint Logistics Analysis Tool

by
Peter J. Cloutier
and
Brian K. Frank
The Army is developing a tool to make detailed logistics forecasts for several
classes of supply. The Joint Logistics Analysis Tool will predict sustainment
requirements and help logistics planners make better informed decisions.
e just got word from headquarters

to prepare for deployment for up to
1 year. Well be executing Operation
Plan 1234. The time-phased force deployment data
[TPFDD] is available from the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System [JOPES], but be advised
that all units have not been selected yet. The G3 is
working on three courses of action (COAs) for a briefing to the commanding general in 48 hours. I need you
to brief logistics supportability for those three COAs,
and by the way, your briefing follows the G3.
The statement above could lead to many days
(and all-nighters) of planning using spreadsheets and
various independent applications to provide a credible briefing for the general. The task of developing a
logistics supportability analysis has been half art and
half science. Relying on years of field experience and
an ocean of data, logisticians spend anywhere from a
few days to several weeks determining whether or not
a COA is supportable. To compensate for uncertainty,
logisticians often send supplies in large quantities to
an area of responsibility (AOR) as soon as an air or
sea port of debarkation (APOD/SPOD) is established.
Unfortunately, this practice creates iron mountains of
excess supplies.
The Army has moved more than one iron mountain
in the last century to further operational success. At one
time, logistics requirements were measured in days of
supply and were reported in the number of pounds of
a particular commodity that would be used per day per
Soldier. This was the most accurate process until recently. Now, with the proliferation of technology, we can
sharpen our pencils and provide more precise forecasts.
The old proverb, For want of a nail the shoe was
lost, is not lost on the logistics community. To be most
useful to the planners who manage the supply chain,
a forecast needs to produce a detailed list of requirements for all classes of supply. A logistics planner
needs to answer these questions: What will be needed?
Do I have enough on hand? When will it be needed?
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
The Joint Logistics Analysis Tool

Until the Joint Logistics Analysis Tool (JLAT) prototype was released for testing in June 2008, the Army
did not have a comprehensive tool to make detailed
logistics forecasts for several classes of supply. The
original JLAT concept was developed using a Microsoft Access platform, but the large amount of data
required to create a forecast quickly outpaced Access
capabilities. The Army Materiel Command (AMC)
G3 employed the Software Engineering CenterBelvoir (SECB) to manage the JLAT program. SECB
expanded JLAT computer capabilities using an Oracle
platform and stand-alone servers to sort gigabytes of
data into useful reports.
The heart of JLAT is a robust data center that
pulls historical data from the AMC Logistics Support Activity, equipment density data from program
For want of a nail the shoe was lost.

For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
Old Proverb
executive offices and project managers, usage data
from the Operating and Support Management Information System, unit structure information from the
Army Force Management Support Agency, and current national inventory positions from Total Asset
Visibility (TAV).
JLAT is a classified, web-based, decision-support
and forecasting tool that is capable of predicting Army
sustainment requirements to the national stock number (NSN) level of detail. AMC is developing JLAT
internally to support specific planning data requests
47
during crisis action planning. JLAT will allow users to

use force information, operating tempo (OPTEMPO)
information, and logistics planning factors created
specifically for JLAT to forecast logistics sustainment
requirements to the NSN level of detail.
The planner at any level can define the force using a
TPFDD from JOPES or build units and equipment lists
for the forecast by standard requirements code (SRC),
unit identification code (UIC), or unit type code. When
planning begins, the planner may only know the types
of units needed for the deployment. But as the plan
matures, the planner can define some of the units by
SRC and provide better equipment and personnel data
for a forecast. Defining the force by UIC identifies
specific, available units for deployment, equipment
shortages, equipment compatibility with supporting
and supported units, and modification table of organization and equipment personnel densities.
Forecasting Logistics Requirements With JLAT
JLAT focuses on Army operations and creates forecasts for classes I (subsistence), II (clothing and individual equipment), III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants),
IV (construction and barrier materials), VI (personal
demand items), VII (major end items), and IX (repair
parts). Class V (ammunition) will be addressed in
future iterations of JLAT.
For classes II and IX, planning factors in the Army
Status of Resources and Training System (ASORTS)
are based on past demand, equipment densities, and
usage. These planning factors, when applied to unit
equipment sets at OPTEMPO rates determined by the
The benefit of JLAT is the ability

to use the forecasts to determine how
much of a particular NSN a unit needs
for its deployment and whether or not
sufficient stocks are on hand to support
the deployment.
planner, generate forecasts that tell planners and item
managers when to ship needed parts and how many to
ship. This alleviates the burden on the strategic air fleet
and allows a greater reliance on sealift assets to meet
anticipated demands.
With greater confidence and reduced risk, deployed
units can ship repair parts using a better mix of surface
and airlift assets to reduce the iron mountain effect.
Using JLAT reports, high-cost, lightweight items or
high-technology items can be shipped by air throughout the deployment and low-cost, heavyweight items
can be economically shipped by surface transportation.
48
Planners will be able to make better informed supply

chain management decisions using the wide variety of
JLAT reports to prioritize requirements.
According to Niels Biamon, Deputy for Current
Operations, G3, at AMC headquarters
The immediate benefits of JLAT are obvious:
knowing how much of an item will be needed,
when it will be needed, and whether we have
enough to support an operation; but its the second
and third order effects that will pay dividends during the deployment. By sending the sustainment
stocks to the AOR only when needed, congestion
at the PODs will be alleviated, improving supply
throughput. The PODs become cross-docking
stations or transportation nodes instead of storage areas resulting from the rapid and continued
delivery of supplies. This should result in less
logistical assets being required which will reduce
our footprint in theater. It could also help us forecast repairable item retrograde and the expected
throughput for forward repair facilities.
For all classes of supply except II and IX, planners
create forecasts based on mission, personnel densities,
and equipment densities. For example, before a deployment begins, the TPFDD will provide personnel densities and flow rates to determine the number of meals
ready-to-eat and unitized group rations the Army will
need to procure to support the operation as it matures.
Personnel densities also shape the class VI stockage
design. Estimates regarding things like the projected
number of enemy prisoners of war, troop camp requirements, and supply storage facilities drive the class IV
requirements at the macrolevel.
JLAT provides planners with default OPTEMPO
values and planning factors to run forecasts immediately. But if planners, based on experience or direction
from higher headquarters, want to change OPTEMPO
values, they can make modifications before the scenario is forecasted. Forecasts for a particular operation
plan may be based on several COAs. Within each scenario-driven COA, planners can alter the phases of the
operation (such as mission staging, offense, defense,
and stability operations), OPTEMPO, equipment densities in theater, units supporting the operation, and
arrival dates.
Planners can use more than one way to get the job
done. A planner can generate multiple COAs and run
them overnight to leave more time for analyzing the
results. Planners can also look at forecasts by specific
NSNs or by types of supply items (like engines or tires)
to help prioritize their distribution in the AOR.
Why Is JLAT important?
The benefit of JLAT is the ability to use the forecasts to determine how much of a particular NSN a unit
julyaugust 2009
needs for its deployment and whether or not sufficient

stocks are on hand to support the deployment. JLAT
alerts item managers at AMCs life cycle management
commands to potential shortages so they can ramp up
their acquisition cycle to ensure their supply will meet
or exceed demand from the field. Logistics planners at
the combatant command and service component levels
will also benefit from the ability to see the forecasted
distribution of secondary items throughout the deployment period. This will allow them to determine the
most cost-effective and prudent methods of transportation for sustainment supplies and to prioritize limited
resources.
For example, if JLAT forecasts a need for 100 of a
specific item to be distributed to the force during a 219day deployment, the service component, item manager,
or U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) manager can make decisions regarding the most effective
use of strategic lift assets. In this case, the plan may
Many factors affect the actual

outcome of an operation, but JLAT
contributes more science to the art
of sustainment planning.
accuracy, and user-friendliness. In addition to adjustments made based on user testing and feedback, JLAT
2.0 will
Improve user interface and functionality.
Include remaining ASORTS and high-priority
non-ASORTS systems in the class IX forecast.
Develop frequent feeds from enterprise databases
to update JLAT federated database tables.
Integrate JLAT output into TRANSCOMs distribution planning models.
Expand JLATs forecasting ability to include all
supply items except class VIII (medical materiel) items.
Create report templates that provide planners with
the information they see as most critical.
In the future, JLAT will be tested by using a forecast
and comparing that forecast to actual sustainment data
for comparison and analysis. Many factors affect the
actual outcome of an operation, but JLAT contributes
more science to the art of sustainment planning. Even a
less detailed forecast will provide a good starting point
because of the level of detail JLAT offers.
Provide a detailed brief to the commanding general
in 48 hours on the sustainment plan for three COAs?
With JLAT, it will take little effort to quickly produce
three or more forecasts for all classes of supply. JLAT
2.0 is in development with a release date goal of June
2010. The Army, as the executive agent for land-based
logistics in the AOR, is leading the way for JLAT.
With the adaptive planning and execution process as
the paradigm for deliberate and crisis action planning,
JLAT gives the planner the ability to develop multiple
baseline COAs, assess their supportability, and make
changes as the plan maturesall without having to
burden a staff with days of data gathering and analysis. Bringing in the requirements from sister services
is the next step to ensuring that resources are propALOG
erly planned for, prioritized, and budgeted.
dictate that an APOD will be secure for deliveries within 5 days and an SPOD will receive deliveries within
30 days. So delivering high-priority parts by air for the
first 30 days and by sea thereafter will facilitate distribution to the AOR. Logisticians can make plans to load
ships based on the forecast so they can move the iron
mountain one rock at a time instead of all at once.
JLAT is not an execution system. It does not order
sustainment supplies for a deploying unit; that is still
the responsibility of a logistician. JLAT tells the logistician what is needed, when it is needed, and if there is
enough on hand at the time of the forecast to complete
the deployment. Logisticians, being typically resourceful in their day-to-day business, can use the forecast
output to develop operational policies and sustainment
plans that compensate for projected demands and
shortages. Factors like secondary item cost and reparability can be gleaned from the stockage or cost reports.
Low-density, low-demand, highly critical secondary
items can also be identified so that success is not hampered for want of a nail.
Peter J. Cloutier works in the Software Engineering Center of the Army Communications and
Electronics Command Life Cycle Management Command. He has an M.S. degree in information systems
from George Mason University and is a graduate
of the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced
Courses and the Combined Arms and Services Staff
School.
The Future of JLAT

JLAT 1.0 is a prototype. Its utility and accuracy will
continue to improve through extensive user cooperation
and testing. AMCs life cycle management commands
will be among the first to evaluate JLATs functionality,
Brian K. Frank is a retired Army ordnance officer and is currently employed by Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. He is a graduate of the Ordnance Officer
Advanced Course, the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School, and the Army Command and General
Staff College.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
49
Lightweight Modular Causeway

System: Logistics Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration
by
Margaret A. Deming
ince their inception in 1995, the Department of

Defenses Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) programs have deployed critically needed warfighting solutions to every major theater.
The combatant commands drive ACTDs and JCTDs
through their stated operational priorities and needs,
which are then applied to a more agile acquisition process, yielding results years ahead of traditional materiel
development cycles. By stressing technology and integration of capabilities rather than technology development,
ACTDs and JCTDs can provide prototype capabilities to
the warfighter more quickly and provide follow-on support in the evaluation of those capabilities.
A sterling example of these programs is the lightweight modular causeway system (LMCS), which comprises one-half of the Joint Enable Theater Access Sea
Ports of Debarkation (JETA/SPOD) ACTD. LMCSs
development was strongly supported by the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), its combatant command sponsor; the Army Engineer, Research and Development
Center, which provided technical team support; the
Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command,
which provided transition team support; and the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command, which provided
operational management team support. Contractor support came from Alion Science and Technology, Booz
Allen Hamilton, Demaree Inflatable Boats, Oceaneering International Incorporated, and Quantum Engineer
Design Incorporated. The Marine Forces Pacific Experimentation Center provided an independent assessment
at various points during this multiyear project, helping
the teams to stay on task and focus on problem areas.
Concept and Development
DOD strategists continue to forecast a requirement
for shallow-draft vessels to be used for conducting
offload operations at austere sites. These operations and
natural disasters require a new causeway system that is
transportable by, and employable from, intratheater sealift vessels such as the joint high-speed vessel.
The core technologies used in designing and building
the causeway prototype included quick-deploy, lightweight pneumatics; lightweight materials; high-strength
50
elastomeric springs for joint compliance between modules (the same technology used to mitigate the effects
of earthquakes in building construction); and highstrength fabrics for robust puncture- and abrasionresistant floatation components. These technologies
reduced the causeways size and weight by 50 percent.
Based on successful initial tests at Fort Eustis, Virginia,
and Vicksburg, Mississippi, LMCS segments were fabricated and the complete unit, including a shipboard
emplacement and recovery system, was tested and demonstrated on the Army logistics support vessel 5 MG
Charles P. Gross in September 2008.
Transformational and Interoperable Technology
This transformational logistics technology was
designed from the ground up to meet the current and
future operational needs of the joint warfighter. Whether the need is force projection, maneuver, sustainment,
disaster relief, or noncombatant evacuation operations,
the key elements of a successful military response
include speed, agility, and access.
A hybrid of the tactical fixed bridging and the floating causeway system, LMCS will increase the number
of potential landing sites by bridging the gap between
an austere environment and a point offshore with sufficient depth for vessels to operate. It is lighter and more
agile than current systems, allowing for rapid delivery
of food, water, and needed medical supplies in case of
a loss of roads, bridges, or port infrastructure. The system can deploy as many sections as needed.
Future plans include deploying LMCS across mudflat and tidal estuary barriers and testing its suitability
for intermodal land, sea, and air transport, including
transport by C17 and C5 military airplanes or heavylift helicopters. It also can be hauled by truck. The
system is compact, allowing 120 feet of causeway to
be shipped or stored in a space with a footprint equal
to that of three 20-foot ISO (International Organization
for Standardization) containers. LMCS is fully interoperable with existing and future Army and Navy watercraft and is designed to handle all classes of military
vehicles, including the 70-ton M1A2 Abrams tank.
Unlike other systems, the LMCS uses no in-water
connections. And in contrast to the current causeway
julyaugust 2009
systems, which can take over a day and a company of

Soldier or Sailors to assemble, LMCS can be deployed
by seven trained personnel and be operational in approximately 3 hours. An equal number of personnel can recover
the system in approximately the same time. The system is
stored in a folded configuration with floatation bladders
empty. When deployed, the system is sequentially joined,
or assembled, and the floatation bladders are inflated.
The bladder nearest the shore can be partially inflated as
needed to provide a ramp-like entry and exit point.
A unique feature of the LMCS is that the floatation bladders will not be filled with high-pressure air.
Instead, they will be rapidly filled with only the volume
of air suitable to provide floatation for the roadway
system. This significantly speeds up deployment times
and can be done with a prepressurized compressed air
system (similar to that used to inflate aircraft emergency exit slides) or with a lightweight portable blower
system that is smaller than a commercial vacuum.
Challenges
No project is without challenges and solutions. A
delay in funding and a 40-percent increase in some
material costs, such as ship-grade aluminum, meant that
the team had to develop, design, build, and test the new
system in 15 months instead of the 24 months originally
planned. This included breaking design paradigms in
order to meet operational requirements and achieve compliance for austere coastal operations, to include survivability in high sea states. To meet this requirement, the
LMCS teams developed a new double-compressive joint
using high durometer urethane elastomers that provided
dependable, repetitive compliance with very limited
fatigue and that could support an M1A2 Abrams tank.
Another significant challenge came in the form of
simple program management. As the operational managers, the Hawaii-based team was responsible for preliminary design reviews, critical design reviews, and
outreach. The technical management team comprised
engineers and scientists in Mississippi (causeway),
Oregon (floatation system), and Maryland (shipboard
deployment system). Transition management (insertion into a DOD Program of Record and outyear funding) was centered in Michigan. A successful ACTD
program requires solid program management and, in
this case, a balance between discipline and flexibility
in scheduling, careful consideration of risk mitigation
options, and concise but thorough communications.
Success and Transition
Active, engaged leadership is essential to the success
of any program. Throughout this multiyear project, the
ACTD team received support from senior PACOM leaders, successive Army Chiefs of Transportation, and the
Army Deputy Chief of Staff G8. Early support came
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
An M1088 medium tactical vehicle crosses

a lightweight modular causeway system.
from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. In September 2008, PACOM hosted a successful
Distinguished Visitor Day that culminated with a flawless demonstration of the LMCS.
The system was delivered on time, on budget, and
within performance goals. Now the capability must
be accepted by a DOD Program of Record, and funds
must be identified for future life-cycle requirements.
The Product Director, Army Watercraft Systems, and
the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G8 have agreed that
PACOM will retain the prototype system for use in the
Pacific theater during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Transition of the causeway to the warfighter as a required
capability is planned to occur as early as fiscal year
2012, in concert with the fielding of the Armys first
joint high-speed vessel.
Overall, this effort employed a team of teams from
Government and industry and was dispersed organizationally among multiple commands, geographically among multiple locations, and culturally (from
science and research and development to engineering,
manufacturing, and operations). Maneuvering from
concept through program approval by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, design, development, testing, training, assessment, and acceptance of a new
capability in just 4 years is a strategic success and
holds promise not only for DOD but also for non-DOD
professionals conducting disaster relief and humanitarALOG
ian assistance operations worldwide.
Margaret A. Deming is the readiness analyst,
G3/5, Marine Forces Africa, in Stuttgart, Germany. She was the deputy manager, Lightweight
Modular Causeway System Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration, attached to the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command at San
Diego, California, and the U.S. Pacific Command
Logistics, Engineering, and Security Assistance
Directorate (J4) when she wrote this article.
51
Earning a Graduate Degree at ILE

by
Willis F. Jackson, Jr., Gerald J. Leonard,
and
Gina Smith
Intermediate-level education students now can earn a masters degree

in supply chain management and logistics from the University of Kansas
while they attend the Army Command and General Staff College.
n 12 June, 10 logistics officers and 1 international officer graduated from both the University of Kansas (KU) School of Business and
intermediate-level education (ILE) at the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). They were
the first officers to take advantage of a new opportunity for ILE students to expand their future potential
with a new specialized graduate degree in supply chain
management (SCM) and logistics.
When Did the SCM Degree Program Begin?

The key organizations involved in developing the
new degree program are the KU School of Business,
located in Lawrence, Kansas; the Department of
Logistics and Resource Operations (DLRO), one of
five teaching departments at CGSC, which is located
near Lawrence at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the
Army Logistics Management College (ALMC) at Fort
Lee, Virginia, which is the administrator for the Armys
National Logistics Curriculum (NLC).
In August 2007, DLRO began talking with ALMC
about becoming certified as an NLC school, primarily
for the Logistics Corps officers attending ILE. After
the idea was accepted, the KU School of Business,
in coordination with DLRO and ALMC, developed
a program plan for a master of science in business
(MSB) degree with an SCM and logistics concentration. The NLC approved the proposed curriculum
on 16 October. The pilot year began in August 2008
and concluded with awarding the first degrees in
June 2009.
How Does the Program Work?
The KU MSBSCM program is a 30-credit-hour
program of study. Professors from the KU School of
Business teach 24 credit hours directly, and DLRO faculty teach 6 hours during ILE. The curriculum program
is shown at right. All courses are taught in the Lewis
and Clark Center at Fort Leavenworth. The course is
designed around the 10-month CGSC year. Many
students have commented on the great advantage of
having both the KU and ILE programs conducted at
the same location.
52
The KU program is designed primarily for the logisticians attending ILE to enhance their existing expertise and knowledge of logistics. The courses apply best
business practices from the civilian sector, relate them
to the SCM arena, and then apply them to Army theater
distribution operations. Although the program is developed primarily for the logistics major (O4), it is open
to any major attending ILE who has the background
and credentials to be admitted to KU. According to the
KU School of Business website:
The Master of Science in Business with a Supply Chain Management and Logistics concentration is aimed specifically toward Army Majors
and Major-eligible Captains. The degree will
complement the quality military supply chain
education officers enjoy while enabling a broader,
civilian economy focus for those who plan to pursue logistics careers after military service.
The KU School of Business is one of 168 schools
accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business (AACSB). The MSBSCM degree
is fully accredited as a new concentration under the
schools existing MSB degree. The programs content
and accomplishments will be addressed for continued
accreditation during a scheduled AACSB assessment
in approximately 3 years.
Why Is the SCM Degree Valuable?
Why should officers consider an advanced civilian
degree? Department of the Army Pamphlet 6003,
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and
Career Management, states:
Self-development is the responsibility of every
officer and ranges from professional reading
during off-duty time to aggressively seeking
positions of increased responsibility. Each officer, with support from mentors, should develop
career goals and clearly articulate those goals to
the commander and the assignments officer at the
AHRC [Army Human Resources Command]
Officers are encouraged to continue to broaden
their logistics experience by Obtain[ing] a
civilian degree in logistics-related fields.
julyaugust 2009
The KU School of Business MSBSCM program

combines the business and military logistics environments to develop future thinkers. The program presents
instruction in the required foundational courses as well
as advanced graduate courses. When students graduate
from this program, they are ready to function as leaders with knowledge of business foundations and best
business practices in supply chain management, transportation, procurement, information systems, change
management, and project management.
How Does a Prospective Student Get Accepted?
For ILE students to be considered for the MSB
SCM program, they first must be accepted as graduate
candidates into the School of Business graduate degree
program. To be accepted, ILE students must
Have an undergraduate degree awarded at the
bachelors degree level.
Complete a KU Graduate School application on line.
As part of the application process, the graduate candidate
is required to answer three essay questions on line.
Provide an official transcript.
Provide two letters of recommendation.
Include a current officer record brief.
Include a signed KU Academic Code of Honor form.
More information on the application process can be
found on the KU School of Business homepage, www.
business.ku.edu/Master-MSB-SCM.
Foundational curriculum
Supply Chain Logistics I (CGSC) (3 credits)
Supply Chain Logistics II (CGSC) (3 credits)
ACCT 701: Financial Accounting (2 credits)
BE 701: Managerial Economics (2 credits)
DSCI 701: Statistical Decision Making
(2 credits)
FIN 701: Financial Management (2 credits)
SCM 701: Introduction to Supply Chain
Management (2 credits)
MGMT 704: Strategic Management (2 credits)
Advanced courses
MGMT 895: Change Management (2 credits)
SCM 703: Transportation and Logistics Systems
(2 credits)
SCM 702: Procurement and Supplier
SCM 704: Information Systems for
Supply Chain Management (3 credits)
SCM 710: Capstone in Supply Chain
The curriculum for the master of science in business degree with a supply chain management
and logistics concentration.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
How Does the Degree Program Work With ILE?

The Dean of the School of Business and the Director
of the MSBSCM program are dedicated to the success of the degree program at ILE. The KU program
director, Greg Freix, and the CGSC DLRO deputy
director, Willis Jackson, Jr., collaborated on the class
schedule to reduce workload conflicts between the two
educational programs. The ILE curriculum workload
is, in effect, a full masters degree program. To make
the KU MSBSCM program successful, coordination
and mutual understanding between both campuses
enables the students to manage both programs. The
students complete their ILE classes during the day at
Lewis and Clark and then pursue their degrees in the
evening. For example, when students are involved in
their ILE exercise, from 0830 hours to 1730 hours
daily, KU MSBSCM classes are not scheduled. This
gives students time to focus on the ILE exercise and
also to spend time with their families.
The future of the KU MSBSCM program will be
determined by the success of the logisticians attending
ILE at Fort Leavenworth. With a student population of
approximately 175 logisticians filling 2 ILE courses a
year, the expectation is that the demand for the MSB
SCM degree program will increase. The plan for the
upcoming August 2009 class is to offer the program
to 32 logisticians; the possibility exists that the program could also be offered to future February ILE
class attendees.
Students can choose from nine different advanced
degree programs while attending ILE to fulfill career
goals and to broaden their logistics experience. An
advanced degree in supply chain management and
logistics will allow ILE students to expand their professional development, apply this experience in the
operational military, and perhaps one day fashion a
ALOG
highly desirable civilian career.
Willis F. Jackson, Jr., is Deputy Director of the
Department of Logistics and Resource Operations
at the Army Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a retired Army
lieutenant colonel.
Gerald J. Leonard is an assistant professor in the
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a retired Army
lieutenant colonel.
Gina Smith is an assistant professor in the
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She is a retired Army
lieutenant colonel.
53
S pectrum
No Belts Required:
The Advantages and Limitations
of Statistical Quality Control
by
Major Donovan O. Fuqua
ean Six Sigma (LSS) is a popular trend associated with making any process or organization better. This article suggests that, although
LSS can be a powerful tool, it is poorly understood
in the field, does not fit current military doctrine,
and has severe limitations for use with complex
military sustainment operations. The two main
tenets of LSS, statistical quality control and waste
reduction, are important to logisticians. The Army
logistics community must find ways to apply
those concepts to logistics operations and educate
multifunctional logisticians.
The idea for this article developed from the tendency of Army logistics professionals to misunderstand LSS and use it as a catchphrase. According to
many logisticians in the Army, LSS is simply about
becoming more efficient. This article, however,
proposes that merely repeating slogans does not
create learning in an organization.
The current use of LSS within the Army logistics community generated the questions that form
the basis of this article: How many logisticians
who have used the acronym LSS can accurately
describe what it is or, more importantly, how it
relates to military operations? How does LSS
relate to systems theory, complexity science, and
supply chain networks? Based on those questions,
this article will address the following questions
relating to LSS and military logistics:
What is LSS?
How is LSS used in organizations to improve
processes and reduce system variation and waste?
Where does LSS succeed and where does it
fail when describing complex adaptive systems
found in real-world organizations?
If LSS is flawed, how should the Army use
statistical quality control and waste reduction
techniques?
What the article does not do is discount the positive work done by professional logisticians seeking
to make Army processes more efficient and capable,
regardless of the methodologies used. Six Sigma and
Lean are two separate processes. Understanding the
54
differences between the two is critical to understanding how the concepts should be used.
The Six Sigma Model
Six Sigma is a statistical quality control method
of reducing variation and limiting defects within a
process. Because defects are costly to businesses
both in terms of potential excess process costs and
lost business, Six Sigma is attractive to businesses
that want to produce outputs with consistent specifications. Organizations in a variety of industries,
such as manufacturing, healthcare, and even customer service, have institutionalized Six Sigma with
varied success.
The Six Sigma model uses the define, measure, analyze, improve, control (DMAIC) method
of improving quality in a system. The DMAIC
method is further described like so:
Define: Set goals for a project.
Measure: Find the current performance.
Analyze: Find the causes of variation.
Improve: Fix the problems.
Control: Monitor or control the process.
The goal of the process is to cut costs and reduce
variation and defects by tying quality control directly to financial results. Six Sigma training is usually
concentrated on the DMAIC model and attempts to
carry the model into all areas of the business.
The basic premise of Six Sigma is meeting the
statistical goal of having plus or minus six standard
deviations between the product target and the upper
and lower specification limits. For example, if a ball
bearing process had a target of 0.50000 inches +/0.00005 inches, using six standard deviations indicates that your production should be within
specification to +/- six standard deviations (identified
by the Greek letter ) from the target (three errors per
billion produced). (See the table at top right.)
The Six Sigma model, however, gives the process
a completely arbitrary +/- 1.5 away from the target
for the actual mean. Because of this, the true goal is
for the sum of the products to be within +/- 4.5 or
for the process to generate only 3.4 defective parts
julyaugust 2009
Number of standard deviations
Percent of values in a sample given
away from the mean
a normal distribution
68.26%
95.45%
99.73%
99.9937%
99.999942%
99.9999998027%
This table shows the percent of values within

certain standard deviations. The premise of Six
Sigma is meeting the statistical goal of having
plus or minus six standard deviations between
the product target and the upper and lower
specification limits.
per million. (See the figure at bottom right for a normal
distribution of values.)
Although controlling variation has always been a core
component of any quality control program, engineers
working for Motorola in the early 1980s were the first to
coin the term Six Sigma. Bill Smith, a Motorola reliability engineer, found that the actual defect rates at
Motorola were higher than the company had figured
based on the defects found in the factory (type I defects).
The defects overlooked in the factory were then, unfortunately, found by consumers (type II defects). At the
Motorola Research Institute, he and Mikel Harry refined
their methodology and helped establish the idea of
defect-free manufacturing in all other sectors of business
at Motorola.
Motorola, Texas Instruments, Microsoft, American
Express, and General Electric have all used Six Sigma.
To varying degrees, these businesses have incorporated
the Six Sigma process into their culture as an overarching method of improving quality and reducing costs.
Because success almost always breeds imitation, Six
Sigma has become a catch-phrase and a business in
itself, often far from its original statistics-based roots. A
quick search on Amazon confirms that a great number
of books have been written about Six Sigma. A roughly
equal number of businesses will train managers from
any paying business on the best practices. In the past
few years, the Army has become a voracious customer.
As Six Sigma has expanded from a statistical tool to
more of a managerial tool, model instructors have
expanded the program from improving manufacturing
quality control to enabling cultural changes within any
organization. Companies such as iSix Sigma and Motorola University offer classes for cultural change within
institutions. Training is geared toward different levels in

the institutions and is often given karate-level titles: green
belts, black belts, master black belts, champions, and
executive leaders. The idea is that all levels of the business must be committed to instituting Six Sigma quality
control as a core component of the firm. The Army has
embraced this belt systemeven offering additional skill
identifiers (1X, 1Y, and 1Z) for training completed.
The Lean Model
Lean is a philosophy of reducing cost, increasing
speed, and eliminating waste in warehousing, ordering,
and manufacturing. Unlike Six Sigma, Lean is not a
method of statistical quality control. The two main tenants
of Lean are just-in-time logistics and smart automation. A
good metaphor of the difference between Six Sigma and
Lean is the difference between a microscope and a telescope. Six Sigma attempts to focus on a single variable in
order to control variation. Lean uses a wide view of the
entire process in order to identify wasteful actions.1
Lean grew out of methods developed by the Toyota
Production System in the 1970s. This method focused
on reducing the seven wastes: defects, overproduction,
overprocessing, conveyance, inventory, motion, and
waiting. The goal of the method was to improve customer value and profits. The combination of Six Sigma
and Lean was likely due to the logic that if two good
things are paired, something great will result.
Other Quality Control Methods
Total Quality Management (TQM) grew out of a
program, instituted by W.E. Deming, that worked to
reestablish Japanese industry after World War II. The
program called for continuous improvement, process
feedback, and a focus on quality within an organization.
34.1% 34.1%
2.1% 13.6%
13.6%
0.1%
-5s
-4s
-3s
-2s
-1s
1s
2s
2.1%
0.1%
3s
4s
5s
Process Mean ()
This curve shows the percent of values in a

sample given a normal distribution.
1 Martin C. Jennings, How the Army Should Use Lean Six Sigma as a Transformation Strategy for Logisticians in the 21st Century, Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, 13 February 2006.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
55
Generally, TQM is considered to be a precursor of Six

Sigma. The basic difference is that Six Sigma imposes
an arbitrary statistical boundary to define what quality
should resemble. However, in many ways, Six Sigma
training is very similar to TQM training in that they
both work to instill cultural changes in an organization
and focus on improving product quality.
ISO 9000, which is maintained by the International
Organization for Standardization, is an international
quality standard used in contractual situations and is
often the standard in international trade. It uses thirdparty registration and is a quality tool in industry.
Unlike Six Sigma, ISO 9000 is not easily applied to
nonmanufacturing industries.
LSS and Complex Adaptive Systems
LSS cannot be effectively applied to complex adaptive systems. Complex adaptive systems are characterized by nonlinearity (defined in this article as
unproportional and nonadditive relationships between
variables2), complex variable interaction, the presence
of many variables, and the mixing of deterministic,
stochastic, and self-organizing variables. Generally,
these systems are identified by their tendencies toward
emergent behavior, unpredictable ordered effects, many
possible feedback loops, and interdependencies. A system is adaptive if it changes its behavior in response to
external stimuli. Complex adaptive systems are commonly described as wicked problems because they
are difficult to frame and require iterative problemsolving techniques, so it is difficult to find the right
associative problems for them. This article suggests
that most real-world strategic and operational systems
are both complex and highly adaptive.
LSS focuses on controlling a single variable without

considering the effects of interaction on the system.
This is apparent when you consider that LSS originated
in manufacturing. When you are constructing a silicon
wafer with specification limits within one micron, LSS
is a powerful tool in limiting variation. But when you
are dealing with highly interdependent social systems,
reducing variation in a single variable could have unintended consequences.
If no distinct process specifications exist, LSS is
unable to measure success. Simply wanting to make
something better or faster is an unquantifiable goal. On
the other hand, placing sufficiently large specification
limits on a process can guarantee compliance to six
standard deviations.
LSS fails to consider inherent process turbulence
seen in dynamic systems when working to control
variation. Natural process turbulence can often appear
as random variation if it is not thoroughly analyzed.
Turbulence (even within one variable) can result from
periodicity3, autocorrelation4, Chaotic system behavior5, or fractional geometries6 within time series data.
Statistical quality control, whether you are using Shewhart7 control charts, LSS, TQM, or another methodology, is a powerful tool in controlling quality in linear
systems or nonlinear systems not influenced by process
interactions. However, in the Army, very few operational
processes can be classified through linear causation
models. It is much more likely for real-world systems to
be dynamical, contain self-organizing and adaptive variables, and have complex variable interaction.
For example, imagine a situation in which you want
to reduce variation of delivery time (a variable) from
seaports in the United States to a seaport in a deployed
2 Functions are linear if and only if: f ( x + x + ... + x ) = f ( x ) + f ( x ) + ... + f ( x )

1
2
n
1
2
n
3 Periodicity is the quality of recurrence at a regular interval and may be subject to the combined effects of multiple waves within a process. This can be detected
through Fourier analysis (a technique of describing a time series in terms of the frequency domain of its periodic constituents).
4 Autocorrelation is the tendency for time series data to form patterns or correlate with itself. It is the autocovariance divided by the variance. In statistical analysis, data
is normally examined with lags of 1 through N/4 (N=number of data points). A value of +1 indicates perfect patterning, -1 indicates perfectly inverse patterning, and 0 indicates no patterning. Where m=lag number, this value is:
N m
(x
autocorrel ation =
x )( x t + m x )
t =1
(x
x)2
t =1
5 Chaos (as opposed to small c chaos) is a phenomenon where systems appear random but actually have repeatable patterns and are dynamical, deterministic, and
nonlinear. Chaotic systems exhibit sensitivity to initial conditions and the potential for attractors. The author recommends Chaos Theory Tamed by Garnett P. Williams
(Joseph Henry Press, Washington DC, 1997) for more information on this phenomenon.
2
6 A fractal is a set of points whose dimension is not a whole number. This definition refers to fractional geometries (or dimensions) that are non-integer (e.g. R
3
). This phenomenon was first described by Beniot Mandelbrot in 1960 in his study of cotton future prices, where he described linear processes in fractal geometry that appeared random in 2 dimensional space.
7 Walter Shewhart is often referred to as the father of statistical quality control for his work in standardizing and controlling manufacturing at Bell Telephone Laboratories from 1925 through 1956. He developed a series of control charts that indicated when a process was moving out of tolerance based on process mean (a variable), numbers of parts nonconforming in a sample (an attribute), or as an exponentially weighted average of a sample (to reduce process memory). His control charts are normally
built around a three standard deviation limit.
56
julyaugust 2009
location. Without a doubt, apparent and possibly

unknown variables in that model are deterministic,
stochastic, and self-organizing. You can work to control
the speed of the vessels, but you cannot control the
weather processes (which are not constant factors) or
the political processes on vessel selection (a set of selforganizing variables). Although you can control the
speed variables, there would be second- and third-order
effects based on decisions. This is a relatively simple
example, but it is representative of what happens when
you attempt to control a more complex system.
Logisticians must recognize the type of system they
are attempting to control before determining control
methodologies. When systems are simple or mechanical,
statistical quality control is an acceptable tool for reducing variation and increasing product quality. In complex
systems, a different methodology must be used.
One method that has shown promise in dealing with
complex adaptive systems is the process of Design,8
which is a process that has its roots in General Systems
Theory.9 This process relies on the cyclical actions of
system framing, operations framing, reflective learning
and reframing, design formulation, and developing concepts for intervention. The Design process should be
both qualitative and quantitative since it forms a continuous background for planning environments. It is a
command process for understanding and intervening in
complex systems for positive, anticipated process shifts
and emergence. Logisticians should read about the
Design process in order to determine how it will influence and shape our doctrine.
Recommendations
LSS is a powerful tool for manufacturing and technical business applications, but I offer the following
recommendations for the Army logistics community:
Write an Army field manual on the use of statistical quality control and waste reduction with the caveat
that, in complex problems, these tools are not always
applicable. Separate this doctrine from LSS and make
it applicable to military operations.
Define logistics preparation of the battlefield (LPB) as
a continuous process with feedback loops. Be prepared to
synchronize LPB with the emerging doctrine of Design.
Teach basic statistical methods and waste reduction classes at officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer basic and advanced courses and in the
corresponding civilian education programs. The Army
is a world-class teaching organization; there is no reason to hire civilian business consultants and contract
out instruction for belts.
Many organizations have successfully used LSS to

increase profits, improve public perceptions, and focus
their workforces on quality. By successfully helping
organizations limit process variation and reduce wasteful processes, LSS has generated interest and a substantial following in business and management circles.
This interest has helped found an industry focused on
selling training courses and books on how to copy the
success of Motorola, General Electric, and others who
have benefited from LSS.
The Army should recognize the positive aspects of
LSS while being careful to exclude elements that are
not applicable to military supply chains and processes.
The U.S. military is not a business, is not organized as
a corporation, and does not view organizational success based on a quarterly earnings statement or a stock
price. This distinction separates the Army from Motorola, General Electric, and other organizations that
have found success through LSS. For example, the
Army should not institute just-in-time logistics because
we are an expeditionary force that requires some
stockpiling and warehousing (thanks to our long and
often tenuous lines of communication). Also, because
we operate in complex environments, the Army logistics community must be willing and able to accept
variation both as a source of adaptation and as a necessary requirement for supporting disparate operations
with often-changing measures of effectiveness and
performance.
In an expeditionary environment, efficiency and
effectiveness can have an inverse proportional relationship. Risk in supply chains dictates the amount of stockpiling required to adequately support operations. As a
general rule, risk increases the requirement to stockpile.
This nonlinear relationship is another reason that using a
corporate model and LSS is not compatible with military operational requirements. While businesses tend to
view success in terms of stock prices or profits, the military is successful if we defend the Nation and provide
ALOG
sovereign options for our political leaders.
Major Donovan O. Fuqua is a student at the
School of Advanced Military Studies and an Army
multifunctional logistician. He is a graduate of
the Air Command and Staff College, the Combined Logistics Officers Advanced Course, and the
Transportation Officer Basic Course. He has a B.S.
degree from Tulane University, a master s degree in
military operational art and science from the Air
University, and a master s degree in industrial engineering and operations research from New Mexico
State University.
8 This methodology is explained in TRADOC Pamphlet 525500, Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design, and SAMS TextArt of Design Version 1.0, Booz
Allen Hamilton, 24 September 2008.
9 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, An Outline for General Systems Theory, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1950, pp. 134165.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
57
LOG NOTES
Its a Transportation Movement Release
I have noticed after searching through several back
issues of Army Logistician that a certain term has been
incorrectly stated (or spelled out) on multiple occasions in your magazine.
The term transportation movement release (TMR) is
defined in Field Manual 401.30, Movement Control.
It is used correctly in Movement Control in Europe
by Captain John D. Kaylor, Jr. (JulyAugust 1998).
However, in several recent articles over the last few
years, incorrect usage has gone unnoticed. (See Using
Central Receiving and Shipping Points to Manage
Transportation in the NovemberDecember 2007
issue as an example.)
For obvious reasons, many logisticians mistakenly
refer to TMRs as transportation movement requests.
One reason why this error is so pervasive (even
amongst my fellow transporters) is because the incor
rect term has appeared in automated systems like
BCS3. It would be unfortunate for the logisticians
magazine of record to perpetuate this mistake.
MAJ Lowell E. Howard, Jr.
1st Sustainment Brigade
Fort Riley, KS
Sustainment Commands Need Improved MTOEs

While I was attending the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from
2006 to 2007, I received orders to return to Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. I was to be assigned to the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater), formerly the 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM). I had been with the 1st
COSCOM before, from 1999 to 2002, and thought I
was familiar with the units and mission. Upon my
return in July 2007, I immediately deployed to Kuwait
to join my unit. I recognized faces and the unit patch,
but the task organization and mission had changed.
In the past, the unit was led by a brigadier general
and had a corps support mission aligned with a linear
battlefield. But in todays fight, the unit is authorized a
major general and has a full-spectrum operations mission that encompasses the entire U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of operations (AO)quite a difference in scope and scale. Initially, the unit was an Army
Forces Command (FORSCOM) unit on deployment
58
orders for a specific time. Howeverno real surprise to

Army personnelthings changed, and our mission
became an enduring mission, just like Third Armys.
The Army as a whole has changed very rapidly during the last 9 years in order to meet the requirements of
a modular force. Logistics has been no different; we,
too, have had to change with the times into a modular
force. The COSCOMs of the past are now split into
sustainment command (expeditionary) (ESC) and sus
tainment command (theater) (TSC) forces. The ESCs
are commanded by a brigadier general and the TSCs by
a major general.
Changes are still ongoing, but one, in particular,
needs more attention. The modification table of
organization and equipment (MTOE) for a TSC is still
set up like a FORSCOM unit. It is designed for a
deployment for a specific mission and a specific time
period. With the change to an enduring mission, rota
tion of active forces in and out of theater for an
indefinite time period is presenting itself to be an
extremely cumbersome endeavor. Dwell time for logis
ticians is an issue. Soldiers on permanent change of
station orders into the TSC are coming from units that
just got back from a deployment.
Coupled with the ever-changing scope and scale of
areas to cover within the CENTCOM AO, the TSC
MTOE is not set up to adequately execute the mission.
Third Army has a derivative unit identification code
(UIC) in its MTOE for its operational command post
here in theater to cover its mission. This derivative UIC
is recognized by Headquarters, Department of the
Army, as an enduring mission and is sourced accordingly. The TSC MTOE needs this same setup.
The Army Combined Arms Support Command
(CASCOM), at Fort Lee, Virginia, has been working on
the changes from a COSCOM to an ESC and TSC for
years and has made enormous strides in advancing the
logistics forces into the current modular force structure. However, we still need attention in the MTOE
evolution of not just the 1st TSC but every TSC that is
assigned an enduring mission for future operations.
Perhaps the answer lies in providing an enduring
MTOE that is only activated and sourced upon the
TSCs assignment as an enduring logistics force, as the
1st Sustainment Command (Theater) is involved in
presently.
MAJ Aaron P. Fitzsimmons
1st Sustainment Command (Theater)
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
julyaugust 2009
R&R: Reading and Reviews

The Second Battle of the Marne. Michael S.
Neiberg, Indiana University Press, Bloomington,
Indiana, 2008, 217 pages.
The Second Battle of the Marne moves our
understanding of the pivotal World War I battle
forward in ways that should particularly appeal to
logisticians.
The preparations for offensive actions in France
crippled the operations as much as they helped. The
massive artillery preparations that preceded an infantry
attack caused so much damage in the immediate battle
area that moving forces forward across the battle
zone became problematic. Furthermore, transportation
infrastructures had matured behind the battle area,
making the rapid movement of enemy reserves to the
threatened area relatively simple. Every threatened
penetration breakthrough or the lesser break in
could therefore be easily thwarted.
The German Spring Offensive of 1918 wilted in part
from a dwindling ability to sustain the forces at the
forward edge. Studies of the beginning of World War
I discuss the centrality of the German railway system
to the German Armys efficient mobilization. Broader
studies note the importance of the expanded Russian
railway systems contribution to Russias unexpectedly
rapid entry into the war.
Few studies have dwelt on the French railway
system other than to note that everything ran through
Paris. However, Michael S. Neiberg suggests in The
Second Battle of the Marne that the French were
as adept as the Germans at moving forces laterally
along the front. The French rail system delivered men
to points close to their tactical sectors almost all the
time. Standard interpretations of the battle still hold
true. Neiberg, however, expands on the strengths of
French logistics.
Moving from a consideration of railroads, Neiberg
calls the readers attention to the critical role of
French industry[which] performed truly amazing
feats to supply French soldiers with new weapons. (He
could have addressed the critical role French supplies
played in equipping American Soldiers.) Nieberg then
proceeds to detail French tank and aircraft production.
Noting the strength of the artillery assigned to each
division, he points to the emergence of an artillery
reserve topping 11,000 gunshalf of which were
heavy-caliber weapons. This reserve belonged to an
Army whose main prewar assets were infantry soldiers
armed with rifles and bayonets.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
As the Germans pushed their offensives forward,

they inevitably formed salients. The Germans capture
of the key road and railroad center of Soissons enabled
them to sustain the 40-odd divisions holding the Marne
salient, but Soissons was near the western shoulder of
the line. Neiberg argues that further German success
demanded the seizure of Reims because sustainment
capabilities through Soissons were barely adequate
to support the force required to hold the salient. (As I
wrote in Soissons 1918, the vulnerability of Soissons
was a major factor in what became the opening move
of the Allied Aisne-Marne offensive, the beginning
of the second battle of the Marne.) The Germans had
to either abandon the route or open the only other
available route through Reims. French Field Marshal
Ferdinand Foch saw that vulnerability and began
planning to attack it at the first opportunity. This, Foch
divined, meant the capture of three rail centers: Reims,
Epernay, and Chlons.
The French rail system delivered men

to points close to their tactical sectors
almost all the time.
Neiberg argues that while Paris became a German
objective later, the Germans understood that the seizure
of this rail network was crucial to anything else they
might want to consider. Nieberg writes, Before the
Germans could hope for a big victory, they had to
improve their supply arrangements. This rail network,
not Paris, he argues, was the immediate objective.
Without it, Paris was unobtainable.
The rail network should not be viewed as the
single cause and single solution to the search for
mobility and victory on the Western Front, but
Neibergs presentation is the most logistically focused
presentation to appear in many years. The Second
Battle of the Marne persuasively shows that logistics
considerations trumped all others in this closing
campaign on the Western Front. This book is also a
good companion to studies of the final campaigns in
Palestine and Mesopotamia.
Douglas V. Johnson is a professor of national

security affairs at the Army War College Strategic
Studies Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
59
Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in

Your Corporation. James P. Womack and Daniel T.
Jones, Free Press, New York, 2003, 396 pages.
Lean is a technique that has been embraced by all
branches of the military. The Army has merged the
concepts of Lean and Six Sigma, and the Air Force
has AFSO21 (Air Force Smart Operations for the
21st Century), which incorporates Lean, Six Sigma,
and the Theory of Constraints. However, making Lean
a policy does not ensure that the individuals in the
organization understand the theory of Lean. This is
where Lean Thinking comes into play. While authors
James P. Womack and Daniel T. Jones certainly did not
invent Lean, they did manage to compile the concepts
that make up Lean in one, easily readable book. I
would suggest that anyone interested in Lean make
this their first reading assignment.
The authors begin with the basic concept of muda,
or waste. They contend there are various types of waste
everywhere. Lean thinking is the antidote for muda.
Lean is the elimination of wasteanything that does
not create value. And value can only be defined by the
customer in terms of a specific product at a specific
price at a specific time. Thus, Lean is a value-added
concept based on customer satisfaction.
In many cases, success is a firm's

worst enemy, as the emphasis
switches from the continuing elimination
of waste to simply managing the
initial success.
The first steps in Lean thinking are identifying the
value and the value stream. Value stream is the set of
all actions required to bring a specific product through
the three critical tasks necessary to put a finished
product in the hands of the customer.
Next is the concept of flow. Flow is the antithesis of
the common batch-and-queue manufacturing mentality
that permeates most manufacturing companies. Small
lot production is required, based on the optimal lot
size of one view.
Following flow is changing to a pull strategy,
where the product is pulled by the customer, rather
than pushed by the producer. Producing to a forecast
only creates more waste.
The last principle of Lean thinking is perfection,
or the elimination of all waste. This should be the
ultimate goal of any firm, and it is one of the reasons
the authors are not keen on benchmarking. Why
should one emulate an existing firm that may itself be
60
full of waste? Why not use the concept of kaizen, or

continuous improvement, to drive the company?
The authors stress that any firm wishing to transition
to Lean needs to have a change agent. This is a person
who is knowledgeable and adamant about the value of
Lean and who can, if necessary, force changes upon
the firm. The authors spend considerable time on the
problems of culture change in firms and the necessity
to use Lean principles continually to eliminate waste.
In short, the true Lean company is never satisfied with
where it is but is always striving to improve or reach
perfection, even if perfection is an unreachable goal.
Employee buy-in is a necessity, and it is crucial that
employees do not view Lean as another reengineering
attempt to reduce employment. Many of the authors
examples (after an initial reduction of the workforce)
guarantee that no employees will be terminated because
of Lean events.
The book is replete with examples of successful
Lean implementations that are broken down by size
of firm, type of industry, and country of origin. It
also includes a general action plan for implementing
Lean. Repeatedly, the authors emphasize the difficulty
of implementing and continuing a Lean strategy. In
many cases, success is a firms worst enemy, as the
emphasis switches from the continuing elimination
of waste to simply managing the initial success. The
authors contend that the best time to switch to Lean is
during a crisis, and they even suggest inventing one if
no crisis is handy.
Anyone involved, or contemplating becoming
involved, in Lean, or anyone who thinks they understand Lean, should read this book. It will not make one
a Lean expert overnight, but it will make the point that
Lean is a vastly different way of thinking. As such, it
requires major changes in an individuals viewpoints.
Lean is not a one-time event or a simple cost-saving
measure. It requires a dramatic restructuring of a firm
and must encompass both suppliers and customers if
it is to be done completely.
The authors finish up with a discussion of what
they call the Lean enterprise, which includes the entire
supply chain, from suppliers suppliers to customers
customers. They could find no examples of this in the
real world. The book is an easy read and is packed
full of information. It should be required for anyone in
any line of work.
William A. Cunningham, Ph.D., is a professor

of logistics and supply chain management in the
Department of Operational Sciences at the Air Force
Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio.
julyaugust 2009
ALOG NEWS
TRANSCOM MERGING ARMY AND AIR
FORCE PORT AND TERMINAL SYSTEMS
The Department of Defense is merging existing
Army and Air Force systems to create a single port
and terminal processing and management system.
Under the U.S. Transportation Commands Port Management Automation project, the Worldwide Port
System (WPS) used by the Armys Military Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command will migrate
into the Global Air Transportation Execution System
(GATES) used by the Air Forces Air Mobility Command. WPS and GATES have worked separately to
provide different services to the same cargo and military passengers. The new system will reduce duplication, provide cost savings, and enhance capabilities.
During the first phase of implementation, in November 2008, regional databases at Fort Eustis, Virginia;
Wheeler Army Air Field, Hawaii; and Rotterdam, the
Netherlands, migrated into the GATES central site at
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
In the second phase, the WPS terminals at SDDC
surface ports will be replaced with remote and
deployable GATES servers and the SDDC business
process servers at four sites will be replaced with
GATES architecture. This phase is scheduled to
begin in November. GATES then will support surface terminal, aerial port, and Defense Courier Division cargo and passenger processing and manifesting
operations to the joint warfighter.
SUPPLY SUPPORT ACTIVITY
CONSTRUCTION STANDARD APPROVED
The new Army construction standard for the multiclass supply support activity (SSA) was approved by
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management on 14 April. Development of the standard
resulted from a coordinated effort of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, G4; the Army Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee, Virginia;
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; and the Army Corps of Engineers.
The standard SSA is a 5-acre facility with 20,640
square feet of covered storage and another 13,125
square feet of outside bulk storage. It will hold approximately 37 deployable containers to support the receiving, turn-in, shipping, distribution, and storage of class
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
II (clothing and individual equipment), IIIP (packaged

petroleum, oils, and lubricants), IV (construction and
barrier materials), and IX (repair parts) supplies.
The new Army SSA standard will apply to all
Army components military construction SSA projects effective in fiscal year 2012.
FORT BRAGG TEAM TOPS ARMY
CULINARY ARTS COMPETITION
The 34th Army Culinary Arts Competition was
held 2 to 13 March at the Quartermaster Center and
School at Fort Lee, Virginia. The Army and one
Coast Guard team sent 184 participants to the culinary competition.
Navy Culinary Specialist First Class Michael
Edwards was honored as the Armed Forces Chef of
the Year. The team from Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
took home the posts ninth Installation of the Year
award and captured seven categories, including the
Nutritional Hot Food Challenge, first place in the
Baron H. Galand Culinary Knowledge Bowl, and
second place in the field cooking competition. Within
the Fort Bragg team, individual awards went to
Specialist Javier Muniz, Armed Forces Junior
Chef of the Year.
Sergeant Orlando Serna, best in show, patisserie/confectionery.
Sergeant Orlando Serna, most artistic exhibit in
show.
Sergeant Orlando Serna, best in class, contemporary pastry.
The Fort Riley, Kansas, team took second place
for Installation of the Year and third place in the
Culinary Knowledge Bowl. Fort Rileys Chief Warrant Officer (W4) Travis Smith took home best
exhibit in show, cold platter, and the best in class,
contemporary cooking.
The Hawaii team received third place for Installation of the Year, took first place in the field cooking
competition and second place in the Culinary Knowledge Bowl, and was awarded the best team buffet
table. Specialist Christopher Bohn, Specialist Ashley Shei, Specialist Christopher Bates, and Private
First Class Fernando Martinez won first place in the
Student Team Skills Competition. Individual awards
within the Hawaii team went to Sergeant First Class
Clinton Francis for best exhibit in show, cold appetizers, and Sergeant Shawn Dubois for best exhibit
in show, showpiece.
The Coast Guard team took third place in the
field cooking competition.
61
Other individual winners include

Staff Sergeant Jose Hernadez, Puerto Rico, for
the best ice carving in show.
Sergeant Michelle Carville, Fort Myer, Virginia,
for the best in class, contemporary cooking.
Sergeant First Class Amir Ahmad, Independent,
Army Senior Enlisted Aide of the Year.
Sergeant Michelle Carville, Fort Myer, Virginia,
Army Junior Enlisted Aide of the Year.
TRANSCOM STRATEGIC PLAN WILL GUIDE

DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION MISSIONS
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
provides interactive ammunition safety guidance,

resources, and expert advice. The Ammunition
Community of Practice (CoP) was launched 3
November 2008 through a Defense Acquisition University partnership with the Defense Ammunition
Center, the Army Combined Arms Support Command, and the Army Ordnance Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School.
The forum allows warfighters to share knowledge
throughout the ammunition enterprise and provides
information on operations, logistics, training, publications, and systems. Members can browse for
information; contribute documents, photos, and presentations; and help other users by sharing their
experiences and expertise.
Professionals have already posted more than 500
documents, with many links to sites and locations
where information is available to assist in ammunitionrelated functions. The site also offers an ask an
expert function that provides information when an
answer cannot be found in the forum. This useful link
is prominently displayed on the main menu. Once the
question is posted, the system forwards the question
to the CoP administrators who respond within 24
hours. These responses are shared with the entire
commmunity.
As the CoP expands, site administrators are asking members to contribute commonly asked questions along with corresponding answers based on
location, duty, or position. These questions and
responses will be posted as a ready reference.
The Ammunition CoP is open to all Department
of Defense military and civilian personnel with a
need to know. Although most members are ammunition professionals, the site benefits individuals
who work with ammunition but are not necessarily
trained ammunition personnel, such as master gunners, combat arms officers, squad leaders, and
ammunition transporters. To join, visit the Ammunition CoP website at https://acc.dau.mil/ammo.
ARMY TRAINING NETWORK LAUNCHED

The companion webportal to Field Manual (FM)
70, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, is up
and running. The Army Training Network (ATN)
is the Armys resource for training and trainers
that includes the training management instructions
and training solutions previously found in FM
71, Battle Focused Training. Putting the training
information online enables trainers to update it
rapidly as changes occur.
Users have access to doctrine as well as training
solutions and are able to comment on doctrine,
make recommendations for changes and additions
to the website, and submit training solutions from
the field. The ATN team will evaluate submitted
comments and solutions to ensure appropriateness
for Armywide distribution.
ATN facilitates communication of new training
methods and news from commanders and provides
a professional forum for trainers and educators to
pose questions and recommend solutions. The site
also has tutorials for using the Digital Training
Management System and links to the Army Training
Requirements and Resources System and Virtual
Battle Space 2.
ATN also offers personalized assistance. If trainers
cannot find information, they can ask the ATN team
questions and will receive a response in 48 to 72
hours. To visit the ATN portal, log in with your
Army Knowledge Online user name and password
at https://atn.army.mil/.
PROFESSIONAL NETWORKING WEBSITE
startED FOR AMMO COMMUNITY
More than 800 personnel have subscribed to a
new website for the ammunition community that
62
The commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Air Force General Duncan J.
McNabb, has released a new strategic plan that provides guidance for successfully executing
TRANSCOMs missions as the Department of
Defenses (DODs) Distribution Process Owner
julyaugust 2009
(DPO) and provider of common-user transportation.

The plan is designed to ensure that TRANSCOM
can meet its vision of synchronizing and delivering
unrivaled full-spectrum deployment and distribution
solutions to warfighting commanders.
The plan states that TRANSCOM must be governed by two imperatives: supporting full-spectrum
global plans and operations and forging a synchronized global DOD supply chain. To implement these
imperatives, TRANSCOM must be able to accomplish four strategic actions over the long term:
Moving the force, which entails delivering
forces to the point of need and ensuring sufficient
surge capacity for the future.
Sustaining the force, which requires delivering
supplies to the point of need, moving patients rapidly, and enhancing the performance of contractors.
Operating the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), which involves preserving
global access, delivering necessary corporate services (including information technology), and developing a ready JDDE workforce.
Executing portfolio management, which encompasses balancing logistics requirements and resources, advocating for DOD logistics capabilities, and
conducting distribution portfolio management.
To support the commands stakeholders and partners, TRANSCOM must improve its ability to provide logistics support to theater operations, enhance
distribution processes, modernize the Defense Transportation System, and conserve energy.
A copy of the strategic plan can be downloaded at
www.transcom.mil/dpo.
and continual improvement of the effectiveness of

its QMS [quality management system].
In order to meet the new standards, the AOAP
MLC staff had to study the changes to standards and
review and update the laboratorys QMS to reflect
the changes needed for the certification.
IRAQI VEHICLES USED STATESIDE TO TRAIN
SOLDIERS AGAINST IED ATTACKS
The Army is using Iraqi light-armored vehicles
(ILAVs) in the United States to train explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Soldiers who will use the
joint EOD rapid response vehicle (JERRV) while
deployed. Since JERRVs are not available for training in the United States, an effort by the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) provides ILAVs as training surrogates
or JERRV surrogate vehicles (JSVs).
The ILAV is the Iraqi Armys less expensive version of the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle
which uses the same platform as the JERRV. The
ILAV does not meet Department of Defense (DOD)
explosive protection and armor standards. So, DOD
has approved the vehicle for training purposes only,
and the ILAVs are becoming more widely available
for predeployment training.
Frank Vigus, Program Manager-Equipment for the
JIEDDO Center of Excellence (JCOE) at Fort Irwin,
California, said that, until March 2007, JERRVs were
available for training, but they have since been identi(continued on page 65)
FIRST ARMY LABORATORY RECERTIFIED

UNDER NEW ISO STANDARDS
The Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) Mannheim Laboratory Center (MLC) in Germany is the
first AOAP laboratory worldwide to be recertified
under new International Organization for Standardization (ISO) guidelines. The laboratory received the
new certification, called ISO 9001:2008, after being
previously certified under less stringent standards.
The new standard allows an organization flexibility in the way it chooses to document its quality
management system, said Akwasi Edusei, AOAP
MLC quality management representative, and it
enables each individual organization to develop the
minimum amount of documentation needed in order
to demonstrate the effective planning, operation and
control of it[s] processes and the implementation
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
The Iraqi light-armored vehicle that was developed for the Iraqi Army is now being used in the
United States to train Soldiers who will drive
joint explosive ordnance disposal rapid response
vehicle (JERRVs) in Iraq to transport Soldiers
and EOD equipment. These training substitutes
are known as JERRV surrogate vehicles.
63
RECENTLY PUBLISHED DOCTRINE

Field Manual Interim (FMI) 493.2, The
Sustainment Brigade, describes the modular
force structure, missions, and operations of the
sustainment brigade and its subordinate functional
and multifunctional units. According to FMI 493.2,
The sustainment brigades consolidate selected
functions previously performed by corps and division
support commands and area support groups into a
central operations echelon. This provides centralized
command and control of subordinate units, which
are task-organized to meet mission requirements.
The missions of the sustainment brigade are theater
opening, distribution, sustainment, and Army Universal
Task List tasks. FMI 493.2 explains the force structure
surrounding the sustainment brigade (echelons above
and below) and how this structure helps to support the
warfighter. It also explains to sustainers the importance
of contracting and their role in contracting; strategiclevel support; and support of military, civilian, joint,
and multinational organization. The FMI serves as
an authoritative reference for developing training,
standing operating procedures, and tactics, techniques,
and procedures for unit operations. Like many recent
manuals, the FMI includes lessons learned and best
practices from the field.
Field Manual (FM) 305.140, Army Special
Operations Forces Logistics, previously FMI 305.140,
is a restricted publication covering logistics for Army
Special Operations Forces (which include Special
Forces, Ranger, special operations aviation, civil
affairs, and psychological operations units). The FM
describes the logistics support framework of special
operations, which includes the sustainment brigade
(special operations) (airborne); the Special Forces
group support battalion, group support company,
group service support company, and battalion support
company; and the Ranger support company, the Ranger
support operations detachment, and various platoons
dedicated to specific sustainment functions. The
document also explains modular force sustainment and
the changes that it will present to Special Operations
Forces logistics.
FM 715, The Army Universal Task List, compiles
all Army tactical tasks (ARTs) for the six warfighting
functions and their subfunctions in one document.
It describes the warfighting functions found in the
modular force and their duties (or tasks) within the
Army Universal Task List (AUTL). The AUTL is a
comprehensive but not all-inclusive listing of Army
tasks, missions, and operations. Commanders and
trainers will use the AUTL as a guide for developing
64
mission-essential task lists and training across the

warfighting functions. AUTL also provides a common
language and reference system for doctrine, combat,
and training developers.
Chapter 4 explains the sustainment warfighting
function and its related ARTs and systems. The FM
states, Sustainment is the provision of the logistics,
personnel services support, and health service support
necessary to maintain operations until mission
accomplishment. The four tasks of the sustainment
warfighting function are to provide logistics support,
personnel services support, health service support,
and internment and resettlement operations (including
detainee operations).
Logistics support ARTs include providing
maintenance support, transportation support, supplies,
field services, contracting support, distribution, and
general engineer support.
Personnel services support includes human resources
support, financial management support, legal support,
religious support operations, and band support.
Health service support consists of providing combat
casualty care, medical evacuation (air and ground),
medical regulating support, and medical logistics.
Internment and resettlement operations tasks
sustainers with performing detainee and enemy prisoners
of war operations and resettlement operations.
The AUTL does not include tasks performed by the
Army as part of a joint or multinational force. Those
tasks are compiled in the Universal Joint Task List.
Joint Publication (JP) 329, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, has received some major changes
in its newest edition and recognizes the roles played
by interagency and multinational partners in planning,
executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian
assistance (FHA) operations. The document identifies
the U.S. Agency for International Development as the
principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and
humanitarian assistance.
The publication also
Defines and explains use of the terms developmental assistance and security assistance.
Provides figures and tables for the overarching
relief process, interagency coordination flow, the composition and functions of a civil-military operations
center, and FHA operations and environments (permissive, uncertain, and hostile).
Offers newly revised sections on organization and
interagency coordination, humanitarian principles in
the law of war, and Pacific Disaster Center tasking,
functions, and programs.
The JPs sections on the International Committee of
the Red Cross and U.S. Navy health service support for
FHA are also revised.
julyaugust 2009
fied as theater requirements. Needing a subsitute,

Vigus found the ILAVdeveloped by Force Protection, Incorporated, and BAE Land Systems for the
Iraqi Armythrough Foreign Military Sales.
Vigus said the ILAV fills the gaps left by theater
demands, production constraints or competing
requirements. He added that surrogates provide the
warfighter with the form, fit, feel, and function of
realistic and comparable systems, while freeing
production systems to combatant commanders.
The Army has 35 JSVs based at various training
sites, where they are being used for operator and maintenance familiarization. Once real systems become
available these will complement the real systems,
said Vigus, who explained that JCOE is working with
other program managers to incorporate radios, vehicle
optic sensor systems, and other equipment to make the
training experience even more realistic.
MRAP VEHICLES SEALIFTED TO CENTCOM
REACH THE 10,000 MARK
The U.S. Transportation Command held a ceremony 23 March at Naval Weapons Station Charleston,
South Carolina, to celebrate the Military Surface
Deployment and Distribution Commands (SDDCs)
shipment of the 10,000th mine-resistant ambushprotected (MRAP) vehicle to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations.
MRAPs originally were sent to CENTCOM by air.
Most MRAPs are now moved by sea because one
cargo ship can carry up to 200 times the weight of a
C17 Globemaster III at one-tenth the cost. Personnel
from the Coast Guard, Marine Corps, commercial
ERRATUM
The captions for the photos on pages 11 and 13 of
the MarchApril 2009 issue of Army Logistician are
transposed. The photo on page 11 shows an apparatus
used for conducting the L33 corrosion test for hypoid
gear oils. The photo on page 13 is of an engine-liner
test rig that was used to research the tribology needed
for low heat refection engine technology.
A contractor with the 841st Transportation

Battalion prepares to load mine-resistant ambushprotected vehicles for shipment from Naval
Weapons Station Charleston, South Carolina,
to Southwest Asia. (Photo by MSG Kevin Young,
841st Transportation Battalion)
carriers, and the port labor force have helped SDDC
and the Navys Military Sealift Command move
nearly 900 vehicles a month.
The MV Alliance New York, which carried the
10,000th MRAP, was the same ship that carried the
first vehicle to the CENTCOM theater of operations
in November 2007.
Army Logistician (ISSN 00042528) is a bimonthly professional bulletin published by the Army Logistics Management College, 2401 Quarters Road, Fort Lee, Virginia 238011705. Periodicals postage is paid at Petersburg,
VA 238049998, and at additional mailing offices.
Mission: Army Logistician is the Department of the Armys official professional bulletin on logistics. Its mission
is to publish timely, authoritative information on Army and Defense logistics plans, programs, policies, operations,
procedures, and doctrine for the benefit of all logistics personnel. Its purpose is to provide a forum for the exchange
of information and expression of original, creative, innovative thought on logistics functions.
Disclaimer: Articles express opinions of authors, not the Department of Defense or any of its agencies, and do
not change or supersede official Army publications. The masculine pronoun may refer to either gender.
Reprints: Articles may be reprinted with credit to Army Logistician and the author(s), except when copyright is
indicated.
Distribution: Units may obtain copies through the initial distribution system (DA Form 12 series). Private domestic subscriptions are available at $23.00 per year by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954,
Pittsburgh, PA 152507954, or by visiting http://bookstore.gpo.gov on the Web. For credit card orders, call (866)
5121800. Subscribers should submit address changes directly to Army Logistician (see address below). Army Logistician also is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.almc.army.mil/alog.
Postmaster: Send address changes to: EDITOR ARMY LOGISTICIAN/ALMC/2401 QUARTERS RD/FT LEE VA
238011705.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
65
ISSN 00042528
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ARMY LOGISTICIAN
US ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE
2401 QUARTERS ROAD
FORT LEE VIRGINIA 238011705
PERIODICALS POSTAGE
AND FEES PAID
AT PETERSBURG VIRGINIA
AND ADDITIONAL CITIES
Official Business
Coming in Future Issues

Army Logistician 40th Anniversary Commemoration
A Sustainers Guide to Financial Management
Evolution of Human Resources Within Sustainment
Human Resources Operations: A Force Enabler
Culture Change in Recruiting
Army Strategic Management
Contracted Logistics for Sustainment Operations in Iraq
51C Proponency and Leader Development
Company Leadership Challenges in Todays Fluid Army
Tactical Planning for Convoys
Marine Corps Detachment Fort Lee

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40 YEARS 19692009

PB 7000904 Headquarters, Department of the Army

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

From CASCOM: Personnel Services Delivery Redesign

Pit Crew Maintenance in the Brigade Support BattalionMajor Troy K. King

Sustainment-Centric IntelligenceCaptain Gregory Larkin

Commentary: Logisticians Are Sustainers, Not Targeters

Over There: Army Expeditionary Forces Logistics in World War I

The 1st Sustainment Brigade in Iraq

Transformation of Finance OperationsMajor Thomas A. Buchholz,

Colonel Shelley A. Richardson

The Critical Role of Shower, Laundry, and Clothing Repair Teams

Technology and Daily Management Help CRSPs Move Cargo

The 1st Sustainment Brigades Contract Coordination Cell

Human Resources Modularity Tested in IraqCaptain Xarhya Wulf

The Joint Logistics Analysis ToolPeter J. Cloutier and Brian K. Frank

Lightweight Modular Causeway System: Logistics Advanced Concept

Earning a Graduate Degree at ILEWillis F. Jackson, Jr., Gerald J. Leonard,

R & R: Reading and Reviews

Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

World Wide Web address:

Personnel Services Delivery Redesign

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B. Nichols

ne of the many questions I come across in my

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

(References: MILPER Messages 07233, 07236)

HR Tasks and Functions

Conducts R5 personnel processing

TSC HRSC = Theater Sustainment Command Human Resources

The various levels of the sustainment command

SIPR (Secure Internet Protocol Router),

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B.

Contracting Agility in LOGCAP-Kuwait

Colonel Scott S. Haraburda, Lieutenant Colonel Frances A. Bloom,

Major Robert T. Keck

To end fraud and waste in contracting and improve support to Soldiers,

Contractors from CSA, Ltd., discuss training

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

Supported unit generates requirement memorandum with

LOGCAPs cost analyst generates independent Government

LOGCAP assists in developing and submitting packet

LOGCAP requirements generation process.

review board or by completing a purchase request and

not written in sufficiently broad terms. If the PWS is

requirements within Kuwait. In essence, the LOGCAP

Major Types of Services

- Construction and maintenance

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

The LOGCAP office has a 1-hour block that provides

As darkness falls, Army contract employees install

marketing to get the word out, but now the LOGCAP

change for the office was the internal change from

An employee of ITT Corporation creates sparks

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS

Major Documents on Contractor Use

Joint Publication 40, Joint Logis-

tics. Chapter II describes key areas

According to the Gansler Report, all logisticians

Planning Initial Reset for Brigade

onducting initial reset of a brigade combat team