1. Avelina Velarde purchased a parcel of land from David Raymundo for P800,000, and agreed to assume the P1.8 million mortgage on the property from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
2. As the bank had not yet approved transferring the mortgage to Velarde, she executed an undertaking to continue paying the loan according to the terms of Raymundo's mortgage until approval.
3. The undertaking also stated that if Velarde violated the mortgage terms, she would forfeit the P800,000 purchase price and any payments made as liquidated damages, and Raymundo would regain ownership of the property.
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1. Avelina Velarde purchased a parcel of land from David Raymundo for P800,000, and agreed to assume the P1.8 million mortgage on the property from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
2. As the bank had not yet approved transferring the mortgage to Velarde, she executed an undertaking to continue paying the loan according to the terms of Raymundo's mortgage until approval.
3. The undertaking also stated that if Velarde violated the mortgage terms, she would forfeit the P800,000 purchase price and any payments made as liquidated damages, and Raymundo would regain ownership of the property.
1. Avelina Velarde purchased a parcel of land from David Raymundo for P800,000, and agreed to assume the P1.8 million mortgage on the property from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
2. As the bank had not yet approved transferring the mortgage to Velarde, she executed an undertaking to continue paying the loan according to the terms of Raymundo's mortgage until approval.
3. The undertaking also stated that if Velarde violated the mortgage terms, she would forfeit the P800,000 purchase price and any payments made as liquidated damages, and Raymundo would regain ownership of the property.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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1. Avelina Velarde purchased a parcel of land from David Raymundo for P800,000, and agreed to assume the P1.8 million mortgage on the property from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
2. As the bank had not yet approved transferring the mortgage to Velarde, she executed an undertaking to continue paying the loan according to the terms of Raymundo's mortgage until approval.
3. The undertaking also stated that if Velarde violated the mortgage terms, she would forfeit the P800,000 purchase price and any payments made as liquidated damages, and Raymundo would regain ownership of the property.
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'That for and in consideration of the
Republic of the Philippines
amount of EIGHT HUNDRED SUPREME COURT THOUSAND PESOS (P800,000.00), Manila Philippine currency, receipt of which THIRD DIVISION in full is hereby acknowledged by the G.R. No. 108346 July 11, 2001 VENDOR from the VENDEE, to his entire and complete satisfaction, by Spouses MARIANO Z. VELARDE and AVELINA these presents the VENDOR hereby D. VELARDE, petitioners, SELLS, CEDES, TRANSFERS, CONVEYS vs. AND DELIVERS, freely and voluntarily, COURT OF APPEALS, DAVID A. RAYMUNDO and with full warranty of a legal and valid GEORGE RAYMUNDO, respondents. title as provided by law, unto the PANGANIBAN, J.: VENDEE, her heirs, successors and assigns, the parcel of land mentioned A substantial breach of a reciprocal obligation, like and described above, together with failure to pay the price in the manner prescribed by the house and other improvements the contract, entitled the injured party to rescind thereon. the obligation. Rescission abrogates the contract from its inception and requires a mutual restitution 'That the aforesaid parcel of land, of benefits received. together with the house and other improvements thereon, were The Case mortgaged by the VENDOR to the Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, questioning the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals Makati, Metro Manila to secure the (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 32991 dated October 9, 1992, payment of a loan of ONE MILLION as well as its Resolution3 dated December 29, 1992 EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.4 (P1,800,000.00), Philippine currency, as evidenced by a Real Estate The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision Mortgage signed and executed by the reads: VENDOR in favor of the said Bank of "WHEREFORES the Order dated May 15, the Philippine Islands, on _____ and 1991 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE which Real Estate Mortgage was and the Decision dated November 14, 1990 ratified before Notary Public for dismissing the [C]omplaint is RESINSTATED. Makati, _____, as Doc. No. ______, Page The bonds posted by plaintiffs-appellees and No. _____, Book No. ___, Series of 1986 defendants-appellants are hereby of his Notarial Register. RELEASED."5 'That as part of the consideration of The Facts this sale, the VENDEE hereby The factual antecedents of the case, as found by the assumes to pay the mortgage CA, are as follows: obligations on the property herein sold in the amount of ONE MILLION "x x x. David Raymundo [herein private EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS respondent] is the absolute and registered (P1,800,000.00), Philippine currency, owner of a parcel of land, together with the in favor of Bank of Philippine Islands, house and other improvements thereon, in the name of the VENDOR, and located at 1918 Kamias St., Dasmariñas further agrees to strictly and faithfully Village, Makati and covered by TCT No. comply with all the terms and 142177. Defendant George Raymundo conditions appearing in the Real [herein private petitioners] is David's father Estate Mortgage signed and executed who negotiated with plaintiffs Avelina and by the VENDOR in favor of BPI, Mariano Velarde [herein petitioners] for the including interests and other charges sale of said property, which was, however, for late payment levied by the Bank, under lease (Exh. '6', p. 232, Record of Civil as if the same were originally signed Case No. 15952). and executed by the VENDEE. "On August 8, 1986, a Deed of Sale with 'It is further agreed and understood Assumption of Mortgage (Exh. 'A'; Exh. '1', by the parties herein that the capital pp. 11-12, Record) was executed by gains tax and documentary stamps on defendant David Raymundo, as vendor, in the sale shall be for the account of favor of plaintiff Avelina Velarde, as vendee, the VENDOR; whereas, the with the following terms and conditions: registration fees and transfer tax 'x x x xxx xxx thereon shall be the account of the VENDEE.' (Exh. 'A', pp. 11-12, '1. That until such time as my Record).' assumption of the mortgage obligations on the property purchased "On the same date, and as part of the above- is approved by the mortgagee bank, document, plaintiff Avelina Velarde, with the the Bank of the Philippine Islands, I consent of her husband, Mariano, executed shall continue to pay the said loan in an Undertaking (Exh. 'C', pp. 13-14, Record).' accordance with the terms and 'x x x xxx xxx conditions of the Deed of Real Estate 'Whereas, as per deed of Sale with Mortgage in the name of Mr. David A. Assumption of Mortgage, I paid Mr. Raymundo, the original Mortgagor. David A. Raymundo the sum of EIGHT '2. That, in the event I violate any of HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS the terms and conditions of the said (P800,000.00), Philippine currency, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, I and assume the mortgage obligations hereby agree that my downpayment on the property with the Bank of the of P800,000.00, plus all payments Philippine Islands in the amount of made with the Bank of the Philippine ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED Islands on the mortgage loan, shall be THOUSAND PESOS (P1,800,000.00), forfeited in favor of Mr. David A. Philippine currency, in accordance Raymundo, as and by way of with the terms and conditions of the liquidated damages, without necessity Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated of notice or any judicial declaration to _____, signed and executed by Mr. that effect, and Mr. David A. David A. Raymundo with the said Raymundo shall resume total and Bank, acknowledged before Notary complete ownership and possession Public for Makati, _____, as Doc. No. of the property sold by way of Deed of _____, Page No. _____, Book No. _____, Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, Series of 1986 of his Notarial Register. and the same shall be deemed 'WHEREAS, while my application for automatically cancelled and be of no the assumption of the mortgage further force or effect, in the same obligations on the property is not yet manner as it (the) same had never approved by the mortgagee Bank, I been executed or entered into. have agreed to pay the mortgage '3. That I am executing the obligations on the property with the Undertaking for purposes of binding Bank in the name of Mr. David A. myself, my heirs, successors and Raymundo, in accordance with the assigns, to strictly and faithfully terms and conditions of the said Deed comply with the terms and conditions of Real Estate Mortgage, including all of the mortgage obligations with the interests and other charges for late Bank of the Philippine Islands, and the payment. covenants, stipulations and provisions 'WHEREAS, this undertaking is being of this Undertaking. executed in favor of Mr. David A. 'That, David A. Raymundo, the vendor Raymundo, for purposes of attesting of the property mentioned and and confirming our private identified above, [does] hereby understanding concerning the said confirm and agree to the mortgage obligations to be assumed. undertakings of the Vendee pertinent 'NOW, THEREFORE, for and in to the assumption of the mortgage consideration of the foregoing obligations by the Vendee with the premises, and the assumption of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. (Exh. mortgage obligations of ONE MILLION 'C', pp. 13-14, Record).' EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS "This undertaking was signed by Avelina and (P1,800,000.00), Philippine currency, Mariano Velarde and David Raymundo. with the bank of the Philippine "It appears that the negotiated terms for the Islands, I, Mrs, Avelina D, Velarde with payment of the balance of P1.8 million was the consent of my husband, Mariano from the proceeds of a loan that plaintiffs Z. Velardo, do hereby bind and were to secure from a bank with defendant's obligate myself, my heirs, successors help. Defendants had a standing approved and assigns, to strictly and faithfully credit line with the Bank of the Philippine comply with the following terms and Islands (BPI). The parties agreed to avail of conditions: this, subject to BPI's approval of an application for assumption of mortgage by Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for plaintiffs. Pending BPI's approval o[f] the Reconsideration.8 application, plaintiffs were to continue paying Meanwhile, then Judge Ynares-Santiago was the monthly interests of the loan secured by promoted to the Court of Appeals and Judge a real estate mortgage. Salvador S. A. Abad Santos was assigned to the sala "Pursuant to said agreements, plaintiffs paid she vacated. In an Order dated May 15, 1991,9 BPI the monthly interest on the loan secured Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's Motion for by the aforementioned mortgage for three Reconsideration and directed the parties to proceed (3) months as follows: September 19, 1986 with the sale. He instructed petitioners to pay the at P27,225.00; October 20, 1986 at balance of P1.8 million to private respondents who, P23,000.00; and November 19, 1986 at in turn, were ordered to execute a deed of absolute P23,925.00 (Exh. 'E', 'H' & 'J', pp. 15, 17and sale and to surrender possession of the disputed 18, Record). property to petitioners. "On December 15, 1986, plaintiffs were Private respondents appealed to the CA. advised that the Application for Assumption Ruling of the Court of Appeal of Mortgage with BPI, was not approved (Exh. 'J', p. 133, Record). This prompted plaintiffs The CA set aside the Order of Judge Abad Santos not to make any further payment. and reinstated then Judge Ynares-Santiago's earlier Decision dismissing petitioners' Complaint. "On January 5, 1987, defendants, thru Upholding the validity of the rescission made by counsel, wrote plaintiffs informing the latter private respondents, the CA explained its ruling in that their non-payment to the mortgage this wise: bank constitute[d] non-performance of their obligation (Exh. '3', p. 220, Record). "In the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, it was stipulated that 'as part of "In a Letter dated January 7, 1987, plaintiffs, thru the consideration of this sale, the VENDEE counsel, responded, as follows: (Velarde)' would assume to pay the 'This is to advise you, therefore, that mortgage obligation on the subject property our client is willing to pay the balance in the amount of P 1.8 million in favor of BPI in cash not later than January 21, in the name of the Vendor (Raymundo). 1987 provided: (a) you deliver actual Since the price to be paid by the Vendee possession of the property to her not Velarde includes the downpayment of later than January 15, 1987 for her P800,000.00 and the balance of Pl.8 million, immediate occupancy; (b) you cause and the balance of Pl.8 million cannot be the re- lease of title and mortgage paid in cash, Vendee Velarde, as part of the from the Bank of P.I. and make the consideration of the sale, had to assume the title available and free from any liens mortgage obligation on the subject property. and encumbrances; and (c) you In other words, the assumption of the execute an absolute deed of sale in mortgage obligation is part of the obligation her favor free from any liens or of Velarde, as vendee, under the contract. encumbrances not later than January Velarde further agreed 'to strictly and 21, 1987.' (Exhs. 'k', '4', p. 223, faithfully comply with all the terms and Record). conditions appearing in the Real Estate Mortgage signed and executed by the "On January 8, 1987 defendants sent VENDOR in favor of BPI x x x as if the same plaintiffs a notarial notice of were originally signed and executed by the cancellation/rescission of the intended sale of Vendee. (p. 2, thereof, p. 12, Record). This the subject property allegedly due to the was reiterated by Velarde in the document latter's failure to comply with the terms and entitled 'Undertaking' wherein the latter conditions of the Deed of Sale with agreed to continue paying said loan in Assumption of Mortgage and the Undertaking accordance with the terms and conditions of (Exh. '5', pp. 225-226, Record)." 6 the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in the Consequently, petitioners filed on February 9, 1987 name of Raymundo. Moreover, it was a Complaint against private respondents for specific stipulated that in the event of violation by performance, nullity of cancellation, writ of Velarde of any terms and conditions of said possession and damages. This was docketed as Civil deed of real estate mortgage, the Case No. 15952 at the Regional Trial Court of downpayment of P800,000.00 plus all Makati, Branch 149. The case was tried and heard payments made with BPI or the mortgage by then Judge Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (now an loan would be forfeited and the [D]eed of associate justice of this Court), who dismissed the [S]ale with [A]ssumption of [M]ortgage would Complaint in a Decision dated November 14, 1990.7 thereby be Cancelled automatically and of no force and effect (pars. 2 & 3, thereof, pp 13- same had never been executed or entered 14, Record). into.' While it is true that even if the contract expressly provided for automatic rescission "From these 2 documents, it is therefore upon failure to pay the price, the vendee clear that part of the consideration of the may still pay, he may do so only for as long sale was the assumption by Velarde of the as no demand for rescission of the contract mortgage obligation of Raymundo in the has been made upon him either judicially or amount of Pl.8 million. This would mean that by a notarial act (Article 1592, Civil Code). In Velarde had to make payments to BPI under the case at bar, Raymundo sent Velarde the [D]eed of [R]eal [E]state [M]ortgage the notarial notice dated January 8, 1987 of name of Raymundo. The application with BPI cancellation/rescission of the contract due to for the approval of the assumption of the latter's failure to comply with their mortgage would mean that, in case of obligation. The rescission was justified in approval, payment of the mortgage view of Velarde's failure to pay the price obligation will now be in the name of (balance) which is substantial and Velarde. And in the event said application is fundamental as to defeat the object of the disapproved, Velarde had to pay in full. This parties in making the agreement. As is alleged and admitted in Paragraph 5 of the adverted to above, the agreement of the Complaint. Mariano Velarde likewise parties involved a reciprocal obligation admitted this fact during the hearing on wherein the obligation of one is a resolutory September 15, 1997 (p. 47, t.s.n., September condition of the obligation of the other, the 15, 1987; see also pp. 16-26, t.s.n., October non-fulfillment of which entitles the other 8, 1989). This being the case, the non- party to rescind the contract (Songcuan vs. payment of the mortgage obligation would IAC, 191 SCRA 28). Thus, the non-payment of result in a violation of the contract. And, the mortgage obligation by appellees upon Velarde's failure to pay the agreed Velarde would create a right to demand price, the[n] Raymundo may choose either of payment or to rescind the contract, or to two (2) actions - (1) demand fulfillment of the criminal prosecution (Edca Publishing & contract, or (2) demand its rescission (Article Distribution Corporation vs. Santos, 184 1191, Civil Code). SCRA 614). Upon appellee's failure, "The disapproval by BPI of the application for therefore, to pay the balance, the contract assumption of mortgage cannot be used as was properly rescinded (Ruiz vs. IAC, 184 an excuse for Velarde's non-payment of the SCRA 720). Consequently, appellees Velarde balance of the purchase price. As borne out having violated the contract, they have lost by the evidence, Velarde had to pay in full in their right to its enforcement and hence, case of BPI's disapproval of the application cannot avail of the action for specific for assumption of mortgage. What Velarde performance (Voysaw vs. Interphil should have done was to pay the balance of Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635)."10 P1.8 million. Instead, Velarde sent Raymundo Hence, this appeal. 11 a letter dated January 7, 1987 (Exh. 'K', '4') which was strongly given weight by the lower The Issues court in reversing the decision rendered by Petitioners, in their Memorandum,12 interpose the then Judge Ynares-Santiago. In said letter, following assignment of errors: Velarde registered their willingness to pay the balance in cash but enumerated 3 new "I. conditions which, to the mind of this Court, The Court of Appeals erred in holding that would constitute a new undertaking or new the non-payment of the mortgage obligation agreement which is subject to the consent or resulted in a breach of the contract. approval of Raymundo. These 3 conditions were not among those previously agreed "II upon by Velarde and Raymundo. These are The Court of Appeals erred in holding that mere offers or, at most, an attempt to the rescission (resolution) of the contract by novate. But then again, there can be no private respondents was justified. novation because there was no agreement of "III all the parties to the new contract (Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 493). The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners' January 7, 1987 letter gave three "It was likewise agreed that in case of violation of the mortgage obligation, the 'new conditions' constituting mere offers or an attempt to novate necessitating a new Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage would be deemed 'automatically cancelled agreement between the parties." and of no further force and effect, as if the The Court's Ruling The Petition is partially meritorious. in which this Court declared that rescission of a contract would not be permitted for a slight or First Issue: casual breach. Finally, they argue that they have Breach of Contract substantially performed their obligation in good Petitioner aver that their nonpayment of private faith, considering that they have already made the respondents' mortgage obligation did not constitute initial payment of P800,000 and three (3) monthly a breach of contract, considering that their request mortgage payments. to assume the obligation had been disapproved by As pointed out earlier, the breach committed by the mortgagee bank. Accordingly, payment of the petitioners was not so much their nonpayment of monthly amortizations ceased to be their obligation the mortgage obligations, as their nonperformance and, instead, it devolved upon private respondents of their reciprocal obligation to pay the purchase again. price under the contract of sale. Private However, petitioners did not merely stop paying the respondents' right to rescind the contract finds basis mortgage obligations; they also failed to pay the in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which explicitly balance of the purchase price. As admitted by both provides as follows: parties, their agreement mandated that petitioners "Art. 1191. -- The power to rescind should pay the purchase price balance of P1.8 obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in million to private respondents in case the request to case one of the obligors should not comply assume the mortgage would be disapproved. Thus, with what is incumbent upon him. on December 15, 1986, when petitioners received The injured party may choose between notice of the bank's disapproval of their application fulfillment and the rescission of the to assume respondents' mortgage, they should have obligation, with the payment of damages in paid the balance of the P1.8 million loan. either case. He may also seek rescission Instead of doing so, petitioners sent a letter to even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the private respondents offering to make such payment latter should become impossible." only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions not The right of rescission of a party to an obligation originally agreed upon in the contract of sale. Such under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on conditional offer to pay cannot take the place of a breach of faith by the other party who violates the actual payment as would discharge the obligation of reciprocity between them.16 The breach a buyer under a contract of sale. contemplated in the said provision is the obligor's In a contract of sale, the seller obligates itself to failure to comply with an existing obligation.17 When transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate the obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent things, and the buyer to pay therefor a price certain upon it, the obligee may seek rescission and, in the in money or its equivalent.13 absence of any just cause for the court to determine Private respondents had already performed their the period of compliance, the court shall decree the obligation through the execution of the Deed of rescission.18 Sale, which effectively transferred ownership of the In the present case, private respondents validly property to petitioner through constructive delivery. exercised their right to rescind the contract, Prior physical delivery or possession is not legally because of the failure of petitioners to comply with required, and the execution of the Deed of Sale is their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase deemed equivalent to delivery.14 price. Indubitably, the latter violated the very Petitioners, on the other hand, did not perform their essence of reciprocity in the contract of sale, a correlative obligation of paying the contract price in violation that consequently gave rise to private the manner agreed upon. Worse, they wanted respondent's right to rescind the same in private respondents to perform obligations beyond accordance with law. those stipulated in the contract before fulfilling their True, petitioners expressed their willingness to pay own obligation to pay the full purchase price. the balance of the purchase price one month after it Second Issue became due; however, this was not equivalent to actual payment as would constitute a faithful Validity of the Rescission compliance of their reciprocal obligation. Moreover, Petitioners likewise claim that the rescission of the the offer to pay was conditioned on the performance contract by private respondents was not justified, by private respondents of additional burdens that inasmuch as the former had signified their had not been agreed upon in the original contract. willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price Thus, it cannot be said that the breach committed only a little over a month from the time they were by petitioners was merely slight or casual as would notified of the disapproval of their application for preclude the exercise of the right to rescind. assumption of mortgage. Petitioners also aver that Misplaced is petitioners' reliance on the cases19 they the breach of the contract was not substantial as cited, because the factual circumstances in those would warrant a rescission. They cite several cases15 cases are not analogous to those in the present one. In Song Fo there was, on the part of the buyer, only Third Issue a delay of twenty (20) days to pay for the goods delivered. Moreover, the buyer's offer to pay was Attempt to Novate unconditional and was accepted by the seller. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds it In Zepeda, the breach involved a mere one-week no longer necessary to discuss the third issue raised delay in paying the balance of 1,000 which was by petitioners. Suffice it to say that the three actually paid. conditions appearing on the January 7, 1987 letter of petitioners to private respondents were not part In Tan, the alleged breach was private respondent's of the original contract. By that time, it was already delay of only a few days, which was for the purpose incumbent upon the former to pay the balance of of clearing the title to the property; there was no the sale price. They had no right to demand reference whatsoever to the nonpayment of the preconditions to the fulfillment of their obligation, contract price. which had become due. In the instant case, the breach committed did not WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby merely consist of a slight delay in payment or an AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private irregularity; such breach would not normally defeat respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the the intention of the parties to the contract. Here, amount of P874,150, which the latter paid as a petitioners not only failed to pay the P1.8 million consequence of the rescinded contract, with legal balance, but they also imposed upon private interest thereon from January 8, 1987, the date of respondents new obligations as preconditions to the rescission. No pronouncement as to costs. performance of their own obligation. In effect, the qualified offer to pay was a repudiation of an SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt existing obligation, which was legally due and Melo, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. demandable under the contract of sale. Hence, private respondents were left with the legal option of seeking rescission to protect their own interest. Footnotes: Mutual Restitution 1 Rollo, pp. 37-53. Required in Rescission 2 Rollo, pp. 68-78. Penned by Justice Regina As discussed earlier, the breach committed by G. Ordoñez-Benitez and concurred in by petitioners was the nonperformance of a reciprocal Justices Gloria C. Paras (Division chairman) obligation, not a violation of the terms and and Eduardo G. Montenegro (member). conditions of the mortgage contract. Therefore, the 3 Rollo, p. 81. automatic rescission and forfeiture of payment 4 Rollo, pp. 21-33. clauses stipulated in the contract does not apply. Instead, Civil Code provisions shall govern and 5 CA Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 20. regulate the resolution of this controversy. 6 Rollo, pp. 68-73. Considering that the rescission of the contract is 7 Records, pp. 280-284. based on Article 1191 of the Civil Code, mutual 8 restitution is required to bring back the parties to Records, pp. 285-293. their original situation prior to the inception of the 9 Records, pp. 339-341. contract. Accordingly, the initial payment of 10 P800,000 and the corresponding mortgage Rollo, pp. 75-78. payments in the amounts of P27,225, P23,000 and 11 To eradicate its backlog of old cases, the P23,925 (totaling P874,150.00) advanced by Court m Februry 27, 2001 resolved to petitioners should be returned by private redistribute long-pending cases to justices respondents, lest the latter unjustly enrich who had no backlog, and who were thus themselves at the expense of the former. tasked to prioritize them. Consequently, this Rescission creates the obligation to return the case was raffled and assigned to the object of the contract. It can be carried out only undersigned ponente for study and report. when the one who demands rescission can return 12 Rollo, p. 227. whatever he may be obliged to restore.20 To rescind 13 is to declare a contract void at its inception and to Coronel v. CA, 263 SCRA 15, October 7, put an end to it as though it never was. It is not 1996. merely to terminate it and release the parties from 14 Power Commercial and Industrial Corp. v. further obligations to each other, but to abrogate it CA, 274 SCRA 597, June 20, 1997. from the beginning and restore the parties to their 15 Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., relative positions as if no contract has been made.21 47 Phil. 821, September 16, 1925; Tan v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 656, July 28, 1989; and Zepeda v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 293, December 9, 1992. 16 Uy v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 69, September 9, 1999; Romeo v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 223, November 23, 1995. 17 Cheng v. Genato, 300 SCRA 722, December 29, 1998. 18 Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511, July 17, 1995. 19 See footnote 15. 20 Co v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 528, August 17,1999. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 revised ed., p. 556. 21 0campo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, June 30, 1994.