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Buerano vs. Court of Appeals
*

No. L30269. July 19, 1982.

EPITACIO BUERANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Acquittal; Double
jeopardy exists where reckless act resulted in damage to property;
Conviction of accused in the charge of slight and less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence constitutes double
jeopardy to the charge of the crime of damage to property through
reckless imprudence.He stressed that if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical
injuries, then the same consequence must perforce follow where
the same reckless act caused merely damage to propertynot
deathand physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life
lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motor vehicle arising from the
same mishap.
_______________
*

FIRST DIVISION.
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Buerano vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
RELOVA, J.:
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Petitioner Epitacio Buerano was the driver of LTB bus with

Plate No. 22900 which collided with the Mabuhay Bakery
delivery panel bearing Plate No. T13016 driven by
Hipolito Vismonte and owned by Chu Yu in Tanay, Rizal on
September 20, 1957.
On December 3, 1957, the Chief of Police of Tanay, filed
with the Municipal Judge of that municipality Criminal
Case No. 251 against herein petitioner for the crime of
Slight and Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence. In said Criminal Case No. 251, the complaint
alleged, among other things, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence that the said bus, driven and
operated by him (petitioner) to collide with the delivery
truck of Mabuhay Bakery owned by Mr. Chu Yu alias
Mariano of Tanay, Rizal, bearing Plate No. T13016, the
result of which the right front side of the said truck
(Mabuhay Bakery) was greatly damaged and the driver,
Hipolito Vismonte, including the two (2) helpers, namely,
Bonifacio Virtudazo and Sy Tian alias Martin, suffered
physical injuries on the different parts of the body which
required medical attention as follows:
Hipolito Vismontefive (5) days
Bonifacio Virtudazoten (10) days
Sy Tian alias Martinone (1) month

On February 6, 1958, after trial, petitioner was found

guilty of slight and less serious physical injuries through
reckless
imprudence
and
sentenced
to
suffer
imprisonment from one (1) month and one (1) day to two (2)
months and to pay the cost of the suit. He appealed the
decision to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7772.
On May 2, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
affirmed the decision of the Municipal Court and sentenced
peti
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Buerano vs. Court of Appeals

tioner to suffer four months of Arresto Mayor and to pay

the costs.
In the meantime, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
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filed against herein petitioner Criminal Case No. 7965 in

the Court of First Instance charging him with the Crime of
Damage to property through reckless imprudence. He filed
a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy in that
because he has been previously convicted of the offense
charged, referring to the judgment of conviction by the
Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance.
Opposition was filed by the Provincial Fiscal contending
that the crime for which petitioner was convicted was for
less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
whereas the second case was for damages to property
through reckless imprudence which are distinct offenses. In
support thereof, he cited the case of People vs. Estipona, 70
Phil. 513, which held that the two (2) offenses are entirely
distinct from one another, punishable under two (2)
different provisions of the code and that more evidence are
necessary to sustain the complaint for injuries than those
submitted in the case for damage.
The Court of First Instance denied the motion to quash
and, after trial, found petitioner guilty in Criminal Case
No. 7965 of the crime of damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals which sustained the Court of First Instance and
sentenced herein petitioner to pay a fine of P4,387.00
which is double the amount of damages suffered by the
delivery truck with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; to indemnify the offended party, the owner of
the delivery truck in the amount of P2,193.50, representing
the amount of damages suffered by the said delivery truck,
and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals held that there
was no double jeopardy because
x x x First. Neither in the JP Court nor in the CFI on appeal was
the appellant convicted or acquitted of the offense of Damage to
Property Thru Reckless Imprudence or the case against him for
that offense dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. Second. The JP Court which found him guilty of
Slight and Less Serious Physical Injuries was not a court of
competent jurisdiction to try the offense of Damage to Property
Thru Reckless Imprudence involving P2,193.50 because the
imposable penalty may be three
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times the aforesaid amount. Third. Appellant could not have

validly pleaded before the JP Court to the said offense of Damage
to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence. Fourth. The offense of
Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence was alleged in the
Information in Criminal Case No. 7965 (the second case) does not
include and is not necessarily included in the first charge of Slight
and Less Serious Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence, as
alleged in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 7722, the
continuation of Criminal Case 251; and Fifth: Appellant was
never tried at all in the JP Court of Tanay in Criminal Case No.
7722 for the crime of Damage to Property Thru Reckless
Imprudence.
We have read the case of People vs. Jose Belga, 53 O.G. (10)
3081, May 31, 1957, cited by appellant, and are of the opinion that
the basic reason relied therein is not found in the case at bar, first
because there were three (3) cases filed in that case, to wit,
Criminal Case No. 88, Reckless Imprudence with Physical Injury;
Criminal Case No. 95, Damage to Property Thru Reckless
Imprudence, and Criminal Case No. 96, for Multiple Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, and accused Jose Belga was
acquitted in the first case No. 88, after due trial, charging both
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. In the case at bar, the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence arising out of the collision has not been
passed upon or dealt with in both Criminal Case No. 251, JP
Court of Tanay, and in Criminal Case No. 7722 of the CFI,
whereas Criminal Case No. 7965, the present case, is solely for
damage to property thru reckless imprudence. In fact, appellant
could not have been convicted of Damage to Property Thru
Reckless Imprudence under the Information filed in Criminal
Case No. 7722, the first case, for it charges only the offense of
Less Serious Physical Injury Thru Reckless Imprudence. Obvious
is the fact that no case for damage to property thru reckless
imprudence was tried in which appellant could be convicted or
acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. Furthermore, under Sec.
9 of Revised Rule 117, in order for jeopardy to be available as bar,
the second offense, Criminal Case No. 7965, must necessarily
include or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
first case, Criminal Case No. 7722. Considering that the decision
of the JP in Criminal Case No. 251 was vacated and the
information filed by the Fiscal in Criminal Case 7722 (the
continuation of Criminal Case 251) charges only the offense of
Less Serious Physical Injuries, it is evident that the first offense
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does not include the second, nor the second, the first.

This view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the

ruling of this Court in the prewar case of People vs.
Estipona de
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Buerano vs. Court of Appeals

cided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People

vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the
Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan,
of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in

his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82
of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits
that its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in
Criminal Case No. 05123CR finding petitioner guilty of
damage to property through reckless imprudence should be
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set aside, without costs. He stressed that if double

jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries, then the same consequence
must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused
merely damage to propertynot deathand physical
injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of
a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap.
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Buerano vs. Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction in Criminal

Case No. CAG.R. No. 05123CR is hereby set aside and
petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged therein.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C.J.), Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., no part.
MelencioHerrera, J., took no part.
Vasquez, J., in the result.
Judgment set aside.
Notes.No double jeopardy attaches where the
judgment of acquittal in question is null and void. (People
vs. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 450.)
Where the counsels of the accused secured in advance
the private prosecutors conformity to the defenses desire
to postpone the hearing of the case and on the date of trial
the accused thru a new counsel asked for the dismissal of
the charge and the incumbent judge of the court, not being
then aware of the mentioned circumstance, issued an order
of provisional dismissal, the said dismissal cannot be
validly pleaded as a bar to the revival of the case on the
ground of double jeopardy. (People vs. Fuentebella, 100
SCRA 672.)
There is no double jeopardy where the order of dismissal
or acquittal was made with grave abuse of discretion to
lack of jurisdiction. (People vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289.)
No double jeopardy present where plea of guilty entered
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before a court has no jurisdiction over the case. (De

Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619.)
o0o
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