Zionism in The Present Tense: Gadi Algazi
Zionism in The Present Tense: Gadi Algazi
Zionism in The Present Tense: Gadi Algazi
The article is based on the lecture held at the diAk Conference Israel 2012: Democracy
under Pressure, October 2628, 2012.
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by the European Union), and in its wake the brutal resurgence of the
conflict after October 2000, an enormous amount of suffering, and the
construction of that great monument of modern civilization known as
the separation wall. Palestinians and Israelis have paid a dire price for
the illusions of the 1990s, most importantly, for failing to face the issue
of colonization and settlements, for the false promise of decolonization
light. The Oslo peace process carefully avoided the basic issues political
sovereignty, settlements, refugees, and the redistribution of resources. In
October 2000, large sectors of the Israeli elite were deeply disappointed
by the Palestinians who were no longer willing to keep waiting for nevernever day, having realized that throughout the years of the Oslo Process,
only one process left deep, solid traces in social reality: The expansion of
the colonies, as the number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories
more than doubled.
This reality, the one shaped by colonization and dispossession, is the heart
of the matter. It is clear enough now that at the heart of our tragedy the
crux of injustice and the most serious obstacle to any viable, acceptable
historical compromise between Israelis and Palestinians lies the settlement process.3
Although successive Israeli governments are politically responsible for
the settlement project, it is essential to see that in practice, it has always
been basically a joint project, driven by an alliance of three major players:
The state, political movements, and a few large-scale organizations. The
state acted through a broad spectrum of ministries (Agriculture, Construction, Defense, Tourism, etc.), but one should not overlook the pioneering role of the Israeli armys special Settlement Branch in this regard.
Soldiers were often used, especially until 1978, to occupy military outposts that would turn into permanent settlements, but the major source
of manpower was civil: Successive Israeli governments have worked in
tandem with Zionist political movements which provided the bulk of
the settlers and promoted the colonization process from the left Zionist
Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza ir to the messianic ultra-nationalist Gush Emunim.
Both government and settler movements have relied on the continuous
support of the Zionist movement more specifically, of its large-scale
organizations which have played a key role in financing and realizing the
colonization project.
Zertal, Idith/Eldar, Akiva (2007): Lords of the Land: The War over Israels Settlements in
the Occupied Territories 19672007, New York.
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We are now all familiar with the horrible reality in the West Bank a fragmented space, interspersed with Jewish settlements connected by a network of roads which separate Palestinian communities from each other,
and interlocking with a system of roadblocks, checkpoints, and the separation fence. This pattern has been shaped by two master-plans laid out in
19781979, one drafted in a government office, the other in the bureaus
of the World Zionist Organization (WZO): The Sharon Plan the blueprint for settlement prepared by Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture in
Menachem Begins first government, and the Drobles Plan the blueprint
for colonizing the West Bank prepared by Matityahu Drobles, head of the
Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization between 1978
and 1992.4
The role of the World Zionist Organization is not confined to strategic
planning. After 1967, the Jewish National Fund (JNF-KKL) was involved
in purchasing land in the Occupied Palestinian Territories through Himanuta (a wholly-owned KKL subsidiary);5 shady land deals have repeatedly
given rise to accusations of corruption, forging documents and bribery.6
In addition, the KKL played a key role in building the infrastructure for
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.7 In fact, in the first ten
years of Israels occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan
Heights, when colonization projects were not openly acknowledged by the
government, the KKL proved an efficient vehicle for promoting colonization through the back door.8 After 1977, as the right-wing Likud party took
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In fact, the Department already had a head the aging Raanan Weitz from Mapai
(Labor). For a while they served together, but right-wing Drobles, member of the Likud,
was the effective head, and stayed in this position for 17 years.
On Himanutas recent involvement in the eviction of Palestinian residents of Silwan
see Sheizaf, Noam (2011): Despite denials, JNF to continue eviction effort of Jerusalem
Palestinians, +972 Magazine, 28.11.2011 (http://972mag.com).
Sharvit, Noam (2005): JNF executives suspected of corruption and land fraud, Globes,
27.2.2005; Barkat, Amiram (2005): JNF-owned company bought land in the territories,
Haaretz, 17.2.2005; Levinson, Chaim (2013): Ex-IDF official in West Bank cuts plea deal
over bribery, Haaretz, 9.4.2013. For older cases involving accusations of forging documents and using bribes, see In Injunction Order issued against selling Notre Dame,
Davar, 13.12.1970 [Hebrew]; Bachar, Ilana/ Freud, Talma (1986): Two Lawyers and a
Land Broker suspected of forging land titles, Maariv, 19.6.1986 [Hebrew].
Three examples from among many: Preparing the Ground for Mevo Choron [Settlement], Davar, 26.5.1972; Preparing the Ground for a New Settlement in Pithat Rafiach, Davar, 13.4.1972; Tzvi Ilan, A Jewish Country is being created in the Shomron
Desert, Davar, 22.12.1972.
In one of the more prominent cases, the New York Times uncovered the construction of
a massive road in the West Bank the Allon Road in the Jordan valley. The road was
in fact built by the KKL: Talmi, Menachem (1973): The Allon Road What all the fuss
is about, Maariv, 23.2.1973.
9 Tarabut Report (2013): JNF in the Jordan Valley: Colonization Now, 8.2.2013, Tarabut
Website (www.tarabut.info).
10 More precisely, there are two different Settlement Departments; the Settlement Branch
of the Jewish Agency, controlled basically by its major donors, operates mainly within
pre-1967 Israel, while the Settlement Department of the WZO focuses on the Occupied
Territories but since 2004 also within pre-1967 Israel.
11 Levinson, Chaim (2013): WZO Settlement Department gets more money than it is
budgeted, Haaretz, 17.6.2013.
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12
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Blougrund, David (2001): The Jewish National Fund, The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, p. 10 (www.israeleconomy.org).
ing the war of 1948, but between 1949 and 1953, through two pieces of
legislation whose outcomes we live with to this very day: The Absentees
Property Law (1950) and the Land Acquisition Law (1953). All political
parties defining themselves as Zionist supported the two laws.13
Large parts of the landed property of the Palestinian refugees were transferred in several steps from the states custody to the main institutions
of the Zionist movement either as their property or for long-term use.
Israels Development Authority was invested with most the land; it was a
joint body consisting not only of representatives of branches of the government (the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Industry, and Labor), but
also of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund.
The Palestinian refugees most valuable lands were sold by the state in a shady
deal a true Nacht-und-Nebel-Aktion to the Jewish National Fund in order
to forestall any possibility of the state having to restitute the property to the
Palestinian refugees. On December 11, 1948 the UN adopted resolution 194
(III) recognizing the Palestinian refugees right of return or compensation for
their property. By January 1949 the government adopted the idea of selling
1 million dunam (1 dunam = 0.1 hectare) to the Jewish National Fund; the
deal was followed by a second One Million Dunam deal, but due to subsequent difficulties, the KKL gave back some of it to the state. The KKL did not
even pay the whole price agreed upon because it was able to use state funds
to pay the state for the stolen land it acquired.14 These lands according to
conservative estimates, total at least 1,5 million dunam more than double
the amount of land bought by the KKL since its foundation.15
The KKL still owns most of these lands; they are its most important source of
revenue. The KKL enjoys, as we shall see, a special legal status in Israel; it is
exempt from taxes, but it does not make its income public nor is it currently
subject to Israels Freedom of Information Law.16 Israels leading economic
13
Parliament members of the left Zionist Mapam were absent during the vote on the Land
Acquisition Law (1953).
14 Kremnitzer, Mordechai/Confino, Roy (2013): Legislation Note The Bill Regarding the
Land Exchange Deal Between the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Land Administration, 17.4.2008, Israel Democracy Institute Website (www.idi.org.il).
15 Oren-Nordheim, Michael (1999): The Crystallization of Settlement Land Policy in the
State of Israel from Its Establishment and During the First Years of the Israel Lands Administration (19481965), Ph. D. dissertation (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University), pp. 236
266 [Hebrew]. On the eve of the foundation of the state of Israel, the JNF owned 942,092
dunam; by August 1964 the JNF owned 2,604,916 dunam (ibid, pp. 51, 264).
16 Winograd, Alona (2013): What is going on in the JNF?, Haaretz, 5.7.2013; Hovel, Revital: JNF could be subject to state comptroller review if Israels justice ministry has its
way, Haaretz, 25.7.2013.
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17 In 2008 circa 972 million NIS from land rent; in 2009 1,133 million NIS; ca. 1,000
in 2011: Choresh, Hadar (2011): Israel Land Administrations Income ca. 4.36 billion,
Maariv, 3.8.2011; Blau, Uri (2011): Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Untold Story of
the Jewish National Fund, Haaretz, 9.12.2011.
18 Sadeh, Shuki (2011): This is where Money actually Grows on Trees: What One really
does with your Donations to the KKL, Haaretz, 6.1.2011 [Hebrew]; Sadeh, Shuki (2013):
Whats between the JNF and Pro-Israel Graffiti in Hebron? Haaretz, 13.6.2013.
19 More precisely, to any Jew or any unincorporated body of Jews or to any company
under Jewish control which is engaged or intends to engage in the settlement of Jews
(Keren Kayemeth Le-Israel (JNF), Memorandum of Association, 1954).
20 Some data were divulged by the chairman of the KKL, Effi Stenzler, in a public lecture given
in June 2009; Zionism at its best both in the Negev and the Galilee, Karka 67 (2009).
21 Earlier still, the link between the State of Israel and the World Zionist Congress was
regulated. In 1952, a special law recognized the special status of the WZC and the Jewish
Agency as bodies authorized to act toward developing the country and its colonization.
A special covenant was drawn between the state and the WZC in 1954, and replaced by
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a second one in 1979. In the covenant, the purpose of the WZC is defined as agricultural
settlement, acquiring land and preparing it through its organs.
22 Until recently, KKL was entitled to be represented by half the members of the board
of the Israel Land Authority; now it is represented by two members, the other 7 representing different government ministries. It has been customary for the KKL board
member to head the Land Authoritys most important committee the Land Committee. As Im revising this paper for publication, Israeli newspapers report about
another major conflict over control between the extreme right-wing Construction and
Housing Minister and the KKL which may result in a shift in the composition of the
Land Authoritys board.
23 The lands of Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael shall, moreover, be administered subject to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael
(Covenant between KKL and the Government of Israel, 1961).
24 Svirski, Shlomo (2005): 1967: A Social-Economic Turning-Point in Israels History,
in: Avi Bareli et al. (eds.): Society and Economy in Israel: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Beer Sheeba: Ben-Gurion Research Institute, Vol. 1, pp. 91116;
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Why should the state do this? The foremost spokesman of the KKL, Yosef
Weitz, director of the Land and Afforestation Department of the KKL,
provided at least one argument: He claimed that the governments Afforestation Department was not attuned to the needs of colonization, whereas
for the KKL, afforestation was the pioneer that goes before the settlers.25
And in fact, the KKL Afforestation Department was not subjected to a
body entrusted with preserving open spaces or the protection of the environment, but to the KKLs Land Development Authority. Weitz claimed to
have invented the use of afforestation to secure control of land already in
the 1920s.26 This method is still in use.
Israels planning legislation only emerged in the 1960s; the KKL had no
rivals to contend with. It persistently ignored ecological critiques of its
afforestation projects. Until 2002 it refused even to submit its afforestation
plans to planning committees.27 Only recently did it co-opt some of its
green critiques, incorporated partly their critique and is now portraying
itself as the largest green organization in the world. Yet KKL afforestation
projects remain tightly linked to its core mission acquiring land and
preparing it for settlement.
My illustration is from the Northern Negev, a few kilometers north of Beer
Sheva. Here, the Israel Land Administration has been engaged for several
years in a campaign to demolish a Bedouin unrecognized village, al-Araqib, in order to force its inhabitants to relinquish their ancestral rights to
the land and move into townships. The JNF is the green pioneer of this
process; it kindled the conflict in the late 1990s by undertaking afforestation works in the area which for the Bedouins signaled that irreversible
facts were being established on the ground, making it impossible for them
to cultivate the land they claim as their own and making future court proceedings meaningless. These trees, they said, were soldier-trees, standing
for the still missing settlers.28 During a parliamentary debate on the issue
of afforestation works in al-Araqib, the Minister of Agriculture himself
an erstwhile candidate for chairmanship of the KKL admitted that it was
well-known that planting such trees was the best method for defending the
lands of the nation against encroachers that is, Bedouins, even though
25 Elhanani, A. (1959): Y. Weitz: Government Afforestation was not integrated in the Agricultural Economy, Davar, 21.8.1959.
26 Weitz, Yosef (1970): Forest and Afforestation in Israel, Ramat-Gan, p. 179 [Hebrew].
27 Israel Union for Environmental Defense vs. Minister of Interior, HCJ 288/00, Piskei
Din, Vol. 55(5), p. 673.
28 Cf. Algazi, Gadi (2010): From Gir Forest to Umm Hiran: Notes on Colonial
Nature and its Keepers, in: Theory and Critique, 37, pp. 233253 [in Hebrew].
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such trees may be uprooted in the future for other purposes.29 And in fact,
when a middle-class Jewish gated community next to Al-Araqib needed to
expand, such trees were indeed uprooted without further ado.
The multifarious use of trees in the colonization process to cover the
traces of demolished Palestinian villages, to secure property claims, to fortify a frontier, to create facts on the ground or, more fundamentally, as a
substitute for not yet available human settlers makes it at least comprehensible why the state has renounced afforestation to a private company
such as the KKL. The case reveals, however, a more basic institutional pattern: The Israel Land Administration has been using bulldozers to demolish
the Bedouin village; the KKL used trees to occupy the land. The ILA has
benefited from the positive public image of the KKL, which can rely on
a flow of donations from both individuals and government institutions,
seeking to contribute to making the desert bloom. Whenever confronted with public critique concerning its role in kindling the conflict
with Bedouin citizens, the KKL answered that it was only implementing
orders operating under the guidance of the Israel Land Administration
and government planning bodies. Yet plans for afforestation are submitted by the KKL to planning committees; its massive landed property and
political influence predispose such bodies to cooperate closely with the
KKL. More crucially: In the face of mounting critique from public opinion
in Israel and beyond, the KKL proved it was autonomous enough to decide
to stop albeit temporarily afforestation works in al-Araqib on its own.
Debunking the KKLs claims not to be responsible for its policies is less
important than understanding the basic mechanism revealed here: Shifting, fluid and obscure responsibilities, a close informal alliance between
state officials and Zionist organizations, an alliance which undermines
democratic control from below or citizens participation.
This might seem like a small example. Take Blueprint Negev a master plan for the Negev, comprising around 60% of pre-1967 Israel, its last
natural land reserves, and directly affecting the lives of 600,000 citizens.
Blueprint Negev foresees the massive colonization of the Negev by several
hundred thousands Jewish settlers: New immigrants, nationalist-religious
settlers, soldiers and their families, young couples from Israels peripheries
or families expected to relocate from the center to the periphery because
they are unable pay for housing. In May 2006, Shimon Peres announced
29 Shalom Simchon, Knesset Debate, 3.3.2010. See Hasson, Nir (2011): Evangelical TV
channel turns the Negev into a forest and removes the Bedouin from Al-Arakib, Haaretz,
11.2.2011.
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that as Minister of Development of the Negev and Galilee, his first task
would be the construction of a new Jewish settlement in the Negev, Karmit, as part of the Blueprint Negev. It was described as the first among
many such settlements designated for wealthy, young American immigrants who want to make Aliyah and live in style.30 A PR-article in Bnai
Brith magazine told prospective new settlers from the US and Canada that
the Negev is the closest thing to the clean slate (sic!) many of Israels prestate pioneers found when they first came to the Holy Land.31 The pioneers might encounter Indians or Bedouins, but this can be taken care of.
Blueprint Negev, however, was not prepared in Israel. It was projected
by the Jewish Agency, financed by JNF-USA, developed by McKinsey &
Company, the global management consulting firm in cooperation with
Israels military and the Ministry for the Development of the Negev of
the Galilee, charged almost openly with the Judaization of space.32 You
would easily recognize the participation of McKinsey as a familiar sign of
neo-liberal times, circumventing political accountability and democratic
participation,33 but the leading role of the JNF-USA and military planners
are peculiar to our colonial reality.34 It is one thing to realize that the
master plans for the colonization of the occupied West Bank were prepared by the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization
together with Ariel Sharon, another to realize that Blueprint Negev has
been prepared through a joint alliance of Zionist corporations, private
consultancy firms and government ministries without ever consulting the
citizens affected and certainly not the Bedouins comprising currently a
third of the Negevs population.
Zionism is part of Israels present. Beyond its role in colonization and the
control of key resources by institutions of the World Zionist Organization, Zionism deeply affects political structures: Israel cannot belong to its
citizens as long as the Zionist movement, its institutions and corporations,
30 Alush, Zvi (2006): New Southern Town Aims to Attract Affluent American Immigrants,
Ynet News, 5.2.2006.
31 Heilmann, Uriel (2008): Israels Desert Frontier: Settling the Undeveloped Negev, in:
Bnai Brith Magazine, pp. 2631.
32 Silvan Shalom, Minister for Development of the Negev and Galilee, expressed his vision:
Judaization of the Galilee, Judaization of the Negev and fulfilling the commandment of
settling the land of Israel. Shalom: Dont Be Ashamed to Say Judaization of Galilee,
Arutz 7, Israel National News, 7.1.2011 (http://www.israelnationalnews.com).
33 Resch, Christine (2005): Berater-Kapitalismus oder Wissensgesellschaft? Zur Kritik der
neoliberalen Produktionsweise, Mnster.
34 Manski, Rebecca (2006): A Desert Mirage: Privatizing Development Plans in the Negev/Naqab, News from Within, 22:8 (October/November 2006).
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There is nothing particular about political elites working closely with big
corporations. What gives neoliberalism in Israel its particular flavor is
among other things the close, long-term alliance between the deep state
and the institutions of the Zionist movement.
This alliance stands in the way of the democratization of Israels polity
and any social transformation that would guarantee basic and equal
entitlement to welfare to all its citizens. To achieve historical reconciliation with the Palestinian people, colonization must stop both in the
Occupied Territories and within Israel. The institutions driving it forward,
such as the Jewish Agency, the WZO and the KKL, must go. Their control of essential resources within Israel stand in the way of any attempt to
achieve a measure of social justice within Israel through redistribution. As
long as they offer venues for institutionalized discrimination, for circumventing democratic power-sharing equal and unconditional citizenship
cannot be guaranteed. Zionism is therefore not a historical relic in Israel
and Palestine. It provides the template for channeling the flow of power
and resources; it underpins an exclusivist, colonial vision of Israeli society
embedded in innumerable practices.
No Zionist party offers Palestinian citizens equal rights both individual
and collective. All maintain their membership in the World Zionist Organization and all cling to the KKL and its considerable resources. Clinging to
them stifles protest and channels it, again and again, to combating the
real enemy, the Palestinians. In September 2011, toward the end of Israels
summer of social protest, the chairman of the Students Unions demanded
from the government to financially support the settlement of the periphery
as a solution to the plight of good Israelis of middle-class background
who perform full military service. This is a historical chance to fulfill the
Zionist vision and to settle the periphery, he wrote, ignoring not only the
Arab citizens, but the Jewish inhabitants of Israels periphery as well. This
is the well-known logic of building your future on the ruins of the poor
and of indigenous communities a colonial logic. To bring about social
change in Israel, this logic must be challenged through social alliances that
cut cross ethnic divisions, alliances that offer Palestinians full equality, and
can offer Israelis a real, viable future outside the fortified ghetto, without
separation walls and fences.
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