Solution for 1 (case study a):

A lease agreement between Mr. Hammer and Mr. Spanner is essentially a contract
with the provisions and binds the parties by referring to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
(LTA 1954). Mr. Hammer as the landlord has the roles, rights and obligations in accordance
with the provisions of the law of property lease agreements made. Meanwhile, as the tenant
informed also that Mr. Spanner has a business tenancy protected prevailing during the period
of the lease period, valid until May 4, 2016. In this lease agreement, Mr. Hammer does not
impose a service charge to its tenants, but the two sides agreed to the terms of full repairing

and insuring terms (FRI). Therefore the tenant shall keep maintenance and repair the damages
that may occur during the term of the lease on a rented unit. Also Tenant must pay the rent on
time, and he is not allowed to delinquent property rental payment. In this case, according to
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954) section 30 (1) about Grounds of Opposition
point (a) to (c), Mr. Hammer as a landlord has a right to remove Mr. Spanner as a tenant as
soon as possible if Mr. Spanner breaches the lease agreement in accordance with the grounds
(a) to (c) (Lyons v Central Commercial Properties Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 767 CA). If Mr.
Hammer wanted to bring an action against this problem by using these grounds, he must also
follow the basic legal procedures applicable to remove the tenant, by including it in the
section 25 notice or put it in the landlord's counter-notice to the tenant's section 26 request
(Youssefi v Musselwhite [2014] EWCA Civ 885). When Mr. Hammer as the landlord has set
specific grounds, then this cannot be changed anymore. Even if he decides to sell his property
later on the new owner also should adhere to the grounds which have been set at the
beginning of the old owner (Marks v British Waterways Board [1963] 3 All ER 28, CA). In
order to analyze the case, there are three issues that possibly relate to the grounds.
Firstly, Mr. Spanner has not taken care of his rented unit well, so when Mr. Hammer
inspected and checked the unit, he saw that the weeds had spread into the rear wall of the
building. This condition has aggravated by Mr. Spanner who does not perform repairs to the
roof of the building that is damaged. Mr. Spanner is the tenant and as a tenant he has agreed
to the FRI lease agreement. During the period of the lease agreement, he should be
responsible for any maintenance and repairs to all forms of damage of units rented. In the
case for Mr. Hammer, he wants Mr. Spanner to get out of a rented unit, this is possible
because Mr. Spanner has disregarded the tenant lease and Mr. Hammer as the landlord has the
right to not extend the lease term and actually decide to give the lease contract to another
tenant instead of extending the lease any longer to Mr. Spanner. This is in accordance with
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954) section 30 (1) about Grounds of Opposition
point (a) Failure to repair. In addition, to relevant examples and cases similar to this issue is
the Lyons v Central Commercial Properties Ltd. [1958] 172 EG 111 CA, where the tenant did
not repair the building rented. If Mr. Hammer wanted to immediately remove Mr. Spanner,
then he should be able to prove that there were no adjustments made by Mr. Spanner for units
rented. If indeed the findings obtained in the unit rented by Mr. Spanner can be shown by Mr.
Hammer then such evidence can be used as the basis for the charges against Mr. Spanner in
court, in which he did not do his duty as a tenant.

Secondly, Mr. Spanner is overdue in rent where he has only paid 4 months during the
last twelve months. In the case of late tenant to pay the rent, the landlord legally entitled not
to extend the return period of the lease with the tenant if the lease agreement has expired. It is
possible and permissible under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954) section 30 (1)
about Grounds of Opposition point (b) Persistent delay in paying rent. Mr. Hammer also must
be able to prove negligence rent payment made by Mr. Spanner by way of showing evidence
in the form of historical record of late payments from Mr. Spanner. In this case, Mr. Hammer
should act with caution in showing evidence of late payment that has been made by Mr.
Spanner. Whether the delay in rental payments actually causes disruption and costs to Mr.
Hammer, that he wanted to immediately remove Mr. Spanner (Hazel v Akhtar and Another
[2002] 1 EGLR 45 CA). Other thing that needs to be considered by Mr. Hammer when he
wants to sue Mr. Spanner and bring this case to the court about delay payment of the rent, Mr.
Hammer should consider whether Mr. Spanner has good and sufficient reasons to prove why
he was late paying rent (Hurstfell Ltd v Leicester Square Property Co Ltd [1988] 2 EGLR
105, (1998) 37 EG 109). However, it may be Mr. Spanner who has some evidence to show
that he is able to pay the full rental fees in the future. He can promise a number of deposits as
a security, or he can agree to pay the debt with interest along with the non-payments
(Rawashdeh v Land [1988] 2 EGLR 109, CA).
Finally, by the new rules stipulate that the area where the unit is rented will change
from industrial into residential area designation due to come into effect on January 2, 2016. It
can also be used as a basis to prove that Mr. Spanner is no longer allowed to continue the
lease term, because the units in the near future are no longer going to fit with the current use
as industrial (Fowles v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 757; and Eichner v Midland
Bank Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 1120, [1970] 2 All ER 597, CA)
In conclusion, based on the analysis of existing problems on a case study (a), then Mr.
Hammer can immediately remove Mr. Spanner, as long as he can provide strong evidences
relevant to the specified grounds. Mr. Hammer also rightly follows legal procedures if he
wants to evict a tenant.
References:
Regulations/Rules:
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 section 30 (1) about Grounds of Opposition point (a) to (c)
Book:
Garner S. and Frith A. (2013). A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant. Oxford
University Press. Oxford. United Kingdom.

Cases
Lyons v Central Commercial Properties Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 767 CA
Youssefi v Musselwhite [2014] EWCA Civ 885
Marks v British Waterways Board [1963] 3 All ER 28, CA
Lyons v Central Commercial Properties Ltd. [1958] 172 EG 111 CA
Hazel v Akhtar and Another [2002] 1 EGLR 45 CA
Hurstfell Ltd v Leicester Square Property Co Ltd [1988] 2 EGLR 105, (1998) 37 EG 109
Rawashdeh v Land [1988] 2 EGLR 109, CA
Fowles v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 757
Eichner v Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 1120, [1970] 2 All ER
597, CA
Other sources:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/2-3/56/part/II
http://www.landlordlawblog.co.uk/2014/04/09/how-can-landlords-evict-tenants-quickly/
https://www.gov.uk/private-renting-evictions
http://www.boltburdon.co.uk/business-clients/property-disputes/lease-renewal-faq/

Solution for 1 (case study b):

Mr. Hammer and Mrs. Chisel are both equally freeholders. There is a covenant in
terms of adjoining land for a private carriageway purposes, assuming that the adjoining land
of the carriageway was made of necessity since the previous land owner era, because the
current use of the land is for industrial designation. In this case applies a rule of easement

where a land owner is allowed to have rights with the provisions for use of land belonging to
his neighbor (Law of Property Act 1925) S.62 (1)). The party who uses the neighbors land as
an access road for vehicles is obliged to maintain, preserve, and perform a repair to any
damages that occurs on the land (Access to Neighboring Land Act 1992 chapter 23). Mr.
Hammer as the dominant and Mrs. Chisel as the servient tenement or the owner of
neighboring land are the rightful user to the road. In the case there are some tenants who
occupied Mr. Hammers property, they are also allowed to use the road just for the specified
purposes according to the terms and conditions on the covenant, for example not to using the
path only up to a permitted access of the carriageway (Access to Neighboring Land Act 1992
chapter 23).
The right to use a portion of land owned by others to be used as access road is a
positive covenant. Meaning that all parties should contribute to maintain and do some repairs
to the road (Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169). According to the case, Mrs. Chisel actually
cannot directly claim benefits from the land facilities without ever doing repairs on the land
as well. She could not impose rights without fulfilling her obligations as well, which is issued
reparation costs to ensure that the land can be executed. Therefore, claimant only has the
right to claim, when she has carried out its obligations in advance as the co-owner of the
adjoining land.
In the case of Mrs. Chisel want to sue Mr. Hammer on the road damage that has
happened previously, it is possible for them as long as they have an agreement that includes
the obligation to pay compensation for any damage that occurs on land that became the object
of the agreement serve targeted. But according to the regulations, it is very difficult to
extinguish an easement as the covenant has been created once then it should be existing
forever (P&A Swift v Combined English Stores Group Plc [1989]). What Mrs. Chisel can do
is to negotiate and claim some previous damages, but she cannot completely stop the right of
way for the easement. Mrs. Chisel should consider the possibility that might has been
occurred. Maybe when the previous land owners prepare a covenant scheme, they did agree
to create an adjoining land to be used as a road/carriageway. Although the provisions of the
land use will be changed from industrial land into residential land, the adjoining land still
have to be used as the road (Re Dolphins Conveyance [1970] Ch 654).
In this case, Mr. Hammer should be responsible for maintenance and repair for the
way but he must not make some significant changes or improvements to the road, for
example layering the road by concreting or asphalting the surface. Based on the Mr. Hammer

point of view as defendant, theoretically, he is entitled to choose whether he wants to enjoy

his rights as one of the owners of the adjoining land and pay the costs relating to the repair
and maintenance of roads or he may choose not to issue a number of funds for repairs and
maintenance but he have to giving his rights. The consequence is that he should not allow his
tenants to use the road for passing large vehicles entering and potentially damage the road
(Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169). Reviewing to this case, it can be seen that if there is a
covenant that binds to the adjoining land used as carriageway. The parties involved in this
covenant shall be liable jointly and together has particularly the rights and obligations to
maintain and repair the damage that hit on the carriageway (Goodman and others v Elwood
[2013] EWCA Civ 1103).
To sum up, the carriageway which consists of adjoining land and is used by both
parties involved in the covenant is legal. Mrs. Chisel as neighboring land owners, should be
aware that the covenants contained in covered of the right of way or entering the neighboring
land. As a neighboring land owner, Mrs. Chisel can only sue the dominant party if she has
been carried out her obligations to the land. In the case of the claim still continues, then there
is an option for the defendant to pay or choose to giving his right to use the land as the
carriageway. If indeed Mr. Hammer eventually be required to repair the road, then he is
merely obligated to repair only and not to alter the structure of the road significantly and
permanently. Supposedly all parties involved in the covenants are equally responsible for
maintaining and repairing the road if there is damage to the road.
Refferences:

Regulations/Rules:
Law of Property Act 1925) S.62 (1)
Access to Neighboring Land Act 1992 chapter 23
Cases:
Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169
P&A Swift v Combined English Stores Group Plc [1989]
Re Dolphins Conveyance [1970] Ch 654
Goodman and others v Elwood [2013] EWCA Civ 1103
Other Sources:
http://www.bsdr.com/freehold-covenants-an-overview.aspx
http://swarb.co.uk/lisc/Land19851989.php
http://www.lawteacher.net/land-law/essays/land-building-law.php

http://www.oxbridgenotes.co.uk/notes/multiple-institutions/2014/gdl-land-lawnotes/samples/freehold-covenants-2
https://hklandlaw.wordpress.com/2010/11/17/does-the-benefit-of-a-guarantee-pass-on-anassignment-of-the-reversion/
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/23
http://www.findlaw.co.uk/law/property/neighbour_disputes/368.html
http://www.wslaw.co.uk/knowledge-centre/industry-news/news-article/1006/case-clarifiesdefinition-of-adjoining-land
http://boundary-problems.co.uk/boundary-problems/easements.html
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/15-16/20

Solution for case study 2:

Referring to the case study (2), in May 2009 when the couple bought the property, the
purchase price of which was told by Conned Surveyors Ltd carried out by Mr. McDonald at
the time was 515,000 when the couple bought the property at that price. From the price, Mr.
McDonald received a commission of 20% which was 103,000. The real value of the

property known in January 2014 was amounted to 465,000 and according to evidence, it is
suggested that the value had increased in property value by 18% during the period May 2009
until January 2014. If it is assumed based on that value, it can be seen that the value of
property in 2009 should have been 394,067.8 and assuming the increase in property value
by 18% which is 70,932.204 (so the summary of the latest value is 394,067.8 +
70,932.204 = 465,000). If the actual value of the property in May 2009 had been amounted
to 394,067.8, then it was overvalue for 31% or about 120,932.2. The commission earned
by Mr. McDonald would have been 78,183.56 instead of 103,000. As a result back in 2009,
the couple had purchased the property at a price that was too high. Now, as Mrs. De Costa
realizes that there was a negligence that has been carried out by Mr. McDonald on behalf of
Conned Surveyors Ltd, she wants to sue them for what they have done to her and her husband
in 2009.
In Mrs. De Costas point of view as a claimant, in which she wants to claim this
negligence, according to the case of Yianni and another v Edwin Evans & Sons (a firm)
[1981] 3 All ER 592. Firstly, she must be able to prove that there has been negligence
committed by Mr. McDonald when he was doing valuation price of the house she had bought
in 2009. If so, Mr. McDonald indebted to Mrs. De Costa a compensation because the
relationship between them is the professional relationship between the appraiser and the
client. In setting this regard, it should be stated that as a result of the defendant's carelessness
when doing work causing material damage to the plaintiff. Secondly, Mrs. De Costa should
be able to proof that in fact Mr. McDonald already knew the object of assessment that will be
appraised, so that he should have done it by following an applicable valuation instructions
and procedures, but it turns out he did not do it. Thirdly, Mrs. De Costa should be able to
prove that Mr. McDonald was negligent in selecting assessment methods, negligent in
performing the analysis and calculation, as well as negligent in setting assumptions and data
used in the assessment. Finally, all forms of unprofessional conducted by Mr. McDonald
must be proven in court and whether it is correlating the losses caused by such negligence.
According to the case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2. The first
is Mrs. De Costa must be able to prove that the result of the negligence of the defendant is
dangerous so that he suffered a loss because of it. How much of losses she has experienced
and how big the impact on her life. The next is that she must be able to prove that it has been
a contractual ties between the two of them for the work that requires the defendant committed
the appropriate assessment work as instructed by her. Because if there was never a
professional relationship between them, it is unlikely that Mrs. De Costa could sue Mr.

McDonald as a defendant. The last is all forms of reports and claims filed by Mrs. De Costa
should be based on the principles of justice and really focused on holding the defendant for
negligence that he has been done. In this case, it must be proved that Mrs. De Costa is not
doing extortion against the defendant, but she claimed what should be her right.
In the case for Conned Surveyors and Mr. McDonalds point of view as defendant,
they need to show that they used the correct valuation standards at the time, because if they
cannot it must be negligence (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1
WLR 582). In this case, it depends on which party can prove and cannot prove. All the
evidence relating to the alleged negligence that has been done and caused losses should be
shown in court. all the details and calculations about how much harm caused, how much the
amount of money lost value, how much the value of the margin of error that allegedly caused
by the negligence of the defendant. All issues and evidences related to it, must be proven by
Mrs. De Costa in court. In this case, Mrs. De Costa also have to be considered that the
defendant could have been argued by saying that back in 2009, when the couple bought a
house, they have agreed to the price and there has been a contract between them shortly after
they decided to agree and make payments. If indeed Mrs. De Costa is not satisfied with the
price of the house, why didnt complain at the time. The fact is there is never a complaint
from the couple, why do the complaint and claim delivered in 2014, just five years after the
purchase agreement is done.
Decline in property values caused by the negligence of an appraiser can be dangerous
where property values are inferred to be an effect on other properties in the surrounding area.
Property which is experiencing error in being valued will have problems when dealing with
banking matters in the future. What to do by a property appraiser at his job is always to
follow the procedures for assessment and appraisal standards and regulations, and always
using assumptions based on data that is valid and accurate. So all of that can minimize and
eliminate the misinterpretation of the property value. But Mrs. De Costa also have to think
that whether can house payment transaction that has been done since the last 5 years can be
claimed back in the form of miscalculation or not.
To conclude, there has been a mistake in counting the property in 2009, resulting in
the de costa buy the property at a price 31% higher than its market value. Mrs. De Costa must
be able to prove every detail of the calculations and all the information that proves that the
defendant had done negligence. Other than that, Mrs. De Costa also must be able to prove
that he was not doing extortion against the defendant and indeed she just purely claim her
rights. He also must be ready with arguments that might be against his claim.

References:
Cases:

Yianni and another v Edwin Evans & Sons (a firm) [1981] 3 All ER 592
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582