Sallenillas vs.

CA
FULL CASE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,

Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge
Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private
respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise
as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.

Sallenillas vs. CA
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the
spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title
was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December
10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed
of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a
daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of
the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the
petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural
Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after
the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the
petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National
Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding,
pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the
mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The
private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex
Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's
Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge
Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an
order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the
deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place
the property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate
and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time for
the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the
trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion
and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the
petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued
the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial

Sallenillas vs. CA
court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12,
1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their
motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to
the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their
respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from
executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until
further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17,
1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to
the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No.
P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28,
1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone,
the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent
to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We
will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold
that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on
December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on
August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their
motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate
court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their
right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet
prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of
Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision,
states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners

Sallenillas vs. CA
disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the
petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119
of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners
have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land
Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their
right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their
property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are
bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal
heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent
appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers
because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis.
The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the
contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the
Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may
therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act,
in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate
court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in
clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the
spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her
(Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations,
that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Sallenillas vs. CA
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we
rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet
prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court
of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are
substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was
a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised
there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted
from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date
the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of
the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable why the Court
ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and,
generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of
the vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a
resolutory condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand,
present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved
properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent.
These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the
owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the
Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or
foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of
redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the
property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was
foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent
on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two
offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second,
formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the
purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month
up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the
property that the private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the
last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and
the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated
September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court

Sallenillas vs. CA
of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to
execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon
the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of
assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST
Sallenillas vs CA
169 SCRA 829, G.R. No. 78687 [January 31, 1989]

Sallenillas vs. CA
Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Court of Appeals and Honorable Raymundo Seva, Judge of Branch 38 of The
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and William Guerra, respondents.
Sarmiento,J.:

Facts:
The property subject matter of the case which was issued by virtue of Free Patent
was granted in favor of spouses Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso who were
petitioner Elena Salenillas parents. The said original certificate of the title was inscribed
in the Registration Book for the province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On
February 28, 1970, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute deed of Sale, sold the property in
favor of the Salenillas spouses for a consideration of P900.00. On December 4, 1973, the
property was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as a security for a loan amounting to
P2, 500.00. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by the bank and was
bought at a public auction by private respondent, Jose Atienza. Petitioner maintains that
they have a right to repurchase the property and their right to repurchase such property
within five years under Sec 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. However,
the private respondent contends that the sale of the property by the patentees to the
petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis--vis the said property.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property
under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act
2. Provided that the answer in the 1st question is in the affirmative, whether or not
their right to repurchase had already prescribed.

Held:

Sallenillas vs. CA
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. They are granted by law the
right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsist. Sec. 119 states that
Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance. Elena, being the daughter of the
Encisos, is a legal heir. Her act of buying the land from her parents does not disqualify
her from being a legal heir. Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private
respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section
119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a
reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.

Latin Maxim(s):

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos Where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.

It is explicitly provided under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act that there are three
classes of persons who are bestowed of the right to repurchase the applicant, his widow
or other legal heirs. Elena Salenillas being a daughter of the Encisos is a legal heir and is
therefore qualified to repurchase the said property regardless of whether they initially
acquired it through inheritance or through sale. Her act of buying the land does not
disqualify her from being a legal heir and Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act makes no
distinction.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex When the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases.

The very purpose of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act is to give the patentee every
chance to preserve for himself and for his family the land that the State had gratuitously
given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. To support the
distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to infringe or
to be in conflict with the very purpose of the said law. Considering that Salenillas is a
daughter of the Enciso spouses, we cannot controvert that allowing her and her husband
to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.