G.R. No. 191560 : March 29, 2011.

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER NATIONAL POLICE

COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, ET AL., Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007, PGMA
appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place
of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P.
de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM
Commissioners. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive
Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory
letters to the respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The
petitioner then filed the present quo warranto petition questioning the validity of the
respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional
prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino
III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking
Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional
Ban on Midnight Appointments."
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular"
appointment, and as such, he cannot be removed from office except for cause. Since
the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of
the constitutional ban on appointments, was officially released (per the congratulatory
letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in
effect, then the petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain
effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively made. The petitioner assails
the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same
grounds.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents
appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on
the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the

constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From
the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner
has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: aquo warranto
against respondent Urro.
The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing
private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner
merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not
have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the
appointing authority.
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make
temporary (acting) appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the
Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of
the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the
NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the Presidents appointment of an
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a
permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive
issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or
within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the
petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the
NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was appointed
until apprised of the appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged the functions of his
office without expressing any misgivings on his appointment. He cannot later on be
heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be
removed except for cause.
Petition is DENIED.

RAMIREZ V CA
7NOV
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a
manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize
wiretapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR,
hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent

courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
communication to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys
meaning of the phrase private communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by
Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

Garcia vs Exec Secretary

211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
FACTS:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all
articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude
oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the
additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous
5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharf age dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within
specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the
Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

BASBACIO VS. DOJ [G.R. NO. 109445. NOVEMBER 07, 1994]

Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law
were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds
had been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals
rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed
a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of
compensation to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. The claim was filed with the
Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground
that while petitioners presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him
and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer
is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was probably guilty. Petitioner
brought this petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners contention has no merit.
RATIO:
Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the manner of
his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted
because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is
entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an unjust conviction. If his
conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while
erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does
respondent that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the
innocence of the accused.

Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
FACTS:
Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It
is An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and
guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the
Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election
Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that
pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to
the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC
in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of
Sanggunian members be at large instead of by district.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing
the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO:
Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is
shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC
is cognizant of its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must
therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it
has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is
vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which
induced it to enact the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities
and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained
single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have
to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995
they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit
of R.A. 7166.

Chua v. CSC (Civil Service Commission) Case Digest

Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are
qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the
National Government.
The
benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing
that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on
January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the
same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA
6683 (Early Retirement Law).
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents
submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government
employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court
applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.

People v. Mapa (GR L-22301, 30 August 1967)

Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an
information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise
Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to
possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste
of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the
accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to
two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is
exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm
Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition
except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants
for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions
which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the
Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first
and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer
speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be
note that in People vs. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him
within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the
conviction must stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon GR No. 110898,

February 20, 1996
Facts:
Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide.
He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief Probation and Parole Officer
recommended denial of private respondents application for probation on the ground
that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his
application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation
and granted private respondents application on April 23, 1993.
Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private
respondent's application for probation despite the appeal filed by the private
respondent.
Held:
Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December28, 1992, after
PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from
the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied
for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent
was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. Furthermore, the law makes no
distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so neither should the court.

Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others
are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail
sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality
of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on
the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.