NOTE: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 167707 (Secretary of DENR vs Yap).

This case is more popularly referred to as Boracay Landowners vs DENR

568 SCRA 164 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Land Classifications Boracay
Cases Positive Act by the Government in Reclassifying Lands
These are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land theyve been occupying in
Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty
taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified landof the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was
not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or
the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor
of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the
Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of

Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested
rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions
of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Private claimants continued possession under Act No.
926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.

926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption
that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing
the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give
them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.

1.

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resource (2000)

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a case for prohibition and mandamus as citizen and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
and its implementing Rules on ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of public domain and minerals and other natural resources, in violation of the
Regalian doctrine.
o
They likewise contend that providing an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domain and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands within the areas violate the rights of
private land owners.
o
Petitioners likewise contend that provisions of the IPRA defining the jurisdiction and powers of the
NCIP violate due process of law.
o
Lastly, petitioners assail the validity of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 which provides that the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President (OP) as lateral and
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy coordination, thereby infringing upon the
Presidents power of control over the executive department.

A groups of intervenors, including Sen. Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA and members of 112 groups
of indigenous peoples prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
The Commission of Human Rights likewise asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect the rights of the indigenous peoples.

Decision:
The votes of the Court are split where 7 voted to dismiss the petition and 7 voted to grant. As the votes were
equally divided and the necessary majority was not obtained, the petition was dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION (Justice Puno)

I

The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System

A

The Laws of Indies

The Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards through
the Laws of Indies and the Royal Cedulas. All lands became the exclusive dominion of the Spanish Crown,
and the Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions
to Spaniards. Private land titles can only be acquired from the government by purchase or other land grant
from the Crown.
The Law of Indies was followed by the Mortgage Law of 1893 which provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds. The Maura Law of 1894 was the last Spanish law promulgated in the
Philippines, which required the registration of all agricultural lands; otherwise the lands shall revert to the
state.

Valentin vs. Murciano

This case answered the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or
paper title.
In this case, plaintiffs entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land while defendants ourchased the
land in 1892. The Court ruled that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in the Philippines by which
plaintiffs could obtain ownership by prescription, without any action of the State, otherwise the same shall
remain the property of the State. Thus, it required settlers on public lands to obtain titles deeds from the
State.

Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance with the Philippine Bill of 1902, governing
the disposition of land of public domain. It prescribe rules for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain, and to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands. It also provided
for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands.

Act No. 926 was superseded by the Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, passed under the Jones Law. it
limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave the Filipinos the same privileges.
It was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 141which remains the present Public Land Law.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens System under Act 496 which placed
all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system, requiring that the government
issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property
described.
D

The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian Doctrine was enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions which basically states that
all lands of the public domain as well as natural resources, whether on public or private land, belong to the
State. It is this concept of state ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

II

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples as a distinct
sector. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and
defines the extent of these lands and domains. Within their ancestral domains and lands the ICCs/IPs are given
the right to self-governance and right to preserve their culture. To carry out the policies of the ACT, the law
created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
A

Indigenous Peoples
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/ IPs) refer to a group of people who have
continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
peoples have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial.
Their unit of government is the barangay. In a baranganic society, the chiefs administered the lands in the
name of the barangay, there was no private property in land. When Islam was introduced in the country in the
archipelago of Maguindanao, the Sultanate of Sulu claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas.
When Spaniards settled in the Philippines, Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where
church would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their house around the
church. All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization and all lands not assigned to
the pueblos were declared to be lands of the Crown., and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to
the lands.
The American government classified the Filipinos into two: Christian Filipinos and non-Christian Filipinos, not to
religious belief, but to geographical area, the latter referring to natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship. The Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. They passed Act
No. 253 creating the bureau of Non-Christian Tribes to determine the most practicable means for bring about
their advancement.
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. It was in the 1973 Constitution
that the State recognized the customs and interest of national cultural communities in the formulation of state
policies.
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated PD 410 or the Ancestral Lands Decree, providing for the issuance of
land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities.
The Aquino government shifted from the policy of integration to one of preservation. She created the Office of
Muslim Affairs, Office of Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all
under the OP.
The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteed the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domain and ancestral
lands.
III

THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION

Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of the Indigenous Peoples and do
not constitute Part of the Land of Public Domain

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, continuously until the present except when interrupted by war or force
majeure. It comprises of lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes
ancestral lands, forests, pastures, hunting grounds, burial grounds, and bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/ IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that
these are limited to lands, not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized, including residential lots,
rice terraces, or paddies, private forests.
The delineation of ancestral domains and lands is conferred on the NCIP who shall issue a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain (CADT) upon finding that the application is meritorious, in the name of the community.
Ancestral Lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Land Title (CALT). The CALTs and
CADTs shall be registered in the Register of Deeds in the place where property is situated.
B

Carino vs. Insular Government

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a
146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory
information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US
military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant
should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation.
The US SC ruled in favor of Carino and ordered the registration of the subject lands in his name. The court laid down
the presumption of a certain title held as far back as memory went and under a claim of private ownership. Land
held by this title is presumed to never have been public land. The registration requirement was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it. In a nutshell, Cario enunciated the legal presumption that ancestral lands and domains
were not part of the public domain, having maintained their character as private lands of the indigenous peoples
since time immemorial
Why Carino doctrine is unique?
Carino is the only case that specifically recognizes native title. Carino was cited by succeeding cases to support the
concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act
Other Separate Opinions:
Justice Kapunan
Regalian theory doesnt negate the native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial, adverting
to the landmark case of CARINO V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT, where the US SC through Holmes held: xxx the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Existence of native titie to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish crown as an exception to the theory of jure regalia
Justice Puno: Carino case firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State and was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector in the society. It grants this people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands and defines the extent of these lands and domains

La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association Inc., et al. V. Victor O. Ramos, Secretary Department of Environment
and Natural Resources; Horacio Ramos, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR);
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation
in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30,
1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation
organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100, 000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December
20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be
declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore
and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, MMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company sold its whole stake in WMCP
to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon
appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the president may execute with foreign proponent. WMCP
likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia
which provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit Philippine mineral resources
2.

Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully
foreign owned companies to exploit Philippine mineral resources

3.

Whether the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources

HELD:
1)

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations
to exploit Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which states that All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development or utilization of natural resources. Y
such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the
point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial
assistance. The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation
in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service

contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the
1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental
law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources
just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained
60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some
parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.
2)

The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself
is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit,
utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the
same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel
necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership
over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These
stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

3)

The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned
corporations. On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of every
contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution. In
contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization
(EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should
the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the
exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government,
the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress
maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to
eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the
country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official
functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by
the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of
government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the
supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth
or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient
discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure
for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of
La Bugal Blaan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court
cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the
nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to
allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the

humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated
technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the States need to maintain flexibility in
its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our countrys competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this
control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and
Regulations -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as the subject Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement

Separate Opinion of Justice Panganiban

The FTAA is now to be implemented by a Filipino corporation, therefore the Court can no longer declare it
unconstitutional. The CA case is a dispute between two Filipino corporations (Sagittarius and Lepanto) both claiming
the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP. Regardless of which side eventually prevails, the FTAA would still
be in the hands of a qualified Filipino firm. The present Constitution, moreover, does not limit foreign participation in
the exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils to financial or technical
assistance. The drafters choice of words and excerpts from deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
that the present Charter did not limit to financial or technical assistance the participation of foreign corporations in
the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils.
The drafters use of the phrase agreements xxx involving xxx technical or financial assistance in Article XII
Section 2 of the 1987 Charter does not absolutely show intent to exclude other modes of assistance. Rather the
phrase signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other activities, provided they bear some reasonable relationship
to and compatibility with financial or technical assistance. If the drafters intended to strictly confine foreign
corporations to financial or technical assistance only, they would have employed restrictive or stringent
language.
Excerpts from then deliberations of the Constitutional Commission likewise show that its members discussed
technical or financial assistance agreements in the same breath as service contracts and used the terms
interchangeably. The members of the Concom actually had in mind the Marcos-era service contracts that they were
more familiar with (but which they duly modified and restricted so as to prevent present abuses), when they were
crafting and polishing the provisions dealing with financial and/or
technical assistance agreements.
The Concom discussions in their entirely had to do with service contracts that might be given to foreign-owned
corporations as exceptions to the general principle of Filipino control of the economy

Aniceto Sumulong vs. Fortunato

Sumulong G.R. No. S.P. No. 68699 June
16, 2006
Facts:
Fortunato Sumulong applied for an application for a land registration for a parcel of land before
the RTC which was later assigned to the MTC pursuant to delegated jurisdiction. He wants the
land to be confirmed and registered in his name. In opposition, Aniceto filed a motion to reopen
the case, lift the order of general default and to admit opposition contending he is a part owner
and actual occupant of the land whose name was omitted by Fortunato in his application
for registration. This amounts to failure of Fortunato to comply with the requirement set forth in
Section 15 and 23 of PD 1529 which makes the land registration proceeding null and void with
the deliberate omission of his name as one of the occupants and part owner of said land as
constituting fraud. He further contends that the applicationfailed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirement because the market value of the property is more than P100,000 and
should be heard before the RTC. The MTC ruled in favor of Fortunato holding that when the
said land registration was published it was a notice sent to the whole world and the MTC has
acquired jurisdiction over it and Anicetos claim of no knowledge about the registration cannot
be given any due course. Upon appeal, the CA denied Anicetos motion for reconsideration
contending that the assessed value of the property as provided in the tax declaration should be
followed which is valued at P50,860.00 and upheld the lower courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has the proper jurisdiction to hear the case.
Whether or not provisions from PD 1529 has been violated to render the land registration null
and void.
Held:
The court held that Section 34 of B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by R.A. 7691 provides that delegatedjurisdiction over cadastral land valued at less than
100,000 as ascertained from the affidavit of the claimant or tax declaration of property shall be
before the MTC. It is not the assessed market value that should be followed. Hence the MTC has
the proper jurisdiction over the land in dispute.
On one hand, failure of Fortunato to declare Aniceto as one of the part owners of the land is in
violation of the provisions of PD 1529. The court noted that both Fortunato and Aniceto are
neighbors as certified by their Brgy. Cpt., Aniceto holds a Declaration of Real Property in the
year 1977 with proof of receipt that he is paying real property tax. The court has reason to
believe that Fortunato deliberately omitted Aniceto as part owner when he registered the land.
Such constitutes fraud rendering the land registration in his name as null and void.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47331 June 21, 1983
SPOUSES PABLO DE LOS REYES and ALEJANDRA DE LOS REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and
CARMEN R. CANTOS, respondents.
Leon Gonzaga, Jr. for petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz for private respondent Cantos.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The right sought to be vindicated in this certiorari proceeding by petitioners, plaintiffs in the lower
court, arose from the undisputed fact that they are bona fide holders and possessors since 1949 of a
parcel of land consisting of 6,163 square meters whereon they built that same year their residence.
They still have a pending miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands for such
property. They thereafter discovered that their house occupied five meters of the adjoining lot, at the
time of the construction in 1949 still public land but subsequently applied for in a miscellaneous
sales application by private respondents, defendants in the court a quo, who were granted a patent
only in 1972. Thus arose the conflict over the five meters in question.
The action was for reconveyance with damages. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the action should have been filed by the Bureau of Lands on behalf of the Republic. With
their sales application still pending, the lot in question is still public. That is to conform to a ruling of
this Court that an action for reversion in such cases "shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines." 1 This doctrine was affirmed expressly in Magay v. Estiandan, 2 where this Court reiterated
that where "the land in question is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is not the proper party
to institute the reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines." 3 From the standpoint then of strict law, what was done by the lower court cannot be
characterized as a violation of controlling legal principles. Still there are equitable considerations that call
for this Court resolving the question raised.
It is undoubted that there is a dispute appropriate for judicial determination. The contending parties
are before the court. For petitioners, it is vital that their claim to the disputed five meters be passed
upon. Their good faith is quite clear. As of the time their house was built, they were bona
fide possessors, thereafter applicants for the sale of such parcel of land including the five meters.
Unfortunately, the patent granted to private respondents twenty-three years after the construction of
their residence included the same five meters. 'Mere is justification then for equity to set matters
right.
Petitioners are thus entitled to the remedy sought, namely, ownership of the five meters in question,
upon payment of just compensation to respondents to be determined as of the time the patent was
granted in 1972.
1. This conclusion finds support in Armamento v. Guerrero. 4 In that case, property covered by an
original certificate of title pursuant to a free patent was granted by the Director of Lands on July 20, 1961

in favor of defendant Guerrero. In that case as well as here, there was a claim by plaintiffs that it was
acquired through fraud and misrepresentation, their allegation being that they were in actual possession
thereof as actual occupants as far back as 1955. Thereafter, a homestead application was made in 1959,
resulting in a grant to them in 1964. It turned out that in the meanwhile, as it did likewise happen here, a
free patent was if sued to defendant. Under such circumstances, this Court, stated: "The particular
circumstances obtaining herein impel us to exercise our equity jurisdiction to the end that substantial
justice may be dispended to the party litigants. To affirm the trial Court's Order of dismissal would leave
the present controversy unresolved and pending investigation at the administrative level. Aside from the
length of nine it would probably take for the case to reach the highest administrative authority, any final
adjudication rendered by the latter may eventually be raised to the appellate Courts for judicial review.
This circuitous and tedious process can be eliminated for the sake of speedy administration of justice by
remanding the case to the trial Court for determination on the merits of the issue of validity of the
issuance of Free Patent No. V-19129 and of the title which followed as a matter of course." 5

2. Nor is it necessary that this case be remanded to the trial court on the question of the validity of
the patent obtained by respondents. As of the time the house of petitioners was built in 1949, they
were in actual possession of the lot for which thereafter a miscellaneous sales application was
submitted to the Bureau of Lands. Unfortunately, the patent granted to petitioners in 1972 included
five meters thereof. It would be unduly-time consuming, if there being no claim to the rest of the
property included in such patent to the respondents, the question of the alleged fraud would still
have to be inquired into. Under the circumstances that can be avoided by an outright determination
that upon payment of the five meters in question, petitioners are entitled to be recognized as the
owners thereof.
3. As far as the Bureau of lands is concerned, there seems to be no thought of reclaiming the
property from respondents. There is, therefore, an express grant which justifies such acquisition. In
Lee Hong Kok v. David, 6reference was made to the Regalian doctrine to the effect that no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. 7 The
government, therefore, as the agent of the state is, in the language of Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, 8 "possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership?" 9
4. The relevant facts thus justify the ruling that this litigation, presenting as it does an issue between
the contending parties as to the disputed five meters, can. be resolved by this Court exercising its
equity jurisdiction to award the same to petitioners upon payment of the due compensation
determined as of the date when respondents acquired their patent.
Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioners are entitled to ownership of such disputed portion upon
payment by them of the just compensation to respondents for such five meters on the amount to be
based on the value thereof as of the time the patent was granted on March 14, 1972.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of September 20,1977 is reversed and the case remanded to
the lower court for the purpose of determining the compensation due private respondent Carmen R.
Cantos for the five meters of the lot in question, upon payment of which plaintiffs would become the
owners of such five meters. No costs.

[Digest] Manotok vs. Barque (2010)

MANOTOK vs. BARQUE[1] (G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605; August 24, 2010; VILLARAMA, JR., J.)

FACTS:

Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad
Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine
Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)

o The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.

On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar
Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was
placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.

Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon
City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302
covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) was issued in 1991.

In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of
TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the
Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax
declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.

o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.

Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No.
210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.

1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks.
--> Barques MR was denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.

o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to
be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991
Manotok TCT.

The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the
Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.

In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming
ownership of the subject property.

2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the
Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT No.
210177.

o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2,
2004.

December 12, 2005, SC First Division

MR Denied in April 2006 Resolution.

affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks filed

o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached. Denied
in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on
May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of
the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En
Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.

On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which
was attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin
Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI
that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the
Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted
Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.

o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.

2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1 st division decision and entry of judgment recalled and
the CAs Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En
Banc remanded the case to the CA.

o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their
claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a
Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.

CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the
government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act.
Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual allegations and
voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of
the claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.

BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:

Manotoks Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied
the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his
name.
Manahans The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They
had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the
property for taxation to protect their rights.

ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National
Government.

RATIO:

From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB indicate the
original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to
produce a sale certificate in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records
Management Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents entitled
Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920 and 1923.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The
Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No.
29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid
only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly
imprinted typewritten name over the words Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name
is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the
Secretarys approval.

The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RDs task in issuing
the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that the Manotok deed of
conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue
TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if
we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of official duty, Department
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor,
supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of
conveyances over friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.

Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao Cases the
absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment
of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on
the basis of such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY requirement. Approval
of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is
explicit in its mandate. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from
this rule.

DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans, states that some
Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature
despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo
provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the requirements under
the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance because it makes
reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the DENR field offices. The
Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the
National Archives.

Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases reservation of
its title once the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is
SECTION 15[2] of the Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new rule Pugeda v.
Trias, the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is
a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may
be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and
ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd
paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.

CONCLUSIONS
Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale
issued to them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and
construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove
the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full
the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No.
22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of
deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy
presented as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their
records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.

RE: MANAHANS No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the records of either
the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment
of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there
is no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest
actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 and
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly observed that
the claim had become stale after the lapse of 86 years from the date of its alleged issuance. Citing Liao
v. CA the certificates of sale x x x became stale after 10 years from its issuance and hence cannot be
the source documents for issuance of title more than 70 years later.
Dispositive:
Manotok Appeal denied
Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and VOID. The Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice to Reversion
proceedings