THIRD DIVISION

FLORANTE SORIQUEZ,
Petitioner,

- versus -

SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
G.R. 153526
Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 25, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Florante Soriquez seeks to annul and set aside the Sandiganbayans (Fifth Division) Resolution[1]
dated March 6, 2002, denying his demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 23539 entitled
People vs. Florante Soriquez, et al., and Resolution[2] dated May 20, 2002, denying his motion
for reconsideration. The prohibition aspect of the petition aims at prohibiting the respondent court
from taking further proceedings in the same criminal case.
In an Information filed with the anti-graft court and raffled to its Fifth Division, petitioner, in his
capacity as Program Director of Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation-Project Management Office (MPRPMO), along with nine others, were charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, petitioner and his coaccused were indicted for having allegedly conspired, through evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, in allowing the contractor, Atlantic Erectors, Inc., to deviate from the plans
and specifications of the contract in connection with the construction of the Pasig-Potrero River
Diking System, popularly known as the Megadike. This breach of contract allegedly resulted in the
collapse of the Megadike, thereby causing damage and undue injury to the government. In its
precise words, the Information[3] alleges, as follows:
That on or about February 29 to June 15, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused public officers from the Department of Public Works and Highways, namely,
Florante Soriquez, Program Director MPR-PMO, Romeo P. Mendoza, Rey S. David, Ulysis

Maago, Juan M. Gonzales and Gil A. Rivera, all Supervising Engineers, MPR-PMO, and private
individuals, Ariel T. Lim, CEO, Alberto Teolengco, Neil Allan T. Mary and Remigio Angtia, Jr. of
Atlantic Erectors, Inc., conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, while accused
public officers were performing their administrative and official functions and acting in evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause
undue injury to the government in the following manner: accused public officers of the DPWH, by
reason of their respective official functions, did consent, allow and/or permit the contractor, Atlantic
Erectors, Inc., represented by aforenamed accused private individuals, to disregard and/or deviate
from the plans and specifications of Contract Package No. 25 in constructing the Transverse
Section of the Pasig-Potrero River Diking System (popularly known as the Megadike) in violation of
the material provision of said contract, and thereafter allow the contractor to collect and receive
P38,289,708.61, despite the violation, and which breach of contract caused the collapse of
substantial portion of the transverse dike, thereby causing prejudice and damage to the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, petitioner, as accused below, entered a plea of Not Guilty. In the ensuing
trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness in the person of Atty. Mothalib Onos, Chairman of
the Fact-Finding Investigation Panel of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, the prosecution
formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case.
Instead of going forward with defensive evidence, petitioner, with leave of court, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Dismiss),[4] thereunder substantially alleging that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is grossly insufficient to warrant his conviction, hence, he is entitled
to an acquittal.
In the herein first assailed Resolution dated March 6, 2002 (Promulgated March 7, 2002), the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denied petitioners demurrer for lack of merit. Says the
respondent court in its denial Resolution:
In sum, the arguments of herein accused may be summarized as follows: that there is no
proof that there was a faulty construction; that even assuming that there was faulty construction,
there is no proof that Atlantic Erectors, Inc., the company where accused-movants come from, is
the only author of the faulty construction to the exclusion of the other contractors; that the findings
mentioned in the Fact-Finding Report are evidentiary in nature but no physical evidence was ever
presented by the prosecution necessitating the acquittal of herein accused; that the evidence on
record is hearsay as the investigators who personally conducted the investigation on the alleged
faulty construction were not presented as witness; that the construction of the megadike was not
tainted with bad faith because during the construction of the same, various groups were monitoring
the construction, including herein prosecution witness, Atty. Onos; that there is no evidence
showing previous plan to defraud the government as, in fact, Atlantic Erectors, Inc. manifested its
willingness to reconstruct the breached section of the megadike using the same plan free of
charge, but the DPWH did not accept the offer and instead reconstructed the same using a
different design; that the Fact-Finding Report is bias; that the information is admittedly erroneous
insofar as to the amount paid by the government to the contractor which is P38,289,708.61, the
truth being that only P17,183,619.61 was duly paid by the government; that the filing of the case is
tainted with political color.
In its CONSOLIDATED COMMENT/OPPOSITION TO ACCUSEDS DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE, dated December 3, 2001, the prosecution admits that the cause of the breach was
not due to faulty construction or deviation from the plans and specifications, but due to faulty
design; that his conclusion was strengthened when the contractor offered to repair the damaged
portion of the megadike free of charge.

In his REPLY TO THE COMMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

dated December 18, 2001, accused Soriquez belies having participated in the defective
construction of the megadike because, according to him, he was not tasked to directly supervise
every phase of the construction. Likewise, accused added that the amount of P17,183,607.99
representing the contractors first progress billing was duly paid to the contractor after a verification
and certification of the work accomplished.
As borne out by the records, accused Soriquez was one of the officials of the Department
of Public Works and Highways who recommended the approval of the design of the transverse
dike without which recommendation the Secretary could not have approved the defective design
plan for the megadike (pp. 5-6, Exhibit 10). On the other hand, his co-accused were the ones
responsible for the construction work in Contract Package-25 (otherwise referred to as the
transverse dike) being the contractors of the megadike in question (Exhibit C). They even
manifested their willingness to reconstruct the breached section of the megadike using the same
plan, free of charge (pp. 18-19, TSN, June 11, 2001).
All of the above shows that, at this point in time, the evidence presented by the prosecution
creates a prima facie case against herein accused, which, if uncontradicted, may be proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge against him (Salonga vs. Pao, 134 SCRA 438; Bautista vs.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587). Mere declaration that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are uncorroborated, inconsistent, incredible or hearsay is not sufficient. It is, therefore, absolutely
necessary for herein accused to present their countervailing/exculpatory evidence.

In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but his motion was likewise denied by same court in
its subsequent Resolution of May 20, 2002, and accordingly set the case for the reception of
defense evidence.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, faulting the respondent court, as follows:
1.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED ACCUSED-PETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DESPITE A FINDING
THAT ONLY A PRIMA FACIE CASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION.
2.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDPETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
3.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDPETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE WELLENTRENCHED DOCTRINE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF
ITS OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE.
4.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDPETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WHEN IT RELIED HEAVILY ON THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN IN THE CASES OF SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438 AND BAUTISTA VS.
SARMIENTO, 138 SCRA 587, WHICH, WE BELIEVE, ARE INAPPLICABLE, HAD ALREADY
BEEN ABANDONED AND SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT DOCTRINES TO THE CONTRARY.

In essence, re-echoing the very same arguments advanced by him before the respondent court,
petitioner claims that the latter gravely abused its discretion when it denied his demurrer to
evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution. He argues that the prosecution failed to establish his participation in the alleged
conspiracy to violate the contract for the construction of the Megadike, adding that the very

observation of the respondent court itself that only a prima facie case was established against him
all the more warrants the dismissal of the charge and his acquittal therefrom.
We are not persuaded.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make
out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[5]
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3 paragraph (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The provision reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In order to be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action has caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.[6]
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner is a public officer as in fact he is an official of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Program Director of the Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation
Project Management Office (MPR-PMO). The first element required for the commission of the
offense is thus clearly extant.
The second element enumerates the different modes by which the offense may be committed.
These three modes, i.e., manifest partiality, evident bad faith and inexcusable negligence, are
distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes would suffice.
The use of the three phrases manifest partiality, evident bad faith and inexcusable negligence
in the same Information does not mean that it thereby charges three distinct offenses but only
implies that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by
the law.[7]
In Criminal Case No. 23539, the Information alleged evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence
as the modes by which petitioner and his co-accused allegedly committed the crime. The
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner was one of the officials of the DPWH who
recommended the defective design plan of the Megadike. It was upon his recommendation that
the design plan was eventually approved by the DPWH Secretary. Such act of petitioner may have
constituted evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence inasmuch as this design plan proved to be

defective. Likewise, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution (such
as the notice of award to Atlantic Erectors, the contract between DPWH and Atlantic Erectors, the
disbursement vouchers[8]) disclosed the role played by petitioner in allowing the contractor to
infringe the material stipulations of the contract that caused the eventual collapse of the Megadike.
As correctly held by the respondent court, the prosecutions evidence established a prima facie
proof of petitioners guilt.
The third element of the offense penalized in Section 3 (e) is satisfied when the questioned
conduct causes undue injury to any party, including the government, or gives any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is thus not essential, it
being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived to be substantial
enough and not merely negligible.[9]
Again, the prosecutions evidence satisfactorily demonstrated that petitioner allowed Atlantic
Erectors to collect and receive the net amount of P12,697,197.61[10] despite the breach of
contract committed by it. Indubitably, the government suffered undue injury and losses.
Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and documentary evidence against petitioner, it would,
therefore, be premature at this stage of the proceedings to conclude that the prosecutions
evidence failed to establish petitioners participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime.
Likewise, the Court cannot, at this point, make a categorical pronouncement that the guilt of
petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As there is competent and sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime charged, it behooves petitioner to adduce evidence
on his behalf to controvert the asseverations of the prosecution. Withal, respondent court did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found that there was a prima facie case against petitioner
warranting his having to go forward with his defensive evidence.
The determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution
as to establish a prima case against an accused is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
Unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of a motion to dismiss or a demurrer to evidence may not be
disturbed.[11]
Petitioner implores this Court to review the evaluation made by respondent court on the sufficiency
of the evidence against him. Such a review cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition which is not available to correct mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions or to
cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact. It should be noted that an order denying a demurrer to
evidence is interlocutory and, thus, not appealable. When such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort to certiorari or prohibition but to continue with the case in due
course and when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.[12] Of course, this rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions, as when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion.[13] In
the present case, however, the Court is not inclined to agree with the petitioner that the respondent
courts denial of his demurrer to evidence is erroneous or tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want
of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.[14]
A perusal of the pleadings and annexes would reveal that none of the above exceptions obtains in
this case. There is no showing that the conclusion made by the respondent court on the sufficiency
of the evidence of the prosecution is manifestly mistaken or grounded entirely on speculation and
conjectures. No capricious exercise of judgment exists that would warrant the issuance of the

extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition. Clearly, the denial of petitioners demurrer was
made by the respondent court in the due exercise of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by then Sandiganbayan Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, (now a member of
this Court) and concurred in by Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Francisco H. Villaruz,
Jr.; Rollo, pp. 35-39.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[3]
Rollo, p. 36.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 63-80.
[5]
Gutib vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 365, [1999].
[6]
Katigbak vs. Sandiganbayan, 405 SCRA 558, [2003].
[7]
Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 655, [1994].
[8]
Rollo, p. 121.
[9]
Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[10]
Rollo, p. 47.
[11]
People vs. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472, [2004].
[12]
[13]
[14]

Quion vs. Sandiganbayan, 271 SCRA 575, [1997].

Gutib vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Cruz vs. People, 303 SCRA 533, [1999].
Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118, [1999]