Election - Bautista V Castro and Carlos V Angeles
Election - Bautista V Castro and Carlos V Angeles
Election - Bautista V Castro and Carlos V Angeles
CASTRO
Facts:
Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates
for the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner
by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes. On
May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City,
(docketed as Election Case No. 82-408) on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices
allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest.
It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers
Village East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was
conducted which resulted in a tie.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Roberto Miguel to have received the same
number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy.
Teachers Village East, Quezon City. From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto
Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. * On July 29, 1982, judgment
was rendered on the appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this decision, declared
protestant Roberto Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East,
Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee Sergio
Bautista. Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari
1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private
respondent but who was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible
evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18)
votes cast in favor of your petitioner were written by one and the same person.
2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be
considered a valid ballot.
3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested
ballots
HELD:
Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on
the opinion of one Desiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an expert
witness. The report of Pagui allegedly appeared only in the records of the case on file with
the CFI which was attached in the Memorandum for Protestant Miguel.
The contention of petitioner that respondent court relied on the report of an alleged
handwriting expert is misplaced. It should be noted that while respondent court considered
the report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the said report. In the words of respondent
court, "(I)t has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the
questioned ballots and handwritings and compare the same with each other . . ." In fact, in
its effort to determine the true value of the contested ballots and in order not to
disenfranchise bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of petitioner which the
alleged handwriting expert found as written by only one person. It contradicted said report
as regards Exhibits "I", "J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was circumspect in relying
on its own findings on whether or not these contested ballots were prepared by one person.
The ballots are the best evidence of the objections raised. Resort to handwriting experts is
not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting, this can be done by the COMELEC (in this
case, the court taking cognizance of the appeal in this election protest) itself.
Petitioner also argues that respondent court misinterpreted and misapplied Section 36(f) of
Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly failed to take into consideration the other
provisions of said Section 36 of the Resolution. We do not agree. The law (Sec. 14 of B.P.
222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for
interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers
in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of
said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.
As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court
which ruled that these were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for petitioner
BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow
with the words "and party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the voter. We
agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must
write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices appearing
thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election
Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo",
"Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or
appellation of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the
name or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means to
identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots under
consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the rule. Consequently,
they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L-25907,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l".
Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was
written in the spare for Barangay Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly
registered in his certificate of candidacy. While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was
no doubt that the voter intended to vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was
popularly known and which nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy.
Hence, the respondent court's decision as regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is
counted for petitioner. Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the city
court as stray vote on the ground that petitioner's name, written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista"
was placed on the first line intended for councilmen. We believe however that the voter's
intention to vote for BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was present and said vote should be
counted in favor of petitioner.
Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as a
vote for petitioner whose name was written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a
name more than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other
purpose than to identify the ballot .
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and
"6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of
Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two (22) votes. The
temporary restraining order issued Court on December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid
votes cast in the election. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or
disqualied, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer,
can not be declared elected. The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualied winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does
not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In
other words, a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the ofce.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. It is the Comelec sitting en
banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. In a petition to
annul an election, two conditions must be averred in order to support a sufcient cause
of action. These are: (1) the illegality must affect more than 50% of the votes cast and (2)
the good votes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is only when these two conditions
are established that the annulment of the election can be justied because the remaining
votes do not constitute a valid constituency.
There are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a)
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date xed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any
polling place had been suspended before the hour xed by law for the closing of the voting
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding
and setting aside the results of the election. Nonetheless, as herein-above stated, the trial
court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of
election were not signicant and even non-existent.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that
power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections.The
result is a failure of election for that particular ofce. In such case, the court can not declare
a winner. A permanent vacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the duly elected vicemayor shall succeed as provided by law.
Both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction
(regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective municipal ofcials. The Court that
takes jurisdiction rst shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.