[G.R. No. 144057.

January 17, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the
Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated
July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court
affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999,
and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) [3] of IbajayNabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the
application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon
Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal
age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC
of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a
parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D,
Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area
of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial
confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid
land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on
the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the

government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of

Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the
court issued an order of general default against the whole
world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of
land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax
Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made
by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. [5]
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco,
Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such
as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to
existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At
present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject
land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial
decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to
present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to
appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,

1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the

subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed
in the name of Naguit.[6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for
was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,
1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director
Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied
the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February
18, 1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the
order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On
February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.[9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in
toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure
question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4,
2000.[10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding
that there is no need for the governments prior release of the
subject lot from the public domain before it can be
considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of
P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of

Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required

period.[11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is
necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable
and disposable before the applicants possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the property
which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must
first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings, bears close
examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION14.Whomayapply.Thefollowingpersonsmayfilein
theproperCourtofFirstInstanceanapplicationforregistrationof
titletoland,whetherpersonallyorthroughtheirdulyauthorized
representatives:
(1)thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheir
predecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,
continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossession
andoccupationofalienableanddisposablelands
ofthepublicdomainunderabonafideclaimof
ownershipsinceJune12,1945,orearlier.
(2)Thosewhohaveacquiredownershipoverprivate

landsbyprescriptionundertheprovisionsof
existinglaws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable
and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not
borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June
12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located. [13] Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that
all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of

the situation would even be aggravated considering that

before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is
in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of
the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in
Republic v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted
that to prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [15] In
that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR
as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court
concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded
by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the
application for registration of the said property. In the case at
bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was
released and certified as within alienable and disposable
zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of

Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the claimant
had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that
the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not
succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application
in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared
alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest
land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence,
the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by
the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file
the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim
of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public

Land Act, which reads:
Sec.48.ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhilippines,
occupyinglandsofthepublicdomainorclaimingtoownanysuch
landoraninteresttherein,butthosetitleshavenotbeenperfected
orcompleted,mayapplytotheCourtofFirstInstanceofthe
provincewherethelandislocatedforconfirmationoftheirclaims
andtheissuanceofacertificateoftitletherefor,undertheLand
RegistrationAct,towit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsin
interesthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotorious
possessionandoccupationofagriculturallandsofthepublic
domain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,forat
leastthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthe
applicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywar
orforcemajeure.Theseshallbeconclusivelypresumedtohave
performedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantand
shallbeentitledtoacertificateoftitleundertheprovisionsofthis
chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936,
the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right
to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona
fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty
(30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new
starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public
domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the
term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that
alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree
and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application
for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[26] With such conversion, such property may now fall
within the contemplation of private lands under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it

having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years
old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is
no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by
the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of
owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to
be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim
of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was
declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the
Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower
courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established
through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at
the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other

interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed

revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of
land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or
for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of
doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept
of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.