Victoria V Republic

Facts:
On November 2, 2004 petitioner Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied for registration under the law of a
1,729-square meter lot in Bambang, City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of that
city. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondent Republic of the Philippines,
opposed the application in the usual form.
The Conversion/Subdivision Plan Victoria presented in evidence showed that the land is inside the
alienable and disposable area under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the Bureau of
Forest Development on January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the
concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as owners for
taxation purposes for the last 30 years.
On January 25, 2006 the MeTC rendered a decision granting the application for registration and finding
that Victoria.
The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), pointing out in its brief
that Victoria failed to present evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain and that she failed to establish the kind of possession required for registration.

Victoria in her reply attached to her brief a Certification dated November 6, 2006 issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), verifying the subject property as within the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Ca reversed MeTCs decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and
2. Whether or not she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property.
Ruling:
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for registration of title: (a)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the

applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
A similar right is granted under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There are no material
differences between Sec. 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. Sec. 14(1) operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the pubic domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President.
Besides, the record shows that the subject property was covered by a cadastral survey of Taguig
conducted by the government at its expense. Such surveys are carried out precisely to encourage
landowners and help them get titles to the lands covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise
an objection after such a survey that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like
a public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.
South City Homes V Republic
The subject of this dispute (lot No.5005) is a strip of land between two lots owned by the petitioner.
The record shows that Lot 2381 was purchased on installment basis by Basilia Dimaranan, and Lot 2386
was acquired under similar condition by Fernando Guico, both from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau
of Landsin the year 1910. Eight (8) years thereafter, installment-payment for Lot 2386 was completed in
favor of Basilia Dimaranan. On the other hand, Lot 2381 was on September 12, 1911 assigned to
Bartolome Pea who continued and completed the installment payments culminating into the issuance in
his name of Patent No. 19138 on September 26,1919. From Bartolome Pena, Lot 2381 was acquired by
Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. and the title was transferred to his name (Exh. "F") while Lot 2386 was acquired by

the Garcias (Exh. "J-2") On August 27,1981, Lot 2386-A was sold by the Garcias to the applicant South
City Homes, Inc. (Exh. "J"). Lot 2381 was on February 25,1977 sold by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. to Koo Jun
Eng (Exh. "G") who in turn assigned the property to the applicant in February of 1981 (Exh. "H").

It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should be registered in its name for either of two
reasons. The first is that the disputed strip of land really formed part of Lots 2381 and 2386-A but was
omitted therefrom only because of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral surveys. The second is
that it had acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of
owner, by itself and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.
For its part, the Republic of the Philippines argues that the elongated piece of land between the two lots
now owned by the petitioner used to be a canal which could not have been appropriated by the
purchasers of the adjacent lots or their successors-in-interest. Neither could it be deemed included in the
lots now owned by the petitioner because their respective technical descriptions indicate otherwise.
Prescription is also not applicable because the petitioner has not established the requisite possession of
the lot, as to manner and length, to justify judicial confirmation of title in its name.
The parties also differ on the nature of the disputed lot. The petitioner insists it is patrimonial property of
the State, being part of the so-called Friar Lands, while the Republic maintains it is part of the public
domain and cannot therefore be acquired by a private corporation.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner own Lot 5005.
Ruling:
To argue that Lot No. 5005 is really a part of the other two lots owned by the petitioner is to oppose the
obvious. What is obvious is the technical descriptions of the two lots whose areas do not include the strip
of land between them. The petitioner points to the original survey of the lands in 1906 which states that
the two lots adjoin each other, without mention of what is now Lot No. 5005. But it forgets that it has itself
suggested that the old surveys were inaccurate, which could explain the omission.
If it is true that there was no canal between the two lots at the time of their survey, then the disputed strip
of land should have been included as part of either of the two adjoining lots. It was not. The petitioner
itself insists that the canal, if there ever was one, had disappeared after it had been filled with silt and dirt.
The result was the segregation of a third and separate lot, now known as Lot No. 5005. Notably, the area
of that dried-up canal is not negligible as to come under what the petitioner calls the allowable margin of
error in the original survey.
As we have already rejected the contention that the third lot was part of the other two lots, the petitioner
must fall back on its claim of acquisitive prescription over it as a separate lot. Its submission is that its
possession of the lot dates back to "time immemorial," by which tired phrase it is intended to convey the
idea that the start of such possession can no longer be recollected. Indeed, it can be. The petitioner's
possession does not in fact go back to "time immemorial," but only to the recent remembered past.
It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the Civil Code:
In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less, than that expressed in his
title, prescription shall be based on the possession.

This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be limited only to that of the successor-ininterest; and in the case of the herein petitioner, it should begin from 1981 when it acquired the two
adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of the other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in the name of the petitioner was filed in 1983,
the applicant had been in possession of the property for less than three years. This was far too short of
the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property, which is ten years if the possession
is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public.
The weakness of the petitioner's position prevents this Court from affirming the claim to the lot in question
either as part of the two other lots or by virtue of acquisitive prescription. And having made this ruling, we
find it unnecessary to determine whether the land is patrimonial in nature or part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

Ching V CA
Facts:
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed
cancelled.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His
legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay
City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P.
Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general
circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on
December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed
administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on
January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in
the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978
by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC), Branch XXVII,
Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known
address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137
(not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). (Order dated May
29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or
Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has
been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he
or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.).
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated
February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a
newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19,
1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a
responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order
dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered
on June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be duly substantiated

by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the
property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said
property in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the
administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in which
the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over
the said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of
Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the fees that may be required
therefor, including the realty taxes due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND CANCELLATION OF
TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY
SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.

Ruling:
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration
case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere
incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in
the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not
have been held
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of registration of
title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (BailonCasilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508,
June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land (National
Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section
49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A
Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance
thereof not annotated on the title

Republic V CA and Sps Lapina

Fact:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer
Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence,
the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots.
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of
foreign nationality.
Issue:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

Ruling:
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-ininterest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows
private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII
of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then
1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use
by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the
case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall
still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential
purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a naturalborn Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently,
there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain.
They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to
June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.