Huggins v. Charleston Police Department et al Doc.

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8:05-cv-03444-TLW Date Filed 12/19/2005 Entry Number 5 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Ira St. Anthony Huggins, # 82687, ) C/A No. 8:05-3444-TLW-BHH

)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Report and Recommendation
Charleston Police Department (Narcotics); )
NFN Seiko, Corporal; )
NFN Costanzo, Corporal; )
D. Costanzo, Corporal; )
NFN Womack, Officer; )
NFN Jenkins, Officer; and )
P. Tharp, Officer, )
)
Defendants. )
_________________________________________

Background of this Case

The plaintiff is a federal prisoner at the Charleston County

Detention Center in North Charleston, South Carolina. The plaintiff has

brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Charleston Police

Department and six (6) police officers employed by the Charleston Police

Department.

The “STATEMENT OF CLAIM” portion of the § 1983 complaint

reveals that this civil rights action arises out of events culminating in the

Dockets.Justia.com
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plaintiff’s conviction in United States v. Ira St. Anthony Huggins, Criminal No.

2:04-1098-PMD-1. The plaintiff alleges: (1) in 2001, the plaintiff was

arrested at the police substation at Citadel Mall for distribution of crack

cocaine in 2000; (2) the affidavit for the arrest warrant stated that Corporal

Seiko and Corporal Costanzo witnessed the plaintiff sell crack cocaine to an

informant; (3) Corporal Costanzo pressured Quincy Green to say that the

plaintiff had sold him fifty dollars worth of crack cocaine; (4) “several months

later” the plaintiff was arrested “at work” by Corporal Seiko and a few other

officers for a parole violation; (5) the plaintiff was returned to Wisconsin; (6)

after an investigation of the “controlled buy” was finished, the distribution of

crack cocaine charge was dismissed and the plaintiff was allowed to return

to Charleston; (7) on January 30, 2004, Corporal Seiko and Corporal

Costanzo executed a search warrant of the plaintiff’s residence; (8) “[t]hey

left the wrong search warrant at my residence[;]” (9) the search warrant was

obtained as the result of false representation made by an unreliable

confidential informant and police officers; (10) there was a discrepancy

between the address listed in the preliminary documents and the affidavit

used to obtain the search warrant; (11) the dates on the paperwork are

inconsistent; (12) there was no video or audio tape made of the alleged

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purchase; (13) this “drug transaction never took place[;]” (14) the documents

with inconsistencies and the police reports were not introduced at the

plaintiff’s federal trial; (15) the plaintiff wrote the newspaper editor to apprise

the newspaper that false statements were made at the plaintiff’s trial; (16)

the lieutenant of the Charleston Police Narcotics Department was fired from

his job for falsifying reports to obtain arrest and search warrants; (17) the

plaintiff won a civil forfeiture case against the Charleston Police Department

for cash and items totaling $2,457.00; (18) the plaintiff opened a “small

business” in 2001, but lost the business in 2004; (19) the plaintiff has been

“found guilty because of a lie by Chas Police Dept.” and his civil rights have

been violated; (20) the plaintiff has lost a significant amount of money; (21)

the plaintiff has suffered emotional stress; (22) the plaintiff’s case is on

appeal in federal court; (23) the plaintiff has notified the court of his lawyer’s

poor level of representation; (24) two examples of the lawyer’s poor

performance are his failure to subpoena a key witness and his failure to

investigate on the plaintiff’s behalf before trial; and (25) the plaintiff “was

forced to go to Trial” with the attorney.

The first portion of the plaintiff’s prayer for relief is a continuation

of the plaintiff’s contentions about his criminal trial in federal court. The

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plaintiff seeks as relief: (1) an investigation of the facts and evidence in this

case; (2) a removal of this civil rights action to another state; and (3)

payment from the Charleston Police Department for violation the plaintiff’s

civil rights, loss of his small business, pain and suffering, and economic

hardship.

Two (2) photocopies of newspaper articles from the Charleston

Post & Courier are appended to the complaint. The first newspaper article

discusses the dismissal of narcotics commander James Mackey for

accepting gifts from Brent Jenkins. A notation on the newspaper article by

the plaintiff indicates that Brent Jenkins was one of the plaintiff’s co-

defendants. The second article deals with the Charleston Police

Department’s alleged failure to comply with South Carolina’s Freedom of

Information Act. The plaintiff’s notation on the second article reads as

follows: “This Article Show [sic] that Chas Police officer committed perjury in

federal Court.” Preceding the articles is a photocopy of a handwritten note

to the plaintiff from Elsa F. McDowell, the “Public Editor” of the Charleston

Post and Courier, on police incident reports. The envelope used to mail the

handwritten note is postmarked August 25, 2005.

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The plaintiff has a prior criminal case in the District of South

Carolina: United States v. Ira St. Anthony Huggins, Criminal No.

2:04-1098-PMD-1. On December 8, 2004, the Grand Jury issued a three-

count indictment against the plaintiff. The plaintiff was arraigned before the

undersigned magistrate judge on January 20, 2005. On the same day, the

undersigned issued an order of temporary detention. On May 18, 2005, a

jury trial was held before the Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy, United States

District Judge, in Charleston, South Carolina. The jury returned verdicts of

guilty on Counts 1, 2, and 3 (distribution of cocaine; use of a firearm during

a drug trafficking crime; and and possession of a “HiPoint” nine-millimeter

pistol and ammunition).

On November 10, 2005, sentencing was entered before Judge

Duffy. Judge Duffy sentenced the plaintiff to one hundred thirty-seven (137)

months on Count 1, one hundred twenty (120) months on Count 2

(concurrent to the sentence in Count 1), and sixty (60) months consecutive

on Count 3. The total term of imprisonment is one hundred ninety-seven

(197) months. The plaintiff, through counsel, on November 15, 2005, filed

a Notice of Appeal on November 15, 2005. The plaintiff’s pending appeal in

Criminal No. 2:04-1098-PMD-1 is Fourth Circuit Docket No. 05-4620.

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Discussion
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful

review has been made of the pro se complaint pursuant to the procedural

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915; 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; and the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. The review has been conducted in light of the following

precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 118 L.Ed.2d 340, 112 S.Ct.

1728, 1992 U.S. LEXIS® 2689 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324-325, 1989 U.S. LEXIS® 2231 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 1995

U.S.App. LEXIS® 26108 (4th Cir. 1995)(en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1177, 134 L.Ed.2d 219, 116 S.Ct. 1273, 1996 U.S. LEXIS® 1844 (1996);

Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595

F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979)(recognizing the district court’s authority to conduct

an initial screening of a pro se filing).1 Pro se complaints and petitions are

held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v.

1
Boyce has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other
grounds, by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)(insofar as Neitzke establishes that
a complaint that fails to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does
not by definition merit sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as “frivolous”).

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Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Leeke v. Gordon, 439

U.S. 970 (1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally

construing a complaint or petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the

development of a potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449

U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(per curiam); and Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319

(1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint or petition, the

plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of

New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). Even under this less stringent

standard, the § 1983 complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The

requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore

a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently

cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social

Services, 901 F.2d 387, 1990 U.S.App. LEXIS® 6120 (4th Cir. 1990).

Since the plaintiff is challenging matters that resulted in his

conviction in Criminal No. 2:04-CR-1098-PMD-1, this case is subject to

summary dismissal because a right of action has not yet accrued. See Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 129 L.Ed.2d 383, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 1994 U.S.

LEXIS® 4824 (1994):

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We hold that, in order to recover damages for

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such a determination, or called into question
by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to
a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the
complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (footnote omitted). See also Woods

v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS® 2495 (2nd Cir.)(plaintiff's

conviction reversed by state court in 1993; hence, civil rights action timely

filed), cert. denied, Candela v. Woods, 516 U.S. 808, 133 L.Ed.2d 18, 115

S.Ct. 54, 1995 U.S. LEXIS® 5329 (1995); Treece v. Village of Naperville,

903 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.Ill. 1995); Seaton v. Kato, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS®

2380, *12-*13, 1995 WESTLAW® 88956 (N.D.Ill., February 28, 1995); and

Smith v. Holtz, 879 F. Supp. 435, 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 3721 (M.D.Pa.

1995), affirmed, 87 F.3d 108, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS® 15388 (3rd Cir.), cert.

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denied, Wambaugh v. Smith, 519 U.S. 1041, 136 L.Ed.2d 536, 117 S.Ct.

611, 1996 U.S. LEXIS® 7706 (1996).

Until the plaintiff's conviction or sentence is set aside, any civil

rights action based on the conviction, sentence, and related matters will be

barred because of the holding in Heck v. Humphrey, supra. Even so, the

limitations period will not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. See

Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 947 F. Supp. 827, 830 & n. 3,

1996 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 18335 (D.N.J. 1996)(following Heck v. Humphrey:

"[b]ecause a prisoner's § 1983 cause of action will not have arisen, there

need be no concern that it might be barred by the relevant statute of

limitations."); and Snyder v. City of Alexandria, 870 F. Supp. 672, 685-688,

1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 17230 (E.D.Va. 1994).

Heck v. Humphrey, supra, is applicable in both Section 1983

actions and Bivens actions.2 See Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 1994

2
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971), the Supreme Court established a direct cause of action under the
Constitution of the United States against federal officials for the violation of federal
constitutional rights. "Bivens is the case establishing, as a general proposition, that victims
of a constitutional violation perpetrated by a federal actor may sue the offender for
damages in federal court despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization for such
suits." Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 589 n. 4, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS® 25129 (1st Cir. 1993),
which cites, inter alia, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)(restating Bivens rule).
A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: federal officials
cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they do not act under color of state law.
(continued...)

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U.S.App. LEXIS® 21164 (5th Cir.1994); Best v. Kelly, 309 U.S.App.D.C. 51,

39 F.3d 328, 330, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS® 28423 (D.C.Cir. 1994); Williams

v. Hill, 878 F. Supp. 269, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 2979 (D.D.C.

1995)("Because Plaintiff has not established that the validity of his conviction

or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, or impugned by the granting of a § 2255 motion or a writ of habeas

corpus under § 2241, his Bivens action challenging his conviction and

sentence will be DISMISSED as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)."),

affirmed, 316 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 74 F.3d 1339, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS® 1554

(D.C.Cir. 1996); and Zolicoffer v. FBI, 884 F. Supp. 173, 1995 U.S.Dist.

LEXIS® 5973 (M.D.Pa. 1995). See also Parris v. United States,

45 F.3d 383, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS® 875 (10th Cir.)(Heck v. Humphrey

applicable to suits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act), cert. denied,

(...continued)
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-820 & n. 30 (1982). Harlow, which is often
cited for the principle of the qualified immunity of state officials for acts within the scope of
their employment, was brought against a federal official. In footnote 30 of the opinion in
Harlow, the Supreme Court stated that Harlow was applicable to state officials sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, case law involving § 1983 claims is applicable in Bivens
actions and vice versa. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 128 L.Ed.2d 811, 114
S.Ct. 1970, 1994 U.S. LEXIS® 4274 (1994); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1241-1242,
2000 U.S.App. LEXIS® 22501 (11th Cir. 2000); and Campbell v. Civil Air Patrol, 131
F.Supp.2d 1303, 1310 n. 8, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 2542 (M.D.Ala. 2001)(noting that,
since courts have expanded the Bivens remedy, usually used for a Fourth Amendment
violation, to allow direct action under First and Fifth Amendments, “the court shall refer
interchangeably to cases” decided under both § 1983 and Bivens).

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514 U.S. 1120, 131 L.Ed.2d 871, 115 S. Ct. 1984, 1995 U.S. LEXIS® 3416

(1995); and Williams v. Hill, supra (Heck v. Humphrey applicable to civil

"RICO" action filed by a federal prisoner against federal prosecutors and

other officials). Hence, Heck v. Humphrey precludes a constitutional

challenge to the criminal proceedings in United States v. Ira St. Anthony

Huggins, Criminal No. 2:04-1098-PMD-1. As a result, the defendants are

also subject to summary dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey even though the

defendants are local employees, not federal employees.

In this civil rights action, this court may take judicial notice of

Criminal No. 2:04-1098-PMD-1 in determining that the criminal proceedings

have not been terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. Aloe Creme Laboratories,

Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Colonial

Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS® 16328

(4th Cir. 1989)(“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in

noticing the content of court records.’”); Mann v. Peoples First National Bank

& Trust Co., 209 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1954)(approving district court’s

taking judicial notice of prior suit with same parties: “We think that the judge

below was correct in holding that he could take judicial notice of the

proceedings had before him in the prior suit to which Mann and the Distilling

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Company as well as the bank were parties.”); and United States v. Parker,

956 F.2d 169, 171, 1992 U.S.App. LEXIS® 1319 (8th Cir. 1992).

The plaintiff cannot have his federal convictions vacated in this

civil rights action. Myers v. Pauling, 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 7628, 1995

WESTLAW® 334284 (E.D.Pa., June 2, 1995)("Release from prison is not a

remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). See also Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641, 137 L.Ed.2d 906, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1997 U.S. LEXIS® 3075

(1997).

The plaintiff does not have standing to seek an investigation or

criminal charges against the defendants. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410

U.S. 614, 619 (1973)(a private citizen does not have a judicially cognizable

interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another person); Diamond

v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986)(applying Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and

collecting cases); Doyle v. Oklahoma State Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566-

1567, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS® 18064 (10th Cir. 1993); Lane v. Correll, 434

F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1970); Nader v. Saxbe, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 497

F.2d 676, 679 nn. 18-19, 681 n. 27 (D.C.Cir. 1974)(n. 27: “Thus her [Linda

R. S.’s] complaint in effect sought a judicial order compelling prosecution of

a particular individual, a practice shunned by American courts.”); and United

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States v. Passman, 465 F. Supp. 736, 741 & n. 13 (W.D.La. 1979)(“the

defendant lacks standing to challenge the failure of the government to

instigate criminal proceedings against another person.”). Cf. Neitzke v.

Williams, supra (although district courts should not blur the distinction

between the standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and a dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915 because a claim is frivolous, a patently insubstantial complaint

may be dismissed). See also Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F. Supp. 333, 340,

1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 18960 (D.Nev. 1993)("Long ago the courts of these

United States established that 'criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil

actions.'"). Cf. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 252

U.S.App.D.C. 37, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201-1202 (D.C.Cir. 1986)(denying motion

to disqualify Office of the United States Attorney). Furthermore, since the

plaintiff does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the criminal

prosecution of another person, the plaintiff lacks standing to raise such a

claim. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., supra, 410 U.S. at 619.

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Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the

above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service

of process. See Denton v. Hernandez, supra; Neitzke v. Williams, supra;

Haines v. Kerner, supra; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n. *,

1993 U.S.App. LEXIS® 17715 (4th Cir. 1993), replacing unpublished

opinion originally tabled at 993 F.2d 1535 (4th Cir. 1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh,

supra; Todd v. Baskerville, supra, 712 F.2d at 74; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)[essentially a redesignation of "old" 1915(d)]; and "new" 28

U.S.C. § 1915A[as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should

review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary

dismissal].

I also recommend that this case be deemed to be a “strike” for

purposes of the “three strikes” rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and (g). These provisions require an inmate to pay the filing fee

for his or her case in advance after he or she has had three cases

“dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

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imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. As discussed above under

Heck v. Humphrey, supra, a prisoner must show that his or her conviction or

sentence has been reversed or vacated before he or she can recover in tort

for the unlawful conviction or sentence. Where, as here, the plaintiff’s three

convictions in Criminal No. 2:04-CR-1098-PMD-1 have not been overturned,

the inmate’s constitutional tort action under § 1983 must be dismissed.

Several courts have held that a dismissal under Heck constitutes a “strike”

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and (g). See Sandles v. Randa, 945 F. Supp.

169, 1996 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 17810 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Sanders v. DeTella,

1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 2838, 1997 WESTLAW® 126866 (N.D.Ill., March 13,

1997)(unpublished); and Grant v. Sotelo, 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 16798,

1998 WESTLAW® 740826 (N.D.Tex., October 19, 1998)(unpublished).3

See also Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 384, 1996

U.S.App. LEXIS® 33974 (5th Cir. 1996)(noting that district court dismissed

a claim as frivolous under Heck and declining to address the propriety of the

district court’s dismissal because plaintiff had not exhausted his appeal) and

cf. Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1061-1064, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS®

3
In Grant, the court recognized that “the question may be raised whether a cause
dismissed pursuant to Heck considerations should be considered for purposes of
computing the three strikes...” but followed the decisions of Sandles and Sanders.

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185 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the undersigned concludes that this action is

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and (g) and should be deemed a

“strike” under this statute. The plaintiff’s attention is directed to the Notice

on the next page.

Respectfully submitted,

December 19, 2005 S/Bruce Howe Hendricks

Greenville, South Carolina United States Magistrate Judge

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Notice of Right to File Objections to M agistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"

&

The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So

The plaintiff is hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or
Order and Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional
three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority
to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 3411 (D.S.C. 1993).
During the ten-day period for filing objections, but not thereafter , a party must file with the Clerk
of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District
Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of
the Report and Recommendation to w hich objections are made and the basis for such
objections. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 8250 (D.S.C. 1992); and Oliverson
v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1467, 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 776 (D.Utah 1995). Failure to file specific, written
objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the
recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847
& nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and
Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party
waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did
not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation
precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard
v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS® 8487 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin,
761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.)(party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the
district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, supra, the Court stated that general, non-specific
objections are not sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the
same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any
specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless.
* * * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and
runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. We would hardly countenance an
appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the
source of the error.

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who
proceeded pro se in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his
objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only “I object”
preserves no issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments
an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS® 15,084 (8th Cir. 1989)("no de novo review if
objections are untimely or general"), which involved a pro se litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6 n. 1 (3rd Cir.
1984)(per curiam)("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity necessary to trigger de novo review"). This notice,
hereby, apprises the plaintiff of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written
objections. See Wright v. Collins, supra; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS®
19,302 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections
addressed as follows:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 10768
Greenville, South Carolina 29603

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