Are Non-Theocratic Regimes Possible?

by Rmi Brague

Rmi Brague

Are Non-Theocratic Regimes Possible?

n both the struggles that constitute the

contemporary American culture wars,
and even more so in the current conflict
with Islamic terrorism, we often encounter
the claim that the two contending sides
represent democracy on the one hand and
theocracy on the other. Etymologically, that
is to say, the power of the people versus the
power of God. I believe that to think in this
way about the conflict with Islamism is to
misconceive the situation. Rather, the real
matter at issue concerns the nature of law,
and as it happens, the two conceptions of
law that face each other both rest on a
common basis, which is the idea of a divine
law.1 This is no doubt a shocking contention for modern secular sensibilities, but I
want to argue that Western democracy
at least as we have known itturns out,
itself, to be a kind of theocracy, too.
In common parlance, theocracy has
taken on a derogatory connotation. Calling a regime theocratic amounts to calling it names. Theocracy is commonly
understood as a political regime in which
power is wielded by some sort of priestly
caste recruited on the basis of the orthodoxy of its members with respect to a religious creed. In post-Khomeini Iran, for
instance, the so-called wilaya-e faqih is described as a theocracy. There, Shiite clerics
hold power, either directly or indirectly,

through the Council of the Revolution,

which checks the conformity to Islam of
every law enacted by parliament and vets
the orthodoxy of all candidates for higher
offices.
Originally, however, theocracy was
not an epithet. On the contrary, when it was
first coined in the first century, A.D., it was
meant to be a term of praise. The originator
of the term was the Jewish historian Flavius
Josephus. Born as Joseph ben Mattathias,
he fought the Romans, was captured,
changed allegiances, and was later adopted
by the family of the Emperor Vespasian.
Apart from historical works on the war in
which he had taken part and about Jewish
history more generally, Josephus wrote a
defense of Judaism in response to the polemical writings of an Egyptian by the name
of Apion. In that treatise, Josephus praises
Moses legislative work by observing that,
alone among the nations, the Jewish people
who abide by the Law of Moses do not live
Rmi Brague is a professor of philosophy at the
Sorbonne in Paris and at the University of Munich. He
is the author of many books, including Eccentric
Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization (2002) and
The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the
Universe in Western Thought (2003). This article is
adapted from a talk presented at the James Madison
Program in American Ideals and Institutions at
Princeton University.

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under any of the political regimes that had

been defined by the Greek philosophers.
Instead, they are ruled directly by Gods
commands. Hence, the polity founded by
Moses is neither a monarchy, an aristocracy, nor a democracy, but what he calls
theokratia, the power of God.2 The only
sovereign of Israel is Godor, to be precise, Gods Law. This is a meaning of theocracy that would be accepted by currently existing Islamic regimes, and it is the
theocracy dreamt of by those who wish to
enforce the so-called sharia.
Western Theocracy:
The Idea of a Divine Law
Although we modern Westerners commonly look down on theocracies, our
systems of legislation are, or were, in some
sense theocratic too. They are, or were,
founded in the last instance on assumptions
that are theological in origin. And certainly, the idea of a divine law is not absent
from our own Western tradition. On the
contrary, it is emphatically present in both
its sourcesin Athens no less than Jerusalem, in Sophocles, Plato, Cicero, and many
others, no less than in the Old Testament.
Or at least, this idea was not absent until
a relatively recent date. The last important
thinker who mentions a divine law among
the different types of laws that he distinguishes was John Austin, a disciple of
Bentham, in his 1832 lectures on jurisprudence.3 What is exceptional in Western intellectual history are rather the last two centuries, during which the idea of a divine law has
been swept out of sight. Nevertheless, while
this idea was present over a vast portion of
our own tradition, it evolved along lines that
have hardly anything to do with the Islamic
understanding of what a divine law (sharia)
is or should be. Because there are both
similarities and differences, a comparison
of the idea of divine law in the Christian
West and in Islam is particularly fruitful.
4

The evolution of the Western idea of a

divine law came to a head in the work of
Thomas Aquinas. In the Treatise on the
Laws in his Summa Theologica, Aquinas
distinguishes four kinds of law: eternal,
natural, divine, and human.4 Eternal law is
the law by which God himself lives and to
which he is, in a sense, subjected: Love.
Divine law is, roughly speaking, the legal
content of the Old and New Covenants.
That much is clear. But what Aquinas means
by the third kind of law, natural law, is not
what that term came to designate in modernity, i.e., the fiction of a pre-political state
of affairs in which human beings were governed by their desire for self-preservation
alone.
The ideas of nature that underlie classical
and modern political thought are at odds.
This is what Leibniz observed against his
older contemporary Hobbes: According
to Aristotle, we call natural what is most
in keeping with the perfection of the nature
of a definite thing; but Mr. Hobbes calls
natural state the one in which the least
amount of art is to be found, perhaps because he did not consider that human nature in its perfection carries art within itself.5 For Aquinas, following in a certain
sense Aristotle, natural law is the law that
springs, not from nature in general, but
from the nature of man in particular. This
nature does not mean the raw or (allegedly) purely biological dimension of human beings. Rather, it is expressed by the
classical definition: man is a rational animal. In this definition, what most defines
mans nature is not his animal side, which
he shares with other living beings, but what
Aquinas calls ratio, a word that had been
chosen as the standard rendering of the
Greek logos. Moreover, this reason is not
merely an instrumental rationality that
can calculate the best means for survival.
Rather, it is a power that can choose as well
the means for fostering the moral fullness

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or perfection of human nature.

As a consequence, natural law has two
dimensions for Aquinas. Concerning whatever is animal in man and in other living
beings, it means very much the same as for
Hobbes or, for that matter, Epicurus: care
for self-preservation. But in the case of man
as such, natural law is located in ratio, i.e.,
in reason and freedom. Natural law is rational law.
Now, Aquinas defines natural law as a
share of eternal law in rational creatures.
Since it mirrors or participates in eternal
law, natural law is, as such, divine.6 It does
not partake any less in divinity than the
writings of the Old and New Testaments.
The legislative import of the former aims at
reminding mankind of the natural law that
it should not have forgotten. The New
Covenant adds something that unaided
human reason could not have known, and
which is therefore commonly called supernatural, but this new element is not a
law. Rather, it is a new regime of salvation:
Gods mercy forgives our sins; Gods grace
endows us with the means to choose life and
to act accordingly.
Finally, Aquinas mentions a fourth kind
of law, human law, which designates the
endeavors of mankind to apply to various
peoples in various circumstances the natural law of reason that mirrors Gods eternal
law.
Western Theocracy:
The Idea of Conscience
To be sure, we no longer ground our attempts at making laws that meet the requirements of justice on the idea of Gods
law. We prefer to speak of the dignity of
human moral conscience. This is the result
of a long and complicated story that I cannot possibly retell here. But we should nevertheless recall that conscience was long
understood as the trace in man of something divine. In a famous passage, for ex-

ample, Rousseau has his curate from Savoy

exclaim: Conscience, conscience! Divine
instinct, immortal and celestial voice....7
But this idea of a link between conscience
and the divine is not new and has, in particular, nothing to do with the Enlightenment. The idea is to be found in antiquity as
well as in the Middle Ages, among pagan
philosophers as well as among Church Fathers or Scholastic theologians.
The first to recognize conscience as something divine was probably the Stoic philosopher Seneca, who wrote, God [or a
god] is near of you, with you, in you. A
sacred spirit has its seat in us. It is the
observer and keeper of our good deeds and
of our wrongdoings.8 The first words of
that passage strangely resemble a famous
verse of the Pentateuch, according to which
the Law is very nigh unto thee, in thy
mouth, and in thy heart (Deuteronomy,
30:14).
The shift from paganism to Christianity
did not affect this idea dramatically. On the
contrary, Paul took over the Stoic idea of
conscience (suneidsis) as playing the same
part for pagans as Moses Law had for the
Jews (Romans, 2:15). Since Moses Law is
from God, it is to be surmised, by analogy,
that human conscience has the same origin.
And Augustine would later explicitly identify the voice of conscience with the voice of
God. There is no soul, albeit corrupted, as
long as it can reason, in whose conscience
God does not speak. For who wrote natural
law in the hearts of men, if not God?9
To be sure, the idea of the divine that
underlies those different statements about
conscience and its origin is not one and the
same. Senecas god is the Stoic Zeus, who is
not radically different from the world that
emanates from him. For Seneca, we possess
this divine spark of conscience in our hearts
because we are, literally, sparks from the
primitive creator Fire that is identical with
god. It is a far cry from this god to Pauls,

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Augustines, and Aquinass God. The latter

is very much the biblical God who not only
addresses human conscience through a silent inner voice but steps into the course of
history, first in Israel under the Old Covenant, and at the fullness of time in Jesus
incarnation. He is the God who calls the law
of nature and/or reason back to human
consciousness, when it has been obliterated
or forgotten, by giving the Ten Commands
to Moses.
Democracy and Its
Theocratic Underpinnings
Whether the underlying idea of democracy
is law or conscience, therefore, both ideas
have theological underpinnings. Hence,
our democratic ideals both of a rule of law
and of a moral awareness that is expected to
serve as a final authority in the mind and
soul of every human being are theologically
grounded. In fact, while journalists commonly denounce the aspirations of Islamic
militants as medieval (a term which itself
carries derogatory connotations not unlike the term theocratic), it must be noted
that many aspects of modern Western democracy have clearly medieval origins. For
instance, historians observe that our modern procedures of election were first elaborated within cloisters. In the Rule of Saint
Benedict, the monks elected their abbot,
and this principle was taken up especially
by the later mendicant orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, in which elections
became quite frequent. In the midst of a
feudal society characterized by hierarchy,
deference, and the hereditary principle,
whatever could have been the ultimate
ground of this trust in the vote? This tradition of the religious orders becomes understandable only when we appreciate how the
principle of moral choice in man, i.e. conscience, was so long considered to partake
in a divine quality.
Similarly, in Western political regimes
6

law is understood to arise from the will of

the people. The people is constituted of
free human beings who are able to know
what they should do because they listen to
their conscience. Here again, law is based in
the last resort on human moral conscience.
Vox populi, vox Dei is what underlies the idea
of one man, one vote. The Latin formula,
in fact, first appears under the pen of Alcuin,
the English monk whom Charlemagne, in
the first years of the ninth century, invited to
his court and put in charge of organizing the
educational system.
This was not mere idealistic theorizing.
In the fifteenth century, the philosopher
and Roman Catholic cardinal Nicholas of
Cusa defended the emphasis laid on ecumenical councils (more so than on papal
edicts) as the principle of infallibility in the
Church by saying that the very criterion of
the divine character of a decision is the fact
that it has been agreed upon by the people:
All legitimate authority arises from elective concordance and free submission. There
is in the people a divine seed by virtue of
their common birth and the equal natural
right of all men so that all authority
which comes from God as does man himselfis recognized as divine when it arises
from the common consent of the subjects.10
The Islamic Idea of a Divine Law
Within Islam, the idea of a divine law has
very different characteristics. According to
Islam, laying down the law or legislating
means that one ascribes to actions a value
(hukm) that is at once legal and moral. The
legal and the moral cannot be separated. In
principle, each and every human action can
be placed into one of five categories: permitted, laudable but not obligatory, strictly
obligatory, blamable but not forbidden,
and strictly forbidden.
Now, the only power that can ascribe a
value to human actions is God. Hence, the
only legislator (hkim) that can possibly

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The same operation would be very diffiexist is God. So says al-Ghazali in his treatise about the principles of Islamic law, cult in Islam. For, if God has spoken; more
thereby expressing no more than the com- precisely, if He has dictated a Book to a
Messenger; if, further, He has chosen and
mon opinion.
In some cases, not very numerous, God purified this Messenger so that his whole
has explicitly pronounced legal decisions in life has the value of an example for human
the Koran. This is the case with marriage, behaviorthen why should we ever trust
inheritance, and penal law. In the over- our own powers?
As a consequence, the West and Islam
whelming majority of instances, however,
legal rulings have to be deduced either from have (or had) no quarrel about the final
origin of legislation. Both
the Book, or from the corpus of
ground (or grounded) it in the
the Traditions about Muhamlast resort on things divine. Nevmad, or from the interplay of
ertheless, the underlying ideas
both together with some other
of law and of the part God plays
sources of law that differ accordin it are, and always were, miles
ing to the various received
apart. This is reflected in the
schools of law. The system of
way the two religions conceive
rules that is ultimately grounded
of Gods speech: in Christianon those divine and human
ity, God speaks through history,
sources is the Islamic law, the
through the voice of conscience,
sharia. In any case, unaided huand in the life of Jesus, the Word
man conscience is never suffiAlcuin
made flesh (1 John 1:14); in Iscient for us to distinguish adequately between right and wrong. And lam, God speaks in the written words of the
this argument of the supporters of the sharia Book.
It is worth repeating that those ideas of
does not lack cogency. It boils down to
Peters formula before the Sanhedrin: It is Gods speech and hence of the divine law
better to obey God than men (Acts, 5:29). were different from the outset. The West and
In Christendom, Hobbes secured a foun- Islam never agreed on those basic issues, not
dation for modern political philosophy by even in the Middle Ages: in fact, they pertaking as the implicit target of his critique haps never differed so acutely as in the
the very utterance of Peter that I have just Middle Ages. One could even venture to say
quoted and that he seldom quotes and tries that certain aspects of modern political ideas
to explain away.11 According to Hobbes, as are more in keeping with Islam than were
long as we can claim that there is an author- medieval Western theories.12 As a conseity higher than the secular state (e.g., the quence, we must reject the lazy assumption
Church), and as long as we can fear sanc- that Islam is nothing more than something
tions worse than death (i.e., Hell), political medieval that simply could not negotiate
life lacks a reliable ground. Hobbes endeav- the turn that the West has taken in moderored to show that there is no other way for nity.
us to obey God than by obeying the worldly
authority under which we live. He could do
Democracy As a Side-Issue
so, in a Christian context, because we are We can come back now to the conflict that
never sure that our private inspirations I mentioned at the beginning. Is the politistem from God and because the Bible can cal regime that opposes theocracy really
admit of various interpretations.
democracy? Is democracy, or the lack
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thereof, the real problem in the Middle East

today? Lack of democracy is a fact in all
Islamic countriesand, for that matter, in
many other countries around the globe
that are not Islamic at all, too. Moreover,
we all must acknowledge that our own socalled democracies are far from being ideal
regimes; Churchills quip, albeit hackneyed,
still holds true.
My thesis, however, is this: the question
of democracy as a political regime is a sideissue. Seen through ancient and medieval
eyesmore precisely, on the basis of the
philosophy of Plato and Aristotledemocracy is no more than one among six possible
regimes. It is the rule, for the common
good, of the whole people (demos)in
contradistinction to the rule of a minority
group, which is called aristocracy, and to
the rule of one person only, which is called
monarchy. Each of these regimes receives,
according to the ancient outlook, a moral
qualification: democracy is the positive
version of the rule of the whole people,
whereas its corruption, the rule of the mob,
is called ochlocracy. In the same way, aristocracy, the rule of the most virtuous, can
degenerate into oligarchy, the rule of the
few (more often than not, the rule of the
rich, i.e., plutocracy). And monarchy,
which could be the best regime, can degenerate into the worst of all, tyranny.13
Democracy, along with the other five
regimes, belongs to the realm of political
science. But political science is itself only a
part of practical philosophy, conceived as
the art of government. Medieval thinkers
divided this practical philosophy into
three parts. Government can be the selfgovernment of the individual, which we
call ethics. It can be the government of the
household (oikos), which the ancients called
economy. This consisted of the right
management of three basic relations: husband and wife, father and children, and
master and slaves.14 Finally, government
8

can be the government of the city (polis),

and this is what we still call politics.
In any case, practical philosophy sets out
to answer the question of good rulership or
good governance: What should I do in
order properly to rule in the three realms?
In ethics: How should I govern myself? In
economicsin slightly modernized
terms: How should I get on with my wife?
How should I raise my children? How
should I behave toward people for whom I
am responsible in my enterprise? In politics: How should I behave as a citizen, or as
a magistrate? Placed in this context, we can
see that democracy is a regime among other
ones, in a realm, the political one, that is
itself a part of a larger whole, practical
philosophy. From a classical point of view,
it is difficult to see democracy as the main
issue.
The Islamic Claim
Now, the Islamic understanding of law does
not concern only political matters. It does
not even concern such matters very much at
all. Its claim extends to the whole realm of
what we might call normativity, to all
rules of right behavior. Islam as such, Islam
as an idea, has no quarrel with the idea of
democracyinsofar as democracy is a definite system of government, to be distinguished from aristocracy, monarchy, etc.
To be sure, the early experience of Islam,
which is repeatedly held up as the paradigm
of an ideal past, was that of a monarchy:
Muhammad ruled alone. Or, to be precise,
God ruled through him. And so too did
God rule through the Caliphs who followed him. Moreover, the present-day Islamic world consists mainly in monarchic
regimes, whatever name those regimes may
otherwise give to themselves. Nevertheless,
many Islamic thinkersnot only the socalled modernists or reformerspoint
out that the Koran does not contain any
clear position on the kind of regime that has

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Gods favor. Some among them underline

the fact that some Caliphs were elected by a
committee (shura), and furthermore, that
even Muhammad asked for advice in some
cases, facts from which they boldly deduce
a preference of Islam for representative,
parliamentary democracy.
The same thinkers also strongly emphasize some features of the Islamic worldview
that can be described as egalitarian. They
take these as starting-points for further
developments of the democratic idea within
Islam. We may forgive some slight anachronisms in this developing line of argument; we may regret that Islamic egalitarianism is set against caricatures of Christianity concerning, say, the meaning of
monastic life and the role of clerics in the
Church. Nevertheless, such features are well
and truly present in Islam: each human
being is responsible before God without the
mediation of any ruler or priest. That much
is certainly true.
Democracy, Laocracy, Ummacracy
I have tried to show that, in a certain way,
we Westerners live (or perhaps, used to
live) under a theocracy. Yet that is certainly
not how we understand the contours and
meaning of our contemporary political life.
On the contrary, we understand ourselves
to be living democratically. We need to
take a closer look at democracy and ask
whether that really is the correct name for
the kind of society we favor. Modern democracies are making use of a term that is
Greek in origin. Yet it may be that the
identity of the word conceals a gap between
ancient and modern experience. For one
thing, what we now recognize as democracies are not exactly democracies, in the
Greek sense, any longer. In ancient Greece,
after all, the demos was hardly more than a
club of free adult males. Furthermore, the
magistrates were not always elected, but
often drawn by lot. Election was felt to be a

feature of aristocracy, whereas lot was

democratic.15
Our modern democracies may not be
aware of what they are in their innermost
core. Perhaps they dont even want to acknowledge their own foundations. What is
the subject of modern democracies? I would
like to take up an intuition of the French
philosopher Henri Bergson (d. 1941), for
whom democracy is evangelical in essence.16 My speculation is this: the real
subject of modern democracies is the people
as constituted by Gods election. There is a
Greek word for this idea of a people. It was
the word chosen by the authors of the Greek
translation of the Bible, the Septuagint. In
order to render the Hebrew am, they chose
the epic term laos, which was rather archaic
or provincial by that point in time. The
Greek adjective laikos (belonging to the
laos) gave us the Latin laicus, still extant in
English as lay or laity, and in other
languages too. If I were allowed to coin an
ugly term of art, I would say that our modern so-called democracies are in the last
analysis laocracies: their subjects are human beings who are free. To be sure,
Greek democracies also understood themselves as being constituted by the rule of
free men, but for the Greeks that adjective
meant merely: not slaves. Our freedom
means something quite different, i.e., that
we need not obey any authority other than
the promptings of our conscience, which
are ultimately expressions of Gods concern for the Good of His creation.
On the other hand, what is required of an
Islamic people is expressed by the concept
of umma: the nation [of Islam]. Such a
people is constituted by Gods call (dawa)
and by the response to this call, which consists in taking upon oneself the yoke of the
law (sharia). If I could venture to coin
another and still less felicitous neologism, I
would say that an Islamic democracy, supposing it could exist, would be an

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ummacracy. In such a regime, each of the

individual citizens would be governed in
the last resort not by his or her conscience,
but by Gods positive, written law. With
regard to the technical procedures of voting, such a regime would hardly be distinguishable from a laocracy in the Western
style. But its content would be widely different. For example, elected parliamentarians
and judges would issue and enforce rulings
whose origin would not be human legislation guided by conscience, but Gods own
utterances in His Book. Magistrates would
be inwardly compelled to comply with the
laws on inheritance, marriage, and punishmentsnot to mention eating and clothingclearly dictated by God. Conscience
could not be an incentive to search for the
right way; it would merely serve as a reminder of a straight and narrow path already quite clearly defined.
The Secularization of Conscience
Our contemporary democracies, especially
in Europe, still understand themselves as
founded in the last instance on the idea of
the human conscience. But they have severed the link that united conscience to divinity, so that the power of conscience is no
longer held as being divine. The rule of
conscience has lost even the last flavorings
of theocracy. This was the result of a long
process, which I can only sketch here. For
the sake of brevity, I will mention only the
most extreme cases, since many thinkers
stood for more qualified conceptions along
the way.
In Rousseaus lyrical outburst quoted
above, the divine is already not a substantive any longer, but a rather vague adjective. Fichte mentions with great emphasis
the voice of conscience inside that tells me
what I have to do in every situation of my
life.17 But this voice is no longer directly
Gods. What speaks through our conscience,
to be sure, is a sublime will that is a law
10

in itself. But Fichte is careful not to name

God as the origin of conscience. We are by
this point already in the new outlook opened
up by Kant: God is not the source of moral
law any longer. The existence of God is
merely one of the principles that we must
postulate for duty to be in keeping with the
good, the other ones being freedom and the
immortality of the soul.
The last important philosopher in the
continental tradition who articulated a
theory of conscience was Heidegger. His
interpretation of conscience (Gewissen)
systematically excludes any reference to
beings that exist in another way than does
the human Dasein itself, be they God or a
Law. Through the voice of conscience,
Dasein does not have to listen to any voice
from the outside; Dasein does not even have
to be reminded of anything like the Good,
values, or whatever else might be named.
Dasein simply calls itself up from dispersion in inauthentic existence.18
At present, conscience is often simply
debunked as the result of natural selection,
social pressure, prejudice, or whatnot. But
when it is still mentioned, it means in everyday parlance whatever the individual decides according to his or her whim. Whether
this whim is rationalized by some ideology
does not make a great difference. We modern Westerners, whether we know it or not,
are the conscientiously degenerate children
of Fichte and Heidegger.
Is a Radically
Non-Theocratic Regime Possible?
Our contemporary regimes, in the Western
world, may be laocratic in a rather
Pickwickian sense, because they have undergone the process that we commonly call
secularization. This concept raises as many
questions as it solves, but I will leave it at
that for the present. This secularized status
of our democracies is a problem, however,
for one may well wonder whether a human

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community can go on understanding itself

as a laos in the long run without some more
or less explicit theological underpinnings.
The rather unpleasant question that
contemporary Western regimes face is this:
Is a radically non-theocratic regime possible in the long run? If we take the word
theocracy in its usual meaning of the
frowned-upon government by clerics, the
experience of the centuries demonstrates ad
oculos that a non-theocratic regime is possible. It could even be doubted that there
ever was such a thing as a genuinely theocratic regime, in this sense, in all of history.
Not even in Islam. It is commonly assumed
that Islam does not draw a sharp line between the political and the religious. This
may be true on the level of principles. But as
far as the historical record is concerned
and if we assume that traditional Islamic
historiography is reliablethe identity
between religious and political leadership
lasted hardly more than the ten years of
Muhammads personal rule over his followers in Medina. Even for a Muslim philosopher like Al-Farabi, the existence of
such unitary regimes belonged to a remote
past: if we are to trust the testimony of later
authors, he mentioned a regime that approximated this type of government, called
it by the name of the regime of the imam
(immiyya) and said that it was extant in
ancient Persia, i.e., earlier even than Islam.
The question becomes trickier if we take
theocracy as meaning a regime in which
norms are considered to rest on a divine
foundationwhether it be Law in the Islamic style or conscience in the Western
style. Since the advent of modern political
thought, the ultimate source of political
legitimacy has been the unspoken contract
between citizens. Now, some contemporary thinkers take, implicitly or explicitly,
a further step: the contract is understood to
be the ultimate source of all norms, including moral rules. Such a moral contract

must remain within the boundaries of mankind. The idea of the contract is even meant
to put out of court whatever might claim an
extra-human origin. Hence, the current
American culture wars, in which partisans
of a democraticwhich is to say, a radically secularnotion of morality hurl the
epithet theocratic at those who believe
that the moral law is something given, to be
discovered, not made.
This radical exclusion of any extrahuman instance has a momentous consequence. On the basis of such a contract, we
probably can build a system of norms enabling human beings to live in peace with
one another. They need only to look after
their interest, i.e., for the self-interest of
present individuals. Hence, the recurrence
since Hobbeswho may have invented it
of the image of players sitting around a
table and agreeing upon the rules of the
game.19 But that presupposes a prior agreement: nobody should call into question the
right of the players who are already there to
take part in the game. The players are the
image of what we call a society. Now,
humankind constitutes itself as a society
because it is first of all a species into which
we are born. But even if we admit that the
begotten child has a right to be born, nobody has a right to be begotten. Once we
view the human community as a society
only, we forget that it has constantly to
decide to go on living. This brings us to the
limit of the contract: such a contract, precisely because it has no external point of
reference, cannot possibly decide whether
the very existence on this earth of the species
homo sapiens is a good thing, or not.
1. This essay takes up some ideas from my last book, La
Loi de Dieu: Histoire philosophique dune alliance
(Paris: Gallimard, 2005); an English translation is due
to appear, published by the University of Chicago Press.
2. See Josephus, Against Apion II,16 165; ed. T.
Reinach (Paris : Belles Lettres, 1930), 86.

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Are Non-Theocratic Regimes Possible? by Rmi Brague

3. See J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. H. L. A. Hart (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).

(Oxford: Blackwell, 1960) III, ch. 39, 306; III, ch. 42,
378; II, ch. 31, 240.

4. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IaIIae, q. 9097.

12. See e.g. Rousseaus praise of Muhammad in his On

the Social Contract, IV, 8, trans. Judith R. Masters (New
York: St. Martins, 1978), 126.

5. Leibniz, Essais de Thodice, II, 220, in uvres

Philosophiques, ed. P. Janet, (Paris: Alcan, 1900), vol.
2, 234.
6. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IaIIae, q.
91, a. 2, c; ad 1m; a. 4, beginning.
7. Rousseau, Emile IV, trans. Allan Bloom (New York:
Basic Books, 1979), 290.

13. See e.g. Aristotle, Politics, III, 7.

14. Aristotle, Politics, I, 3, 1253b6-7.
15. See e.g. Aristotle, Politics, IV, 4, 1290b1.
16. H. Bergson, Les deux Sources de la morale et de la
religion (1932), 300.

8. Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistolae, 41, 1-2; ed. L.C.

Reynolds, Oxford, t. 1, 108.

17. Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen [1800], III,

4, in: Ausgewhlte Werke, ed. F. Medicus (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962), vol. 3, 394.

9. Augustine, De Sermone Domini in monte, II, ix, 32;

PL, 34, 1283 [c]; see Sermo XII, iv, 4; PL, 38, 102.

18. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tbingen: Niemeyer,

1963 [1927]), 54, 269; 57, 275, 278; 59, 291.

10. Nicholas of Cusa, De concordantia catholica, III, 4,

331 (Opera Omnia, vol. 14, 348); trans. P. E. Sigmund
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 230.

19. See Hobbes, Leviathan, II, 30, 227; see further

Adam Smith, A Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D.
Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1976), VI, ii, 2, 17, 234.

11. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. M. Oakeshott

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