Dead Guy Order
Dead Guy Order
Dead Guy Order
UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT
SOUTHERNDISTRICTOFFLORIDA
MIAMIDIVISION
CASENO.1224356CIVGOODMAN
[CONSENTCASE]
PROCAPSS.A.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATHEONINC.,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
ORDERONPATHEONSRULE37(B)MOTION
FORFAILURETOCOMPLYWITHDISCOVERYORDER
Nobodyeverdid,oreverwill,escapetheconsequencesofhischoices.
Alfred A. Montapert (1906 ), American philosopher, and the author of
TheSupremePhilosophyofMan:TheLawsofLife
Defendant Patheon, Inc. (Patheon) has filed a motion [ECF No. 699] for an
order requiring Plaintiff Procaps S.A. (Procaps) to show cause why it has not
compliedwiththeOrderthatitfileabindingnoticeconcerningitspositiononhowit
intends to prove anticompetitive effect in this rule of reason antitrust case. Patheons
motionisthelatestsalvoinanongoingdiscoverydisputewhichhasragedonformore
thantwoyears.1
At bottom, Patheons current motion raises two concerns: (1) Patheon says
(correctly)thatProcapsneverfiledwithCourtthebindingnoticerequiredbyanearlier
Order,and(2)itsaysthatProcapshasnotsufficientlydisclosedtheactualevidenceit
intendstorelyon(butinsteadprovidedonlygeneralitiesabouteconomicprinciples).
In its response [ECF No. 709], Procaps explains that it did not read the earlier
Order as requiring an actual filing with the Court but that it did in fact provide the
requisitenoticeinasupplementalinterrogatoryanswer.Procapsresponseexplainsthat
it now appreciates that, under one reading, the Order could require a separate
notice.Nevertheless,itdescribesitssupplementalinterrogatoryanswersasbinding
and, in effect, deems this part of the discovery dispute to be a disagreement over
semantics.
Procaps describes Patheons dissatisfaction over the level of detail in its
substantiveinterrogatoryanswersconcerninganticompetitiveeffectsasbeingbasedon
anerroneousunderstandingoftheapplicablelegalstandardforproofofactualharm
to competition under the socalled first prong of the standard articulated in Levine v.
Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996).2 Procaps argues that
theforumtoassessthesufficiencyofitsevidenceunderthefirstLevineprongisduring
summaryjudgmentlitigationorduringtrial,notduringadiscoverydispute.
AlthoughProcapsshouldhavefiledabindingnoticewiththeCourt,ratherthan
serve an interrogatory response to Patheon,3 Procaps has now repeatedly and
unequivocally given notice of its position. The Court deems Procaps supplemental
interrogatoryanswerstobeabindingnoticeofitsposition,whichitcannotchange.
Indeed, Procaps itself described (in its response to the motion) its supplemental
interrogatoryanswersasbindingandattachedasanexhibitaproposednoticeofits
binding position. Procaps advised that it would of course file the notice if the
2
Under the first method of proving anticompetitive effect, the antitrust plaintiff
must prove that the defendants behavior had an actual detrimental effect on
competition. Under the second method, Levine requires the plaintiff to prove that the
behavior had the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition. An antitrust
plaintiffusingthesecondprongmustdefinetherelevantmarketandestablishthatthe
defendantspossessedpowerinthatmarket.Id.Initsinterrogatoryanswers(andagain
initsresponseandaproposednotice),Procapsadvisedthatitisproceedingonlyunder
thefirstprongofthetwoLevinealternatives.
3
The Order required Procaps to formally advise Patheon (and the Court) of its
positiononhowitintendstoproveananticompetitiveeffectonthemarket.[ECFNo.
678, p. 9]. It also explained that Procaps could avoid the requirement of providing
supplemental,moredetailedinterrogatoryanswersbyfilinganunequivocal,binding
noticethatitwillnotseektoestablishtherequisiteanticompetitiveeffectonthemarket
throughproofthatPatheonsbehaviorhadthepotentialforgenuineadverseeffectson
competition. [Id., at pp. 1314 (emphasis in original Order)]. On the other hand, the
Order also made reference to supplemental interrogatory answers, which are not filed
with the Court unless specifically authorized or unless part of a discovery dispute
whichtheCourtisexpectedtoresolve.IntheCourtsview,however,arequiredfiling
canmeanonlyaformalsubmissiontotheClerkoftheCourt.
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mechanism and its anticipated testimony that this disruption, based on well
established market principles, has inevitably, predictably and inexorably led to
adversepriceandoutputeffectsascomparedtothebutforworld(emphasisadded).
Italsorejectsthenotionthatempiricalevidenceofanactualpriceincreaseintheactual
worldisnecessary.
Summing up its opposition to Patheons motion, Procaps says that Patheon is
entitled to know what Procaps plans to do and not do at trial; it is not entitled to tell
Procapshowtoproveitscase.
Given the myriad opportunities it has been given in its discovery responses to
explainitstheoryofthecaseandtheevidencewhichpurportedlysupportsit,itisclear
to the Court that Procaps has no other specific evidence of actual detrimental effects
beyond what it has already disclosed. To be sure, it is possible that Procaps is simply
unwilling to provide any further detail despite an order compelling further
information,buttheUndersignedsreviewofProcapsdiscoveryresponseandfollow
uplettersstronglysuggeststhatthispossibilityhasnotmorphedintorealityatthislate
stageofthecase.TheCourtisnotgoingtoagainrequireProcapstospelloutitscasein
any greater detail or compel it to pinpoint facts, as opposed to relying on generic
theories which may or may not ultimately carry the day. So Procaps will not need to
provide a second round of supplemental interrogatory answers but this result will
generateconsequences.
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otherwise seek to improve the evidence and/or theories it has now advanced. To
provide a concrete example, if Procaps, in an answer responsive to a particular
interrogatory, listed only three customers who approached it, then it cannot have its
expert later mention marketing efforts with additional customers at a trade show, nor
canithaveawitnesstestifyaboutmeetingsorcommunicationswithothercustomers.
Procaps need not have disclosed each and every fact it intends to rely upon at
trial,butitwasrequired,ifaskedindiscovery,todisclosefactualthemesorcategories
orapproaches.Moreover,itcannotansweraspecificinterrogatorybyrelyingonvague
comments or general principles but then later seek to rely on moreparticularized
evidence.
Specifically, Patheon asked Procaps to identify all customers who have been or
will be harmed by Patheons anticompetitive conduct and to describe the harm and
providethefactualbasis.Thisrequiresaspecificlistofcustomers.Ifitfailedtoprovide
the names of specific customers and did not give particular facts in the supplemental
interrogatoryanswer,thenitwillnotbeabletointroducesuchevidencelater,suchasin
a summary judgment motion opposition or at trial. Instead, it will be limited to
whatever discovery responses it provided (e.g., all customers were affected, without
furtherdetail).4
bythewithdrawaloftheBannerassetsandtheresultingexclusionofProcapsthrough
the Collaboration. [ECF No. 7041, nonconfidential portion of sealed supplemental
interrogatoryanswersfiledunderseal].
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time to permit Patheon to adequately prepare to take the deposition of the expert (or
experts)whoareexpectedtoadvancetheprinciplebasedtheory.So,inonerespect,this
isanordercompellingProcapstoprovideasecondsupplementalinterrogatoryanswer,
thoughitdoesnotexpresslygrantthemotionatissuebecausetheUndersignedisnot
issuingtherequestedshowcauseorder.
At the risk of being redundant, the Court underscores the critical point that
Procaps view and its litigation position may have farreaching consequences. Having
optedtorely,atleastinpart,oneconomictheoryandantitrustassumptions,insteadof
actualevidenceofactualeffects,Procapsmustunderstandthatitsstrategywillsurely
generate consequences. If the law supports Procaps view, then its failure to provide
sufficient amounts of precise evidence and specific illustrations of detrimental, actual
effects will not prove fatal. But if the law is exactly what Patheon says it is, then
Procaps wevedisclosedenough, wererelyingongeneralprinciples, werenot
providingmorespecificevidenceindiscovery
and
wehavenomorefactsto
provideapproachesmaybefatalorsignificantlydamagingtoitscase.
The Court is not finding or even suggesting that Procaps is in fact providing
misleading interrogatory answers by purposefully not providing evidencefilled
interrogatory answers. The Court has reviewed the interrogatory answers and
understands that Procaps has provided extensive, multipage answers which try to
explain why specific evidence is not available. For example, Procaps supplemental
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answertointerrogatory6ismorethansixpageslong.Itexplainsthatithasonlylimited
knowledge about the identity of customers and potential customers in the relevant
markets because of the nature of its role during the Collaboration and due to its
substantialforeclosurefromtherelevantmarketsasaresultofthemarketdivision.
SoitmaywellbethatProcapssimplycannotprovideadditionaldiscoveryabout
thespecificevidencewhichsupportsitsclaimbecauseitjustdoesnothavetheevidence
and cannot obtain it. If that is the reality, then Procaps is not engaged in discovery
abuse. But its inability to provide moredetailed discovery creates two main
consequences: (1) it may not later rely on new evidence not previously disclosed
(assumingPatheonrequesteditindiscovery),and(2)itmightnotbeabletosustainits
burdentoproveanticompetitiveeffects.Time(andtheinevitablefurtherlegalbriefing)
willtell.
DONEANDORDEREDinChambers,inMiami,Florida,May12,2015.
Copiesfurnishedto:
AllCounselofRecord
JohnBarkett,SpecialMaster
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