1:14-cv-00424 #112
1:14-cv-00424 #112
1:14-cv-00424 #112
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ORDER
This matter is before the court on the motion of Defendant Luther Strange to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (Doc. 101), and Plaintiffs opposition (Doc. 105). For
the reasons explained below, the court finds that Stranges motion to dismiss should
be denied.
Standing is an Article III doctrine limiting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to actual cases and controversies. Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145
F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 1998). In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must
demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability. I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d
1273, 1278 (11th Cir .2014). As the parties invoking this courts jurisdiction,
Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). There are three requirements for standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in factan invasion of a legally
protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. Third, it must be
the Plaintiff couples are married. If Plaintiffs marriages are not recognized as
valid in Alabama then their marriage licenses will be inconsequential. Plaintiffs
alleged injuries cannot be fully redressed by the other defendants in this case.
Probate judges can issue marriage licenses to the Plaintiffs, but for their marriages
to have any meaning, the Attorney General must recognize those marriages as
valid. The laws of Alabama expressly state that [a] marriage contracted between
individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state and [t]he State of Alabama shall
not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was
alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of
whether a marriage license was issued. ALA. CODE 30-1-19. Thus, a Plaintiffs
receipt of a marriage license from a probate judge will not result in a valid marriage
absent the Attorney General being bound by the rulings in this case.
If not subject to an injunction, Strange could even initiate or direct that
actions be filed against the Plaintiffs for falsely declaring their marital status in
state forms. See e.g. ALA. CODE 40-18-27(d) (prohibiting false statements in tax
returns); ALA. CODE. 22-1-11 (false statement in applications for Medicaid).
Strange could also prosecute any person who performed a marriage ceremony for a
same-sex couple. See ALA. CODE 30-1-11 (penalizing solemnization of marriage
without a license).
Federal courts in other states have found standing existed to sue the state
Attorney General in suits asserting constitutional claims against state laws that
prohibited same-sex marriage. See e.g. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F.Supp.3d 1144 (S.D.
Ind.) affd, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 316(2014); Citizens
for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). For instance, the
Baskin court found that because the plaintiffs had broadly challenged Indianas law
that prohibited same-sex marriage and the Attorney General had broad powers to
enforce criminal statutes that could result in criminal penalties, that the Attorney
General had a sufficient connection and role in enforcing such statutes for the
plaintiff couples to have standing against him. Baskin, 12 F.Supp.3d at 1152-53. As
in the Baskin case, the Plaintiffs in this case have broadly challenged Alabamas
laws that prohibit same-sex marriage and the Attorney General has broad powers
to enforce statutes that provide criminal penalties relating to same-sex marriages.
In light of all of the above, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their
burden of showing that they have standing against Attorney General Strange.
Accordingly, the motion of Defendant Luther Strange to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b) (Doc. 101), is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 2015.
/s/ Callie V. S. Granade
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE