[G.R. No.

121215. November 13,

1997]

MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS

REYES, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
, THIRD DIVISION,
and the PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, res
pondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The significance of the

minutes taken during the
session
of
a
local
legislative assembly is the
determinant issue in this
present petition.
Petitioner, along with
two others, was charged
with
the
crime
of
falsification of a public
document,
specifically
Resolution No. 57-S-92
dated July 27, 1992 of the
Municipal
Council
of
Mariveles,
Bataan. The
complaint alleged that the
resolution,
appropriating
the amount of P8,500.00
for the payment of the
terminal leave of two
municipal employees, was
anomalous for not having
been approved by the said
Council, as the minutes of
the proceedings therein
made no reference to the
supposed
approval
[1]

thereof. It contended that

its seeming passage was
carried out by petitioner in
connivance
with
Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
Member
Jesse
Concepcion
and
SB
Secretary Antonio Zurita.
After
preliminary
investigation,
the
deputized prosecutor of
Balanga,
Bataan
recommended the filing of
an
information for
Falsification
of
Public
Document
against
petitioner and Concepcion,
excluding Zurita who died
during
the
pendency
hereof.
[2]

municipality, when in truth

and in fact as both accused
knew well the same is false
and incorrect as the said
resolution was not approved
by the aforesaid Sangguniang
Bayan for which both
accused has the obligation to
disclose the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

On October 14, 1994,

prior to his arraignment,
petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation
arguing,
among other things, that
the
Ombudsman
previously dismissed a
similar complaint against
him involving the same
factual setting.
[4]

On September 21,
1994, the information filed
before the Sandiganbayan
reads as follows:
That on or about July 27,
1992 or sometimes (sic) prior
or subsequent thereto, in
Mariveles, Bataan,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, OSCAR DELOS
REYES and JESSE
CONCEPCION, both public
officers, being Municipal
Mayor of Mariveles, Bataan
and Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of
Mariveles, Bataan, passed
and approved the said
resolution appropriating the
amount of P8,500.00 for
payment of the terminal leave
of two (2) employees of the

Likewise adduced in the

motion is the joint affidavit
of the other members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mariveles attesting to the
actual
passage
and
approval of Resolution No.
57-S-92.
In a resolution dated
December
29,
1994,
respondent
Sandiganbayan denied the
Motion for Reinvestigation,
the pertinent portion of
which reads:
Acting on accused Mayor
Oscar delos Reyes Motion
for Reinvestigation and
accused Jesse Concepcions
Manifestation, the same are
hereby DENIED, being

without merit and the

prosecution having
vigorously opposed the
Motion. The allegations of
fact and the arguments of
counsel are best taken up in
the trial on the merits. As
found by the prosecution, a
prima facie case exists.
Consequently, let the
arraignment of the above
entitled case be set on March
03, 1995, at 8:30 A.M.
[5]

After the motion for

reconsideration
was
denied on May 24, 1995,
petitioner filed this instant
petition for certiorari. On
September 18, 1995, the
Court resolved to issue the
temporary
restraining
order prayed for by
petitioner.
The
order
of
respondent
Sandiganbayan must be
sustained.
In
an
effort
to
exonerate himself from the
charge, petitioner argues
that
the
deliberations
undertaken
and
the
consequent passage of
Resolution No. 57-S-92
are
legislative
in
nature. He adds that as
local chief executive, he
has neither the official
custody of nor the duty to
prepare said resolution;
hence, he could not have
taken advantage of his
official
position
in

committing
falsification
punished
171 of the
Code.
[6]

the crime of
as defined and
under Article
Revised Penal

Petitioner would like to

impress upon this Court
that the final step in the
approval of an ordinance
or resolution, where the
local
chief
executive
affixes his signature, is
purely
a
ministerial
act. This
view
is
erroneous. Article 109(b)
of the Local Government
Code outlines the veto
power of the Local Chief
Executive which provides:
Article 109 (b) The local
chief executive, except the
punong barangay shall have
the power to veto any
particular item or items of an
appropriations ordinance, an
ordinance or resolution
adopting a local development
plan and public investment
program or an ordinance
directing the payment of
money or creating liability. x
x x. (Underscoring supplied)
Contrary to petitioners
belief, the grant of the veto
power confers authority
beyond
the
simple
mechanical act of signing
an ordinance or resolution,
as a requisite to its
enforceability. Such power
accords the local chief
executive the discretion to
sustain a resolution or
ordinance in the first

instance or to veto it and

return it with his objections
to the Sanggunian, which
may proceed to reconsider
the
same. The
Sanggunian
concerned,
however, may override the
veto by a two-thirds (2/3)
vote of all its members
thereby
making
the
ordinance or resolution
effective for all legal
intents and purposes. It is
clear, therefore, that the
concurrence of a local
chief executive in the
enactment of an ordinance
or resolution requires, not
only a flourish of the pen,
but the application of
judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence
as well.
Petitioners
other
contention
that
the
Ombudsman should have
dismissed the present
case in view of a previous
dismissal of a similar
complaint involving the
same factual context is
likewise misplaced.
As
explained
by
Deputy Special Prosecutor
Leonardo P. Tamayo in his
comment, the other case
relied upon by petitioner
has no relation whatsoever
with
the
one
in
question. Notably,
the
former case was subject of
a separate complaint and
preliminary investigation,
hence, the findings and
records therein could not

be made part of the case

under consideration.
[7]

It must be stressed
that
the
Ombudsman
correctly relied on the
minutes taken during the
session
of
the
Sangguniang Bayan held
last July 27, 1992, which
petitioner
regards
as
inconclusive evidence of
what actually transpired
therein. In a long line of
cases, the Court, in
resolving
conflicting
assertions
of
the
protagonists in a case, has
placed reliance on the
minutes or the transcribed
stenographic notes to
ascertain the truth of the
proceedings therein.
The following cases
illustrate the importance of
the minutes:
It was held that contrary to
petitioners claim, what the
minutes only show is that on
August 12, 1994 the
Sanggunian took a vote on
the administrative case of
respondent Mayor and not
that it then rendered a
decision as required by
Section 66(a) of the Local
Government Code.
[8]

With the same factual context

as in the case at bar,
petitioners herein were
accused of having falsified
or caused the falsification of
the excerpts of the minutes of
the regular sessions of the

Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Quirino pr
ovince on August 15,
1988 and September 19,
1988. x x x.
[9]

In his resolution, Secretary

Drilon declared that there
were no written notices of
public hearings on the
proposed Manila Revenue
Code that were sent to
interested parties as required
by Article 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the
Local Government Code nor
were copies of the proposed
ordinance published in three
successive issues of a
newspaper of general
circulation pursuant to
Article 276(a). No minutes
were submitted to show that
the obligatory public
hearings had been held.
[10]

It appears from the minutes

of the board meeting of
February 28, 1958 that the
names of the members
present as well those who
were absent have been
recorded, and that all those
present took active part in the
debates and deliberations. At
the end of the session, when
the presiding officer asked
the members if there were
any objections to the
approval of the proposed
budget, only one councilor
raised an objection. The
minutes, therefore, could
readily show who of the
members present in the
deliberations voted pro and
who voted con.
[11]

The certification of the

election registrar relied upon
by the petitioner is correct as
far as it goes. Only 80 votes
appear to have voted
according to the precinct
book in the sense that only 80
voters affixed their signatures
thereon after voting. But this
does not necessarily mean
that no other voters cast their
ballots in the questioned
precinct: there were 279 in
all, according to the minutes
of voting, although only 80
of them signed the precinct
book.
[12]

As found by the trial

court, the said minutes of the
meeting of the Sangguniang
Bayan do not mention the
execution of any deed to
perfect the agreement. An
engineer was appointed to
survey the old abandoned
road, but this act does not in
any manner convey title over
the abandoned road to the
Pansacola spouses nor
extinguishes their ownership
over the land traversed by the
new provincial highway.
[13]

In the case at bar, the

minutes of the session
reveal
that
petitioner
attended the session of
the Sangguniang Bayan
on July 27, 1992. It is
evident, therefore, that
petitioner approved the
subject resolution knowing
fully well that the subject
matter treated therein was
neither taken up and
discussed nor passed

upon by the Sangguniang

Bayan
during
the
legislative session.

will encounter difficulty in

resolving the dispute at
hand.

Thus,
the
Court
accords full recognition to
the minutes as the official
repository of what actually
transpires
in
every
proceeding. It
has
happened that the minutes
may be corrected to reflect
the true account of a
proceeding, thus giving the
Court more reason to
accord them great weight
for
such
subsequent
corrections, if any, are
made
precisely
to
preserve the accuracy of
the records. In light of the
conflicting claims of the
parties in the case at bar,
the
Court,
without
resorting to the minutes,

With regard to the joint

affidavit of some members
of the Sangguniang Bayan
attesting to the actual
passage and approval of
Resolution No. 57-S-92,
the Court finds the same
to have been belatedly
submitted as a last minute
attempt
to
bolster
petitioners position, and,
therefore, could not in any
way aid the latters cause.

[14]

Indeed, the arguments

raised
by
petitioners
counsel are best taken up
in the trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, the
instant
petition
is

DISMISSED. The
assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan
dated
December 29, 1994, and
May 24, 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED. The
temporary
restraining
order issued by this Court
on September 18, 1995, is
hereby LIFTED.
The Sandiganbayan is
DIRECTED to set Criminal
Case No. 21073 for
arraignment and trial.
SO ORDERED.
Melo,
Francisco, and Panganiba
n, JJ., concur.
Narvasa,
C.J.,
(Chairman), on leave.