Bonnevie vs. Ca 3. Rosepacking Co. vs. Ca 4.bpi Investment Corp. vs. Ca

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1. Saura Import &Export Co., Inc v.

DBP
G.R. No. L-24968 April 27, 1972
Facts: Saura Inc. applied to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corp (before its conversion to DBP) for a loan of 500k
secured by a first mortgage of the factory building to
finance for the construction of a jute mill factory and
purchase of factory implements. RFC accepted and
approved the loan application subject to some
conditions which Saura admitted it could not comply
with. Without having received the amount being
loaned, and sensing that it could not at anyway obtain
the full amount of loan, Saura Inc. then asked for
cancellation of the mortgage which RFC also
approved. Nine years after the cancellation of the
mortgage, Saura sued RFC for damages for its nonfulfillment of obligations arguing that there was indeed
a perfected consensual contract between them.
Issue: Was there a perfected consensual contract?
Was there a real contract of loan which would warrant
recovery of damages arising out of breach of such
contract?
Held: On the first issue, yes, there was indeed a
perfected consensual contract, as recognized in Article
1934 of the Civil Code. There was undoubtedly offer
and acceptance in this case: the application of Saura,
Inc. for a loan of P500,000.00 was approved by
resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding
mortgage was executed and registered. But this fact
alone falls short of resolving the second issue and the
basic claim that the defendant failed to fulfill its
obligation and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to
recover damages. The action thus taken by both
partiesSaura's request for cancellation and RFC's
subsequent approval of such cancellationwas in the
nature of mutual desistance what Manresa terms
"mutuo disenso" which is a mode of extinguishing
obligations. It is a concept derived from the principle
that since mutual agreement can create a contract,
mutual disagreement by the parties can cause its
extinguishment. In view of such extinguishment, said
perfected consensual contract to deliver did not
constitute a real contract of loan.

1/4%/annum from Ayala Investment and


Development Corporation (AIDC), the predecessor
of BPI Investment Corp. (BPIIC), for the
construction of a house on his lot in New Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa.
He mortgaged the house and lot to AIDC as

security for the loan.


1980: Roa sold the house and lot to ALS

Management & Development Corp. and Antonio


Litonjua for P850K who paid P350K in cash and
assumed the P500K indebtness of ROA with AIDC.
AIDC proposed to grant ALS and
Litonjua a new loan for P500K with interested rate
of 20%/annum and service fee of 1%/annum on the
outstanding balance payable within 10 years

through equal monthly amortization of P9,996.58


and penalty interest of 21%/annum/day from the
date the amortization becomes due and payable.
March 1981: ALS and Litonjua executed

a mortgage deed containing the new stipulation


with the provision that the monthly amortization will
commence on May 1, 1981
August 13, 1982: ALS and Litonjua paid

BPIIC P190,601.35 reducing the P500K principal


loan to P457,204.90.
September 13, 1982: BPIIC released to ALS

and Litonjua P7,146.87, purporting to be what was


left of their loan after full payment of Roas loan
June 1984: BPIIC instituted foreclosure

proceedings against ALS and Litonjua on the


ground that they failed to pay
the mortgage indebtedness which from May 1,
1981 to June 30, 1984 amounting to P475,585.31
August 13, 1984: Notice of sheriff's sale was

published
February 28, 1985: ALS and Litonjua filed Civil

Case No. 52093 against BPIIC alleging that they


are not in arrears and instead they made an
overpayment as of June 30, 1984 since the P500K
loan was only released September 13, 1982 which
marked the start of the amortization and since
only P464,351.77 was released applying legal
compensation the balance of P35,648.23 should
be applied to the monthly amortizations
RTC: in favor of ALS and Litonjua and against

2. BONNEVIE VS. CA
3. ROSEPACKING CO. VS. CA
4.BPI INVESTMENT CORP. VS. CA

Frank Roa obtained a loan with interest rate of 16

BPIIC that the loan granted by BPI to ALS and


Litonjua was only in the principal sum of

contract. It is perfected only upon delivery of


the object of the contract. A contract o loan
involves a reciprocal obligation, wherein the
obligation or promise of each party is the
consideration for that of the other; it is a basic
principle in reciprocal obligations that neither
party incurs in delay, if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply is a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him

P464,351.77 and awarding moral damages,


exemplary damages and attorneys fees for the
publication
CA: Affirmed reasoning that a simple loan is

perfected upon delivery of the object of the contract


which is on September 13, 1982
ISSUE: W/N the contract of loan was perfected only on
September 13, 1982 or the second release of the loan?
HELD: YES. AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to
the award of damages. The award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondents is
DELETED, but the award to them of attorneys fees in
the amount of P50,000 is UPHELD. Additionally,
petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents

5.GARCIA VS. TRIO

P25,000 as nominal damages. Costs against petitioner.

obligation to pay commenced only on October

Respondent Thio received from


petitioner Garcia two crossed checks
which amount to US$100,000 and
US$500,000, respectively, payable to
the order of Marilou Santiago. According
to petitioner, respondent failed to pay
the principal amounts of the loans when
they fell due and so she filed a
complaint for sum of money and
damages with the RTC. Respondent
denied that she contracted the two
loans and countered that it was Marilou
Satiago to whom petitioner lent the
money. She claimed she was merely
asked y petitioner to give the checks to
Santiago. She issued the checks for
P76,000 and P20,000 not as payment of
interest
but
to
accommodate
petitioners request that respondent use
her own checks instead of Santiagos.

13, 1982, a month after the perfection of the


contract
contract of loan involves a reciprocal
obligation, wherein the obligation or promise of
each party is the consideration for that of the other.
It is a basic principle in reciprocal obligations that
neither party incurs in delay, if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him.
Consequently, petitioner could only demand for the
payment of the monthly amortization after
September 13, 1982 for it was only then when it
complied with its obligation underthe loan contract.

BPIIC was negligent in relying merely on the


entries found in the deed of mortgage, without
checking and correspondingly adjusting its records
on the amount actually released and the date when
it was released. Such negligence resulted in
damage for which an award of nominal damages
should be given
SSS where we awarded attorneys fees
because private respondents were compelled to
litigate, we sustain the award of P50,000 in favor of
private respondents as attorneys fees
Whether or not a contract of loan is a
consensual contract.

HELD
The Court held in the negative. A loan contract
is not a consensual contract but a real

6. PANTELEON VS. AMERICAN EXPRESS


INTERNATIONAL
7. GARCIA VS. THIO

FACTS

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.


CA reversed RTC and ruled that there
was no contract of loan between the
parties.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not there was a contract of
loan
between
petitioner
and
respondent.
(2) Who borrowed money from petitioner,
the respondent or Marilou Santiago?
HELD

(1)
The Court held in the
affirmative. A loan is a real contract, not
consensual, and as such I perfected
only upon the delivery of the object of
the contract. Upon delivery of the
contract of loan (in this case the money
received by the debtor when the checks
were encashed) the debtor acquires
ownership of such money or loan
proceeds and is bound to pay the
creditor an equal amount. It is
undisputed that the checks were
delivered to respondent.
(2)
However, the checks were
crossed and payable not to the order of
the respondent but to the order of a
certain Marilou Santiago. Delivery is the
act by which the res or substance is
thereof placed within the actual or
constructive possession or control of
another. Although respondent did not
physically receive the proceeds of the
checks, these instruments were placed
in her control and possession under an
arrangement whereby she actually relent the amount to Santiago.
Petition
granted;
judgment
resolution reversed and set aside.

and

8. REPUBLIC VS. CA
9. QUINTOS VS. BECK
10. 10. DE LOS SANTOS VS. JARRA
Facts: The Plaintiff Felix delos Santos filed this suit
against Agustina Jarra. Jarra was the administratix of the
estate of Jimenea. Plaintiff alleged that he owned 10 1st
class carabaos which he lent to his father-in-law Jimenea
to be used in the animal-power mill without
compensation. This was done on the condition of their
return after the work at the latters mill is terminated.
When delos Santos demanded the return of the animals
Jimenea refused, hence this suit.
Issue: W/N the contracts is one of a commodatum
Ruling:
YES. The carabaos were given on commodatum as these
were delivered to be used by defendant. Upon failure of

defendant to return the cattle upon demand, he is under


the obligation to indemnify the plaintiff by paying him
their value. Since the 6 carabaos were not the property of
the deceased or of any of his descendants, it is the duty of
the administratrix of the estate to either return them or
indemnify the owner thereof of their value.

11. manzano vs. perez


12. PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
CA
Facts:
Vives (will be the creditor in this case) was
asked by his friend Sanchez to help the
latters friend, Doronilla (will be the debtor
in this case) in incorporating Doronillas
business Strela. This help basically
involved Vives depositing a certain amount
of money in Strelas bank account for
purposes of incorporation (rationale:
Doronilla had to show that he had sufficient
funds for incorporation). This amount shall
later be returned to Vives.
Relying on the assurances and
representations of Sanchez and Doronilla,
Vives issued a check of P200,00 in favor of
Strela and deposited the same into Strelas
newly-opened bank account (the passbook
was given to the wife of Vives and the
passbook had an instruction that no
withdrawals/deposits will be allowed unless
the passbook is presented).
Later on, Vives learned that Strela was no
longer holding office in the address
previously given to him. He later found out
that the funds had already been withdrawn
leaving only a balance of P90,000. The
Vives spouses tried to withdraw the
amount, but it was unable to since the
balance had to answer for certain postdated
checks issued by Doronilla.
Doronilla made various tenders of check in
favor of Vives in order to pay his debt. All of
which were dishonored.
Hence, Vives filed an action for recovery of
sum against Doronilla, Sanchez, Dumagpi
and Producers Bank.
TC & CA: ruled in favor of Vives.
Issue/s:
(1) WON the transaction is a commodatum
or a mutuum. COMMODATUM.

(2) WON the fact that there is an additional


P 12,000 (allegedly representing interest)
in the amount to be returned to Vives
converts the transaction from
commodatum to mutuum. NO.
(3) WON Producers Bank is solidarily liable
to Vives, considering that it was not privy
to the transaction between Vives and
Doronilla. YES.
Held/Ratio:
(1) The transaction is a commodatum.
CC 1933 (the provision distinguishing
between the two kinds of loans) seem to
imply that if the subject of the contract is a
consummable thing, such as money, the
contract would be a mutuum. However,
there are instances when a commodatum
may have for its object a consummable
thing. Such can be found in CC 1936 which
states that consummable goods may be
the subject of commodatum if the purpose
of the contract is not the consumption of
the object, as when it is merely for
exhibition. In this case, the intention of the
parties was merely for exhibition. Vives
agreed to deposit his money in Strelas
account specifically for purpose of making it
appear that Streal had sufficient

capitalization for incorporation, with the


promise that the amount should be returned
withing 30 days.
(2) CC 1935 states that the bailee in
commodatum acquires the use of the thing
loaned but not its fruits. In this case, the
additional P 12,000 corresponds to the fruits
of the lending of the P 200,000.
(3) Atienza, the Branch Manager of Producers
Bank, allowed the withdrawals on the
account of Strela despite the rule written in
the passbook that neither a deposit, nor a
withdrawal will be permitted except upon
the production of the passbook (recall in this
case that the passbook was in the
possession of the wife of Vives all along).
Hence, this only proves to show that Atienza
allowed the withdrawals because he was
party to Doronillas scheme of defrauding
Vives. By virtue of CC 2180, PNB, as
employer, is held primarily and solidarily
liable for damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. Atienzas acts, in helpong
Doronilla, a customer of the bank, were
obviously done in furtherance of the
business of the bank, even though in the
process, Atienza violated some rules.

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