6/22/2014

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

Then let us again examine whether that is a sound statement, or do we let it pass,
and if one of us, or someone else, merely says that something is so, do we accept
that it is so? Or should we examine what the speaker means?
Socrates, Euthryphro 9e [G.M.A. Grube translation, Plato, Five Dialogues, Euthyphro,
Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, Hackett Publishing Company, 1981, p. 14]

The professor of philosophy who forgets that philosophy is about wisdom may still
be a real lover of knowledge, may still be a great creative scholar, and may even
still be a very good person, but he will not really be a philosopher. When he
speaks, especially on moral, practical, or political matters, his words may represent
nothing but the most dangerous folly, without the Socratic perspective and drive to
correct it. All too often, brilliant fools seem to be the stock-in-trade of academia
and the intelligentsia.
Enklinobarangus (

This page is intended as a brief description of ideas and principles characteristic of the Friesian and other
modifications of Kantian philosophy editorially recommended in the Proceedings of the Friesian School,
Fourth Series. More detailed explanations will be found elsewhere at the site. For brevity, familiarity with certain
philosophical issues and theories is often presupposed, so these descriptions may not be as accessible as the
essays listed on the Home Page under "Topics and Essays on the Site".

Epistemology
Kantian epistemology is foundationalist and rationalistic in a qualified sense. Kant allowed that there were
synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics, grounded in "pure intuition," in metaphysics, grounded on
the Principle of the Possibility of Experience, and in morality, grounded on Pure Reason acting as the
Moral Law. Fries and Nelson modified Kantian epistemology, first, by clarifying that synthetic a priori
propositions are not proven by Kantian "Deduction," second, by clearly distinguishing immediate
knowledge, which is the ground of synthetic propositions, from mediate knowledge, which is expressed in
propositional form and may be justified by immediate knowledge, and, third, by distinguishing intuitive
from non-intuitive immediate knowledge.
On Friesian principles, the common argument against the existence of immediate knowledge, that it would
require us to claim that certain synthetic propositions are infallible and incorrigible, which today no longer
seems credible, fails. Immediate knowledge as the ground of synthetic propositions may in some sense be
http://www.friesian.com/friesian.htm

1/6

6/22/2014

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

infallible and incorrigible, but the expression of any propositions themselves, as items of knowledge, is
mediate. Mediate knowledge presupposes many things that are not part of immediate knowledge, e.g. the
meanings of words in natural languages, or items of implicit knowledge. Thus, mediate knowledge is
always fallible and corrigible. This allows Friesian epistemology to accommodate a hermeneutic
dimension of interpretation and reinterpretation, with the common sense limitation that the interpretations
of synthetic propositions must be recognized as grounded by immediate knowledge in order to be true.
If synthetic a priori propositions are not grounded in intuitive immediate knowledge, where the ground
need merely be shown ("demonstrated" in Friesian terminology) for fallible and corrigible justification, then
they can only be grounded in non-intuitive immediate knowledge. Such a ground cannot be "shown." The
difference between discovery and justification then becomes significant. Discovery is handled by Nelson's
theory of Socratic Method. But while Nelson's theory of Socratic Method as "abstraction" is intuitionistic
and inadequate, the theory is easily reformulated in terms of Popper's theory of falsification, which
winnows out inconsistent items. Popper's theory of scientific method, where theories are imaginatively
generated, may thus be coupled with the Socratic injunction, "Say what you believe," to recover what
Kant called the "quid facti" of rational knowledge.
The theory of non-intuitive immediate knowledge frees the Kantian epistemology of synthetic a priori
propositions from the narrow confines of the Principle of the Possibility of Experience and from vague
appeals to Pure Reason as the ground of the Moral Law. Instead, independent axiomatic systems become
possible for varieties of non-empirical knowledge, not just metaphysics but also the multiple value systems
of morality, aesthetics, and religion. However, a difference remains, as follows in the next section, between
phenomena and things-in-themselves which, among other things, limits mathematical knowledge from
application beyond phenomenal reality.
Friesian epistemology is basically an internalist theory of knowledge. "Externalist" theories, based on some
external relationship, like causality, to account for knowledge, are rejected on the principle that the
difference between knowledge and opinion can only be distinguished on the basis of some internal
evidence. No external relationship is available for internal examination as evidence for knowledge. On
the other hand, Kantian metaphysics, as follows, holds that external relationships are internal in that the
objects of experience are phenomenal contents of consciousness. Thus Friesian epistemology in fact can
subsume externalist considerations within itself. (However, note well, the treatment in "Ontological
Undecidability" and elsewhere shifts the meaning of "external" and "internal" so that Kant-Friesian
epistemology is neither externalist nor internalist.)
Similarly, Friesian epistemology combines both the coherence and the correspondence theories of truth:
the coherence of mediate with immediate knowledge, but then the correspondence of mediate
knowledge to the empirically real phenomenal objects that are present in immediate knowledge. This
avoids traditional criticisms of coherence, that it allows for no relationship to reality, since reality is in
immediate knowledge, and traditional criticisms of correspondence, that it posits a ground of truth
inaccessible to knowledge, since phenomenal objects are within consciousness.
Thus, on several fronts, Kant-Friesian epistemology passes over into metaphysical considerations.

Metaphysics
http://www.friesian.com/friesian.htm

2/6

6/22/2014

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

Kantian metaphysics recognizes the difference between phenomena and things-in-themselves.

Schopenhauer thought this was the most important thing about Kant's thought. Nevertheless, Kant's
phenomenalism is often mistaken for some kind of subjectivist, conceptualist, or psychologistic theory. The
key point about it all, therefore, is that Kant's phenomenalism is a theory of
empirical realism, according to which we are directly acquainted with
real external objects in space and time. Unlike the familiar case of Descartes,
what Kant would call "transcendental realism," we are not merely acquainted
with the internal and private contents of our minds, though phenomena are
that too (see "Ontological Undecidability"). Instead, we are justified in our
common sense attitude towards the world, whereby Dr. Johnson refuted
Bishop Berkeley by kicking the table. This implies that the real objects of
experience are present in our perception, and Kant's theory is that this is correct. Such a theory precludes
the Cartesian threats of scepticism or solipsism.
On the other hand, there are things-in-themselves. Traditionally these could be interpreted as the "real"
objects ("transcendental realism"), turning Kant's "transcendental idealism" into just another version of
Descartes or Berkeley, raising the same classic Cartesian problems of knowledge, mind and body, etc.
Schopenhauer realized the most clearly the mistake involved in that interpretation; and, since he didn't
think that plurality applied beyond perceptual objects, he always carefully referred to the "thing-in-itself"
rather than to "things-in-themselves." The scruple is not necessary, but it does reveal that things-inthemselves are not a parallel order of objects over and above phenomenal objects. They are just the
transcendent aspect of those very same phenomenal objects. They are indeed things (as we see them) "in
themselves."
The transcendence of phenomenal objects encompasses different things:
1. The existence of objects in so far as they are separate and independent from our
existence. This is conformable to Heidegger's distinction between beings (nta in Greek, "being
things"), which are individual and phenomenal, and Being (enai in Greek, "to be"), which is general
and "hidden," although manifest in the nta. It is also conformable to Spinoza's distinction between
natura naturata, "nature natured," manifest individual things, and natura naturans, "nature
naturing," the hidden power that manifests the individual things. What seemed like no more than an
epistemological or psychology theory in Descartes is thus a metaphysical distinction instead,
although this needed clarifying after the way Kant formulated it.
2. Aspects of reality that may be unconditioned. In phenomenal reality everything conditions
everything else, which requires a deterministic and naturalistic view of the world. Unconditioned
objects, like Kant's "Ideas" of God (an absolutely unconditioned object, as Spinoza had defined
God), freedom (an unconditioned cause), and immortality (the unconditioned self as the soul),
simply cannot exist in such a deterministic and naturalistic universe. However, such issues also
intrude into science, since cosmology deals with the unconditioned object of the universe as a
whole. Thus, whether space and time are finite or infinite, and whether the universe has a beginning
or an end, trouble the consideration of people who are far above metaphysical speculations about
God or the soul. Kant treated all such problems together, as transcending phenomenal reality: No
unconditioned object is an object of a possible experience. Significantly, the Buddhist philosophical
doctrines of "dependent origination" and "relative existence" parallel the Kantian theory of
http://www.friesian.com/friesian.htm

3/6

6/22/2014

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

conditioned, phenomenal reality -- just as the Buddhist doctrines of Nirvana and space as
unconditioned things parallel the Kantian theory of "Ideas" and the Antinomies. Furthermore, Kant's
theory of the Antinomies now can be extended to Set Theory, where it has become evident that an
unconditioned whole, like the Universal Set, produces contradictions -- famous paradoxes like
Russell's, or the Nelson-Grelling Paradox introduced in the pages of the Abhandlungen der
Fries'schen Schule, Neue Folge itself.
3. The dimension of value in objects. Hume's famous distinction between matters of fact and
matters of value has led many people to assume that "value judgments" have no basis in reality,
since the reality that we perceive is factual. Hume's distinction, however, would be no surprise to
Plato, who believed that value was based, not on the things of experience, but on the transcendent
Forms. Kantian theory is that such a transcendent aspect of things is not a separate World, as
Plato had thought, but is present in things-in-themselves. The view that all we perceive in
phenomenal objects is factual, however, is mistaken. Plato himself esteemed beauty as the
particular form of value that actually can be seen in things. To make this consistent with the rest of
his theory, however, he had to say that beautiful objects were only "shadows" of the higher reality,
"participating" in the Form of Beauty. Although Kant's own aesthetics were subjectivist (the theory
of the Critique of Judgment), his metaphysics could allow for a more literal rendering of Plato's
own claim about beauty: Since transcendence is in phenomenal objects, the beauty that we see in
things is in fact a perception right through factual reality to Beauty Itself.
Kantian metaphysics, with some minor clarifications and modifications, thus accomplishes a great deal,
especially in providing a sort of "phase space" for matters of value, although much the same thing had
originally been done by Plato. See also "A New Kant-Friesian System of Metaphysics" and "Meaning and
the Problem of Universals, A Kant-Friesian Approach."

Ethics and Value Theory

Kant's desire to derive the ultimate principle of morality, and really of all value, from the pure form,
universality, and rule making function of reason itself was not well conceived, successful, or persuasive.
Nevertheless, his project can be sympathetically interpreted and reformed. The Moral Law, as a synthetic
a priori proposition, actually cannot be derived from anything, let alone some logician's version of what
reason is. Nelson was correct that Socratic Method would be the means to the discovery of such
propositions, though, as I have noted, the logic of Socratic Method must be clarified through Popper's
insights into falsification. The Moral Law, indeed, may be formulated rather like Kant's own "means and
ends" version, though Schopenhauer claimed not to understand what this was supposed to mean.
The other problem with Kant's project was its moralism: The view that morality is ultimately the only form
of value, which is implied by the idea that morality is the direct dictation of the form of reason itself.
Following Schiller's denial of this, Nelson ultimately developed a complete theory of ethical "Ideals" that
were not merely moral ideals. This kind of theory is here labelled the Polynomic Theory of Value, and is
elaborated beyond Nelson to specify that there are six "domains" of value that are axiomatically
independent of each other. This allows for a realistic view of aesthetics, as suggested under "Metaphysics"
above.

http://www.friesian.com/friesian.htm

4/6

6/22/2014

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

Political Economy
A conspicuous thing about the lives of both Fries and Nelson was their political activism. In both cases,
this was not always to good effect. In the long run, Fries may be said to have been on the "right side" in
resistance to Prussian and Austrian Reaction, but this also involved a promotion of German racialist
nationalism that ultimately very much became the "wrong side." Nelson, in turn, was forthrightly opposed
to the nationalism that would eventually motivate Germans to draw much of Europe down into a living hell
of tyranny, war, and mass murder; but he also mistakenly subscribed to socialist principles that helped
promote totalitarian regimes and also introduced corrupting and dangerous influences even into the
democracies, the consequences of which, with the election and relection of Bill Clinton in the United
States in 1992 and 1996, and the return to power of the British Laborites and French Socialists in 1997,
and German Socialists in 1998, have still not played out entirely.
The Friesian tradition, however, leads to classic and brilliant defenses of capitalism. Popper's
understanding of falsification inspired his friend F.A. Hayek in his formulation of the principles of Austrian
Economics originally developed by Ludwig von Mises. In retrospect, the Austrian theory that the free
market serves to cordinate limited and diffused knowledge may be assimilated to a Popperian
reformulation of Socratic Method, in that each is a means of dealing with our own ignorance, a self-aware
Socratic Ignorance. Similarly, Nelson's suspicions of democracy can be set aside on the same principles.
The defense of capitalism may also be assimilated to the Polynomic Theory of Value; for capitalism on the
Austrian interpretation requires that the values exchanged in the free market be relative and different:
Parties A and B exchange goods X and Y because X really is more valuable to B than to A and Y really
is more valuable to A than to B. That is why the exchange takes place. Thus, the relativity of non-moral
ethical value ("hortative" value here) is distinct from the absolute requirements of moral value ("imperative"
value ever since Kant).
The Friesian tradition has long been playing catch up with Adam Smith, but fortunately, with F.A. Hayek,
it caught up and went ahead. In the Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series, the tradition
may now be fully integrated into the great heritage of Classical Liberalism. As Karl Popper and Julius
Kraft moved the focus of the School to Britain, it is appropriate that the English language continuation of
the School in this journal should more fully assimilate the Liberal content of the English tradition, which is
at once so characteristic of it and at the same time so different from the hostility to Liberal principles that
marked Germany and German philosophy in the days of both Fries and Nelson (e.g. Hegel and
Heidegger) and even still today (when Heidegger has been turned into "deconstruction" and "postmodernism" -- both bywords for trendy leftism, as in the case of Richard Rorty).

Philosophy of Religion
Fries's view of religion had added an aesthetic dimension to Kant's moralistic "religion within the limits of
reason alone." Nelson's associate Rudolf Otto, however, recognized that religion contained even more
than this: The sense of the "sacred" or the "holy" was not just a matter of moral judgment, as Kant had
thought, nor even also just a matter of aesthetic judgment, as Fries had added, but was special and sui
generis in its own independent modality. The only argument Otto needed for this was a descriptive and
phenomenological one based on historical religions. That God might ask Abraham to sacrifice his son, or
that Jesus might take the sins of the world upon himself in the Crucifixion, or that Salvation might be by
http://www.friesian.com/friesian.htm

5/6

6/22/2014

The Principles of Friesian Philosophy

"faith alone," as separately taught by Luther and Shinran, are

all aspects of religion that could not be captured either by
morality or by aesthetics. The traditional response of
philosophers, ever since Xenophanes and Socrates, was to
ignore or dismiss them as immoral or unedifying; but this
clearly fails to "save the phenomena." Only Otto, on the
basis of Friesian epistemology and metaphysics, could
realize their significance. "Salvation" as a religious concept,
whether in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism, is
independent of morality and aesthetics. Even in Judaism,
"walking in the ways of the Lord," clearly involves obeying
regulations for ritual purity and distinctive behaviors that
cannot be given either a moral or aesthetic justification.
While the bien pensants at the beginning of the 20th
Century figured that religion would wither away in the face of
scientific enlightenment, this did not happen; and at the
beginning of the 21th Century the danger of religious
fanaticism feeding large scale wars is greater than it has been
since perhaps the Thirty Years War. While this has enabled
frank atheists (e.g. Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins)
to again blame human evils on religion, they are in the awkward position of explaining why their alternative
has remained so unpopular (or, for that matter, was associated with ideological mass murder in the 20th
Century). Instead, people have understood all too well that a world merely of science, without religious
transcendence, is a bleak Existential desert, devoid of meaning. With the addition of Otto and Hayek, the
Friesian School hopefully achieves a broad, enlightened, and non-reductionistic approach to all the
problems of philosophy and of the human condition.

Return to Friesian School on the Home Page

Return to The Project of the Friesian School on the Home Page
The Sources and Influence of the Kant-Friesian School
History of Philosophy
Home Page Contents
Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2007 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved

http://www.friesian.com/friesian.htm

6/6