DIONISIA VALENCIA vs.

HONORIO ACALA
G.R. No. 16256
September 28, 1921

FACTS:
Dionisia Valencia, and her deceased husband, Daniel Adepueng, conveyed to one
Severino Agbagala and his wife Francisca Cadapan the land in question as they
acknowledge being indebted to Severino Agbagala in the sum of P6.75, which they will
pay with the fruits of the land the possession of which they now turn over to him. They
have mortgaged it for P6.75, in a condition that they may redeem it by paying the same
price, without taking into account the fruits of the land and the interest on the money.
Later on in the year 1899, Francisca Cadapan, wife of Severino Agbagala, conveyed
this same property to Juan Cagayat and Josefa Galendis. That the possession of the
land passed to Pedro Acala, who is one of the Acalas, the defendants in the present
action. In the year 1912, the herein defendants Acala sold the land unconditionally to the
herein defendant Bagayanan for the sum of P70.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the contract in question was one of sale with the right of
repurchase or an antichresis.
RULING:
It is a contract of antichresis and not of sale with the right of repurchase. It is evident
that the antichretic creditor and his successors in interest cannot acquire ownership by
prescription of the realty given in antichresis. Therefore, such a contract should be
classified as one of antichresis, by means of which the creditor acquires the right to
collect the fruits of the real property turned over to him by his debtor, but with the
obligation to apply them to the payment of whatever interest is due and the contracting
parties may stipulate that the interest of the debt be paid by the fruits of the property
given in antichresis.

CARLOS PARDO DE TAVERA vs. EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC.,

G.R. No. L-45963
October 12, 1939

FACTS:
On January 17, 1931, defendant corporation, Tavera-Luna Inc., for the purpose of
constructing the Crystal Arcade building on its premises at Escolta, Manila. To secure
this loan, the corporation executed a first mortgage on said premises and on the building
proposed to be erected thereon. On February 11, 1932, Tavera-Luna, Inc., secured from
El Hogar Filipino an additional loan of P300,000 with the same security executed for the
original loan. The Tavera-Luna, Inc., thereafter, defaulted in the payment of the monthly
amortizations on the loan: whereupon, El Hogar Filipino foreclosed the mortgage
proceeded with the extra-judicial sale of the Crystal Arcade building, at which it was the
highest bidder for P1,363,555.36. One day before the expiration of the period of
redemption, Carlos Pardo de Tavera and Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano, in their
capacity as stockholders of the Tavera-Luna, Inc., and El Hogar Filipino, Inc., to annul
the two secured loans as well as extra-judicial sale made in favor of the latter. Vicente
Madrigal was included as party defendant because of his having signed the second
contract of loans aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contracts in question were one of mortgage or an antichresis.
RULING:
It is contended that the contracts in question are not of mortgage, but of antichresis.
The distinction, however, is immaterial, for even if the contracts are of antichresis, the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the security is valid. Stipulations in a contract of antichresis
for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the security may be allowed in the same manner as
they are allowed in contracts of mortgage and of pledge. On the other hand, a loan given
on a property which may be considered as a public building is not, in itself, null and void.
It is unlawful to make loans on that kind of security, but the law does not declare the
loan, once made, to be null and void. The unlawful taking of the security may constitute a
misuser of the powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter, for which it may be
made to answer in an action for ouster or dissolution; but certainly the stockholders and
depositors of the corporation should not be punished with a loss of the money loaned
nor the borrower be rewarded with it.

PERFECTO DE LA VEGA vs. TOMAS BALLILOS

G.R. No. L-9957
August 8, 1916

FACTS:
On May 9, 1913, plaintiffs through their counsel filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, alleging as a cause of action that they were the sole heirs of their
common predecessors in interest, Victor de la Vega and Ursula de Guzman, who at their
deaths were in possession of a parcel of land measuring six cavans and a half. About
the year 1895, Fidel de la Vega, one of the co owners of the said property, in
consideration of a loan of P430 which he had received from the defendant Tomas
Balielos (or Ballilos) conveyed to the latter the parcels of land Nos. 1, 4, and 6, by
means of a contract of antichresis, until such time as the said debtor, or some one of the
coowners of the land, should return the said borrowed sum; that subsequently, to wit, in
the year 1905, the plaintiffs, with the exception of Policarpo de la Vega, successively
borrowed from the defendant the sums of P40, P18 and P60, under the same contract of
antichresis, but this time they gave as security the lots marked Nos. 2, 3, and 7, from
which lots the defendant was to collect the interest due, as in fact he did, from the date
of the encumbrance of the said parcels of land up to the time the complaint was filed
when they offered to pay the defendant the said sums of P430, P40, P18, and P60, a
total of P548, in order to reacquire the said parcels; but that the defendant refused and
still unlawfully refuses to receive the said sums and has appropriated to himself the said
parcels of land. The plaintiffs therefore prayed that the defendant be ordered to deliver
the restore the said parcels of land to them, after they should have paid him the sum of
P548, and that he be further ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P500 for the
losses and damages suffered by them, with the costs of the proceedings against the
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is an antichresis, as contended by the plaintiffs, or a
sale under pacto de retro,
RULING:
It is a contract of antichresis. The contract cannot be construed as a mortgage of the
neither can it be held to be a sale under pacto de retro inasmuch it contains no mention
whatever of any sale with right of redemption, although it does say that the debtor ceded
and conveyed to the creditor the ownership and possession of the lands in order that he
might manage and enjoy them in consideration of the sum for which they were
mortgaged. As stated in Article 1881. By antichresis a creditor acquires a right to receive
the fruits of real property of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment
of interest, if due, and afterwards to the principal of his credit.

AMOS A. DAVIS vs. FRANCISCA NEYRA

G.R. No. L-6939
March 7, 1913

FACTS:
Julian Palma sold the house in question on the 18th day of February, 1909, to the
plaintiff, Amos A. Davis, for the sum of P1, 000. According to the terms of the contract it
was agreed by both parties that the vendor should remain in actual possession of the
house on and after the 18th day of February, 1909, as the tenant of the vendee, by
paying P15 per month rent. The vendor paid the rent as agreed upon for twelve months
only. Julian Palma sold the house on June 28, 1909, with the right to repurchase the
same on or before the 24th of the following month, to Emilio Esteban, for the sum of
P595. Under the terms of this contract Palma was to occupy the house free of rent. On
the 23rd day of September, 1909, for the consideration of P600, Palma made an
absolute sale of the house to Esteban, and transferred the same on that date. On the
21st of December of the same year Esteban sold and transferred the house to one Jose
Colomeda. Colomeda on the 19th day of December sold the house to the present
defendant for the sum of P1, 300. The defendant went into the actual possession of the
house on this date, and has actually occupied the same up to the present time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is one with the right to repurchase or one of antichresis.
RULING:
The contract entered into between the plaintiff and Julian Palma is sufficient to show
that the sale was one with the right to repurchase within the period of two years. This is
specifically stated in the contract. The parties agreed that if Palma did not repurchase
this property within two years, the plaintiff would become the absolute owner. The
contract itself says that the sale was one of venta con pacto de retro. The house in
dispute is real property. On the very day that the plaintiff bought to the house he entered
into possession. Palma then became the tenant of the plaintiff. The possession of the
tenant, in so far as the questions in this case are concerned, is the possession of the
landlord. After the sale between Palma and the plaintiff, the former had nothing left to sell
except his right to repurchase. He could not legally transfer the actual possession of the
house to anyone. Such a transfer, if made, could not prejudice the title acquired by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff having purchased the property and having received from the
vendee the possession of the same, his title cannot be defeated by that of the
defendant. The defendant, being a possessor in good faith, is relieved from the payment
of rents

FELICIDAD A. DE PALAD vs. SAITO and JOSE MADRAZO

G.R. Nos. L-32482
March 14, 1931
FACTS:
In the period between January, 1923, and September, 1924, Palad executed three
documents which are of particular interest. The first document in point of time purported to
be a contract of antichresis. Palad, in consideration of the amount of P20, 925.09, ceded by
way of antichresis his abaca plantation, the exception of a small part thereof, to K. Saito. The
P20, 925.09 was made up of the accounts of Palad with the Ohta Development Company,
the Mintal Plantation Company, Vicente Uy Tan Chang, and K. Saito. The document was
verified before a notary public and J. A. Sarenas, the attorney for Palad, signed as one of the
instrumental witnesses. Upon the execution of the document, Palad delivered the plantation
to Saito, who proceeded to cultivate and develop it. By another document, this time of sale,
dated January 26, 1923, Palad transferred to Saito the buildings on the land, five hemp
stripping machines, and three carabaos for the sum of P5, 333.46. By the terms of the
agreement this sum was to be discounted from the P20, 925.09, the consideration of the
contract of antichresis. On September 27, 1924, Palad executed a third document, whereby
he transferred the abaca plantation to Jose Madrazo for the sum of P3, 500. Saito, in turn,
consented to the sale, since it was subject to the encumbrance in his favor, by virtue of the
contract of antichresis. This document was acknowledged by the parties before the clerk of
court of Davao. Palad received P100 in cash, and a promissory note for the remaining P3,
400 was signed by K. Ohsihiro. Thereafter, Madrazo attempted to take possession of the
plantation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are liable for damages.
RULING:
Yes. The trial judge allowed the plaintiffs damages in this case in the amount of P33,
267.66, and in the companion case damages in the amount of P8, 800. It condemns the
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P33, 267.66.
Although, the defendants have improved the plantation to the advantage of the plaintiffs.
The defendants have also assumed debts of the plaintiffs amounting to somewhere near
P20, 000. It would not be far from justice to permit the benefits derived from the
defendants to balance the damages caused by the defendants, permitting, of course,
Jose Madrazo to withdraw the P3, 400 which has been deposited in court.

BALDOMERO BAUTISTA VS. ALEJANDRO CABLAY, TUASONS AND DE VEYRAS

G.R. NO. L-18589
OCTOBER 31, 1962
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Baldomero, Andres, Angelo, Eufemia, Valeriano and Jose, all surnamed
Bautista, as well as the deceased Paula Bautista who was survived by her children
Margarita and Teofilo, both surnamed De Veyra, who should be joined as parties
plaintiffs, but are named as defendants, because plaintiffs do not know their
whereabouts, and have been unable, therefore, to contact them allege, in their
amended complaint; that they are the legitimate children of Alberto Bautista, deceased,
from whom they inherited two (2) parcels of Riceland. The aforementioned riceland was
mortgaged by said Alberto Bautista, during his lifetime, to secure the payment of a debt
in the sum of P1,500, to Anastacio Tuason, who had held the aforementioned property
and received the products thereof, netting about P2,000 a year, with the obligation to
apply the same to the payment of said debt, which has thus been more than fully settled;
that, upon the death of Anastacio Tuason, his widow, defendant, Alejandra Cablay, their
children, defendants, Juana, Felisa, Magdalena, Filomena, Jose and Alberto, all
surnamed Tuason, as well as defendants Daniel Frianeza and Graciano Barroso,
succeeded the deceased in the aforesaid possession; and that, despite repeated
demands, the defendants have refused and still refuse, without just cause, to surrender
said possession to plaintiffs herein who, accordingly, prayed that judgment be rendered
declaring that the said debt of Alberto Bautista in favor of Anastacio Tuason has been
fully paid; that the entry of the aforementioned mortgage in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan be ordered cancelled; and that the defendants be ordered to
render accounts of the fruits of the property above referred to respectively received by
that and to turn over to plaintiffs the value of said fruits, after deducting the sum of
P1,500, representing the original final debt of Alberto Bautista, as well as the possession
of said property and to pay damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint amount to an averment of
antichresis
RULING:
The appeal by the plaintiffs, who maintain that a dismissal upon said ground is
proper only when it is borne out by the allegations of the complaint; that such is not the
situation obtaining in the case at bar, and the lower court labored under the impression
that the contract between Alberto Bautista and Anastacio Tuason was an ordinary
mortgage, which is erroneous, because it is alleged in the amended complaint that the
land was held by Anastacio Tuason with the obligation to apply its products to the
payment of his credit against Alberto Bautista, and, hence, under a contract of

antichresis; and that an action to recover a land held under such contract does not
prescribe. . It is not true that the special defense of prescription of action may be upheld
only when borne out by the allegations of the complaint. Appellants' pretense would have
some color of validity had the order appealed from been issued upon a motion to
dismiss, without taking any evidence on the plea of prescription.
SEVERINA ROSALES AND PUREZA CONGZON vs. LOECADIO S. TANSECO
G.R. No. L-4135
November 29, 1951

FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the widow and daughter, respectively, of Eustaquio Congzon, who
owned with his wife a piece of land with improvements. On August 15, 1927, defendant
Loecadio S. Tanseco prepared fictitious mortgage of the land in favor of Tan Tay San,
which he made Eustaquio Congson sign without consideration. That document was
subsequently cancelled to be substituted in May 30, 1930 by another "mortgage" 1 for
P26,000 in favor of defendant Tan Sun, which Eustaquio Congzon again signed thru
fraud and without consideration. On March 30, 1932 Tan Sun transferred all his rights to
defendant Tan Tay San, who in turn assigned his interests to defendant Leocadio
Tanseco in April, 1936.
For second cause of action the complaint incorporates the pertinent allegations of
the first, and asserts that the buildings on the lot were totally burned in June 1942; that
said buildings have always been occupied by the mortgagees, and never by Eustaquio
Congzon; but that the plaintiffs, who never enjoyed the possession and fruits of their
land, did satisfy taxes thereon amounting to P39,480.75.
In their third cause of action, the plaintiffs stated that from and after the destruction
of the buildings on June 8, 1942, they were in actual and quiet possession of the lot until
June 1, 1946, when defendant Leocadio Tanseco, thru force, intimidation and strategy,
and without their consent, occupied the property and constructed thereon a house, all to
their damage prejudice. Plaintiffs prayed that they be declared owners of the lot, that the
"mortgage" documents and assignments be annulled, and that Leocadio Tanseco be
ordered to vacate and pay damages and costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract was a contract of mortgage or a contract of antichresis
RULING:
The contract although entitled "Escritura de Hipoteca" was in reality a contract of
antichresis. In a contract of antichresis the creditor is obliged to pay the taxes on the
property, unless the contract says otherwise (Art. 1882 Civil Code). The contract
between Eustaquio Congzon and Tan Sun said nothing about taxes. Hence it was the
obligation of the creditor or creditors to pay the taxes on the property at issue herein.
Furthermore the third cause of action, posed the question: Where the antichretic
debtor peacefully in possession of the premises given as guaranty is ejected thru force

or strategy by the antichretic creditor does he have a right of action?Under the Civil
Code every possessor is entitled to be respected in his possession: and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected, or possession shall be restored to him, by the
means established by the laws of procedure (Art. 446). And a possessor, however he
may acquired thereof without legal proceedings.