Encyclical Letter
Encyclical Letter
Encyclical Letter
FIDES ET RATIO
OF THE SUPREME PONTIFF
JOHN PAUL II
TO THE BISHOPS
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON
Blessing
My Venerable Brother Bishops,
Health and the Apostolic Blessing!
Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and
God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truthin a word, to know himselfso that, by
knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves
(cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2).
5. On her part, the Church cannot but set great value upon reason's drive to attain goals which render
people's lives ever more worthy. She sees in philosophy the way to come to know fundamental truths
about human life. At the same time, the Church considers philosophy an indispensable help for a
deeper understanding of faith and for communicating the truth of the Gospel to those who do not yet
know it.
Therefore, following upon similar initiatives by my Predecessors, I wish to reflect upon this special
activity of human reason. I judge it necessary to do so because, at the present time in particular, the
search for ultimate truth seems often to be neglected. Modern philosophy clearly has the great merit of
focusing attention upon man. From this starting-point, human reason with its many questions has
developed further its yearning to know more and to know it ever more deeply. Complex systems of
thought have thus been built, yielding results in the different fields of knowledge and fostering the
development of culture and history. Anthropology, logic, the natural sciences, history, linguistics and so
forththe whole universe of knowledge has been involved in one way or another. Yet the positive
results achieved must not obscure the fact that reason, in its one-sided concern to investigate human
subjectivity, seems to have forgotten that men and women are always called to direct their steps
towards a truth which transcends them. Sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of
caprice, and their state as person ends up being judged by pragmatic criteria based essentially upon
experimental data, in the mistaken belief that technology must dominate all. It has happened therefore
that reason, rather than voicing the human orientation towards truth, has wilted under the weight of so
much knowledge and little by little has lost the capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise
to the truth of being. Abandoning the investigation of being, modern philosophical research has
concentrated instead upon human knowing. Rather than make use of the human capacity to know the
truth, modern philosophy has preferred to accentuate the ways in which this capacity is limited and
conditioned.
This has given rise to different forms of agnosticism and relativism which have led philosophical
research to lose its way in the shifting sands of widespread scepticism. Recent times have seen the rise
to prominence of various doctrines which tend to devalue even the truths which had been judged
certain. A legitimate plurality of positions has yielded to an undifferentiated pluralism, based upon the
assumption that all positions are equally valid, which is one of today's most widespread symptoms of
the lack of confidence in truth. Even certain conceptions of life coming from the East betray this lack
of confidence, denying truth its exclusive character and assuming that truth reveals itself equally in
different doctrines, even if they contradict one another. On this understanding, everything is reduced to
opinion; and there is a sense of being adrift. While, on the one hand, philosophical thinking has
succeeded in coming closer to the reality of human life and its forms of expression, it has also tended to
pursue issuesexistential, hermeneutical or linguisticwhich ignore the radical question of the truth
about personal existence, about being and about God. Hence we see among the men and women of our
time, and not just in some philosophers, attitudes of widespread distrust of the human being's great
capacity for knowledge. With a false modesty, people rest content with partial and provisional truths,
no longer seeking to ask radical questions about the meaning and ultimate foundation of human,
personal and social existence. In short, the hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive
answers to these questions has dwindled.
6. Sure of her competence as the bearer of the Revelation of Jesus Christ, the Church reaffirms the need
to reflect upon truth. This is why I have decided to address you, my venerable Brother Bishops, with
whom I share the mission of proclaiming the truth openly (2 Cor 4:2), as also theologians and
philosophers whose duty it is to explore the different aspects of truth, and all those who are searching;
and I do so in order to offer some reflections on the path which leads to true wisdom, so that those who
love truth may take the sure path leading to it and so find rest from their labours and joy for their spirit.
I feel impelled to undertake this task above all because of the Second Vatican Council's insistence that
the Bishops are witnesses of divine and catholic truth. 3 To bear witness to the truth is therefore a task
entrusted to us Bishops; we cannot renounce this task without failing in the ministry which we have
received. In reaffirming the truth of faith, we can both restore to our contemporaries a genuine trust in
their capacity to know and challenge philosophy to recover and develop its own full dignity.
There is a further reason why I write these reflections. In my Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor, I
drew attention to certain fundamental truths of Catholic doctrine which, in the present circumstances,
risk being distorted or denied.4 In the present Letter, I wish to pursue that reflection by concentrating
on the theme of truth itself and on its foundation in relation to faith. For it is undeniable that this time
of rapid and complex change can leave especially the younger generation, to whom the future belongs
and on whom it depends, with a sense that they have no valid points of reference. The need for a
foundation for personal and communal life becomes all the more pressing at a time when we are faced
with the patent inadequacy of perspectives in which the ephemeral is affirmed as a value and the
possibility of discovering the real meaning of life is cast into doubt. This is why many people stumble
through life to the very edge of the abyss without knowing where they are going. At times, this happens
because those whose vocation it is to give cultural expression to their thinking no longer look to truth,
preferring quick success to the toil of patient enquiry into what makes life worth living. With its
enduring appeal to the search for truth, philosophy has the great responsibility of forming thought and
culture; and now it must strive resolutely to recover its original vocation. This is why I have felt both
the need and the duty to address this theme so that, on the threshold of the third millennium of the
Christian era, humanity may come to a clearer sense of the great resources with which it has been
endowed and may commit itself with renewed courage to implement the plan of salvation of which its
history is part.
Revelation are neither identical nor mutually exclusive: There exists a twofold order of knowledge,
distinct not only as regards their source, but also as regards their object. With regard to the source,
because we know in one by natural reason, in the other by divine faith. With regard to the object,
because besides those things which natural reason can attain, there are proposed for our belief
mysteries hidden in God which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known. 7 Based upon
God's testimony and enjoying the supernatural assistance of grace, faith is of an order other than
philosophical knowledge which depends upon sense perception and experience and which advances by
the light of the intellect alone. Philosophy and the sciences function within the order of natural reason;
while faith, enlightened and guided by the Spirit, recognizes in the message of salvation the fullness
of grace and truth (cf. Jn 1:14) which God has willed to reveal in history and definitively through his
Son, Jesus Christ (cf. 1 Jn 5:9; Jn 5:31-32).
10. Contemplating Jesus as revealer, the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council stressed the salvific
character of God's Revelation in history, describing it in these terms: In this Revelation, the invisible
God (cf. Col 1:15; 1 Tim 1:17), out of the abundance of his love speaks to men and women as friends
(cf. Ex 33:11; Jn 15:14-15) and lives among them (cf.Bar 3:38), so that he may invite and take them
into communion with himself. This plan of Revelation is realized by deeds and words having an inner
unity: the deeds wrought by God in the history of salvation manifest and confirm the teaching and
realities signified by the words, while the words proclaim the deeds and clarify the mystery contained
in them. By this Revelation, then, the deepest truth about God and human salvation is made clear to us
in Christ, who is the mediator and at the same time the fullness of all Revelation. 8
11. God's Revelation is therefore immersed in time and history. Jesus Christ took flesh in the fullness
of time (Gal 4:4); and two thousand years later, I feel bound to restate forcefully that in Christianity
time has a fundamental importance.9 It is within time that the whole work of creation and salvation
comes to light; and it emerges clearly above all that, with the Incarnation of the Son of God, our life is
even now a foretaste of the fulfilment of time which is to come (cf. Heb 1:2).
The truth about himself and his life which God has entrusted to humanity is immersed therefore in time
and history; and it was declared once and for all in the mystery of Jesus of Nazareth. The
Constitution Dei Verbum puts it eloquently: After speaking in many places and varied ways through
the prophets, God 'last of all in these days has spoken to us by his Son' (Heb 1:1-2). For he sent his
Son, the eternal Word who enlightens all people, so that he might dwell among them and tell them the
innermost realities about God (cf. Jn 1:1-18). Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, sent as 'a human being
to human beings', 'speaks the words of God' (Jn 3:34), and completes the work of salvation which his
Father gave him to do (cf. Jn 5:36; 17:4). To see Jesus is to see his Father (Jn 14:9). For this reason,
Jesus perfected Revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work of making himself present and
manifesting himself: through his words and deeds, his signs and wonders, but especially though his
death and glorious Resurrection from the dead and finally his sending of the Spirit of truth. 10
For the People of God, therefore, history becomes a path to be followed to the end, so that by the
unceasing action of the Holy Spirit (cf. Jn 16:13) the contents of revealed truth may find their full
expression. This is the teaching of the Constitution Dei Verbum when it states that as the centuries
succeed one another, the Church constantly progresses towards the fullness of divine truth, until the
words of God reach their complete fulfilment in her. 11
12. History therefore becomes the arena where we see what God does for humanity. God comes to us in
the things we know best and can verify most easily, the things of our everyday life, apart from which
we cannot understand ourselves.
In the Incarnation of the Son of God we see forged the enduring and definitive synthesis which the
human mind of itself could not even have imagined: the Eternal enters time, the Whole lies hidden in
the part, God takes on a human face. The truth communicated in Christ's Revelation is therefore no
longer confined to a particular place or culture, but is offered to every man and woman who would
welcome it as the word which is the absolutely valid source of meaning for human life. Now, in Christ,
all have access to the Father, since by his Death and Resurrection Christ has bestowed the divine life
which the first Adam had refused (cf. Rom 5:12-15). Through this Revelation, men and women are
offered the ultimate truth about their own life and about the goal of history. As the
ConstitutionGaudium et Spes puts it, only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of
man take on light.12 Seen in any other terms, the mystery of personal existence remains an insoluble
riddle. Where might the human being seek the answer to dramatic questions such as pain, the suffering
of the innocent and death, if not in the light streaming from the mystery of Christ's Passion, Death and
Resurrection?
common bread.17
In short, the knowledge proper to faith does not destroy the mystery; it only reveals it the more,
showing how necessary it is for people's lives: Christ the Lord in revealing the mystery of the Father
and his love fully reveals man to himself and makes clear his supreme calling, 18 which is to share in
the divine mystery of the life of the Trinity.19
14. From the teaching of the two Vatican Councils there also emerges a genuinely novel consideration
for philosophical learning. Revelation has set within history a point of reference which cannot be
ignored if the mystery of human life is to be known. Yet this knowledge refers back constantly to the
mystery of God which the human mind cannot exhaust but can only receive and embrace in faith.
Between these two poles, reason has its own specific field in which it can enquire and understand,
restricted only by its finiteness before the infinite mystery of God.
Revelation therefore introduces into our history a universal and ultimate truth which stirs the human
mind to ceaseless effort; indeed, it impels reason continually to extend the range of its knowledge until
it senses that it has done all in its power, leaving no stone unturned. To assist our reflection on this
point we have one of the most fruitful and important minds in human history, a point of reference for
both philosophy and theology: Saint Anselm. In hisProslogion, the Archbishop of Canterbury puts it
this way: Thinking of this problem frequently and intently, at times it seemed I was ready to grasp
what I was seeking; at other times it eluded my thought completely, until finally, despairing of being
able to find it, I wanted to abandon the search for something which was impossible to find. I wanted to
rid myself of that thought because, by filling my mind, it distracted me from other problems from
which I could gain some profit; but it would then present itself with ever greater insistence... Woe is
me, one of the poor children of Eve, far from God, what did I set out to do and what have I
accomplished? What was I aiming for and how far have I got? What did I aspire to and what did I long
for?... O Lord, you are not only that than which nothing greater can be conceived (non solum es quo
maius cogitari nequit), but you are greater than all that can be conceived (quiddam maius quam
cogitari possit)... If you were not such, something greater than you could be thought, but this is
impossible.20
15. The truth of Christian Revelation, found in Jesus of Nazareth, enables all men and women to
embrace the mystery of their own life. As absolute truth, it summons human beings to be open to the
transcendent, whilst respecting both their autonomy as creatures and their freedom. At this point the
relationship between freedom and truth is complete, and we understand the full meaning of the Lord's
words: You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free (Jn 8:32).
Christian Revelation is the true lodestar of men and women as they strive to make their way amid the
pressures of an immanentist habit of mind and the constrictions of a technocratic logic. It is the
ultimate possibility offered by God for the human being to know in all its fullness the seminal plan of
love which began with creation. To those wishing to know the truth, if they can look beyond
themselves and their own concerns, there is given the possibility of taking full and harmonious
possession of their lives, precisely by following the path of truth. Here the words of the Book of
Deuteronomy are pertinent: This commandment which I command you is not too hard for you, neither
is it far off. It is not in heaven that you should say, 'Who will go up for us to heaven, and bring it to us,
that we may hear it and do it?' Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, 'Who will go over the
sea for us, and bring it to us, that we may hear and do it?' But the word is very near you; it is in your
mouth and in your heart, that you can do it (30:11-14). This text finds an echo in the famous dictum of
the holy philosopher and theologian Augustine: Do not wander far and wide but return into yourself.
Deep within man there dwells the truth (Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat
veritas).21
These considerations prompt a first conclusion: the truth made known to us by Revelation is neither the
product nor the consummation of an argument devised by human reason. It appears instead as
something gratuitous, which itself stirs thought and seeks acceptance as an expression of love. This
revealed truth is set within our history as an anticipation of that ultimate and definitive vision of God
which is reserved for those who believe in him and seek him with a sincere heart. The ultimate purpose
of personal existence, then, is the theme of philosophy and theology alike. For all their difference of
method and content, both disciplines point to that path of life (Ps 16:11) which, as faith tells us, leads
in the end to the full and lasting joy of the contemplation of the Triune God.
17. There is thus no reason for competition of any kind between reason and faith: each contains the
other, and each has its own scope for action. Again the Book of Proverbs points in this direction when
it exclaims: It is the glory of God to conceal things, but the glory of kings is to search things out
(Prov 25:2). In their respective worlds, God and the human being are set within a unique relationship.
In God there lies the origin of all things, in him is found the fullness of the mystery, and in this his
glory consists; to men and women there falls the task of exploring truth with their reason, and in this
their nobility consists. The Psalmist adds one final piece to this mosaic when he says in prayer: How
deep to me are your thoughts, O God! How vast is the sum of them! If I try to count them, they are
more than the sand. If I come to the end, I am still with you (139:17-18). The desire for knowledge is
so great and it works in such a way that the human heart, despite its experience of insurmountable
limitation, yearns for the infinite riches which lie beyond, knowing that there is to be found the
satisfying answer to every question as yet unanswered.
18. We may say, then, that Israel, with her reflection, was able to open to reason the path that leads to
the mystery. With the Revelation of God Israel could plumb the depths of all that she sought in vain to
reach by way of reason. On the basis of this deeper form of knowledge, the Chosen People understood
that, if reason were to be fully true to itself, then it must respect certain basic rules. The first of these is
that reason must realize that human knowledge is a journey which allows no rest; the second stems
from the awareness that such a path is not for the proud who think that everything is the fruit of
personal conquest; a third rule is grounded in the fear of God whose transcendent sovereignty and
provident love in the governance of the world reason must recognize.
In abandoning these rules, the human being runs the risk of failure and ends up in the condition of the
fool. For the Bible, in this foolishness there lies a threat to life. The fool thinks that he knows many
things, but really he is incapable of fixing his gaze on the things that truly matter. Therefore he can
neither order his mind (Prov 1:7) nor assume a correct attitude to himself or to the world around him.
And so when he claims that God does not exist (cf. Ps 14:1), he shows with absolute clarity just how
deficient his knowledge is and just how far he is from the full truth of things, their origin and their
destiny.
19. The Book of Wisdom contains several important texts which cast further light on this theme. There
the sacred author speaks of God who reveals himself in nature. For the ancients, the study of the natural
sciences coincided in large part with philosophical learning. Having affirmed that with their
intelligence human beings can know the structure of the world and the activity of the elements... the
cycles of the year and the constellations of the stars, the natures of animals and the tempers of wild
beasts (Wis 7:17, 19-20)in a word, that he can philosophizethe sacred text takes a significant step
forward. Making his own the thought of Greek philosophy, to which he seems to refer in the context,
the author affirms that, in reasoning about nature, the human being can rise to God: From the
greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their Creator (Wis 13:5).
This is to recognize as a first stage of divine Revelation the marvellous book of nature, which, when
read with the proper tools of human reason, can lead to knowledge of the Creator. If human beings with
their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not because they lack the means to do so,
but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment in the way.
20. Seen in this light, reason is valued without being overvalued. The results of reasoning may in fact
be true, but these results acquire their true meaning only if they are set within the larger horizon of
faith: All man's steps are ordered by the Lord: how then can man understand his own ways?
(Prov 20:24). For the Old Testament, then, faith liberates reason in so far as it allows reason to attain
correctly what it seeks to know and to place it within the ultimate order of things, in which everything
acquires true meaning. In brief, human beings attain truth by way of reason because, enlightened by
faith, they discover the deeper meaning of all things and most especially of their own existence.
Rightly, therefore, the sacred author identifies the fear of God as the beginning of true knowledge:
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge (Prov 1:7; cf. Sir 1:14).
opposition between the wisdom of this world and the wisdom of God revealed in Jesus Christ. The
depth of revealed wisdom disrupts the cycle of our habitual patterns of thought, which are in no way
able to express that wisdom in its fullness.
The beginning of the First Letter to the Corinthians poses the dilemma in a radical way. The crucified
Son of God is the historic event upon which every attempt of the mind to construct an adequate
explanation of the meaning of existence upon merely human argumentation comes to grief. The true
key-point, which challenges every philosophy, is Jesus Christ's death on the Cross. It is here that every
attempt to reduce the Father's saving plan to purely human logic is doomed to failure. Where is the
one who is wise? Where is the learned? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the
wisdom of the world? (1 Cor 1:20), the Apostle asks emphatically. The wisdom of the wise is no
longer enough for what God wants to accomplish; what is required is a decisive step towards
welcoming something radically new: God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise...; God
chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not to reduce to nothing things that are (1
Cor 1:27-28). Human wisdom refuses to see in its own weakness the possibility of its strength; yet
Saint Paul is quick to affirm: When I am weak, then I am strong (2 Cor12:10). Man cannot grasp
how death could be the source of life and love; yet to reveal the mystery of his saving plan God has
chosen precisely that which reason considers foolishness and a scandal. Adopting the language of
the philosophers of his time, Paul comes to the summit of his teaching as he speaks the paradox: God
has chosen in the world... that which is nothing to reduce to nothing things that are (cf. 1 Cor 1:28). In
order to express the gratuitous nature of the love revealed in the Cross of Christ, the Apostle is not
afraid to use the most radical language of the philosophers in their thinking about God. Reason cannot
eliminate the mystery of love which the Cross represents, while the Cross can give to reason the
ultimate answer which it seeks. It is not the wisdom of words, but the Word of Wisdom which Saint
Paul offers as the criterion of both truth and salvation.
The wisdom of the Cross, therefore, breaks free of all cultural limitations which seek to contain it and
insists upon an openness to the universality of the truth which it bears. What a challenge this is to our
reason, and how great the gain for reason if it yields to this wisdom! Of itself, philosophy is able to
recognize the human being's ceaselessly self-transcendent orientation towards the truth; and, with the
assistance of faith, it is capable of accepting the foolishness of the Cross as the authentic critique of
those who delude themselves that they possess the truth, when in fact they run it aground on the shoals
of a system of their own devising. The preaching of Christ crucified and risen is the reef upon which
the link between faith and philosophy can break up, but it is also the reef beyond which the two can set
forth upon the boundless ocean of truth. Here we see not only the border between reason and faith, but
also the space where the two may meet.
grope for him and find himthough indeed he is not far from each one of us (Acts 17:26-27).
The Apostle accentuates a truth which the Church has always treasured: in the far reaches of the human
heart there is a seed of desire and nostalgia for God. The Liturgy of Good Friday recalls this powerfully
when, in praying for those who do not believe, we say: Almighty and eternal God, you created
mankind so that all might long to find you and have peace when you are found. 22 There is therefore a
path which the human being may choose to take, a path which begins with reason's capacity to rise
beyond what is contingent and set out towards the infinite.
In different ways and at different times, men and women have shown that they can articulate this
intimate desire of theirs. Through literature, music, painting, sculpture, architecture and every other
work of their creative intelligence they have declared the urgency of their quest. In a special way
philosophy has made this search its own and, with its specific tools and scholarly methods, has
articulated this universal human desire.
25. All human beings desire to know,23 and truth is the proper object of this desire. Everyday life
shows how concerned each of us is to discover for ourselves, beyond mere opinions, how things really
are. Within visible creation, man is the only creature who not only is capable of knowing but who
knows that he knows, and is therefore interested in the real truth of what he perceives. People cannot be
genuinely indifferent to the question of whether what they know is true or not. If they discover that it is
false, they reject it; but if they can establish its truth, they feel themselves rewarded. It is this that Saint
Augustine teaches when he writes: I have met many who wanted to deceive, but none who wanted to
be deceived.24 It is rightly claimed that persons have reached adulthood when they can distinguish
independently between truth and falsehood, making up their own minds about the objective reality of
things. This is what has driven so many enquiries, especially in the scientific field, which in recent
centuries have produced important results, leading to genuine progress for all humanity.
No less important than research in the theoretical field is research in the practical fieldby which I
mean the search for truth which looks to the good which is to be performed. In acting ethically,
according to a free and rightly tuned will, the human person sets foot upon the path to happiness and
moves towards perfection. Here too it is a question of truth. It is this conviction which I stressed in my
Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor: There is no morality without freedom... Although each individual
has a right to be respected in his own journey in search of the truth, there exists a prior moral
obligation, and a grave one at that, to seek the truth and to adhere to it once it is known. 25
It is essential, therefore, that the values chosen and pursued in one's life be true, because only true
values can lead people to realize themselves fully, allowing them to be true to their nature. The truth of
these values is to be found not by turning in on oneself but by opening oneself to apprehend that truth
even at levels which transcend the person. This is an essential condition for us to become ourselves and
to grow as mature, adult persons.
26. The truth comes initially to the human being as a question: Does life have a meaning? Where is it
going? At first sight, personal existence may seem completely meaningless. It is not necessary to turn
to the philosophers of the absurd or to the provocative questioning found in the Book of Job in order to
have doubts about life's meaning. The daily experience of sufferingin one's own life and in the lives
of othersand the array of facts which seem inexplicable to reason are enough to ensure that a
question as dramatic as the question of meaning cannot be evaded. 26 Moreover, the first absolutely
certain truth of our life, beyond the fact that we exist, is the inevitability of our death. Given this
unsettling fact, the search for a full answer is inescapable. Each of us has both the desire and the duty
to know the truth of our own destiny. We want to know if death will be the definitive end of our life or
if there is something beyondif it is possible to hope for an after-life or not. It is not insignificant that
the death of Socrates gave philosophy one of its decisive orientations, no less decisive now than it was
more than two thousand years ago. It is not by chance, then, that faced with the fact of death
philosophers have again and again posed this question, together with the question of the meaning of
life and immortality.
27. No-one can avoid this questioning, neither the philosopher nor the ordinary person. The answer we
give will determine whether or not we think it possible to attain universal and absolute truth; and this is
a decisive moment of the search. Every truthif it really is truthpresents itself as universal, even if it
is not the whole truth. If something is true, then it must be true for all people and at all times. Beyond
this universality, however, people seek an absolute which might give to all their searching a meaning
and an answersomething ultimate, which might serve as the ground of all things. In other words,
they seek a final explanation, a supreme value, which refers to nothing beyond itself and which puts an
end to all questioning. Hypotheses may fascinate, but they do not satisfy. Whether we admit it or not,
there comes for everyone the moment when personal existence must be anchored to a truth recognized
as final, a truth which confers a certitude no longer open to doubt.
Through the centuries, philosophers have sought to discover and articulate such a truth, giving rise to
various systems and schools of thought. But beyond philosophical systems, people seek in different
ways to shape a philosophy of their ownin personal convictions and experiences, in traditions of
family and culture, or in journeys in search of life's meaning under the guidance of a master. What
inspires all of these is the desire to reach the certitude of truth and the certitude of its absolute value.
speculative powers of the human intellect. Finally, there are religious truths which are to some degree
grounded in philosophy, and which we find in the answers which the different religious traditions offer
to the ultimate questions.27
The truths of philosophy, it should be said, are not restricted only to the sometimes ephemeral
teachings of professional philosophers. All men and women, as I have noted, are in some sense
philosophers and have their own philosophical conceptions with which they direct their lives. In one
way or other, they shape a comprehensive vision and an answer to the question of life's meaning; and in
the light of this they interpret their own life's course and regulate their behaviour. At this point, we may
pose the question of the link between, on the one hand, the truths of philosophy and religion and, on the
other, the truth revealed in Jesus Christ. But before tackling that question, one last datum of philosophy
needs to be weighed.
31. Human beings are not made to live alone. They are born into a family and in a family they grow,
eventually entering society through their activity. From birth, therefore, they are immersed in traditions
which give them not only a language and a cultural formation but also a range of truths in which they
believe almost instinctively. Yet personal growth and maturity imply that these same truths can be cast
into doubt and evaluated through a process of critical enquiry. It may be that, after this time of
transition, these truths are recovered as a result of the experience of life or by dint of further
reasoning. Nonetheless, there are in the life of a human being many more truths which are simply
believed than truths which are acquired by way of personal verification. Who, for instance, could
assess critically the countless scientific findings upon which modern life is based? Who could
personally examine the flow of information which comes day after day from all parts of the world and
which is generally accepted as true? Who in the end could forge anew the paths of experience and
thought which have yielded the treasures of human wisdom and religion? This means that the human
beingthe one who seeks the truthis also the one who lives by belief.
32. In believing, we entrust ourselves to the knowledge acquired by other people. This suggests an
important tension. On the one hand, the knowledge acquired through belief can seem an imperfect form
of knowledge, to be perfected gradually through personal accumulation of evidence; on the other hand,
belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal relationship and
brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to
others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.
It should be stressed that the truths sought in this interpersonal relationship are not primarily empirical
or philosophical. Rather, what is sought is the truth of the personwhat the person is and what the
person reveals from deep within. Human perfection, then, consists not simply in acquiring an abstract
knowledge of the truth, but in a dynamic relationship of faithful self-giving with others. It is in this
faithful self-giving that a person finds a fullness of certainty and security. At the same time, however,
knowledge through belief, grounded as it is on trust between persons, is linked to truth: in the act of
believing, men and women entrust themselves to the truth which the other declares to them.
Any number of examples could be found to demonstrate this; but I think immediately of the martyrs,
who are the most authentic witnesses to the truth about existence. The martyrs know that they have
found the truth about life in the encounter with Jesus Christ, and nothing and no-one could ever take
this certainty from them. Neither suffering nor violent death could ever lead them to abandon the truth
which they have discovered in the encounter with Christ. This is why to this day the witness of the
martyrs continues to arouse such interest, to draw agreement, to win such a hearing and to invite
emulation. This is why their word inspires such confidence: from the moment they speak to us of what
we perceive deep down as the truth we have sought for so long, the martyrs provide evidence of a love
that has no need of lengthy arguments in order to convince. The martyrs stir in us a profound trust
because they give voice to what we already feel and they declare what we would like to have the
strength to express.
33. Step by step, then, we are assembling the terms of the question. It is the nature of the human being
to seek the truth. This search looks not only to the attainment of truths which are partial, empirical or
scientific; nor is it only in individual acts of decision-making that people seek the true good. Their
search looks towards an ulterior truth which would explain the meaning of life. And it is therefore a
search which can reach its end only in reaching the absolute. 28 Thanks to the inherent capacities of
thought, man is able to encounter and recognize a truth of this kind. Such a truthvital and necessary
as it is for lifeis attained not only by way of reason but also through trusting acquiescence to other
persons who can guarantee the authenticity and certainty of the truth itself. There is no doubt that the
capacity to entrust oneself and one's life to another person and the decision to do so are among the most
significant and expressive human acts.
It must not be forgotten that reason too needs to be sustained in all its searching by trusting dialogue
and sincere friendship. A climate of suspicion and distrust, which can beset speculative research,
ignores the teaching of the ancient philosophers who proposed friendship as one of the most
appropriate contexts for sound philosophical enquiry.
From all that I have said to this point it emerges that men and women are on a journey of discovery
which is humanly unstoppablea search for the truth and a search for a person to whom they might
entrust themselves. Christian faith comes to meet them, offering the concrete possibility of reaching the
goal which they seek. Moving beyond the stage of simple believing, Christian faith immerses human
beings in the order of grace, which enables them to share in the mystery of Christ, which in turn offers
them a true and coherent knowledge of the Triune God. In Jesus Christ, who is the Truth, faith
recognizes the ultimate appeal to humanity, an appeal made in order that what we experience as desire
and nostalgia may come to its fulfilment.
34. This truth, which God reveals to us in Jesus Christ, is not opposed to the truths which philosophy
perceives. On the contrary, the two modes of knowledge lead to truth in all its fullness. The unity of
truth is a fundamental premise of human reasoning, as the principle of non-contradiction makes clear.
Revelation renders this unity certain, showing that the God of creation is also the God of salvation
history. It is the one and the same God who establishes and guarantees the intelligibility and
reasonableness of the natural order of things upon which scientists confidently depend, 29 and who
reveals himself as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. This unity of truth, natural and revealed, is
embodied in a living and personal way in Christ, as the Apostle reminds us: Truth is in Jesus
(cf. Eph 4:21; Col 1:15-20). He is the eternal Word in whom all things were created, and he is
the incarnate Word who in his entire person 30 reveals the Father (cf. Jn 1:14, 18). What human reason
seeks without knowing it (cf. Acts 17:23) can be found only through Christ: what is revealed in him
is the full truth (cf. Jn 1:14-16) of everything which was created in him and through him and which
therefore in him finds its fulfilment (cf. Col 1:17).
35. On the basis of these broad considerations, we must now explore more directly the relationship
between revealed truth and philosophy. This relationship imposes a twofold consideration, since the
truth conferred by Revelation is a truth to be understood in the light of reason. It is this duality alone
which allows us to specify correctly the relationship between revealed truth and philosophical learning.
First, then, let us consider the links between faith and philosophy in the course of history. From this,
certain principles will emerge as useful reference-points in the attempt to establish the correct link
between the two orders of knowledge.
Christianity proclaimed from the first the equality of all men and women before God. One prime
implication of this touched the theme of truth. The elitism which had characterized the ancients' search
for truth was clearly abandoned. Since access to the truth enables access to God, it must be denied to
none. There are many paths which lead to truth, but since Christian truth has a salvific value, any one
of these paths may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus
Christ.
A pioneer of positive engagement with philosophical thinkingalbeit with cautious discernmentwas
Saint Justin. Although he continued to hold Greek philosophy in high esteem after his conversion,
Justin claimed with power and clarity that he had found in Christianity the only sure and profitable
philosophy.32 Similarly, Clement of Alexandria called the Gospel the true philosophy, 33 and he
understood philosophy, like the Mosaic Law, as instruction which prepared for Christian faith 34 and
paved the way for the Gospel.35 Since philosophy yearns for the wisdom which consists in rightness
of soul and speech and in purity of life, it is well disposed towards wisdom and does all it can to
acquire it. We call philosophers those who love the wisdom that is creator and mistress of all things,
that is knowledge of the Son of God.36 For Clement, Greek philosophy is not meant in the first place
to bolster and complete Christian truth. Its task is rather the defence of the faith: The teaching of the
Saviour is perfect in itself and has no need of support, because it is the strength and the wisdom of
God. Greek philosophy, with its contribution, does not strengthen truth; but, in rendering the attack of
sophistry impotent and in disarming those who betray truth and wage war upon it, Greek philosophy is
rightly called the hedge and the protective wall around the vineyard. 37
39. It is clear from history, then, that Christian thinkers were critical in adopting philosophical thought.
Among the early examples of this, Origen is certainly outstanding. In countering the attacks launched
by the philosopher Celsus, Origen adopts Platonic philosophy to shape his argument and mount his
reply. Assuming many elements of Platonic thought, he begins to construct an early form of Christian
theology. The name theology itself, together with the idea of theology as rational discourse about
God, had to this point been tied to its Greek origins. In Aristotelian philosophy, for example, the name
signified the noblest part and the true summit of philosophical discourse. But in the light of Christian
Revelation what had signified a generic doctrine about the gods assumed a wholly new meaning,
signifying now the reflection undertaken by the believer in order to express the true doctrine about
God. As it developed, this new Christian thought made use of philosophy, but at the same time tended
to distinguish itself clearly from philosophy. History shows how Platonic thought, once adopted by
theology, underwent profound changes, especially with regard to concepts such as the immortality of
the soul, the divinization of man and the origin of evil.
40. In this work of christianizing Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought, the Cappadocian Fathers,
Dionysius called the Areopagite and especially Saint Augustine were important. The great Doctor of
the West had come into contact with different philosophical schools, but all of them left him
disappointed. It was when he encountered the truth of Christian faith that he found strength to undergo
the radical conversion to which the philosophers he had known had been powerless to lead him. He
himself reveals his motive: From this time on, I gave my preference to the Catholic faith. I thought it
more modest and not in the least misleading to be told by the Church to believe what could not be
demonstratedwhether that was because a demonstration existed but could not be understood by all or
whether the matter was not one open to rational proofrather than from the Manichees to have a rash
promise of knowledge with mockery of mere belief, and then afterwards to be ordered to believe many
fabulous and absurd myths impossible to prove true. 38 Though he accorded the Platonists a place of
privilege, Augustine rebuked them because, knowing the goal to seek, they had ignored the path which
leads to it: the Word made flesh.39 The Bishop of Hippo succeeded in producing the first great synthesis
of philosophy and theology, embracing currents of thought both Greek and Latin. In him too the great
unity of knowledge, grounded in the thought of the Bible, was both confirmed and sustained by a depth
of speculative thinking. The synthesis devised by Saint Augustine remained for centuries the most
exalted form of philosophical and theological speculation known to the West. Reinforced by his
personal story and sustained by a wonderful holiness of life, he could also introduce into his works a
range of material which, drawing on experience, was a prelude to future developments in different
currents of philosophy.
41. The ways in which the Fathers of East and West engaged the philosophical schools were, therefore,
quite different. This does not mean that they identified the content of their message with the systems to
which they referred. Consider Tertullian's question: What does Athens have in common with
Jerusalem? The Academy with the Church?.40 This clearly indicates the critical consciousness with
which Christian thinkers from the first confronted the problem of the relationship between faith and
philosophy, viewing it comprehensively with both its positive aspects and its limitations. They were not
naive thinkers. Precisely because they were intense in living faith's content they were able to reach the
deepest forms of speculation. It is therefore minimalizing and mistaken to restrict their work simply to
the transposition of the truths of faith into philosophical categories. They did much more. In fact they
succeeded in disclosing completely all that remained implicit and preliminary in the thinking of the
great philosophers of antiquity.41 As I have noted, theirs was the task of showing how reason, freed
from external constraints, could find its way out of the blind alley of myth and open itself to the
transcendent in a more appropriate way. Purified and rightly tuned, therefore, reason could rise to the
higher planes of thought, providing a solid foundation for the perception of being, of the transcendent
and of the absolute.
It is here that we see the originality of what the Fathers accomplished. They fully welcomed reason
which was open to the absolute, and they infused it with the richness drawn from Revelation. This was
more than a meeting of cultures, with one culture perhaps succumbing to the fascination of the other. It
happened rather in the depths of human souls, and it was a meeting of creature and Creator. Surpassing
the goal towards which it unwittingly tended by dint of its nature, reason attained the supreme good
and ultimate truth in the person of the Word made flesh. Faced with the various philosophies, the
Fathers were not afraid to acknowledge those elements in them that were consonant with Revelation
and those that were not. Recognition of the points of convergence did not blind them to the points of
divergence.
42. In Scholastic theology, the role of philosophically trained reason becomes even more conspicuous
under the impulse of Saint Anselm's interpretation of the intellectus fidei. For the saintly Archbishop of
Canterbury the priority of faith is not in competition with the search which is proper to reason. Reason
in fact is not asked to pass judgement on the contents of faith, something of which it would be
incapable, since this is not its function. Its function is rather to find meaning, to discover explanations
which might allow everyone to come to a certain understanding of the contents of faith. Saint Anselm
underscores the fact that the intellect must seek that which it loves: the more it loves, the more it
desires to know. Whoever lives for the truth is reaching for a form of knowledge which is fired more
and more with love for what it knows, while having to admit that it has not yet attained what it desires:
To see you was I conceived; and I have yet to conceive that for which I was conceived (Ad te
videndum factus sum; et nondum feci propter quod factus sum).42 The desire for truth, therefore, spurs
reason always to go further; indeed, it is as if reason were overwhelmed to see that it can always go
beyond what it has already achieved. It is at this point, though, that reason can learn where its path will
lead in the end: I think that whoever investigates something incomprehensible should be satisfied if,
by way of reasoning, he reaches a quite certain perception of its reality, even if his intellect cannot
penetrate its mode of being... But is there anything so incomprehensible and ineffable as that which is
above all things? Therefore, if that which until now has been a matter of debate concerning the highest
essence has been established on the basis of due reasoning, then the foundation of one's certainty is not
shaken in the least if the intellect cannot penetrate it in a way that allows clear formulation. If prior
thought has concluded rationally that one cannot comprehend (rationabiliter comprehendit
incomprehensibile esse) how supernal wisdom knows its own accomplishments..., who then will
explain how this same wisdom, of which the human being can know nothing or next to nothing, is to be
the intellect, for all its natural limitations, to explore reality, andtheological wisdom, which is based
upon Revelation and which explores the contents of faith, entering the very mystery of God.
Profoundly convinced that whatever its source, truth is of the Holy Spirit (omne verum a quocumque
dicatur a Spiritu Sancto est) 50 Saint Thomas was impartial in his love of truth. He sought truth
wherever it might be found and gave consummate demonstration of its universality. In him, the
Church's Magisterium has seen and recognized the passion for truth; and, precisely because it stays
consistently within the horizon of universal, objective and transcendent truth, his thought scales
heights unthinkable to human intelligence.51 Rightly, then, he may be called an apostle of the
truth.52 Looking unreservedly to truth, the realism of Thomas could recognize the objectivity of truth
and produce not merely a philosophy of what seems to be but a philosophy of what is.
end in itself, without any hope or possibility of ever attaining the goal of truth. In the nihilist
interpretation, life is no more than an occasion for sensations and experiences in which the ephemeral
has pride of place. Nihilism is at the root of the widespread mentality which claims that a definitive
commitment should no longer be made, because everything is fleeting and provisional.
47. It should also be borne in mind that the role of philosophy itself has changed in modern culture.
From universal wisdom and learning, it has been gradually reduced to one of the many fields of human
knowing; indeed in some ways it has been consigned to a wholly marginal role. Other forms of
rationality have acquired an ever higher profile, making philosophical learning appear all the more
peripheral. These forms of rationality are directed not towards the contemplation of truth and the search
for the ultimate goal and meaning of life; but instead, as instrumental reason, they are directed
actually or potentiallytowards the promotion of utilitarian ends, towards enjoyment or power.
In my first Encyclical Letter I stressed the danger of absolutizing such an approach when I wrote: The
man of today seems ever to be under threat from what he produces, that is to say from the result of the
work of his hands and, even more so, of the work of his intellect and the tendencies of his will. All too
soon, and often in an unforeseeable way, what this manifold activity of man yields is not only subject
to 'alienation', in the sense that it is simply taken away from the person who produces it, but rather it
turns against man himself, at least in part, through the indirect consequences of its effects returning on
himself. It is or can be directed against him. This seems to make up the main chapter of the drama of
present-day human existence in its broadest and universal dimension. Man therefore lives increasingly
in fear. He is afraid of what he producesnot all of it, of course, or even most of it, but part of it and
precisely that part that contains a special share of his genius and initiativecan radically turn against
himself.53
In the wake of these cultural shifts, some philosophers have abandoned the search for truth in itself and
made their sole aim the attainment of a subjective certainty or a pragmatic sense of utility. This in turn
has obscured the true dignity of reason, which is no longer equipped to know the truth and to seek the
absolute.
48. This rapid survey of the history of philosophy, then, reveals a growing separation between faith and
philosophical reason. Yet closer scrutiny shows that even in the philosophical thinking of those who
helped drive faith and reason further apart there are found at times precious and seminal insights
which, if pursued and developed with mind and heart rightly tuned, can lead to the discovery of truth's
way. Such insights are found, for instance, in penetrating analyses of perception and experience, of the
imaginary and the unconscious, of personhood and intersubjectivity, of freedom and values, of time and
history. The theme of death as well can become for all thinkers an incisive appeal to seek within
themselves the true meaning of their own life. But this does not mean that the link between faith and
reason as it now stands does not need to be carefully examined, because each without the other is
impoverished and enfeebled. Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which
expose it to the danger of losing sight of its final goal. Deprived of reason, faith has stressed feeling
and experience, and so run the risk of no longer being a universal proposition. It is an illusion to think
that faith, tied to weak reasoning, might be more penetrating; on the contrary, faith then runs the grave
risk of withering into myth or superstition. By the same token, reason which is unrelated to an adult
faith is not prompted to turn its gaze to the newness and radicality of being.
This is why I make this strong and insistent appealnot, I trust, untimelythat faith and philosophy
recover the profound unity which allows them to stand in harmony with their nature without
compromising their mutual autonomy. The parrhesia of faith must be matched by the boldness of
reason.
hidden in Christ (Col 2:3) and therefore intervenes in order to stimulate philosophical enquiry, lest it
stray from the path which leads to recognition of the mystery.
52. It is not only in recent times that the Magisterium of the Church has intervened to make its mind
known with regard to particular philosophical teachings. It is enough to recall, by way of example, the
pronouncements made through the centuries concerning theories which argued in favour of the preexistence of the soul,56 or concerning the different forms of idolatry and esoteric superstition found in
astrological speculations,57 without forgetting the more systematic pronouncements against certain
claims of Latin Averroism which were incompatible with the Christian faith. 58
If the Magisterium has spoken out more frequently since the middle of the last century, it is because in
that period not a few Catholics felt it their duty to counter various streams of modern thought with a
philosophy of their own. At this point, the Magisterium of the Church was obliged to be vigilant lest
these philosophies developed in ways which were themselves erroneous and negative. The censures
were delivered even-handedly: on the one hand,fideism 59 and radical traditionalism,60 for their distrust
of reason's natural capacities, and, on the other, rationalism 61 and ontologism 62 because they attributed
to natural reason a knowledge which only the light of faith could confer. The positive elements of this
debate were assembled in the Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, in which for the first time an
Ecumenical Councilin this case, the First Vatican Councilpronounced solemnly on the relationship
between reason and faith. The teaching contained in this document strongly and positively marked the
philosophical research of many believers and remains today a standard reference-point for correct and
coherent Christian thinking in this regard.
53. The Magisterium's pronouncements have been concerned less with individual philosophical theses
than with the need for rational and hence ultimately philosophical knowledge for the understanding of
faith. In synthesizing and solemnly reaffirming the teachings constantly proposed to the faithful by the
ordinary Papal Magisterium, the First Vatican Council showed how inseparable and at the same time
how distinct were faith and reason, Revelation and natural knowledge of God. The Council began with
the basic criterion, presupposed by Revelation itself, of the natural knowability of the existence of God,
the beginning and end of all things,63 and concluded with the solemn assertion quoted earlier: There
are two orders of knowledge, distinct not only in their point of departure, but also in their
object.64 Against all forms of rationalism, then, there was a need to affirm the distinction between the
mysteries of faith and the findings of philosophy, and the transcendence and precedence of the
mysteries of faith over the findings of philosophy. Against the temptations of fideism, however, it was
necessary to stress the unity of truth and thus the positive contribution which rational knowledge can
and must make to faith's knowledge: Even if faith is superior to reason there can never be a true
divergence between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries and bestows the
gift of faith has also placed in the human spirit the light of reason. This God could not deny himself,
nor could the truth ever contradict the truth. 65
54. In our own century too the Magisterium has revisited the theme on a number of occasions, warning
against the lure of rationalism. Here the pronouncements of Pope Saint Pius X are pertinent, stressing
as they did that at the basis of Modernism were philosophical claims which were phenomenist, agnostic
and immanentist.66 Nor can the importance of the Catholic rejection of Marxist philosophy and
atheistic Communism be forgotten.67
Later, in his Encyclical Letter Humani Generis, Pope Pius XII warned against mistaken interpretations
linked to evolutionism, existentialism and historicism. He made it clear that these theories had not been
proposed and developed by theologians, but had their origins outside the sheepfold of Christ. 68 He
added, however, that errors of this kind should not simply be rejected but should be examined
critically: Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and
supernatural truth and instill it in human hearts, cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous
opinions. Rather they must come to understand these theories well, not only because diseases are
properly treated only if rightly diagnosed and because even in these false theories some truth is found
at times, but because in the end these theories provoke a more discriminating discussion and evaluation
of philosophical and theological truths.69
In accomplishing its specific task in service of the Roman Pontiff's universal Magisterium, 70the
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has more recently had to intervene to re-emphasize the danger
of an uncritical adoption by some liberation theologians of opinions and methods drawn from
Marxism.71
In the past, then, the Magisterium has on different occasions and in different ways offered its
discernment in philosophical matters. My revered Predecessors have thus made an invaluable
contribution which must not be forgotten.
55. Surveying the situation today, we see that the problems of other times have returned, but in a new
key. It is no longer a matter of questions of interest only to certain individuals and groups, but
convictions so widespread that they have become to some extent the common mind. An example of this
is the deep-seated distrust of reason which has surfaced in the most recent developments of much of
philosophical research, to the point where there is talk at times of the end of metaphysics. Philosophy
is expected to rest content with more modest tasks such as the simple interpretation of facts or an
enquiry into restricted fields of human knowing or its structures.
In theology too the temptations of other times have reappeared. In some contemporary theologies, for
instance, a certain rationalism is gaining ground, especially when opinions thought to be
philosophically well founded are taken as normative for theological research. This happens particularly
when theologians, through lack of philosophical competence, allow themselves to be swayed
uncritically by assertions which have become part of current parlance and culture but which are poorly
grounded in reason.72
There are also signs of a resurgence of fideism, which fails to recognize the importance of rational
knowledge and philosophical discourse for the understanding of faith, indeed for the very possibility of
belief in God. One currently widespread symptom of this fideistic tendency is a biblicism which
tends to make the reading and exegesis of Sacred Scripture the sole criterion of truth. In consequence,
the word of God is identified with Sacred Scripture alone, thus eliminating the doctrine of the Church
which the Second Vatican Council stressed quite specifically. Having recalled that the word of God is
present in both Scripture and Tradition,73 the Constitution Dei Verbum continues emphatically: Sacred
Tradition and Sacred Scripture comprise a single sacred deposit of the word of God entrusted to the
Church. Embracing this deposit and united with their pastors, the People of God remain always faithful
to the teaching of the Apostles.74 Scripture, therefore, is not the Church's sole point of reference. The
supreme rule of her faith 75 derives from the unity which the Spirit has created between Sacred
Tradition, Sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church in a reciprocity which means that none
of the three can survive without the others. 76
Moreover, one should not underestimate the danger inherent in seeking to derive the truth of Sacred
Scripture from the use of one method alone, ignoring the need for a more comprehensive exegesis
which enables the exegete, together with the whole Church, to arrive at the full sense of the texts.
Those who devote themselves to the study of Sacred Scripture should always remember that the
various hermeneutical approaches have their own philosophical underpinnings, which need to be
carefully evaluated before they are applied to the sacred texts.
Other modes of latent fideism appear in the scant consideration accorded to speculative theology, and
in disdain for the classical philosophy from which the terms of both the understanding of faith and the
actual formulation of dogma have been drawn. My revered Predecessor Pope Pius XII warned against
such neglect of the philosophical tradition and against abandonment of the traditional terminology. 77
56. In brief, there are signs of a widespread distrust of universal and absolute statements, especially
among those who think that truth is born of consensus and not of a consonance between intellect and
objective reality. In a world subdivided into so many specialized fields, it is not hard to see how
difficult it can be to acknowledge the full and ultimate meaning of life which has traditionally been the
goal of philosophy. Nonetheless, in the light of faith which finds in Jesus Christ this ultimate meaning,
I cannot but encourage philosophersbe they Christian or notto trust in the power of human reason
and not to set themselves goals that are too modest in their philosophizing. The lesson of history in this
millennium now drawing to a close shows that this is the path to follow: it is necessary not to abandon
the passion for ultimate truth, the eagerness to search for it or the audacity to forge new paths in the
search. It is faith which stirs reason to move beyond all isolation and willingly to run risks so that it
may attain whatever is beautiful, good and true. Faith thus becomes the convinced and convincing
advocate of reason.
to keep alive the great tradition of Christian thought which unites faith and reason.
60. The Second Vatican Council, for its part, offers a rich and fruitful teaching concerning philosophy. I
cannot fail to note, especially in the context of this Encyclical Letter, that one chapter of the
Constitution Gaudium et Spes amounts to a virtual compendium of the biblical anthropology from
which philosophy too can draw inspiration. The chapter deals with the value of the human person
created in the image of God, explains the dignity and superiority of the human being over the rest of
creation, and declares the transcendent capacity of human reason. 80 The problem of atheism is also
dealt with in Gaudium et Spes, and the flaws of its philosophical vision are identified, especially in
relation to the dignity and freedom of the human person. 81 There is no doubt that the climactic section
of the chapter is profoundly significant for philosophy; and it was this which I took up in my first
Encyclical Letter Redemptor Hominis and which serves as one of the constant reference-points of my
teaching: The truth is that only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on
light. For Adam, the first man, was a type of him who was to come, Christ the Lord. Christ, the new
Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals man to himself
and brings to light his most high calling.82
The Council also dealt with the study of philosophy required of candidates for the priesthood; and its
recommendations have implications for Christian education as a whole. These are the Council's words:
The philosophical disciplines should be taught in such a way that students acquire in the first place a
solid and harmonious knowledge of the human being, of the world and of God, based upon the
philosophical heritage which is enduringly valid, yet taking into account currents of modern
philosophy.83
These directives have been reiterated and developed in a number of other magisterial documents in
order to guarantee a solid philosophical formation, especially for those preparing for theological
studies. I have myself emphasized several times the importance of this philosophical formation for
those who one day, in their pastoral life, will have to address the aspirations of the contemporary world
and understand the causes of certain behaviour in order to respond in appropriate ways. 84
61. If it has been necessary from time to time to intervene on this question, to reiterate the value of the
Angelic Doctor's insights and insist on the study of his thought, this has been because the
Magisterium's directives have not always been followed with the readiness one would wish. In the
years after the Second Vatican Council, many Catholic faculties were in some ways impoverished by a
diminished sense of the importance of the study not just of Scholastic philosophy but more generally of
the study of philosophy itself. I cannot fail to note with surprise and displeasure that this lack of
interest in the study of philosophy is shared by not a few theologians.
There are various reasons for this disenchantment. First, there is the distrust of reason found in much
contemporary philosophy, which has largely abandoned metaphysical study of the ultimate human
questions in order to concentrate upon problems which are more detailed and restricted, at times even
purely formal. Another reason, it should be said, is the misunderstanding which has arisen especially
with regard to the human sciences. On a number of occasions, the Second Vatican Council stressed
the positive value of scientific research for a deeper knowledge of the mystery of the human
being.85 But the invitation addressed to theologians to engage the human sciences and apply them
properly in their enquiries should not be interpreted as an implicit authorization to marginalize
philosophy or to put something else in its place in pastoral formation and in the praeparatio fidei. A
further factor is the renewed interest in the inculturation of faith. The life of the young Churches in
particular has brought to light, together with sophisticated modes of thinking, an array of expressions
of popular wisdom; and this constitutes a genuine cultural wealth of traditions. Yet the study of
traditional ways must go hand in hand with philosophical enquiry, an enquiry which will allow the
positive traits of popular wisdom to emerge and forge the necessary link with the proclamation of the
Gospel.86
62. I wish to repeat clearly that the study of philosophy is fundamental and indispensable to the
structure of theological studies and to the formation of candidates for the priesthood. It is not by chance
that the curriculum of theological studies is preceded by a time of special study of philosophy. This
decision, confirmed by the Fifth Lateran Council, 87 is rooted in the experience which matured through
the Middle Ages, when the importance of a constructive harmony of philosophical and theological
learning emerged. This ordering of studies influenced, promoted and enabled much of the development
of modern philosophy, albeit indirectly. One telling example of this is the influence of
the Disputationes Metaphysicae of Francisco Surez, which found its way even into the Lutheran
universities of Germany. Conversely, the dismantling of this arrangement has created serious gaps in
both priestly formation and theological research. Consider, for instance, the disregard of modern
thought and culture which has led either to a refusal of any kind of dialogue or to an indiscriminate
acceptance of any kind of philosophy.
I trust most sincerely that these difficulties will be overcome by an intelligent philosophical and
theological formation, which must never be lacking in the Church.
63. For the reasons suggested here, it has seemed to me urgent to re-emphasize with this Encyclical
Letter the Church's intense interest in philosophyindeed the intimate bond which ties theological
work to the philosophical search for truth. From this comes the Magisterium's duty to discern and
promote philosophical thinking which is not at odds with faith. It is my task to state principles and
criteria which in my judgement are necessary in order to restore a harmonious and creative relationship
between theology and philosophy. In the light of these principles and criteria, it will be possible to
discern with greater clarity what link, if any, theology should forge with the different philosophical
opinions or systems which the world of today presents.
which may have influenced those concepts and terms, in order to formulate correct and consistent
interpretations of them.
66. With regard to the intellectus fidei, a prime consideration must be that divine Truth proposed to us
in the Sacred Scriptures and rightly interpreted by the Church's teaching 89enjoys an innate
intelligibility, so logically consistent that it stands as an authentic body of knowledge. The intellectus
fidei expounds this truth, not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure of the propositions in
which the Church's teaching is framed, but also, indeed primarily, in bringing to light the salvific
meaning of these propositions for the individual and for humanity. From the sum of these propositions,
the believer comes to know the history of salvation, which culminates in the person of Jesus Christ and
in his Paschal Mystery. Believers then share in this mystery by their assent of faith.
For its part, dogmatic theology must be able to articulate the universal meaning of the mystery of the
One and Triune God and of the economy of salvation, both as a narrative and, above all, in the form of
argument. It must do so, in other words, through concepts formulated in a critical and universally
communicable way. Without philosophy's contribution, it would in fact be impossible to discuss
theological issues such as, for example, the use of language to speak about God, the personal relations
within the Trinity, God's creative activity in the world, the relationship between God and man, or
Christ's identity as true God and true man. This is no less true of the different themes of moral
theology, which employ concepts such as the moral law, conscience, freedom, personal responsibility
and guilt, which are in part defined by philosophical ethics.
It is necessary therefore that the mind of the believer acquire a natural, consistent and true knowledge
of created realitiesthe world and man himselfwhich are also the object of divine Revelation. Still
more, reason must be able to articulate this knowledge in concept and argument. Speculative dogmatic
theology thus presupposes and implies a philosophy of the human being, the world and, more radically,
of being, which has objective truth as its foundation.
67. With its specific character as a discipline charged with giving an account of faith (cf. 1 Pet 3:15),
the concern of fundamental theology will be to justify and expound the relationship between faith and
philosophical thought. Recalling the teaching of Saint Paul (cf.Rom 1:19-20), the First Vatican Council
pointed to the existence of truths which are naturally, and thus philosophically, knowable; and an
acceptance of God's Revelation necessarily presupposes knowledge of these truths. In studying
Revelation and its credibility, as well as the corresponding act of faith, fundamental theology should
show how, in the light of the knowledge conferred by faith, there emerge certain truths which reason,
from its own independent enquiry, already perceives. Revelation endows these truths with their fullest
meaning, directing them towards the richness of the revealed mystery in which they find their ultimate
purpose. Consider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of distinguishing divine
Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition of its credibility, the capacity of human language
to speak in a true and meaningful way even of things which transcend all human experience. From all
these truths, the mind is led to acknowledge the existence of a truly propaedeutic path to faith, one
which can lead to the acceptance of Revelation without in any way compromising the principles and
autonomy of the mind itself.90
Similarly, fundamental theology should demonstrate the profound compatibility that exists between
faith and its need to find expression by way of human reason fully free to give its assent. Faith will thus
be able to show fully the path to reason in a sincere search for the truth. Although faith, a gift of God,
is not based on reason, it can certainly not dispense with it. At the same time, it becomes apparent that
reason needs to be reinforced by faith, in order to discover horizons it cannot reach on its own. 91
68. Moral theology has perhaps an even greater need of philosophy's contribution. In the New
Testament, human life is much less governed by prescriptions than in the Old Testament. Life in the
Spirit leads believers to a freedom and responsibility which surpass the Law. Yet the Gospel and the
Apostolic writings still set forth both general principles of Christian conduct and specific teachings and
precepts. In order to apply these to the particular circumstances of individual and communal life,
Christians must be able fully to engage their conscience and the power of their reason. In other words,
moral theology requires a sound philosophical vision of human nature and society, as well as of the
general principles of ethical decision-making.
69. It might be objected that the theologian should nowadays rely less on philosophy than on the help
of other kinds of human knowledge, such as history and above all the sciences, the extraordinary
advances of which in recent times stir such admiration. Others, more alert to the link between faith and
culture, claim that theology should look more to the wisdom contained in peoples' traditions than to a
philosophy of Greek and Eurocentric provenance. Others still, prompted by a mistaken notion of
cultural pluralism, simply deny the universal value of the Church's philosophical heritage.
There is some truth in these claims which are acknowledged in the teaching of the Council. 92 Reference
to the sciences is often helpful, allowing as it does a more thorough knowledge of the subject under
study; but it should not mean the rejection of a typically philosophical and critical thinking which is
concerned with the universal. Indeed, this kind of thinking is required for a fruitful exchange between
cultures. What I wish to emphasize is the duty to go beyond the particular and concrete, lest the prime
task of demonstrating the universality of faith's content be abandoned. Nor should it be forgotten that
the specific contribution of philosophical enquiry enables us to discern in different world-views and
different cultures not what people think but what the objective truth is. 93 It is not an array of human
opinions but truth alone which can be of help to theology.
70. Because of its implications for both philosophy and theology, the question of the relationship with
cultures calls for particular attention, which cannot however claim to be exhaustive. From the time the
Gospel was first preached, the Church has known the process of encounter and engagement with
cultures. Christ's mandate to his disciples to go out everywhere, even to the ends of the earth
(Acts 1:8), in order to pass on the truth which he had revealed, led the Christian community to
recognize from the first the universality of its message and the difficulties created by cultural
differences. A passage of Saint Paul's letter to the Christians of Ephesus helps us to understand how the
early community responded to the problem. The Apostle writes: Now in Christ Jesus you who once
were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who has made us both
one, and has broken down the wall of hostility (2:13-14).
In the light of this text, we reflect further to see how the Gentiles were transformed once they had
embraced the faith. With the richness of the salvation wrought by Christ, the walls separating the
different cultures collapsed. God's promise in Christ now became a universal offer: no longer limited to
one particular people, its language and its customs, but extended to all as a heritage from which each
might freely draw. From their different locations and traditions all are called in Christ to share in the
unity of the family of God's children. It is Christ who enables the two peoples to become one. Those
who were far off have come near, thanks to the newness brought by the Paschal Mystery. Jesus
destroys the walls of division and creates unity in a new and unsurpassed way through our sharing in
his mystery. This unity is so deep that the Church can say with Saint Paul: You are no longer strangers
and sojourners, but you are saints and members of the household of God (Eph 2:19).
This simple statement contains a great truth: faith's encounter with different cultures has created
something new. When they are deeply rooted in experience, cultures show forth the human being's
characteristic openness to the universal and the transcendent. Therefore they offer different paths to the
truth, which assuredly serve men and women well in revealing values which can make their life ever
more human.94 Insofar as cultures appeal to the values of older traditions, they pointimplicitly but
authenticallyto the manifestation of God in nature, as we saw earlier in considering the Wisdom
literature and the teaching of Saint Paul.
71. Inseparable as they are from people and their history, cultures share the dynamics which the human
experience of life reveals. They change and advance because people meet in new ways and share with
each other their ways of life. Cultures are fed by the communication of values, and they survive and
flourish insofar as they remain open to assimilating new experiences. How are we to explain these
dynamics? All people are part of a culture, depend upon it and shape it. Human beings are both child
and parent of the culture in which they are immersed. To everything they do, they bring something
which sets them apart from the rest of creation: their unfailing openness to mystery and their boundless
desire for knowledge. Lying deep in every culture, there appears this impulse towards a fulfilment. We
may say, then, that culture itself has an intrinsic capacity to receive divine Revelation.
Cultural context permeates the living of Christian faith, which contributes in turn little by little to
shaping that context. To every culture Christians bring the unchanging truth of God, which he reveals
in the history and culture of a people. Time and again, therefore, in the course of the centuries we have
seen repeated the event witnessed by the pilgrims in Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost. Hearing the
Apostles, they asked one another: Are not all these who are speaking Galileans? And how is it that we
hear, each of us in his own native language? Parthians and Medes and Elamites and residents of
Mesopotamia, Judea and Cappadocia, Pontus and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, Egypt and the parts of
Libya belonging to Cyrene, and visitors from Rome, both Jews and proselytes, Cretans and Arabians,
we hear them telling in our own tongues the mighty works of God (Acts 2:7-11). While it demands of
all who hear it the adherence of faith, the proclamation of the Gospel in different cultures allows people
to preserve their own cultural identity. This in no way creates division, because the community of the
baptized is marked by a universality which can embrace every culture and help to foster whatever is
implicit in them to the point where it will be fully explicit in the light of truth.
This means that no one culture can ever become the criterion of judgment, much less the ultimate
criterion of truth with regard to God's Revelation. The Gospel is not opposed to any culture, as if in
engaging a culture the Gospel would seek to strip it of its native riches and force it to adopt forms
which are alien to it. On the contrary, the message which believers bring to the world and to cultures is
a genuine liberation from all the disorders caused by sin and is, at the same time, a call to the fullness
of truth. Cultures are not only not diminished by this encounter; rather, they are prompted to open
themselves to the newness of the Gospel's truth and to be stirred by this truth to develop in new ways.
72. In preaching the Gospel, Christianity first encountered Greek philosophy; but this does not mean at
all that other approaches are precluded. Today, as the Gospel gradually comes into contact with cultural
worlds which once lay beyond Christian influence, there are new tasks of inculturation, which mean
that our generation faces problems not unlike those faced by the Church in the first centuries.
My thoughts turn immediately to the lands of the East, so rich in religious and philosophical traditions
of great antiquity. Among these lands, India has a special place. A great spiritual impulse leads Indian
thought to seek an experience which would liberate the spirit from the shackles of time and space and
would therefore acquire absolute value. The dynamic of this quest for liberation provides the context
for great metaphysical systems.
In India particularly, it is the duty of Christians now to draw from this rich heritage the elements
compatible with their faith, in order to enrich Christian thought. In this work of discernment, which
finds its inspiration in the Council's Declaration Nostra Aetate, certain criteria will have to be kept in
mind. The first of these is the universality of the human spirit, whose basic needs are the same in the
most disparate cultures. The second, which derives from the first, is this: in engaging great cultures for
the first time, the Church cannot abandon what she has gained from her inculturation in the world of
Greco-Latin thought. To reject this heritage would be to deny the providential plan of God who guides
his Church down the paths of time and history. This criterion is valid for the Church in every age, even
for the Church of the future, who will judge herself enriched by all that comes from today's
engagement with Eastern cultures and will find in this inheritance fresh cues for fruitful dialogue with
the cultures which will emerge as humanity moves into the future. Thirdly, care will need to be taken
lest, contrary to the very nature of the human spirit, the legitimate defense of the uniqueness and
originality of Indian thought be confused with the idea that a particular cultural tradition should remain
closed in its difference and affirm itself by opposing other traditions.
What has been said here of India is no less true for the heritage of the great cultures of China, Japan
and the other countries of Asia, as also for the riches of the traditional cultures of Africa, which are for
the most part orally transmitted.
73. In the light of these considerations, the relationship between theology and philosophy is best
construed as a circle. Theology's source and starting-point must always be the word of God revealed in
history, while its final goal will be an understanding of that word which increases with each passing
generation. Yet, since God's word is Truth (cf. Jn 17:17), the human search for truthphilosophy,
pursued in keeping with its own rulescan only help to understand God's word better. It is not just a
question of theological discourse using this or that concept or element of a philosophical construct;
what matters most is that the believer's reason use its powers of reflection in the search for truth which
moves from the word of God towards a better understanding of it. It is as if, moving between the twin
poles of God's word and a better understanding of it, reason is offered guidance and is warned against
paths which would lead it to stray from revealed Truth and to stray in the end from the truth pure and
simple. Instead, reason is stirred to explore paths which of itself it would not even have suspected it
could take. This circular relationship with the word of God leaves philosophy enriched, because reason
discovers new and unsuspected horizons.
74. The fruitfulness of this relationship is confirmed by the experience of great Christian theologians
who also distinguished themselves as great philosophers, bequeathing to us writings of such high
speculative value as to warrant comparison with the masters of ancient philosophy. This is true of both
the Fathers of the Church, among whom at least Saint Gregory of Nazianzus and Saint Augustine
should be mentioned, and the Medieval Doctors with the great triad of Saint Anselm, Saint
Bonaventure and Saint Thomas Aquinas. We see the same fruitful relationship between philosophy and
the word of God in the courageous research pursued by more recent thinkers, among whom I gladly
mention, in a Western context, figures such as John Henry Newman, Antonio Rosmini, Jacques
Maritain, tienne Gilson and Edith Stein and, in an Eastern context, eminent scholars such as Vladimir
S. Soloviev, Pavel A. Florensky, Petr Chaadaev and Vladimir N. Lossky. Obviously other names could
be cited; and in referring to these I intend not to endorse every aspect of their thought, but simply to
offer significant examples of a process of philosophical enquiry which was enriched by engaging the
data of faith. One thing is certain: attention to the spiritual journey of these masters can only give
greater momentum to both the search for truth and the effort to apply the results of that search to the
service of humanity. It is to be hoped that now and in the future there will be those who continue to
cultivate this great philosophical and theological tradition for the good of both the Church and
humanity.
to the supernatural.
Moreover, the demand for a valid autonomy of thought should be respected even when theological
discourse makes use of philosophical concepts and arguments. Indeed, to argue according to rigorous
rational criteria is to guarantee that the results attained are universally valid. This also confirms the
principle that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it: the assent of faith, engaging the intellect and
will, does not destroy but perfects the free will of each believer who deep within welcomes what has
been revealed.
It is clear that this legitimate approach is rejected by the theory of so-called separate philosophy,
pursued by some modern philosophers. This theory claims for philosophy not only a valid autonomy,
but a self-sufficiency of thought which is patently invalid. In refusing the truth offered by divine
Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since this is to preclude access to a deeper knowledge
of truth.
76. A second stance adopted by philosophy is often designated as Christian philosophy. In itself, the
term is valid, but it should not be misunderstood: it in no way intends to suggest that there is an official
philosophy of the Church, since the faith as such is not a philosophy. The term seeks rather to indicate a
Christian way of philosophizing, a philosophical speculation conceived in dynamic union with faith. It
does not therefore refer simply to a philosophy developed by Christian philosophers who have striven
in their research not to contradict the faith. The term Christian philosophy includes those important
developments of philosophical thinking which would not have happened without the direct or indirect
contribution of Christian faith.
Christian philosophy therefore has two aspects. The first is subjective, in the sense that faith purifies
reason. As a theological virtue, faith liberates reason from presumption, the typical temptation of the
philosopher. Saint Paul, the Fathers of the Church and, closer to our own time, philosophers such as
Pascal and Kierkegaard reproached such presumption. The philosopher who learns humility will also
find courage to tackle questions which are difficult to resolve if the data of Revelation are ignoredfor
example, the problem of evil and suffering, the personal nature of God and the question of the meaning
of life or, more directly, the radical metaphysical question, Why is there something rather than
nothing?.
The second aspect of Christian philosophy is objective, in the sense that it concerns content. Revelation
clearly proposes certain truths which might never have been discovered by reason unaided, although
they are not of themselves inaccessible to reason. Among these truths is the notion of a free and
personal God who is the Creator of the world, a truth which has been so crucial for the development of
philosophical thinking, especially the philosophy of being. There is also the reality of sin, as it appears
in the light of faith, which helps to shape an adequate philosophical formulation of the problem of evil.
The notion of the person as a spiritual being is another of faith's specific contributions: the Christian
proclamation of human dignity, equality and freedom has undoubtedly influenced modern
philosophical thought. In more recent times, there has been the discovery that history as eventso
central to Christian Revelationis important for philosophy as well. It is no accident that this has
become pivotal for a philosophy of history which stakes its claim as a new chapter in the human search
for truth.
Among the objective elements of Christian philosophy we might also place the need to explore the
rationality of certain truths expressed in Sacred Scripture, such as the possibility of man's supernatural
vocation and original sin itself. These are tasks which challenge reason to recognize that there is
something true and rational lying far beyond the straits within which it would normally be confined.
These questions in fact broaden reason's scope for action.
In speculating on these questions, philosophers have not become theologians, since they have not
sought to understand and expound the truths of faith on the basis of Revelation. They have continued
working on their own terrain and with their own purely rational method, yet extending their research to
new aspects of truth. It could be said that a good part of modern and contemporary philosophy would
not exist without this stimulus of the word of God. This conclusion retains all its relevance, despite the
disappointing fact that many thinkers in recent centuries have abandoned Christian orthodoxy.
77. Philosophy presents another stance worth noting when theology itself calls upon it. Theology in fact
has always needed and still needs philosophy's contribution. As a work of critical reason in the light of
faith, theology presupposes and requires in all its research a reason formed and educated to concept and
argument. Moreover, theology needs philosophy as a partner in dialogue in order to confirm the
intelligibility and universal truth of its claims. It was not by accident that the Fathers of the Church and
the Medieval theologians adopted non-Christian philosophies. This historical fact confirms the value of
philosophy's autonomy, which remains unimpaired when theology calls upon it; but it shows as well
the profound transformations which philosophy itself must undergo.
It was because of its noble and indispensable contribution that, from the Patristic period onwards,
philosophy was called the ancilla theologiae. The title was not intended to indicate philosophy's servile
submission or purely functional role with regard to theology. Rather, it was used in the sense in which
Aristotle had spoken of the experimental sciences as ancillary to prima philosophia. The term can
scarcely be used today, given the principle of autonomy to which we have referred, but it has served
throughout history to indicate the necessity of the link between the two sciences and the impossibility
of their separation.
Were theologians to refuse the help of philosophy, they would run the risk of doing philosophy
unwittingly and locking themselves within thought-structures poorly adapted to the understanding of
faith. Were philosophers, for their part, to shun theology completely, they would be forced to master on
their own the contents of Christian faith, as has been the case with some modern philosophers. Either
way, the grounding principles of autonomy which every science rightly wants guaranteed would be
seriously threatened.
When it adopts this stance, philosophy, like theology, comes more directly under the authority of the
Magisterium and its discernment, because of the implications it has for the understanding of
Revelation, as I have already explained. The truths of faith make certain demands which philosophy
must respect whenever it engages theology.
78. It should be clear in the light of these reflections why the Magisterium has repeatedly acclaimed the
merits of Saint Thomas' thought and made him the guide and model for theological studies. This has
not been in order to take a position on properly philosophical questions nor to demand adherence to
particular theses. The Magisterium's intention has always been to show how Saint Thomas is an
authentic model for all who seek the truth. In his thinking, the demands of reason and the power of
faith found the most elevated synthesis ever attained by human thought, for he could defend the radical
newness introduced by Revelation without ever demeaning the venture proper to reason.
79. Developing further what the Magisterium before me has taught, I intend in this final section to
point out certain requirements which theologyand more fundamentally still, the word of God itself
makes today of philosophical thinking and contemporary philosophies. As I have already noted,
philosophy must obey its own rules and be based upon its own principles; truth, however, can only be
one. The content of Revelation can never debase the discoveries and legitimate autonomy of reason.
Yet, conscious that it cannot set itself up as an absolute and exclusive value, reason on its part must
never lose its capacity to question and to be questioned. By virtue of the splendour emanating from
subsistent Being itself, revealed truth offers the fullness of light and will therefore illumine the path of
philosophical enquiry. In short, Christian Revelation becomes the true point of encounter and
engagement between philosophical and theological thinking in their reciprocal relationship. It is to be
hoped therefore that theologians and philosophers will let themselves be guided by the authority of
truth alone so that there will emerge a philosophy consonant with the word of God. Such a philosophy
will be a place where Christian faith and human cultures may meet, a point of understanding between
believer and non-believer. It will help lead believers to a stronger conviction that faith grows deeper
and more authentic when it is wedded to thought and does not reject it. It is again the Fathers who
teach us this: To believe is nothing other than to think with assent... Believers are also thinkers: in
believing, they think and in thinking, they believe... If faith does not think, it is nothing. 95 And again:
If there is no assent, there is no faith, for without assent one does not really believe. 96
kind to the transcendent. A philosophy which no longer asks the question of the meaning of life would
be in grave danger of reducing reason to merely accessory functions, with no real passion for the search
for truth.
To be consonant with the word of God, philosophy needs first of all to recover its sapiential
dimension as a search for the ultimate and overarching meaning of life. This first requirement is in fact
most helpful in stimulating philosophy to conform to its proper nature. In doing so, it will be not only
the decisive critical factor which determines the foundations and limits of the different fields of
scientific learning, but will also take its place as the ultimate framework of the unity of human
knowledge and action, leading them to converge towards a final goal and meaning. This sapiential
dimension is all the more necessary today, because the immense expansion of humanity's technical
capability demands a renewed and sharpened sense of ultimate values. If this technology is not ordered
to something greater than a merely utilitarian end, then it could soon prove inhuman and even become
potential destroyer of the human race.98
The word of God reveals the final destiny of men and women and provides a unifying explanation of
all that they do in the world. This is why it invites philosophy to engage in the search for the natural
foundation of this meaning, which corresponds to the religious impulse innate in every person. A
philosophy denying the possibility of an ultimate and overarching meaning would be not only illadapted to its task, but false.
82. Yet this sapiential function could not be performed by a philosophy which was not itself a true and
authentic knowledge, addressed, that is, not only to particular and subordinate aspects of reality
functional, formal or utilitarianbut to its total and definitive truth, to the very being of the object
which is known. This prompts a second requirement: that philosophy verify the human capacity
to know the truth, to come to a knowledge which can reach objective truth by means of that adaequatio
rei et intellectus to which the Scholastic Doctors referred.99 This requirement, proper to faith, was
explicitly reaffirmed by the Second Vatican Council: Intelligence is not confined to observable data
alone. It can with genuine certitude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin
that certitude is partially obscured and weakened. 100
A radically phenomenalist or relativist philosophy would be ill-adapted to help in the deeper
exploration of the riches found in the word of God. Sacred Scripture always assumes that the
individual, even if guilty of duplicity and mendacity, can know and grasp the clear and simple truth.
The Bible, and the New Testament in particular, contains texts and statements which have a genuinely
ontological content. The inspired authors intended to formulate true statements, capable, that is, of
expressing objective reality. It cannot be said that the Catholic tradition erred when it took certain texts
of Saint John and Saint Paul to be statements about the very being of Christ. In seeking to understand
and explain these statements, theology needs therefore the contribution of a philosophy which does not
disavow the possibility of a knowledge which is objectively true, even if not perfect. This applies
equally to the judgements of moral conscience, which Sacred Scripture considers capable of being
objectively true. 101
83. The two requirements already stipulated imply a third: the need for a philosophy ofgenuinely
metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical data in order to attain something
absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search for truth. This requirement is implicit in sapiential and
analytical knowledge alike; and in particular it is a requirement for knowing the moral good, which has
its ultimate foundation in the Supreme Good, God himself. Here I do not mean to speak of metaphysics
in the sense of a specific school or a particular historical current of thought. I want only to state that
reality and truth do transcend the factual and the empirical, and to vindicate the human being's capacity
to know this transcendent and metaphysical dimension in a way that is true and certain, albeit imperfect
and analogical. In this sense, metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it
is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their
spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being,
and hence with metaphysical enquiry.
Wherever men and women discover a call to the absolute and transcendent, the metaphysical
dimension of reality opens up before them: in truth, in beauty, in moral values, in other persons, in
being itself, in God. We face a great challenge at the end of this millennium to move
from phenomenon to foundation, a step as necessary as it is urgent. We cannot stop short at experience
alone; even if experience does reveal the human being's interiority and spirituality, speculative thinking
must penetrate to the spiritual core and the ground from which it rises. Therefore, a philosophy which
shuns metaphysics would be radically unsuited to the task of mediation in the understanding of
Revelation.
The word of God refers constantly to things which transcend human experience and even human
thought; but this mystery could not be revealed, nor could theology render it in some way
intelligible, 102 were human knowledge limited strictly to the world of sense experience. Metaphysics
thus plays an essential role of mediation in theological research. A theology without a metaphysical
horizon could not move beyond an analysis of religious experience, nor would it allow the intellectus
fidei to give a coherent account of the universal and transcendent value of revealed truth.
If I insist so strongly on the metaphysical element, it is because I am convinced that it is the path to be
taken in order to move beyond the crisis pervading large sectors of philosophy at the moment, and thus
to correct certain mistaken modes of behaviour now widespread in our society.
84. The importance of metaphysics becomes still more evident if we consider current developments in
hermeneutics and the analysis of language. The results of such studies can be very helpful for the
understanding of faith, since they bring to light the structure of our thought and speech and the
meaning which language bears. However, some scholars working in these fields tend to stop short at
the question of how reality is understood and expressed, without going further to see whether reason
can discover its essence. How can we fail to see in such a frame of mind the confirmation of our
present crisis of confidence in the powers of reason? When, on the basis of preconceived assumptions,
these positions tend to obscure the contents of faith or to deny their universal validity, then not only do
they abase reason but in so doing they also disqualify themselves. Faith clearly presupposes that human
language is capable of expressing divine and transcendent reality in a universal wayanalogically, it is
true, but no less meaningfully for that. 103 Were this not so, the word of God, which is always a divine
word in human language, would not be capable of saying anything about God. The interpretation of
this word cannot merely keep referring us to one interpretation after another, without ever leading us to
a statement which is simply true; otherwise there would be no Revelation of God, but only the
expression of human notions about God and about what God presumably thinks of us.
85. I am well aware that these requirements which the word of God imposes upon philosophy may
seem daunting to many people involved in philosophical research today. Yet this is why, taking up what
has been taught repeatedly by the Popes for several generations and reaffirmed by the Second Vatican
Council itself, I wish to reaffirm strongly the conviction that the human being can come to a unified
and organic vision of knowledge. This is one of the tasks which Christian thought will have to take up
through the next millennium of the Christian era. The segmentation of knowledge, with its splintered
approach to truth and consequent fragmentation of meaning, keeps people today from coming to an
interior unity. How could the Church not be concerned by this? It is the Gospel which imposes this
sapiential task directly upon her Pastors, and they cannot shrink from their duty to undertake it.
I believe that those philosophers who wish to respond today to the demands which the word of God
makes on human thinking should develop their thought on the basis of these postulates and in organic
continuity with the great tradition which, beginning with the ancients, passes through the Fathers of the
Church and the masters of Scholasticism and includes the fundamental achievements of modern and
contemporary thought. If philosophers can take their place within this tradition and draw their
inspiration from it, they will certainly not fail to respect philosophy's demand for autonomy.
In the present situation, therefore, it is most significant that some philosophers are promoting a
recovery of the determining role of this tradition for a right approach to knowledge. The appeal to
tradition is not a mere remembrance of the past; it involves rather the recognition of a cultural heritage
which belongs to all of humanity. Indeed it may be said that it is we who belong to the tradition and
that it is not ours to dispose of at will. Precisely by being rooted in the tradition will we be able today
to develop for the future an original, new and constructive mode of thinking. This same appeal is all the
more valid for theology. Not only because theology has the living Tradition of the Church as its
original source, 104but also because, in virtue of this, it must be able to recover both the profound
theological tradition of earlier times and the enduring tradition of that philosophy which by dint of its
authentic wisdom can transcend the boundaries of space and time.
86. This insistence on the need for a close relationship of continuity between contemporary philosophy
and the philosophy developed in the Christian tradition is intended to avert the danger which lies
hidden in some currents of thought which are especially prevalent today. It is appropriate, I think, to
review them, however briefly, in order to point out their errors and the consequent risks for
philosophical work.
The first goes by the name of eclecticism, by which is meant the approach of those who, in research,
teaching and argumentation, even in theology, tend to use individual ideas drawn from different
philosophies, without concern for their internal coherence, their place within a system or their historical
context. They therefore run the risk of being unable to distinguish the part of truth of a given doctrine
from elements of it which may be erroneous or ill-suited to the task at hand. An extreme form of
eclecticism appears also in the rhetorical misuse of philosophical terms to which some theologians are
given at times. Such manipulation does not help the search for truth and does not train reason
whether theological or philosophicalto formulate arguments seriously and scientifically. The rigorous
and far-reaching study of philosophical doctrines, their particular terminology and the context in which
they arose, helps to overcome the danger of eclecticism and makes it possible to integrate them into
theological discourse in a way appropriate to the task.
87. Eclecticism is an error of method, but lying hidden within it can also be the claims ofhistoricism.
To understand a doctrine from the past correctly, it is necessary to set it within its proper historical and
cultural context. The fundamental claim of historicism, however, is that the truth of a philosophy is
determined on the basis of its appropriateness to a certain period and a certain historical purpose. At
least implicitly, therefore, the enduring validity of truth is denied. What was true in one period,
historicists claim, may not be true in another. Thus for them the history of thought becomes little more
than an archeological resource useful for illustrating positions once held, but for the most part
outmoded and meaningless now. On the contrary, it should not be forgotten that, even if a formulation
is bound in some way by time and culture, the truth or the error which it expresses can invariably be
identified and evaluated as such despite the distance of space and time.
In theological enquiry, historicism tends to appear for the most part under the guise of modernism.
Rightly concerned to make theological discourse relevant and understandable to our time, some
theologians use only the most recent opinions and philosophical language, ignoring the critical
evaluation which ought to be made of them in the light of the tradition. By exchanging relevance for
truth, this form of modernism shows itself incapable of satisfying the demands of truth to which
theology is called to respond.
88. Another threat to be reckoned with is scientism. This is the philosophical notion which refuses to
admit the validity of forms of knowledge other than those of the positive sciences; and it relegates
religious, theological, ethical and aesthetic knowledge to the realm of mere fantasy. In the past, the
same idea emerged in positivism and neo-positivism, which considered metaphysical statements to be
meaningless. Critical epistemology has discredited such a claim, but now we see it revived in the new
guise of scientism, which dismisses values as mere products of the emotions and rejects the notion of
being in order to clear the way for pure and simple facticity. Science would thus be poised to dominate
all aspects of human life through technological progress. The undeniable triumphs of scientific research
and contemporary technology have helped to propagate a scientistic outlook, which now seems
boundless, given its inroads into different cultures and the radical changes it has brought.
Regrettably, it must be noted, scientism consigns all that has to do with the question of the meaning of
life to the realm of the irrational or imaginary. No less disappointing is the way in which it approaches
the other great problems of philosophy which, if they are not ignored, are subjected to analyses based
on superficial analogies, lacking all rational foundation. This leads to the impoverishment of human
thought, which no longer addresses the ultimate problems which the human being, as the animal
rationale, has pondered constantly from the beginning of time. And since it leaves no space for the
critique offered by ethical judgement, the scientistic mentality has succeeded in leading many to think
that if something is technically possible it is therefore morally admissible.
89. No less dangerous is pragmatism, an attitude of mind which, in making its choices, precludes
theoretical considerations or judgements based on ethical principles. The practical consequences of this
mode of thinking are significant. In particular there is growing support for a concept of democracy
which is not grounded upon any reference to unchanging values: whether or not a line of action is
admissible is decided by the vote of a parliamentary majority. 105 The consequences of this are clear: in
practice, the great moral decisions of humanity are subordinated to decisions taken one after another by
institutional agencies. Moreover, anthropology itself is severely compromised by a one-dimensional
vision of the human being, a vision which excludes the great ethical dilemmas and the existential
analyses of the meaning of suffering and sacrifice, of life and death.
90. The positions we have examined lead in turn to a more general conception which appears today as
the common framework of many philosophies which have rejected the meaningfulness of being. I am
referring to the nihilist interpretation, which is at once the denial of all foundations and the negation of
all objective truth. Quite apart from the fact that it conflicts with the demands and the content of the
word of God, nihilism is a denial of the humanity and of the very identity of the human being. It should
never be forgotten that the neglect of being inevitably leads to losing touch with objective truth and
therefore with the very ground of human dignity. This in turn makes it possible to erase from the
countenance of man and woman the marks of their likeness to God, and thus to lead them little by little
either to a destructive will to power or to a solitude without hope. Once the truth is denied to human
beings, it is pure illusion to try to set them free. Truth and freedom either go together hand in hand or
together they perish in misery. 106
91. In discussing these currents of thought, it has not been my intention to present a complete picture of
the present state of philosophy, which would, in any case, be difficult to reduce to a unified vision. And
I certainly wish to stress that our heritage of knowledge and wisdom has indeed been enriched in
different fields. We need only cite logic, the philosophy of language, epistemology, the philosophy of
nature, anthropology, the more penetrating analysis of the affective dimensions of knowledge and the
existential approach to the analysis of freedom. Since the last century, however, the affirmation of the
principle of immanence, central to the rationalist argument, has provoked a radical requestioning of
claims once thought indisputable. In response, currents of irrationalism arose, even as the baselessness
of the demand that reason be absolutely self-grounded was being critically demonstrated.
Our age has been termed by some thinkers the age of postmodernity. Often used in very different
contexts, the term designates the emergence of a complex of new factors which, widespread and
powerful as they are, have shown themselves able to produce important and lasting changes. The term
was first used with reference to aesthetic, social and technological phenomena. It was then transposed
into the philosophical field, but has remained somewhat ambiguous, both because judgement on what
is called postmodern is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, and because there is as yet no
consensus on the delicate question of the demarcation of the different historical periods. One thing
however is certain: the currents of thought which claim to be postmodern merit appropriate attention.
According to some of them, the time of certainties is irrevocably past, and the human being must now
learn to live in a horizon of total absence of meaning, where everything is provisional and ephemeral.
In their destructive critique of every certitude, several authors have failed to make crucial distinctions
and have called into question the certitudes of faith.
This nihilism has been justified in a sense by the terrible experience of evil which has marked our age.
Such a dramatic experience has ensured the collapse of rationalist optimism, which viewed history as
the triumphant progress of reason, the source of all happiness and freedom; and now, at the end of this
century, one of our greatest threats is the temptation to despair.
Even so, it remains true that a certain positivist cast of mind continues to nurture the illusion that,
thanks to scientific and technical progress, man and woman may live as a demiurge, single-handedly
and completely taking charge of their destiny.
bring his Church to birth and give her growth. From this vantage-point, the prime commitment of
theology is seen to be the understanding of God's kenosis, a grand and mysterious truth for the human
mind, which finds it inconceivable that suffering and death can express a love which gives itself and
seeks nothing in return. In this light, a careful analysis of texts emerges as a basic and urgent need: first
the texts of Scripture, and then those which express the Church's living Tradition. On this score, some
problems have emerged in recent times, problems which are only partially new; and a coherent solution
to them will not be found without philosophy's contribution.
94. An initial problem is that of the relationship between meaning and truth. Like every other text, the
sources which the theologian interprets primarily transmit a meaning which needs to be grasped and
explained. This meaning presents itself as the truth about God which God himself communicates
through the sacred text. Human language thus embodies the language of God, who communicates his
own truth with that wonderful condescension which mirrors the logic of the Incarnation. 110 In
interpreting the sources of Revelation, then, the theologian needs to ask what is the deep and authentic
truth which the texts wish to communicate, even within the limits of language.
The truth of the biblical texts, and of the Gospels in particular, is certainly not restricted to the narration
of simple historical events or the statement of neutral facts, as historicist positivism would
claim. 111 Beyond simple historical occurrence, the truth of the events which these texts relate lies
rather in the meaning they have in and for the history of salvation. This truth is elaborated fully in the
Church's constant reading of these texts over the centuries, a reading which preserves intact their
original meaning. There is a pressing need, therefore, that the relationship between fact and meaning, a
relationship which constitutes the specific sense of history, be examined also from the philosophical
point of view.
95. The word of God is not addressed to any one people or to any one period of history. Similarly,
dogmatic statements, while reflecting at times the culture of the period in which they were defined,
formulate an unchanging and ultimate truth. This prompts the question of how one can reconcile the
absoluteness and the universality of truth with the unavoidable historical and cultural conditioning of
the formulas which express that truth. The claims of historicism, I noted earlier, are untenable; but the
use of a hermeneutic open to the appeal of metaphysics can show how it is possible to move from the
historical and contingent circumstances in which the texts developed to the truth which they express, a
truth transcending those circumstances.
Human language may be conditioned by history and constricted in other ways, but the human being
can still express truths which surpass the phenomenon of language. Truth can never be confined to time
and culture; in history it is known, but it also reaches beyond history.
96. To see this is to glimpse the solution of another problem: the problem of the enduring validity of
the conceptual language used in Conciliar definitions. This is a question which my revered predecessor
Pius XII addressed in his Encyclical Letter Humani Generis. 112
This is a complex theme to ponder, since one must reckon seriously with the meaning which words
assume in different times and cultures. Nonetheless, the history of thought shows that across the range
of cultures and their development certain basic concepts retain their universal epistemological value
and thus retain the truth of the propositions in which they are expressed. 113 Were this not the case,
philosophy and the sciences could not communicate with each other, nor could they find a place in
cultures different from those in which they were conceived and developed. The hermeneutical problem
exists, to be sure; but it is not insoluble. Moreover, the objective value of many concepts does not
exclude that their meaning is often imperfect. This is where philosophical speculation can be very
helpful. We may hope, then, that philosophy will be especially concerned to deepen the understanding
of the relationship between conceptual language and truth, and to propose ways which will lead to a
since catechesis has philosophical implications which must be explored more deeply in the light of
faith. The teaching imparted in catechesis helps to form the person. As a mode of linguistic
communication, catechesis must present the Church's doctrine in its integrity, 118 demonstrating its link
with the life of the faithful. 119 The result is a unique bond between teaching and living which is
otherwise unattainable, since what is communicated in catechesis is not a body of conceptual truths,
but the mystery of the living God. 120
Philosophical enquiry can help greatly to clarify the relationship between truth and life, between event
and doctrinal truth, and above all between transcendent truth and humanly comprehensible
language. 121 This involves a reciprocity between the theological disciplines and the insights drawn
from the various strands of philosophy; and such a reciprocity can prove genuinely fruitful for the
communication and deeper understanding of the faith.
CONCLUSION
100. More than a hundred years after the appearance of Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical terni Patris, to
which I have often referred in these pages, I have sensed the need to revisit in a more systematic way
the issue of the relationship between faith and philosophy. The importance of philosophical thought in
the development of culture and its influence on patterns of personal and social behaviour is there for all
to see. In addition, philosophy exercises a powerful, though not always obvious, influence on theology
and its disciplines. For these reasons, I have judged it appropriate and necessary to emphasize the value
of philosophy for the understanding of the faith, as well as the limits which philosophy faces when it
neglects or rejects the truths of Revelation. The Church remains profoundly convinced that faith and
reason mutually support each other; 122 each influences the other, as they offer to each other a
purifying critique and a stimulus to pursue the search for deeper understanding.
101. A survey of the history of thought, especially in the West, shows clearly that the encounter
between philosophy and theology and the exchange of their respective insights have contributed richly
to the progress of humanity. Endowed as it is with an openness and originality which allow it to stand
as the science of faith, theology has certainly challenged reason to remain open to the radical newness
found in God's Revelation; and this has been an undoubted boon for philosophy which has thus
glimpsed new vistas of further meanings which reason is summoned to penetrate.
Precisely in the light of this consideration, and just as I have reaffirmed theology's duty to recover its
true relationship with philosophy, I feel equally bound to stress how right it is that, for the benefit and
development of human thought, philosophy too should recover its relationship with theology. In
theology, philosophy will find not the thinking of a single person which, however rich and profound,
still entails the limited perspective of an individual, but the wealth of a communal reflection. For by its
very nature, theology is sustained in the search for truth by its ecclesial context 123 and by the tradition
of the People of God, with its harmony of many different fields of learning and culture within the unity
of faith.
102. Insisting on the importance and true range of philosophical thought, the Church promotes both the
defence of human dignity and the proclamation of the Gospel message. There is today no more urgent
preparation for the performance of these tasks than this: to lead people to discover both their capacity
to know the truth 124 and their yearning for the ultimate and definitive meaning of life. In the light of
these profound needs, inscribed by God in human nature, the human and humanizing meaning of God's
word also emerges more clearly. Through the mediation of a philosophy which is also true wisdom,
people today will come to realize that their humanity is all the more affirmed the more they entrust
themselves to the Gospel and open themselves to Christ.
103. Philosophy moreover is the mirror which reflects the culture of a people. A philosophy which
responds to the challenge of theology's demands and evolves in harmony with faith is part of that
evangelization of culture which Paul VI proposed as one of the fundamental goals of
evangelization. 125 I have unstintingly recalled the pressing need for a new evangelization; and I appeal
now to philosophers to explore more comprehensively the dimensions of the true, the good and the
beautiful to which the word of God gives access. This task becomes all the more urgent if we consider
the challenges which the new millennium seems to entail, and which affect in a particular way regions
and cultures which have a long-standing Christian tradition. This attention to philosophy too should be
seen as a fundamental and original contribution in service of the new evangelization.
104. Philosophical thought is often the only ground for understanding and dialogue with those who do
not share our faith. The current ferment in philosophy demands of believing philosophers an attentive
and competent commitment, able to discern the expectations, the points of openness and the key issues
of this historical moment. Reflecting in the light of reason and in keeping with its rules, and guided
always by the deeper understanding given them by the word of God, Christian philosophers can
develop a reflection which will be both comprehensible and appealing to those who do not yet grasp
the full truth which divine Revelation declares. Such a ground for understanding and dialogue is all the
more vital nowadays, since the most pressing issues facing humanityecology, peace and the coexistence of different races and cultures, for instancemay possibly find a solution if there is a clear
and honest collaboration between Christians and the followers of other religions and all those who,
while not sharing a religious belief, have at heart the renewal of humanity. The Second Vatican Council
said as much: For our part, the desire for such dialogue, undertaken solely out of love for the truth and
with all due prudence, excludes no one, neither those who cultivate the values of the human spirit while
not yet acknowledging their Source, nor those who are hostile to the Church and persecute her in
various ways.126 A philosophy in which there shines even a glimmer of the truth of Christ, the one
definitive answer to humanity's problems, 127 will provide a potent underpinning for the true and
planetary ethics which the world now needs.
105. In concluding this Encyclical Letter, my thoughts turn particularly to theologians, encouraging
them to pay special attention to the philosophical implications of the word of God and to be sure to
reflect in their work all the speculative and practical breadth of the science of theology. I wish to thank
them for their service to the Church. The intimate bond between theological and philosophical wisdom
is one of the Christian tradition's most distinctive treasures in the exploration of revealed truth. This is
why I urge them to recover and express to the full the metaphysical dimension of truth in order to enter
into a demanding critical dialogue with both contemporary philosophical thought and with the
philosophical tradition in all its aspects, whether consonant with the word of God or not. Let
theologians always remember the words of that great master of thought and spirituality, Saint
Bonaventure, who in introducing his Itinerarium Mentis in Deum invites the reader to recognize the
inadequacy of reading without repentance, knowledge without devotion, research without the impulse
of wonder, prudence without the ability to surrender to joy, action divorced from religion, learning
sundered from love, intelligence without humility, study unsustained by divine grace, thought without
the wisdom inspired by God. 128
I am thinking too of those responsible for priestly formation, whether academic or pastoral. I encourage
them to pay special attention to the philosophical preparation of those who will proclaim the Gospel to
the men and women of today and, even more, of those who will devote themselves to theological
research and teaching. They must make every effort to carry out their work in the light of the directives
laid down by the Second Vatican Council 129and subsequent legislation, which speak clearly of the
urgent and binding obligation, incumbent on all, to contribute to a genuine and profound
communication of the truths of the faith. The grave responsibility to provide for the appropriate
training of those charged with teaching philosophy both in seminaries and ecclesiastical faculties must
not be neglected. 130 Teaching in this field necessarily entails a suitable scholarly preparation, a
systematic presentation of the great heritage of the Christian tradition and due discernment in the light
Given in Rome, at Saint Peter's, on 14 September, the Feast of the Triumph of the Cross, in the year
1998, the twentieth of my Pontificate.
JOHN PAUL II
1 In my first Encyclical Letter Redemptor Hominis, I wrote: We have become sharers in this mission of the prophet
Christ, and in virtue of that mission we together with him are serving divine truth in the Church. Being responsible for
that truth also means loving it and seeking the most exact understanding of it, in order to bring it closer to ourselves
and others in all its saving power, its splendour and its profundity joined with simplicity: No. 19: AAS 71 (1979), 306.
2 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes,
16.
engagement of the intellect and the will: Since human beings are totally dependent on God as their creator and Lord,
and created reason is completely subject to uncreated truth, we are obliged to yield through faith to God the revealer
full submission of intellect and will (Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, III: DS 3008).
16 Sequence for the Solemnity of the Body and Blood of the Lord.
17 Penses, 789 (ed. L. Brunschvicg).
18 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, 22.
19 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 2.
20 Proemium and Nos. 1, 15: PL 158, 223-224; 226; 235.
28 This is a theme which I have long pursued and which I have addressed on a number of occasions. 'What is man
and of what use is he? What is good in him and what is evil?' (Sir 18:8)... These are questions in every human heart, as
the poetic genius of every time and every people has shown, posing again and againalmost as the prophetic voice of
humanitythe serious question which makes human beings truly what they are. They are questions which express the
urgency of finding a reason for existence, in every moment, at life's most important and decisive times as well as more
ordinary times. These questions show the deep reasonableness of human existence, since they summon human
intelligence and will to search freely for a solution which can reveal the full meaning of life. These enquiries, therefore,
are the highest expression of human nature; which is why the answer to them is the gauge of the depth of his
engagement with his own existence. In particular, when the why of things is explored in full harmony with the search for
the ultimate answer, then human reason reaches its zenith and opens to the religious impulse. The religious impulse is
the highest expression of the human person, because it is the highpoint of his rational nature. It springs from the
profound human aspiration for the truth and it is the basis of the human being's free and personal search for the
divine: General Audience (19 October 1983), 1-2: Insegnamenti VI, 2 (1983), 814-815.
29 [Galileo] declared explicitly that the two truths, of faith and of science, can never contradict each other, 'Sacred
Scripture and the natural world proceeding equally from the divine Word, the first as dictated by the Holy Spirit, the
second as a very faithful executor of the commands of God', as he wrote in his letter to Father Benedetto Castelli on 21
December 1613. The Second Vatican Council says the same thing, even adopting similar language in its teaching:
'Methodical research, in all realms of knowledge, if it respects... moral norms, will never be genuinely opposed to faith:
the reality of the world and of faith have their origin in the same God' (Gaudium et Spes, 36). Galileo sensed in his
scientific research the presence of the Creator who, stirring in the depths of his spirit, stimulated him, anticipating and
assisting his intuitions: John Paul II, Address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (10 November
1979):Insegnamenti, II, 2 (1979), 1111-1112.
30 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, 4.
31 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3, 55: SC 136, 130.
32 Dialogue with Trypho, 8, 1: PG 6, 492.
33 Stromata I, 18, 90, 1: SC 30, 115.
34 Cf. ibid., I, 16, 80, 5: SC 30, 108.
35 Cf. ibid., I, 5, 28, 1: SC 30, 65.
36 Ibid., VI, 7, 55, 1-2: PG 9, 277.
37 Ibid., I, 20, 100, 1: SC 30, 124.
38 Saint Augustine, Confessions, VI, 5, 7: CCL 27, 77-78.
39 Cf. ibid., VII, 9, 13-14: CCL 27, 101-102.
40 De Praescriptione Haereticorum, VII, 9: SC 46, 98: Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiae et
ecclesiae?.
41 Cf. Congregation for Catholic Education, Instruction on the Study of the Fathers of the Church in Priestly Formation
(10 November 1989), 25: AAS 82 (1990), 617-618.
47 Apostolic Letter Lumen Ecclesiae (20 November 1974), 8: AAS 66 (1974), 680.
48 Cf. I, 1, 6: Praeterea, haec doctrina per studium acquiritur. Sapientia autem per infusionem habetur, unde inter
septem dona Spiritus Sancti connumeratur.
1586): Bullarium Romanum 4/4, Rome 1747, 176-179; Urban VIII, Inscrutabilis Iudiciorum (1 April 1631): Bullarium
Romanum 6/1, Rome 1758, 268-270.
58 Cf. Ecumenical Council of Vienne, Decree Fidei Catholicae, DS 902; Fifth Lateran Ecumenical Council, Bull Apostoli
Regiminis, DS 1440.
59 Cf. Theses a Ludovico Eugenio Bautain iussu sui Episcopi subscriptae (8 September 1840), DS 2751-2756; Theses a
Ludovico Eugenio Bautain ex mandato S. Cong. Episcoporum et Religiosorum subscriptae (26 April 1844), DS 27652769.
60 Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Index, Decree Theses contra Traditionalismum Augustini Bonnetty (11 June
1855),DS 2811-2814.
61 Cf. Pius IX, Brief Eximiam Tuam (15 June 1857), DS 2828-2831; Brief Gravissimas Inter (11 December
1862),DS 2850-2861.
62 Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, Decree Errores Ontologistarum (18 September 1861), DS 2841-2847.
63 Cf. First Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, II: DS 3004; and Canon
2, 1: DS 3026.
64 Ibid., IV: DS 3015, cited in Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World Gaudium et Spes, 59.
65 First Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, IV: DS 3017.
66 Cf. Encyclical Letter Pascendi Dominici Gregis (8 September 1907): ASS 40 (1907), 596-597.
67 Cf. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Divini Redemptoris (19 March 1937): AAS 29 (1937), 65-106.
68 Encyclical Letter Humani Generis (12 August 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 562-563.
69 Ibid., loc. cit., 563-564.
70 Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution Pastor Bonus (28 June 1988), Arts. 48-49: AAS 80 (1988), 873;
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian Donum Veritatis (24
May 1990), 18: AAS 82 (1990), 1558.
71 Cf. Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation Libertatis Nuntius (6 August 1984), VII-X: AAS76
(1984), 890-903.
72 In language as clear as it is authoritative, the First Vatican Council condemned this error, affirming on the one hand
that as regards this faith..., the Catholic Church professes that it is a supernatural virtue by means of which, under
divine inspiration and with the help of grace, we believe to be true the things revealed by God, not because of the
intrinsic truth of the things perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself, who
reveals them and who can neither deceive nor be deceived: Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, III: DS 3008, and Canon
3, 2: DS 3032. On the other hand, the Council declared that reason is never able to penetrate [these mysteries] as it
does the truths which are its proper object: ibid., IV: DS 3016. It then drew a practical conclusion: The Christian
faithful not only have no right to defend as legitimate scientific conclusions opinions which are contrary to the doctrine
of the faith, particularly if condemned by the Church, but they are strictly obliged to regard them as errors which have
no more than a fraudulent semblance of truth: ibid., IV: DS 3018.
Apostolic Exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis (25 March 1992), 52: AAS 84 (1992), 750-751. Cf. also various remarks on
the philosophy of Saint Thomas: Address to the International Pontifical Athenaeum Angelicum (17 November
1979): Insegnamenti II, 2 (1979), 1177-1189; Address to the Participants of the Eighth International Thomistic
Congress (13 September 1980): Insegnamenti III, 2 (1980), 604-615; Address to the Participants at the International
Congress of the Saint Thomas Society on the Doctrine of the Soul in Saint Thomas (4 January 1986):Insegnamenti IX, 1
(1986), 18-24. Also the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis Sacerdotalis (6
January 1970), 70-75: AAS 62 (1970), 366-368; Decree Sacra Theologia (20 January 1972): AAS 64 (1972), 583-586.
85 Cf. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, 57; 62.
86 Cf. ibid., 44.
87 Cf. Fifth Lateran Ecumenical Council, Bull Apostolici Regimini Sollicitudo, Session VIII: Conciliorum Oecumenicorum
Decreta, 1991, 605-606.
88 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 10.
91 Ibid.
92 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes,
15; Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity Ad Gentes, 22.
105 Cf. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae (25 March 1995), 69: AAS 87 (1995), 481.
106 In the same sense I commented in my first Encyclical Letter on the expression in the Gospel of Saint John, You
will know the truth, and the truth will set you free (8:32): These words contain both a fundamental requirement and a
warning: the requirement of an honest relationship with regard to truth as a condition for authentic freedom, and the
warning to avoid every kind of illusory freedom, every superficial unilateral freedom, every freedom that fails to enter
into the whole truth about man and the world. Today also, even after two thousand years, we see Christ as the one who
brings man freedom based on truth, frees man from what curtails, diminishes and as it were breaks off this freedom at
its root, in man's soul, his heart and his conscience: Encyclical Letter Redemptor Hominis (4 March 1979), 12: AAS 71
(1979), 280-281.
107 Address at the Opening of the Council (11 October 1962): AAS 54 ( 1962), 792.
108 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian Donum
Veritatis (24 May 1990), 7-8: AAS 82 (1990), 1552-1553.
109 In the Encyclical Letter Dominum et Vivificantem, commenting on Jn 16:12-13, I wrote: Jesus presents the
Comforter, the Spirit of truth, as the one who 'will teach' and 'bring to remembrance', as the one who 'will bear witness'
to him. Now he says: 'he will guide you into all the truth'. This 'guiding into all the truth', referring to what the Apostles
'cannot bear now', is necessarily connected with Christ's self-emptying through his Passion and Death on the Cross,
which, when he spoke these words, was just about to happen. Later however it becomes clear hat this 'guiding into all
the truth' is connected not only with the scandalum Crucis, but also with everything that Christ 'did and taught'
(Acts 1:1). For the mysterium Christi taken as a whole demands faith, since it is faith that adequately introduces man
into the reality of the revealed mystery. The 'guiding into all the truth' is therefore achieved in faith and through faith:
and this is the work of the Spirit of truth and the result of his action in man. Here the Holy Spirit is to be man's supreme
guide and the light of the human spirit: No. 6: AAS 78 (1986), 815-816.
110 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 13.
111 Cf. Pontifical Biblical Commission, Instruction on the Historical Truth of the Gospels (21 April 1964): AAS 56
(1964), 713.
112 It is clear that the Church cannot be tied to any and every passing philosophical system. Nevertheless, those
notions and terms which have been developed though common effort by Catholic teachers over the course of the
centuries to bring about some understanding of dogma are certainly not based on any such weak foundation. They are
based on principles and notions deduced from a true knowledge of created things. In the process of deduction, this
knowledge, like a star, gave enlightenment to the human mind through the Church. Hence it is not astonishing that
some of these notions have not only been employed by the Ecumenical Councils, but even sanctioned by them, so that
it is wrong to depart from them: Encyclical Letter Humani Generis (12 August 1950): AAS 42 (1950), 566-567; cf.
International Theological Commission, Document Interpretationis Problema (October 1989): Enchiridion Vaticanum 11,
2717-2811.
113 As for the meaning of dogmatic formulas, this remains ever true and constant in the Church, even when it is
expressed with greater clarity or more developed. The faithful therefore must shun the opinion, first, that dogmatic
formulas (or some category of them) cannot signify the truth in a determinate way, but can only offer changeable
approximations to it, which to a certain extent distort or alter it: Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
Declaration in Defence of the Catholic Doctrine on the Church Mysterium Ecclesiae (24 June 1973), 5: AAS 65 (1973),
403.
114 Cf. Congregation of the Holy Office, Decree Lamentabili (3 July 1907), 26: ASS 40 (1907), 473.
115 Cf. John Paul II, Address to the Pontifical Athenaeum Angelicum (17 November 1979), 6: Insegnamenti, II, 2
(1979), 1183-1185.
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian Donum Veritatis (24
May 1990), 7: AAS 82 (1990), 1552-1553.
118 Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi Tradendae (16 October 1979), 30: AAS 71 (1979), 1302-1303.
119 Cf. ibid., 22, loc. cit., 1295-1296.
120 Cf. ibid., 7, loc. cit., 1282.
121 Cf. ibid., 59, loc. cit., 1325.
122 First Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, IV: DS 3019.
123 Nobody can make of theology as it were a simple collection of his own personal ideas, but everybody must be
aware of being in close union with the mission of teaching truth for which the Church is responsible: John Paul II,
Encyclical Letter Redemptor Hominis (4 March 1979), 19: AAS 71 (1979), 308.
124 Cf. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae, 1-3.
125 Cf. Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi (8 December 1975), 20: AAS 68 (1976), 18-19.
126 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, 92.
127 Cf. ibid., 10.
128 Prologus, 4: Opera Omnia, Florence, 1891, vol. V, 296.
129 Cf. Decree on Priestly Formation Optatam Totius, 15.
130 Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution Sapientia Christiana (15 April 1979), Arts. 67-68: AAS 71 (1979), 491-492.
131 John Paul II, Address to the University of Krakow for the 600th Anniversary of the Jagiellonian University (8 June
1997), 4: L'Osservatore Romano, 9-10 June 1997, 12.
132 He noera tes pisteos trapeza: Pseudo-Epiphanius, Homily in Praise of Holy Mary Mother of God: PG 43