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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dycaico vs. Social Security System

G.R. No. 161357. November 30, 2005.*

ELENA P. DYCAICO, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondents.
Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause; Labor Law; Social Legislation;
Retirement; Social Security System; Social Security Law (R.A. No. 8282); Words and
Phrases; The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of RA No.
8282 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.For
reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his retirement
in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Valid
Classifications.A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. With respect to Rep.
Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it is
permeated with provisions that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive
benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are entitled to deference as those of
the institution charged under our scheme of government with the primary
responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing policies and
interests. However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with
respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Classifying dependent spouses
and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the
marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse,
regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement
of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
_______________
*

EN BANC.

539

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maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or
financial burdensuch classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the
aforesaid policy objective.The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not
bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date of his
retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To
the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with the possibility of
relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In
particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those
contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated death of the other spouse. This concern is concededly valid. However,
classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension
based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the
achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to
members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity,
old age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial
burden. The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy.
Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the
aforesaid policy objective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If it were the intention of
Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered into in contemplation of
imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definite duration-of-relationship
or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for entitlement to
survivors pension.If it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages
or those entered in contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a
definite duration-of-relationship or durational period of relationship as one of the
requirements for entitlement to survivors pension. For example, in the United States,
a provision in their social security law which excludes from social security benefits
the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their respective

relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death, was
declared valid. Thus, nine months is recognized in the United States as the minimum
duration of a marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the
purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension.
540

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dycaico vs. Social Security System

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Classification of dependent

spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were
contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to
survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions.The
classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages
to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the
purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial
distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso
as of the date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the dependent
spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after
the latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as
sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits
accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the
rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy
of the law to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries
against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Retirees enjoy a protected
property interest in their retirement benefits.As earlier opined, in Government
Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the Court characterized retirement benefits
as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where
employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have
contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment. Thus, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the
due process clause and [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they
acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Further, since pursuant

to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension,
a widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part
of the husbands contractual compensation. Although the subject matter in the
above-cited case involved the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 covering government employees, the
pronouncement therein
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that retirees enjoy a protected property interest in their retirement benefits applies
squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the
mandatory contributions of both the employers and the employees to the SSS do not,
likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but
form part of the latters compensation. Even the retirement benefits of self-employed
individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage of
Rep. Act No. 8282 are not mere gratuity because they are required to pay both the
employer and employee contributions. Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the
surviving spouse is entitled to survivors pension accruing on the death of the
member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such benefit following the
demise of the wife or husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters
contractual compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; The proviso as
of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of
the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose
respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters
retirement of their survivors benefitsit has created the presumption that marriages
contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the
purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282, a conclusive presumption
that does not afford any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose;
The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it
presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true.The proviso as of the
date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due

process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective

marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of
their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving
spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard. By this outright
disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members
were contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso as of the date of his
retirement qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement
to survi-vors pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the
retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the
benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because
the said surviving spouses
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dycaico vs. Social Security System

are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The
proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it
presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this
kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttable presumption and statutes
creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the
due process clause.
Judicial Review; The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the casethe
question of the constitutionality of the proviso in Section 12-B(d) of R.A. No. 8282 is
absolutely for the proper resolution of the present case.The Court concedes that the
petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does
not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case. However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is
absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the
Court required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to
pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render
substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now,

deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing upon the death of her
husband.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ernesto M. Tomaneng for petitioner.
Jomar C. Catabay for respondent SSS.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Elena P. Dycaico which seeks to
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reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated April 15, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed
the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social Security Commission
(SSC), denying the petitioners claim for survivors pension accruing from
the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System
(SSS) member-pensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is
the appellate courts Resolution dated December 15, 2003, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The case arose from the following undisputed facts:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24,
1980. In his self-employed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the
petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries.
At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his
monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly

pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his
death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an
application for survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied
on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No.
8282 or the Social Security Law2 she could not be considered a primary
beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso
reads:
_______________
1

Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Marina

L. Buzon and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-28.

2

An Act Further Strengthening the Social Security System Thereby Amending for this

Purpose Republic Act No. 1161, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Social Security Law.
The law took effect on May 23, 1997.
544

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Dycaico vs. Social Security System

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.

...
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date
of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. . . .

Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the

Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on
June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his
death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage contract
with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his
retirement date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if you
do not conform with us, you may file a formal petition with our Social Security
Commission to determine your benefit eligibility.3

On July 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that
the denial of her survivors pension was unjustified. She contended that
Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his

SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate
family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be
legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivors pension.
The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacios designation of them as his
beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote
social justice.
On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the
denial of the petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the petitioners
contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family
members by citing the definitions of
_______________
3

CA Rollo, p. 26.
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primary beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No.
8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said provision, primary beneficiaries
are [t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children . . .
Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines
dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to
receive support from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has
been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically
or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the
member. Based on the foregoing, according to the SSC, it has consistently
ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as
primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and

dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his
lifetime.
Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries
who are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of
the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who
was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his
retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC
further opined that Bonifacios designation of the petitioner as one of his
primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only on moral
considerations but also for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is
not entitled to claim the survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the
SSCs February 6, 2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, dated April
15, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Citing the same
provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA
declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of
Boni546

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Dycaico vs. Social Security System

facio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner
as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA
further observed that Bonifacios children with the petitioner could no
longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all reached
twenty-one (21) years of age. The decretal portion of the assailed decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
06 February 2002 Resolution of respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.4

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the

assailed Resolution dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied
her motion. Hence, the petitioners recourse to this Court.

The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiaries as used
in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any qualification.
She thus theorizes that regardless of whether the primary beneficiary
designated by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled
to the survivors pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC on
the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of
Rep. Act No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because these definitions
cannot modify Section 12-B(d) thereof.
The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in
January 1997, a few months before he passed away, they merely intended
to legalize their relationship and had no intention to commit any fraud.
Further, since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it should be
construed liberally in favor of claimants like the petitioner. She cites the
Courts pronouncement that the sympathy of the law on social security is
toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its
_______________
4

Rollo, p. 28.
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own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.5
The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282 should be read in conjunction with the definition of the terms
dependents and primary beneficiaries in Section 8 thereof. Since the
petitioner was not as yet the legal spouse of Bonifacio at the time of his
retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivors pension
accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insists that the designation by
Bonifacio of the petitioner and their illegitimate children in his SSS Form
RS-1 is void.
According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which
provides that should there be no primary or secondary beneficiaries, the

benefit accruing from the death of a member should go to his designated

common-law spouse and that to rule otherwise would be to condone the
designation of com-mon-law spouses as beneficiaries, a clear case of
circumventing the SS Law and a violation of public policy and morals. 6
Finally, the SSS is of the opinion that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 is clear and explicit; hence, there is no room for its interpretation,
only for application.
In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as
well as the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective
comments on the issue of whether or not the proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes
that this issue is intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the
merits of the petition.
In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the
proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal
_______________
5

Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115858, 28 July

1996, 257 SCRA 717.

6

Comment, p. 5; Rollo, p. 37.

548

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dycaico vs. Social Security System

protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning

date of qualification and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivorship
pension. It asserts that this classification of beneficiaries is based on valid
and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative purpose of
Rep. Act No. 8282.
The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after
his retirement stating that it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her
to qualify for the survivorship pension upon the latters death. It further
alleges that there is no violation of the due process clause as the petitioner

was given her day in court and was able to present her side. The SSS filed
its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the
legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the
contingency occurred (his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be
considered a primary beneficiary within the contemplation of Rep. Act No.
8282. The SSS posits that the statutes intent is to give survivorship
pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the
deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled
thereto and cannot be subject of change by the SSS.
The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the
proviso as of the date of his retirement merely marks the period when
the primary beneficiary must be so to be entitled to the benefits. It does not
violate the equal protection clause because the classification resulting
therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the condition as to
the period for entitlement, i.e., as of the date of the members retirement, is
relevant as it set the parameters for those availing of the benefits and it
applies to all those similarly situated. The Solicitor General is also of the
view that the said proviso does not offend the due process clause because
claimants are given the opportunity to file their claims and to prove their
case before the Commission.
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For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.
...
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date
of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. . . .

Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the primary beneficiaries are:
1. 1.
2. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and

3. 2.
4. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children.
Further, the dependent spouse and dependent children are qualified
under paragraph (e) of the same section as follows:
1. 1.
2. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she
remarries; and
3. 2.
4. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has
not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one years
of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
The SSS denied the petitioners application for survivors pension on the
sole ground that she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio as of the date
of his retirement; hence, she could not be considered as his primary
beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary
beneficiaries, is unconstitutional
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for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.7
In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v.
Montesclaros,8 the Court invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 11469 which stated that the dependent spouse shall not be
entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. In the
said case, the Court characterized retirement benefits as property interest
of the pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. The proviso, which
denied a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the

dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the threeyear prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due process clause.
There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The proviso was also
held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated against
dependent spouses who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners
within three years before they qualified for their pension.
For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date
of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The proviso infringes the equal protection clause
As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
_______________
7

SECTION 1, ARTICLE III, CONSTITUTION reads:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
8

G.R. No. 146494, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 441.

Entitled The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. This law has been

superseded by Republic Act No. 8291 of the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997.
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which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries results in the
classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two
groups:
1. (1)
2. Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members
were contracted prior to the latters retirement; and
3. (2)

4. Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members

were contracted after the latters retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their
respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate
or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the
marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of
dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his
retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as
primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and,
therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension under the same provision
by reason of the subject proviso.
It is noted that the eligibility of dependent children who are
biological offsprings of a retired SSS member to be considered as his
primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is not
substantially affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement. A
biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled
to survivors pension upon the death of a retired SSS member so long as
the said child is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached
twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he or
she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be
considered primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 is affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement in the
same manner as the de552

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pendent spouses. A legally adopted child who satisfies the requirements in

Section 8(e)(2)10 thereof is considered a primary beneficiary of a retired
SSS member upon the latters death only if the said child had been legally
adopted prior to the members retirement. One who was legally adopted by
the SSS member after his or her retirement does not qualify as a primary

beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension under

Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a
dependent spouse who claims to have been unjustly deprived of her
survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Hence,
the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant classification of the
dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision.
As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of
dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his
retirement. She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated
against as the proviso as of the date of his retirement disqualifies them
from being considered primary beneficiaries for the purpose of
entitlement to survivors pension.
Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law.11 With
respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is
recognized that it is permeated with provisions that draw lines in
classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in
this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged
under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for
making such judgments in light of competing policies and interests.12
_______________
10

Supra.

11

Farias v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA

503.
12

Califano, Jr. v. Goldfarb, 430 US 199, 51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977).

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However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with
respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy

the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)

it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.13
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the
purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date of his
retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in Section 12-B(d)
thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional concern
with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose
of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to
prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable
one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other
spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent
spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on
whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no
relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide
meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.14 The nexus
of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put
differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the
aforesaid policy objective.
For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or
those entered in contemplation of imminent
_______________
13

Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, supra.

14

Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8282.
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Dycaico vs. Social Security System

death, then it should have prescribed a definite duration-of-relationship

or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for
entitlement to survivors pension. For example, in the United States, a
provision in their social security law which excludes from social security
benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage earner who
had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine
months prior to his death, was declared valid. 15 Thus, nine months is
recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of a marriage to
consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of
entitlement to survivorship pension.
In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12B(d) in Rep. Act No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to
survivors pension all those dependent spouses whose respective marriages
to retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement. The
duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in
certain instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60)
years old.16 A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said
age may still last for more than ten years, assuming the member lives up to
over seventy (70) years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the
marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of ena_______________
15

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 US 749, 45 L.Ed.2d 522.

16

Section 12-B reads in part:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.(a) A member who has paid at least one hundred twenty (120)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (1) has reached the age of sixty
(60) years and is already separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or (2) has
reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly
pension: Provided, That he shall have the option to receive his first eighteen (18) monthly pensions
in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be determined by the SSS.

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bling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the
other spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to
survivors pension because he or she is not a primary beneficiary as of the
date of retirement of the SSS member following Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether
their respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or
after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors
pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and
discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his
retirement, which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose
respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the
latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these
marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose
of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The
proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like
the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide
meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.17
The proviso infringes the due process clause
As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v.
Montesclaros,18 the Court characterized retirement benefits as a property
interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where
employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees
have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part
of the terms of employment.19 Thus, it was ruled that, where the
employee
_______________
17

Supra.

18

Supra.

19

Id., at p. 448.
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Dycaico vs. Social Security System

retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to
benefits that is protected by the due process clause and [r]etirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law.20 Further, since pursuant to the pertinent
law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a
widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is
also part of the husbands contractual compensation.21
Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the
retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 197722 covering government employees, the
pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected property interest in
their retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private sector
under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the mandatory contributions
of both the employers23 and the employees24 to the SSS
_______________
20

Id., at p. 449.

21

Id.

22

This has been superseded by Rep. Act No. 8291 otherwise known as The Government

Service Insurance Act of 1997.

23

Section 19 reads in part:

Sec. 19. Employers Contributions.(a) Beginning as of the last day of the month when an
employees compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment,
his employer shall pay, with respect to such covered employee, the employers contribution in
accordance with the schedule indicated in Section Eighteen of this Act. Notwithstanding any
contract to the contrary, an employer shall not deduct, directly or indirectly, from the compensation
of his employees covered by the SSS or otherwise recover from them the employers contributions
with respect to such employees.
24

Section 18 reads in part:

Sec. 18. Employees Contribution.(a) Beginning as of the last day of the calendar month when an
employees compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment,
the employer shall deduct and withhold

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do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282
mere gratuity but form part of the latters compensation. Even the
retirement benefits of self-employed individuals, like Bonifacio, who have
been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282 25 are not
mere gratuity because they are required to pay both the employer and
employee contributions.26 Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the
_______________
from such employees monthly salary, wage, compensation or earnings, the employees contribution
in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage, compensation or earnings during the month in
accordance with the following schedule.
25

Section 9-A reads:

Sec. 9-A. Compulsory Coverage of the Self-employed.Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory
upon such self-employed persons as may be determined by the Commission under such rules and
regulations as it may prescribe, including but not limited to the following:
1. 1.
2. All self-employed professionals;
3. 2.
4. Partners and single proprietors of businesses;
5. 3.
6. Actors and actresses, directors, scriptwriters and news correspondents who do not fall within
the definition of the term employee in Sec. 8(d) of this Act;
7. 4.
8. Professional athletes, coaches, trainers and jockeys; and
9. 5.
10. Individual farmers and fishermen.
Unless otherwise specified herein, all provisions of this Act applicable to covered employees
shall also be applicable to the covered self-employed persons.
26

Section 19-A reads:

Sec. 19-A. Contribution of the Self-employed Member.The contributions to the SSS of the selfemployed member shall be determined in accordance with Section Eighteen of this Act; Provided,
That the monthly earnings declared by the self-employed member at the time of his registration
with the SSS shall be considered as his monthly compensation and he shall pay both the employer
and employee contributions: Provided, further, That the contributions of self-employed persons

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Dycaico vs. Social Security System

surviving spouse is entitled to survivors pension accruing on the death of

the member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such benefit
following the demise of the wife or husband, as the case may be, is also
part of the latters contractual compensation.
The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly
deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired
SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their
survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such
surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose
respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters
retirement, the proviso as of the date of his retirement qualifying the
term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors
pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the
retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of
securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption,
moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not
afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose.
The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional
because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In
the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an
irrebuttable presumption and statutes creating per_______________
earning One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) monthly or below may be reduced by the Commission.

The monthly earnings declared by the self-employed member at the time of his registration shall
remain the basis of his monthly salary credit, unless he makes another declaration of his monthly
earnings, in which case such latest declaration becomes the new basis of his monthly salary credit.

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manent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the
due process clause.27
In the petitioners case, for example, she asserted that when she and
Bonifacio got married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship
and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had
been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest
child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was
not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios
bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being
considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was
deprived of the survivors benefits, a property interest, accruing from the
death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due
process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove
that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his
bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his
death.28 Hence, the pro_______________
27

See, for example, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 US 628, 41 L.Ed.2d 363; U.S.

Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 US 508, 37 L.Ed.2d 767; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 US
441, 37 L.Ed.2d 63.
28

In this connection, it is well to note that, as discussed in Government Service

Insurance System v. Montesclaros, supra, under Section 10.4.1 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 8291 (the present GSIS Law), the surviving spouse who
married the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive
survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the

marriage solely to receive the benefit. The said Rules acknowledge that whether the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter
of evidence. The said Section reads:
Sec. 10.4. Allocation of the Survivorship Pension Among Beneficiaries.The survivorship pension
shall be paid as follows:
10.4.1.When the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he/she shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or
until he/she remarries. For purposes of this

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viso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) which deprives

the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS
members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.
Conclusion
Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is
nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of
entitlement to survivors pension is not substantially affected since the
following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act
No. 8282:
1. (1)
2. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
3. (2)
4. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children.
In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and
dependent children as follows:
1. (1)
2. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
3. (2)
4. The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached
twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age,
he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.

Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the
validity of the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d)
of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions
of a constitutional
_______________
section, the marriage of the surviving spouse immediately prior to the death of the member or pensioner shall be
acceptable, unless it is proven that the marriage was solemnized solely for purposes of receiving the benefit.

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nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. 29 However, the
question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely necessary for
the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required
the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass
upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to
render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her
advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension
accruing upon the death of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April
15, 2003 and Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso
as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot
deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the
basis of this invalid proviso.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Azcuna, Tinga and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Notes.The retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government. (Tantuico, Jr.
vs. Domingo, 230 SCRA 391 [1994])
_______________
29

Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34298, 28 February 1985, 135

SCRA 37.
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Section 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms

bars the creation of any insurance or retirement planother than the GSIS
for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue
and iniquitous proliferation of such plans; SSS Res. 56 contravenes Sec.
28 (b) of CA 186 and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. (Conte vs.
Commission on Audit, 264 SCRA 19 [1996])
o0o