7) Yau Vs Silverio - Rodriguez (D2017)
7) Yau Vs Silverio - Rodriguez (D2017)
7) Yau Vs Silverio - Rodriguez (D2017)
ISSUES:
Whether the Decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 may
no longer be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal since more than five
(5) years have already lapsed from its finality
PROVISION:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute
of limitations.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals rendered conflicting Decisions. It denied
Macapagals claim while it granted that of Silverios.
While it is true that Section 6, Rule 39 states that a judgment may be
executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the
date it becomes final and executory. And after the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced
by action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution
by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.
Doctrine 1
In computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, any interruption or
delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may
be issued without scire facias (writ requiring the named party to appear in
court and show why a judgment should not be executed). Thus, the time
during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will
be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.
Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and
executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued
on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of
the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio
filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial
courts judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or
interrupted the further enforcement of the writ. Because of their own
maneuvers, there has been a delay of sixteen (16) years in the enforcement
of such judgment, reckoned from its finality on December 26, 1991 up to the
present. Indeed, the enforcement of the trial courts judgment by motion has
been interrupted by the acts of Macapagal and Silverio the judgment
debtors.
Doctrine 2
Let it be stressed that with respect to Macapagal and Silverio the Decision of
the trial court has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer
subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the
judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro
tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is
void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become
final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final
judgment. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes
final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition of Esteban Yau in G.R. No. 158848
and DENY the petition of Arturo Macapagal in G.R. No. 171994.