ANTITANK WARFARE SEMINAR

14-15 October, 1976

Washington, D.C.

TRANSCRIPT

PART I

ENGLISH TEXT

PART I

TRANSLATORS

Mr. P, M. Sprey

Mia j, Tash

Capt. L. 0, Ratley III

NOTES TO THE READER

This;docxament is divided into two parts.

The first

is a transcript of the questions asked Col. Rudel and the

answers a^ translated from the German answers.

The sec

ond part of the work is a transcript only of the material

that was asked and answered in the German original.

are slight differences in PART I

dered at the conference)

There

(the translations as ren

and PART II

(which was translated

later from a recording of the entire conference).

If the

reader has a particular interest in any area covered in

PART I, he (she)

should also refer to the translated Ger

man original in PART II.

The slight differences are due

to the loss of a certain portion at the German original

during simultaneous translations as opposed to not hav

ing any time limit when working with recorded material.

Due to the poor quality of the tape recorder used, some
of the material is unintelligible and is so indicated in
the t e x t .

11-

ABSTRACT

This document is a transcript of a conference held

-V

in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 October 1976, with various

representatives of the U.S. Armed Services and Industry
and Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel. Col. Rudel was the most
highly decorated member of the German Armed Services in

World War Two. Col. Rudel was a JU-87 Stuka Lagtwai^e

pilot and his most notable achievement was the destruct
ion of 519 Soviet tanks with his JU-87 "G" Stuka which
was fitted with two 37 mm antitank cannons.

The U.S. interest in Col. Rudel was stimulated in

the past by the situation confronting NATO today of a

massive Warsaw Pact advantage in armored vehiclesespecially tanks. The information obtained from Col.
Rudel at this conference and recent studies on air to
ground antitank warfare, tend to support the thesis

that a tremendous resevoir of information is available

from Laitiuaiie. antitank experience that is directly

applicable to the NATO/Warsaw Pact situation in Europe
today.

TAPE I

SIDE I

INTRODUCTION
CHAIRMAN:

I would like to introduce Capt. Lon Ratley who

will give a brief rundown of the war on the Eastern

Front as fought through the German eyes.

Capt. Lon Ratley

is assigned to AFIT (unintelligible), but he is going to

Postgraduate

Navy.

School in Monterey, California with the

His thesis subject was Close Air Support and he

is trying to draw analogies i think quite successfully

between the war of the MOs and the possible war in
the near future; or in the next 10 to 15 years.

In his

research he did go to Germany, he speaks fluent Geannan,

and he did examine the Archives and spoke to German
Generals.

He was fortunate enough to be able to find

Col. Rudel and spend a delightful time interviewing him

for his research paper.

it was the outgrowth of that

effort that has led to where we are today.

What I'd like to do is have Capt. Ratley give a

brief overview of the war on the Eastern Front, give you

background on Col. Rudel himself, and then we will go
into a seminar session.

In order to make it reasonable,

we will try to restrict the participants to those

people that are sitting at the table.

go into the question and answer period.

the topics flow as they may.

-1-

Then, we will

We will let

TAPE I

SIDE

Col. Rudel, I assure you, will be true to his word.

He'll

be candid and frank with his answers and when they hurt
and are not quite what we want to hear, we'll be fortu

nate enough to hear them anyway.

That is the purpose

of this meeting.

Let me, for my own edification and for everybody

else here, go around the table and show Col. Rudel who's

here.

I am Col. Bob Dilger; I

Armament.

am the Director of A-10

To my left is Gen. Brill.

Program Director for the A-10 program.

He is the System
Next to him is

Mr. Wilson, from the Office of Strategic Research - CIA.

Close Air Support is one of the prime subjects they are

looking at this time.

Next to him is Fred Feer who has

worked with Peter in some related areas of conventional

warfare.

Mr. Mike Mecca is next.

He is a

retired Air

Force Officer, 105 driver and now very much involved in

the A-10 program from a viewpoint of employment, among

other things.

Next, Mr. Fred Frederickson.

son is formerly from I#and Warfare of

DDR&E.

Mr. Frederick-

He is now

in an analysis program, System Planning Program.

to him is Mr. Spirey-

Next

Mr, Spray was formerly in the group

that is now called ASI^A<SI and he was very active in the

formulation stage of the A-10.

He was the man that intro

duced me to the work of Col. Rudel back when I was

eligible)

viewpoint.

(in

for the A-10 program from the concept formulation

Moving to the other side is, Mr. Tom Christy.

-2-

TAPE I

SIDE I

He is the head of ASD/PA&E

(Tac Ai^. Next to him

IS Bernie Bock, Deputy Director of the DDR&E (General Purpose

Forces).
Then, Gen. Smith, ADCS Air Headquarters
Marine Corps. Tom Turner is next. Vice President of Fairchild Industries. He also vforks for Gen. Brill.
Gen. McMullen, who is next, was formerly Director of
the A-10 program and is now director of all requirements
for TAC. This is a new job for him and we in the A-10
are delighted that he is here. Next to him is Maj. Tash
who will help with the interpretation. He speaks fluent

German. i would like to find a seat for Mr. Meyers up

here at the table. Mr. chuck Meyers is from ddR&B
(A.ir Warfare). This is an unusual position to have at a
meeting like this, but he recently took over responsibility for the A-10.

So, with this, I would like to turn the meeting

over to Capt. Lon Ratley.

He will give us a brief over

view of the War on the Eastern Front and a background

on Col. Rudel for those of you that have,not read his
book.

Then we will go into seminar session.

CAPTAIN LON RATLEY:

Good morning gentlemen.

i am Capt. Ratley. Col.

Dilger already explained what we are going to go through

basically; a recap of the campaign on the Eastern Front
and a few words about the German anti-tank aircraft.
-3-

TAPE

SIDE

The code name for the German plan for the camptiign
against Russia was "BARBAROSSA,"
consisted of twelve weeks;

Basically, the plan

three weeks for the capture

of Smolensk, three weeks for resupply and rest and then

six weeks thereafter would be the capture of Moscow.

There were 3330 German tanks used in this campaign,
opposing approximately 22-24 thousand Russian tanks.
About 3.2 million German soldiers and about 4.5 million
Russian troops located in Western USSR.
QUESTION:

By General Brill

Were these all TlQtK67

(Referring to the German

tanks.)
ANSWER:

No sir, there were no

were Panze^i III'6 and Il/'4.

at that time.

They

Later in the war the Germans

used the PanthzA (which was in the 40 ton class) and the
TIqzh. (in the 60 ton class) .
CAPTAIN LON RATLEY;

The German execution of the campaign went according

to plan, until the capture of Smolensk which fell on 16

July, 1941, that is where their difficulty started.

There was some question about the strategic objectives
of the campaign.

Hitler decided that, in lieu of

dlmmediately going for the rail and communication center

in Moscow, he would attack instead to the South and

-4^

TAPE

SIDE

capture large numbers of disorganized Soviet troops

in the Ukraine.

This was quite a successful operation.

However, when they shifted the weight of the campaign

back to the North to Moscow, there was insufficient
strength left to permit the Germans to effect the
capture Moscow prior to the onset of winter weather.

Through December '41, these figures you see here

are rough, but approximately 3 million Russian POW's,
17,500 Russian tanks destroyed, 2000 Russian aircraft

were destroyed the first day.

figure is somewhat suspect.

I might add that that

The

1800 aircraft were destroyed.

reported

Back in headquarters

Marshall Goering at the time didn't believe them and he

sent his own special people out to the field to investi

gate.

Subsequently he discovered it wasn't 1800,

it was in fact over 2000.

Basically the winter campaign

deteriorated to static warfare.

German losses during the

winter were primarily due to their unpreparedness for

winter; as opposed to any offensive action by the Soviets.

There were excessive command changes on the German side

because of the failure to take Moscow.

Primarily GudzfiloLVi

and Hotk who were the two prime architects of the BlitzkJLlQ,g
and armored tactics.
iVon

All three army group commanders,

l/on Bock, and l/ow Run6te.dt) were also relieved.

The summer offensive of 19 42 had two primary objectives;

Stalingrad and the oil fields at Baku on the Caspian Sea.

-5-

TAPE I

SIDE

The execution miscarried with the failure to hold

Stalingrad.

Ninety percent of the city was captured by

the Germans, but ten percent was not.

Subsequently,

the Russians moved in and were successful in surrounding

Stalingrad and caputring the Sixth Army.

At the same

time, a special Army Group "A" (it is difficult to see

from this map but Stalingrad is here on the Volga, Army

Group "A" penetrated down here by the Cacusus Mountains

and advanced patrols-even reached the Caspian Sea.

You

don't see this much in History books, but they did in

fact reach the Caspian Sea.

It is down in this area.

As you can see, this extended right wing of the German

Army put them in an extremely precarious position because
they were not able to hold Stalingrad.

At this point entered Marshall Von Manstein.

He

was successful in a series of defensive battles on its

left wing, and therefore, enabled the Germans to withdraw

Army Group "A" back to its jumping off position.

In

March of 194 3 he successfully counterattacked the

Russians in Kharkov and they suffered a severe defeat

there and the initiative passed back into German hands.
This led to the German Summer offensive in 19 43 at the

battle of Kursk.

This was a Russian salient that pro

truded into the German lines around the city of Kursk.

It was the Germans plan to pinch off this salient by

concentric attacks from the North and South. The planning

-6-

TAPE

SIDE I

for the campaign was characterized by a lot of deception,

delays and differences of opinion.

Von Manstein had opted

for an immediate attack at Kursk, before the onset of the

rainy season, immediately after the battle of Kharkov

in March.

One thing led to another, and the actual

offensive did not start until July 1943.

The allies,

as you know, landed in Sicily on the 12th of July and

Hitler called off the offensive at Kursk in order to with

draw the Second SS Panzer Corps into Italy to counter

allied landings.

It is generally agreed that after the

battle of Kursk, any possibilities for a total German

victory on the Eastern Front disappeared.

That is not

to imply that they lost the war there, only that the war
could not be totally won.

The final campaigns from 1943 to '45 basically

consisted of a war of attrition with the initiative swing

ing to the Soviets and a gradual German defeat.

There

were no spectacular battles after the battle of Kursk.

Field commanders, because of mistrust between major field

commanders and OKW Headquarters, were not given enough
authority in the field to fully exploit all of the situations

that presented themselves.

For example, the defensive

line, because they taught them "not one step backwards,"

could not be straightened so as to preclude the number of
miles of front that any given division would have to defend.
-7-

TAPE I

S^IDE I

There was also a marked deterioration in mobile warfare

because of worn-out equipment, lack of fuel and logistics

support.

A little bit about anti-tank aircraft:

Two were

primarily used, the HS-129 and Stuka "G" Model that

Col. Rudel flew.

The HS-129 carried a 30 mm cannon

on a center line mount.

The JU87-G carried two pod

mounted 37 mm cannons mounted outboard from the main

landing gear.

This is a shot of the HS-129.

Of this

particular version here, there were only 6 or 9 built, I'm

not sure exactly which.

This isn't the 37, this is the

75 mm cannon that was used.

This particular aircraft was

considered ponderous and was only used for individual

tanks that had broken through the front and were a threat
to the major areas to the rear of the German divisions.
Today we are primarily concerned with the Stuka,

You

can see a standard "D" Model here without the cannons.

It is important to note that the Stuka was considered

in 1939 by the Germans to be an aircraft that was not

to modern standards.

It was not considered a modern

front line aircraft by the Germans in 1939.

was used up until the very end of the war.

Yet, it
This is a

picture of the "G" Model Staka with the individual cannons

mounted here, each weighing about 1000 pounds and each
carrying (you can see it here) a magazine of. six 37 ram
shells each.

Col. Rudel had 2500 certified sorties.

-8-

tape I SIDE I

Twenty-one hundred of which were with the

and 400

Of which were in the FW-190.

A little background on Col. Rduel:

he was born in

1916 in Silesia, his father was an Evangelist Minister.

He joined the Luitwaiiz in 1936, going into pilot training,

subsequently posted to the Staka squadron and from there

he was tranferred to a reconaissance squadron and then back

to a Staka squadron. From there his first actual bomb

dropping combat did not start until the Russian campaign

of June 1941. Thereafter, he was promoted very rapidly,
ending the war as a Gzickuiad&l commander which would be
roughtly equivalent to an augmented AF Wing today. He
was primarily responsible for introducing the Stuka. with
the 37 mm cannons, into operational use in Russia. His

tally on tanks was 519, that he personally destroyed. The

figure is somewhat misleading because the Germans required
that the tank burn and also explode before it was con

sidered a kill. So, roughly you can multiply that by a

factor of two or three to get a more realistic picture
of how many tanks Col. Rudel personally destroyed.
He was decorated personally by Hitler with the

Knights Cross, Golden Oak Leaf, Swords &Diamonds, only

one of which was awarded to Col. Rudel.

He is the

highest decorated German soldier in the 2nd World War.

That concludes my portion.

-9-

TAPE I

SIDE I

CHAIRMAN:

Let me just add a few comments to it and then we will go

to the seminar.
of the

It was the Stuka which was an important part

concept, that was to provide mobile fire

power to the rapid advancing forces.

Even though the Germans

were out numbered, for exapmle, in Russia by a large magnitude,

by lightning tactics they were able to get on the edge of Mos

cow in a matter of 6 weeks or thereabouts.

That was a 1200

mile advance, against overwhelming numerical superiority on

the other side.

The thing that Lon did not mention was that

Colonel Rudel also sunk the largest ship of the war by air.
The battleship MuKat,

He also sank a cruiser.

The 2500 sor

ties, as it turns out, in the latter part of the war, when the
German Luitujaiiz was enormously outnumbered in the air.

The

Soviets actually had air supremeacy for all practical purposes.

The tank kills that he had, again did not occur during the
early part of the war at all.

His tank kills occurred pri

marily after the introduction of the gun on the Stuka.

And

it was over the lively debate that took place within the Lufforces, as to whether that one could even do this, so

Rudel was much impressed with the accuracy of a gun system

and did the basic "R and D flying".

He brought it out to oper

ational lines and introduced it through a combination of tac

tics.

He came enormously successful in his venture there.

So most of the kills occurred in the later part of the war,

almost all with the gun system.

-10-

And they occurred under a

TAPE I

SIDE I

situation that would be difficult to comprehend from a view

point of numerical superiority on the opposite side.

kill also had to be verified by another person.

A tank

The tank had

to burn, it had to explode and another person had to verify

it.

Then you had a tank kill, and not before .

Two or three

to me, is a conservative estimate of what really occurred.

Now, unfortunately, I was outranked.

participant in the seminar.

So I cannot be a

All I can be is the Chairman.

I'd like to throw it open to questions and we will interpret

to make sure Col. Rudel understands the questions as well,

and we will interpret back.

We will go slowly,

QUESTION:

Bob, 1*6. like to ask the Colonel this,,. Colonel, in add

ition to the tanks that you shot at, did you keep a record

of the trucks or artillery pieces or dxther vehicles accompany

ing the tanks or did you not even bother to shoot at them?
ANSWER:

Yes, he did both attack and keep some numeration of the

things he shot at.

Unfortunately these records were stolen

from him so they are unavailable to anybody right now.

He

can't account for all of them, but did, in fact, account for
over 300 vehicles and 80 artti-aircraft positions that he had
destroyed.
QUESTION:

Almost all the kills I guess were in the Stuka,

said 37 ram, 6 rounds per magazine?

-11-

Now, you

TAPE

SIDE

ANSWER:

Yes s i r .
QUESTION:

So those were really single shot?

ANSWER;

Yes sir.

I've already talked with him about this so I

can answer your question. Usually what he would do is attack

fron slant range of about 300 meters.

QUESTION:

(Unintelligible)
ANSWER:

No, he*d fire two simultaneously.

fire two at the same time;

He would attempt to

one from each gun.

QUESTION:

Your slant range was 200 meters?

Let him answer that.

ANSWER:

The guns were harmonized to shoot at 400 meters but Col.

Rudel found i t was difficult for him to be as exact as he

wanted to be in order to effect a kill by shooting at those

ranges.

He would usually go down to 200 sometimes 100 or 150.

He had to be very exact in his deliveries and he had to hit

the tank in a vulnerable area where the tungsten-carbide center

would penetrate the fuel or ammunition storage area in order

to effect a kill.

He couldn't do this at further slant range

because of the accuracy.

QUESTION:

-1^-

TAPE I

3IDE I

Now, given you had a very short open fire (unintelligible)

what sort of ground air threat was involved?

Was there org

anized arms activity or, because of the dynamics of the sit

uation, was i t nonexistent?
ANSWER:

When the Russian tanks would break through the front, as

with any attack, their logistics train would become somewhat

strained.

VtakpanzzA., the guns that are mounted on a tank

chassis would fall behind the tanks.

would present itself:

Therefore, the problem

Tanks that had "broken, through the front

...had turned out i t was much more difficult of course...and

his attacking with his aircraft would be coordinated with other

aircraft that would attack the Vtak positions on the ground.

Also, he would make multiple passes at the tank (unintelligible)

Generally speaking, there would only be one (inintelligible)
QUESTION:

What sort of aircraft provided Zak suppression?

ANSWER;

There were two anti-tank squadrons in his wing.

Pardon

me, there was only one anti-tank flight of aircraft, it was

called aircraft (unintelligible) a very strong squadron of

aircraft.

What he would do in an attack, there would be other

Stuka4> in his wing that normal Stuka^ without the cannons on,
would bomb, would attack the fZak positions through coordinated
effort.

QUESTION;
-13-

TAPE I

$IDE I

Were these bombs (unintelligible)

ANSWER;

The Stuka. would carry a bomb that could (unintelligible)

and the bombs had a fuse in them that was set at 50 cm at that

time, which would allow them to explode above the ground (un
intelligible) , They would carry about a 4 pound bomb inside,
similar to our "Rockeye",
QUESTION:

How long (unintelligible)

ANSWER:

About 50 seconds.
QUESTION:

Would you ask him to give us a review of the attack pro

file, dive angle, air speed, altitude, when he'd generally try
to roll in, that type of thing?
ANSWER:

If they had a cloud deck of 200 meters and they had to

fly underneath that and then with a very relatively flat at
tack angle.

They didn't take into account the height of the

clouds...When they were not paying attention to,their cloud

decks, then they would normally start between 800 and 1500
meters.

They would circle around until they found the tank

itself. The problem was not actually shooting or killing

the tank, but it was finding the tank.

Being able to vis

ually acquire their target, that is where they spent most of

their time.

He added too that speed was poison for finding

-14-

TAPE I

SIDE I

tar^.

Normally they would fly at 250 kilometers, but when

they were at an angle of 20 to 30 degrees, they would dive.

It would be about..,320.

the aircraft.

They had aerodynamic problems with

If you got at 320 kilometers, you*d get ossi-

lations.
QUESTION:

This was only the cannon aircraft?

ANSWER:

Yes, this was for the cannon.

accurately if you went over 350.

go 450 in a

The cannon would not fire

The regular aircraft would

dive.

QUESTION;

Kilometers per hour hou're talking about?

ANSWER;

Everything is in kilometers per hour.

The cannon itself was the controlling factor.

It was

definately the aerodynamics of the cannon which limited the

airspeed.

Normally their landing speed was 180 and their

crusing was 250.

Because the cannon was the most important

thing, they would let the cannon control all of the speed.
was the thing that actually killed the tank so every
thing else fell to the side.
QUESTION;

180 kilometers for this landing with the aircraft...

with the cannon (unintelligible)
ANSWER;

-15-

TAPE I

SIDE I

About 140.
QUESTION:

Pierre mentioned something about speed is poison?

ANSWER:

Yes, there is just a little phrase at the end of what he.

was saying about that the essence is to find tanks. Once you
find them, you can shoot them with a reasonable candor and

the phrase he used was that in finding tanks speed is poison.

QUESTION:

Could I quote that?

ANSWER:

Ask him it is not my statement.

context.

Let's not take it out of

He says that really speed is absolutely catastrophic

and it is a poison when you are trying to kill a tank because

you can get too fast.

You will over shoot the tank and then

you've wasted your mission.

QUESTION:

Before Tom comes in, let's finish developing our point.

General Smith said don't quote it out of context.

low speeds for descrimination.

going to be

We advocate

General Smith, your point is

what?

ANSWER:

You've got to take the whole warfare into context.

In

other words, if you can't survive what surrounds you, you are
not going to survive the shoot.

Speed is catastrophic when

you are trying to find something, and a tank is not too much
-16-

TAPE I SIDE I

different from a truck. If you are in foliage, the slower

you can go certainly improves your eyeball action capability

and then you've got to keep in sight everything that is going

around you too. You know the equation balances out very
quickly; what is coming at you determines your speed and if
you're going to survive the kill.
QUESTION;

This is the question that I was going to ask.

We've

mentioned that they did try Vlak suppression, but we haven't

mentioned what other kinds of air defense flying you were

under while you were circling, looking for tanks. While you
were flying 250 kilometers at a couple of hundred meters.

What about rifle firing, what about machine gun firing, what
about all of the other things that you would encounter.

How

did you avoid these?

ANSWER;

They had to deal with everything from pistols on up and

they had soldiers that had fallen on their backs who would

just shoot up into the air and when you had 100 soldiers in

front of the tanks or with the tanks and you just had to pass
through it and you encountered (unintelligible). He says
that he often had 30 or 40 hits in the airplane and as long
as none of those hits, all calibers, as long as none of those

hits were in the radiator, it really wasn't a big problem.

(Unintelligible,)
END TAPE I

SIDE I

-17-

TAPE I

SIDE I I

ANSWER CON*T:

...until such time as he has through his experience and

seat of the pants feeling and he could see- the slant range to

the tank, he would roll out just for a second, stabilize his

platform and fire and then immediately start jinking again. "
That*3 a very important point, let me emphasize that,
over that with Colonel Rudel,

I went

He says that his line up time

from wings level until firing with the cannon was between 1
and 1 1/2 seconds, and I believe that's accurate because he

quotes for bombing 3 to 4 seconds line up time for experienced

pilots.

He said, however, there was no way you could get a

pilot out of ordinary training to be able to hit a tank with

only one second line up time.

On the other hand, he said it

was absolutely essential for survival to hold it down to that.

And, of course, in an airplane, that would be less limited by

its cannons, you know, that one second for cannons versus three
or four seconds for bombing^ in and of itself, would be a tre
mendous survival advantage.

Younger pilots, to continue aug

menting what Mr. Sprey said, had a lot of difficulty because

they couldn't, quite frankly, they couldn't "see" the same

slant ranges that Col. Rudel could.

They simply didn't have

the experience and hadn't had enough practice to be able to

roll out just momentarily and let two rounds go and start

jinking again.

The majority of the losses that they had with

the antitank aircraft were in a phase where the pilot would

roll out, track the target and then fire.

I might add that

just based on a conversation with Col. Rudel yesterday, that

-18-

-.N

TAPE

SIDE

II

you had to be very canny in working with the Russians

He

said often he would come into the area^ a wooded area, and

finally after making several orbits, he would spot a tank

and then, he said, something would just not look right to
him, it would look fishy, and so he would maybe wait ten
more minutes and then he might spot a fZdk battery or they

would finally just get disgusted with waiting and they would

open up on him.

They would expend all of their munitions

that they had at the time and then, he could go in and attack

the tank, after the enemy had expended all of their flak at
him.

It is very individual the way that a pilot is going

to attack tanks.

He rates that as a very important factor

in survival in addition to the tactics that he is talking

about.

That sense for a tactical situation for telling

when there was a fZak trap set up and when there wasn't.
He refers to i t as just intuition and also constant exposure

to get that sixth sense it is absolutely essential to be flying

every single day.

A few weeks away from the front you lose

contact with the situation, you lose contact with the latest

tactics of the enemy.

He says it is very dangerous when you

come back after you've been out of contact for a few weeks.
QUESTION:

He said he typically operated from 1500 meters from the

front?
ANSWER:

No, 1500 meters in cruise altitude.

-19-

TAPE I

SIDE II

QUESTION:

Okay then, how typically,.,

ANSWER;

Your question as to how far depended on the particular

time of the war and where the airfield happened to be.

could be anywhere from 17 to 100 kilometers.

to say.

It is impossible

But he definately stresses experience.

important thing.

It

It was a very

That is why it was impossible for young people

to survive the way he did because they did not have the exper
ience ,
QUESTION:

One other question along that same line, when he arrived

in target area, I assume that he had no problem finding a target

area...was there any control at all over the Air Force like to

day with airborne air controllers and so forth, or did he have

to be brought in by external means?
ANSWER;

He stresses particularly experience.

the aircraft flys the pilot.

With the young pilot

With the very expereinced pilot,

it is the pilot that is flying the machine.

practically slept in his machine.

He says that he

He'd be going from 3 in the

morning until eight or nine in the evening.

He was constantly

with the machine itself and it was the fact that he had total

control over his aircraft that made the big difference.

CHAIRMAN:

Excuse me for just a minute.

-20-

We've been going for one

TAPE I SIDE II

hour now. Suppose we take a 15 minute break. We've only

scratched the surface of Mr. Christie's question. I don't
know the size of the flights, I don't know the tactics en-

volved. I don't know the coordination of the captain. We

will open up session with those kind of questions. Did he
rendezvous, how was it controlled, how did they get there,
how did they get back?
INTERMISSION
CHAIRMAN:

I appreciate the patience of everybody at this time.

We have made a few changes. One is that Ive asked here,

because he -speaks fluent Geirman, Mr Sprey to sit up here
so that we get the full impact of what is being translated.
It is easy to lose some of what is being translated.

Sec

ondly, there was a suggestion made and I concur that what

we Qught to do is set up a random shotgun blasting rather

than questions that bounce all around, to all kinds of is
sues, that we take phases of the problem and we restrict

questions to you know like command and control or whatever

one at a time and stay with it until we have exhausted it

to our satisfaction, then press on to the next topic area.

There was one other thing, they have to have the tape re
corder down here to get a better pick up and they have
asked me to ask everybody to speak up when they ask the
questions so that it is picked up and if not for me to

repeat the questions to make sure that it is picked up

-21-

TAPE

SIDE I I

on the recorder
QUESTION:

What are you going to do with the tape?

QUESTION:

Who's doing the taping?

Bill McLaurin

ANSWER;

Yes, if I may.
nalist.

Bill McLaurin is a professional jour

We thought it might be very good if he wrote a

piece on how he sees the discussion then pass it around to the

people who were here to make sure it was a truthful reflection

of Col. Rudel's comments.

That was the idea, to get a profes

sional journalist, so to speak, to give an interpretation.

CHAIRMAN:

Let me make an observation, it is a veiwpoint of mine,

and I don't know if it is held by anybody else, but Col. Rudel

has had enormous experience, but in a different era under dif
ferent conditions and different times and I think it is incum
bent upon us who have some influence on this era on this time

that we listen to the history as it were and we are each res

ponsible for how well that translates into today's world.

It

may not translate at all or it might be almost 100 per cent

translateable with each of us.

We are not here to quarrel with

what happened 30 years ago, we are here to find out what happened
30 years ago.

With that, I'd like to pick up with where Mr, Christie*s

question dropped off.

That is, we are trying to build the

-22-

TAPE I

3IDE II

scenario that took place more or less typically and I guess

when you really get down to it, there is no such thing as a
typical mission. Questions like how many people flew in the
flight? Was it a flight of one, a flight of two or was it
squadron size.

Did he meet up with cover, was that standard?

How did he support his organization? Was it controlled by

ground controllers? Those kind of questions. Neil can you
go ahead and start that off there and that will open it up.
ANSWER:

He would usually go out alone.

He would start early.

Hed be the first one out to reconnoiter the area. When the

report was that there would only be ten tanks, that they

were looking for ten to 15, then he would be followed up

with a very small flight of usually about 12, sometimes only

six or seven of those aircraft. He added that he would fly
with a squadron size (unintelligible), a normal squadron was
12 to 16 aircraft, but because of the maintainance difficulties

and so forth, they could only put six or seven up in the air.

If there was a stronger enemy formation of artillery and

tanks and so forth, instead of flying a squadron level, they

would fly at a group level.

reality, 15 aircraft.

Theoretically 27 aircraft, in

Again they would fly in a (unintelligible)

QUESTION:

What sort of

did they have with the top cover?

The fighter aircraft, were there prior

rendezvous

arrangements or was the cover against the Soviet opposition?

-23-

TAPE I

SIDE II

ANSWER:

1*11 answer his question, but just to clear up any con-fusion, I'll run through the,,.
QUESTION:

I want to know why you laughed,

ANSWER:

Because he said that their coiranunications, normally were

telephonic landlines that functioned part of the time and fun

ctioned part of the time not.

blems.

So, that was one of their pro

The levels at which they would work, would be (unint

elligible) squadrons;
16 aircraft.

smaller than our squadrons, maybe 12-

From there, you would go to a G-tappe which was

three squadrons plus a staff flight.

to a

From there you would go

which was three G/iapen. From there, you would

go to a LaitdZxjl^lon or a Lu{tKoA.p^, which would be an ai^

division or Air Corps,

From there, to a Luitilottz which would

be an air fleet, (it would be just the level of command).

In

Col. Rudel*s case, his wing would be subordinated to an Air

Corps, through land lines would coordinate with close air

support units like Col.Rudel's and with fighter units.

They

would set a rendezcous point and they would supposedly meet

their air cover prior to going into attacking their targets.

In practice, Gol.Rudel's support aircraft would arrive only
about one-half of the time.

There would be different excuses;

they would say they were attacked in route, they were engaged
elsewhere, the weather was too bad and so forth.

-24-

In Russia

tape I

SIDE II

the airfields v/ere so muddy sometimes, that they couldn't

take off.
QUESTION;

With regard to the General's question.

What sort of

large mass armored forces (unintelligible) some said when

he got into a situation when there was a mixed battle between
the Soviets and the Germans it was diffucult to discern,
ANSWER:

Normally, between 15 and 20 was what they were facing.

(Tanks) But in a very large conflict when they were con
centrated, there would be between three and four hundred
tanks.

QUESTION;

Which would be equal to.,.he's speaking now of what you

would actually see or encounter on a sortie? I'm talking
about what was inside his area of responsibility.
ANSWER;

What he'd have to do, would be to fly very close to the

ground to the figure of two meters, in order to distinguish

who was a German and who was a Russian. Often they would be
engaged as close as 50 meters from one another and he would

fly under to see the form of the German helmet so that he could

distinguish between the ground units.

It was extremely dif

ficult the way they would mix themselves on the front lines
(unintelligible).

They would really intermix.

The Germans

would be at one place, the Russians may be back behind the

-25-

TAPE

SIDE

II

German line at one point, and the Germans into the Russians

line at another point.

It was an extremely difficult problem

for him to discern which were friendly and which were enemy,
and, of course, that was the big thing that occupied his

time.

It was very difficult, especially when they were re

ceiving Vlak, because the positions on the ground were so

close and the tendency would be to,..if they^re flying around up there and they start getting shot at they'd say,
"Well, we're getting shot at so obviously those are not Ger

mans.

In reality, it wasn't the case because the troops

were so intermixed, so interwoven with one another on the

<

ground.

He said that he had to sometimes make as many as

five or six passes for identification alone (unintelligible).

QUESTION;

Were there cases of complaints of inexperienced Stuka

pilots shooting up firendly, as happened to us, was that a

constant problem or..
ANSWER:

This, of course, occurred, but one did not see it very

often.

It happened to Col. Rudel on one occasion.

It was the

regulation in his wing that none of the pilots in his wing

could drop ordinance any closer than he, himself, personally did
He also said that he controlled when they bombed at all, so
the last decision before bombing was hit,
QUESTION:

I was thinking in particular, if the case of using the

-26-

TAPE I

SIDE II

SJtuka "G" with the 37 mm, whether there were cases where

inexperienced pilots actually shot up individual German

armored fighting units? Germans because of misidentification,

stress, whatever.
ANSWER:

It happened to Col. Rudel personally.

Fortunately the

bomb missed, and the guy jumped out of the tank and waved

at him.

It was a Tiger (tank) and the guy, very shocked and

frightened,

popped open the hatch and waved at him,

QUESTION:

Let's pursue that a little further then...did they ever

have any ground control-or ground assistance in target identi
fication, and what marking devices would be used?
ANSWER;

He said that in the Panzer divisions, which you have to

remember were elite divisions, they had

who were on the ground, in tanks, with radios.

very close communication.
introduce this subject.

Officers

They were in

There is probably a better way to

The 14th Panzer Division had one

Panzer left at the time of this incident and the commanding

general of the unit told Col. Rudel that he was going to
use that tank as a radio tank.

officer.

in.

Put in his

Liaison

He took the cannons out in order to get the radios

He said that the conversation, the exchange, was far

more important to him than whether that one Panzer could

shoot or not.

The St.LLk.cii> gave him the possibility of attacking

-27-

TAPE I

SIDE II

targets that he needed attacked and obviously with

vastly greater fire power than that one tank could give
him.

That introduces the importance of this liaison.

But, the fact that there were LuitmUe,

Liaison officers

mounted in special tanks, had radios that were on the air-

to-ground frequency of the JU-87 and they were in constant,

very close, contact.

They announced what they needed done,

what targets they needed, if they could pinpoint them, they

would pinpoint them, if they only knew they were taking
fire from a certain area, they would ask them to search

for them.

So they were in very close tactical contact.

Col. Rudel says that if they had not had that kind of
arrangement, the war would have been over in 1943.

That's

how critical it was to the overall success of this close

support effort.
QUESTIONS

Down to what level were these patrol units, did he

tell you?

How many?

ANSWER:

There was one per division, so that would be division

level liaison.
QUESTION:

(Unintelligible) Movement around the battle field is

terribly confusing and diverse, it seems to me that they

obviously couldn't be everywhere at once.

-28-

TAPE I

SIDE II

ANSWER:

You've got to remember that, these were small

divisions.

They were more like our brigades.

Somewhere

between our brigade level and division level.

This was, of course, up to the division commander

(where to put the

LaptimU^ Liaison Officer) , but he was

normally to be found all the way up front with the spearhead

of the armored division and that was just the assistance
they gave the division commanders.
NEW VOICE;

You know, through, Pete, Tom, it seems to me, that

when you have friendly versus enemy, you get into a large
mass of tank battles, the thing that (unintelligible) is
going to be very murky

(unintelligible).

People is the wrong word.

It is going to be difficult, in fact, if there was

some kind of marking capability to keep track of what's

out t h e r e . . .

That's why it is to important to train the force before

the b a t t l e s t a r t s .
So what?

So important to train the force before you get in that

situation.
Yeah.

-29-

TAPE

SIDE

II

ANSWER:

In addition to the Panzer divisions, there were

liaison officers with 20 other elite groups.

The (unin

telligible) were not organic to the division because there

were not enough of them to go around.

In fact, they were

only assigned to divisions that were right in the thick of

it.

Any division that was off the line or just holding or

something, they pulled the

Liaison Officer and

assigned him to the replacement division.

QUESTION;

What was the line of authority?

Did these liaison

officers have the authority to direct aircraft?

What was

their authority?
ANSWER:

Now just one minute, first answer the previous question

Yes, we have a previous question that has not been
translated.

And the question was about whether or not you used

pilots as these forward controllers or liaison officers.
ANSWER:

No, there were no pilots that were used.

They were

Officers, who had speical training, one year

schooling for this particular chore that they were doing.
They were mostly used just as liaison officers.

did not have any command authority or anything.

They

They would

inform the air units how the division was deployed on the
-30-

TAPE

SIDE

II

battlefield, where they were, where the friendly troops

were, and where they suspected the enemies were.
have any command authority.

He didn't

The organization chart would

have the Flieger Air Division or Air Corps as Col. Rudel*s

commander, and he was theoretically responsible to him.
However, because of his experience, innovation and previous

employment, he in effect had a free hand with operations...

that was given to other experienced leaders also, but only
very experienced ones.

They would be sent from one area to another as the need

arose and that would come from higher authority.

But as

far as employment within his area, the authority to release

his bombs, was left to him because of his experience and his
prior success.

He knew more than his commanders knew and

they recognized it and said in effect, you fact a free hand

in what you are doing.
Start out with the question.

What was the question?

The question was, did other commanders, were they held

responsible to the higher echelon of the command, the Air

Divisions and Air Corps?
ANSWER:

Col. Rudel said that there were a few of course, if

the commander of the individual wing or group was a new

commander, then the control that the Air Division commander

would exercise would, of course, be much more stringent than
he would with someone like Col, Rudel,
-31-

However, because of the

TAPE I

SIDE I I

core of experienced

people that they had available for

commanders, by the end of the war there were very, very few
wing commanders that had to be subordinated to the Air
Corps commander, in that manner.

For the inexperienced squadron leaders (unintelligible),

the Flieger Corps level, the Air Corps level told them
exactly where to bomb or gave them exact coordinates and

they had to bomb there.

They had no freedom of action,

for the inexperienced people, and they bombed there even

if there were friendly troops right at those coordinates.

Col. Rudel came back from a mission and he said that

they had not destroyed all of the Russian tanks or troops

in a particular area and he wanted to return to that parti
cular target to finish up, if there was a conflict between

what he thought and what the Air Corps commander thought

that the Air Corps commander had a more important target,

the, of course. Col. Rudel was ordered to the more important
target.
QUESTION:

I'd like to ask him a two part question.

Could he

give us a brief description of how he reacted to an air

request, where did it come from and how did it actually get
to him.

In reading his book, I see that some of his missions

were almost on his own initiative.

He went out sort of hunting

as against reacting to a request as we would to our own

tactical air control system.

Aid then in those areas that were

-32-

TAPE I

SIDE II

within the range of friendly units, did he ever have

coordination with the artillery that helped him soften

up the area, so to speak, in suppression?

Did he ever

use the artillery?

ANSWER:

It would be the front division commanders that

would place their requests and many times the army requests
would be 20 to 30 at a time.

Of course, this would far

exceed the assets that they had...

END OP TAPE I

SIDE II

-33-

TAPE

II

SIDE

The final decision on who would receive the help

was made by the Air Corps.

It apparently was neither a

joint conference of division commanders nor higher than

Air Corps.

The last decision, after receiving the re

quests and the reasons from the division commanders,

was made at the Air Corps level on who would actually
receive the help.
QUESTION:

Yes, you said something (unintelligible) conversation

(unintelligible).

You said that even though there were

(unintelligible) of those who were issuing the orders

and executing that mission (unintelligible) tactical
battle, wouldn't there be some process of updating

(unintelligible).
ANSWER:

It was clear that a German pilot, group commander,

squadron commander, whatever, wouldn't knowingly attack

German troops.

I think what he meant before was that

if there was some friendlies you couldn't see on the

ground, they were ordered to attack there and naturally

they would.

There was, theoretically, a system of update,

but it was so complicated and fluid there, that i t

seldom functioned. It was dependent upon how far away

they were from the controls, how far away they were from
-34-

TAPE

II

SIDE

their own bases, from the Corps.

kilometers from the Air

If they were 300

Corps, their radios could

not function at that distance, so i t had to be strictly

at the knowledge of the flight commander as to whether
or not they would attack.

He said that the German soldiers

on the ground..., it was seldom that they would have

trouble discerning which were their own soldiers, in
that situation, because of the PZak, other than, as we

said before, when they were mixing in one with another.

But, normally the ftak was so intense that they..., an

inexperienced man would say that that is the place that
normally they (unintelligible) that there was not a great
difficulty telling which were the friendlies and not.
The German friendly soldiers would have a flare signal
they would use, so that they could identify themselves.

If the Siuka6 were to fly over

signal, they would circle again.

and there was no

Knowing the circle,

their own troops would use the flare signal to say "we're
German,

and don't bomb us."

QUESTION;

I'd like to go back to his flight control.

He in

dicated that the first shot out of the barrel in the day

time was his.

Look at the situation and then quite often

i t wound up with additional airplanes in the flights.

Could you get the command and control that he exercised

over his supporting air that was directly in support of

-35-

TAPE I I SIDE

him on a mission?
ANSWER:

Yes sir.

Could I just hold on it one second to

answer the previous question

the artillery

about, well that also, I meant about the identification

of the ground troops.

They would fly down, of course,

and make these I.D. passes and then when the troops on

the ground realized that they were trying to clarify

the situation they would use flares, flare pistols to

clarify their position.

Then,

from above, Col. Rudel

could look down and he could see all the lights and
maybe he could make out exactly where the front was.

They would use different colors for different purposes

and he would know exactly along what line the friendlies
and the enemies...,

And even apparently inexperienced commanders would

normally be warned off if they were about to bomb on
some coordinates that were four hours old and the

friendly troops had advanced too, meanwhile.

Even an in

experienced commander normally, if they were shooting off

Afery pistols, would see that he wasn't supposed to bomb

there.

If he wasn't too rigid, then apparently they would

let him move his coordinates forward, bomb forward.

Apparently, that was an informal arrangement, strictly

speaking he was supposed to bomb the coordinates.
-36-

But,

TAPE I I

SIDE I

apparently the system was flexible enough to allow him

to shift his coordinates forward.

The remark that you made about giving away positions,

sir, by the lighting and by flares; he (col. Rudel) said

that the Germans were concerned about having friendly

bombs dropped on them and they would constantly light

their own positions to avoid this situation.

There was

no such thing as a secret as to where they were.

The

Germans always knew where the Russian soldiers were and

the Russians always knew where the German soldiers were.

So, it was not a problem of giving away their positions...

it was already known.

It was more important to them and

to their own safety that they identify themselves,

which they would do constantly, with the Stukoi/> so that
they would not get their own bombs.

To answer your question about the artillery:

artillery was used only for spotting.

shell (unintelligible).

The

They'd drop a

They wouldn't be used to soften

up an area or to try to destroy some of the Russian units..

. . . . suppression?

The artillery didn't have enough munitions to waste

them that way.

Not that they'd be wasted, but there were

other targets of higher priority that they...,

You see, they were operating on a completely different
tonnage scale than the U.

S. divisions.

got such higher artillery

tonnages that they could afford

-37-

A U.S. division

TAPE I I

SIDE

to do that type of thing.

There was very little mass

artillery anywhere on the Russian front, because they

were so tight on artillery.

Our idea of artillery pre

paration, by the Germans was relatively rare.

CHAIRMAN:

I think we can take a break now.

I propose, it*s

quarter to twelve right now, that we take a fifteen

minute break, return at 12:00, go for another hour

and then at 1:00 we'll adjourn for lunch-

This paper, that's hopefully going around; if you

would, I would really like you all to sign up with your
address and when we have something that resembles minutes

out of this, we'll send them to you for your information.

It's started out, i t hasn't gone too far.

So, if each of

you would please sign we'll try to take care of that ad

ministrative detail.

(AFTER BREAK)

(MR. TURNER)

Can I make a point?

The comment that I made about

the journalist; He is a journalist by background but

this report is strictly for internal use and not for the
press, for anybody who may be misled by that comment.
QUESTION;

Internal to what?
ANSWER;

To this group.

Explain internal!

TAPE

II

SIDE

QUESTION

He's making this tape so that this group can hear

it?
ANSWER:

No, so that we can put one report together, that's

not biased.

QUESTION;

That's an internal tape?

ANSWER:
Yes.

QUESTION:

Controlled by you?
ANSWER:

Correct.

QUESTION;

That's going to be used to cross check the minutes.

ANSWER;

That's correct.
CHAIRMAN;

Specifically, we want to avoid any kind of an impli

cation that sounds like,... and that was the ground rules
that Tom and I had talked about.

We're going to live by

those and we'd like you all to do the same.

Now, we're having lunch at one o'clock and we have
reserved spaces for twenty people, i t ' s flexible.
those who wish to s i t in at lunch,
-39-

For

i t will be informal.

TAPE

II

SIDE

We'll have an hour and a

period will be lunch.

half,

of course not all that

We'll readjourn here at 2:30.

May I have the hands of those people who would like to

have lunch upstairs.

Someone count, I'm too dumb.

If someone wishes to join that did not put their

hand up, I'm sure there is expansion capability.

We

specifically went at one so that we wouldn't be going

during the noon lunch hour rush.
LUNCHEON

INTERMISSION

CHAIRMAN:

O.K., with that we closed with the question of

signalling and controls that were used at the front

by the pilots.

Shall we continue in the command and con

trol sense for a period.

Raise your hands, and we'll

start the questions still in the command and control area.

QUESTION:

Why don't we pursue the one that we had just before

lunch.

As we were closing Col. Rudel made a few comments

that I think were very interesting and that underlines

probably the most fundamental points concerning the men at

controls.

He said that the pilots involved in close support,

they must think of themselves as soldiers...if they don't

think of themselves as soldiers, then none of the other

arrangements can work.

The whole thing evolves around that.

He said that if they think of themselves as purely pilots

-40-

TAPE I I

SIDE I

or as fighter pilots, it is not possible to do this

mission.

To do close support, the pilots have to be,

in his term, infantry of the air.

QUESTION:

How did Col. Rudel manage the air that was support

ing him?

He indicated that quite often the first flight

of the day was the personal reconnaisance of the area

and then subsequently air power was applied.

them from the

fields?

where he was?

How did he call it in?

Did he hold

Did he marshall them so far from

Is he a

(unintelli

gible) ?
ANSWER:

The first part of that question was that he would

go out first, then return to the base, because the other

pilots would sleep longer than he would.

before dawn flight.

dawn.

This was a

It was a reconnaisance flight before

He would return and the other pilots would then be

ready (having gotten up later than he did) and they would

take off, usually in group strength, which was, as we
have said before, about 14 or 15 airplanes.

Then he

would take them back to the area that he had selected

and presumedDly brief the Air Corps level what was to

attack.

That would start off the fighting day.

With his

normal aircraft strength being 36, he would only be able

to put 14-15 aircraft in the air and ready for flight.
-41-

TAPE

II

SIDE

QUESTION:

Was the reason for this battle damage, or was this

one of their maintenance problems?
ANSWER;

The main reason for that was mechanical.

Their

problems were because an aircraft is a very technical

machine and in order to maintain that aircraft properly,

they could only get about 1/3 of them in the air.

It

was less the problem that they had been shot at.

Half of the aircraft were severely battle damaged.

He has located them... In theory he had 36 airplanes

available, 27 on strength and 9 reserve.

were always intended to be in maintenance.

The reserves

In fact,

he was able to only put up 14 or 15, normally.

Of course,

there were days when he'd go alone; there was only one
airplane available.

He says it was not so much a problem of resupply,

because they got pretty good resupply by air with the JU52 tri-motor, up to and including engines.

But, he said

that the battle damage system was a serious problem.

QUESTION;

That's the point I want to clarify.

Was i t the

battle damage that was keeping the readiness strength

suppressed?
ANSWER:

-42-

TAPE I I SIDE I

He says about half and half.

About half would be

in battle damage status and about half would be in

mechanical difficulty.
QUESTION:

Can we press just a little bit further on this

control of his flight.

I recognize that there are as

many different targets as there are ways to run an air

show.

But, in general, did he make the first pass and

mark it?

Did he exercise command of the individual

planes in their strikes?

How tightly did he hold them

or was it a general application and then to go home,

reload and come back?
ANSWER:

It depended greatly on whether or not there were

other aircraft..., whether there were enemy aircraft

in the air coming against them.

If, in fact, they had to

counter enemy aircraft, then the formation would be

very tight and they would go one after another, follow

ing Col, Rudel.

He would always be the first one in

and everyone else would follow him through, in trail,

with about 10 feet of separation between them, the aircraft
behind him.

The reason for that was that the typical enemy fighter
tactics that they were facing

were to try to get in the

midst of the group, to catch a straggler or something.

-43-

If

TAPE

II

SIDE

they tightened up, they found it was very discouraging

to the Russian pilots because the JU-87 had pretty good
air-to-air firepower.

Normally, if they could hold

tight formation, the fighters would never try to break

up their formation (unintelligible).

Now within that

tight grouping they still had individually briefed targets

where they rolled in.

Every single pilot had a pre

scribed target, that was given to him by the flight

commander.

Those could be different.

Of course to

keep a tight formation, they had to be pretty close,

but they would be briefed (unintelligible).

Without a fighter threat it was a much less con
trolled flight that would go in and, as was already

said, they each had a target that was pre-briefed.

could be within a

That

two or three kilometer distance that

they would be attacking.

He would let his pilots have

their individual targets and then after about 10 minutes

time he would call for reassembly, they would gather to

gether and then either return or...,

QUESTION:

One final question or command control;

Once they got

airborne how much of the time did they get diverted to a

higher priority target and what was the mechanism for

doing this?

-44-

TAPE I I

SIDE

ANSWER:

That happened very seldom.

They got it over radio,

but it was only possible to recall them if they were

within 30 or 40 kilometers of the transmitter.

This

was a very seldom occurance.

One of the reasons they were much less diverse

is they were flying so many sorties all day long and

they weren't particularly long, they were about an hour

a sortie.

With flights taking off all day long there

was less reason to divert.

They pulled up to two-hour

normal combat missions and the average was about one hour
First, to answer the first question, the thing

with the sortie was the fact of how far away the target
was.

That was the only criteria.

to the resource problem.

We keep coming back

They didn't go around throwing

bombs all over the countryside.

They had to have targets

that warranted sending the aircraft, the few resources

that they had and using the bombs and cannon to attack

specific targets.

On an average day, however, he would

fly five to six sorties, but if it was that necessary

for them to fly in order to save ammunition and gas

they would just stay on the strip.

That was five or six sorties per ready aircraft.
That means if there were 14 or 15 that were normally
ready, each of those would fly 5 to 6 sorties per day.

-45-

TAPE

II

SIDE

They would surge and fly more sorties when there was
an enemy breakthrough.

The question was asked, what kind of resource!

allocation would they make to these particular missions.

The Germans built about 116,000 planes during the

war time period, of which 4,888 were Stuka^, A small

percentage of those StukcU, I don't know the'exact amount,
was the G-model with the gun.

In addition to those

close air supports there were must a few hundreds of

the (HeKi4(i/ie)

129.

So, in essence, the

was

not making allocations of resources, it was not truly

a close air support air force.

They were primarily

the air superiority type fighters that they were

building or the interdiction kind of aircraft.

two main birds were the FW-190

The

and the ME-109 and

they built over 60,000 of those two birds.

QUESTION;

I hear the British felt that the gun was not sat

isfactory because of the lack of a good gun sight and

the low rate of fire and perhaps the low range, al

though the outer penetrating quality was there.

believe the Royal Air Force abandoned the gun for the

rocket.

Was the gun with (unintelligible) in the

or was the gun ever abandoned, or was the gun

carried to the end or did the rocket come in?

TAPE

II

SIDE

ANSWER:

Their experience was exactly the opposite.

He

would take any problem that he had with his aircraft

just to have the weapon system that he had on it, to

^3,ve the cannon that he had on it, because the accuracy

and the distance to which he could shoot, was much better
and further than was their experience with the rocket.
With the rocket, they had a problem with the tra
jectory at the end, which would bend down and come in

at the tank.

The aerodynamic control of the rocket

was so poor that the stability of the rocket was such

that they could not count on the accuracy that he would

have in cannon.

He said that with his cannon position

of the 3.7 he could count on about 1100 meters

muzzle

velocity whereas with the rocket it was only 700.

They

did experiments with the FW-190 and they worked quite

hard on the rockets.

They brought the muzzle

velocity

up from 115 meters per second to 400 meters per second,

but it was still hopeless at 400 meters per second.
The trajectory for it was just too great to do any good.
Even the warhead was quite good, he said, if you could

hit you usually got a kill with these bigger rockets

but it was just hopeless to hit.

Also, he reports something that I don't think is

widely known about his gun.

The aircraft cannon is

different, apparently, than the ground 3.7 from which

-47-

TAPE

II

SIDE

it was derived and according to him, 1100 meters per

second muzzle velocity, whereas, the ground 3.7 had 700.

I've always believed this gun had that too, but he says

that 1100 meters per second was the velocity.

Actually,

that makes it a little faster, I think, than the A-10 gun.

QUESTION:

We've been hearing comments here regarding the fact

that he was willing to take certain measures on the Stuka

there relative to modifying weapons to get the kind of

weapon that he wanted.

The question that I am interested

in turning the problem around the other way is:

In view

of the fact that all of this modification was going on

with the Stuka in order to have the so-called regi

mented weapon, were there

any other plans to come out

with a new airplane with those kind of weapons so they

could get a better marriage.

If so, what kind of airplane

were they thinking about?

ANSWER:

Originally he did not like the Stuka because it was

not a close air support aircraft, but as they went on he

found things that he liked about it.

There were no

plans that he knew of to create a better aircraft that

would be a close air support type aircraft (unintelligible)

QUESTION:

Let me pursue that then while we are on it.

-48-

Were

TAPE

II

SIDE

there any recommendations either by himself or other

pilots in the

to do such a thing?
END SIDE

TAPE

II

SIDE

TAPE

II

II

QUESTION;

(Unintelligible)Was there any kind of recovery

system if they lost a pilot?

Could he describe that?|

ANSWilR:

They always waited until they had information as

to the status of the pilot whether he was dead, whether

he was breathing, or whether he had been taken prisoner.

If i t was within 5 to 600 meters in the Russian front,

they would land another Stuka and pick him up,

QUESTION;

The other question was, when pilots were hit on

this type of mission and they sustained damage, was i t
typical for them to explode in space, or to be able to

milk the plane, or to fly long enough to get back into

friendly territory normall^^, or did they normally go

down behind Russian lines, behind the FEBA on the Russian

side?
ANSWER;

They would land in friendly territory.

It would

have to be in a prepared field, and then a couple of days

later the pilots would show up back in the squadron.
-49-

TAPE

I I SIDE

II

QUESTION:

Would you explain that answer one more time?

ANSWER:

The pilot would attempt to get the aircraft back

over to friendly territory.

He would select a landing

area so that he could make i t back to the field,

so that

he could land the aircraft and a couple of days later,

he said that they would

show up back at the squadron unit

He says that about 50% of the pilots hit were able

to make i t back to friendly territory and the other 50%

were either killed in the air or had to land on the

Russian side which was pretty much the same thing, he

never saw them again.
QUESTION:

Why don't we talk about the pilots for a little

while.

Apparently they had a big turnover since they

had a high casualty rate.

He must have some sort of an

idea of what i t took to make a pilot.

was a pilot?

What kind of a- guy

How long did the guys usually last?

What

sort of people were around making up the force that was

important to him?
ANSWER:

They began flying either the (unintelligible or the

unintelligible door to door)

then they would graduate

to the (unintelligible)

The normal flying course

23.

lasted a year and a-half to 2 years and after that there

-50-

TAPE

II

SIDE

II

would be another 6 months of specific Staka training

where they would learn bombing and how to shoot the
weapons that were attached to the aircraft itself.

They would practice flying at 5 to 7 meters formation.

During the height of the war, the initial training

was shortened by 1/2 year, but it was immediately
apparent that the pilots were not as well trained

and they were not as capable as the other pilots.

QUESTION:

(Unintelligible) How many flying hours?

ANSWER:

This would only be an estimate, but he says about

80 hours, that's total.

That includes both at the

Stuka school and (unintelligible).

QUESTION:

That really is a very low flying rate for the

period of time.
ANSWER:

The rest of the time, basic training was devoted

to such things as infantry training so they had all of
the training that a basic soldier would have had,

specific training hours in (unintelligible).

He doesn't

want to be quoted as to saying that (unintelligible).

QUESTION:

It sounds that fairly early on they were selected

-51-

tape II SIDE I I

to go to Stuka pilots.
ANSWER:

The decision was made after your year to year and

a-half time in your (unintelligible).

Then Col. Rudel

wanted in all instances to be a fighter pilot, but his

whole class, his whole year group, was sent to bomber

school.

He was very distraught about that actually,

and on one occasion Marshall Goering came for a visit

and he explained that they were just starting out a Stuka

unit, a dive bomber unit, and asked for volunteers and
Col. Rudel volunteered.

That's how he became associated

with the Stuka.

He explains this rather emphatically in his first

book. The. Stuka PtZot..,The possibilities for becoming

a fighter pilot were so scant for his class, there were

rumors going around

that they were all going to

be bomber pilots and that's the way it was going to be and

only the very top of the class, the very top percent
would be taken into the fighter pilots and as Marshall

Goering had made this impassionate and rather exciting

presentation about the Stuka6, he volunteered with

several others.

Then, as the class assignment came out,

almost everybody got fighter.

That was one of his first

disappointments.

-52-

TAPE

II

SIDE

II

NEW VOICE:

Welcome to the military!

QUESTION:

Let me expand on that question and make i t more

general.... than a personal thing.

When a normal class

would graduate, how would they make the decisions as to

who would go fighter, bomber, etc.?
ANSWER:

There wasn't a very large class and it wasn't just

what they needed at a particular time but somewhere up

in the hierarchy they knew that at any particular moment

they were going to have a certain number of fighter

pilots and those people, they had tentatively selected

so they knew, the students did not.
QUESTION:

He is implying that they were careful not to select

the top 10% to be fighter pilots.

What he is saying is

that they were doing consciously the opposite taking

the whole class and sending them all to one kind of
airplane unit.
QUESTION:

Mr. Sprey had a question that we maybe should go

back to.

How did the JU-87G employment differ from the

other....I meant the other unit (unintelligible).

Let me expand on that....Col. Rudel's unit was more
successful than the other one,

this could be attributable

-53-

TAPE

II

SIDE

II

in any way, differences in training, operations or

the difference in Col. Rudel's own expertise...
ANSWER:

It is very similar to anything else in business.

He is saying that without having specifically different

tactics or a different technique, that is noticeable,

that an individual who is successful just brings success

to his own organization.

These people, just by association,

are more successful than some others.

think there

is nothing that he can depend on and say i t was this.

He is quite modest in saying that he is not contributing

to

himself

specifically, but success is what bred them.

I might add that with regard to the number of tanks

killed. Col. Rudel had the most with 500.

What is sort

of suprising is that the number two guy only had 100 then
70, 60, 50.

Would you attribute that to tenure in

combat?
ANSWER:

He says that the difference between the two units

is that his unit had approximately two years in the

operation of handling and flying aircraft.

His wing

had 12 to 20 cannon-firing aircraft and about 900 tanks,

500 (unintelligible).

The other squadron that belonged

to the other wing got about 200 tanks, now these are

rough estimates, he doesn't have the precise figures on

that.

-54-

TAPE II SIDE II

The nmnber two pilot on tank kills was in the war

about the same time as he, perhaps six months less

time in actual combat. He had the same training that

Col. Rudel had, but he did not have the number of

sorties. Flying hours weren't any match. The number two

man had about six or seven hundred flying hours sorties,

whereas of course, Col. Rudel had 2500. He lived in
his airplane. That was one of the things that he
attributes to the big difference.
QUESTION:

Ask col. Rudel to comment on the Eastern or Western

fronts.
ANSWER;

He said it would have been almost suicide on the

western front. He said it is difficult to imagine that

they would have had anywhere near the success. They

would have had probably ten times as many losses because

there were so many western planes in the sky, they did not
have the freedom to fly that he had. They would have not
had the opportunity to even find the tanks.

He is not referring to the French pilots at all,

just to the British and the American pilots not to say

anything derogatory about the French, he was just referring
to the British and the American pilots.

He says that in the Wes^^ with the British and the

-55-

tape II SIDE II

American pilots, the average pilot was very good whereas

he has explained once before, with the Soviet pilots,

90% were very weak pilots and that is one reason that
he credits their success in the East.

That is an interesting point because he is not

talking about hundreds of airplanes and if he calculated

it there might not be much of a difference between
QUESTION:

That brings up another point.

I was under the

impression that in late '43 and '44 that we could buy

a lot of trouble on the Eastern front.

To the Russians...

ANSWER:

We had all kinds of trouble doing any flying in

Russian air space it took us six months to negotiate...,

QUESTION:

Even in his book though he...,

ANSWER:

American airplanes...he says there were American

airplanes with Russian pilots.

He had an engagement one

time with 30 mustangs, American pilots with a flight of

f I believe it was.

That was late in the war when the

Eastern front and Western front tended to be just as close

to one as the other but he might comment on that...

He said that they just turned inside of them all the

time for about 15 minutes after 15 mustangs had fired.

-56-

TAPE

I I SIDE I I

QUESTION:

I understand that was the only time (unintelligible),

ANSWER:

He did that in order to make the aircraft more

(unintelligible).

He said he is talking about the air

superiority that existed in the West late in the war

where there was perhaps a ten to one disparity between

fighters on one side.

At that point there was just no

hope of being left alone to search in peace for tanks.

If you didn't have some kind of assurance that you could

go out and concentrate on searching for tanks with some

kind of cover and reasonable assurance; if you had some

flight that couldn't do that, then there was no point in
going out.

And in fact they did not even take the aircraft

out into the West because in fact for that reason, lack of
air superiority...
QUESTION:

In attacking armor with the gun there were specific

attack parameters, avenues, or options that he taught
either the pilots when they arrived on the Eastern front

or they were taught at Stuka training so that they would

always try to achieve a frontal attack or side attack or

rear attack on the tanks say for the best probability of

kill?

-57-

TAPE II SIDE II
ANSWER:

With regard to tactics or vulnerable areas of the

tank:

Before he got the (unintelligible),

in order

to make his transition to a fully ready combat crew

member they would take him on some relatively easy

missions where they didn't anticipated any heavy Flak
or anything.

As such, he would make a gradual transition

to the point where he could go on the more demanding

missions. They would train them in the school to
specifically aim at the drive train area, the motor of
the tank and where the munitions in the tank would be

stored and that would, of course, be at the right rear

or the rear itself.

Specifically that is the reason for

a kill that they could authenticate too. Those would be

the places that would explode. He said that about 90%
of their attacks were directly from the rear in to the
grill which was the weak spot; into the rear deck of the
The other good way to attack was from the side

aiming below the turrets to the weaker side armor which

was where the (unintelligible) were stored.
up the other 10% of the attacks.

That made

Ninety percent from

the rear, 10% to the side.

QUESTION I

Did they ever have any luck at all in frontal,

or did he even try?

-58-

TAPE I I SIDE

II

ANSWER:

He's talked about the T-^34 and the StaZ^n I

and StaZXn II.

with a

hell of a

The StaZ>in T and TI are heavy tanks

lot more armor in i t than a

T-r34 .

(several people talking unintelligible).

There is one big . differenca with -ttiab speaking of
the best vulnerable points now: and iihat is- that there .
was absolutely no option for a sneak attack with
the JU87-G.

There were only on the deck attacks at

perhaps 30 degrees, no .more> .and perhaps you are talking

now about a much wider range 'Of opportunity.

Thirty degrees is pUefcty .steep.

more than that.

We don't .get much

He. said tha^U the,highest that he

used to engage in was;20 degrees and, usually, much more

often right on the deck- at".ten degrees to-attack because

he was always trying for 100 to 200 meters slant range

where we are talking about the possibility of 60 degree
attacks,

45 degrees maximum...60 degrees wow I

You realize right now, of course, i t is probably

cJDOUt

55.

For whatever i t was worth, it was our opinion from a small

arms standpoint

that given-^a. fixed slant range for

example 3500 feet,

if you. held that constant, the steeper

you go the better off you'. 11 work'-but if the steeper you

59-

TAPB I I SIDE I I

went, the more likely it was that you ha^ to move out.
I don't think i t would equal.

So, you come back to

where Col. Rudel was, that the best attack of all was

low an^le, close-in,

QUESTIONS

Using that as a giy^n, and you mention training,

how much of your training wai3 devoted to low level, and
what was that low level?
ANSWER;

You mean in actual flight....right,,,.

You mean the training the pilot would get after

he was posted to th operational unit?

During the Stuka train^-n^, how much time did he
get at the actual low,,.prior to going into combat.
The standard training for the least pcirameters
for the "G" cannon firing aircraft was 20 to 25 degrees
and 400 meters to 600 meters.

He would wind up not much

more than 50 meters off the ground.

QUESTIONS

Let me get back

the (unintelligible) let me ask

Col. Rudel what he would like to have had.

ANSWER;

Twenty or 30 is what he wovi-ld have liked to have

had in each cannon (viniy)itelligible) .

When they had a take off .location, not necessarily

SO""

TAPE

I I SIDE

II

in the field, but if they had a location ten to 20

kilometers from the front, then he could spend 25-minutes
or more in the target area and for that reason his six

shots were not that bad.

a great deal of time.

He could return without wasting

If their take off location was

back such a distance that it required 25 to 30-minutes

to get into the target area, then he only had 15-minutes

that he could spend in the target area and that would be
the time he had to work a little harder.
Many of their air fields were 200 and 250 kilometers

away from the front and at that type of distance it

would take him two to two and a-half hours to fly to the
target area and then he would only have about ten minutes
in the target area.
QUESTION:

Just to carry this a little bit further,

is there

a limitation within the pilot; say I was given an area

of a very high threat (unintelligible) the average

pilot could fly before he (unintelligible).
ANSWER;

He says that (unintelligible).

They've had pilots

that were wiped out after two or three sorties (unintelli

gible) .

But normally they wouldn't take that kind of

mission except that they had an adequate number that

could make five or six missions pretty well and he said

-61-

TAPE

II

SIDE

II

that there was a pretty small number he felt that

could make ten sorties.

QUESTION;

(Unintelligible)
ANSWER:

No, that is way above average.

He is saying that

they had very few pilots that could go above ten.

Of

course we're talking about . (unintelligible) averages.

No, this is of course the defenses he is talking

about and remember they are higher than any defenses

in (unintelligible) and certainly higher than in South

Vietnam and much higher than most of the world.
END TAPE

II

SIDE

II

TAPE I I I

SIDE

QUESTION;

I've got a nxamber of sub-questions related to visibility.

It has to do with how it affected Col. Rudel's operations, what

he would have thought the minimviin visibility for operations was,
and finally what effect low visibilities had from the point of

view of enemy air getting in on the Stuka6.

What kind of visibility are you talking about?
Air-ground visibility.

Is i t a mile, a mile and a half,

two miles, this kind of thing.

ANSWER;

To answer the first part of the question about weather min-

imums, the weather minimums for the regular Stuka were lower
than those for the cannon aircraft.

For the regular StukcL the

absolute minimum would be 30 meters ceiling and 300 meters vis.

For the cannon aircraft i t would be 100 meters ceiling 600 to

700 visibility.
QUESTION:
That was enroute then for

combat?

What about combat?

ANSWER:

The

same.

QUESTION;

What was the visibility on the cannon equipped again?

ANSWER:

100 meters ceiling, 700 meters visibility,

(unintelligible)

The (unintelligible) wasn't as good as before , when you had bad

weather, because, although there was perhaps some element that

would preclude the enemy fighters from coming in, the losses to

-63-

TAPE III SIDE I

fZak were much higher than in normal weather. The fighters

didn't fly in that weather, period.' However, the losses to

Vlak overruled any possible advantage they could get by not

being attacked by fighters.
QUESTION:

Because the weather forced them lower?

MfSWER;

Well, they had a hundred meter ceiling and on top of that

they had difficulty seeing the flashes of the fiak (unintelligible)

and the VZak, of course, knew their height from the well-defined
cloud ceiling and had that advantage in (unintelligible) on them.
QUESTION:

How many plane losses did you have due to the tank blowing
up and you going through the debris?
ANSWER:

Now and then they would pick up some frag from a tank that

had exploded but no Stuka was lost due to picking up frag from
an exploding.tank.
CITESTION:

What sort of tactics did he use when he was searching at

v^ry low altitudes, and found one? How did he convert into
making an attack?
ANSWER;

He would orient himself towards the tank and look to see

wnich was the rear end of it.

Then immediately position himself

so as to attack that quadrant from the rear.

-64-

TAPE III SIDE I

QUESTION:

What would he do then, gain altitude and dive or just make

(unintelligible)?
ANSWER;

His tactic, and one of the things contributing to his suc

cess, was to always come in on a very jinking maneuveir.

explains

As he

it, almost like a-drunken ntan, coming in to his tank

and when he had his tank in sight, he would level off to come

in with only one second of leveling off.

his success.

That was the key to

So many of the others had a long profile, where

they would come in, straight and level, lining up on the tank.
But he only used one second, a second and a half at the longest,
other than that he was jinking back and forth, but he would not
climb.

He would go down as far as five or ten meters.

QUESTION:

Which was he most consicious of, shooting.or the amount of

time (unintelligible).

If he were flying at more than a second

level would he break off without shooting because he'd get that
feeling that it had been long enough?
ANSWER:

(Several people talkingunintelligible)

General,

1*11 answer your question how he specifically pos

itioned himself.

Without regard to the weather restraints, with

regard to the small arms and auto weapons fire, he could fly at

800 meters, with light Vlak he would fly at from 1200 to 1^00
meters.

He would fly over the tank and make what he considered

-65-

TAPE

I I I SIDE

a large turn

and would be climbing at the same time to

reposition himself to attack the tank.

He always had to watch

out for the airspeed at 320 kilometers, otherwise he would

have oscillations and he wouldri't have a steady platform.

Then he would immediately make this large turn and he would

roll in for attack.

(Unintelligible)

Your question of whether it was more important to him to

3hoot accurately or to be only a second in his level flight.

He

said he only spent a second or so at level flight and it was

not a question of it being a trade off of accuracy and level
flight because he was always accurate.

His further comment on

that is that he always flew the aircraft, the aircraft was never

flying him, the aircraft always did precisely what he wanted it

to do so there was never a question of him being inaccurate
oecause he was in complete control.

So a second was all he needed

and there was no (unintelligible).

QUESTION?

(unintelligible) accuracy?
ANSWER;

That is opposed to what he said about some of the newer

pilots.

I suppose that it is universal that one tends to let

the aircraft fly him instead of him flying the aircraft.

CHAIRMAN;

We are down to a couple of minutes and General Brill

wanted to ask one last question.

-66'-

tape III SIDE I

QUESTION;

Colonel Rudel has had a chance to see the A-10, I wonder

what his comments would be as to the design, performance (unint

elligible)
ANSWER:

He said that the first thing that he saw was that the air

plane, the A-10, had the performance that he had always wished
for when they were flying in Russia. They wanted the option
to fly at the speeds that they were going or to fly at 500 or

600 knots, I mean 500 or 600 kilometers per hour.

very far from having that option.

They were

The first thing that excited

him when he saw this airplane was that it had

what they

had always wanted for and was beyond what they could get.
He has already told you about how they started using FW190*s because of the better speed and of the sacrifice that

they made when they went to the 190's.

Here he sees the pos

sibilities of keeping the dive, the performance and still having

that speed that they wanted back then and that he thinks it is
a tremendous thing.

Most important he says is not to sacrifice that slow speed.

He says that it is great that they have that fast speed and they
all wanted it but under no circumstances should you sacrifice

that slow speed.

You won't find the tanks any other way.

QUESTION:

Whkt about the size?

-67-

TAPE I I I SIDE I
ANSWER:

He would like very much to see a second seat in the A-10

for many reasons.

One that he will repeat many times is the

fact that the pilot, when he is attacking, when he is looking

for a tank, must spend 100% of his time looking for that tank.

If he must spend time looking in the rear to defend himself, or

to separate himself from the other aircraft, but most impor

tantly to defend himself from attacking aircraft, he does not

nave the concentration on the attack area and on the target.

He will not be able to find the tanks, which is the most im

portant thing to begin with.

Having a second individual in the

aircraft itself has many secondary benefits, one of which is the

fact that the gunner, as he is describing it, can also help

spot.

It is a second pair of eyes that can say, "I can see him

now," "turn at this point" or "there is somebody behind us you

have got to get out of the area" "you have to change what you
are doing now."

stance

The other thing is, and especially in his in

is that the second individual was a control, offering

immediate refutation, if you will, or confirmation of the kill.

Confiirmation of the fact that you have stopped a particular
tank.

Secondary reason as to why i t would be nice to have a

second individual is the comradeship that there would be

moral support.

If you are concentrating so on what you are

doing, it assists the pilpt so much to have somebody else in

there to share his experience with him.

Another thing extremely important, he believes, is to have

-68-

TAPE III SIDE I

a second individual to be a gunner with a weapon that he can

use against attacking aircraft.

For several reasons that weapon

must be one that is a very fast shooting weapon that can put

a lot of ammunition in the air at the seone time.

Specifically

they discovered that attacking fighter pilots when they found

that the SiukcL had its own self defense and was shooting at
them from the rear, became very hesitant to attack that air

craft and of course that gives them the safety and also more
peace, if you will, or quiteness to look for their target.
One other thing. Col. Rudel spoke of control.

What he

meant by this is by having a back seater there, it could

dampen an over enthusiastic pilot's B.D.A^.

checker or whatever.

He would act as a

The teamwork actually strenghtens the

pilots pressing in.

QUESTION:

I*d like to ask, as I think many other people would, are

Col. Rudel's remarks about the A-10 attributable to him?
ANSWER:

Col. Rudel says that in spite of the technology in air

craft, he found in his experience that most important, was the
spirit and the elan and the dedication of individual crew mem

bers.

He is of the opinion that the next confrontation, the

next war we have, will determine whether the world will be dom

inated by the Bolsheviks or by the free countries of the West.

He is of the opinion that the cruciality of this conflict has

to permeate the spirit of all of the individual soldiers that
-69-

TAPE

I I I SIDE

are going to be involved in battle.

CHAIRMAN:

On behalf of all of these gentlemen that shared time this

morning and this afternoon I wish to thank you.

We have cer

tainly enjoyed it I know that we have learned a lot and have

much to think about.
COLONEL RUDEL:

Thank you very much for all.

little with my experience.

It is about 30 years ago, but a

little can perhaps help you.

END TAPE I I I

SIDE

I hope I can help you a

^70-

PART

II

ORIGINAL GERMAN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

PART II TRANSI4ATORS

Capt. L. O. Ratley III

Mr. Frederic U. Boehm

Naval Postgraduate School

Defence Language Institute

Monterey, California

Monterey, California

TAPE

SIDE I

005-664

English language text spoken by the narrator.

Col. Dilger followed by.Cpt. Ratley,. who. is giving an

overview siaranation relative to World War Two.

This is

followed by additional statements from the narrator,

665-670 First question form the f:j.oor presented to Col.

Rudel in English.

'

QUESTION:

Colonel, in addition to the tanks you shot at, did

you keep a record of the trucks or artillery pieces, or

other vehicles accompanying the tanks, or did you not

even bother to shoot at them?

670-680

Translation of above question presented to Col.

Rudel by Cpt. Ratley. in .|;he Germari language. It is not

readable at all (Speaker is too far removed from microI

phone)

680-695

Co. Rudel begins his first response to question

presented by Cpt. Ratley.

genau noJt^e.Kt wo^d^n, we.^66 -Ldh, abaft,..

SOO La^twagan zzKhtofit^ SO fZakbatteA.Zan, Ge^chutzbattzfilan, d(i6 wuKdz e,nau

Va6 htakt

laldzfL alle,6 Im 1=lag back,. da6 mlfi von thKzvi Land-

^Izatzn ge^tohZen Mafide,^ da 6taht'6 vom flag 1 Z530 alle.4) kaaA.4iC.kaA,i dx^n, and e4, kann dzn Lzatzn
nZckXi6 natzan,
696-704

Tch ^acho, e.4, Zck ^acke. c.4.

Translation and discussion of above statements

into English follows by English language speaker.

. V

'

-71-

TRANSLATION;

That has been accurately recordie<3> I know, but... 300

trucks destroyed, 80 anti,-aircraft batteries, artillery

batteries, all that has been j^QCurateXy recorded.

Un

fortunately all that is listed in tube flight book which

was taken from me by your country m^n, in it is exactly
recorded everything from flight 1 through 2530, and it

(the flight book) cannot lot of ^ny use to (your) people.

I am searching for i t . . .
703-704

Col,

Am 9,

Rudel states;

1945 {wu,/trfe daA Bucfi gz-ttohlun] ,

TRANSLATION;

On 9 May 1945 the book wa,B stolenp

704-732

Continuation of translation, interjections and

additional questions from the ifXooir (the translations seem

exceptionally accurate).

732-742

Question (unintelligible)

743-757

Response by Col, Rudels

"Tc^i habz no/Lmale.

Jch habz ml/i dlt

t (unintelligible)
cmi ZOO m

400 m,,,

(unintelligible) aui 5 c,rr} od^^ 10 cpt Qznaa-

Al^o

kab^ Ifih ja adi ISO

oddH. 100 m, Mtnn e.6

300

758-764

hab^ -icfe aui

Translation into English?

I have normally ,,.(unintelligible).p. I have them mostly

up to 200 m400 m (unintelligible) np to 5 cm or 10 cm
-72-

precisely,., but usually I have fired from a range of 150

or 100 m, and if i t was far then 300 m.

764-773

Col. Rudel speaking:

Ick

ganz genau 4 e n . . . (unintelligible)

odzfi dan

, and daKum maA6tz Zch aui

>

f0

cm...

TRANSLATION:

I had to fire (shoot) very accurately...(unintelligible)

the fuel,
773-780

and therefore I

had to at 10 cm.

Translator interprets;

He had to be very exact, he had to hit the tank...

780-785

Col. Rudel:

words

(unintelligible)

785-801

Conversation in English follows, followed by a

question in German, addressed to Col. Rudel.

801-823

Col.

Rudel*s answer;

Unanganzkm, X.n Bezag au^,.,abzA dZz GeA.man6

kabzn ganz tz^ckt ...

V^ng ^ckon,

unangemkm mcla, da^

Wtnn dlz Vanztn.

Md/ien, {uh^en mZjl

duKdhgabKoahzn

oft ohm Vtak^chutz odQ,fi

dlz Vtak kamzYi (unintelligible) Va^ kabzn

dann..,>in Kauf gtnomtn, abzK ujznn dlz VKontQ,n
6X,ch \jzn.ka.fLtzt kabtn, ^tand dlt flak gznau
f

ne,bzn dzn VanzzKn, and dann habz Ick

dzn

Kanonznma^ckZmn, kabz Zck za gtaZck^A. ZzZt

(unintelligible)
TRANSLATION:

Unpleasant in regard to... or the Germans have quite easily

-73-

but the thing was unpleasant.

Wh^n the tanks had broken

through (penetrated deeply) we very fre<^uently flew with

out anti-aircraft protection or the anti-aircraft batteries

came (unintelligible) protection or the anti'-aircraft

batteries came (unintelligible)

That we have then...taken

into consideration (readily excepted) , but when the front

lines offered stronger resistance, the anti-aircraft bat
teries stood right next to the tanks, and then I have with

the cannon-machines, I have simultaneously (unintelligible)

823-851

English translation follows,

851-862

Words by Col. Rudels

(unintelligible)

...noAmaten,.,Stuka,..flak,..

dufLch Spzz^aZ^tcLiie.Z
TRANSLATION:

...normal,.oStuka,.,ftak...through special squadron

Words by trnaslator;
e,in Gz6(ikwade,n.,,,

Was a squadron
Col.

Rudel:

,. ,be.l Stuka 77. ..

...

in Stuka 77...

863-934

English translation follow mixed with exchanges

between Col. Rudel and Cpt. Ratley, followed by more trans

lations by Cpt. Ratley, and fchllowed by more exchanges bet

ween Rudel and the Captain, mostly unintelligible.
934-941

Col. Rudel responding?

Pa 6lnd vjIk zw^6che.yi SOO and 1500 m.

dan VanzzK ubtKhaapt gz{unde,n habzn,

-74-

b^6

Va6 Vko-

bZ^m waK nldht dlz PanzzA. abzu6ch^e64>en, AondeAn

dlQ, PanzzfL za ilndzn,

WIjl habo^n mai ubeA 15-20

MZnuX:e.n ge,kA,e.^6t, 6xC4 u)Z^ ubzAhaupt d-ce gz^ehen

h.abe,rL, d:a^am l6t zlnzn ^ckntllz Ma^cklnz Gl^t,
TRANSLATION:

Then we circled at between 800 and 1500 iti until we had at

all located (found) the tank.

The problem was not to elim

inate the tanks, but it was to find them.

We have occas

ionally circled over 15-20 minutes before we were able to

sight them, therefore a fast aircraft is poison.

942-956

English translation interspersed with additional

remards by Col. Rudel, and more interpretations...

Rudel remards:

Ick 6e,tb6t iZog 250 km, and da^um da66

(^ZnkzZ von 20-30 GKad A.unJt2.A.gycnge.n, machtz Z6

ztwa 32 0 km,
TRANSLATION;

I flew at the speed of 250 km and because we were descending

at an angle of 2030 degrees, this speed amounted to approx
imately 320 km.

957-967

More English translations, and again Rudel:

320-320 km,,,mzfiA, 6chneZZ duA.^tz man auck nZcfit

iZZzgzn, wz^Z 6on6t dZz Kanonzn SckwZngungzn

CLu^gz-6ztzt ufCLAzn.

Vann

Z6 ungznau,

AZ6o

32 0 km wan. ztwa. ..
TRANSLATION:

320-320

km...Faster one was not allowed to fly because other-75-

the cannons were given to severe vibrations.

cannon) was firing inaccurately.

Then it (the

Consequently 320 km was

about..

967-1023

Continued English translations.

Rudel:

VZz Kanontn habzn

^afia^ten

azKodynciml6c,hQ.yi EZgen-

hzH,0LbQZ&ztzt, ^,

TRANSLATION;

The cannon considerably reduced the aerodynamic qualities.,.

Again Rudel speaking, unintelligible, followed by more con

versation in English and exchanges with Col, Rudel,
Col. Rudel speaking;

Wewn man idknall

Z-6-t gZc-Zck,

Be,t^le.bo66to a

In dt^.,,und dlz U^kung

NuH.

2,6 6c.h.oid(L am dan

and dcL6 Qatd waA Anie,A,^ka dafu^

au^g^bta

and concluded by some English language comments.

TRANSLATION:

If one is quick in the...and the effect is the same.

It

is only regretable for the fuel and the money which Amer
ica is spending for it.

1024-1067

Continued discussion in English and a new ques

tion addressed to Col. Rudel in German by the translator.

1067-1088

Response by Rudel;

Jck habe.

In ddK Ma^aklnc SO-SO ... von de,H.

Vi,6toZ.e. ttbe/L Gzw(ihH.f McL-6chZne.ngewe.kA. ange.^cLnge.n

Wenn kzlne Itbtn^wlchtlgen Telle ve,A.ie.tzt waKen,

-76-

zum

dzK KakltK, dann kabz Ich nZckt6

gzmachi, dann,, Umme/c glUck gzillckt,, ,auch

dzH. l^otoK fiat

vzMtAagzn, abcJi mlt En.d-

mu^6 man Azcknen,

TRANSLATION:

I have frequently 30-50...in the aircraft... starting with

the pistol, to the rifle, machine-gun.

If no vital parts

were damaged, for example, a radiator, then I did not do

anything, then... always quickly repaired...Also the enging did withstand something, but one must anticipate
ground fire.

QUESTION TO COL. RUDEL:

(HaA, da6 tin

?n.oblzm?

TRANSLATION:

Was that a considerable problem?

RUDEL RESPONDING:

E4 u)aK nZckt 6ckon, abcA. e4

TRANSLATION:

And what sort of ground fire was it?

Answer by Rudel:

Ja, allt6, von ?lhtol(L anga^angen, VUtolz,

Geu>zk/L, Ma6chZnzngzwQ,h/L, ja mlt,,,, dlz kabe,n
6A,c.k au.^ dan 'Rucke.n ge.Ze.gt and habzn nac.h obzn
gz6cko66zn, and wenn da6 mzkKZH.e. kundzfit Lzate,
tun, tA.e,iizn 10 odtK 7 5.
TRANSLATION:

Yes, everything, starting with a hand-gun (pistol), rifle.

-77-

machine-gun, yes with,,., They placed themselves on their

backs and fired upwards, and when that is carried out by

several hundred men, 10 or 15 will hit,

1088-1098

English translation follows.

END SIDE I

TAPE I

TAPE I

SIDE I

005-175 Conversation in English between narrator and other

parties present.

176-212 Col, Rudel enters into conversation, his voice un

intelligible.

Rudel speakings

Tck kabz dcL^ citZ(L&

^c.kZ(i{^kcLndZ.zAJi&c.hiifi

SlckuKkzlt gemaakt,.,(unintelligible)
TRANSLATION;

I have done all that with automatic certainty,..

Followed by English translation.

213-232 Suggestion by narrator to have a 15 minute break

in the conversation.

233-352 Following the break conversation in English con

tinues.

The narrator briefs all parties present at the

discussion concerning mode of questioning and topics to

be discussed,

357-572 First question in German presented to Col. Rudel,

(unintelligible)
Response by Col, Rudel:

Ich bin ixah aU zKhtz

^^uhau^kla/Lung.

gz^tcLA.te,t za/t

Va bin Ich attzlvi gefZogen,

-78-

TRANSLATION;

I started early as the first aircraft for the purpose of

early advance reconnaissance, in such instances I flew
alone, usually.

Followed by translation into English.

Col. Rudel speaking:

Vann kam e.i au{ dai Z-itt dJiaui

wenn nuA.
10 PanzeJi germZdzt waKzn. Und wU nui mit UneJi

Staiint, dan htliit thzonztlic-h H MaicUnen,

piakUich zi uioAm vletZ&lc.ht nun 6.1 Haichimn,
pia.ktLic.h. zi woAzn geiZogen, we.nn nuJi 10 bZi
It odVL 75 fanzzK ge.me.ZdeX a)aA.en.
TRANSIATION;

Then it depended on the target, if only 10 tanks were re

ported, we started with only one (1) squadron, which means

in theory 12 aircraft, in reality there were possibly only

6-7 aircraft, when only 10 to 12 or 15 tanks were reported.
Followed by English translation.
Rudel again;

llnkzlt,
PanzeA.,
6t(iKk(L lugz^ugve.Kbande. Qzmzldzt (jociA.zn,
StaJikz Elnkzlttn,

Vann hind mln mlt dzn

G/iuppz Qzhtdfitzt, dlz G/tappe hat thzoKiltie,ck 25 Ma^chlmn, abz/i In dzK Vfiaxlh

hattzn wlK vlzllzlckt nuK 15 Vlagztugz,

dann ilnd wIk mlt 15 gzita^tzt.
-7-9-

TRANSLATION:

A strong unit, artillery, tanks, aircraft formations were

reported.

Strong units.

Then we took off with a group

such a group had in theory 25 aircraft, however, in re

ality we had possibly only 15 aircraft.

Then we took

off with only 15,

English translation follows.

Next question to Col. Rudel unintelligible.

His answer is:

Ja, Tele.(on, da4 manckmal iunktZonZeAte.

(unintelligible) WZa, hattcn auch JagcA,

am TtZz.^on, , von dzvi JagcAn duAcfigzgcb&n,

dann and dann In daK and dzH. Hohe,

Abe^

dcL6 hat In 50 von 100 nuA ge.ktappt,

Vann

habe.n dlt JagzA gz^agt, wlH. ^Ind ang^gAlUzn

M0Ad2.n, wl/L 6lnd abgtdAangt wofidzn, od^fi

wlA 6lnd au6 dem PZatz nZckt ACLu^gzkommtn,

wzlt

Vcklcimmtz Vlatzz kattzn,

wlz gz6agt In 50 von 100 hat

NuA

gzklappt,

TRANSLATION:

Yes, phone, which was sometimes operable (unintelligible)

We also had fighter planes on the telephone...transmitted

to us by the fighter planes, at such and such time, and

at such and such altitude.

But that worked out satis

factorily in only 50 of 100 instances.

Then the fighter

planes reported, we have been attacked, we have been forced

away (forced to turn off), or we didn't have the starting

-80-

field at all^ because they had completely muddied landing

strips.

So, as I have stated^ in only 50 from 100 instan

ces did it work well.

(i.e. as briefed).

Followed by English translation and detailed elaborations

on airforce matters.

Next follows a question in German addressed to Rudel:

Acfi, wVi mochtzn

woZZan,

PanzeAguJLppe.. .Sowjzt (unintelligible) PanzeAe,Xnhe,Zie,fi, am

wZz gA.o6^ waA.e,n d^e^e.?

Translation:

15-20 tanks, usually, and whenever it was a tank battle,

such as near Kharkov and Smolensk, there were from 300
400 tanks.

Question is not clear, the interpreter is too far away.

572-625

Exchanges in English followed by some German words,

(unintelligible) followed by a statement by Rudel:

...

6e,ck6 ode.A. 6X.zbe.nmaZ ganz

Zn zvoJiz

MztZA. Hokt gcflogzn, un zu 6e,hen, ob da6 Vzu6chz

odeA Ra44en

ge.(Zoge,yi, and ma66te,

Stahtzhztmz 6zhzft, d&nn dZz Zagzn

dzu^tchzn

iun^z^g

MztzA au.6tXnandzA. and waAzn ganz vzA^ckacktztt,

da waAzn klzfi Vzat^chz, hlzK Ru66zn, voA6lzktlg

6zZn, damZt man n^cht zZgznz TAuppzn,,,da^um

kabz Zch &6 ganz Im TlzHlag ubzA^Zogzn., , ft/o

6Xnd Vzut6chz and too 6Znd Ru66zn?
TRANSLATION:

...have flown very low six or seven times at two meters al-81-

titude in order to see whether those were Germans or Ru

ssians. Five or six or seven times I flew very low, and
I had to see the German helmets, because they were only 50
m apart and were completely interspersed, there were Germans

here, Russians here, Germans here, and again Germans here,

and so we had to be extremely careful, in order that we

would not our own troops... Therefore I flew very low

over them... Where are Germans, and where are Russians?

Very good, very good.

.,. Followed by more conversation in

English, and English translation of the above paragraph.

626-651

Rudel speaking:

Be4ow<ie/L4 wa/t (l6 6chwlz/tlg. ,,Ick dackt^

dlldi, Ra-64en...In WlKkllchktlt mAe.n*6 nu^
T^upptn...
TRANSLATION;

It was especially difficult.,I thought they were all Russians

...In reality they were only our own troops.,.

At this point it becomes difficult to understand. Something

about Vlak and ube.fL6c.ho66e,n overshoot but subsequent
English translation has meaning and seems to be correct (See
Part I).

652-700

Question:

e4 o^t pa66lQ,H,t, da66 ^(LhkcimpHJiJie,QQ.fL dtatickz

Soldatzn gztotzt habzn?
TRANSLATION:

Has it happened frequently that Close-Air-Support pilots killed

German soldiers?

(Germans killing Germans by mistake)

-82-

Rudel speaking:

NtZn,

^4-t nlcki

^ dbuH. e.6

TRANSLATION:

No, it did not happen often, but it did happen.

QUESTION:

lila.Ken S.ie.

-in GAaben,..?

Were they mostly in trenches ...?

Answer here very varely audible - but translation good. Next

question difficult to understand. The German speakers are too
far removed from the microphone.
700 END OF TAPE I

The next question addressed to Col. Rudel is not clear enough.

Something about the Tiger-tank, opening of the hatch... and
the guy waving at Rudel.

The question directed to Col. Rudel by the interpretor is not

clear.

Col, Rudel;

wa/ten

0 iilzltfiz, dlz rfe/t Vanzzfi-

dZvZ^Zon zu.QttZ'itt waKzn,

VZz antQ,KhZe.tte.n

mlt Radio, and 4agten mlK die, and die. WltdzK6tandz

haban wIk, odnK mI/l wU^zn da^ doKt.^Mnd da^um Ut

elm ganz ango. la^ammznafibzlt zMl^ahzn HtzK and
la^tiaailz 6zZb6tvzn.6tandZlcli,

Und voznn vjlfi nlckt

(Lino, 60 gate Za^ammena^bzlt zwUcknn Hzkh. and

Laitwaifz gdplant hattzn, dann waKu dzn. KJilzg &chon

1943 za Endz,

bJl/t habzn an6 genaa antzKkaZtnn and

6lnd zlgznttlck 140 PanzeA kaben Pollen, and da

-83-

hattzn u)l/L {Inh-zlvL hi0,66, dzH. hat mlK gt^agt

da66 dtK zlYid VdYLzan., dzn nzhmo, Ich nldht zu.m

Sahle,66e.n, hondzKn da baaz lc.h RadloQtKato. tin,

Va6 l6t ml/L (AJlchtlgz/L al6 tvznn da6 tin tln^taiahlgt/c

PanztA wa/L, iMtll 6lt mlK dann altth t/iltdlgzn konntn,
wa.4 Ich ab^chlt^^tn ma44^e,..

Vie waAtn an 6lch nu/t, ah, bit dt/i Panzt/idlvUlon,

vlt-t-ttlchl 20 EZlltdlvl^loyitn

AZ'&o dlt lAia^tn nlcht.

ymfi an VanztKdlvl&lontn gtbundtn.

Vie PanztKdlv,

hatttn 6lt aZZt, abtA auch 20 EZlttdlv,, dazu gthoAtn

dlt SS-Vlvl6lon, GtblKg& jagtK and GA,066dtut6chland,
aiim Btl^plttf WIa. hatttn dlt Ftltgt-flvtA-blndung mlt
jtdt^ Division,
TRANSLATION:

Those were air force officers who were assigned to the tanksdivision.

They conversed by radio and told me that we have

such and such resistance, or we know that there...And therefore

a close cooperation between army and air force is a matter of

course.

And If we had not planed such a good cooperation bet

ween army and air force then the war would have been over in 1943

We have had detailed conversations and have flown over the area

many times, so that close air contact prevailedo.. The 14th Tank

Division had only one tank, should have in reality had 140
tanks, and then we had from General Unrein, that was his
name, he told me...that the one tank, I do not take it out

for combat, but I install into it radio equipment.

That is

more important to me than if it were a combat tank, because

-84-

you could then take care of everything for me, what I have
to shoot dovm (the
Again Rudel;

They were really only with the tank-division (the Ualion

officers from the LaitmUt) possibly 20 elite divisions,

among those the SS-division, mountain-troops division, and
GKoiidtutichland, for example. We maintained radio contact
with each division.

Hereafter much English is spoken. Then: (Do iand man die.izn

OU^ze.fL? UdK eA a.n deA. nontwhere was this officer? Was
he at the front?

Rudel answering;

Ganz voJin mlt dzK vo^tdzK^ttn., .dU &dhUcktzKZYi,

noch
ItaUaneA, iJLzlwUUgz Rumamn,
hattan

Ab^chnZtt wa6

e,.. aacfi and dann Im ganzzn

wa-t..,ft;ewrt nZckt^ to6 waK,

wiLfidz de,x,. .abge.zong(Ln and zu e^ne/t EZnhzlt

me.^n Tfizund,
TRANSLATION:

Way out front was the first... the poorer troops, partially
Italians, Rumanian volunteers,...we had these...also and then
over the entire front what took place... if nothing took place

that one was...withdrawn and sent to a unit, where...No, my

friend, ah...

Much of this text extremely difficult to understand...

Vai HtdA hat bzi deA
ang&iAagt, AbeA ei

habe.n 10-20 v&Jiic.Ue.de.m SUZlen angei^agt, ah,..

-85-

ob wZ/L komrmn konmno

Und dann

dlt Laitilotto,

znUchtldzvi and ^agtn, wI/l hab&n nu/c &o mvid ^ovlzl

Stixka^, ujl/i konmn nuA. tlYiamal odz.K zwdlmal kzute.

ill^gtn, and dann u)a/idt

tklzdan, wo kin wl/i

gQ,he,n.

Abe,Ji MaakiAagen hind htkK vlzlt gme^en,

E6 kccben

20-50 Ste,llzn ge4chA.l&h&n, bel un6 g^el^en die.

Ra44en an,

Sle. ma^Aen Kommen!

TRANSLATION:

The army made inquires, with the air farce.

But some 10-20

different places (units) were making requests for Close- AirSupport as to whether or not we could come.

And then the air-

force had to decide and to say, we have only so many aircraft.

We can today fly only once or twice, and then it was decided

where to we would go.

But there were many requests.

Some 20-

30 units called for help, the Russians are attacking in our

sector.

You have to come

New question to Rudels

Und uja6 ^u/l Stellen waJtm dai^, wah.tn da& Vlvl^lonan?

TRANSLATION:

And what sort of units were those?

Were they divisions?

Rudel:

--

Mostly,..

VllzgQ,KkoKp&, odzH. wewn tK gat^ Bdzldkuigtn kattz,

aach
TRANSLATION:

Air Corps, or if he did have good connections, also,,.

Here follows much laughter and English language conversation.

-86-

TAPE I I SIDE I

001-076 unintelligible
077-090

Col Rudel:

iHzltzK vo^n, ange,gA,^i{zn wu/idz, wo

Ru44en

wa/tew. Weww e/i. mQ.n.ktt, da66 dlt VzutAckzn In dzK

Mzk/Lzahl 6lnd mo (lk angJieZfen &otltz, and l6t tin

zlnlgzKmL66zn vtfinuLnitlgzn. KommandzaA,,, ,nlc.ht

nack dzn BzizkZzn g-ing, dann hat ZH. 6zlb^t^tand^g ^n Ru66tand,..

TRANSLATION:

Further ahead, having been attacked, where the Russians were.

If he noticed that the Germans had further advanced, and are

in the majority...where he was to attack, and he is a reas

onable sensible commander... and not striclty went by military

orders, then he attacked in Russia...

091-092 Mr. Sprey, and the Col. Rudel speaking:

092-137

Col. Rudel:

AbzA ZA. kat kz^n Sy6tzm, wo zn. nzuz NachA^chtzn

bzkam, zK mah^tz da6 6zlb6t 6zkzn.

TkzoKztUzh,

u}znn zn. (unintelligible) kzatz \^an.zn voU von dzA

LiL^tbAuckz* , , vZztZz-tcht nuA. TO km and da6 nach6tz

mat ioaAzn viln. Va natztz dzn. Bz^zhl dzA duAch da6
Rad^o kam nZckt6 mzhx, abzK noKmatzAuoz^^z kabzn

wlA 40 vlzl flak bzkommzn, da6 Z6 ia^t unmogllch

wa/L, da4> zlgznz T^uppzn mA.zn. . .auch duAch LzuchtzzZzkzn,, , and wznn mXa. nZcht mZt LzucktzzZckzn

,,,dann kabzn win nock zlnz Randz gz^logzn, dann

-87-

m&Akt&n die. untcn ithon; "Dll/i tvlacn n-iaht B&iche-id',

dann kaben ild G&ichoii...would fire a flare for ident
ification) , dann Rafeeien, and dann hab&n ui-Ln. ge.naa
geieh&n, aha! dai X.&t rfie de.utic.he V/iont und doAt i^Lnd
d-ie Run en.
TRANSLATION:

But he had no system where he received new information, he had

to see that for himself.

Theoretically ,if he was not too far

away from the air-bridge (LaiibJiuckz) along the ... (unintell

igible). Today we were from the air-bridge...probably only 70

km, and the next time we were 300 km...We couldn't make it with

the radio. In that case the order, which was transmitted by

radio, was no longer of any use, but normally we received so

much flak, that it was almost impossible, that they were fri
endly troops... Also through flares...and when we did not

with flares...than we flew another circle, then they down

below (our ground forces) realized already, we are not suf

ficiently informed (we are lost).

Then they fired a flare

(they would fire a flare for identification...Then rockets,

and then we could see precisely, oh yes!

That is the German

front and over there are the Russians.

137-261

English

262-280

Translator speaking

281-294

Col. Rudel:

Viz T/Lappe,n haben 6lch kzyintllck gemaaht dufiak

L^uch-izc.yLchc.n. , . dcLiJiyC'i
Kop{, k^Xeg^n, Vann habzn

da^ habe.n

Somb^-yi au.^ d.Q.yi

ubt/iall Lzucktzzlahe,n,

aUo aai Szlb^tzfikoittixyiQ^tKl^b ge,macht.

-88-

TRANSLATION:

The troops identified themselves through flares...so they

would not git hit on the head with bombs.

Then they every

where fired flares, that they did for reasons of self-preservation.

294-295

Question to Rudel by translator:

Konnten dlz

da.4i nZckt be.rmA,ke.n, ioa6 V2.ULt6c.hQ,

and nldkt Vzat^che. 6lnd?

TRANSLATION:

Could the Russians notice that, which were Germans, and which
were

not?

295-306

Col. Rudel:

CZcttzlckt,

dlz

.. . abe/L no^mat2.^uoe,l6 2,

ganz gunaa wo die, V2.ut6c,h

uyid ufo Ru.44c.Ki. . .die, Ve.ULt.j^dhzvi wu.44'tcw auck

ge.naii, wo die, Ra44en ^Id,

Ob &le, nuA. 6cho6-

4en ode,K nlcht, d(i-& waft zqclV.

TRANSLATION:

Possibly, possibly...but normally the Russians knew precisely

where the Gemans arid where the Russians.. .the Germans also

knew exactly where the Russians were.

Whether they were

shooting or not, made no difference.

307-375

Translator - English

480-530

English

531-540

(unintelligible)

540-545

Col.

Rudel:

.,,da.Yivi 6lyid &lz auige^tandzn, dann iilnd ^Iz tlzz

-89-

gzilog&n,.,.(unintelligible)gzflogen,..
TRANSIiATTON:

...then they got up, then they flew low,...(unintelligible)

flew...

546-548

English

548-554

Col. Rudel:

554-560

Col Rudel;

(unintelligible)

,,, rmX6te,n^ nufi Im Vu^ah^chnltt 14-15 Ma^cklnzn

dann (unintelligible)
TR?VNSLATION:

...generally only on the average 14-15 aircraft, then...

(unintelligible)
560-585

English

568-613 Translator and Col Rudel (unintelligible)

614-622

Col Rudel;

WlA kattzn allz6 gzb/iackt, kzln Stuck (unintelligible)

Viz mzl6t2.n ,Ma6<iklmn Wd^ddn unklaA,

nuK Q,lyi

be.6chAznktZA TzlZ.,,
TRANSLATION;

We had brought everything, not one piece (unintelligible) most

aircraft will not be clear for takeoff, only a limited portion.

623-644

English

645-678

Col. Rudel:

Pie G/iuppe hatt& (unintelligible) 27 Ma&ch^ne.n and von

d&n&n u>a>Le.n vle.lte.lc.ht 15 Maic.kJ.n&n fea>t. .. (unintelligible)

r/ieo/ieiiicfe. .. (unintelligible) nun alleZne. (unintelligible)
o.befL dann \j.ieZt.e..Lc.kt. .cm Lau^e. dzi Tage.^ wuA.de.n d-tc
-90-

Mack

chine,, , .aa^haltdn, . .

TRANSLATION;

The group had...(unintelligible) 27 aircraft, and of those possibly

15 aircraft were ready for takeoff...(unintelligible). Theoretically
...alone...(unintelligible).

Then possibly in the course of the

day the aircraft were... caught up...

678-715

English

716-737

Translator (unintelligible)

737-773

Col Rudel;

Va^ kam dKciii{^ an, aa^ diz Lu^t, . ,coe.nn mZa

6ind wlK ganz zin&A hintzA de,m andz/czn, an nidht

abge,6c.ho^6zn za wzn.dQ,n, dznn die, 3agzfi ve.^6uchte,n
dann zwi6che.n unA himinzukomrmn, dann nahmen ^ie,
von an6 die, Ve,u,e,H,kn.ait, von dzn "S7" zntgzge.n, and

da^ katte,n 6ie, nicht ge.^n,

At^^o wenn ^ta^ke. Jagd-

au^kta/Lung u)aA., ma66i:en coi,A ganz dicht e,ine,JL nach

dem andcAzn 4>tu/Lzzn,

Jah ^tufizte, aU

and

je,de.A. waA, ja in^oA.mie,A,t, mo e4 hanging, aa^^e,n.de,m

z^,,,waH. da& nuA,,.,gznau gz^agt,, ,(joznn kzinz

6ta/Lkz Jagdau^kZaA-ung u}aA,,,dann habzn wiJi in gA,04^zAen

Ab^tandzn jedz^ 6zin Zi&l angzgKlUzn, da& dzA, voJihzJigz^agt bzkommen hat,,,Vu ^olUt da^, and da 6otl6t

da6..,a6M,*

Va6 kann ^zin, da66 u)i,^ dann vzitlzizht

aui 2-3 km vzfi6zhizdzn 6tuAztzn,

VzA zi,nz hizK, dzH.

andzH.z da,,,Vann nach 10 Mi,nutzn, da gab ick da/ich:

SammzZt zuchi

Vann ^ch-to66zn diz Ma^ckinzn ooizdzA

aiii and dann ilogzn wiA, 6aAuck,

"91-

TRANSLATION!

That depended on the air...if we had air...we flew directly

one behind the other, so as not to get shot down, because the

fighter bombers tried to penetrate between us, then they took

from us fire power of the "87", and that they didn't like.
Also when there was intense fighter reconnaissance, we were
required to dive closely one behing the other. I would dive
first, and everyone of course was naturally informed where he
was heading. Aside from that he knew...that was only...pre
cisely stated...when there was not such intense air recon

naissance. .. then we each of us individually and in larger int

ervals attacked our targets, of which we were earlier briefed
you will do that and you that...etc. It was possible that we
then probably dived at different and varying distances of 2-3
km. One here, the other there...Then after about 10 minutes I

transmitted the order to reassemble, then the aircraft again

closed formations (assembled into formations) and then we flew
back home,

774-823

English conversation

823-844

Questions by translator

SZnd S^e

. .6c.kon, .. (unintelligible)

TRANSLATION:

Did you once,.,already.o (unintelligible)

Col, Rudel speakings
Va6

QCLYLZ

TRANSLATION;

That happened very seldom...

-92-

Question by translator:

Und wtnn zi poiiUKt Ut. wU hab^n S^e... (unintelligible)

TRANSLATION:

And when it happened, how have you...(unintelligible)

Answer by Col. Rudel:

.. .FunUp/tucfe, Zm Schwung du.Jic.h. Fanfeip/tecfee/t,

and dan. Be^eW hat mlah nuJi ziJie.lc.kt, ditUiig
odeJi vle./izlg km von dzK StzUz, dU mln. dai
duAckgegebe.n kat,,..ionit habe izh u nl<Lht
mzkn. bzkommzn,
TRANSLATION;

...wireless message, immediately by radio communication, and the

order reached me only 30-40 km away from the position (location)

which has transmitted to me...otherwise I have no longer received
it (the message).

844-881 Followed by English translation, and elaborations to

the above, intersperced by additional words from Col Rudel...
(unintelligible)
Col Rudel:

Ei iKagt ilc.h, ob e.i diingend uitvi, odzK.. .amzn.

B&nz^n ... loenn

nlc.ht anbtdlngt eJiioitdzKJUc.h. uicui,

ilnd uiln nlc.ht gzilogtn, abzA. -dm Vui)ic.kic.hnltt uia/i...

6e,ck6 .,.
TRANSLATION:

The question was, was it urgent, or...our fuel...if it wasn't

absolutely necessary we did not fly, but on the average was...

five to six...

-93-

881-932 Followed by good English translation and statements

by narrator.

933-944 Question addressed to Cpto Ratley;

I hear the British felt the gun was not satisfactory.,

945-989 Cpt. Ratley posing above questions to Col Rudel..,

(unintelligible)

and followed by more talk in English, and

intermittent response by Col. Rudel (unintelligible) followed

by many English voices.
A question by Rudel:

WcL6 haX:te,n die, Raketen jjuA Had,,,?

TRANSLATION;

What did the rockets have as wheel.o.?

Followed by more English conversation. Continuous conversation

by all partiesmostly unintelligible.
990-1013

Rudel Speakings

...Und dann

man ganz nahe. ke.iangek&n and

dann waA, dZe. Rafee;te... e^cwen ganz gK066e.n Bogtn,

and e4 wa/t Gluakk^^acke., ob man tfilUt odzK nldht,

Wznn man t/iai, dann wan. rfe/i Vanztn. fiQ,latl\) kapatt,

abzfi win, kabzn nldkt gttKoHan.

Vann Ut dzn.

gn,o6&z, Monotint dtn. Kanom,.da4^

von 700 hat.

elne, V-NuZZ

Maine Kanom hat 1100.

man lentlmettn. ge.naa

Vann konnte.

da^ wan, dzn. gn.o^6e,

\}on.t(ill, dan.um havz Ick auc.k altd anden^m Hacktzlle,

da^ e4 ln.gdnd6lt,, ,aZZz6 In Kau^ genommen, nun. an

dlz Kanono, zti knltgan,, ,aUo din Rakeien, da6 wan.
din Uotbaha^^ win haban lang^t nlcht die En-^olgd

-94-

gtkabt, wle. win, 4-i.e...

TRANSLATION:

..And then we had to go very close up to, and then the rocket
was...a very large curve, and it was a matter of good luck,

whether one hits or not.

If one did make a hit, then the tank

relatively speaking destroyed, but we did not hit.

Therefore

the significant advantage of a cannon... that it had a 'V-Null'

(Vo) Muzzle velocity of 1100, while a normal carbine has a 'VNull* of 700.

My cannon had 1100, then one was able to fire

accurately within centimeters, that was the significant ad

vantage, therefore I have taken into consideration and accepted

another disadvantage, which somehow...only to obtain the cannon.

Therefore the rockets, that represented an emergency measure.

We by far did not register the successes as we did...

10141065 English translation follows given by trnaslator.

1066-1079 Question addressed to Col. Rudel (unintelligible)

Answer by Rudel also partly unintelligible.
Rudel:

...ga/t nZcht,,

SJtan,zkampaZagze,ug

waJL, Idk konnte qolk nlcht Im

-cck bX.Yi nuA. aa4 Zwccng zu dun Kommando ge.komme.n,

-iak hdbz gezwunge,mA,ma46e,n, gezwangene-tma-A-fien.
TRANSLATIONS

...not at all.,.because it was not a dive bomber, I was totally

unable to in a steep dive...I only got to this command by force,

I had to get accustomed very slowly, but under a measure of out
side pressure, under duress.
-95-

1080-1104 New question by interpreter, unintelligible, con

tinued exchanges between Rudel and the interpreter... followed
by more English language conversation.

Question to Rudel by translator (unintelligible)

1106-1127 Response by Rudel partially unintelligible,

Rudel;

*0 Gc.6chto^yid'cgqvl^, d^Lo. CLyid^/izyi 'SCLgayi,

Ge^chwZndZgk^Zt Ut 6c.hlzcht, dcu6zlbt kat bU

un6 6ckon 4>tattgtiandm.

Jck hztbdK^ doJi zln

NahkampiftlegeA. mA, dzK voan, zbzn

iu.fl da.6 lang^amt^e, Vlugzzug, ob voIk 15 km mzhfi

mcLdhttn, odtn. 100 km, da6 mackie n^ckt6 au6,

dtnn die. JagzK wa/ten ZQO-400 odo^fi 500 km 4ckne.Z'

leA, al&o mnn daAunt^A die, ande.Ae.n Elgtn^ckaitzn

le.lden, dann illege. Ich tlzbeJi mlt 250 km, dznn

e4 l^Jt beze,lchne.nd iu/i dlz Lel^tang,, ,maZ abge,6c.ko6ie,n, e,lvimal du/tch zwanzlgka^te Laitube.Klzge.nktlt, nlckt daA.ck Jage.A,, nlcht daKch JagzK, we^nn 6le
elmn nlckt ubzA.Aa^cke,n, kann man, man lit &o manovAle/iiaklg, da^A dlz Jag ex e.lnhe,lte,n nlcht6.,,
TRANSLATION:

..-speed is good, the others are saying that speed is bad, that
sort of thing did take place.

I myself was an experienced short

range fighter pilot, I simply was in favor of a slower air

craft.

Whether or not we did make 15 km more, or 100 km, that

did not make much difference, because the fighter planes were
300-400, or 500 km faster, consequently, if other characteristics

-96-

(inherent qualities) are suffering here under, then I would

rather fly at a speed of 250 km, because it is significant
for the results (accomplishments)...one shot down, one

through 20 fold air superiority, and not through fighter

plane, not through fighter planes, if they do not take one

by suprise, one can, one is so manoeuverable that fighter

units are unable to...
END TAPE I I SIDE I

TAPE II SIDE II

001-041 Question addressed to Col. Rudel not intelligible.

Andwer from Rudel unintelligible.
042-150

Rudel speaking:

...am zu ItKYizfi, habzYi win, dlz.. .23,. .g/io66e,

..ME-34, dlz. Au6kun^t dcLue,A,te. ztwcL

c,ln.lnh(iZb 6^-6 zwq,a, 3cih.fi<L, u.yid dcLyin. fi(ib.yL

Bombew - and Schle,6.. .u)e,A.t gzle.gt,,.

5-7 m Ab^tand ode.K 4o,..dawn kamtn

zu-t...

TRANSLATION:

...in order to learn, we have the...23...large aircraft...,the

training lasted approximately one and a half to two year, and
then they have also attended the 'Stuka-Sckool* for six months,
there they received bombing and shooting..., placed value...
five to seven interval or so...then they got to...
180-215
accurate.

English translation of the above follows and seems

Then follows discussion in which Col. Rudel takes

part.

-97-

English translation is good,

215-243 Question to Col. Rudel by interpreter:

Stuka kabe,n dlt au6 daK
TRANSLATION:

How many Stuka^ have they from the prepa...

Rudel speaking;

In dox StuLka^ckate. odzA,,,?

TRANSLATION:

In the *Staka-Sc.kool* or...?

Followed by English translation.

Question by interpreter;
wl/L QZMoknt 6lnd,,,?
TRANSLATION:

What were used?

243-266 English translation good, interspersed with exchanges

with Rudel, but not intelligible.
267-282

Rudel speaking:

Va6 wotltQ, Ich bzllzlbo, tun, e4 voafi mlK 6o

tangw, (unintelliglhle) Wq,/l 6agte., ja,,,

Stukawacke. au6 lak b^aucke, nock dlnlga Lzutz,
W2.fl rmtdzt 6^ch

Da hdbzn

m^K

ge^agt, PlZegeA. mlltz Ick wdKdzn, Ick mu66te,

Kamp^Z^e,ge,fL v)(LH,dzn, dann,.,
TRANSLATION;

That I absolutely wanted to do, it was so boring to me...(unint

elligible) . Who said yes.. .Stuka. duty from... I still need sev
eral people, who eill volunteer? There they told me, I wanted

-98-

to become a pilot, I had to become a fighter pilot, then...

283-312 Translation in English by translator is good, and

is followed up by more discussion and questioning.

313-353 Question to Co. Rudel by interpreter;

AZ4>

noKmatd

zua PKa^ang ge.kommen

-cit,... (unintelligible) .

Wa4 Zn dem Moment

gtbJLauckt u)cul, odzH, hat d^e...

e/te... ?

TRANSLATION:

When a normal class came before examination...what was needed

at that moment, or has the...larger...?
Col. Rudel answering:

TRANSLATION:

It was a larger class.

353-370

Question addressed to Rudel;

Via Ir/cagz l6t, hind zwle, Stuka.,

gzkabt,,

kabe.n kzlnA

e4 6o anttJihcklzdllck, da66 Ihn.

Z'itmZlck mahfL Efi^oZg ge^habt,,,, wa4 e.6 auch, (/oznn

d'iz Lzatz nZcht andzKa TaktZk bQ.nutzt habcn, waA.

dge.m ?2,^,6onZlckkzlt (Initiative), ode^t eZgem

Au6bltdung,, fiabzyi Sle, IfiA,z PZZot&n and&^6 tA.alnZeAt

aU dlz da. (vaAzn, ufah waA. e,6, da66 man 6agtn donntt,
dah hat dzn UnteA^chZed gzmacht?
TRANSLATION:

The question is, have two Staka6,,we had none...how was it so

that you had quite a bit moresuccess.. .was it also

when your mem did not employ other tactics, was it individual
-99-

training...did you train your pilots differently from those

which were there, what was it that one could say that or that
specific thing made the difference (played a significant role)
370-381 Col. Rudel answering;
(unintelligible) dejL qXyiz, ohm

zu macken fiat den

and dzH. andeAt macht

dcu gle.lc.he. and hat keZmn EA^otg... =^unintelligible)

TRANSLATION s

(Unintelligible) ...one, without doing anything special gains

success, and the other (pilot) does the same thing, and has no
success...(unintelligible)

Interpretor asking additional quesiton, unintelligible.

Rudel speakings

Wenn

expoYi^ojiteyi,, ^dtfi macht QtnzKztZ

nlckt6 anddfiz^ al6 dzK andzJit, abzK zk hat E/tioZge,.

TRANSLATION:

If one of them carries out an exposed (visable)...he generally

does not do anything different than the others but he is suecessful...

382-430 Translator speaking, giving good translation of above

conversation, followed by more exchanges between Co. Rudel and
the interpretor, largely unintelligible.

Additional elaborations by Col- Rudel unintelligible.

431-445 Interpretor translating - very good translation, fol
lowing is English conversation.

445-450

Question to Colonel Rudel:

Konnen sio. In IkfizK Ualnamg 6lch das No^6tzlle.n

-100-

(ind e^wa-& sckatznn,

iuK tZn E/iiolg,,.

Slz dofit kattzn?

TRANSLATION:

Can you in your mind picture it.,.and to approximate something,

what kind of success you had there?

450-457 Col. Rudel responding:

eiwa4...(unintelligible) an dzn VanzzK Mihlg

kzJLange.kzn, nuA. zln ganz... (unintelligible)

da4> mKz

Szlb^tomofid.

TRANSLATION:

...something unintelligible...to approach the tank quietly...

in order for a complete...that would be nearly suicide.

458-480

Translation very good, additional comments by Col Rudel

unintelligible, followed by English conversation.

Rudel's works

unintelligible.

90%,,, 10% , *,

60 gA. 06 6 6.171 A,ZoZg*

TRANSLATION:

...nearly 90 per cent, ... 10 per cent, with such considerable

success...

English translation good.

481-503

English conversation follows, is joined by Rudel,

(unintelligible).

Question to Rudel partially unintelligible:

E6 viaK 6pat

KK^zg, da waK da6 iuK Vztit6chZand, ,,

TRANSLATION:

It was late in the war, at that point it was for Geimany...

Interpreter's question continues, unintelligible.

-101-

503-506 Rudel speaking:

Wx./t hatten izhx &ngt... (unintelligible)

we had very close...(unintelligibel) followed by English

translation.

507-511 Rudel speaking:

ndch eZmm,.. (unintelligible)

TRANSLATION:

After a...(unintelligible) Followed by Englsih

511-532 Question by translator:

SXz, da^ wa/t da^ dlnzlQn zut, aU Sla

Ikfiz Bombew.. . f
TRANSLATION:

Do you mean that was the only time when your bombs...?
Followed by English conversation.
Answer by Rudel Unintelligivle...
English conversation continues:

he is talking about the air superiority...(unintelligible)

533-554 English conversation. Translation into German unint
elligible. Answer by Col Rudel alSo unintelligible.

554-575 Translator speaking...|Good translation^ followed by

English conversation, and -elaborations over preceeding discussions.

575-617 Question to Col. Rudel:

W>cei;^e von de./L Aa4>blldung,, ,

TRANSLATION;

How much of the training...

You mean in actual flight?

-102-

Colonel Rudel;

Im J=lugze.u.g iUbit, uiai e.i 6nhn... und

(lock wa/L e4?
TRANSLATION:

In the aircraft itself it was very ...and how high was it?
Answer unintelligible, followed by English dialogue.
626-651

Rudel speaking:

400 m, ,..50 m,,.400 m,,.400 - 600 m.,.

TRANSLATION:

400 meters...50 meters...400 meters...

Interspersed by English words, and additional English conversation continues.

651-653 Question addressed to Rudel:

SXe kcLtttn Qe,Kn ge,habt, da44 S>ce 20-30 mat Zn

zlndm S(ika66

konmn,,,?

TRANSLATION:

You would have liked it very much that you could have fired 2030 times during one salvo...?

653-686

Rudel answering;

Va4 kam dJiaui an, uiie. uie.lt win In.. .mtnn

vili kzlmn.. .viznn win 10 odex 20 km hlnteA

dzK TKont waJLzn...10, 20 mat am Tag, itfettn

Ich abeA ic-hon elm haZbe Stunde Anitug
hatte, and elne haZbe Stunde wledeJi zwiuck

konnte eben hocfuteni.. .wenn klnten del fJiont

elne ftugpZatzmogllchkelt wan, odei keln
Teld, wo wlK keln genadei Veld hatten, dann
-103-

. . ZU/LUCfe, , . 6^4 ZU.,,

TRANSLATION:

That depended on how far we were in...if we received no...

When we were 10-20 km behind the front lines...10,20 times

a day, however, when I had already a half hour approach flight,

and a half hour for return flight...it was possible at the

most...if there was no landing possibility behind>the front,

or no field, where we had no level field, then we...back...
all the way to..,

Translation follows and seems very accurate, followed by Rudel's

additional comments, which are largely unintelligible
586-692

Question by translator:

Me^nen

noA.maU Pilot..,gUt
Ma44e dQ.6
Q,Jiltbe,n konnto., zlna
Izlt ubzA, e^wen ^c.kwzfiQ.n .,,m da6

ve.lll2.lcht e/t we.nlge,/i Ge4efio44 iangzn &olltz

and dann iAogllakkzlt glbt, zu^uakzugzUn.. . ?
TRANSLATION:

irou mean that normal pilots...isn't there a certain number

.quantity) of the army, to experience, for a specific time over

a heavy...where possibly he mighl recieve less fire...and then

possibility exists to turn back...?

>92-706 English dialogue follows, joined by Rudels

Se.niA.b^tLtat, Szn&lblZlta.t... dat,
ma44 man

tat e.6 btu}u66t,

Ruc.k'&yLcht we/imen, de/i e-cwe

andojiz ma.fi nack 2-3

E-i.niatze.n zle.m(lc.h kaputt.

-104-

Wenn man mSji

da

a-nde.>i&...kabzn uiU die. nlcht meft/t ille.gzn

Idiitn, iondejin haben die. jedoch...
TRANSLATION;

Sensibility, sensibility... that is correct, one must take

that into consideration, one might do that consciously, the

other pilot was after 2-3 missions quite exhausted. If they
gave me other...we did not allow those to fly any longer, but
have them...

707-716 English conversation continues.

END TAPE II SIDE II

-105-

tape III SIDE I

001-120 English conversation continued, with intermittent

dialogue between Col. Rudel and the interpreter, largely

unintelligible. Both, questions by interpreter and responses

by col. Rudel unintelligible. Continued dialogue in English.

121-150 Question in English;

How many plane losses did you have due to..,?

Question of interpreter to Col. rfudel unintelligible

151-188 English translation of the above conversation accurate

Additional exchange of dialogue between interpreter and Col.
Hudel to this point unintelligible.

1188-215 Col Rudel speaking:

...zti lange gzfLa.d2.aa6 iuh/izn,

PanzzA

gzyiau In Slaht bekomrmn, wak^^nd

60 lange anilogzn, wafidzYi
e^ne Sac/ie...
dA,(L
. ,and dann tH.otzdzm au^ 5 cm and 10 cm
gzncLix. , .and dann hahz Ich hltK cibgq.wlnke.lt.
translation:

...flew straight ahead for too long, until...got the tank preci.sely in sight, while they approached so long, they were shot

cown...like a thing...the aircraf|...and the none-the-less to

5 cm and 10 cm percisely...and then I have angel of...
Followed by English translation, quite accurate.

215-356 English conversation follows, as well as exchanges of

opinion between all parties present, largely unintelligible.

A..SO words by Col. Rudel unintelligible. Response in English

by interpreter very good.

conversation between Col. Rudel unintelligible. Response by

-106-

Col. Rudel also unintelligible.

English translation of the above legible, Rudel*s words un

intelligible.
357-428

English dialogue partially legible.

Rudel speaking;

...de/L Pilot, dzK

ImmdK konzQ,YitKlzH.zyi

ami Beizkl, abt^ dan. Pilot hltzt 6on6t daa^/ind

mlt dzm Kopi nack klntzn, kommt ^ckelnbaA e,ln

Jagzn., dan. mlch

Mill , dann kann

man 6lch nlcht.,. konzdntA,le^e.n,

Wl(Lde.^kole,

nochmal, ujIa, kabtn 10 mlnatzn o^t g2.bn.aackt,

am,,,dciVLn kann dz,K Ikm gznau

and jdtzt l^t

jztzt

... (unintelligible)

da6 Be.zlzkiingAizld genau beobachten konntn,

and nlckt dauzA,nd den

Kopi nack hlnttn,..

TRANSLATION:

...the pilot, he always muct concentrate on orders,... but

the pilot otherwise constantly sits with his head turned back
comes what appears to be a hunter plane who might want to shoot
me down, then one connot...concnetrate.

I repeat again, we

frequently needed 10 minutes inorder to...then he can tell him

percisely, now and only now it is exact (unintelligible)...
the relative area, to be able to observe correctly, and not con
tinually to turn the head back...

Additional comments by Col. Rudel not legible, followed by:

...cfeA. zfjozltz Bombed., *l6t eln

6ckn2.ll

6ciklQ,66(Lndz6 Ua^cklmngzMzkK, vollli dop-

pellauilg, odux d^zllau^lg, dann kann zfi

-107-

aach dZe. cLng^t^^tndzn JagzK, kann ZK

cLbgz6c,k'i^^e,n,

Un4 2.^e. B^od^ckuizzn hcLbzn

vltlo. VlugzQ.uge. abge.6(iko44tn, and JagzK

wtJLde.n In dtK AYigKlHAln^t
g^dap^t,
wenw 4^e we-'tfeen...and 4'te konne.n abge6ckoo6zn wzfid^yi, dann 4^nd 4^e ^akon

4eU, 4tkfL voA,6lckUg, aUo auck dlz^zK

i

Gz6lckUpanki Ut 4eU voldhtlg.., da^

bzdtatatf da44 6^e
Kon4tA.ukJtcon da6
e^ngetAagen w^/cd, da4

uU/l haben 14

mm, vXeZZe.^cht kabe.n wZa noch au^ 2 cm

ge^ew.. .(i(X4

Zch nlckt,. .die. Wai-

ienexpe/Lten wa/tew... abe^ 14 mm gzht meZm^

Aachtzn6 ohm Schwle/LZgk&lt&n
TRANSLATION;

...the second bomber...is a very fast firing maching gun, com

pletely double-barrelled or three-barrelled, then he can also
bring down the attacking planes. Our airborne gunners have

shot down many aircraft, and fighter planes are considerably

toned down in their desire to attack when they notice... Con

sequently this point of view is ^Iso very important...which

means that during construction it be entered, that a, we have
a double-barrelled machine gun, perhaps by now we already have
a three-barralled...14 mm, we have 14 mm precisely...the weapon's
experts were...but 14 mm in my opinion is feasible without difficulties.

428-457 Followed by English translation of very good quality.

-108-

and more English language dialogue.

458-486

Exchange between members of the group and Col. Rudel,

and comments by Col. Rudel unintelligible.

Opinion on Col.

Rudel's view translated by interpreter.

487-495

Closing comments by narrator, followed by closing

statements by Col. Rudel Spbkne in English:

Thank you very much for all, I hope that I
can help you a little with my experience.
It is now 30 years ago, but a little can

perhaps help you.

END TAPE I I I SIDE

I want to."

-109-

SUMMARY

The historical parallel brought forward in this con

ference, of the JU87 SiukcL opposing the Russian armored

ground formations ..in World War Two and the future deploy
ment of the A-10 to Europe to off-set the massive Warsaw
Pact armored advantage, is most substantial.

The analo-

gus situation, of the JU-87G versus T-34 Tank and the A-10

versus T-62 Tank, is quite clear and indisputable.

The

documented LuitwaHz success, in combating armored threats

on the ground by the use of highly mobile weapons plat

forms in the air is worthy of more study, as it can directly

benefit the effectiveness of NATO forces in contemporary
Europe.

The operational expertise of Col. Rudel, and to a

lesses extent other World War Two Lu(tu)a^iSz pilots, is a

relatively inexpensive resource that can significantly

effect the redressing of the current NATO/Warsaw Pact mili
tary imbalance.

-110-