SANTOS V.

LUMBAO
G.R. No. 169129

March 28, 2007

FACTS: Maria owned a parcel of land when she was still alived. Rita, one of the heirs Maria,
sold to respondents Lumbao a parcel of the whole property through a document denominated as
Bilihan ng LUpa in 1979. Thereafter, respondets Lumbao took actual possession thereof and
erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present as
the exclusive owners up to the present.
Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein
petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effectuate the issuance of a separate
title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is
concerned. However, Rita could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On 1986, the whole property was partitioned among the heirs of Maria including the subject
property already sold to respondent. The whole property now covered by TCT.
On 1992, Lumbao filed a Complaint for Reconveyance before the RTC asserting ownership and
alleging fraudulent act of the petitioners of having titled the whole lot.
Respondent heirs of Rita questioned the sale of their mother toLumbao, and assuming that the
sale was valid, the latter are still barred by laches becasue they have filed only their complaint in
1986 while the sale was made on 1979 (7 years thereafter).
ISSUE: Are the respondent Lumbaos barred by laches?
RULING: No. It is true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute
because it is not subject to extinctive prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in actual
possession of the land to be reconveyed, as in this case, prescription or laches cannot set in. Such
an exception is based on the theory that registration proceeding cannot be used as a shield for
fraud of for enriching person at the expense of another.
Moreoer, laches is negated in view of the constant demand of the respondent for the transfer of
the certificate of title from the very beginning.

ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN
G.R. No. 161916 , January 20, 2006
FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of
(petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is
claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself
and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they
vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he
filed an ejectment suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations
claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said
house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in
Dominadors name was when their parents were in need of money for renovating their house,
their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had
a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the
estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by
his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa
and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of
execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a
share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are
co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of
Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became
co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus
making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the

co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action
w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for
the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be
dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the
ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.

LEONOR B. CRUZ,
Petitioner, v.
TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,
Respondent
G.R. No. 164110, 2008 February 12,
FACTS: Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of aparcel of
land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay MahabangLudlod, Taal,
Batangas. Sometime in 1992, Teofila Catapang, with the consent of NormaMaligaya as one of
the aforementioned co-owners, built a house on a lot adjacent to thesubject parcel of land. The
house built by Catapang intruded on a portion of the co-owned property.In September 1995, Cruz
learned about the intrusion and made several demandsfor Catapang to demolish and vacate the
part of the structure encroaching upon theirproperty. However, Catapang refused and disregarded
the demands of Cruz.Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang before the
MCTCof Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent of only oneof
the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendants construction of the house and possession of
the portion of the lot in question. On appeal, the RTC affirmed thedecision of the
MCTC.Catapang filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversedthe RTCs
decisionand ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals held that there is nocause of action for
forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into theproperty, considering the consent
given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot becharacterized as one made through strategy or
stealth which gives rise to a cause ofaction for forcible entry. Thus, the case went to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the consent given by one of the co-owners is sufficient to warrant thedismissal of a
complaint for forcible entry.
DECISION:
No, Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to theprejudice of the
co-ownership. In this case, the act of Norma Maligaya is tantamount todevoting the property to
her exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none ofthe co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thingowned in common. The Court ruled that
it would necessarily follow that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other coowners, validly give consent to themaking of an alteration by another person, such as Catapang
in this case, in the thing owned in common.In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each

co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the coownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The Court ruled
that, to give consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property would be to
injure the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent other co-owners from usingt he
property in accordance with their rights. In this case, the consent of only one co-owner will not
warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the respondent
Catapang. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of her other coowners did notgrant Catapang any right to enter and even build upon the co-owned
property.According to the Supreme Court, the respondent Catapangs act of getting only
theconsent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the
constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into
the co-owned property.
As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
The petition was GRANTED.
G.R. No. 161136

November 16, 2006

WILFREDO
T.
VAGILIDAD
and
LOLITA
A.
vs.
GABINO VAGILIDAD, Jr. and DOROTHY VAGILIDAD, Respondents.

VAGILIDAD, Petitioners,

FACTS: Zoilo owned the whole lot no. 1253 before he died in 1931. He got 3 heirs. On 1986,
Loreto, one of the heirs, sold to respondent Gabino a portion of the whole lot of 1,604 square
meters specifying the boundaries evidenced y a deed of sale. The sale was not registered.
On 1987, in view of the death of Zoilo, the 3 heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate
adjudicating the whole lot to Loreto. On 1989, Loreto sold the same lot to Wilfredo even the
latter knew that it was already sold to Gabino. Later, Wilfredo registered the sale with the
registry of property.
ISSUES:
1. Is the sale of a co-heir of a portion of undivided property specifying the boundaries and
the area thereon valid?
2. In case it was valid, does the registration of Wilfredo of the sale give him a better right
over the property under the rule on double sale?
RULING:
1.

YES. The mere fact that LORETO sold a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and
bounds before partition does not, per se, render the sale a nullity. It is ruled that the fact that an
agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale
void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is
legally possible to do so.

In the case at bar, the contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO could be legally
recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square
meter property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO, JR.
We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will
affect only his share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. But the
1

co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights in favor of LORETO. The rights of GABINO as owner
over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by
LORETO to WILFREDO in the susequent Sale.

2. No. It is true that in case of double sales of immovables under art. 1544, the first
registrant in good faith has the better right over the property. However, in this case, it was
shown that Wilfredo registered the subject property with evident bad faith. Thus, since he
is not in good faith, the rule on double sale does not favor him.