G.R. No.

L-7188

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in
the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

EN BANC

The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a
person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that
at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia
died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed
certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator
and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in
Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed
by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three
front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for
appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked
Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if
he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified
without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses,
Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke
and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of
each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and
numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of
his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it
was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed
and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law
still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the
new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of
holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate

Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of
Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses
to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough
that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios
or leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three
of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and
her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement,
this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left
margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura
Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting
witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of
the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a
fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of
the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which
provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court?
But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is
made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce
at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in
court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will
operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
1

solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court
in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should
be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be
resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after
the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities
required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied
so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time
of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the
testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a
vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of
wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a
will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as
having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no
subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession.
The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills,
Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is
denied probate. With costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitionerappellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one
of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving
the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference
to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or
article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order
of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of

the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of

the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part
of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen,
this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by
free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this
will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article
792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall
govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being
contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

G.R. No. L-23678

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,

Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.

EN BANC

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction
of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to
time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted

and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine
of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
5

death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
6

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4445

September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants.
Fernando Salas for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros,
admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of
Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina
Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the
appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled
to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the
deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the
execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was
executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of
Domingo Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting
witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mario, testified in
support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality
wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all important
details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the will was
made. It does not appear from the record why the third subscribing witness was not
called; but since counsel for the contestants makes no comment upon his absence,
we think it may safely be inferred that there was some good and sufficient reason
therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that, when because of
death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the
witness stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason

for the absence of any of these witnesses should be made to appear of record, and
this especially in cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the
will and swore that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and
memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and
testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each other, they as well
as the third subscribing witness. Despite the searching and exhaustive crossexamination to which they were subjected, counsel for appellants could point to no
flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which
occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction, however,
which we think is more apparent than real. One of the witnesses stated that the
deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution
food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a
sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name. We think
the evidence discloses that his wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time
when he signed his name to the instrument, and that he was given nourishment
while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether this was immediately
before or after, or both before and after he attached his signature to the will. To say
that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with
the fact that he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or
impossible that nourishment might have been given to him both before and after
signing the will, and that one witness might remember the former occasion and the
other witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both. But,
however this may have been, we do not think that a slight lapse of memory on the
part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of an unimportant incident,
to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is sufficient to raise a
doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of their
recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of
contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the
circumstances under which it was executed, or even a single contradiction as to a
particular incident, where the incident was of such a nature that the intention of any
person who was present must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory
statements in regard to it are so clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or
probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the
witnesses could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it is
alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the
witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity, and on
the other hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and detailed
account of all that occurred, and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we
have no doubt that the trial judge who heard them testify properly accepted their
testimony as worthy of entire confidence and belief.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at
the time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will
was executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the
alleged testator was at that time in such physical and mental condition that it was
impossible for him to have made a will. Two of these witnesses, upon crossexamination, admitted that they were not in the house at or between the hours of
7

four and six in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been
made, this being the time at which the witnesses in support of the will testified that it
was executed. Of the other witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag,
a brother of the testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These
witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill,
at or about the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that
time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house, and the alleged
testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make himself
understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the testimony
of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition to his
manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and
settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of
the truth, and readiness to swear to any fact which he imagined would aid in
securing his object. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased
was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will,
but this witness in his anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of his brother
to the will, promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was
not his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response
to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to
understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On crossexamination, he was forced to admit that because his brother and his brother's wife
(in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he and his other brothers and
sisters had not visited them for many months prior to the one particular occasion as
to which testified; and he admitted further, that, although he lived near at hand, at no
time thereafter did he or any of the other members of his family visit their dying
brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness
could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the
subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have
joined in its execution on the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested
witness happened to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that
the testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive evidence in support of the
allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time and
place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not
think that the testimony of this witness nor any of the other witnesses for the
contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner
and from in which it was executed.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased
was introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature with the
signature attached to the instrument in question, we are wholly of the opinion of the
trial judge, who held in this connection as follows:
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures,
and the presiding judge of this court does not claim to possess any special
expert knowledge in the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the court has
compared these two signatures, and does not find that any material
differences exists between the same. It is true that the signature which
appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at the

time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but
two facts must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and
the other fact, that for some reason which is not stated the testator was
unable to see, and was a person who was not in the habit of signing his
name every day.
These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist
between the two signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in
the two signatures are identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that,
at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their
testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced
stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he
was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise
himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he
was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no
wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed
the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the
testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and
physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with
the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit
instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the
property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his
brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence;
and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and
unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their
contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when it is
considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending
or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his
brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he
and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so
bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity,
were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that
the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and
made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men
and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence
of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants'
allegation that the will never was executed.
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine
the degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been everywhere
recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental
capacity, or its impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III.,
264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court has ever attempted to lay down any
8

definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental capacity requisite for the
making of a valid will, without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking"
(Trish vs. Newell, 62 III., 196, 203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental
aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that "mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property"
(Lodge vs.Lodge, 2 Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it
has not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and
disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few indeed would be the
wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity,
would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in
upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives
him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680);
and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of
soundness is one of degree" (Boughton vs. Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P.,
25); on the other hand, it has been held that "testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind.
Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from disease, or great
bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator
incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from
knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is
engaged in" (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).

(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law,
vol. 23, p. 71, second edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner
the execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the
deceased; that it was made in strict conformity with the requisites prescribed by law;
and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory,
and executed the instrument of his own free will and accord.
The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of this
instance against the appellants.

But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down
a definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may
present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the
testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed
with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of
testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort
in England and the United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity
has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can
be no question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof
of the existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of
testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner
in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his
bounty.
9

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6801

March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Bataan, admitting to probate a document which was offered as the last will and
testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been executed in
the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator
died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months following the date of
the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas,
widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a
former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not
executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and
further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen
years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his
body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he
lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to
one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able
to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary
witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Seor
Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since
died, and consequently their testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in
the lower court. The other three testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino
Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will was executed. According to the
uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the following
manner:

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating
to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor
Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the
pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the
testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the
attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the
witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after
looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that
they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in
perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code of
Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz,
the testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. Upon
this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting
witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his
right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his
head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was
not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not,
because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a
physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court
as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was
the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the
infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak.
The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature
as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present
when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the
manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the
will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business
for the decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his
request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the will he had
performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates
the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses
for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa
testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death
and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis
resulted. The following question was propounded to Doctor Basa:
Q.
Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time
you attended him, do you think he was in his right mind?

10

A.
I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted
some mental disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the
testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He
does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of
the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental
capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had
manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him
on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was
in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person
who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was
supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony
Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms
and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in
support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost.
In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify
to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens
the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the
testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in
consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired.
Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at
the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's
infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was
not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not
include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his
property by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such
circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is
only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of
mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document
of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question
of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court. The numerous citations there
given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to the
case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in
favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of
the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of
Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27;
Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established,
and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of
competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent

upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we
think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities which we might
cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and
body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will.
The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use
of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such
were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet
such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in
statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are
many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest
conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any
other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless
mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing
the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is
not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a
variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be
capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there
cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section
365, and quoted with approval inCampbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by
the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the
property he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the
objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was
engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there
cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of
the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was
an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his death he
suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were mush
enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of
11

his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became
filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the
properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The
failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total,
or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the
will, and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in
striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or
recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions in
conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would
seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him
when he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that
his reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although
they never heard him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same
contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in
the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have
led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his
mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to
the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all
indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this
occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct
was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the
nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the
writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator
was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again,
the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a
rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.

12

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
C.A. No. 8075

March 25, 1946

TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee.
Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.
Lucio Javillonar for appellee.
DE JOYA, J.:
On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister,
Encarnacion Neyra, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the
recovery of one-half () of the property mentioned and described therein, which had
been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra, and which had been previously
divided equally between the two extrajudicially, demanding at the same time one-half
() of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra.
The defendant filed an answer admitting that the property mentioned and described
therein was community property, and at the same time set up counterclaims
amounting to over P1,000, for money spent, during the last illness of their father, and
for money loaned to the plaintiff.
After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to onehalf () of the said property, adjudicating the same to her, but at the same time
ordered said plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by
virtue of said counterclaims.
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals for
Manila, alleging several errors, attacking the execution and validity of said
agreement; and on November 10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed, pursuant to the
to an agreement or compromise entered into by the parties, as shown by the
corresponding document, dated November 3, 1942, which was filed in the case the
following day, November 4, 1942.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two years,
unexpectedly died, on November 4, 1942 at the age of 48, allegedly from heart
attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease from which, it was claimed, she had
been suffering for sometime.

In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 10, 1942,
dismissing the appeal, by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio
Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since November
4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, filed a petition, dated November 23, 1942,
asking for the reconsideration of said decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing
the appeal, claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement, dated November 3,
1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already
then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following
day; and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark
appearing on said document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's
attorney, against Encarnacion's will; and that the court had no more jurisdiction over
the case, when the alleged agreement was filed on November 4, 1942, at the
instance of Trinidad Neyra, as Encarnacion was already dead at the time.
The principal question to be decided, in connection with said petition for
reconsideration, is whether or not said compromise or agreement had been legally
executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942. Trinidad Neyra
maintains the affirmative.
The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, in
this case, has fully established the following facts:
That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving
certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra
and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; That after the death
of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had
serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased
father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had
two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In
the first case, filed in March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded by
Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at
No. 366 Raon Street, Manila which was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in
the court of first instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R.
No. 8162); and the second is the instance case.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any
ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of
her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and
her other relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda.
de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will, in favor of her only sister of
the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when the
said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after
due deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty
offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly
communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said
religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the
latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her
death, sent for Atty. Ricardo Sikat, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a
new will; that Atty. Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, merely prepared a draft of a
13

codicil, amending said will, dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious
organization, among others as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also
forwarded to the authorities of religious organization, for their consideration and
acceptance; but it was also rejected.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and
confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, after
which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in her house at No. 366 Raon
Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion; that Mons. Fernandez
caused the necessary arrangements to be made, and, as a matter of fact, on
November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house by Father Teodoro
Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who
remained in bed, took holy communion; that after the mass, Father Garcia talked to
Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion
and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the
same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad,
who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the two sisters greeted each other
in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and two had a long and cordial
conversation, in the course of which they also talked about the properties left by their
father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of
Manila, the instant case being the second, and they agreed to have the latter
dismissed, on the condition that the property involved therein should be given
exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents of
said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness
to Encarnacion. They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the
necessary document embodying the said agreement, but Attorney Panis could come
only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion
gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their
agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her last will and testament;
that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will
and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries
therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents
were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of
November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and
testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of
Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and
others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes,
or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did
not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with
the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the
two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis,
after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of
Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad
Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as
witnesses.

Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents, at the
request of Encarnacion Neyra.
The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad
Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no interest in the final
outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three of the
attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who had
known and seen and actually talked to the testatrix.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter
Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo
Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the witnesses presented
by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of
Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that
when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in
question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and
that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the
documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus
contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also
testified that Encarnacion Neyra's, thumbmark was affixed to the will, only in the
morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del Barrio, when
Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature of
effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to
the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease often live
as long as ten (10) years, while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the
disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the
patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil,
Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250-1253; McCrae, Osler's Modern
Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.)
And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4,
1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the
testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy
than the testimony of the alleged medical experts.
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Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to
the probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held
not to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient
for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to
have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony to the contrary, to
the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis.
(Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the
attending physician that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in
a comatose condition for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to
establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several
credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what was said to
him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil.,
573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age,
nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might
sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuelavs. Tablizo, 48 Phil.,
485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will,
the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying
down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of
property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was in a
perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will. (Amata and
Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that,
in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942,
Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus
showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons
suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired,
partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily
receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from
tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the
moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion
Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental
capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3,
1942.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time
Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in
the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been
fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was
lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the

time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other
sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this
case. (Jaboneta vs.Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix
on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature. (Yap
Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are
children of legatees named in the will, dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated
from the will, dated November 3, 1942.
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect that
there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the
thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying the
agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and
that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead,
in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view, is absolutely devoid of any
semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense
of proportion. Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they
have testified to deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy
of belief. And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal
aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728,
735.)
To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the two
documents, dated November 3, 1942, petitioners have erroneously placed great
emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking evidently on the common
belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. Terrible indeed are the feuds of
relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and yet not impossible. They had forgotten
that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of
the Christian faith, and hope and charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute.
They had also forgotten that there could be no more sublime love than that
embalmed in tears, as in the case of a reconciliation.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two
sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the
former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must
have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. And believing perhaps
that her little triumphs had not always brought her happiness, and that she had
always been just to her sister, who had been demanding insistently what was her
due, Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation, as she did not want to go to
her eternal rest, with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore,
most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the benificiary of her generosity,
under her last will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by executing said
agreement, and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labors.
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally
signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence
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of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she wascompos mentis and
possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the time; the petition
for the reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on
behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4, 1942,
and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of
section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the
Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal,
is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

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