AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Operation Allied Force

Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns

MICHAEL W. LAMB SR.

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 27

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 2002
 Air University
Donald A. Lamontagne, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

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Stephen O. Fought, PhD, Dean
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ii
 Foreword

In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force

(OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of
lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from
this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden
nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed,
there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the
campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of
intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions
that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the
spectrum of military operations.
Colonel Lambs examination of some key lessons
learned provides nuggets that airmen need to remember in
future campaigns. From the coalition operations and or-
ganization to targeting, from logistics to rapid response
contingencies, these lessons are essential elements to be
remembered in future campaigns. Each of these nuggets
suggests discussion points for war fighters and planners.
They are not intended to be critical, but to raise questions
and suggest areas that should be examined and debated
as part of the campaign planning process. The questions
are the end items of an analysis of the lessons derived from
OAF. Many of the lessons raised in this analysis are tough
ones, but they should frame the strategic and operational
issues to pursue during the course of any postconflict ex-
amination. All persons involved in this process must put
aside parochial differences and personal pride, and answer
the questions honestly. Duty to our nation demands noth-
ing less.
Each war is different, and OAF was especially so. While
it was chiefly an operation conducted from air and space,
that does not mean that ground forces have now been rel-
egated to secondary status or rendered obsolete. Hardly
so. One must be cautious not to draw the wrong conclu-
sions, particularly as the Department of Defense under-
goes transformation.
OAF was successful largely because of the flexibility and
training of a well-disciplined and joint team of soldiers, air-
men, sailors, and marines. Though successful, enough un-
comfortable lessons turn up from the OAF experience to

iii
suggest that instead of attributing the success of OAF
solely to airpowers solo performance, students and practi-
tioners of air and space warfare should give careful
thought to the hard work that lies ahead to bring to
fruition air and space powers fullest potential in joint and
combined warfare. The experiences in OAF indicate the
need to continuously improve our strategy development
and campaign planning. When one takes a look back at the
OAF campaign, its most notable and distinct accomplish-
ment was not that Slobadon Milosevic finally withdrew his
forces from Kosovo, but rather that air and space power
prevailed despite senior leaders reluctance to take major
risks and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance
held together.
As with all Maxwell Papers, we encourage discussion
and debate of Colonel Lambs important lessonsgolden
nuggetsfrom Operation Allied Force.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN
Major General, USAF
Commandant, Air War College

iv
 About the Author

Lt Col Michael W. Chox Lamb Sr. is currently the com-

mander of the 66th Mission Support Squadron at
Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. His Air Force ca-
reer includes tours in space and missile research and de-
velopment engineering, technical engineering, flight-test
engineering, intelligence operations and assessments, the
National Intelligence Council, and the Air Force Doctrine
Center and as an executive officer. Colonel Lamb has par-
ticipated in or launched some 86 missile systems for re-
search tests, including Atlas, Thor, Minuteman I, Minute-
man II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper. He is the Air
Forces only fully qualified technical engineer on Minute-
man I, Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper
missile systems. While attached to the 410th Bombard-
ment Wing, he performed duties as a flight-test engineer
responsible for developing new operational tactics for the
B-52 Stratofortress and saw action in Operation Desert
Storm. As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agencys
(DIA) Science and Technology Advisory Board, his hall-
mark performance on time-sensitive critical national intel-
ligence issues was recognized with DIAs highest award,
the Directors Medal. As chairman of the Science and
Technology Intelligence Committee for Collections, Na-
tional Intelligence Council, he published the Science and
Technology Gaps Study and created an interactive data-
base that provided analysts up-to-date databases for de-
tailed intelligence assessments for which he received the
Director for Central Intelligence Medal of Merit. Colonel
Lamb is uniquely qualified to write on the lessons from Op-
eration Allied Force due to his deployment to Joint Forge
where he authored the report to Congress and subse-
quently incorporated many of the lessons learned into joint
and Air Force doctrine publications. He also coauthored
the White Paper on Effects Based Operations as part of
the 2001 CSAF Billy Mitchell Doctrine Symposium. He has
a masters degree from West Coast University in astronau-
tical engineering and from the Air War College (AWC) in na-
tional security studies. He is a graduate of the AWC Class
of 2002.

v
 Operation Allied Force
Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns
Operation Allied Force was a conclusive NATO and American
military success.
Gen Henry H. Shelton
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Operation Allied Force (OAF) provides the United States

and our allies an opportunity to glean valuable insights
about military operations as this century unfolds. As Sec-
retary of Defense William S. Cohen stated, Kosovo . . . il-
luminates in many ways how America and our allies and
adversaries are going to approach the art of war well into
the next century.1
OAF was a successful undertaking. In fact, it was an ex-
traordinarly successful military campaign by almost any
measure. The operation achieved its stated strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical objectives and more. It has been called
the most precise and lowest collateral damage air campaign
in history. A total of 38,004 sorties were flown with all but
two aircraft returning safely during 78 days of around-the-
clock operations.2 It is not difficult to argue that OAF was
successful. The Serbs left Kosovo and the killing ended,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are enforc-
ing the peace, and refugees eventually returned to their vil-
lages and towns.
However, like any military operation, there are many les-
sonsgolden nuggetsthat need to be learned and applied
to future campaigns. Of note, each war is different, and OAF
was especially so. While it was primarily an air campaign,
that does not suggest that land forces, boots on the ground
will now be relegated to lesser status or rendered out of date.
After OAF ended, airpowers detractors lost no time in seek-
ing to denigrate NATOs achievement. For example, Lt Gen
William Odom, USA, retired, charged that this war didnt do
anything to vindicate airpower. It didnt stop the ethnic
cleansing, and it didnt remove Milosevicas though those
were ever the expected goals of NATOs airpower employment
to begin with.3 Yet, because of the air wars ultimate success

1
2 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

in forcing Slobodan Milosevic to yield to NATOs demands,

the predominant tendency among most outside observers
was to characterize it as a watershed achievement for air-
power. One needs to be cautious not to draw the wrong con-
clusions, particularly as the Department of Defense (DOD)
and its services embark upon a new round of transformation,
shifting from a threat-based planning model to a capabilities-
based model.
NATO proved to be flexible and adaptable during one of the
most challenging times in its history. Despite the pro-
nouncements of skeptics and critics, the alliance held to-
gether and proved its unity, resolve, and ability to defend its
interests and values. Despite domestic pressure, geopolitical
concerns over relations with Russia and China, refugee prob-
lems, and collateral damage, the nations of the alliance held
firm and saw the operation through to a successful conclu-
sion. Furthermore, 14 of 19 alliance members contributed
forces to the operation, totaling 305 aircraft that flew more
than 15,000 sorties.4 Just as important, the alliance demon-
strated the dramatic ability to quickly transform from the
role of the war fighter to the role of the peacekeeper with the
rapid implementation of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force
(KFOR) immediately following the cessation of hostilities.
There is much to be learned from the operation. The prob-
lems and questions arising out of OAF are many and cut
across the spectrum of military operations. The efforts of
OAF were successful primarily because of the flexible appli-
cation of joint doctrine and training by a well-disciplined and
cooperative team of soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines.

The Campaign
The OAF campaign was not a traditional military con-
flict. There was no direct clash of massed military forces.
President Slobodan Milosevic of the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) was unable to challenge superior allied
military capabilities directly. Therefore, he chose to fight
chiefly through indirect means by
1. use of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians,
2. attempts to exploit the premium the alliance placed on
minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage,
 LAMB 3

3. creation of enormous refugee flows to create a hu-

manitarian crisis, and
4. the conduct of disinformation and propaganda cam-
paigns.
Milosevics military forces were forced into hiding through-
out most of the campaign, staying in caves and tunnels and
under the cover of forest, village, or weather. He was forced
to conserve his antiaircraft missile defenses to sustain his
challenge to our air campaign. He chose his tactics in the
hope of exploiting our legitimate political concerns about tar-
get selection, collateral damage, and military operations
against enemy forces intermingled with civilian refugees. His
ultimate goal was coalition disunity; however, he failed de-
spite all these efforts.
At the outset of the air campaign, NATOs mission state-
ment was to conduct air operations against military targets
throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to attack Ser-
bian capability to continue repressive actions against ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo.5 From this mission statement, NATO
set specific strategic objectives for its use of force in Kosovo
that later served as the basis for its stated conditions to Milo-
sevic for stopping the bombing. These objectives were to
1. deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his
attacks on helpless civilians and create conditions to
reverse his ethnic cleansing and
2. damage Serbias capacity to wage war against Kosovo
in the future or spread the war to neighbors by di-
minishing or degrading its ability to wage military
operations.6
At the outset of the campaign, Milosevic was not de-
terred from escalating the ethnic cleansing. Although there
were expectations on the part of some that this would be a
short campaign, the United States made clear to our allied
counterparts that OAF could well take weeks or months to
succeed and that the operation should only be initiated if
all were willing to persist until success was achieved. Al-
liance leaders agreed in advance that if the initial strikes
did not attain NATOs goals, NATO would have to persist
and indeed expand its air campaign.
4 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Originally, OAF was planned to be prosecuted in five

phases under NATOs operational plan, which had been in
development since the summer of 1998.
Phase 1 Deployment of air assets.
Phase 2 Establish air superiority over Kosovo and
degrade command and control over the whole of the
FRY.
Phase 3 Attack military targets in Kosovo and those
FRY forces south of 44 degrees north latitude, which
were providing reinforcement to Serbian forces into
Kosovo. This was to allow targeting of forces not only
in Kosovo but also in the FRY south of Belgrade.
Phase 4 Expand air operations against a wide range
of high-value military and security force targets
throughout the FRY.
Phase 5 Redeploy forces as required.7
A limited air response relying predominantly on cruise
missiles to strike selected targets throughout the FRY was
developed as a stand-alone option and was integrated into
phase 2. Within a few days of the start of NATOs campaign,
alliance aircraft were striking both strategic and tactical
targets throughout Serbia as well as working to suppress
and disrupt the FRYs integrated air defense system.
During OAF, US diplomacy had several objectives. The
first was to ensure that NATO remained united and firm.
To this end, the president, the secretary of state, and other
US officials spoke almost daily with NATO counterparts
throughout the 78-day campaign. NATO unity and resolve
not only remained firm but also strengthened overtime. At
the NATO Summit in Washington on 23 April 1999, alliance
leaders approved intensifying the air campaign; allowed
the target set to include military-industrial infrastructure,
media, and other strategic targets; and announced the de-
ployment of additional aircraft.8 The alliance also clearly
outlined its political conditions to end the operation. As
proclaimed in the NATO Statement on Kosovo, President
Milosevic had to
1. ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the
immediate end of violence and repression in Kosovo,
 LAMB 5

2. withdraw his military, police, and paramilitary forces

from Kosovo,
3. agree to the stationing of an international military
presence in Kosovo,
4. agree to the unconditional and safe return of all
refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered ac-
cess to them by humanitarian aid organizations, and
5. provide credible assurance of his willingness to work
for the establishment of a political framework based
on the Rambouillet accords.9
The second US diplomatic objective was to help directly
effected countries deal with the humanitarian crisis and to
prevent the conflict from widening. To this end, the secre-
tary of state was in regular contact with her counterparts
from the region. The United States, its NATO allies, and, in
fact, many other countries and nongovernmental organi-
zations from around the world contributed immense
amounts of emergency assistance to help meet the needs
of the tide of refugees then pouring out of Kosovo into
neighboring countries.10
The third US diplomatic objective was to work construc-
tively with Russia. History will show that, after a somewhat
rocky start, the relationships between the United States
and Russia, and between the NATO alliance and Russia,
over the issue of Kosovo were maintained effectively over
the course of operations. While there continued to be
sharp differences with Russia over the conflict itself and
the kind of international presence that would be required
in Kosovo after the conflict ended, these differences did not
preclude agreement on the conditions that Belgrade would
have to meet to bring an end to the air campaign or indeed
on the roles for Russian army units in the NATO-led
KFOR.11
In the end, NATO proved to be flexible, effective, and ul-
timately successful during a uniquely challenging time in
its history. Despite domestic pressures in many NATO na-
tions, an enormous humanitarian crisis, and isolated in-
stances of unintentional collateral damage, the nations of
the alliance held firm and saw the operation through to a
successful conclusion.
6 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Some say that working within NATO unduly constrained

US military forces from getting the job done quickly and ef-
fectively. It was no surprise that conducting a military cam-
paign through an alliance would be a challenge. Neverthe-
less, OAF could not have been conducted without the NATO
alliance or without the infrastructure, transit and basing ac-
cess, host-nation force contributions, and, most importantly,
political and diplomatic support provided by the allies and
other members of the coalition. These immense contribu-
tions from NATO allies and partners, particularly those na-
tions near the theater of conflictHungary, Macedonia, Bul-
garia, Romania, Albania, and otherswere in large part a
dividend of sustained US and NATO engagement with those
nations over the previous few years. This engagement, in-
cluding vigorous participation in Partnership for Peace activ-
ities, helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they
were better able to withstand the tremendous burden in-
flicted upon them by the humanitarian crisis and the con-
duct of the operation itself.
Admittedly, gaining agreement among the 19 NATO na-
tions was not easy and was achieved only through consider-
able dialogue and diplomacy. After the air war ended, Sec-
retary of Defense Cohen conceded in a statement to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, It was very difficult
to take 19 different countries and get an effective cam-
paign under way without some bumps in the road. Cohen
concluded the alliance was slow, in some cases too slow,
to achieve a consensus and labeled the problem as self-
inflicted wounds in asymmetric warfare.12 However, NATO
held together and that became its greatest strength. It is
true that there were differences of opinion within the al-
liance, and this is to be expected in an alliance of democ-
racies. But building consensus generally leads to sounder
decisions. If NATOas an institutionhad not responded
to this crisis, it would have meant that the worlds most
powerful alliance was unwilling to act when confronted
with serious threats to common interests on its own door-
step.
It is important to remember that the alliance had been
addressing this crisis through diplomatic activities and
military planning for some time before the onset of the mil-
itary campaign itself. Because NATO had been engaged in
 LAMB 7

trying to settle this conflict before military operations com-

menced; because it had conducted planning for the opera-
tion itself; because of its member nations respect for dif-
ferences of opinion and the need for consensus; and, simply,
because the alliance is the most effective existing means
for addressing European security issues; it was both nat-
ural and inevitable that the United States would work
through NATO. Without the direct support of our NATO al-
lies and key coalition partners, the campaign would not
have been possible. There are, of course, golden nuggets to
be found for our decision-making processes during crises
and for alliance capabilities, but we must not forget the
fact that NATO stood up to the challenge and succeeded.
Lessons learned from OAF will be gleaned for several
years to come. The golden nuggets that follow are just a
few, but they will be vital to our success in future crises,
especially those that include coalition operations. Some of
these lessons we may have forgotten from previous opera-
tions, and we must relearn them; others will carry us for-
ward into this new century and help us to meet future
challenges.

Golden Nuggets
It will be virtually impossible to use the devastating power of
modern military forces in coalition operations to the fullest ex-
tent.
Gen Klaus Naumann
DSACEUR and
Chairman, NATO Military Committee

This section discusses 13 lessons learned from Opera-

tion Allied Force in detail. For the readers convenience,
the golden nuggets and the discussion are summarized in
the appendix to this paper.
1. Alliances and coalition forces are only as strong as
their weakest elements.
Having to get approval for targets from 19 different na-
tions with varying levels of commitment to the operation
made targeting difficult. The varying levels of commitment
to the operation also led to security concerns that drove
8 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

the implementation of parallel NATO and US-only planning

and air tasking order (ATO) processes.
OAF was a comprehensive coalition effort. Although the
US contribution constituted the vast majority of the effort,
14 nations contributed forces to the effort, providing 305
aircraft that flew more than 15,000 sorties.13 Furthermore,
allied support was critical regarding host-nation support
for basing and overflight access. The alliance sustained 78
days of around-the-clock operations, with 38,004 sorties
flown while losing only two aircraft to hostile fire.14 Both
pilots were successfully rescued. The campaign achieved
the most precise targeting results with the lowest collateral
damage in history. OAF was a success; it met the cam-
paign objectives of the commander in chief (CINC) and the
joint force commander (JFC).
While recognizing that gaining consensus among 19
democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved
through discussion and compromise and that there were
differences of opinion within the alliance, both Secretary
Cohen and Gen Henry H. Shelton stressed that the NATO
alliance is also our greatest strength.15 They also noted
that building consensus generally leads to sounder deci-
sions.16 Every alliance nation has its own interests and
viewpoint based on its history, tradition, economic devel-
opment, and other considerations. The key in alliance or
coalition building is to find the common ground and reach
consensus.
Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander, Europe
(SACEUR), acknowledged that every single nation had a
domestic political constituency, and every single nation
had a different set of political problems. In some there
were government coalitions. In others there were historic
relationships. Some bore the agony of defeat in a previous
conflict and the word war couldnt be mentioned. Others
were long-standing partners with American efforts else-
where in the world.17 However, he also noted that despite
their differences, the allies pulled together and their cohe-
sion and resolution got stronger.18
General Clark also noted despite differences among al-
liance members that hindered the conduct of a more
rapid, overwhelming campaign with more strike power,
the fact remained that sustaining unity in the face of ef-
 LAMB 9

forts to destabilize the countries around Yugoslavia, a sus-

tained propaganda campaign, ethnic cleansing, and the ef-
forts of certain nations to halt our actions sent a powerful
message to the international community [which was] that
NATO stood together, we could win, and we would win.19
With regard to the use of force Clark said, Once the
threshold is crossed and you are going to use force, that
force has to be as decisive as possible in attaining your
military objects.20 However, he also observed that with re-
gard to OAF, the consensus of 19 nations was required to
approve action, and many countries had preconceptions
about how to apply force.
Gen Klaus Naumann, former deputy supreme allied com-
mander, Europe (DSACEUR) and chairman of the NATO Mil-
itary Committee, confirmed General Clarks views stating
that to conduct coalition operations one has to accept that
the pace and the intensity of military operations will be de-
termined by the lowest common denominator and that there
will be restrictions due to differing national legislation. Gen-
eral Naumann also pointed out that coalitions have difficulty
responding rapidly to situations when, as he put it, The
slowest ship determines the speed of the convoy.21
2. Timely tactical and operational intelligence is a con-
stant requirement.
There has to be a commitment to acquire aircraft which are in-
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraftthe so-
called ISR. We had a shortage of that capability and when you
have a shortage of that capability; it also impacts on your abil-
ity to deliver precision-guided munitions. So the two act in con-
cert.
William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

For coercive operations to be successful, relevant, timely,

and predictive, intelligence is required. Knowing what would
cause Milosevic to back down was a problem right from the
start of OAF. It was the majority opinion within NATO that
three days of punitive strikes would be enough to force Milo-
sevic to concede, but the majority was wrong.
Collection and battle management of air and space intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets were ex-
tremely effective, but there were shortfalls in the number and
10 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

capability of platforms, communications, and personnel that

limited intelligence capabilities. These shortfalls allowed for
situational awareness but often came up short on target-level
information. The coalition was largely unable to see the bat-
tlefield to the detail needed to impact the operations of Serb
ground forces.
All US service components have shortfalls in trained intel-
ligence analysts, particularly in imagery interpreters and lin-
guists. These shortfalls hampered intelligence support to
force protection, threat warning, targeting, battle damage as-
sessment (BDA), and situational awareness. They highlight
the need for increased theater ISR platforms, a dedicated ISR
communications structure, and more trained personnel to
provide intelligence support to operations across the full
spectrum of conflict.
3. Gaining and maintaining the initiative in the in-
formation operations arena, especially public affairs,
are critical.
IO was both a great success . . . and perhaps the greatest fail-
ure of the war. IO is not yet understood by war fighters [and
is] classified beyond their access. A property executed infor-
mation operation could have halved the length of the cam-
paign.
Adm James Ellis Jr.
Commander
Joint Task Force Noble Anvil

Despite OAF being called one of the most precise air oper-
ations ever and having one of the lowest collateral damage to
bombs dropped ratios in history, Milosevic took the initiative
in the information operations (IO) arena by exploiting the few
instances of collateral damage. In what might be labeled the
moral hardening of targets, he flooded the media with pic-
tures and information portraying the effects on the civilian
populace. Public affairs (PA) needs to be part of the planning
from the beginning. Commanders need to involve PA early in
the campaign planning process, even before the start of the
operation, and they must stay ahead of the crisis event curve
by dealing with bad news openly, quickly, and accurately
(e.g., the Chinese Embassy bombing).
Information operations played a major role in OAF. The
Serbian information isolation strategy and well-practiced
 LAMB 11

propaganda campaign limited our ability to influence the

Serbian population against its leadership. On the opposite
side, our IO efforts maintained strong resolve within NATO
and contributed significantly toward FRY capitulation.22
National IO policy and resource limitations precluded a ro-
bust, continuous IO campaign in advance of hostilities. An
earlier, more comprehensive IO campaign led by an inter-
agency team might have contributed to earlier compliance
with the March 1999 Rambouillet accord.
Information operations must be fully integrated into all
theater operations and engagement plans. These need to
be thoroughly detailed in deliberate and crisis action plans
as well as becoming an essential part of all exercises. We
must restructure our organizations to incorporate IO con-
siderations and tactics at every level. IO should be imbed-
ded within all campaign plans. When a crisis develops, in-
formation operations should be part of the operation in
every aspect, from policy discussions to routine logistical
efforts.
During an actual crisis or operation, information opera-
tions planning must be continuous. Channels of commu-
nication must be exercised daily. Constant feedback is re-
quired to determine means and methods that are having
the greatest effect (i.e., a form of IO battle damage assess-
ment). In addition, we need to address organizational
structure, as these efforts will require additional perma-
nent IO manning throughout.
A capability to intrude on the propaganda machine that
holds such regimes as Milosevics in power needs to be de-
veloped, exploited, and enhanced. Better programming
that will capture an audience is required if the IO effort is
to be more than a technology oddity for the targeted popu-
lation. Through satellite systems, or more powerful air-
borne systems, this capability can be extended, allowing
for complete disruption of enemy propaganda and the in-
jection of truthful information across an entire country.
Overall effectiveness of IO is difficult to assess. However,
the fact that by the end of OAF Milosevic had to contend
with revolt in some of his cities and discontent within the
ranks of his armed forces (themes advanced by the leaflet
and broadcast campaign) is impossible to overlook.
12 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Early synchronization of alliance IO capabilities and

greater alliance interoperability, combined with an estab-
lished mechanism to provide a type of BDA of IO and psy-
chological operations methods, will allow adjustments as the
campaign progresses and will greatly improve IO effective-
ness. We need to include IO measures of effectiveness (MOE)
and IO BDA requirements during planning at every echelon
and to ensure that IO MOE and BDA requirements are re-
sourced and tasked in intelligence collection plans and
tracked during execution. We should leverage existing tech-
nology and software to create unitary BDA reporting and
tracking that incorporates target data, target folder, recon-
naissance data, mission data and reports, and combat video.
Admiral Ellis noted, One important lesson learned is that
IO should not be confined solely to periods of crisis or con-
flict. Rather, IO activities should be continuous and must be
integrated with campaign plans and targeting activities from
their inception. The cessation of hostilities does not result in
an end to IO planning and execution; rather, it simply signals
the commencement of a new phase. Maintaining a robust IO
during peacetime can potentially avert a crisis and the need
for combat. Maintaining continuous IO ensures the presen-
tation of a consistent message, regardless of the mode, which
is critical to success.23
Thus, we should ensure all operational plans (OPLAN),
concept plans (CONPLAN), and functional plans (FUNCPLAN)
have a complete and integrated IO plan in their annexes. We
should include IO in all exercises under various conditions
that include operations under severe information degrada-
tion. Plans must include defining end-states, especially after
cessation of hostilities, which in IO often will flow from the
post-hostilities phase into the redeployment phase.
4. No matter how wedded to strategic targeting the
combined forces air component commander is, if the
CINC, president, or secretary of defense is not support-
ive, it will not work.
Once the threshold is crossed and you are going to use force,
that force has to be as decisive as possible to attaining your
military objects.
Gen Wesley Clark
SACEUR
 LAMB 13

The combined forces air component commander

(CFACC) during OAF wanted to conduct a hard-hitting
strategic operation right from the start. Facing political ne-
cessity, the CINC and the political leadership constrained
the CFACC. As the operation continued and it became ap-
parent that incrementalism was not the answer, splinter-
ing appeared between the CFACC and the CINC. In the
end, the CFACC, as the subordinate, must know when to
salute smartly and then conduct the operation within the
guidance.
It must be noted that at no time in the OAF target devel-
opment process did targeting personnel shy away from se-
lecting targets because they were considered unlikely to re-
ceive approval due to risk or political sensitivity. Under joint
doctrine the target development process considers all poten-
tial facilities that meet CINC objectives and guidance.24 These
facilities make up what is characterized as a master target
file (MTF). Following MTF development in OAF, a full workup
that contained an assessment of military significance and
collateral damage, including unintended civilian casualty es-
timates (UCCE), was done for each target. At this point, all of
the MTF targets were forwarded to the JFC and ultimately to
the CINC, who passed them to US, NATO, and allied political
leadership for approval.
The United States needs to conduct a complete review of
the benefits of effects-based operations as a method to
more effectively achieve the desired outcome. No matter how
quickly the military decision cycle can be completed (target
approval to strike), it will always be governed by the speed
of the political decision cycle. This is truer for an alliance/
coalition where decisions can be cumbersome. Any future
agile and intelligent enemy will understand this.
The United States must examine the targeting process
and determine areas where the process can be streamlined
and speeded up. This may require improving the system
for target approval at the highest levels as encountered
during OAF. Improvements in this process could be ac-
complished through preapproved target packages, essen-
tially getting all targets identified prior to execution, or
through scheduling high-level target review on a regular
basis, so the operational commander would know in a
matter of hours vice days whether a target was approved.
14 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Another approach to speeding target approval would be to

delegate this authority to the operational commander as
much as possible. Limited target approval authority was
granted to the commander in chief, Europe (CINCEUR),
after two weeks of the OAF campaign. This streamlined the
approval process and allowed the operational commander
more flexibility on the battlefield, but it still complicated
prosecution of targets.
The United States cannot limit itself in future conflicts to
an air-only targeting methodology. True effects-based target-
ing needs to include provisions for target engagement by all
available systems to preclude unnecessary lengthening of the
conflict. Multiple-Launch Rocket System, attack helicopter,
gunship, naval gunfire, and special operations forces all need
to be included in the targeting process when available. Our
goal in any conflict is to end the conflict as quickly as possi-
ble on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Ar-
tificially limiting the resources available to the combatant
commander only lengthens the conflict and makes the
enemys job less complicated.
As a final point, target approval decisions were based on
an unproven method of determining unintended civilian ca-
sualty estimates that continually overestimated the number
of civilians at risk. This potentially discouraged approval of
valid military targets. There is a need for a formalized UCCE
methodology using actual civilian casualties from OAF, along
the lines of the tier analysis used for collateral damage, to
allow decisions to be based on more realistic estimates.
5. Proper preparation of war-fighting commanders is
critical.
Combat is not the first time for one to train in new pro-
cedures. Training should be accomplished before engage-
ment.25 Commanders need to be as well versed in how to
conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) as
they are in conducting unlimited conventional war. The
highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and politically
motivated targeting process implemented during OAF
more closely resembled MOOTW than the level of effort
otherwise indicated by the Air Force. In fact, Air Force
leadership felt that the level of effort was the equivalent of
a major theater war in terms of assets used.
 LAMB 15

Air Force Lt Gen Marvin R. Esmond noted, The sum

total of OAF and ongoing contingency operations equaled a
Major Theater of War (MTW) level of effort for many por-
tions of the Air Force. The combined effects of a smaller
force structure, reduced forward basing, and a high level
of ongoing steady-state contingency operations created se-
vere and lasting impacts on some USAF units and person-
nel.26 The CFACC and the planners in the combined air
operations center (CAOC) had difficulty applying their
training for war, strategic attack, and effects-based opera-
tions to this MOOTW scenario. Operations in the future
are more likely to resemble OAF than Operation Desert
Storm, highlighting the need for more preparation.
Joint Task Force Noble Anvil was not formed around a
predesignated (and trained) theater staff. In fact, our mod-
els have focused on training and planning for three star
joint force air component commanders (JFACC) only, but
major coalition operations of this magnitude require deci-
sive and senior US leadership (four star). Allied Forces
Southern Europe/commander US Naval Forces, Europe
(AFSOUTH/CNE) was uniquely positioned to synchronize
US and alliance operations in this operation, and the com-
mander in chief, US Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUS-
NAVEUR) staff, largely surface-centric, formed the core
cadre. This was an effective measure, even though OAF
was mainly an air-centric operation, but it was not optimal
and shows the need for changes in manning, infrastruc-
ture, and training.
Planning should include fully functional joint task force
(JTF) and component staffs using preidentified facilities
with necessary connectivity and standardized operating
procedures. An augmentee database and training program
should also be developed to more quickly transition into a
task force and facilitate deployment schedules. One crucial
factor is that these JTFs also have a predeveloped and de-
tailed information management plan and a command, con-
trol, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) fa-
cility that includes the staff, components, and alliance
members.
6. Logistics is a key concern for an expeditionary
force.
16 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Conducting military operations in far-away places with tech-

nology and tactics that greatly reduce the potential for loss of
American lives is necessary, but expensive. It consumes sup-
plies, wears out equipment, and tests the ingenuity of even the
best-trained military in the world.
Lt Gen John W. Handy
Deputy Chief of Staff
Installations and Logistics

As OAF grew in intensity and the restrictions on collat-

eral damage became tighter, stocks of precision-guided
munitions (PGM) were quickly depleted, putting a strain on
the supply system. Use of older weapon systems with their
higher maintenance costs also stresses the supply chain,
which can impede effectiveness. An additional burden on
the logistics system occurred because of the long distances
tankers had to fly as well as their reliability. To ensure
strike packages were supported, extra tankers had to be
launched, depleting fuel and tanker parts.
Munitions supply/resupply met the needs of OAF. How-
ever, shortages were developing in precision munitions, es-
pecially with respect to joint direct attack munitions
(JDAM), AGM-130s, and shipboard supplies. If the air
campaign had continued for more than 30 additional days,
the complete depletion of the US inventory of these muni-
tions would have resulted.
When the in-theater requirement is expanded to what a
MTW would require, resupply capability is a major concern.
This issue attracted Joint Staff attention because the re-
quirements during operations diverted PGM stocks from
other CINC regions. It was also raised at the Joint Warfight-
ing Capabilities Assessment and Joint Requirements Coun-
cil reviews.
Finally, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) does not currently provide inherent visi-
bility on what capability has closed from a deploying force.
When a unit line number (ULN) is used to represent a unit,
the ULN does not show closed in JOPES until the entire
ULN is closed. Senior leadership requires a process to rap-
idly determine what specific forces of a unit have closed.
Such a process would allow for an exact determination of
when a unit is combat ready and highlights a need for im-
provements in in-transit visibility (ITV) capabilities. There
 LAMB 17

are currently insufficient doctrine, policy, and plans for in-

tratheater ITV and a lack of theater infrastructure to sup-
port ITV. Inability to capture data accurately and expedi-
tiously at the source is a major impediment to achieving
ITV and asset visibility. The lack of theater ITV doctrine
and supporting policy leads to ad hoc planning that results
in fragmented theater ITV. Lack of adequate feeder sys-
tems and associated communications support preclude
timely capture and transmission of ITV data to the Global
Transportation Network (GTN). Lack of data or delays in
receiving data, in turn, adversely affected airfield and sea-
port planning and management.
7. Basing is a primary concern for expeditionary
forces.
As noted by the National Audit Office, in OAF even a
comparatively small force of strike aircraftthe equivalent
of just two squadronsneeded a surprising number of
bases. Although each basing decision may have made
sense individually, as a whole the result was to complicate
support.27 Global reach can reduce the need for forward
bases but not completely. Gaining access to adequate
bases is a fundamental requirement for success for an ex-
peditionary force. However, with access come potential re-
strictions. Host nations maintain veto power over US air-
craft operating out of bases on their soil. Also, bases that
the United States had access to were often far from the
fight, putting a strain upon aircraft, aircrew, planners, and
the logistics system.
The United States has dramatically decreased its over-
seas basing of military forces since the end of the Cold War.
Consequently, the success of US military operations
around the world often hinges on the combat capability of
the few forces already in theater and on US ability to rap-
idly deploy forces to distant conflicts or hot spots. For very
small operations, a deployment of forces from within the
theater might be adequate. However, such large campaigns
as OAF require deployment of military units from the con-
tinental United States (CONUS) or from other theaters to
augment the forces on hand. In such situations, trans-
portation planners must rapidly develop movement sched-
ules for the deployment of these forces. For OAF, planners
18 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

drew upon forces deployed worldwide, including forces

based in the United States. Even with an extremely com-
pressed planning timeline for the operation and vast dis-
tances to move, the deployment of US forces to OAF was,
from an overall standpoint, successful.
Bedding down and employing such a massive force were
challenging. Despite Partnership for Peace, NATO, and
other organizations, there were issues that, although even-
tually solved, initially delayed or beleaguered operations.
Host-nation support is a complex, diverse, and diplomatic
long term set of negotiations that, in many cases, are often
never satisfactorily finalized. Avoiding these problems in
future conflicts could be possible by developing appropri-
ate checklists to ensure international agreements address
critical host-nation support for military plans and contin-
gencies. Suggestions for the content of such a checklist,
though not exhaustive, include designated points of entry
and departure, customs, overflight authorization, use of
radio frequencies, air traffic control, blanket diplomatic
clearances, basing rights, facility access agreements, coali-
tion contracting procedures, connectivity, force protection,
site surveys and update process, site explosive material
handling plan, and weapon storage. Implementation of
such agreements would facilitate quick access and assist
in rapid deployment, rapid employment, and immediate
sustainment. Each of these areas has unique challenges
and some mutually exclusive areas of concern. Rapid em-
ployment and immediate sustainment necessitate more
extensive efforts with customs and diplomatic clearances
than do rapid deployment concepts. Base infrastructure
support for rapid deployment is not as extensive as sup-
port requirements for rapid employment and immediate
sustainment.
In OAF the austere transportation infrastructureair-
ports, seaports, roads, and railroadsin and around Alba-
nia limited deployment options and increased deployment
timelines. Poor infrastructure conditions, most likely the
norm in future conflicts, slowed aircraft turnaround times,
limited throughput at the ports, and slowed onward move-
ment of forces and humanitarian supplies. Such problems
can be mitigated to some extent by an early assessment of
infrastructure limitations. This enables proper matching of
 LAMB 19

transportation infrastructure capability to operational re-

quirements. As a result, deployment packages can be op-
timized and required transportation support can be more
efficiently allocated. In preparation for deployment, US Air
Forces Europe (USAFE) conducted extensive beddown
planning by surveying, preparing, and publishing new
beddown assessments for 27 sites in 11 NATO and East-
ern European countries.28 These assessments were critical
and allowed logistics planners from deploying units to re-
duce the equipment necessary for deployed operations.
This, in turn, decreased the requirements for both in-
tratheater and intertheater airlift. However, there were still
instances where deploying units brought more capability
than required, which needlessly increased airlift sorties. It
is critical that deployment planners obtain all necessary
information on potential beddown locations as soon as
possible. In addition, assessment teams should be given
better training and more useful tools to gather and dis-
tribute information to effected units.
In contrast, ground and sea infrastructure capabilities
were not assessed until later in the operation. As a result,
planners lacked sufficient information to make informed
decisions about the desirability of employing additional ca-
pabilities such as Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore or strate-
gic sea lift. Similarly, the CINC or JFC could have deployed
engineers or planners to deploy things they plan and mo-
bilized contractors to enhance the transportation infra-
structure as necessary. Decisions to deploy these forces
need to be made early in the operation to increase trans-
portation throughput capacity.
8. As technology improves, the effects of collateral
damage and losses of friendly forces increase, impacting
friendly centers of gravity.
As a cautionary note, given the severe restriction on collateral
damage, it was noted that precision guided is no longer good
enough.
Adm James Ellis Jr.
Commander
Joint Task Force Noble Anvil

As the public becomes more accustomed to bloodless

conflicts where no (or few) friendly personnel are lost and
20 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

the loss of lives on the enemy side, especially for civilians,

is extremely low, any loss of friendly forces or collateral
damage takes on greater importance. The inadvertent
damage to a hospital in downtown Belgrade had the effect
of stopping all bombing within the city. These restrictions
make it harder for commanders to conduct reasoned cam-
paigns to achieve desired results.
It is a major tribute to US and NATO air forces in Kosovo
that there were no aircrew combat losses in 38,004 sorties,
minimal casualties due to accidents, and no cases of frat-
ricide or friendly fire. NATO lost only two men in a train-
ing accident during an intensive 11-week campaign, much
of it flown out of austere bases, in poor weather, and in
mountainous terrain.
The problem with such success is that it may help cre-
ate unrealistic expectations and demands for perfect or
bloodless war. It is far from clear that the US public re-
ally does demand few or no casualties: public opinion polls
strongly suggest that Americans will accept casualties if
they believe in the war or peacekeeping mission and the
quality of its leadership, and if they believe American men
and women are properly equipped and supplied. Some-
what ironically, American politicians and the media seem
to be more sensitive to casualties per se than the public.29
Nevertheless, there is no casual tolerance of casualties by
either the American public or that of any other member of
NATO.
This is not to make an argument for more casualties,
but it is a strong argument for the DOD to better educate
the public in the true risks of war through the use of pub-
lic information campaigns that stress the real-world risk of
casualties throughout any conflict. Wars like Kosovo may
be training political leaders, military planners, the media,
and the public to treat every casualty as a mistake and any
significant number of casualties as failure. Such thinking
can ultimately become a critical political and operational
constraint on effective action, as well as leading policy
makers to underestimate the risk of using force. The risks
are obvious:
Over commitment because risks are minimized.
 LAMB 21

Rules of engagement that reduce losses but reduce

military effectiveness even more.
Political and strategic vulnerability to even minimal
losses.
Exploitation of the above by US adversaries.
In the specific case of Kosovo, there is also a good argu-
ment for reviewing such operational constraints as the al-
titude ceilings imposed during the war. Effective military
planning and operations cannot simply accept some set of
rules because the issue is controversial and the trade-offs
are difficult to analyze. If minimal casualties is becoming
a rule of Western-conducted warfare, planning and opera-
tions must treat the issue honestly and explicitly. These
points are reinforced by the political and strategic impact
of collateral damage on OAF. NATO made a detailed effort
to review the range of possible collateral damage for each
target and to plan its strikes so that the weapon used, the
angle of approach, and the aim point would minimize col-
lateral damage. This process was so exhaustive that NATO
often had more strike aircraft available than cleared tar-
gets, and many important targets were avoided or repeat-
edly sent back for review.
Collateral damage presents other problems, including
the issue of how to count and assess collateral damage and
how to treat the issue during and after a conflict. There is
no way to know how many cases occurred in which collat-
eral damage of some kind took place by the time the war
ended. Nevertheless, one lesson is that exaggerated or false
claims regarding collateral damage may well come back to
haunt the United States and its allies. There have already
been many critical assessments of the impact of the bomb-
ing and missile strikes by those on the ground.30 For ex-
ample, peacekeeping forces have found numerous unex-
ploded bomblets from US cluster munitions scattered over
the areas that NATO attacked. US cluster munitions have
presented this problem since Vietnam, and anyone who
visited the sites of air attacks during the Gulf War saw
large numbers of cluster munitions scattered about. Sub-
sequently, the use of cluster munitions was halted during
the campaign due to political pressure.
22 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

The United States and its allies will also face a climate
in which wartime reporting on collateral damage can be ex-
pected to steadily improve, and in which any hostile power
or movement will use collateral damage and targeting er-
rors as a political weaponoften creating its own myths
and false images of such damage when these are politically
desirable. Like it or not, collateral damage has become a
weapon of war.
9. Commanders need to keep all options open when
conducting an operation.
Kosovo . . . illuminates in many ways how America and our al-
lies and adversaries are going to approach the art of war well
into the next century.
William S. Cohen

Because the United States announced ground forces

would not be used, the Serbs gained some freedom of
movement they would not have otherwise had. The lack of
a land component also restricted NATOs ability to operate.
Without a land component, the JFC and the CFACC did
not have a viable intelligence preparation of the battle-
space (IPB) capability with respect to fielded enemy forces.
The Air Force provides great IPB for operational and strate-
gic targeting but relies upon the Army to provide the tacti-
cal-level IPB. The lack of tactical-level IPB hampered the
JFCs ability to carry out the CINCs guidance to strike
fielded forces.
Regardless of conflicting interests among alliance mem-
bers, another key to success is to preserve uncertainty in
a potential opponents mind. One way to accomplish this is
to keep all options open. As noted by General Naumann,
NATO did not do this. Rather, when NATO began to pre-
pare for military options, some alliance members ruled out
the use of ground forces and did so publicly. According to
General Naumann, This allowed Milosevic to calculate his
risk and to speculate that there might be a chance for him
to ride the threat out and to hope that NATO would either
be unable to act at all or that the cohesion of the alliance
would melt away under the public impression of punishing
air strikes.31
 LAMB 23

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Admiral Ellis, commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil,
stated that ruling out the use of ground forces probably pro-
longed the air campaign. He also noted that Task Force
Hawk represented Milosevics worst nightmare.32 Gen
Montgomery Meigs, commanding general, US Army Europe,
stressed much the same thought during his 30 June 1999
appearance on ABCs Nightline when he indicated that the
presence of Task Force Hawk no doubt made Milosevic repo-
sition his forces along the KosovoAlbanian border and re-
think NATOs intent.33
In conjunction with preserving uncertainty, another les-
son learned concerning military power is that an alliance
should never threaten the use of force unless fully pre-
pared to immediately use it. In the spring of 1998, long be-
fore any consensus existed among the NATO members,
NATO ministers began threatening the use of force to end
the fighting in Kosovo. Unfortunately, according to General
Naumann, NATO was not prepared to intervene militarily
at that time, a fact of which Milosevic was well aware. Ac-
cordingly, he continued his offensive against the Kosovo
Liberation Army.
10. Expeditionary capability, power projection, lift,
and sustainability are crucial to rapid response con-
tingencies.
OAF demonstrated that the United States and its allies
have very different levels of expeditionary capability and
strategic lift. The United States provided almost all of the
dedicated military air and sea lift used during the campaign.
It was clear that the United States had a distinct advantage
in many areas of expeditionary capability, although some of
its services proved more capable than others.
Further, OAF demonstrated the value of Air Force plan-
ning for rapid deployment of expeditionary packages. How-
ever, the Air Force was forced to use over 90 percent of its
total expeditionary assets in a war in which it could oper-
ate securely from highly advanced friendly air bases. Seri-
ous questions exist about the size of the planned inventory
of expeditionary assets. Current plans need to be reviewed
to determine whether they provide enough forces and
equipment. The United States needs to make a compre-
24 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

hensive review of its rapid deployment and expeditionary

capabilities, and create the capabilities it needs.
There was a tendency outside the US European Com-
mand (USEUCOM) theater to view OAF as a short-duration
operation rather than a full-fledged campaign. This view
often caused frustration and hindered efforts to acquire
the necessary assets for the theater of operations. It was
noted that the requirement to adhere to the Roberts
Amendment imposed significant limitations at the begin-
ning of the campaign that hindered our ability to deploy
and prepare properly.34
US ground troops were not allowed into the Former Yu-
goslavian Republic of Macedonia to integrate and prepare
with other NATO forces. Site surveys of Albania and other
countries were delayed, preventing proper transportation re-
quirement and capability analysis. The application of peace-
time global military force policy and global naval force pres-
ence levels delayed the deployment of critical EA-6Bs, joint
surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS), and other
assets. Not having a carrier battle group in the area of re-
sponsibility at the start of the campaign was particularly dif-
ficult. Given the level of effort required to successfully exe-
cute such a campaign, all wartime allocations need to be
reviewed in relation to a major theater war. This is especially
true of such high-demand/low-density assets as the EA-6B
and carrier battle groups.
Although the Roberts Amendment was not renewed by
Congress and is no longer applicable, demands placed
upon the military by congressional legislation often have
significant impact on our capabilities and options. It is im-
portant that the military effect of such limitations be
clearly understood and articulated to national decision
makers. We need to identify better triggers to allow a
quicker transition to wartime levels. Wartime levels must
be reanalyzed for adequacy, and assets must surge faster
to meet theater requirements.
11. Video teleconferencing was indispensable as a bat-
tlefield synchronization tool and greatly improved com-
munication at the highest levels, but there are dangers
in its use.
 LAMB 25

As General Clark stated, Used properly, video teleconfer-

encing (VTC) is a powerful tool, one that can shorten decision
cycles dramatically. During OAF video teleconferencing was
indispensable as a battlefield synchronization tool and
greatly improved communication at the highest levels.35
However, unwritten VTC guidance is subject to misinterpre-
tation as information and guidance filters down to lower staff
levels, and VTCs, unfortunately, draw senior leaders into
lower-level decision processes. In the case of OAF, senior de-
cision makers were involved at a level of detail normally re-
served for the operators. This occurred for three reasons: the
risks were high, the payoffs tenuous, and simply because
they could. Discipline is required by senior leaders to ensure
that they function at the appropriate level of engagement and
command and control.
The management of information and the ability to rap-
idly exchange key information between all forces played a
vital role in the execution of OAF. Connectivity within the
theater was adequate to support the effort. However, the
demand on the system rose as various sites occasionally
overloaded, and it caused system failures. The use of web
technology helped the sharing of information throughout
the campaign.
NATO commanders used VTC for the first time as a major
instrument for exercising command and control. Daily com-
manders video teleconferences were held to review progress
of operations, coordinate future operations, and promulgate
intentions. These conferences spanned the chain of com-
mand from the SACEUR to the JFC and onward to compo-
nent commanders. In other words, the conferences spanned
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command,
thus greatly compressing normal command and control
processes. As a result, strategic and operational command-
ers were able to directly influence tactical operations. Joint
Vision 2020 anticipated these phenomenafrom use of tech-
nologies such as video teleconferencingby observing:
Higher echelons will use these technologies to reduce the
friction of war and to apply precise centralized control when
and where appropriate. Real time information will likely drive
parallel, not sequential planning and real time, not pre-
arranged, decision making. The optimal balance between
centralized and decentralized command and control will have
26 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

to be carefully developed as systems are brought into the in-

ventories.36
The ability of high-level commanders to influence tactical
operations directly had positive as well as negative aspects.
Among the positive developments was the speed with which
commanders and key staff officers could perform essential
coordination. One critical challenge is the timely documenta-
tion and dissemination of the most essential items of the
VTC, such as the commanders intentions, to those key per-
sonnel who did not attend. A thorough review should identify
improvements that can be made in the use of VTCs as a
major tool for exercising command and control. Where ap-
propriate, revisions to doctrine should be incorporated. The
compression of time in exercising command and control
made possible by VTC and other technologies is already a
topic for joint experimentation.
12. Coalition operations present significant interop-
erability problems when alliance members have dis-
parate technological capabilities.
Because of the growing need to disseminate large vol-
umes of information and data quickly, especially with re-
gard to transmitting high-priority imagery of emerging tar-
gets, ground-based communication capabilities must be
improved.37 Problems with connectivity between NATO
and US systems often plagued rapid effective information
sharing. Improvement in sharing information requires de-
velopment of a multi-level security (MLS) system that will
also resolve connectivity problems and establish clear pol-
icy guidance to facilitate information sharing within the
NATO alliance. At the start of the campaign there were only
two fully operational Standardized Tactical Entry Point
(STEP) sites within the theater that provided critical access
to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET),
the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network
(NIPRNET), the Defense Switched Network (DSN), and
other essential communications. The STEP sites would
have been overwhelmed if they had not been supplemented
by the rapid installation of two more sites by accelerating
the contracted schedule.
Expanded air operations could not have been supported
without commercialization of forward bases. Commercial-
 LAMB 27

ization of communications at forward operating locations

was the single biggest factor that ensured the war fighter
had communications throughout the conflict. The lack of
joint, secure digital communications capability was a key
shortfall, which prevented sensor to shooter transmis-
sion of targeting data and impeded targeting of emerging,
relocatable, and time sensitive targets (TST).38 Surface, air,
and space sensors need a capability to transmit target data
in real time to platforms or PGMs poised to rapidly engage
emerging targets. An example would be allied artillery
radar locating enemy artillery then being able to send tar-
get coordinates directly to strike aircraft overhead.
Maintaining operational security is more challenging
and complex than ever given the speed of information
transfer enabled by the World Wide Web and the myriad of
such 24-hour news agencies as Cable News Network
(CNN), Fox News, and Microsoft National Broadcasting
Company (MSNBC). Inadvertent or deliberate exposure of
information in CONUS can have immediate impact on the
modern battlefield.
Federated architecture and collaboration greatly con-
tributed to the overall targeting success in OAF. Web-
based technology facilitated the movement and sharing of
TST data among all key nodes in the target development
and exploitation federation. SIPRNET and Linked Opera-
tional-Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) infrastructure
were the primary information systems used by the US and
NATO operations planning community. Many of the col-
laborating organizations participating in the targeting
process lacked sufficient SIPRNET or LOCE terminals to
engage fully in the process. Federation and collaboration
could be greatly enhanced, and response time on mission
essential targeting reduced, if SIPRNET and LOCE infra-
structure were more robust and more terminals made
available at CONUS locations participating in the federa-
tion process. An alternative is to tie SIPRNET and LOCE
into other systems used for collaborative targeting.
CONUS-based federated partners must ensure their loca-
tions have sufficient connectivity to support a theaters
combat operations.
28 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

13. Shortages of preferred precision-guided muni-

tions posed a significant threat to overall success of
the operation.
PGMs were employed in OAF at a much higher rate and
in much higher proportions than previously anticipated for
small-scale contingencies. Allied forces were neither as
well equipped with PGMs nor as well trained to use them
as were US forces. The Air Force expended more than
25,000 bombs and missiles during OAF of which nearly
8,500 were PGMs, and these became a contentious com-
modity.39 In the end, low theater inventories threatened
the OAF mission, and this in turn required resupply from
other theaters, which put those theaters at risk.
Technology allowed the United States to own the night,
but poor weather created sanctuaries and operational lulls.
During OAF there was greater than 50 percent cloud cover
more than 70 percent of the time (and it was not the worst
season of the year). As General Clark noted, Precision
Guided Munitions (PGM) proved very effective and demon-
strated immense potential by allowing highly accurate
strikes while minimizing collateral damage and civilian casu-
alties.40 He also commented that of particular note was the
success of the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). This
low cost, highly accurate weapon provided the capability to
strike during adverse weather conditions.41 It should be
noted, however, that the expenditure of JDAMs equaled the
production rate. PGMs were indispensable in their ability to
hit high-value targets in urban areas while minimizing col-
lateral damage. Future operations will rely more heavily on
PGMs. PGM stocks and funding must be increased to a level
required to realistically support combatant commander re-
quirements for contingencies, training, and MTW readiness.
OAF corroborated the requirement to maintain and fund
nonprecision weapons and platforms. The accuracy of non-
precision platforms using Global Positioning System (GPS)
satellites and other means has reached the point where
nonprecision is almost a misnomer. These munitions were
highly successful in attacking many high-priority targets not
suitable for PGMs, such as fielded force staging areas, large
military storage complexes, and airfields. This nonprecision
capability was also critical during the final days around
 LAMB 29

Mount Pastrik when Serb forces massed to engage the

Kosovo Liberation Army.
Deep underground targets posed a great challenge during
the campaign. There were leadership bunkers that could not
be taken out due to their depth, reinforcement, or location in
highly populated areas. Development of better penetrators
remains a priority. The success of all-weather PGMs in this
campaign is well known and documented; however, a more
robust all-weather PGM capability is still required to prevent
weather from providing an enemy sanctuary. There is a need
to continue improvement in ability to strike through bad
weather.

Conclusion
After full consideration at the highest levels, strikes on
the enemy homeland may be inevitable and mandatory in
future wars. An enemy will possess key facilities within its
territory that are integral to its war effort. These targets
could include political and military leadership, weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), command and control nodes for
operational forces, sources of national wealth, military
sustainment depots, satellite ground stations, satellite
tracking facilities, power projection forces (missile launch
sites, bomber bases), and national information networks.
Successful strikes against these targets will have a critical
effect at the strategic and operational levels.
Planners should expect significant political restrictions on
attacks in future conflicts. These limiting factors will derive
from a myriad of world and national political concerns as well
as proliferation concerns (WMD use). Planners will need to
reconcile the requirement to disable strategic targets within
an enemys homeland with such restrictions; indeed, all
campaign planning should anticipate such restrictions. Ex-
isting plans should be carefully reviewed in light of such re-
strictions and be adjusted to meet the desired strategic ef-
fects. Operation Allied Force can serve as the model for such
planning given the many operational constraints placed on
war fighters during the conflict.
At the same time, policy makers should not learn the
wrong lessons from OAF. Although OAF was considered a
successful campaign, the policy constraints placed on the
30 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

combatant commander unnecessarily lengthened the con-

flict. Longer conflicts mean greater risks assumed by US
military personnel. Policy makers must understand that
acceptance of some risk in the near term is essential to
long-term success. OAF established an unrealistic stan-
dard against which to measure future conflicts: campaign,
allied, and national military objectives must be defined
and obtained before a policy of zero risk acceptance is
adopted. To do otherwise jeopardizes the accomplishment
of those objectives. The commanders intent must be up
front, early, and clearly defined so as to allow for proper
planning and execution to meet objectives.
There still remains the problem associated with holding
TSTs or dispersed ground forces at risk. In OAF the limited
effects on FRY integrated air defenses, particularly antiair-
craft artillery and man-portable air defenses, resulted in alti-
tude restrictions throughout that hampered weapons effec-
tiveness. Beyond analyzing tactical methods, we may find
that using other weapons may prove far more effective. Non-
lethal weapons should prove especially effective against
massed ground mobile forces. Such weapons as high-power
acoustic generators, high-power microwaves, electromag-
netic pulse, anti-POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) agents,
and antirubber chemicals applied against units in road
march should cause bottlenecks and disorganized advances.
Conventional attack could then inflict more permanent and
serious damage. As satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles
identify large logistics bases, the JFACC can task appropri-
ate munitions and delivery platforms to strike them. Logis-
tics may well prove to be an aggressors greatest vulnerabil-
ity. In the face of informed and precision attack, an enemy
will be unable to develop sufficient logistics infrastructure for
multidivisional invasion or occupation.
While many firsts occurred in information operations dur-
ing OAF, there were also some areas where the United States
was less successful. There were problems associated with the
fusion of the data collected from all sources and subsequent
distribution in a timely and filtered method to users. The
United States was not successful in degrading information
networks as the enemy continued to control all media inter-
nal to its populace. The United States did detect enemy in-
trusions in friendly information networks, but should expect
 LAMB 31

and be prepared for far worse. Indeed, the United States

should expect an enemy to focus more on US deployment ef-
forts through attacks on such information systems as the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) network. Given the de-
pendence on the ATO, the United States should also expect
possible attacks that delay, alter, or destroy ATO data trans-
missions. It should also not be unexpected that an enemy
would attack US logistics through the supply or JOPES net-
works. Information management and IO will be crucial to fu-
ture successes in any conflict.
Information management and IO also include hardware
and systems. OAF points to the need for more bandwidth
and faster transmission paths. Such could be said for al-
most any operation, present or future. Platforms must
have the ability to incorporate the latest information hard-
ware and software, employ information obtained by off-
board sensors, and transmit information garnered by on-
board sensors to other weapon systems. Systems must
also be capable of operating in a corrupted information en-
vironment. Lastly, as Admiral Ellis cautioned, Regardless
of the acknowledged benefits associated with the use of
state-of-the-art technology, commanders and planners
must never lose sight of the fact that technology is only one
aspect of waging a successful campaign.42
OAF did demonstrate new technologies, greater levels of
joint and combined interoperability, and many improve-
ments. They included
general execution interoperability;
precision targeting, stand-off weaponry, and massed
effects;
selective application of violence, kinetic destruction,
and nonkinetic weapons effects;
limitation of collateral damage;
coordination and focus of joint and coalition air and
sea forces;
information processing and sharing;
limited NATO combined force projection out of area
operations;
massing of weapons effects and not maneuver ele-
ments by land and sea-based aviation maneuver ele-
ments;
32 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

increased exploitation of spaced-based information,

guidance, and intelligence systems;
integration, coordination, and focus of joint and com-
bined tactical air and missile striking power; and
efficient and effective use of limited aviation resources,
precision weaponry, and aircraft in an iterative combat
cycle.
The bottom line is that OAF clearly was an operational
success, and this success should not be understated. It
was an inherently complicated undertaking, beset with
complexities brought about by the myriad of military and
political constraints. Yet, more than 38,004 sorties were
flown with all but two planes returning safely, and no ca-
sualties were sufferedan incredible achievement! Dr. Ben
Lambeth summarized OAF as:
The most intense and sustained military operation to have been
conducted in Europe since the end of World War II. It represented
the first extended use of military force by NATO, as well as the first
major combat operation conducted for humanitarian objectives
against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. It was
the longest US combat operation to have taken place since the war
in Vietnam, which ended in 1975. At a price tag of more than $3
billion all told, it was also a notably expensive one. Yet in part pre-
cisely because of that investment, it turned out to have been an un-
precedented exercise in the discriminate use of force on a large
scale. Although there were some unfortunate and highly publicized
cases in which innocent civilians were tragically killed, Secretary of
Defense William Cohen was on point when he characterized Allied
Force afterward as the most precise application of airpower in his-
tory.43

In Operation Allied Force there were many individual

areas of success, ranging from the outstanding accom-
plishments of our men and women in the field and at sea
to the unequalled performance of their equipment, mate-
rial, and technology, to name just a few. These successes
do not detract from the need to critically examine the op-
eration and glean some golden nuggets from which we
must learn.

Notes

1. Senate, Joint Statement on the Kosovo After-Action Review pre-

sented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and General Henry H.
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed
 LAMB 33

Services Committee, 14 October 1999. Hereafter cited as Cohen and Shel-

ton.
2. Report to Congress: Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, De-
partment of Defense, 31 January 2000, xvii.
3. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATOs Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and
Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Project Air Force,
2001), 220.
4. Ibid., 78.
5. Ibid., 7.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 89.
8. Clara Anne Robbins, Thomas E. Ricks, and Neil King Jr., Milose-
vics Resolve Spawned Unity, Wider Bombing List in NATO Alliance, Wall
Street Journal, 27 April 1999.
9. Cohen and Shelton.
10. Public Law 106-31, the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropria-
tions Act.
11. Brad Sherman, U.S. Must Have Realistic Objectives, Thousand
Oaks Star, 15 April 1999.
12. Lambeth, 207.
13. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 78.
14. Ibid., vii.
15. Ibid., 5.
16. Ibid., 3.
17. Ibid., 1. See also Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, Public Af-
fairs (New York: Perseus Books), 16189.
18. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 1. See also Clark, 422.
19. Clark, 456.
20. Ibid., 45758.
21. Klaus Naumann, Statement of General (Ret) Klaus Naumann, Ger-
man Army, Former Chairman NATO MC Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearing on Kosovo After-Action Review, 2 November 1999.
22. Cohen and Shelton.
23. Senate, Combined Prepared Statement of General Wesley Clark,
USA; Admiral James Ellis, Jr., USN; and Lieutenant General Michael Short,
USAF; of the United States European Command to the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee, 21 October 1999. Hereafter cited as Clark, Ellis, and
Short.
24. Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 Janu-
ary 2002, chap. 2.
25. USEUCOM briefing with slides, Kosovo After-Action Conference,
16 September 1999.
26. Lt Gen Marvin R. Esmond, deputy chief of staff, Air and Space Op-
erations, Department of the Air Force, in minutes of H.A.S.C. No. 10629,
Lessons Learned from The Kosovo ConflictThe Effect of the Operation on
Both Deployed/Non-Deployed Forces and on Future Modernization Plans,
Hearing before the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services House of Representatives, 19 October 1999.
27. Ministry of Defence, Kosovo: The Financial Management of Military
Operations, House of Commons, 5 June 2000.
34 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

28. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 37.

29. John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy
1999 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
30. Rebecca Grant, True Blue: Behind the Kosovo Numbers Game,
Air Force Magazine 83, no.8 (August 2000).
31. Ibid., 9.
32. Clark, Ellis, and Short.
33. Apaches in Kosovo: Lessons Learned (transcript), Nightline, ABC
NEWS broadcast, n.d., n.p., Internet, 30 June 1999, available from http://
abcnews.go.com/onair/nightline/transcripts/nl990630_trans.html.
34. Congress adopted an important amendment to the Defense ap-
propriations bill, referred to as the Roberts Amendment. It required the
president to certify to Congress by 15 May 1998 that the continued pres-
ence of US forces in Bosnia was in the national interest and why. The
president had to state the reasons for deployment and the expected du-
ration of deployment; had to provide numbers of troops deployed, esti-
mate the dollar cost involved, and give the effect of such deployment on
overall effectiveness of US forces; most importantly, had to provide a clear
statement of the mission and objectives; and had to provide an exit strat-
egy for bringing the troops home. If the president did not meet these con-
ditions, funding for military deployment would end in May 1999. Public
Law 105262, Sec. 8115, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999,
105th Cong., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1999.
35. Clark, Ellis, and Short.
36. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 28.
37. Cohen and Shelton.
38. JP 3-60 defines TSTs as those targets of such high priority to
friendly forces that the JFC designates them as requiring immediate re-
sponse because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces
or they are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.
39. Lambeth, 87.
40. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 12.
41. Ibid., 15. See also Lambeth, 8994.
42. Clark, Ellis, and Short.
43. Lambeth, 219.
 APPENDIX

OAF GOLDEN NUGGETS

1. Alliances and coalition forces are only as strong as

their weakest elements. Having to get approval for targets
from 19 different nations with varying levels of commit-
ment to the operation made targeting difficult. The varying
levels of commitment also led to security concerns that
drove the implementation of parallel NATO and US-only
planning and ATO processes.
2. Timely tactical and operational intelligence is a con-
stant requirement. For coercive operations to be successful,
relevant, timely, and predictive, intelligence is required.
Knowing what would cause Milosevic to back down was a
problem right from the start of OAF. Most planners antici-
pated that three days of punitive strikes would be enough
to force Milosevic to concede; they were wrong.
3. Gaining and maintaining the initiative in the informa-
tion operations arena, especially public affairs, are critical.
Despite OAF being one of the most accurate air operations
ever (with one of the lowest collateral damage to bombs
dropped ratios in history), Milosevic took the initiative in
the IO arena by exploiting the few events of collateral dam-
age by flooding the media with pictures and information
portraying the effects on the civilian populace. PA needs to
be part of the planning from the beginning. Commanders
need to get PA going early, even before the start of the op-
eration, and they must stay ahead of the crisis event curve
by dealing with bad news openly, quickly, and accurately.
4. No matter how wedded to strategic targeting the
CFACC is, if the CINC or NCA is not supportive, it will not
work. The CFACC during OAF wanted to conduct a hard-
hitting strategic operation right from the start but was
constrained by the CINC and the political leadership. As
the operation continued, and it became apparent that in-
crementalism was not solving the problem quickly, frac-
tures appeared between the CFACC and the CINC. In the
end the CFACC, as the subordinate, must know when to
salute smartly and then conduct the operation within the
guidance given.

35
 5. Proper preparation of war-fighting commanders is crit-
ical. Commanders need to be as well versed in how to con-
duct MOOTW as they are in conducting unlimited war. The
highly restrictive ROEs and politically motivated targeting
process implemented during OAF more closely resembled
MOOTW than the level of effort otherwise indicated. The
planners in the CAOC and the CFACC had difficulty ap-
plying their training for war, strategic attack, and effects-
based operations to this MOOTW scenario. Operations in
the future are more likely to resemble OAF than Operation
Desert Storm.
6. Logistics is a key concern for an expeditionary force.
As the operation grew in intensity and the restrictions on
collateral damage became tighter, stocks of PGMs were de-
pleted, putting a strain on the supply system. Use of older
weapon systems with their higher maintenance costs can
hamper effectiveness. Additional tankers needed to be
launched to ensure enough tankers were airborne to sup-
port the strike packages, adding to the burdens on the lo-
gistics system.
7. Basing is a primary concern for expeditionary forces.
The reciprocal of this rule is that global reach can lessen
the need for forward bases. Gaining access to adequate
bases is a fundamental requirement for success for an ex-
peditionary force. With access though come potential re-
strictions. The British maintained veto power over US
bombers operating out of bases in the United Kingdom.
Also, bases that we had access to were often far from the
fight, putting a strain on aircraft, aircrew, planners, and
the logistics system.
8. As technology improves, the effect upon friendly cen-
ters of gravity caused by collateral damage and losses of
friendly forces increases. As the public becomes accus-
tomed to bloodless conflicts where no (or few) friendly per-
sonnel are lost and the loss of lives on the enemy side (es-
pecially civilians) is extremely low, any loss of friendly
forces or collateral damage has greater impact. The inad-
vertent damage to a hospital in downtown Belgrade had
the effect of stopping all bombing within the city. Such re-
strictions make it harder for commanders to conduct co-
herent campaigns to achieve results.

36
 9. Commanders need to keep all options open when con-
ducting an operation. Because there was an announcement
that land forces would not be used, the Serbs gained free-
dom of movement they would not have otherwise had. The
lack of a land component also restricted NATOs ability to
operate. Without a land component, the JFC and the
CFACC did not have a viable intelligence preparation of the
battle-space capability with respect to fielded enemy
forces. The Air Force provides excellent IPB for operational
and strategic targeting, but relies upon the Army to pro-
vide the tactical level IPB. The lack of tactical level IPB
hampered the JFCs ability to carry out the CINCs guid-
ance to strike fielded forces.
10. Expeditionary capability, power projection, lift, and
sustainability are crucial to rapid response contingencies.
Operation Allied Force demonstrated that the United
States and its allies have very different levels of expedi-
tionary capability and strategic lift. The United States pro-
vided almost all of the dedicated military air and sea lift
used during the air and missile campaign. It was clear that
the United States had a distinct advantage in many areas
of expeditionary capability, although some of its services
proved more capable than others.
Further, Allied Force demonstrated the value of USAF
planning of expeditionary packages for rapid deployment.
However, the Air Force often was forced to use over 90 per-
cent of its total expeditionary assets in a war in which it
could operate under sanctuary conditions from friendly
and highly advanced air bases. Serious questions seem to
exist about the size of the planned inventory of expedi-
tionary assets. Current plans need review to examine
whether they provide enough forces and equipment. The
United States needs to make a comprehensive review of its
rapid deployment and expeditionary capabilities, and cre-
ate the capabilities it needs.
11. Video teleconferencing was indispensable as a bat-
tlefield synchronization tool and greatly improved communi-
cation at the highest levels, but there are dangers to using
VTC. Unwritten VTC guidance is subject to misinterpreta-
tion as information and guidance filter down to lower staff
levels, and VTCs, unfortunately, draw senior leaders into
lower-level decision processes. In the case of OAF, senior

37
decision makers were involved at a level of detail normally
reserved for the operators. This occurred for three reasons:
the risks were high, the payoffs tenuous, and, simply, be-
cause senior leaders could. Discipline is required by sen-
ior leaders to ensure that they remain at the appropriate
level of engagement and of command and control.
12. Coalition operations present significant interoperabil-
ity problems when alliance members have disparate tech-
nological capabilities. Problems with connectivity between
NATO and US systems often plagued rapid, effective infor-
mation sharing. To correct this problem requires develop-
ment of a MLS system that will also resolve connectivity
problems and establish clear policy guidance that facili-
tates information sharing within the NATO alliance.
13. Shortages of preferred precision-guided munitions
posed a significant threat to overall success of the operation.
Preferred munitions were employed in OAF at a much
higher rate and in much higher proportions than previ-
ously anticipated for small-scale contingencies. Allied
forces were neither as well equipped with PGMs nor as well
trained to use them as were US forces.

38