Phil 120 Essay 1

Nathaniel Kan
Philosophy 120
First Paper
It is quite commonly accepted by both utilitarians and deontologists that desert is
at least instrumentally good; that is, that giving people what they deserve generally leads
to higher welfare. For example, one might say that in general, punishment for a crime is a
deterrent to future crimes, and therefore by giving a criminal what he deserves
(punishment), we are increasing the future good (reducing future crime). Or by rewarding
individuals for good acts (saving lives, recycling, and so on) we are promoting the
propagation of similar good acts. But does desert have any intrinsic value beyond what it
can add towards increasing total well-being? I claim the answer is yes, and why and to
what degree I will attempt to demonstrate through thought experiment in this paper.
Imagine a dictator whose brutal regime is responsible for the deaths of thousands
of innocents. When his regime is overthrown, he flees to a small uninhabited island, on
which there are sufficient resources for him to live alone and peacefully, separate from
society without means to return, with net positive utility. Thus he lives out the rest of his
life, affecting no one, and dies. Let us call this scenario A.
Now instead of living out his life, imagine that shortly after his arrival to the
island, a covert CIA assassin tracks him to the island and kills him, to make extra sure
that he will never come to power anywhere again. No knowledge of his death is ever
revealed to society; in both scenarios everyone believes he died with the fall of his
regime. Call this scenario B.

Which is the morally superior scenario? A utilitarian would say A would have
greater total utility, as we count the dictator's well-being from living out his life in the
total sum, and therefore A would be morally preferable. However it seems a repugnant
idea for the dictator to go unpunished for his actions, and not get "what he deserves," and
for that reason we might say that B is preferable.
A utilitarian might refute this argument by saying that normally having a strict
moral code of punishing bad acts and rewarding good acts serves society well because
otherwise extensive calculation would be necessary for every decision. Moral code is a
chart we have calculated beforehand to make real world decisions easier; for example, we
say in general, murder is wrong and there are repercussions for it. Desert matters insofar
as it makes things run smoothly when we follow general rules about giving people what
they deserve.
But in response to that argument, I offer the following modification of the
example. Suppose that the dictator is again stranded on the deserted island, but there is
another man stranded on another very close by island. This man has done good acts
throughout his life, and is now stuck on his island due to an ill fortuned shipwreck. Both
men are capable of living out their lives with the same net positive utility, never able to
return to society, and neither capable of interacting with the other. But suppose there is a
carnivorous monkey on a tree in the water between the two islands, who will jump to one
island and eat the man on it, and then stay there. Who should die, and who should live? I,
and I think almost everyone would agree, believe that it is apparent that the dictator
should die, and the good man should live. If one has to die, why shouldn't it be the man
who has done evil his whole life?1
Opponents of this argument could make two strong arguments against it: first, that
our moral intuitions are not useful in determining superior moral situations, at least, they
are not objective, and second, that the thought experiment is not actually a closed
environment, that is, we need to take into account our utility.
The first argument claims that because our moral intuitions are based on a long
and arbitrary history they are not valid as evidence of whether or not a moral system is
superior. Because our moral intuitions are generally developed from our moral codes,
they do not tell us anything new, or anything towards an underlying truth; it is circular to
define a system of comparing situations on a moral scale based on moral intuitions based
on a moral code which comes from that system.
To this I would maintain that completely discarding our moral intuitions is not
practical, as it is the only measurement for any moral system we devise. Even
utilitarianism does not discard all moral intuitions; the idea that well-being is an intrinsic
good comes from our most basic moral intuition. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
there is some underlying moral equivalent to natural law that justifies certain moral codes
and contradicts our intuitions; without any evidence to point to laws about the structure of
morality, we have to believe that moral codes are developed for the smooth operation of
society. We can imagine some alien race who have an entirely different view of morality,
and who would be to say that our system would be better than theirs?
Without our moral intuitions, it is impossible to understand any moral theory,
including utilitarianism. A utilitarian can look at utilitarianism and ask herself, "Why is
1
Note at this point that there is no mention of the degree to which desert matters intrinsically, or how much
desert equals how much total well-being. It might very well be the case that desert matters very little, and
then in the first situation A might be morally preferable, because desert matters so much less than total
well-being.
well-being intrinsically good?" The only answer to that question is because our moral
intuitions tell us so.
The second argument is much stronger. The utilitarian can assert that the reason
we choose the dictator to die instead of the good man is because it gives us utility to do
so. The thought experiment is not a closed system; we need to take into account our own
benefit from the result, because all though we say no one in society within the experiment
knows whether it is the dictator or the good man who dies, we, as a non-impartial arbiter
of the experiment, know, and that corrupts the results. This fits in with utilitarianism. If
the situation were to ever happen in reality, it would make no difference which man was
devoured, but because it is in our minds, we decide the outcome that gives us the most
utility.
It is true that when events occur in conformity with our moral intuitions we gain
utility; that is why we feel satisfied when an evil man receives the punishment he
deserves. But does that make it
A moral code with desert is better than a moral code without it, because it fits our
intuitions better, and that is the only way we have of measuring the success of a moral
system.
• Desert has intrinsic moral significance

o Example: Imagine a dictator responsible for deaths of thousands is
overthrown and escapes to a deserted island from which he has no means
of escape. A law enforcement agent tracks him down … should he kill
him?
• Utilitarian view on punishment:
o Reasons for punishment then are:
 To serve as a deterrent
 To prevent evil-doers from committing further crimes
(incarceration)
 Welfare increase for victims
o Punishment that went unknown would be pointless
• Pluralist would say:
o Intrinsic reason to punish: Justice
• Seems like dictator should be punished, even though no one would know and he
would never be able to cause harm again. Anything else would conflict with our
natural sense of justice.
o Utilitarian: Our sense of justice is derived from moral codes that are
convenient for application in society, but shouldn't be strict
• If he is repentant, does that make a difference?
o Christianity: Yes, second chance etc
o Empirically many would say yes (stipulating dictator is truly repentant)
 Thus how can we say it is just to punish him in desert island
scenario, as it would depend on whether he was repentant or not
 Maybe everyone would agree on punishing the dictator, but what if
he just killed one man? While drunk?
o Utilitarian:
• Economics – cons. Fiscal policy, etc
• Dictator and good man example – one gets eaten who should it be
o Universal agreement on dictator
 This leads to desert mattering intrinsically, if only a little bit
 Go back to the deserted island with only the dictator example
• Now we might say he desert matters so little that he should
live in most cases, because the welfare from him living
outweighs his deserving to die

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Nathaniel Kan

It is quite commonly accepted by both utilitarians and deontologists that desert is

deterrent to future crimes, and therefore by giving a criminal what he deserves

of innocents. When his regime is overthrown, he flees to a small uninhabited island, on

life, affecting no one, and dies. Let us call this scenario A.

regime. Call this scenario B.

for that reason we might say that B is preferable.

But in response to that argument, I offer the following modification of the

environment, that is, we need to take into account our utility.

on a moral code which comes from that system.

Without our moral intuitions, it is impossible to understand any moral theory,

intuitions tell us so.

deserves. But does that make it

• Desert has intrinsic moral significance

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