Critical Thinking-What Can It Be?: Matthew Lipman

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M A T T H E W L I P M A N

Critical Thinking-
What Can It Be?
I f schools are to succeed in teaching critical
thinking, educators must have a clear idea of what
it is: critical thinking relies upon criteria, is
self-correcting, and is sensitive to context.
I
f we are to foster and strengthen
critical thinking in schools and
colleges, we need a clear concep
tion of what it is and what it can be.
W e need to know its defining fea
tures, its characteristic outcomes, and
the underlying conditions that make
it possible.
The Outcomes of Critical
Thinking Are Judgments
L et's begin with outcomes. I f we con
sult current definitions of critical
thinking, we cannot help being struck
by the fact that the authors stress the
f such thinking but gener
ally fail to note its essential character
istics. W hat is more, they specify out
comes that are limited t nd
hus, one writer defines
critical thinking as "the mental pro
cesses, strategies, and representations
people use to solve problems, make
decisions, and learn new concepts." 1
A nother conceives of critical thinking
as "reasonable reflective thinking that
is focused on deciding what to believe
and do."2
T hese definitions provide insuffi
cient enlightenment because the out
comes (solutions, decisions, concept-
acquisition) are too narrow, and the
defining characteristics (reasonable,
reflective) are too vague. For example,
if critical thinking is t
hen selecting a doc
tor by picking a name at random out of
a phone book would count as critical
thinking. W
Our contemporary conception of
education as inquiry combines two
aims the transmission of knowledge
and the cultivation of wisdom. But
what is wisdom? Consulting a few die
tionaries will yield such phrases as
"intelligent judgment," "excellent
judgment," or "judgment tempered by
experience." But what is judgments
H ere again, recourse to dictionaries
suggests that judgment is "the forming
of opinions, estimates, or conclu
sions." I t therefore includes such
things as solving problems, making
decisions, and learning new concepts;
but it is more inclusive and more
general.
T he line of inquiry we are taking
shows wisdom to be the characteristic
outcome of good judgment and good
judgment to be the characteristic of
critical thinking. P erhaps the point
wher* we are now, where we want to
know how ordinary judgment and
good judgment differ, is a good place
to consider some illustrations
W herever knowledge and experi
ence are not merely possessed but
e see clear in
stances of judgment. A rchitects, law-
38 E D U CA T I ON A L L E A D E R S H I P
yers. and doctors are professionals
whose work constantly involves the
making of judgments I t is true of any
of us when we are in moral situations:
we have to make moral judgments. I t
is true of teachers and farmers and
theoretical physicists as well: all must
make judgments in the practice of
their occupations and in the conduct
of their lives. T here are practical, pro
ductive, and theoretical judgments, as
A ristotle would have put it I nsofar as
we make such judgments well, we can
he said to behave wisely
I t should be kept in mind that good
professionals make good judgments
about their own practice as well as
about the subject matter of their prac
tice A gixxj doctor not only makes
good diagnoses of patients and pre
scribes well for them, but also makes
good judgments about the field of
medicine and his or her ability to
Critical thinking is
thinking that both
employs criteria and
that can be assessed
by appeal to criteria.
practice it. Good judgment takes ev
erything into account, including itself
A judgment, then, is a determina
tion of thinking, of speech, of action,
or of creation A gesture, such as the
wave of a hand, can be a judgment; a
metaphor, like "John is a worm,' is a
judgment; an equation, like E =mc2 , is
a judgment T hey are judgments be
cause, in part, they have been reached
in certain wax's, relying on certain in
struments or procedures in the proc
ess T hey are likely to be g udg
ments if they are the products of s
erformed acts guided by or
facilitated by appropriate instruments
and procedures I f we now look at the
process of critical thinking and iden
tify its essential characteristics, we can
better understand its relationship to
judgment I will argue that critical
thinking is s
Critical Thinking Relies
on Criteria
W e suspect an association between the
terms c nd c ecause
thev have a common ancestrv W e are
Hou hig> Hou hiflh'
It's a long w wy from
the accepted units of
measure that serrv as
standards, hut an
ordinary fixture is a
spontaneous and
natural beginning of
the use of criteria as a
basis for comparison
S E P T E M BE R 1 988
39
also aware of a relationship between
criteria and judgments, for the very
meaning of c s a rule or prin
ciple utilized in the making of judg
ments." A criterion is an iastrument for
judging as an ax is an instrument for
chopping. I t seems reasonable to con
clude, therefore, that there is some sort
of logical connection between critical
thinking" and "criteria" and "judgment."
T he connection, of course, is to be
found in the fact that judgment is a
skill, critical thinking is skillful think
ing, and skills cannot be denned with
out criteria by means of which alleg
edly skillful performances can be eval
uated S o critical thinking is thinking
that both employs criteria and that can
be assessed by appeal to criteria,
T he fact that critical thinking relies
upon criteria suggests that it is well-
founded, structured, and reinforced
thinking, as opposed to "uncritical"
thinking, which is amorphous, haphaz
ard, and unstructured. Critical think
ing seems to be defensible and con
vincing. H ow does this happen?
W henever we make a claim or utter
an opinion, we are vulnerable unless
we can back it up with r hat is
the connection between reasons and
criteria? Criteria a easons: they are
one kind of reason, but it is a particu
larly r ind. W hen we have to
son things out descriptively or evalua-
tionally and these are two very im
portant tasks we ha-. to use the
most reliable reasons we can find, and
these are classificatory and evaluation-
al criteria Criteria may or may not
have a high level of public acceptance,
but they have a high level of accept
ance and respect in the community of
inquiry. T he competent use of such
respected criteria is a way of establish
ing the objectivity of our prescriptive,
descriptive, and evaluative judgments.
T hus, architects will judge a building
by employing such criteria as u
nd b nd presumably,
critical thinkers rely upon such time-
tested criteria as v
nd c ny area of
practice architectural, cognitive, and
the like should be able to cite the
criteria by which that practice is
guided.
Ordinary Thinking Critical Thinking/Reasoning
Guessing ............................................ Estimating
Preferring ........................................... Evaluating
Grouping ........................................... Classifying
Believing ........................................... .Assuming
Inferring...................................... Interring logically
Associating concepts............................ Grasping principles
Noting relationships..................... Noting relationships among
other relationships
Supposing....................................... Hypothesizing
Offering opinions without reasons ....... Offering opinions with reasons
Making judgments without criteria ....... Making judgments with criteria
fig. 1. Comparing Ordinary Thinking to Good Thinking
T he intellectual domiciles we in
habit are often of flimsy construction;
we can strengthen them by learning to
reason more logically But this will
help little if their foundations are soft
and spongy. W e need to rest our
claims and opinions all of our think
ing upon footings as firm as bed
rock. One way of putting our thinking
upon a solid foundation is to rely
upon sound criteria
H ere, then, is a brief list of the sorts
of things we invoke or appeal to and
that therefore represent specific kinds
of criteria:
standards;
laws, by-laws, rules, regulations;
precepts, requirements, specifica
tions;
conventions, norms, regularities,
principles, assumptions, presup
positions, definitions;
ideals, goals, objectives;
tests, credentials, experimental
findings;
methods, procedures, policies
A ll of these instruments are pan of the
apparatus of rationality I solated in cat
egories in a taxonomy, as they are
here, they appear inert and sterile. But
when they are at work in the process
of inquiry, they function dynam
ically and critically.
A s noted, by means of logic we can
validly extend our thinking; by means
of reasons such as criteria we can
justify and defend it. T he improvement
of student thinking from ordinary
thinking to good thinking depends
heavily upon students' ability to iden
tify and cite good reasons for their
opinions (see fig. 1 ). S tudents can be
brought to realize that, for a reason to
be called good, it must be r o
the opinion in question and s
(in the sense of being more readily
accepted, or assumed to be the case)
than the opinion in question.
Critical thinking is a son of c
hen we openly
state the criteria we employ for ex
ample, in assigning grades to stu
dents we encourage students to do
likewise. By demonstrating models of
e invite
students to assume responsibility for
their own thinking and, in a larger
sense, for their own education.
W hen we have to select among cri
teria, we must of course rely on other
criteria to do so S ome criteria serve
this purpose better than others and
can therefore be said to operate as
or example, when I
pointed out earlier that criteria are
especially reliable reasons and that
good reasons are those that reveal
strength and relevance, I was saying
that r nd r
are important meta-criteria. C
and c re others.
S ome criteria have a high level of
generality and are often presupposed,
explicitly or implicitly, whenever crit
ical thinking takes place T hus the no
tion of knowledge presupposes the
criterion of t nd so wherever
scientific knowledge is claimed, the
concomitant claim being made is that
it is true I n this sense, philosophical
domains such as epjstemology, ethics,
and aesthetics do not dictate the crite
ria relevant to them; rather, the criteria
define the domains. E pistemology
consists of judgments to which truth
and falsity are the relevant criteria;
ethics comprises judgments to which
right and wrong are relevant; and aes
thetics contains judgments to which
beautiful and not-beautiful are rele
vant. T
all of these are of such vast
scope that we should probably con
sider them m nd they in
turn are instances of the great galactic
criterion of m
One of the primary functions of
criteria is to provide a basis for com
parisons. W hen a comparison is made
and no basis or criterion is given (for
QM
b a r qfl k i =i b a b o p e fm
example, "T okyo is better than N ew-
York "), confusion results. On the
other hand, if several competing crite
ria might be applicable (as when
someone says, "T okyo is larger than
N ew York" but does not specify
whether in size or in population), the
situation can be equally confusing Just
as opinions should generally be
hacked up with reasons, comparisons
should generally be accompanied by
criteria
S ometimes criteria are introduced
"informally' and extemporaneously,
as when someone remarks that T ues
day's weather was good compared
with M ondays, while W ednesdays
weather was bad compared with M on
day's I n this case. M onday's weather is
being used as an informal criterion.
E ven figurative language can be un
derstood as involving the use of infor
mal criteria T hus, an open simile such
as "T he sch<x)l was like an army camp"
suggests the regimentation of an army
camp as an informal criterion against
which to measure the orderliness of
the schxxil.
On the other hand, when criteria
are considered by an authority or by
general consent to be a basis of com
parison, we might speak of them as
"formal" criteria W hen we compare
the quantities of liquid in two tanks in
terms of gallons, we are employing
the unit of the gallon on the say-so of
the Bureau of W eights and M easures
T he gallon measure at the Bureau is
the institutionalized paradigm case to
which our gallon measure is compa
rable
S o things are compared by means of
more or less formal criteria. But there
is also the distinction between com
paring things with one another and
comparing them with an ideal stan
dard, a distinction P lato addresses in
or example, in grad
ing test papers, we may compare a
student's performance with the perfor
mances of other students in the class
(using "the curve" as a criterion); or
we may compare it with the standard
of an error-free performance
nd c re terms
often used interchangeably in ordi-
narv discourse S tandards, however.
represent a vast subclass of criteria I t
is vast because the concept of s
an be understood in many dif-
ferent ways T here is the interpretation
cited in the preceding paragraph,
where we are talking about a standard
of perfection T here are. in contrast,
standards as m evels of per
formance. as in the oft-heard cry, "W e
must not lower our standards!" T here
is a sense in which standards are con
ventions of conduct: "W hen in R ome,
do as the R omans do T here is also
the sense in which standards are the
units of measurement defined author
itatively by a bureau of standards
T here is. of course, a certain arbi
trariness about even the most reliable
standards, such as units of measure
ment, in that we are free to define
them as we like W e could, if we liked,
define a yard as containing fewer
inches than it presently does But the
fact is that, once defined, we prefer
such units to be unchanging: they are
so much more reliable that way.
P erhaps we can sum up the relation
ship between criteria and standards by
saying that criteria specify general re
quirements, while standards represent
the degree to which these require
ments need be satisfied in particular
instances Criteria and particularly
standards among them are among
the most valuable instruments of ratio
nal procedure T eaching students to
use them is essential to the teaching of
critical thinking (see fig 2 )
Critical Thinking Is
Self-Correcting
T he most characteristic feature of in
quiry is that it aims to discover its own
weaknesses and rectify what is at fault
in its own procedures I nquiry, then, is
M uch of our thinking unrolls im
pressionistically. from association to
association, with little concern for ei
ther truth or validity, and with even
less concern for the possibility that it
might be erroneous A mong the many
things we may reflect upon is our own
thinking, yet we can do so in a way that
is still quite uncritical. A nd so, meta-
cognition. or thinking about thinking,
need n<x be equivalent to critical
thinking
One of the most important advan
tages of converting the classr<x>m into
a community of inquiry (in addition to
the improvement of moral climate) is
that the members of the community
not only become conscious of their
own thinking hut begin looking for
and correcting each others methtxis
and procedures Consequently, insofar
as each participant can internalize the
methixjology of the community as a
w-hole. each participant is able to be
come self-correcting in his or her own
thinking
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S E P T E M BE R 1 988
41
Critical Thinking Is Sensitive
to Context
Just as critical thinking is sensitive to
uniformities and regularities that are
generic and intercontextual, it is sen
sitive to situational characteristics that
are holistic or context-specific. T hink
ing that is. sensitive to context takes
into account:
(a) e
for ex
ample, a line of investigation ordi
narily considered a nd
therefore fallacious might be found
permissible in a trial;
(b) s
for example, the
rejection of certain E uclidean theo
rems, such as that parallel lines never
meet, in non-E uclidean geometries;
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(c) o for in
stance, a remark taken out of context
may seem to be flagrantly in error but
in the light of the discourse taken as a
whole appears valid and proper, or
vice versa;
(d) t
for example, a case of over-
generalizing about national voter pref
erences based on a tiny regional sam
ple of ethnically and occupationally
homogeneous individuals
(e) t
there are
terms and expressions for which there
are no precise equivalents in other
languages and whose meanings are
therefore wholly context-specific.
W ith regard to t
and s suitable
illustration might be an exercise in
volving the application of a particular
criterion to a set of fictional situations
S uppose the criterion in question is
which is itself a way of con
struing the still broader criterion of
justice) One form that fairness as
sumes is t igure 3 is an
exercise taken from W
he instructional manual ac
companying K P hiloso
phy for Children program for children
9 to 1 0 years of age.
I n performing this exercise, stu
dents apply the criterion of t
i e , f o six
situations requiring sensitivity to con
text. Classroom discussion should dis
tinguish between those situations in
which the procedure of turn-taking is
appropriate and those in which it is
dubious. U sing exercises like these in
a community of inquiry sets the stage
for critical thinking in the classroom. I t
is not the only way to accomplish this,
but it is one way
The Promise of Intellectual
Empowerment
W hat, then, is the relevance of critical
thinking to the enhancement of ele
mentary school, secondary school, and
college education? P art of the answer
lies in the gradual shift that is occur
ring in the focus of education the
shift from l o t e
QO E D U CA T I ON A L L E A D E R S H I P
want students to think for themselves
and not merely to learn what other
people have thought.
But another part of the answer lies
in the fact that we want students who
can do more than merely think: it is
equally important that they exercise
good judgment I t is good judgment
that characterizes the sound interpre
tation of written text; the well-bal
anced, coherent romposition; the lu
cid comprehension of what one hears;
and the persuasive argument. I t is
good judgment that enables one to
weigh and grasp what a statement or
passage states, assumes, implies, or
suggests A nd this good judgment can
not be operative unless it rests upon
proficient reasoning skills that can as
sure competency in inference, as well
as upon proficient inquiry, concept-
formation, and translation skills S tu
dents who are n aught to use crite
ria in a way that is both sensitive to
context and self-corrective are n e
ing taught to think critically. I f teach
ing critical thinking can improve edu
cation, it will be because it increases
the quantity and quality of meaning
that students derive from what they
read and perceive and that they ex
press in what they write and say.
L ast, a word about the employment
of criteria in critical thinking that facil
itates good judgment Critical thinking,
as we know, is skillrul thinking, and
skills are proficient performances that
satisfy relevant criteria. W hen we think
critically, we are required to orches
trate a vast variety of cognitive skills,
grouped in families such as reasoning
skills, concept-formation skills, inquiry
skills, and translation skills. W ithout
these skills, we would be unable to
draw meaning from written text or
from conversation, nor could we im
part meaning to a conversation or to
what we write
W e all know that an otherwise
splendid musical performance can be
ruined if so much as a single instru
mentalist performs below acceptable
standards. L ikewise, the mobilization
and perfection of the cognitive skills
that make up critical thinking cannot
omit any of these skills without jeop
ardizing the process as a whole W e
cannot be content, then, to give stu
dents practice in a handful of cognitive
skills while neglecting all the others
necessary for the competency in in
quiry, in language, and in thought that
is the hallmark of proficient critical
thinkers. I nstead of selecting and pol
ishing a few skills that we think will do
the trick, we must begin with the raw
subject matter of communication and
inquiry with reading, listening, speak
ing, writing, and reasoning and we
must cultivate all the skills that the
mastery of such processes entails I t is
only when we do this that we realize
that the philosophical disciplines
alone provide both the skills and the
criteria that are presently lacking in
the curriculum.D
I . R obert S temberg, "Critical T hinking:
I ts N ature, M easurement, and improve
ment" in E d. Fran
ces R . L ink (A lexandria, Va.: A ssociation for
S upervision and Curriculum D evelop
ment. 1 985). p. 46.
2 R obert H E nnis, A T axonomy of
Critical T hinking D ispositions and A bili
ties' in T
d. Joan Boykoff Baron and
R obert J S temberg (N ew York: W . H Free
man and Co., 1 987). p 1 0
3 For a penetrating discussion of judg
ment, see Justus Buchler, T
N ew-
York: Columbia U niversity P ress, 1 951 )
4 U seful discussions of the nature of
criteria are to be found in M ichael A nthony
S lote, "T he T heory- of I mportant Criteria,"
H I I , 8 (A pril
1 966): 2 2 1 -2 2 4: and M ichael S criven. T he
lx)gic of Criteria. T
6 (October 1 959)' 85 -*-868; and S tan
ley Cavell. T Oxford;
T he Clarendon P ress. 1 9^9). pp 3-36
5 1 see no inconsistency between urg
ing "cognitive accountability" and urging
the development of intellectual autonomy
among students T here are times when we
cannot let other people do our thinking for
us: we must think for ourselves. A nd we
must leam to think for ourselves by think
ing for ourselves: no one can instruct us in
how to do it. although a community of
inquiry makes it relatively easy T he point
is that students must be encouraged to
become reasonable for their own good
(i.e.. as 3 tep toward their own autonomy)
and not just for our good (i.e.. because the
growing rationalization of the society re
quires it)
6. T he S tranger remarks to young S oc
rates, "W e must posit two types and two
standards of greatness and smallness .
T he standard of relative comparison will
remain, but we must acknowledge a sec
ond standard, which is a standard of com
parison with the due measure." S
(2 83e) in P
ed. F-dith H amilton and H untington Cairns
(P rinceton: P rinceton U niversity P ress,
1 961 ), p. 1 051
7. For 3 ontemporary interchange re
garding comparison of things with one
another vs comparison of things with an
ideal, see Gilbert R yle, "P erceiving" in
L ondon: Cambridge U niversity
P ress, 1 966), pp 93-1 02 ; and D W H amryn.
L ondon: D ouble
day and Company and M acmillan. 1 970), pp.
1 6^-2 1
harles P eirce, in "I deals of Conduct,"
ed by Charles H artshome and P aul W eiss
(Cambridge, M ass H arvard U niversity P ress,
1 931 -35) discusses the connection between
self-correcting inquiry, self-criticism, and
self-control.
9 M atthew L ipman and A nn M argaret
S harp. W L anham.
M d.: U niversity P ress of A merica and I A P C.
co-publishers. 1 986). pp 2 2 6-2 99
1 0 M atthew L ipman. K
(U pper M ontclair, N .J.: I A P C. 1 982 )
s P rofessor of P hiloso
phy and D irector of the I nstitute for the
A dvancement of P hilosophy for Children.
M ontclair S tate College. U pper M ontclair.
N J 0^043
S E P T E M BE R 1 988 43



Copyright 1988 by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development. All rights reserved.

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