Gordon Wood - The Invention of the United States.
Gordon S. Wood (born November 27, 1933) is Alva O. Way University Professor and Professor of History Emeritus at Brown University and the recipient of the 1993 Pulitzer Prize for History for The Radicalism of the American Revolution. His book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 won a 1970 Bancroft Prize. In 2010, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal.
Gordon Wood - The Invention of the United States.
Gordon S. Wood (born November 27, 1933) is Alva O. Way University Professor and Professor of History Emeritus at Brown University and the recipient of the 1993 Pulitzer Prize for History for The Radicalism of the American Revolution. His book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 won a 1970 Bancroft Prize. In 2010, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal.
Gordon Wood - The Invention of the United States.
Gordon S. Wood (born November 27, 1933) is Alva O. Way University Professor and Professor of History Emeritus at Brown University and the recipient of the 1993 Pulitzer Prize for History for The Radicalism of the American Revolution. His book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 won a 1970 Bancroft Prize. In 2010, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal.
Gordon Wood - The Invention of the United States.
Gordon S. Wood (born November 27, 1933) is Alva O. Way University Professor and Professor of History Emeritus at Brown University and the recipient of the 1993 Pulitzer Prize for History for The Radicalism of the American Revolution. His book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 won a 1970 Bancroft Prize. In 2010, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal.
2 The United States is not a nation like other nations, and it never has been. There is at present no American ethnicity to back up the state called the United States, and there was no such distinctive ethnicity even in 1776 when the United States was created. Many European countries, Germany, for example, were nations before they became states. Most of the European states were created out of a prior sense of a common ethnicity or language. Some of these European states, the Czech Republic, for example, are new, created in the twentieth century, and are certainly newer than the 235-year old United States. Yet these European states, new as they may be, are under-girded by peoples who had a preexisting sense of their own distinctiveness, their own nationhood. In the United States the process was reversed. Americans created a state before they were a nation, and much of American history has been an effort to define the nature of that nationality. Americas lack of a national identity and a common ethnicity may turn out to be an advantage in the twenty-first century, dominated as it is by mass immigration from the south to the north. It certainly enables the United States to be more capable of accepting and absorbing immigrants. The whole world is now in the United States. Of course, America has its own recent problem with immigrants, especially those illegal immigrants coming from Mexico, but its problems with immigration pale in comparison with the problems of immigration that the European nations are facing and will continue to face over the rest of the twenty-first century. Since Americans have never been a nation in any traditional meaning of the term, it has been the state, the Constitution, the principles of liberty, equality, and free government that make Americans think of themselves as a single people. To be an American is not to be someone, but to believe in something. 3 This was true at the birth of the United States. At the end of the Declaration of Independence of 1776 that created the United States, the members of the Continental Congress mutually pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. There was nothing else but themselves they could dedicate themselves to-no patria, no fatherland, no nation as yet. The American Revolution was not a consequence of two and half million people deciding in 1776 that they were a distinct ethnicity that had to break away from the British Empire. The American Revolution was not like the Algerian break from France in the 1960s or the Indian and Pakistani break from the British Empire in the 1940s. The Americans almost to the moment of declaring independence in 1776 considered themselves Englishmen, equal in every way to Englishmen in the metropolitan center three thousand miles away. The rights they invoked in defense of themselves against the actions of the British government were English rights, such as no taxation without representation or the right of trial by jury. They never demanded rights or privileges that were unique to them as Americans. When the Continental Congress began to anticipate a break from England in 1775, some of the delegates realized that to continue to talk of defending English rights was becoming embarrassing. So they decided to call these rights natural rights, but the rights were the same, good old English rights. It was a strange revolution, as some of the leaders realized, one that was undertaken on behalf of the English constitution, not in opposition to it. The British themselves, the Americans said in 1776, must applaud an action which accords so eminently with the true spirit of their own constitution. 1
4 Since the colonists had always thought of themselves as Englishman or Britons, they were slow to think of themselves as Americans. They shared no common history except as Britons. They shared no common historic institutions except the crown and Parliament. Beyond their particular individual colony, their focus was on the mother country across the Atlantic, not on the other colonies. Until the Continental Congress met in Philadelphia 1774, more of its members had been to London than had been to Philadelphia. 2
During the colonial period they did not call themselves Americans. It was the British officials in London who called the North American colonists Americans. British officials were the ones who throughout the first half of the eighteenth century had imagined and feared the possibility of an independent America. In their minds they created America before the colonists did. It took the imperial crisis of 1765-1776 to convince the colonists that they should have a separate destiny from the Englishmen at home. Only during the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 70s did the colonists begin to refer to themselves as Americans. There was certainly no real nation in 1776; and not even a semblance of a real national government. Indeed, Americans had no experience being a nation or running a central government. Prior to the revolution, John Jay later recalled, we had little occasion to inquire or know much about national affairs. . . . War and peace, alliances and treaties, and commerce and navigation were conducted and regulated without our advice or control. 3 Running a nation in a world of other nations had to be learned on the fly. 5 At the outset the United States lacked nearly all of the symbols of a real nation, one that had the respect of the civilized world. It had no flag, no great seal, no rites, no rituals, no ceremonies, no emblems of nationhood. 4 The American commissioner in France, Silas Deane, was embarrassed that the Declaration of Independence arrived without proper authentication by a national seal, the use of seals, said Deane, being a very ancient custom in Europe. Unsure that it was dealing with a real nation-state, France in 1778 asked that the thirteen United States of North America individually ratify the commercial treaty and the military alliance that had been negotiated in Paris. 5
The new governments only semblance of a national symbol was the number thirteen. Indeed, the thirteen separate states that revolted in 1776 were what commanded peoples loyalties. A mans country was his state, whether it was Virginia or Pennsylvania or Massachusetts. Since there was no definition of national citizenship until the Fourteenth Amendment passed in the aftermath of the Civil War, people were citizens of a particular state, which is what made them citizens of the United States. 6
Americans today are remarkably mobile and are apt to think of their home state as simply one administrative unit among many. Consequently, it is hard for even Americans today to realize how emotionally important the states were to people of the early Republic. Citizens of Virginia and Massachusetts had 150 years of provincial history to sustain their loyalty to their respective states. Against that experience the new United States could scarcely compete. The problem is similar to that of creating a sense of Europeanness today against the loyalty people feel toward their respective nations in Europe. 6 The initial central authority was very weak. Indeed, the Continental Congress was not really a governmental body at all. John Adams termed the Massachusetts delegation in the Continental Congress our Embassy. 7 The Congress was a delegation of embassies from each colony (a diplomatic assembly, Adams called it) brought together by the exigency of events in 1774. 8 It bore no resemblance to a legislature; instead, it was a gathering of separate, individual states to solve some common problems, similar, as its name indicates, to the Congress of Vienna of 1815. The Declaration of Independence drawn up by the Continental Congress emphasized the sovereignty of the individual states, proclaiming that as Free and Independent States they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all the other things which independent States may of right do. At the outset the United States of America had a literal plural meaning that has since been lost. These independent states were very different from one another. It was their common language and their common English heritage that made them seem alike. Except for that common language and heritage, they were almost as different from one another as the eighteenth-century European states were from one another. Puritan Massachusetts with its small farms and its pervasive sense of equality had very little in common with the aristocratic and slaveholding colony of Virginia, where 40 percent of the population was composed of African slaves. Inevitably, these thirteen states, if they were to successfully fight Great Britain, the greatest power in the world, would have to have some sort of union. Hence they created the Articles of Confederation by signing a treaty. The confederation was not a state; it was a league of friendship, a treaty of confederation of separate and 7 independent states, very similar to the present-day European Union. Even getting the states to agree to this union was difficult, and it was not ratified by all the states until March 1781, three years after the Treaty of Alliance with France was signed and only six months before the battle of Yorktown that effectively ended the war. Consequently, during the war the states assumed powers that presumably belonged to only the Confederation Congress, including waging war, laying embargoes, and even in some cases carrying on separate diplomatic correspondence and negotiations abroad. Under such circumstances it was difficult for the collective entity called the United States to establish its character or reputation as a legitimate nation-state in eyes of the world. Were it certain that the United States, could be brought to act as a Nation, and would jointly and fairly conduct their Commerce on Principles of Reciprocity with all Nations, the American commissioners in Paris negotiating the peace treaty told Congress in 1783, then good commercial relations with the rest of the world would become possible. 9
Somehow after a long and bloody war this disunited and ramshackle government defeated the British---with considerable French aid, both financial and military. It seems unlikely that the Americans could have won without the aid of France. Certainly the clinching victory at Yorktown in 1781 was essentially a French victory. It was not easy for a government like that of Britain an ocean away to put down an insurgency that had the support of a large proportion of the population. It is a lesson that has not been well heeded by recent American governments. Some Americans did not want the war to end, for fear that with peace the country would fall apart. It seemed that only the military cause had kept the states more or less 8 united. With the peace treaty ratified in 1783, the various sectional rivalries emerged. And talk of disunion and the creating regional confederacies went from the privacy of drawing rooms to the public press. Since the country seemed unable to follow the law of nations, it had no respect abroad. The states tended to ignore some of the obligations made by the United States in the peace treaty, including even paying back wartime loans made to the countrys friends. Indeed, John Jay, the secretary of foreign affairs, told John Adams that there had not been a single day since [the treaty] took effect on which it has not been violated in America, by one or other of the States. 10 One Frenchman told the Americans that Till you order your confederation better, till you take measures in common to pay debts, which you contracted in common, till you have a form of government and a political influence, the county would never have any standing in the world. 11
The British had even more contempt for the new republic. They refused to send a diplomatic representative to the United States and continued to occupy posts in the western territory of the country. John Adams, the first minister to the Court of St. James, reported in 1785 that there is no question more frequently asked me by the foreign ministers, than what can be the reason of such frequent divisions of States in America. They wanted to know why the country was so disposed to crumble into little separate societies, why it was in danger of multiplying the members of the Confederation without end, or of setting up petty republics, unacknowledged by the confederacy, and refusing obedience to its laws. The European states---Spain, France, Britain---used to be divided into many pieces, but now, he said, they were each busy pulling themselves 9 together, creating single kingdoms out of their many parts. Why couldnt the United States do something similar? 12
It wasnt inevitable that a few American leaders would come together in 1787 in order to form a more perfect Union. The so-called United States could easily have broken into several separate regional states. After all, the wars for independence in Latin America produced twenty-two independent nations from only a few vice-royalties. The creation of the Constitution in 1787 was something of a miracle. No one ten years earlier in 1776 had even imagined the possibility of such a strong federal government. All experience and all theory were opposed to such a large continental republic. Americans had revolted out of fear of far-removed power threatening their liberties, and now they had created just such a distant and powerful government. The best theorists of the age, Montesquieu being the most well-known, said that republics could never be sustained over a large and diverse people. Republics, if they were to hold together, had to be small in size and homogeneous in their culture. The new expansive and extended federal government seemed to challenge both experience and this conventional wisdom. Yet such was the relief felt over the ratification of the new Constitution that the American people were more excited and more united than at any time since the Declaration of Independence a decade earlier. Tis done! declared Dr. Benjamin Rush in July 1788. We have become a nation. 13
This was an extravagant claim, to say the least, no doubt fed by Rushs confidence that the United States at last had a government that could command the respect of the civilized world. But most Americans did not share Rushs enthusiasm. 10 They knew they were not yet a nation and that it would not be easy to create one. Because of extensive immigration, America already had a diverse society. In addition to seven hundred thousand people of African descent and tens of thousands of native Indians, nearly all the peoples of Western Europe were present in the country. In census of 1790 only sixty percent of the white population of well over three million remained English in ancestry. The rest were composed of a variety of ethnicities. Nearly nine percent was German, over eight percent was Scots, six percent was Scots-Irish, nearly four percent was Irish, and over three percent was Dutch; the remainder were made up of French, Swedes, Spanish, and people of unknown ethnicity. But for eighteenth century enlightened reformers ethnic diversity and multiculturalism were not good things, Instead of emphasizing the multicultural variety of the different immigrants, reformers sought to stress the remarkable acculturation and assimilation of the many immigrants into one people, which, as the Massachusetts political and literary figure Fisher Ames pointed out, meant, to use the modern jargon, nationalized. 14
The Revolutionary leaders idea of a modern nation, shared by enlightened British, French, and German eighteenth-century reformers as well, was one that was not fractured by differences of language, ethnicity, religion, and local customs. Sameness and uniformity among the people were desirable for any nation, but, as Montesquieu had emphasized, especially for a republic. The many state histories written in the aftermath of the Revolution were anything but celebrations of localism and the diversity of the nation. Indeed, declared David Ramsay who wrote a history of his state of South Carolina, these local histories were testimonies to the American commitment to enlightened nationhood; 11 they were designed to "wear away prejudices--rub off asperities and mould us into an homogeneous people." 15
Homogeneous people! This is a phrase that seems to separate Americans of today most decisively from that different, distant eighteenth-century world. Because Americans today can take their nationhood much more for granted, they can indulge themselves with the luxury of celebrating their multicultural diversity. But two hundred years ago Americans were trying to create a nation from scratch and had no such luxury. They were desperately trying to make themselves one people, and that desperate need to be a single people tended to make someone like John Jay stress Americas homogeneity in spite of its diversity. Jay lived in New York City, the most ethnically and religiously diverse place in all America, and was himself three-eighths French and five-eighths Dutch, without any English ancestry whatsoever. Nevertheless, Jay could declare in Federalist No. 2, that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people- a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts. . . have nobly established general liberty and independence. Jay actually believed that he was English. What is remarkable was the extent to which the variety of European peoples in America had assimilated British culture. England of course was historically very good at accommodating foreign immigrants, as long as they were Protestants. It had taken in 50,000 French Huguenots at the end of the seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth century had accepted tens of thousands of 12 Germans from the Palatine and from other German-speaking areas, many of whom moved on to the American colonies. The British naturalization act of 1740 was remarkably liberal for the age. It allowed non-Catholic foreign immigrants to the colonies---but not to Britain itself---to be naturalized as full British subjects after seven years residence. Unlike the other imperial powers, Britain encouraged foreign Protestant immigrants to its colonies. 16
Like immigrants in more recent times, the foreign colonial immigrants worried about the encroachment of English on their native tongue. But English usage was difficult to resist. Henry Muhlenberg, the patriarch of the Lutheran Church in eighteenth-century North America, for example, frequently found it necessary to preach in English, since he often had non-German speakers attending his services. American society was diverse but it remained dominantly British. Nearly three- quarters of Americans were of British heritage, most looked like Britons, and most spoke the same language as the subjects of the former mother country. Which is why most Europeans came to call them Anglo-Americans. Could these colonists who had been British and who had celebrated their Britishness for generations become a truly independent people? How could one united people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, and professing the same Protestant religion differentiate themselves from the people of the former mother country? Since American culture over the subsequent years remained overwhelmingly British, how could they be a separate and distinctive nation? These questions, perhaps more than any others, bedeviled the politics and the culture during the early decades of the new Republics history. 13 If they were to be a single national people with a national character, Americans would have to invent themselves. Initially, they struggled with a proper name for their new country. On the tercentenary celebration of Columbuss discovery of America in 1792 one patriot suggested The United States of Columbia as a name for the new Republic. Poets, ranging from the female black slave Phillis Wheatley to the young Princeton graduate Philip Freneau, saw the logic of the name and thus repeatedly referred to the nation as Columbia. With the same rhythm and number of syllables, Columbia could easily replace Britannia in new compositions set to the music of traditional English songs. 17
But Columbia did not stick. Neither did Dr. Samuel Mitchills suggestion that new nation be called Fredonia and its people Fredonians. Despite Mitchills argument that we cannot be national in feeling and in fact until we have a national name, the countrys designation remained the United States of America, with its people appropriating the name that rightfully belonged to all the peoples of the New World. 18
Since their country lacked a unique name and ethnicity, the best Americans could do was to locate their national identity and character in something other than the traditional sources of nationhood. One of the ways they sought to establish their nationhood was to claim, as the Congress did in 1796, to be the freest and most enlightened nation in the world. 19
This was an extraordinary, mind boggling claim. To most educated Europeans, America seemed to be an undeveloped country, recently removed from the wilderness, filled with a mongrel people, surrounded by savages. America had no sophisticated court life, no magnificent cities, no great concert halls, no lavish drawing rooms, 14 and not much to speak of in the way of the fine arts. Its economy was primitive. There was as yet nothing comparable to the Bank of England, no stock exchanges, no great centers of capital. Nineteen out of twenty Americans were employed in agriculture and most of them lived in tiny rural communities. Nevertheless, as far removed from the centers of civilization as they were, many Americans persisted in believing not only that they were the most enlightened people on earth but also that because they were enlightened they were by that fact alone a nation. Indeed, America became the first nation in the world to base its nationhood on Enlightenment values. This claim was what transformed what otherwise might have been a mere colonial rebellion into a world-historical event that promised, as Richard Price and other foreign liberals pointed out, a new future not just for Americans but for all humanity.. Americans told themselves that they were the most cosmopolitan, the most compassionate, the most egalitarian, the most tolerant, and the most literate people in the world. They had few of the vulgar peasant customs charivaries, for ex) that still plagued much of Europe. Despite their diversity almost all of them spoke the same language without the parochial dialects that fragmented the countries of Europe. People in Yorkshire could not be understood in Somerset and vice-versa. On the eve of the French Revolution the majority of Frenchmen did not speak French. Unlike the countries of the Old World, Americans could be understood from one end of their country to another. The other source of nationhood that Americans appealed to was the fact of union itself. Indeed, Union often became a synonym for nation. President George Washington, whose prestige as the father of the country was unmatched by anyone, personified that 15 Union. During the first eight years of the new Republic, from 1789 to 1796, he almost singlehandedly held the nation together as an elected monarch. Creating this union was no simple matter. Believing that the Americans would sooner or later have to return to their rightful place in the British Empire, the British government in Canada made generous offers of free land and attracted tens of thousands of American migrants in the early 1790s. These emigrants seemed to have very little emotional investment in the United States and had no trouble leaving it for the sake of free land. The same sort of out-migration was soon taking place in the Southwest as thousands of Americans took advantage of cheap land offered by the Spanish government in Mexico. These southwestern emigrants left the United States with no sense that they were going to create the future state of Texas. All they wanted was good land and the opportunity to make some money. Confronted with such weak and fluid feelings of loyalty to the United States, Washington and his fellow Federalists desperately sought to strengthen the Union. They used patronage, the army, the federal courts, and ultimately coercion and repression to create unity and prevent what they thought would be a French invasion of the United States supported by the Fifth Column followers of Thomas Jefferson. They pushed too far and brought the country to the brink of civil war in 1798-99. The election of Thomas Jefferson as president in 1800 eased the crisis and produced a new sense of beginning again. Jefferson repudiated the Federalist vision of the United States as a modern, integrated nation-states. In its place he wanted the least government possible, one without patronage, bureaucracy, a military establishment, and 16 all the other coercive instrument of power. Under Jeffersons administration only the delivery of the mail reminded people that they had a federal government at all. Not only did Jefferson refuse to recognize the structure and institutions of a modern state, he scarcely accepted the basic premise of a state, that is, its presumed monopoly of legitimate control over a prescribed territory. For him during his first presidential administration the United States was really just a loosely bound confederation, not all that different from the government of the former Articles of Confederation. Hence his vision of an expanding empire of liberty over a huge continent posed no problems for his relaxed idea of a state. "Who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively?" he asked in his second inaugural address. In fact, Jefferson always conceived of his "empire of liberty" as one of like principles, not like boundaries. As long as Americans believed certain things, they remained Americans, regardless of the boundaries of the government they happened to be in. At times he was remarkably indifferent to the possibility that a western confederacy might break away from the eastern United States. What did it matter? he asked in 1804. "Those of the western confederacy will be as much our children & descendents as those of the eastern." 20
Not every American was enthralled by the Jeffersonian vision. A large proportion of the population, most of whom were in New England, remained deeply alienated from Jeffersons regime. Some New Englanders even began talking of taking their section out of the Union. Fear of the democratic passions unleashed by the Jeffersonian Republicans made many Federalists rethink Americas 1776 break from Great Britain. Amidst a revolutionary world gone mad, Britain in 1809 seemed to be a bastion of stability, and, in 17 the words of Timothy Pickering, former Federalist secretary of state, the country of our forefathers, and the country to which we are indebted for all the institutions held dear to freemen. 21
Federalist magazines even denied that there was any such thing as Americanness. Benjamin Rush in 1805 thought that most of the Federalists, that is, he said, a majority of the old and wealthy native citizens, were still Englishmen in their hearts. Indeed, Rush went so far as to say that he had been wrong in 1788 in saying that Americans had created a nation. They had, he now said, no national character, and however much we may boast of it, there are very few true Americans in the United States. 22
Because most Americans were anxiously trying to establish their identity as an independent people, distinct from their British ancestors, the kinds of Anglophilic sentiments expressed by the Federalists were bound to be misinterpreted and used against them The leader of the Federalists in the House of Representatives, Josiah Quincy, realized only too keenly the mistakes many of his colleagues were making in professing an emotional attachment to Great Britain. Not only did such professions do little credit to their patriotism, but they did infinitely less to their judgment. The truth is, he said in 1812, the British look upon us as a foreign nation, and we must look upon them in the same light. 23
Since British culture was everywhere, it was hard to think of Britain as foreign. Most of the plays that Americans watched in the early Republic were not American but British in origin and were performed by traveling British actors. Of the one hundred-sixty plays professionally put on in Philadelphia between May 1792 and July 1794 only two were written by Americans. Even when native authors attempted something of their own, 18 the English influence was inescapable. Take, for example, the play Independence written in 1805 by the young South Carolina playwright William Ioor. Despite the patriotic title, the play was based on an English novel, was set in England, and had only English characters. 24
Seventy per cent of the books Americans read were pirated English editions. About three-fourths of every issue of one of Americas leading magazines, the Columbian, was borrowed from British sources. Most of the songs Americans sang were British songs. The homes and gardens of Americans were copies of English styles. Culturally, and in other ways as well, the United States still seemed to be a provincial outpost of the British Empire. It is in this context that we can understand the Americans declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812. President James Madison said that the United States was going to war against Great Britain solely because of the British impressment of American sailors---the practice of British warships stopping American commercial vessels to seize sailors thought to be British subjects---and the British violations of Americas maritime rights---the right as a neutral to carry non-contraband goods to a belligerent port. Both issues suggested that the United States was in some sense still a colony of Great Britain. Since American and British sailors often sounded and looked alike, British ship commanders often seized American citizens whom they mistakenly believed to be British subjects. This practice of impressment aroused so much anger precisely because it threw into the faces of the Americans the ambiguous and fluid nature of their national identity. Although the war of 1812 ended as a draw, most Americans thought it had been a great victory. The United States, once thought to be so fragile that it would soon fall 19 apart, emerged from the war with a new sense of strength and unity. The people, observed Albert Gallatin in 1815, are more American; they feel and act more as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby better secured. 25 The war, which Americans called a second American revolution, seemed to vindicate the Americans bold experiment in democracy. The Federalists were completely discredited, and the new Republic gained a self-confidence that it had never possessed before. From that moment on Americans turned inward and began to perceive that they had a much deeper problem of potential disunity than their British heritage. From the Missouri crisis of 1819 on the issue of slavery dominated their thinking. From that moment on, the Civil War became inevitable. Only in its aftermath did Americans finally begin to create a united nation.
20
1 Pennsylvania Gazette, 9 Oct. 1776. 2 John M. Murrin, A roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American Politics, in Richard Beeman et al., eds., Beyond Confederation: the Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1787), 340. 3 John Jay, Address to the People of the State of New York (1787), in Henry P. Johnson, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (New York: G.P. Putnams sons, 18910, 3: 298-99. 4 Benjamin Irvin, Clothed in Robes of Sovereignty: The Continental Congress and the People Out of Doors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.) 5 David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, New York University Law Review, 85 (2010), 932-1066. 21
6 James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19780, 213-47. 7 John Adams to Abigail Adams, 18 Sept. 1774, in L.H. Butterfield et al., eds., Adams Family Correspondence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 1: 158. 8 Adams, quoted in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 580. 9 The American Peace Commissioners to the President of Congress, 10 Sept. 1783, in Gregg L. Lint et al., eds., Papers of John Adams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 15: 286-87. 10 John Jay to John Adams, 1 Nov. 1786, in Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America: From the Signing of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, September 10, 1783, to the Adoption of the Constitution, March 4, 1789. . . (Washington, DC: Blair and Rives, 1837), 2: 674. 11 Chevalier de Chastellux to Gouverneur Morris, 8 Dec. 1784, in Jared Sparks, ed., The Life of Gouverneur Morris, with Selections from His Correspondence. . . (Boston: Gray and Bowen, 1832), 1 :272. 22
12 John Adams to John Jay, 24 Nov. 1785, in Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Works of John Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, 1850-56), 8: 347-48. 13 Rush to Elias Boudinot[?], 9 july 1788, in Lyman H. Butterfield, ed., Letters of Benjamin Rush (Princeton: American Philosophical Society, 1951), 1: 470-75. 14 Fisher Ames, Falkland III, 10 Feb. 1801, Works of Fisher Ames (1854), ed. W.B Allen (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), 1: 216. 15 David Ramsay to John Eliot, 11 Aug. 1792, in Robert L. Brunhouse, ed., David Ramsey, 1749-1815: Selections from His Writings (American Philosophical Society, Trans. N.s. 55, pt. 4 (1965), 133. 16 Kettner, Development of American Citizenship, 74-75. 17 Matthew Dennis, The Eighteenth-Century Discovery of America: The Columbian Tercentenary (1792) and the Creation of American Identity, in William Pencak, Matthew Dennis, and Simon Newman, eds., Riot and Revelry in Early America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 205-228. 18 Alan David Aberbach, In Search of an American Identity: Samuel Latham Mitchill, Jeffersonion Nationalist (New York, 1988), 154-56; Joseph Jones, Hail, Fredonia! 23
American Speech (1934), 12-17; Richard L. Merritt, Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775 (New Haven: Yale University Press:, 1966); T.H. Breen, Ideology and Nationalism on the eve of the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in Need of Revising, Journal of American History, 84(1997), 13-39. 19 Charles s. Hyneman and George W. Carey, eds., A Second Federalist: Congress Creates a Government (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), 24., 20 Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 108. 21 Henry Adams, ed., Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1800-1815 (Boston, 1877), 389. 22 Benjamin Rush to John Adams, 29 June, 14 Aug. 1805, in John A. Schutz and Douglass Adair, eds., The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of Johan Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813 (San Marino, CA: The Huntington, 1966), 28, 31. 23 Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War, 61. 24 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009), 599. 24
25 Gallatin to Matthew Lyon, 7 May 1816, in Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia, 1879), 2: 700.
(The Ethics of American Foreign Policy) Jack Godwin - The Arrow and The Olive Branch - Practical Idealism in U.S. Foreign Policy-Greenwood Publishing Group (2008)