EN BANC

PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE, G.R. Nos. 154297-300

MAXIMO B. USITA, JR. and
WILFREDO C. ANDRES,
Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN,
SPECIAL DIVISION,
Respondent. Promulgated:

February 15, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the Sandiganbayan, Special Division,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 11, 2002 retaining petitioners,
Atty. Maximo B. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO), as counsels de oficio of then accused President Joseph Estrada and his son,
Jose Jinggoy Estrada.

The facts are as follows:

On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of
PAO personally appeared before respondent Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan
[1]
to request the relief of the appearance of PAO as de oficio counsel
for accused President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada in their criminal cases before
the Sandigabayan. However, the request was denied.

On May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be
Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan,
praying that she be relieved of her duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for
the said accused on the ground that she had a swelling workload consisting of
administrative matters and that the accused are not indigent persons; hence, they are
not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO.

On May 9, 2002, respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to
be plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former
President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada.

On May 14, 2002, the remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Be
Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the
accused, former President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada, are not indigents;
therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO.

On May 28, 2002, respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but
retaining two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and
Atty. Andres. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:

. . . There being no compelling and sufficient reasons to abandon the Courts previous
rulings, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. While it is true that a similar motion filed
by the PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta was granted per Courts
Resolution of May 9, 2002, the rationalization advanced by Atty. Rueda was found
meritorious by the Court in that there was unexpected upsurge in her administrative
workload as head of the office including the administration and supervision of more or
less 1,000 PAO lawyers and 700 staff nationwide and many other functions which
require her immediate attention and undivided time.

Nonetheless, considering that there are eight (8) de oficio counsels from the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, deems it
proper to reduce their number and retain only two (2) of them, namely: Atty. Wilfredo
C. Andres and Atty. Maximo B. Usita to continue their duties and responsibilities as
counsels de oficio for accused Joseph and Jose Jinggoy Estrada.
[2]



The retained lawyers of PAO joined the four Court-appointed counsels from the
private sector, namely, Prospero Crescini, Justice Manuel Pamaran, Irene Jurado and
Noel Malaya.

On June 4, 2002, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 28, 2002.

In a Resolution dated June 10, 2002, respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

It appearing that the ground raised by the movants PAO lawyers are mere
rehashes/reiterations of their previous arguments which the Court finds to be not valid
justification for them to be relieved, either temporarily or permanently of their duties
and responsibilities as counsels de oficio in these cases, the instant motion in hereby
DENIED.
[3]



Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent in
rendering the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 10, 2002.

On September 21, 2004, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed
the Court that petitioners Atty. Usita and Atty. Andres were appointed as Assistant City
Prosecutors of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office sometime in August 2002, and
that PAO is left as the lone petitioner in this case.

The issue is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining
two PAO lawyers to act as counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent
persons.

PAO contends that it is undeniable that in retaining its two PAO lawyers as
counsels de oficio of former President Estrada and Jose Estrada, respondent Court
relied upon the provisions of Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio.The Court, considering the gravity of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
oficio such members of the bar in good standing, who, by reason of their experience
and ability, can competently defend the accused.


PAO, however, submits that the power of respondent to appoint and retain PAO
lawyers as counsels de oficio is limited by Sec. 20 of Letter of Implementation (LOI)
No. 20 dated December 31, 1972 and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1725
dated September 26, 1980, thus:

LOI No. 20

Sec. 20. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office shall represent, free of charge, indigent
persons mentioned in Republic Act No. 6035, or the immediate members of their
family, in all civil, administrative, and criminal cases where after due investigation the
interest of justice will be served thereby, except agrarian reform cases as defined by
Republic Act 3844, as amended, which shall be handled by the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and such cases as are now
handled by the Department of Labor.


PD No. 1725

WHEREAS, the Citizens Legal Assistance Office as the law office of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines for indigent and low-income persons, performs a
vital role in the implementation of the legal aid program of the State, in upholding the
rule of law, in the protection and safeguarding of the institutional and statutory rights of
the citizenry, and in the efficient and speedy administration of justice.


The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 renamed the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office as the Public Attorneys Office and retained its powers and functions. Section
14, Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the said Code provides:

Sec. 14. Public Attorneys Office (PAO). The Citizens Legal Assistance Office
(CLAO) is renamed Public Attorneys Office (PAO). It shall exercise the powers and
functions as are now provided by law for the Citizens Legal Assistance Office or may
hereafter be provided by law.


In the implementation of the foregoing provisions of law, PAO issued Memorandum
Circular No. 5, Series of 1997, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series
of 2001, and subsequently by Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2002, defining
who are indigent persons qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO, thus:



Section 3. Indigency Test. Taking into consideration recent surveys on the amount
needed by an average Filipino to 1) buy its food consumption basket and b) pay for its
household and personal expenses, the following shall be considered indigent persons:

1. Those residing in Metro Manila whose family income does not exceed P14,000.00
a month;

2. Those residing in other cities whose family income does not exceed P13,000.00
a month;

3. Those residing in all other places whose family income does not
exceed P12,000.00 a month.

The term family income as herein employed shall be understood to refer to the gross
income of the litigant and that of his or her spouse, but shall not include the income of
the other members of the family.


PAO states that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities attached to the records of the
cases of the accused show that they were not qualified to avail themselves of the
services of PAO, since they could afford the services of private counsels of their own
choice. It noted that the wife of former President Estrada had an income
exceeding P14,000.

PAO argues that the only exception when it can appear on behalf of a non-indigent
client is when there is no available lawyer to assist such client in a particular stage of
the case, that is, during arraignment or during the taking of the direct testimony of any
prosecution witness subject to cross-examination by the private counsel on
record. The appearance of PAO is only provisional in those instances.

PAO asserts that the sole reliance of respondent on Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is improper. Respondent should have not only
considered the character of PAO lawyers as members of the Bar, but especially their
mandate to serve only indigent persons. In so doing, the contradiction in the exercise
of PAOs duties and responsibilities could have been avoided.

PAO asserts that while its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule 14.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,
[4]
PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate
as government lawyers.

Hence, PAO submits that the subject Resolutions of respondent are not in accordance
with the mandate of PAO and affect the rendition of effective legal service to a large
number of its deserving clients.

In defense, respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, represented by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, stated that it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since it did not act in an arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner in
issuing the subject Resolutions.

It explained that it was facing a crisis when respondent issued the subject
Resolutions. At that time, the accused, former President Joseph Estrada, relieved the
services of his counsels on nationwide television. Subsequently, the counsels of
record of co-accused Jose Estrada withdrew, and both accused were adamant against
hiring the services of new counsels because they allegedly did not believe in and trust
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan had the duty to decide the cases, but could
not proceed with the trial since the accused were not assisted by counsel.

Respondent stated that, bound by its duty to protect the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard by himself and counsel, it exercised its prerogative under Sec. 7,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
[5]
and appointed Chief Public
Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta of the PAO and eight other PAO lawyers, including
petitioners, to act as counsels de oficio for the said accused. As noted earlier, the
Chief Public Attorney and six PAO lawyers were later relieved from such duty, but
respondent retained two PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio for the accused.

Considering the attendant situation at the time of the issuance of the subject
Resolutions, respondent asserts that it did not act in an arbitrary, despotic, capricious
or whimsical manner in issuing the subject Resolutions. In appointing the PAO lawyers
to act as counsels for the said accused, respondent merely acted within the
prerogative granted to it by the Rules of Court in order to protect the constitutional
right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. Respondent also merely
required petitioners to perform their duty as members of the Bar and officers of the
court to assist the court in the efficient administration of justice.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in
an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[6]


The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
subject Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or
arbitrariness. At the time of PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail
themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect
the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by themselves and counsel during
the trial of the cases.

Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent
the accused, in view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of
the eight PAO lawyers obviously to meet such possible exigency as the accused again
relieving some or all of their private counsels.

In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been
finally resolved, this petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be
relieved as counsel de oficio therein has become moot.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.