1. MACALINTAL VS COMELEC G.R. No.

157013, July 10, 2003

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:
2. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void
because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
3. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to
do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,
domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident
of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant
does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include theproclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that
way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in
no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.


2. G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution,
Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count.
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power
of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the
authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided
under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of
its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections
Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and
exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President.
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep.
Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an unofficial
tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be
lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would
be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same
to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit:
(1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The
aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.

3. ESTRADA VS DISIERTO
353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto President Arroyo a de jure
president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims
she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a
longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19,
Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal
of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the
de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet Singularity of Office EO
284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3,
par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multipleoffices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid
down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override
the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.


5. Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989 ]
Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon
Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos
loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.
Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present
danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with in
the making of the finding?
HELD: Petition Dismissed.
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the
facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist
factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially
in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only
exacerbate the situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning
to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses
and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to
destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts
to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

6. MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo
was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment.
While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also
filed an administrative and criminal complaint
16
with the Law Department
17
against Benipayo, alleging that
her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs.
Yorac
34
and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
35
The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"
36
, this provision should be
harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before
the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments.
This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the
law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

7. PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
472 SCRA 587 Political Law Commission on Appointment Ad Interim Appointments vs
Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Law on Public Officers Modes and Kinds of Appointment
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in
an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against
theappointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the
consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in
an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered
by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is
in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the
civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-
appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so
that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed
one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the
Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that the president
was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the
presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be
constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary
or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president
may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.

8. IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
9. People vs. Patriarca, Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000
Facts: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of
the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political
beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended,
by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime of
murder.

10. ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately
P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose
de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when
they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates
the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.