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Philippine National Bank vs. Asuncion, 60 SCRA 321

G.R. No. L-46095 November 23, 1977
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, FABAR INCORPORATED, JOSE MA. BARREDO, CARMEN B. BORROMEO and TOMAS L.
BORROMEO, respondents.
Nestor L. Kalaw, Carlos R. Cruz & Rolando S. Santos for petitioner,
Conrado B. Enriquez for private respondents.

MAKASIAR, J .:
Philippine National Bank (hereafter referred to as the petitioner), on January 16, 1963, granted in favor of respondent Fabar Incorporated various credit
accommodations and advances in the form of a discounting line, overdraft line, temporary overdraft line and letters of credit covering the importation of
machinery and equipment. Petitioner likewise made advances by way of insurance premiums covering the chattels subject matter of a mortgage
securing the aforementioned credit accommodations. Said credit accommodations had an outstanding balance of P8,449,169.98 as of May 13, 1977.
All of the above credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo and Tomas L.
Borromeo (private respondents herein) and Manuel H. Barredo- For failure of private respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding repeated
demands, petitioner instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo in a complaint dated October 31, 1972, and
which was filed before the sala of the Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII (hereafter referred to as
the respondent Court).
On May 19, 1975, before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. In a Manifestation dated June 6, 1975, counsel for private respondents
informed the respondent Court of said death.
Subsequently, respondent Court issued an Order of dismissal dated November 29, 1976, which is hereinbelow quoted as follows:
In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present suit is for a money
claim which does not survive the death of said defendant.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were
the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor ...
the claim of plaintiff may be filed with the estate proceedings of the decedent.
Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion dated December 14, 1976 praying for the reconsideration of respondent Court's Order dismissing the case as
against all the defendants, contending that the dismissal should only be as against the deceased defendant Manuel H. Barredo.
In an order dated January 26, 1977, respondent Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of meritorious grounds.
Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner, in its lone assignment of error, alleged that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the case against all the defendants, instead of
dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant and thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, private
respondents herein.
Petitioner's contention is well taken. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the
surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against
the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to
file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, which is the precursor of Section 6, Rule
86 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court said, in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al. (107 Phil. 891) that:
It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 (of the Old Rules of Court) provides the procedure should the creditor
desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such

Page | 2
procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving debtors, should the creditor choose to demand
payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction
to 'take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allow the creditor
to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the night to "proceed
against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. "The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine
against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the
surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case
dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, as was made apparent in the
aforequoted decision. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against the
surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in
effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this
provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is
not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise
stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely
procedural, while the latter, substantive
Moreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in Section 5, Article X, provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED MODIFYING THE APPEALED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT COURT DATED NOVEMBER 29,
1976 AND JANUARY 26, 1977 IN THE SENSE THAT AS AGAINST THE DECEASED MANUEL H. BARREDO, THE CASE IS DISMISSED, BUT AS
AGAINST ALL THE OTHER SOLIDARY DEBTORS, THE CASE IS REMANDED TO RESPONDENT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Martin, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Muoz-Palma, J., took no part.

Santero vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728

G.R. No. , 153 SCRA 728
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 31, 1987
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
, .
, J .:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the respondent court granting the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents. Said
order reads as follows:

Page | 3
Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982 filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero, thru their guardian,
Anselma Diaz, the Opposition thereto dated July 8, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Reply to Opposition dated July 12, 1982 filed by movant Anselma
Diaz and the Rejoinder dated July 26, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Court was constrained to examine the Motion For Allowance filed by the herein
movant last year wherein the ground cited was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted
and said minors were given an allowance prayed for in their motion.
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion last
year to be spent for the school expenses of her wards. In their opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no
longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not
have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for
the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of
Pablo Santero, et al.
In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but
will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances. She cited Article 290 of the Civil Code providing that:
Support is everything that is indispensable for substance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some trade or vocation, even
beyond the age of majority.'
citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom, under the direction of the Court, such allowance as provided by law.'
From the foregoing discussion alone, the Court cannot deviate from its duty to give the allowance sought by the wards, the fact that they need further
education which should have been provided to them if their deceased father were alive.
On the allegation that the funds from which the allowance would be derived are trust funds, the Court, time and again had emphasized that the estate
of the Santeros is quite big and the amount to be released for allowances is indeed insignificant and which can easily be replaced from its general fund
if the so-called trust fund is adjudicated to the oppositors.
WHEREFORE, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero are hereby granted an allowance of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
each for tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator who is ordered to reimburse to
them the said amount after this order shall have become final to enable the oppositors to file their appeal by certiorari if they so desire within the
reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
Bacoor, Cavite, July 28, 1982.
ILDEFONSO M. BLEZA
Executive Judge

Page | 4
(pp. 35-36, Rollo)
It appears from the records that petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo
Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children
begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their
mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero who
died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in 1976.
Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the
respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an
order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as
their allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero. The respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but oppositors (petitioners
herein) asked the court to reconsider said Order.
On September 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by respondent Court directing Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as to the
additional three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among others
that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and
her first three (3) children who were then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance
payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under Art. 188, of the New Civil Code.
On October 15, 1985, petitioners herein filed their Motion to Admit Supplemental Petition opposing the inclusion of three (3) more heirs. We denied that
"Motion for Extension of Time to file their Supplemental Petition" as per Our Resolution dated October 23, 1985.
On November 11, 1985, another Order was issued by the respondent court directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the
three additional recipients or children of Anselma Diaz apparently based on the oppositors' (petitioners herein) "Urgent Motion to Direct the
Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants."
The issues now being raised in this present Petition are:
1. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the respondents Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of
Miguel.
2. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance based on the allegations of the said respondents that the
abovenamed wards are still schooling and they are in actual need of money to defray their school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth is that they are
no longer schooling.
3. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the motion for allowance without conducting a hearing thereon, to
determine the truth of allegations of the private respondents.
Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed
and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of
the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83
because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They further allege that the administrator of the

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estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute
funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the administrator
are derived.
In this connection, the question of whether the private respondents are entitled to allowance or not concerns only the intestate estate of the late Pablo
Santero and not the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti, parents of their late legitimate son Pablo Santero. The reason for this is
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." The question of whether or not the
petitioners and private respondents are entitled to inherit by right of representation from their grandparents more particularly from Simona Pamuti was
settled by Us in the related case of "Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin" (G.R. No. 66574-R) wherein We held that in view of the barrier
present in said Art. 992, petitioners and private respondents are excluded from the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The present petition obviously lacks merit.
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according tothe social position of the
family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried
property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of
their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the
New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the
provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the
estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with
respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court without hearing. The record shows that the "Motion for Allowance" dated
June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing (p. 2, Annex "A") addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and setting the hearing thereof on July 8,
1982 at 9:00 in the morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received by the lawyer, Atty. Beltran as he filed an opposition thereto on the
same date of hearing of the motion. Furthermore even the instant petition admits that the wards, (petitioners and private respondents as represented
by their respective guardians) "have been granted allowances for school expenses for about 8 years now." The respondent court in granting the motion
for allowance merely "followed the precedent of the court which granted a similar motion last year." (Annex "F") However in previous years (1979-1981)
the "wards" (petitioners and private respondents) only received P1,500.00 each depending upon the availability of funds as granted by the court in
several orders. (Annex 1 to Annex 4).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.

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SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Damsco vs. Lagui, 166 SCRA 214

G.R. No. 81381 September 30, 1988
EFIGENIO S. DAMASCO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 59, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Del Prado, Diaz. Sy, Damasco Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

PADILLA, J .:
In an Information dated 11 September 1987, but filed only on 17 September 1987 with the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided
over by respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui, petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1987, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten
one Rafael K. Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, by then and there uttering
the following remarks, to wit:
BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ... MAYROON AKONG
BARIL, BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO (Rollo, P. 13)
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave
threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the costs.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent Judge's decision, contending that he cannot be
convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the
information was filed. Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after
the lapse of 71 days. (Incidentally the affidavit complaint was filed with the Fiscal's Office only on 7 September 1987, or after the lapse of 61 days from
8 July 1987.
1
) Upon the other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months
2
which means sixty (60) days.
3

In denying petitioner's motion, the lower court held that:
Just to disabuse the mind of the movant, let it be said that the Court is fully aware of the respective date of the commission of
the offense and of the filing of the information. The Court holds on to the principle that the allegation in the information confers
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction once acquired cannot be lost.
Thus, since the Court acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for the
crime charged, which is Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after trial what has been proven is merely
light threats.
4

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, recommends that the petition be given due course, stating that:
Respondent Judge denied the "Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the Dispositive Portion of the Decision" apparently with the
misimpression that what was being questioned was the court's jurisdiction over the offense charged, ratiocinating that
jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be lost. But such is not the case. True, the allegations in the Information confer jurisdiction
upon the courts, and once acquired, such jurisdiction cannot be lost. However, this principle is not applicable in the case at bar.
The jurisdiction of the lower court over the crime was never questioned. Rather, the legal dispute lies in whether or not it was
proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but which has
already prescribed. Verily, the query should be answered in the negative for reasons heretofore discussed.
5


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In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,
6
the Court held that where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible
within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court,
would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accussing the defendant of the graver offense.
Incidentally, in the case of Felino Reyes vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines,
7
a Memorandum prepared by this
ponente for the Court, entitled "An Examination of the Rule Which Holds That One Cannot Be Convicted Of A Lesser Offense Includible Within a
Greater Offense, Where Prosecution For The Latter Was Commenced After Expiration Of Limitations Applicable To The Lesser Offense," discusses a
possible attempt to depart from the rule laid down in Francisco vs. CA,
8
by invoking the principle of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official acts and duties, and by interpreting the phrase "prescription of a crime or offense" as merely "a bar to the commencement of a criminal action.
9

However, Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited
and punished by law.
10
Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which
are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art. 69 of the Revised Penal
Code extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89, which is a part of
substantive law.
11
This position is further strengthened by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction of offense as
one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash.
Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA,
12
can be done only "through an overhaul of some
existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the commencement of a criminal action and therefore,
waivable.
13
But this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
14

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
People vs. Lacson, 400 SCRA 261

G.R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON
RESOLUTION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 65034.
2
The said Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacson's Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the Kuratong Baleleng cases;
and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al."
pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City.
The following appear in the records of this case:
(1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M.
that day.
3

(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members
was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout.
4

(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank
Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo
de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team
arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gang's safe house in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their
arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to
summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.
5

(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes.
Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed in
Commonwealth Avenue.
6


Page | 8
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested
in Superville Subdivision.
7

(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman
against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same
officers and personnel.
8

(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel was
headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution recommending the
dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause.
(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special
Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review panel reversed the
Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and personnel of
ABRITFG.
9

(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as
principals.
10
The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048; Carlito
Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052;
Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin Abalora in Crim.
Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.
(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended
Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to
accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
11

(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as
none of the "principal" accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A.
No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.
12

(12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect
on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby
expanding the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a
government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet
begun as of the date of its approval.
13

(13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,
14
respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the
transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses
charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249.
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez
recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members.
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora,
15
Leonora Amora,
16
Nenita Alap-ap,
17
Imelda Montero,
18
Margarita Redillas,
19
Carmelita
Elcamel
20
and Rolando Siplon
21
also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these
cases.
22

(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a
judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and
(3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999
23
held by
Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused.
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty.
Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other
hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyer's League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes,
Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit.
24

(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution
25
dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:
"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the
recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show that a

Page | 9
crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there is no more reason to
hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to these cases and lay to rest the
ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the prosecution witnesses and the private complainants
alike--- may get on with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where
the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that 'if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary
matters should be presented and heard during the trial', and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is an exception to the general rule and may
be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.'
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused or
to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."
SO ORDERED."
26

(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S
Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
27

(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to
enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and raffled to
Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.
28

(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an Order
29
dated June 5, 2001, viz:
"After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without
any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the finding of
the Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein and to hold them for
trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since theSandiganbayan was adjudged
to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and
remains to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of PNP Chief Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit "B")
together with the sworn statements of witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits "2" and "3" - supportive of the refiling of the case (Exhibit "9").
xxx xxx xxx
Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they have a right to be preserved pending hearing on
the injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
30

(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations charged as
principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
31
against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice,
the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was
amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the Informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.
32

(25) The Second Amended Petition
33
dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:
"The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by respondent
Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive
complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new
Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and jurisprudence as shown by the following:
(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition action a quo rendering the same moot and academic by concluding
that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i] the complaints

Page | 10
therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioner's arraignment while the case had not yet been remanded to the QC RTC and while
the Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the
TRO application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule 110.
(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new Informations on June
6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after said cases
were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and
others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the
dismissal order was issued.
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts taken by
respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting
that a valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the fact that the petitioner had shown that
an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is
assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez's political schemes."
34

(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a
Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court.
35

(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding
or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.
36

(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as "provisional dismissal," and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere
revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
respondent, viz:
"In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that the cases
presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present controversy,
being one involving "provisional dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear,
simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal
cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from the DOJ's issuance of subpoenas to
petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon
City's Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical mandate of
Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now definitely barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided
therein.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of further
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO
M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings conducted by respondent State
Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson, et al." and filed before respondent Judge
Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
37

The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice
to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived."
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the
lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the
express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has
already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was
respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument
that their dismissal bears his express consent.

Page | 11
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the
cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the
victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin
Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only
seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three
(3)
38
other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the
hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule
117 was yet inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the
said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against
double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and
company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent
Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived
informations for multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where
respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even
then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge
Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate
court to the effect that "records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x."
39
It is doubtful whether
this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir's finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted
affidavits of desistance.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order of
then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of
the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new
rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling
reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a
position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness
requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence
or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The
reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent
Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence
of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not.
Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.
SO ORDERED.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA 494

Page | 12
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998]
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J .:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working
as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between
him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
[1]

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner
St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the business. She then discovered that
there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already
paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
[2]

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
[3]

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence
to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6,
1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and
petitioner.
[4]

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.
[5]
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August
18, 1997 for lack of merit,
[6]
hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
[7]

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional
validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The
increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years i nto the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972,
and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation.
[8]
Created
and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination
only.
[9]
Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the
Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been
provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC.
[10]
The present Section 223,
as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of
the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that
there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
[11]

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
[12]
and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65,
[13]
for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule
65.
[14]

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:

Page | 13
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
[15]

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court,
[16]
the following amendments of the original
provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted
and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause
therein now provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Italics supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and
the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial
review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This
is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that
have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over
all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others,
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions
of the NLRC.
[17]
Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this
Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified

Page | 14
cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.
[18]

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech
[19]
from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional
Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the
decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in
the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
x x x
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases
which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court
may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the
Constitution and the guarantor of the peoples basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I
understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add
to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights
requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
x x x
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following
proceedings transpired:
[20]

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, add the phrase THE LABOR CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor
Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Italics supplied)
x x x
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its
unanimous approval on third reading followed.
[21]
; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp. 180-181.21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate
Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the
Senate on February 20, 1995,
[22]
inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the

Page | 15
word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original
action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with
which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the
Court of Appeals;
[23]
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would
subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as
an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and
realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have
all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are
correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may
not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.
[24]

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to
remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurall y equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted
and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in
the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.
[25]
should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered
to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima,
JJ., concur.


Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC



G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

Page | 16
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE
WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT
EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of
whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In
fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on
said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel
this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before
Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of
service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
D E C I S I O N
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman
could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and
(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office
alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in
fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in
1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code
for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Page | 17
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs
counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet
been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of
said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty.
Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
People vs. Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

REGALADO, J .:
Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and
a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1,
1995, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.
For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate copies of the basic motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial
and Bar Council, Solicitor General, Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and
Ombudsman. Copies of the supplemental motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or entities and, additionally, to the individual
members of this Court.
In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the
only issue to be resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash the
aforementioned criminal case. We quote the pertinent portions of his ponencia not only for easy reference but to serve as a basis for determining
whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the administrative offense, to wit:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D.
No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the
aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion
to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI
No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily
acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same
force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA

Page | 18
275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former President are
part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued
by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1
nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law (Rollo, pp.
7-8).
xxx xxx xxx
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the
mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution
or whoever may be the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take
judicial notice of all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be
well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar
(and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties is subject to censure. But
where, as in the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it not for the public respondent's irresponsibility
in the performance of his duties, it is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside for
grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's error is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross
ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence.
We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by respondent judge in his aforesaid original and supplemental motions are completely
refuted by the foregoing discussion demonstrative not only of his adjudicatory error but also of judicial incompetence. In fact, just to cite a few
representative cases, it may be worthwhile for respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations in Aducayan vs. Flores, etc., et al.,
1
Ajeno
vs. Inserto,
2
Libarios vs. Dabalos,
3
and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc.,
4
which would put his asseverations at rest.
Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other supplications, arguments, and even his insinuations for that matter, which
although born more of fecundity in formulation and less of bases in law, we have decided to anatomize even with some expense of prolixity.
Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only purpose of (h)is motion is to plead with bended knees and with
all humility for the kind reconsideration" of the decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly ignorant of the law and as such, (he) was
reprimanded and fined in the amount of P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be spread on (his) personal records."
5

He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error primarily stemmed from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor
and, on a personal note, he expresses this concern: ". . . I am again begging with humility that the spreading of the aforesaid Decision on my personal
records be reconsidered because doing so will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the judiciary in the future. This is very painful. I
will agonize up to my last day and my last breath in life."
6

The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into consideration and is not insensitive thereto, including
his argumentum ad misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is more than ample substantiation for the findings of the ponente in the main case, and
compelling legal warrant for the administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under similar and comparable
situations.
The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official procedure and requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge
would want this very Court to violate and forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official documents. His further argument that
The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only open criticisms on my private qualifications as a minister in
the temple of justice but will open more comments on my official acts, competence and credibility as a judge that might
undermine the people's faith in the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in Puerto Princesa City and in the entire country
because it is always difficult to disassociate my private credential from that of my public qualifications.
7

is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic. The Court regrets that respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the
recipient of uncommon sympathetic consideration in this case.
Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public career, judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by
subsequently demonstrating his true worth through observance of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a misjudgment which is the heritage of
the heedless and to rise to higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming as valid his meticulosity on the
confidential nature of disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent copies of his motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of this resolution. It is
elementary that copies of such motions are merely filed with the court and furnished only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us to keep sub
rosa what he himself publicizes.
From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent judge then goes into a critical second gear by rhetorically wondering aloud in this
fashion:
On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court required me to comment on the above-entitled petition.
On August 23, 1994 I filed my comment thereto and on October 24, 1994, in a Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme

Page | 19
Court resolved to note my Comment. When the Third Division of the Honorable Court required me to comment in G.R. No.
116049, the supposition is that a valid raffle of said case to that Division had already been made. That was my thinking and
impression for, why would the case go to that Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in quandary, however, as to why all of
a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was transferred to the Second Division of the Supreme Court without us or any party being
informed by the Honorable Supreme Court about it. In our level at the Regional Trial Court in Palawan, we observe the raffle of
cases with solemnity and abide by the result of the raffle faithfully. And the said Second Division meted me out excessive
penalties when it was the Third Division that required me to comment. Why did this happen? (Emphasis supplied.)
8

Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the uninformed, we assure His Honor that the Supreme Court also conducts "a valid
raffle," observes such raffle of its cases "with solemnity," and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This case was validly and solemnly raffled to Mr.
Justice Bidin who was then with the Third Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred to the Second Division where he served as
working chairman until his retirement on April 7, 1995. In accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case remained with him as the
original ponente and he accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a member of the Second Division. There is no rule in the Court that the
parties be informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as respondent judge would want or expect. To do so would easily be
revelatory of the identity of theponente which is precisely what some litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.
In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further informed that because of the retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the uncertainty of
the date when his replacement could act upon his unfinished cases and the subsequent proceedings therein, after its summer session and working
recess the Court en banc, after due deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to assign the preparation of this resolution to the
present writer thereof, he having been and still is with the Second Division. Respondent judge, with his claim of extensive magisterial experience,
should have verified all the foregoing facts from the records of this Court, instead of proceeding upon speculations.
Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a constitutional basis, respondent judge questions the competence of the Second
Division of this Court to administratively discipline him. Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a constitutional issue as to require the
referral of this case, or at least the disciplinary aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter merely involves a clarification of the
misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably because of his unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them
being on internal procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware of the submissions of respondent judge on this point
through the copies of the motions which he furnished them, and he insistently harps on constitutional grounds therein, the Court en banc resolved to
accept this aspect of the case from the Second Division.
His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon." This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the second sentence of Section 7, Article X of the
1973 Constitution which provided: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
Members, order their dismissal."
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc" in referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the
1987 Constitution and, from this, he argues that it is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to
take up that precise matter with the committee chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out the equivalent provision in the 1973
Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the "Court," without qualification. It was accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as
the power to discipline is concerned, the qualification was not intended to make a difference, as a reference to the Court by itself necessarily means
the Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc" there because all internal procedural and administrative matters, as well as ceremonial
functions, are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. On the other hand, where the reference is to the Court acting through its divisions,
it would necessarily be so specified. For lack of transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said Commission, the writer has perforce to rely
on his recollection and notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing facts as they transpired.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause
which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the
other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was
adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and
providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx

Page | 20
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even
cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to
adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts,
9
and the very
purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
10

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the
Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when
the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be
decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the same rationale and applies with equal
force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent
to hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby DENIED. This resolution is
immediately final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Judge Caoibes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001 (in scribed digest)

[G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001]
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J .:
Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, seeks the review of the following orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
December 22, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint
[1]
for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in
authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner to return
the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner
blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses
unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan
against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint
[2]
against petitioner, this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as
Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial
officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the complaint filed earlier with the office of the Ombudsman.
In the Order
[3]
dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court,
[4]
praying that the
Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office of the

Page | 21
Court Administrator, is already investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has
the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its
exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 197, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order
[5]
denying the motion for referral to the Supreme Court. Invoking Section 15 (1) of
Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman held that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the criminal charges of respondent Judge against petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
[6]
of the foregoing order, maintaining that the Office of the Ombudsman should either refer Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 to
the Supreme Court for preliminary evaluation, or await the latters resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ which involves the same parties and subject
matter. Otherwise, petitioner argues, the absurd situation may result wherein the Office of the Ombudsman files criminal charges against petitioner who, on the other
hand, is declared without fault by the Supreme Court.
In the Order
[7]
dated December 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration and required petitioner to submit a counter-
affidavit within an inextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, asking for the reversal of the assailed Orders dated August 22, 1997 and December 22, 1997 of the Office of
the Ombudsman and the issuance of a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order, directing the Office of the Ombudsman to refrain from taking further action in
the implementation of the challenged orders.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on case No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No.
97-387-RTJ.
The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez,
[8]
this Court resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a
criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cognizance of Case NO. OMB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court
on the ground that, allegedly, the accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal charges falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and
duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, among others, the following powers and duties to the Office of the Ombudsman:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge
a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith, or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act...
The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the Ombudsman in maintaining its jurisdiction over the charges of physical injuries, malicious mischief and
assault upon a person in authority filed by respondent Judge against petitioner. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by Section 16 of R.A. 6770 which states that
the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure or office.
The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestations, in Lieu of Comment, correctly opined and we quote:
xxx the grant of the aforequoted powers to the Office of the Ombudsman is not tantamount to giving it exclusive authority thereon. In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770, which is relied upon by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides that it has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and corruption
cases and felonies committed by public officers in relation to their office. Moreover, it was held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993], that the
Ombudsmans power under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
[9]

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office
furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court
for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless
he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative
matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs.
Vasquez.
[10]

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to
deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy
which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with
all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge
Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 22
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official business.

In re: JBC vs. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007 (in scribed digest)
EN BANC

Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then
Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City.

JBC No. 013

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 22, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION

PER CURIAM:


Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.[1]
Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed
against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City,
as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were
five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all
dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the
Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases.[3] On even date, letters[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for
certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995
dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed
before the JBC.[5]

In a letter[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that
respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement
vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183


DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),
Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of
the Civil Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM.

x x x x

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondents direct participation, as it was upon his direction and
approval that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by
respondent only shows his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard,
respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and
public service demands of every government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and
integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his

Page | 23
guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be
irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities involved. Accordingly, respondents continuance in office becomes untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.

(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:

(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary[7]

In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He
alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the
Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the
President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.

Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in his PDS, which was sworn to before
a notary public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.[9]

In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the
NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted;
that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993[11] which was immediately accepted by the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief
that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his
administrative case considering that the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from
the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.

Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and
then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum[12] dated September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:

In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the records of the subject administrative
case against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we
examined the records of said administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent
documents.

After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this Office finds that there
are reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.

An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in
having answered yes to Question No. 24, but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. Question No. 24 and
his answer thereto are hereunder quoted as follows:

24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by
any court, tribunal or any other government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of an
administrative offense or imposed any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is Yes to any of the questions, give particulars.

But all dismissed (acquitted)
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439
Date of [Dismissal] August 2, 1995
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814
Date of [Dismissal] July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he
filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as
Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on the certified documents secured from the Office of the
NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:

1. In compliance with the Summons dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the
NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint lodged
against him by the Napolcom;

2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the Notice of Hearing of even date, signed by Mr. Canonizado, in connection with the formal
hearing of the subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;

3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper items relative to
the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as
follows:

Mindanao Times:

Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal


Page | 24
Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to those allegedly behind
his ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his
prepared statement on his dismissal from government service.

Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a series of administrative
charges were hurled against him by some regional employees.

I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process, Quitain said.

He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.

Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to clear my name, the only
legacy that I can leave to my children, Quitain said in his statement.

It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the administrative case, he also said.

Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation of Secretary
Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional director for Region XI.

Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name


Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his name in court from
charges of tampering with an official receipt.

Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court against the group that plotted his ouster
from office: He said his only appeal was for Interior and Local Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the
charges.

Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them, Quitain said.

Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only legacy that I can give my children, Quitain said.

While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of Administrative Order No. 183
by Judge Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted
newspaper clippings, Judge Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative Order.

x x x x

Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known that he was administratively charged and was consequently
dismissed from the service since he will not be considered. But this may be the reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did
not declare the administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case that would
be filed against him by reason of his resignation and the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed, does not hold
water. It is rather absurd for him to state that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case
filed against him because when he resigned and relinquished his position, the issues raised therein became moot and academic. He claims that he
did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the administrative case because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself
from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should know that
his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic
dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by
the simple expedient of resigning from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic
dismissal of his administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally verify the status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged
assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.


On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he had a clean record and was
qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even
more because of his concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted on
his application. His act of dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was
dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and dishonesty.



Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as an administrative matter; and (2) that he be
dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

Respondent was required to Comment.[13]

In compliance with the Courts Resolution respondent filed his Comment[14] contending that before he filed his application for RTC Judge with the
JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the case was secretly heard and decided. He
averred that:

1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the surrounding
provinces, he was recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police
Commission, Region XI;


Page | 25
2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who were the same followers involved in the
chain of corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;



3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing criminal charges against him;

4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to resign in exchange for the dismissal of said criminal charges, but
when he refused to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or exiled at the DILG central office in Manila;

5. Upon his exile in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate superiors cooperated with his detractors in instigating for his
removal. Hence, upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM on
condition that all pending cases filed against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;

6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he submitted his Personal Data Sheet
before the Judicial and Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge, he made the following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any court,
prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case filed against him that he knows;

7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have desisted from applying as a judge and would have given his
full attention to the said administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing embarrassment; and

8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had thereon and the decision rendered therein, without his knowledge,
could have probably occurred during his exile period when he was detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative
case are null and void since he was denied due process.



Respondents Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.[15]


OCA submitted its Memorandum[16] dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained in its Memorandum dated
September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full
knowledge of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitains explanations in his Comment are but mere
reiterations of his allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the
service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.

It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office,
including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by
Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.[17]

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No.
183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC
his verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due process. He further
argues that since all the criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he
resigned from office, his administrative case had become moot and academic.

Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this
information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears
emphasis that in the Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,[18] Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that I was dismissed from the (Napolcom)
office without due process. It also reads: Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his
prepared statement on his dismissal from the government service. Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process.
The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him
summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an answer.[19] Then
on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[21]
Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and
academic.[22] Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a
clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the Bench.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,[23] this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to
enable them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not
contain the important information in question because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his
reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account against him if it had been disclosed.


Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.[24]

Page | 26

Section 8(2), Rule 140[25] of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:



1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,[26] we held:

By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into consideration in acting
on his application, Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has
tarnished with his falsehood.

WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately
executory.

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary.[27] We have often
stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will
never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.[28]

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable
resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to
accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the administrative
case.[29]

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency
of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.[30] Indeed, if innocent, the respondent offici al merits vindication of his
name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure
and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[31]

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the
service had he not resigned during the pendency of this
case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if
any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitains 201 File.

SO ORDERED.


Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 (in scribed digest)

G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Page | 27
Petitioners are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the peoples rights to self-
governance and justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of
Supreme Court Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.
Petitioners allege that:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent
Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacaang in view of the
question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the
Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the
validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary,
whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at
the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."
1

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil
Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained."

Therefore, the entry in Ongs birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that
Ongs citizenship at birth is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as
long as Ongs birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is
stated in his birth certificate.
2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ongs new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration
dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that
he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a
birth certificate; that respondent Ongs old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent
Ongs remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be
issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent
Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of
this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:

Page | 28
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by and
bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however,
was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ongs citizenship."
3
To date, however, the JBC has not received the
referral.
Supporting the Presidents action and respondent Ongs qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that:
1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the
appointees qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice,
which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.
4

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file
the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it
recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who
extended the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was
allegedly a Filipino citizen
5
who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a
result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a
Filipino citizen;
6
that respondent Ongs mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who
were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE
VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE,
ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE
A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO.
113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY
CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.
7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this
Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona
8
and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,
9
on the ground that the case is one of transcendental
importance. They claim that the Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore,

Page | 29
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ongs birth certificate, unless
corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The petition has merit.
First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this
Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances.
10

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary
who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from
extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ongs qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution,
11
the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date,
respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino
citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years
and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the
naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate
12
states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a
Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
Specifically, the following appears in the records:
P E T I T I O N
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL,
to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth
certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when
citizenship was acquired and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents
Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
x x x
V E R I F I C A T I O N
Republic of the Philippines )
City of Manila ) S.S.
I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was
prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are true to my knowledge.
(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28
th
day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence
Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on __________________, 19__.
(Sgd.)
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM

Page | 30
Doc. No. 98;
Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.
13

In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in connection
with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit:
1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.
Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the
oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and,
under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.
15

Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate
cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore,
be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all
entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship.
The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the
records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of
three Constitutions.
17
Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For
this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting
an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he
shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.


Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 676 SCRA 579
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 696 SCRA 496

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
MENDOZA, J .:

Page | 31
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration
1
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed
2
by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and
the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph
of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings,
in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,
3
112,
4
113,
5
and 114,
6
the
Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.
7
On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed,
in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was
immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution
8
reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is
immediately executory."
9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.
10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always
been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution
11
and the 1935 Constitution
12
vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation
of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.
13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,
14
with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased
to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees
must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities,
15
the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of
law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.
16
Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC,
not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
18
It has been the
situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing
only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make

Page | 32
the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress
would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-
member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to
reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at,
with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined
and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.
19
The
Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which
government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that
the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every
word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and
defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012
Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided,
as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One
example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately."
20
Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."
21
Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members."
22
In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments
were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function
to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-
legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the existence and
the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House
plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its
non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation,
24
the declaration of an existence of a state of war,
25
canvassing of electoral
returns for the President and Vice-President,
26
and impeachment,
27
the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering
the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature
and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the
other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers
arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief
Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position
28
to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the
1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated
doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order to
respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Page | 33
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,
29
which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress
in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for
Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also,
two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered
membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,
30
then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors. From the
enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of
our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have
only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond
what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.
31
Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the
Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three
main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article
VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have
seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
x x x
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI
and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and
constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress role
under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they relate inter
se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as
such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon
the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It
may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the
scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the
voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be
legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention
that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible
to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular members of
the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC
is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.
Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the first time
through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent,
usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement
of the Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of
fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:
32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when
a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it.
33


Page | 34
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what
respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into
the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise
sanction the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted."
34
"The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."
35
Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted
from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated."
36
"The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would
have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation."
37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in
confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.
38
In
cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the
manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter
which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in
order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Page | 35
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, T hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 257-286.
2
Id. at 287-298.
3
Entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) defer the consideration of all nominees
and the preparation of the short list to be submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;" id. at 303-304.
4
Entitled "Resolution expressing anew the sense of the Senate that the Senate and House of Representatives should have one (1)
representative each in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and that each representative is entitled to a full vote;" id. at 305-307.
5
Entitled "Resolution to file an urgent motion with the Supreme Court to set for oral argument the motion for reconsideration filed by the
representatives of Congress to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in the case of Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen.
Francis Joseph G.. Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., G.R. No. 2022242 considering the primordial importance of the constitutional issues
involved;" id. at 308-310.
6
Entitled "Resolution authorizing Senator Joker P. Arroyo to argue, together with the Counsel-of-record, the motion for reconsideration filed
by the representative of the Senate to the Judicial and Bar Council in the case of Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen.
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr.;" id. at 311-312.
7
Id. at 313-314.
8
Id. at (318-I)-(318-K).
9
Id. at 318-J.
10
Petitioners Memorandum, id. at 326-380; Respondents Memorandum, id. at 381-424.
11
Malolos Constitution Article 80 Title X. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the
National Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely
independent of the Legislative and Executive Powers."
12
1935 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments."
13
1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, 437.
14
Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be
appointed by the President."
15
1 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p. 487.
16
List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive
Officer, Judicial and Bar Council, rollo, pp. 62-63.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12, 2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30,
2001.
19
Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands (2nd ed. 1926), p. 26.

Page | 36
20
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of
six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
x x x
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x.
21
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he
was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis
supplied)
22
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
23
1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 27(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
24
1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
25
1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 23 (1). The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
26
1987 Constitution, Article VII Section 4. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.
27
1987 Constitution, Article XI Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
xxx
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.
28
Dated March 27, 2007; Annex "D," rollo, p. 104.
29
Annex C, id. at 95. Quoting the interpretation of Article VIII, Section (1) of the Constitution by Fr. Joaquin Bernas in page 984 of his book,
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary. He quoted another author, Hector de Leon, and portions of the

Page | 37
decisions of this Court in Flores v. Drilon, and Escalante v. Santos, before extensively quoting the Record of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 (pages 444 to 491).
30
Annex "E," id. at 1205.
31
Rollo, pp. 91-93.
32
G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
33
Id. at 516-517. (Citations omitted.)
34
Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., p. 198.
35
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2009 ed., p. 231.
36
Id., citing Cartwrite v. Cartwrite, 40 A2d 30, 155 ALR 1088 (1944).
37
Id., Agpalo, p. 232
38
Dissenting Opinion, Chief Justice Panganiban, Central Bank (Now Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299, citing Peralta v. COMELEC. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82
SCRA 30, 77, citing concurring and dissenting opinion of former Chief Justice Fernando, citing Malcolm.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation



DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J .:
On July 17, 2012, the Court rendered a Decision
1
granting the petition for declaration of unconstitutionality, prohibition, and injunction filed by petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez, and declaring that the current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is unconstitutional. The Court also
enjoined the JBC to reconstitute itself so that only one member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
On July 24, 2012, respondents Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. moved for reconsideration.
2
The Court then
conducted and heard the parties in oral arguments on the following Issues:
1. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight members, two of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
A. Whether or not the JBC should be composed of seven members only.
B. Whether or not Congress is entitled to more than one seat in the JBC.
C. Assuming Congress is entitled to more than one seat, whether or not each representative of Congress should be entitled to exercise one whole
vote.
I maintain my dissent to the majority opinion now being reconsidered.
To reiterate, the vital question that needs to be resolved is: whether or not the Senate and the House of Representatives are entitled to one
representative each in the JBC, both with the right to cast one full vote in its deliberations.
At the core of the present controversy is Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of
law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)

Page | 38
In interpreting Section 8(1) above, the majority opinion reiterated that in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of the
Congress," the Filipino people through the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended Congress to just have one representative in the JBC. The majority
opinion added that there could not have been any plain oversight in the wordings of the provision since the other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
were amended accordingly with the shift to a bicameral legislative body.
The mere fact, however, that adjustments were made in some provisions should not mislead the Court into concluding that all provisions have been
amended to recognize the bicameral nature of Congress. As I have previously noted in my dissenting opinion, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the
Constitutional Commission himself, admitted that the committee charged with making adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the
JBC, failed to consider the impact of the changed character of the Legislature on the inclusion of "a representative of the Congress" in the membership
of the JBC.
3

Indeed, to insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate or the House of Representatives should sit at any time in the JBC, is to
ignore the fact that they are still separate and distinct from each other although they are both involved in law-making. Both legislators are elected
differently, maintain separate administrative organizations, and deliberate on laws independently. In fact, neither the Senate nor the House of
Representatives can by itself claim to represent the Congress.
Again, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to limit the term "Congress" to just either of the two Houses can be seen from the words
that they used in crafting Section 8(1 ). While the provision provides for just "a representative of the Congress," it also provides that such
representation is "ex officio" or "by virtue of one's office, or position."
4

Under the Senate rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is automatically the Senate representative to the JBC. In the same way, under the
House of Representatives rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is the House representative to the JBC. Consequently, there are actually two
persons in Congress who hold separate offices or positions with the attached function of sitting in the JBC. If the Court adheres to a literal translation of
Section 8(1 ), no representative from Congress will qualify as "ex officio" member of the JBC. This would deny Congress the representation that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended it to have.
Having said that the Senate and the House of Representatives should have one representative each in the JBC, it is logical to conclude that each
should also have the right to cast one full vote in its deliberations. To split the vote between the two legislators would be an absurdity since it would
diminish their standing and make them second class members of the JBC, something that the Constitution clearly does not contemplate. Indeed, the
JBC abandoned the half-a-vote practice on January 12, 2000 and recognized the right of both legislators to cast one full vote each. Only by recognizing
this right can the true spirit and reason of Section 8(1) be attained.
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice


Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 226-250.
2
Id. at 257-284.
3
http://opinion.inquirer.net/31813/jbc-odds-and-ends (last accessed February 15, 2013).
4
Webster's New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 477.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation



DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J .:
I dissent.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives must be represented in the Judicial and Bar Council. This is the Constitution's mandate read as a
whole and in the light of the ordinary and contemporary understanding of our people of the structure of our government. Any other interpretation
diminishes Congress and negates the effectivity of its representation in the Judicial and Bar Council.

Page | 39
It is a Constitution we are interpreting. More than privileging a textual preposition, our duty is to ensure that the constitutional project ratified by our
people is given full effect.
At issue in this case is the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution which provides the following:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis provided)
Mainly deploying verba legis as its interpretative modality, the main opinion chooses to focus on the article "a." As correctly pointed out in the original
dissent of Justice Robert A bad, the entire phrase includes the words "representative of Congress" and "ex officio Members." In the context of the
constitutional plan involving a bicameral Congress, these words create ambiguity.
A Bicameral Congress
Our Constitution creates a Congress consisting of two chambers. Thus, in Article VI, Section 1, the Constitution provides the following:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives x x x.
(Emphasis provided)
Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines".
1
Members of the House of Representatives, on the other hand, are elected by
legislative districts
2
or through the party list system.
3
The term of a Senator
4
is different from that of a Member of the House of
Representatives.
5
Therefore, the Senate and the House of Representatives while component parts of the Congress are not the same in terms of their
representation. The very rationale of a bicameral system is to have the Senators represent a national constituency. Representatives of the House of
Representatives, on the other hand, are dominantly from legislative districts except for one fifth which are from the party list system.
Each chamber is organized separately.
6
The Senate and the House each promulgates their own rules of procedure.
7
Each chamber maintains
separate Journals.
8
They each have separate Records of their proceedings.
9
The Senate and the House of Representatives discipline their own
respective members.
10

To belabor the point: There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of
Representatives. There is no single journal for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for the House of
Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and
a Record of proceedings for the House of Representatives. The Congress of the Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the Senate that
promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members.
No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the Senate. No Member of the House of Representatives reports to
the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the House of Representatives.
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not exist separate from the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get directions from the Senate. By constitutional design, he or she cannot get
instructions from the House of Representatives. If a Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate, then he or she must be open to
amend or modify the instructions given to him or her by the Senate if the House of Representatives instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution
vests disciplinary power only on the Senate for any Senator.
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives.
No Senator may carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No Member of the House of Representatives may carry instructions from the
Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of the House of Representatives may therefore represent Congress as a whole.
The difference between the Senate and the House of Representative was a subject of discussion in the Constitutional Commission. In the July 21,
1986 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Jose F. S. Bengzon presented the following argument during the discussion on
bicameralism, on the distinction between Congressmen and Senators, and the role of the Filipino people in making these officials accountable:
I grant the proposition that the Members of the House of Representatives are closer to the people that they represent. I grant the proposition that the
Members of the House of Representatives campaign on a one-to-one basis with the people in the barrios and their constituencies. I also grant the
proposition that the candidates for Senator do not have as much time to mingle around with their constituencies in their respective home bases as the
candidates for the House. I also grant the proposition that the candidates for the Senate go around the country in their efforts to win the votes of all the
members of the electorate at a lesser time than that given to the candidates for the House of Representatives. But then the lesson of the last 14 years
has made us mature in our political thinking and has given us political will and self-determination. We really cannot disassociate the fact that the
Congressman, the Member of the House of Representatives, no matter how national he would like to think, is very much strongly drawn into the
problems of his local constituents in his own district.

Page | 40
Due to the maturity of the Filipinos for the last 14 years and because of the emergence of people power, I believe that this so-called people power can
be used to monitor not only the Members of the House of Representatives but also the Members of the Senate. As I said we may have probably
adopted the American formula in the beginning but over these years, I think we have developed that kind of a system and adopted it to our own needs.
So at this point in time, with people power working, it is not only the Members of the House who can be subjected to people power but also the
Members of the Senate because they can also be picketed and criticized through written articles and talk shows. And even the people not only from
their constituencies in their respective regions and districts but from the whole country can exercise people power against the Members of the Senate
because they are supposed to represent the entire country. So while the Members of Congress become unconsciously parochial in their desire to help
their constituencies, the Members of the Senate are there to take a look at all of these parochial proposals and coordinate them with the national
problems. They may be detached in that sense but they are not detached from the people because they themselves know and realize that they owe
their position not only to the people from their respective provinces but also to the people from the whole country. So, I say that people power now will
be able to monitor the activities of the Members of the House of Representatives and that very same people power can be also used to monitor the
activities of the Members of the Senate.
11

Commissioner Bengzon provided an illustration of the fundamental distinction between the House of Representatives and the Senate, particularly
regarding their respective constituencies and electorate. These differences, however, only illustrate that the work of the Senate and the House of
Representatives taken together results in a Congress functioning as one branch of government. Article VI, Section 1, as approved by the Commission,
spoke of one Congress whose powers are vested in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Thus, when the Constitution provides that a "representative of Congress" should participate in the Judicial and Bar Council, it cannot mean a Senator
carrying out the instructions of the House or a Member of the House of Representative carrying out instructions from the Senate. It is not the kind of a
single Congress contemplated by our Constitution. The opinion therefore that a Senator or a Member of the House of Representative may represent
the Congress as a whole is contrary to the intent of the Constitution. It is unworkable.
One mechanism used in the past to work out the consequence of the majoritys opinion is to allow a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representative to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council but to each allow them only half a vote.
Within the Judicial and Bar Council, the Chief Justice is entitled to one vote. The Secretary of Justice is also entitled to one whole vote and so are the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the private sector, legal academia, and retired justices. Each of these sectors are given equal importance and
rewarded with one whole vote. However, in this view, the Senate is only worth fifty percent of the wisdom of these sectors. Likewise, the wisdom of the
House of Representatives is only worth fifty percent of these institutions.
This is constitutionally abominable. It is inconceivable that our people, in ratifying the Constitution granting awesome powers to Congress, intended to
diminish its component parts. After all, they are institutions composed of people who have submitted themselves to the electorate. In creating shortlists
of possible candidates to the judiciary, we can safely suppose that their input is not less than the input of the professor of law or the member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or the member from the private sector.
The other solution done in the past was to alternate the seat between a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.
To alternate the seat given to Congress between the Senate and the House of Representatives would mean not giving a seat to the Congress at all.
Again, when a Senator is seated, he or she represents the Senate and not Congress as a whole. When a Member of the House of Representative is
seated, he or she can only represent Congress as a whole. Thus, alternating the seat not only diminishes congressional representation; it negates it.
Constitutional Interpretation
The argument that swayed the majority in this cases original decision was that if those who crafted our Constitution intended that there be two
representatives from Congress, it would not have used the preposition "a" in Article VIII, Section 8 (1). However, beyond the number of representatives,
the Constitution intends that in the Judicial and Bar Council, there will be representation from Congress and that it will be "ex officio", i.e., by virtue of
their positions or offices. We note that the provision did not provide for a number of members to the Judicial and Bar Council. This is unlike the
provisions creating many other bodies in the Constitution.
12

In other words, we could privilege or start our interpretation only from the preposition "a" and from there provide a meaning that ensures a difficult and
unworkable result -- one which undermines the concept of a bicameral congress implied in all the other 114 other places in the Constitution that uses
the word "Congress".
Or, we could give the provision a reasonable interpretation that is within the expectations of the people who ratified the Constitution by also seeing and
reading the words "representative of Congress" and "ex officio."
This proposed interpretation does not violate the basic tenet regarding the authoritativeness of the text of the Constitution. It does not detract from the
text. It follows the canonical requirement of verba legis. But in doing so, we encounter an ambiguity.
In Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
13
we said:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio
legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing

Page | 41
of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional
provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not
the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis provided)
And in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
13
we said:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.
The authoritativeness of text is no excuse to provide an unworkable result or one which undermines the intended structure of government provided in
the Constitution. Text is authoritative, but it is not exhaustive of the entire universe of meaning.
There is no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves as to the meaning of "representative of Congress" and "ex officio." There is no
compelling reason why there should only be one representative of a bicameral Congress.
Proposed Reasons for Only One Representative of Congress
The first reason to support the need for only one representative of Congress is the belief that there needs to be an odd number in the Judicial and Bar
Council.
This is true only if the decision of the constitutional organ in question is a dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or a no. It is in this sense that a tie-breaker will
be necessary.
However, the Judicial and Bar Council is not that sort of a constitutional organ. Its duty is to provide the President with a shortlist of candidates to every
judicial position. We take judicial notice that for vacancies, each member of the Judicial and Bar Council is asked to list at least three (3) names. All
these votes are tallied and those who garner a specific plurality are thus put on the list and transmitted to the President. There had been no occasion
when the Judicial and Bar Council ever needed to break a tie. The Judicial and Bar Councils functions proceed regardless of whether they have seven
or eight members.
The second reason that the main opinion accepted as persuasive was the opinion that Congress does not discharge its function to check and balance
the power of both the Judiciary and the Executive in the Judicial and Bar Council. From this premise, it then proceeds to argue that the Representative
of Congress, who is ex officio, does not need to consult with Congress as a whole.
This is very perplexing and difficult to accept.
By virtue of the fundamental premise of separation of powers, the appointing power in the judiciary should be done by the Supreme Court. However,
for judicial positions, this is vested in the Executive. Furthermore, because of the importance of these appointments, the Presidents discretion is limited
to a shortlist submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court but composed of several
components.
The Judicial and Bar Council represents the constituents affected by judicial appointments and by extension, judicial decisions. It provides for those
who have some function vis a vis the law that should be applied and interpreted by our courts. Hence, represented are practicing lawyers (Integrated
Bar of the Philippines), prosecutors (Secretary of the Department of Justice), legal academia (professor of law), and judges or justices (retired justice
and the Chief Justice). Also represented in some way are those that will be affected by the interpretation directly (private sector representative).
Congress is represented for many reasons.
One, it crafts statutes and to that extent may want to ensure that those who are appointed to the judiciary are familiar with these statutes and will have
the competence, integrity, and independence to read its meaning.

Page | 42
Two, the power of judicial review vests our courts with the ability to nullify their acts. Congress, therefore, has an interest in the judicial philosophy of
those considered for appointment into our judiciary.
Three, Congress is a political organ. As such, it is familiar with the biases of our political leaders including that of the President. Thus, it will have
greater sensitivity to the necessity for political accommodations if there be any. Keeping in mind the independence required of our judges and justices,
the Members of Congress may be able to appreciate the kind of balance that will be necessary -- the same balance that the President might be able to
likewise appreciate -- when putting a person in the shortlist of judicial candidates. Not only do they appreciate this balance, they embody it. Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives (unlike any of the other members of the Judicial and Bar Council), periodically submit themselves to the
electorate.
It is for these reasons that the Congressional representatives in the Judicial and Bar Council may be instructed by their respective chambers to
consider some principles and directions. Through resolutions or actions by the Congressional Committees they represent, the JBC Congressional
representatives choices may be constrained. Therefore, they do not sit there just to represent themselves. Again, they are "representatives of
Congress" "ex officio".
The third reason to support only one representative of Congress is the belief that there is the "unmistakable tenor" in the provision in question that one
co-equal branch should be represented only by one Representative.
14
It may be true that the Secretary of Justice is the political alter ego of the
President or the Executive. However, Congress as a whole does not have a political alter ego. In other words, while the Executive may be represented
by a single individual, Congress cannot be represented by an individual. Congress, as stated earlier, operates through the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Unlike the Executive, the Legislative branch cannot be represented by only one individual.
A Note on the Work of the Constitutional Commission
Time and again, we have clarified the interpretative value to Us of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thus in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, we emphasized:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reason for their votes, but they give Us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers
understanding thereof.
15
(Emphasis provided)
Also worth Our recall is the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:
16

The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution,
that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down
in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils.
There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs.
17
(Emphasis provided)
In addition to the interpretative value of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission, we should always be careful when we quote from their
records without understanding their context.
The Committees of the Constitutional Commission were all tasked to finish their reports not later than July 7, 1986.
18
The Second and Third Readings
were scheduled to finish not later than August 15, 1986.
19
The members of the Sponsorship and Style Committee were tasked to finish their work of
formulating and polishing the style of the final draft of the new Constitution scheduled for submission to the entire membership of the Commission not
later than August 25, 1986.
20

The Rules of the Constitutional Commission also provided for a process of approving resolutions and amendments.
Constitutional proposals were embodied in resolutions signed by the author.
21
If they emanated from a committee, the resolution was signed by its
chairman.
22
Resolutions were filed with the Secretary-General.
23
The First Reading took place when the titles of the resolutions were read and referred
to the appropriate committee.
24

The Committees then submitted a Report on each resolution.
25
The Steering Committee took charge of including the committee report in the Calendar
for Second Reading.
26
The Second Reading took place on the day set for the consideration of a resolution.
27
The provisions were read in full with the
amendments proposed by the committee, if there were any.
28

A motion to close debate took place after three speeches for and two against, or if only one speech has been raised and none against it.
29
The
President of the Constitutional Commission had the prerogative to allow debates among those who had indicated that they intended to be heard on
certain matters.
30
After the close of the debate, the Constitutional Commission proceeded to consider the Committee amendments.
31

After a resolution was approved on Second Reading, it was included in the Calendar for Third Reading.
32
Neither further debate nor amendment shall
be made on the resolution on its Third Reading.
33
All constitutional proposals approved by the Commission after Third Reading were referred to the
Committees on Sponsorship and Style for collation, organization, and consolidation into a complete and final draft of the Constitution.
34
The final draft
was submitted to the Commission for the sole purpose of determining whether it reflects faithfully and accurately the proposals as approved on Second
Reading.
35


Page | 43
With respect to the provision which is now Article VIII, Section 8 (1), the timetable was as follows:
On July 10, 1986, the Committee on the Judiciary presented its Report to the Commission.
36
Deliberations then took place on the same day; on July
11, 1986; and on July 14, 1986. It was on July 10 that Commissioner Rodrigo raised points regarding the Judicial and Bar Council.
37
The discussion
spoke of the Judicial and Bar Council having seven members.
Numerous mentions of the Judicial and Bar Council being comprised of seven members were also made by Commissioners on July 14, 1986. On the
same day, the amended article was approved by unanimous voting.
38

On July 19, 1986, the vote on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary took place.
39
The vote was 43 and none against.
40

Committee Report No. 22 proposing an article on a National Assembly was reported out by July 21, 1986.
41
It provided for a unicameral assembly.
Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., made the presentation and stated that they had a very difficult decision to make regarding bicameralism and
unicameralism.
42
The debate occupied the Commission for the whole day.
Then, a vote on the structure of Congress took place.
43
Forty four (44) commissioners cast their votes during the roll call.
44
The vote was 23 to 22.
45

On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened for purposes of introducing amendments to the proposed Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and
14.
46

On October 9, 1986, the entire Article on the Legislature was approved on Third Reading.
47

By October 10, 1986, changes in style on the Article on the Legislature were introduced.
48

On October 15, 1986, Commissioner Guingona presented the 1986 Constitution to the President of the Constitutional Commission, Cecilia Munoz-
Palma.
49

It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission either through the Style and Sponsorship Committee or the Committees on the Legislature and the
Judiciary was not able to amend the provision concerning the Judicial and Bar Council after the Commission had decided to propose a bicameral
Congress. We can take judicial notice of the chronology of events during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The chronology should be
taken as much as the substance of discussions exchanged between the Commissioners.
The quotations from the Commissioners mentioned in the main opinion and in the proposed resolution of the present Motion for Reconsideration
should thus be appreciated in its proper context.
The interpellation involving Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion took place on July 10, 1986 and on July 14, 1986.
50
These discussions were
about Committee Report No. 18 on the Judiciary. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about appointments of members of the Supreme Court and of judges of lower courts. At present it is
the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. In this proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members, called the Judicial and Bar
Council. And while the President will still appoint the members of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council.
x x x x
MR. RODRIGO: Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints four of them who are the regular members.
x x x x
MR. CONCEPCION: The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics.
51

x x x x
It must also be noted that during the same day and in the same discussion, both Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion later on referred to a
National Assembly and not a Congress, as can be seen here:
MR. RODRIGO: Another point. Under our present Constitution, the National Assembly may enact rules of court, is that right? On page 4, the proviso on
lines 17 to 19 of the Article on the Judiciary provides:
The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.

Page | 44
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: So, two things are required of the National Assembly before it can repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, etc. it must have the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.
52

On July 14, 1986, the Commission proceeded with the Period of Amendments. This was when the exchange noted in the main opinion took place.
Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as the provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 5.
x x x x
If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, this will be a diminution of the appointing power of the
highest magistrate of the land, of the President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be limited by a group of
seven people who are not elected by the people but only appointed.
Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional provisions on appointments. The members of the
Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even a municipal judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon
recommendation or nomination of three names by this committee of seven people, commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and
Commission on Civil Service x x x even ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the
Judiciary from the rest of our government in the appointment of the high-ranking officials?
Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our President without being effective at all because this Council
will be under the influence of the President. Four out of seven are appointees of the President, and they can be reappointed when their term ends.
Therefore, they would kowtow to the President. A fifth member is the Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member represents the
legislature. In all probability, the controlling party in the legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative from the National
Assembly is also under the influence of the President. And may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is an
appointee of the President. So, it is futile; he will be influenced anyway by the President.
53

It must again be noted that during this day and period of amendments after the quoted passage in the Decision, the Commission later on made use of
the term National Assembly and not Congress again:
MR. MAAMBONG: Presiding Officer and members of the Committee, I propose to delete the last sentence on Section 16, lines 28 to 30 which reads:
"The Chief Justice shall address the National Assembly at the opening of each regular session."
May I explain that I have gone over the operations of other deliberative assemblies in some parts of the world, and I noticed that it is only the Chief
Executive or head of state who addresses the National Assembly at its opening. When we say "opening," we are referring to the first convening of any
national assembly. Hence, when the Chief Executive or head of state addresses the National Assembly on that occasion, no other speaker is allowed
to address the body.
So I move for the deletion of this last sentence.
54

Based on the chronology of events, the discussions cited by the main ponencia took place when the commissioners were still contemplating a
unicameral legislature in the course of this discussion. Necessarily, only one Representative would be needed to fully effect the participation of a
unicameral legislature. Therefore, any mention of the composition of the JBC having seven members in the records of the Constitutional Commission,
particularly during the dates cited, was obviously within the context that the Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a bicameral legislature.
The composition of the Congress as a bilateral legislature became final only after the JBC discussions as a seven-member Council indicated in the
Records of the Constitutional Commission took place. This puts into the proper context the recognition by Commissioner Christian Monsod on July 30,
1986, which runs as follows:
Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of what the thinking of this group is, that all the provisions that were being
drafted up to that time assumed a unicameral government.
55

The repeated mentions of the JBC having seven members as indicated in the Records of the Constitutional Commission do not justify the points raised
by petitioner. This is a situation where the records of the Constitutional Commission do not serve even as persuasive means to ascertain intent at least
in so far as the intended numbers for the Judicial and Bar Council. Certainly they are not relevant even to advise us on how Congress is to be
represented in that constitutional organ.
We should never forget that when we interpret the Constitution, we do so with full appreciation of every part of the text within an entire document
understood by the people as they ratified it and with all its contemporary consequences. As an eminent author in constitutional theory has observed
while going through the various interpretative modes presented in jurisprudence: "x x x all of the methodologies that will be discussed, properly
understood, figure in constitutional analysis as opportunities: as starting points, constituent parts of complex arguments, or concluding evocations."
56


Page | 45
Discerning that there should be a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives that sit in the Judicial and Bar Council so that Congress can
be fully represented ex officio is not judicial activism. It is in keeping with the constitutional project of a bicameral Congress that is effective whenever
and wherever it is represented. It is in tune with how our people understand Congress as described in the fundamental law. It is consistent with our
duty to read the authoritative text of the Constitution so that ordinary people who seek to understand this most basic law through Our decisions would
understand that beyond a single isolated text -- even beyond a prepos1t10n in Article VIII, Section 8 (1 ), our primordial values and principles are
framed, congealed and will be given full effect.
In a sense, we do not just read words in a legal document; we give meaning to a Constitution.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration and deny the Petition for lack of merit.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Article IX
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management, 482 SCRA 233

G.R. No. 158791 February 10, 2006
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Before this Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Department of Budget and Management (DBM) praying that this Court reconsider its
Decision dated July 22, 2005 (the Decision) granting the subject petition.
The DBM assails this Courts interpretation of Article IX (A) Section 5 of the Constitution, Sections 62, 63, and 64 of the FY 2002 General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 9162), and the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal
Autonomy) dated June 3, 1993.
The DBM posits that this Courts ruling that fiscal autonomy means preference in terms of cash allocation is not supported by the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, particularly the discussions on the draft article on the Judiciary where the concept of fiscal autonomy was, by its
claim, introduced.
The DBM cites the comments of then Commissioner Blas Ople expressing concern over "the propensity throughout this Article in its various provisions
to accord the Supreme Court, the lower courts and the judicial system as a whole, a whole plethora of privileges and immunities that are denied the
rest of the government of the Republic of the Philippines."
1

A close reading of Commissioner Oples comments shows, however, that he was not questioning nor seeking to qualify the concepts of "fiscal
autonomy" and "automatic release" as provided for in what is now Article VIII Section 3 of the Constitution.
2
What was then under consideration was
the original draft article on the Judiciary which, with regard to appropriations, provided as follows:
Section 15. An amount equivalent to not less than two percent of the national budget shall be automatically appropriated and regularly released for the
judiciary. (Underscoring supplied)
What the original draft thus provided for was automatic appropriation, which is not the same as automatic release of appropriations. The power to
appropriate belongs to Congress, while the responsibility of releasing appropriations belongs to the DBM. Commissioner Ople objected to automatic
appropriation, it bears emphasis, not to automatic release of appropriations.
It was Commissioner Christian Monsod who proposed the substitute provision that is now Article VIII Section 3 providing for "fiscal autonomy" and for
automatic and regular release of appropriations.
In support of its position, the DBM also cites Commissioner Monsods explanation that "[t]he whole purpose of that provision is to protect the
independence of the judiciary while at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a position of privilege by an automatic percentage." Again,
what Commissioner Monsod objected to was automatic appropriation for the judiciary, not automatic release of appropriations once approved. The
following statement of Commissioner Monsod, read in its context, does not in any way support the position taken by the DBM.

Page | 46
The Commissioner will recall that when the provision giving fiscal autonomy to the judiciary was presented to the body, we were the ones who denied
to it the percentage of the budget because, precisely, we wanted the judiciary to go through the process of budget-making to justify its budget and to go
through the legislature for that justification.But we also said that after having gone through this process, it should have fiscal autonomy so that there
will bean automatic and regular release of such funds. The whole purpose of that provision is to protect the independence of the judiciary while
at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a position of privilege by an automatic percentage.
3
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DBM further claims that the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release funds does not preclude the implementation of a cash
payment schedule for all agencies, including those belonging to the constitutional fiscal autonomous group (CFAG). It explains the meaning of "cash
payment schedule" in the context of the budgetary process, from the enactment of the general appropriations law to the release of appropriations, thus.
After the General Appropriations Act (GAA) is signed into law, this Department, in coordination with the agency concerned, prepares the financial plan
for the year in accordance with its appropriations under the GAA. The result of this exercise is embodied in the Agency Budget Matrix or ABM which
reflects the individual obligation authority ceilings of the agency, called the allotment. An allotment allows the agency to enter into a contract or
otherwise obligate funds although cash has not yet been received by said agency. Simply put, allotments serve as a guarantee that the national
government will look for cash to support the agencys obligations. Therefore, the closer the allotment is to the amount of its appropriation, the better.
The approved allotment of an ordinary agency does not cover its full appropriations, while those for entities vested with fiscal autonomy always cover
the full amount of its appropriations. For instance, allotments for Personal Service of an ordinary agency only cover those for filled positions. In
contrast, the Personal Service allotments of agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy are comprehensively released, including those for positions that are
admittedly vacant. At the end of the year, whatever is unspent for Personal Services, particularly for unfilled positions, translates to savings, which may
be used to augment other items of appropriations.
As emphasized, the ABM of an ordinary agency is disaggregated into those Needing Clearance and Not Needing Clearance. Pursuant to Budget
Execution Guidelines no. 2000-12 dated August 29, 2000 x x x, the full allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG is placed under the Not Needing
Clearance column.
Finally, items under the Not Needing Column of an ordinary agency is further disaggregated to "this release" which represents the initial allotment
authorized under the ABM, and "for later release" which represents the amount to be released after the conduct of the agency performance review. In
contrast, the total appropriation and allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG are all placed under "this release" since no agency performance review
is conducted by the DBM on these entities.
x x x x
Thus, in order to ensure that the budgets of agencies vested with fiscal autonomy are released in full, the DBM in a ministerial capacity, ensures that
the allotments of agencies belonging to the CFAG (i) cover the full amount of their annual appropriations, and (ii) are not subject to any condition. In
other words, budgets of fiscal autonomous agencies occupy the highest category in terms of allotment.
x x x x
After the ABMs are issued, the Notices of Cash Allocations (NCAs) are issued every month to support approved allotments with cash.
Ideally, the NCA should cover in full the monthly allotment of the agency. The reality, however, is that every national budget is based on
revenue projections, and that there is an ever present risk that these revenue targets are not met in full during the course of the budget
year. Last FYs 2001 and 2002, for instance, revenue shortfall was at 7.16% and 9.16%, respectively, as shown below under Table 2.
x x x x
Further, not all revenue collections are received at the start of the budget year. The cash flow of the national government, like most other public
institutions, has its highs and lows depending on the tax calendar. Thus, not all of the projected revenues are available for spending at the start of the
budget year.
It thus becomes imperative for the Executive Department, through the DBM, to manage the release of funds through implementation of cash
payment schedules. For instance, if collections for a given month meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA for that month shall cover 100% of
the allotment. If, however, collections do not meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA to be released may not cover 100% of the allotment. Add
a few more variables, such as amount of deficit and total disbursement of agencies, then one gets a cash payment schedule that varies on a monthly
basis.
4
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DBM goes on to emphasize that it has no discretion on how much cash enters petitioners coffers, as cash payment schedules are "dictated by the
amount of revenue collection, borrowings, deficit ceilings and total disbursement program of the national government"
5
; and if the cash payment
schedule prescribes that the total cash to be released for a given month is 85% of allotment, then a Notice of Cash Allocation amounting to 85%
ofeach agencys allotment is released for all agencies. It thus contends that this equality in treatment does not violate the fiscal autonomy of the
agencies belonging to the CFAG, for "since approved allotments of agencies belonging to the CFAG are higher than ordinary agencies,
they automatically get higher cash allocations."
6

The DBMs protestation that it has no discretion on the amount of funds released to agencies with fiscal autonomy fails. The Court finds that the DBM,
in fact, exercised discretion denied it by the constitutional mandate toautomatically release such funds. Understandably, a shortfall in revenue in a
given year would constrain the DBM not to release the total amount appropriated by the GAA for the government as a whole during that year. However,
the DBM is certainly not compelled by such circumstance to proportionately reduce the funds appropriated for each and every agency. Given a
revenue shortfall, it is still very possible for the DBM to release the full amount appropriated for the agencies with fiscal autonomy, especially since, as

Page | 47
noted in the Decision, the total appropriation for such agencies in recent years does not even reach 3% of the national budget.
7
That the full amount
is, in fact, not fully released during a given fiscal year is plainly due to a policy decision of the DBM. Such a decision, whether it goes by the
label of "cash payment schedule" or any other term, cannot be reconciled with the constitutional mandate that the release to these agencies should be
automatic.
Respecting this Courts observation that Sections 62, 63 and 64 of the General Provisions of the FY2002 GAA reflect the legislative intent to except
entities with fiscal autonomy from the possibility of retention or reduction of funds in the event of an unmanageable budget deficit, the DBM comments
as follows:
Unfortunately, the sponsorship speech of Cong. Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations in justifying the
introduction of Sections 63 and 64 (sic) in the FY 2002 GAA, belies such contention.x x x In his speech, he states that the incorporation of Section 62 is
due to concerns raised by Congressmen on the general impoundment powers of the President, without distinguishing as to the two types of public
institutions. More revealing is his explanation in introducing Section 63, which defines unmanageable national government deficit. He states that in
order to discourage the Executive Department from reducing the Internal Revenue Allotment of local government units, there is need to define the legal
parameters of "unmanageable deficit". Reference to local government units, which likewise enjoy fiscal autonomy according to the pronouncements of
this Honorable Court[Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 at 218 (2000)], reveal the true intent of Congress to cover both agencies vested with fiscal
autonomy and those without. x x x"
8
(Underscoring supplied)
The Court, however, has examined the speech of Congressman Andaya and finds nothing therein that detracts from its ruling. It bears emphasis that
this Court explicitly observed that Sections 62 and 63 refer to government agenciesin general, while Section 64 applies specifically to agencies with
fiscal autonomy. It is in these three provisions read together, and not in reading each one in isolation, that the distinction intended by the legislature
becomes evident.
When Congressman Andaya introduced Sections 62 and 63, he was thus speaking of government agencies in general. If he did not then expressly
distinguish between agencies with fiscal autonomy and those without, it was because there was no pressing need for him to do so. Particularly with
regard to Section 62, his speech would reveal that his attention was on a matter that did not call for such distinction, namely, the "deep concern,
frustration and despair" expressed by numerous members of Congress "over the impoundment of appropriations by the Department of Budget and
Management and the Office of the President" which, he explained, provided the reason behind Section 62 of the GAA.
As for the mention of local governments in Congressman Andayas introduction of Section 63, the same does not imply that said provision was meant
to include the agencies belonging to the CFAG. In fact, his speech even suggests that Section 63, rather than itself being an authorization to the DBM
to withhold or reduce appropriations, was merely intended to set a guiding principle for the DBM in those cases where it already has authority to
withhold or reduce such appropriations.
In the case of LGUs, the Congressman explicitly referred to "the provisions of the Local Government Code, R.A. 7160 which authorizes the reduction of
the IRA in the event that there is an unmanageable deficit of the National Government."
9
He then stated that Section 63 was prompted by the need to
set parameters in determining the existence of an "unmanageable deficit."
On the other hand, there is no similar authorization for such reduction in the case of agencies belonging to the CFAG not even during an
"unmanageable deficit" either in the Constitution or in statute. Thus, notwithstanding the inclusion of LGUs, there is no basis for supposing that the
agencies belonging to the CFAG are also covered by Section 63 of the GAA.
The DBM furthermore argues that this Courts Resolution of June 3, 1993 in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC
10
(the Resolution) reading:
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly releasedsubject to availability of
funds. (Underscoring supplied)
means that fund releases may still be subject to a cash release program.
In support of this argument, the DBM cites a letter dated May 18, 1993 of then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio (now a member of
this Court) to the Secretary of Budget and Management, regarding A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC then pending with this Court.
The letter quotes then Chief Justice Narvasas summary of this Courts position on the controversy, which summary states, inter alia:
"4) the Court will look to releases by the DBM of funds against the approved budget of the Judiciary, in the full amount sought and promptly upon
notice; it is willing to consider and pass upon suggestions by the DBM forscheduling of releases; x x x"(Underscoring supplied)
In the same letter, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, after considering the Courts position, opined that one of the principles by which the
constitutional mandate on judicial fiscal autonomy can be achieved is that "[a]fter approval by Congress, the appropriations for the judiciary shall be
automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds" which opinion, the DBM alleges, is the position adopted by this Court.
Instead of supporting the DBMs position, however, this letter only shows the consistency of this Court in interpreting "automatic release" as requiring
the full release of appropriations. The Courts willingness to pass upon suggestions for scheduling of releases in no way implies that it was assenting
to an incomplete or delayed release of funds. Rather, it was a recognition by this Court that scheduling of releases, as such, does not violate the
Constitution and is, in fact, presupposed in the phrase "automatically and regularly released."

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The phrase "subject to availability of funds" must thus be understood in harmony with the constitutional mandate to automatically release funds as the
same has been consistently interpreted by this Court. It is not an authority for the DBM to implement a policy which, although labeled "cash payment
schedule," actually goes beyond mere scheduling of releases and
effects a withholding and reduction of the approved appropriations, as it did in the present case against petitioner Civil Service Commission.
Finally, while acknowledging the unconstitutionality of imposing a "no report, no release" policy on agencies clothed with fiscal autonomy, the DBM
prays for a clarification that such agencies are still responsible for the timely submission to it of financial reports. The Court considers it sufficient to
echo the following statements in the Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.:
This is not to say that agencies vested with fiscal autonomy have no reporting responsibility at all to the DBM. This is precisely the reason why
guideline No. 5 under the Resolution of 3 June [1993 states that the Supreme Court, or constitutional commissions clothed with fiscal autonomy for that
matter, may submit reports relative to its appropriation "for records purposes only." The word "may" is permissive [Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20,
22 (1963)], as it is an auxiliary verb manifesting "opportunity or possibility" and, under ordinary circumstances, "implies the possible existence of
something." [Supangan, Jr. v. Santos, G.R. No. 84663, 24 August 1990 x x x Interdependence will work only if it is undertaken within the parameters of
the Constitution."
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Department of Budget and Management is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shope vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JAIME N. FERRER, LINO PATAJO and CESAR MIRAFLOR as Commissioners of the Commission on Elections; COMELEC BIDDING COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EMILIO AGUILA
and MEMBERS PACIENCIO BALLON, ALEJANDRO MACARANAS, TOMAS MALLONGA and ERNESTO LOMBOS; HON. JUDGE JOSE LEUTERIO of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch 11 and ACME STEEL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, respondents.

CUEVAS, J .:
Appeal by certiorari from the Order dated November 15, 1969 issued by the respondent Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II, DISMISSING Civil Case No. 77972 entitled,
"Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. COMELEC, et al.", and his Honor's subsequent Order of December 20, 1969 DENYING petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127 on
September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths with the following specifications and descriptions, to wit:
11,000 Units VOTING BOOTHS, easy to install and store. Must be of light but strong and durable materials, rust proof or rust resistant and construction must
be sturdy. Each Unit shall consists of two (2) voting booths with overall measurements of 150 cms. long x 75 cms. wide x 185 cms. high. (Each voting booth or
compartment measuring 75 cms. long x 75 cms. wide x 185 cms. high). The top and all sides except the front side, shall be fully covered. The front side of the
unit shall be without cover to serve as its opening (entrance). Each voting compartment shall be provided with a writing table.
Each unit shall be contained in individual wooden box.
Bidders are required to submit finished sample.
1

Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said INVITATION were the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and the
private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company, (Acme for short).

Filipinas' sealed proposal was as follows:
Prices Per Unit Brief Description
P128.00 Sample 2 same in construction as sample 1, except that its siding and top
cover is made of plywood (or lawanit if available). 33.5 kilos in weight. Packed
in wooden box.
2

P123.00 Same as sample 2, except that it is packed in corrogated carton box.
Acme's bid was

Page | 49
Prices Per Unit Brief Description
P78.00 Made of steel, channel type frames with steel sheet sidings, top cover and
table; painted, 51 kilos in weight.
3



On October 7, 1969, the respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum on the proceedings taken
pursuant to the said Invitation to Bid which stated that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets,
painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy 51 kilos in weight.
4
The Committee instead recommended that
Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the
Commission of all the samples before the final award be made."
5

On October 9, 1969, after an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the COMELEC Commissioners, and after the
Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to Acme,
subject to the condition, among others, that "(Acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant. ... ."
6

On October 11, 1969, the COMELEC issued Purchase Order No. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the 11,000 Units of voting booths in favor of
Acme. Acme accepted the terms of the purchase.
On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 77972, against herein
public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent Acme.
Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge in an order dated October 20,
1969 denied the writ prayed for.
7

Thereafter or more specifically on October 29, 1969, the public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of suit, and that the complaint states no cause of action.
8

Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the respondent Judge issued the questioned Order dismissing Civil Case No. 77972. Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant appeal.
In the meantime, since no restraining order had been issued against the holding of the national elections scheduled on November 11, 1969, Acme
complied with its contract with the COMELEC.
On this score alone, this petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic. Considering however the nature and importance of the legal
questions raised, We have opted to discuss and resolve the same with finality.
Two main issues are raised before Us, namely:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with
an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the
winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.
By constitutional mandate-
The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number of location
of Polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. ... The decisions, orders and rulings
of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution, which
was then in force)
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180, approved June 21, 1947, the election law then enforced) provided that, "(a) any
controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the
corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed," and that, "any violation of any final and executory decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission shall" constitute contempt of court Likewise, the same section provided that, "any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the
Supreme Court.

Page | 50
Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), as amended, provides that, "final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of
the Commission on Elections ..." fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court prescribed the manner of appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court from a final ruling or decision of the Commission on Elections,
among other administrative bodies.
Hence it has been consistently held
9
that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari
final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.
We are however, far from convince that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various
proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this
court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those
pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.
Thus in the case of Masangcay vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-13827, September 28, 1962 (6 SCRA 27, 2829), We held that
... (W)e had the occasion to stress in the case of Guevarra vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958) that
under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection
with the elections. In this sense, We said the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the
meaning of the Constitution (Sec. 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may, however, exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the
demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of
the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission
exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature. ... .
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy
before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of
the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding
the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions
over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this
Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
On the second issue, We rule that Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to enjoin the COMELEC from pursuing its
contract with Acme, the winning bidder.
While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the COMELEC's award of contracts, the same being purely
administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its complaint.
Indeed, while the law requires the exercise of sound discretion on the part of procurement authorities,
10
and that the reservation to reject any or all bids
may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award,
11
petitioner has miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of malice or fraud on the
part of the public respondents in the challenged award.
The COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, dated September 16, 1969, expressly stipulates
8. AWARD OF CONTRACT
Subject to the rights herein reserved, award shall be made by the Commission by resolution to the lowest and responsible
bidder whose Offer will best serve the interest of the Commission on Elections. The resolution of the Commission shag be
communicated in writing to the winning bidder. The winning bidder or awardees shall enter into contract with the Commission on
Elections for the supply of the voting booths under the terms and conditions embodied in the Invitation to Bid.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REJECT ANY OR ALL BIDS; TO WAIVE ANY
INFORMATION THEREIN; OR TO ACCEPT SUCH BID AS MAY IN ITS DISCRETION BE CONSIDERED MOST
REASONABLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS. The right is also reserved to reject bids which are defective due to inadequate
preparation, omission or lacks sufficient data, guarantee and other information required to be submitted, or bids without the
accompanying bond. The right is further reserved to reject the bid of a bidder who had previously failed to perform properly or to
deliver on nine materials covered by contract of similar nature.
xxx xxx xxx
14. THIS CALL FORBIDS IS NO MORE THAN AN INVITATION TO MAKE PROPOSALS AND THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS IS NOT BOUND TO ACCEPT ANY BID, NOR SHALL THIS CALL FOR BIDS BY ITSELF CONFER A RIGHT TO

Page | 51
ANY BIDDER TO ACTION FOR DAMAGES OR UNREALIZED OR EXPECTED PROFITS UNLESS THE BID IS DULY
ACCEPTED BY THERE SOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
12
(Emphasis supplied)
The "Bidders Tender Call No. 127", the form accomplished by the bidder pursuant to Invitation to Bid No. 127, also categorically provide that the bidder
submits his proposals "subject to the conditions stated in the invitation."
13

It is crystal clear from the aforequoted conditions, that subject to the rights of the COMELEC duly reserved in the said Invitation, award shall be made
to the lowest and responsible bidder whose offer will best serve the interest of the COMELEC; that the COMELEC had reserved the right, among
others, to accept such bid, as may in its discretion, be considered most reasonable and advantageous; and that the invitation was merely a call for
proposals. Consequently, the COMELEC was not under legal obligation to accept any bid since "Advertisements for bidders are simply invitation to
make proposals and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears."
14

Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, a bidder may have the right to demand damages, or unrealized or expected profits, only when his
bid was accepted by resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' bid, although recommended for award of contract by the bidding committee, was not the
winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared to have been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no cause of action.
In Leoquinco vs. Postal Savings Bank, 47 Phil. 772, 774775, this Court held:
... (A)ppellant set forth and admitted in his pleadings in the regulation adopted by the Board of Directors authorizing the sale at
public auction of the land, as well as the notice announcing the auction that appellant had expressly reserved to themselves the
right to reject any and all bids. By taking part in the auction and offering his bid, the appellant voluntarily submitted to the terms
and conditions of the auction sale announced in the notice, and clearly acknowledged the right reserved to the appellees. The
appellees, making use of that right, rejected his offer. Clearly the appellant has no ground of action to compel them to execute a
deed of sale of the land in his favor, nor to compel them to accept his bid or offer. ... .
In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting booths in Acme's favor, the Commissioners of the COMELEC had taken into account that
Acme's bid was the lowest; that Acme was a responsible manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of the samples submitted by the bidders,
Acme's sample was favorable chosen subject to certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents properly exercised its sound
discretion in making the award.
Once more, We reiterate the dictum earlier laid down in the case of Jalandoni vs. National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, et al., G.R.
No. L-15198, May 30,1960 (108 Phil, 486, 491-492) that
Neither can it be contended that the fact that appellant gave the lowest quotation, which was favorably indorsed by the
Committee on Bids, created a vested right in favor of the said bidder. Admittedly, the offers were rejected by the Board of
Directors. It is clear therefore that there having no meeting of the minds of the parties, there was no perfected contract between
them which could be the basis of action against the defendants-appellees.
The presentation by a reliable and responsible bidder of the lowest bid to officials whose duty it is to let the contract to the
lowest reliable and responsible bidder, but who have the right and have given notice that they reserve the right to reject any and
an bids, does not constitute an agreement that they will make a contract with such a bidder, nor vest in him such an absolute
right to the contract as against a higher bidder (Colorado Paving Co. vs, Murphy, (CCA 8th) 78 F. 28, 37 LRA 630).
The mere determination of a public official or board to accept the proposal of a bidder does not constitute a contract
(Smithmeyer vs. United States, 147 U.S. 342, 37 L, ed. 196,13 S. Ct. 321); the decision must be communicated to the bidder
(Cedar Rapids Lumber Co. vs. Fischer, 129 Iowa 332,105 N.W. 595,4 LRA (NS) 177).
No contractual relation can arise merely from a bid, unless by the terms of the statute and the advertisement, a bid in pursuance
thereof is, as a matter of law, an acceptance of an offer, wholly apart from any action on the part of the municipality or any of its
officers (Molloy vs. Rochelle, supra).
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition to be without merit aside from being moot and academic, the same is hereby DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Saligumba vs. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 669




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