- In 1953, the plaintiffs sold land to the defendants through a Deed of Absolute Sale, transferring ownership. However, the plaintiffs later alleged the sale was fraudulent and filed a case.
- In 1955, the parties entered into an Agreement where the defendants paid partial payment and agreed to pay the remaining balance, with the Agreement superseding all previous contracts.
- The plaintiffs filed the current case in 1960 seeking to recover the land. The defendants argued the case was barred by the 5-year redemption period under the Public Land Law.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants acquired ownership of the land when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in 1953, making the redemption period start then. D
- In 1953, the plaintiffs sold land to the defendants through a Deed of Absolute Sale, transferring ownership. However, the plaintiffs later alleged the sale was fraudulent and filed a case.
- In 1955, the parties entered into an Agreement where the defendants paid partial payment and agreed to pay the remaining balance, with the Agreement superseding all previous contracts.
- The plaintiffs filed the current case in 1960 seeking to recover the land. The defendants argued the case was barred by the 5-year redemption period under the Public Land Law.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants acquired ownership of the land when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in 1953, making the redemption period start then. D
- In 1953, the plaintiffs sold land to the defendants through a Deed of Absolute Sale, transferring ownership. However, the plaintiffs later alleged the sale was fraudulent and filed a case.
- In 1955, the parties entered into an Agreement where the defendants paid partial payment and agreed to pay the remaining balance, with the Agreement superseding all previous contracts.
- The plaintiffs filed the current case in 1960 seeking to recover the land. The defendants argued the case was barred by the 5-year redemption period under the Public Land Law.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants acquired ownership of the land when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in 1953, making the redemption period start then. D
- In 1953, the plaintiffs sold land to the defendants through a Deed of Absolute Sale, transferring ownership. However, the plaintiffs later alleged the sale was fraudulent and filed a case.
- In 1955, the parties entered into an Agreement where the defendants paid partial payment and agreed to pay the remaining balance, with the Agreement superseding all previous contracts.
- The plaintiffs filed the current case in 1960 seeking to recover the land. The defendants argued the case was barred by the 5-year redemption period under the Public Land Law.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants acquired ownership of the land when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in 1953, making the redemption period start then. D
PERPETUA ABUAN, ET AL. v. EUSTAQUIO S. GARCIA, ET AL.
On August 7, 1953, petitioners Perpetua Abuan et al. sold a parcel of rice land to defendants Eustaquio Garcia et al. through a Deed of Absolute Sale. A TCT was issued to defendants. Later, petitioners filed an action to recover the land, alleging the sale was tainted with fraud and was without consideration. Reaching an amicable settlement, the parties entered into an "Agreement" dated February 28, 1955, under which defendants paid P500 as partial payment of the purchase price of the land, and promised to pay the balance of P1,500 on or before April 30, 1955, with a grace period of 30 days. The Agreement also stated that it "shall supersede all previous agreements or contracts heretofore entered into..." Plaintiffs instituted the present action on March 4, 1960. Defendants moved to dismiss, on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action was already barred, because the five-year redemption period had already expired. Section 119 of the Public Land Law
provides: o Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patient or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to re-purchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance. Plaintiffs argue that the period should be counted from the date of full payment (May 1965) since it was on this date that the contract was consummated. CFI Nueva Vizcaya dismissed the complaint, fixing the starting date as February 28, 1955, when the Agreement was entered into. CA certified the case to SC. SC: "Conveyance" means transfer of ownership; it means the date when the title to the land is transferred from one person to another. The 5-year period should, therefore, be reckoned with from the date that defendants acquired ownership.
When did defendants legally acquire ownership of the land? ! Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (August 7, 1953). Dismissal affirmed.
Under Art. 1498, When the sale is made through a public instrument, as in this case, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. This manner of delivery is common to personal as well as real property. It is clear, therefore, that defendants acquired ownership to the land in question upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute on August 7, 1953. The Agreement of February 28, 1955, only superseded the deed as to the terms and conditions of payment. The Agreement did not operate to revest the ownership of the land in the plaintiffs. Assuming arguendo that the Deed is null and void as petitioners allege, we can consider the date of the Agreement at the latest, as the time within which ownership is vested in the defendants. While it is a private instrument the execution of which could not be construed as constructive delivery under Art. 1498, Art. 1496 explicitly provides that ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him "in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee." The intention to give possession (and ownership) is manifest in the Agreement, especially considering the following circumstances: (1) the payment of part of the purchase price, there being no stipulation in the agreement that ownership will not vest in the vendees until full payment of the price; and (2) the fact that the agreement was entered into in consideration of plaintiffs' desistance, as in fact they did desist, in prosecuting their reivindicatory action, thereby leaving the property in the hands of the then and now defendants as owners thereof, necessarily. This was delivery brevi manu permissible under Articles 1499 and 1501 of the New Civil Code. In the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, the payment of the price is not a condition precedent to the transfer of ownership, which passes by delivery of the thing to the buyer.